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  <channel>
    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: frequently]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/frequently</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Sun, 18 May 2008 18:36:01 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[I spy - employees snooping around?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d94aacf5df0c049737b72c0e23324678</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d94aacf5df0c049737b72c0e23324678</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Apparently many employees ( nearly half ) have the habit of snooping around within the company. This according to a new research study by Cyber-Ark . Many gain access using privileged accounts such as...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Apparently many employees ( nearly half ) have the habit of snooping around within the company. This according to a <a href="http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/147400/nearly_half_of_it_workers_snoop_in_confidential_files.html">new research study by Cyber-Ark</a>. Many gain access using privileged accounts such as administrator or root passwords, which the research found were not changed that often.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;font-family:&quot;;font-size:85%;"  >"Cyber-Ark said privileged passwords get changed far less frequently than user passwords, with 30 percent being changed every quarter and 9 percent never changed at all, meaning that IT staff who have left an organization could still gain access."</span><br /><br />This is a bit unnerving - most organizations should be following compliance mandates such as SOX to isolate administrator access from content. And using technology to enforce this..<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/BitArmor1?a=H0Al6I"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/BitArmor1?i=H0Al6I" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/BitArmor1?a=LLodQi"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/BitArmor1?i=LLodQi" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/BitArmor1?a=rJCYMI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/BitArmor1?i=rJCYMI" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/BitArmor1/~4/318116842" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 23 Jun 2008 09:28:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/passwords">passwords</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/user passwords">user passwords</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/gain access">gain access</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/research">research</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/administrator">administrator</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/administrator access">administrator access</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/research study">research study</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/root passwords">root passwords</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/percent">percent</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/BitArmor1/~3/318116842/i-spy-employees-snooping-around.html">I spy - employees snooping around?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Successful 802.1X Every Time]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/31c561f94756b4a64cf6425397c85c5b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/31c561f94756b4a64cf6425397c85c5b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Its not rocket science, but any time we mingle and intertwine four or five different pieces of technology, theres always the potential for a mess or at least a misconfiguration or two along the way....]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It&#8217;s not rocket science, but any time we mingle and intertwine four or five different pieces of technology, there&#8217;s always the potential for a mess&#8230; or at least a misconfiguration or two along the way. Don&#8217;t know what 802.1X is? Check out the recent <a href="http://www.securityuncorked.com/security-uncorked/2008/4/2/what-is-8021x-heres-a-technology-primer-for-you.html" target="_blank">802.1X technology primer</a>. </p><p><strong>If you&#8217;re planning to, or are&nbsp;implementing wired&nbsp;802.1X, wireless security&nbsp;and/or NAC</strong>, the contents of this blog <em>may</em> save you hours of time and trouble. </p><p>Throughout the implementations I&#8217;ve done, for both wired and wireless 802.1X, I&#8217;ve developed a procedure for implementing and testing 802.1X each step of the way. Following these steps my seem to be tedious and unnecessarily time-consuming. But, if&nbsp; you&#8217;re just starting with 802.1X, I&#8217;m offering a way to implement it in phased pieces that will give you the information to test, confirm and troubleshoot at each step. </p><p>To be honest, I frequently skip these steps, but I&#8217;ve done many 802.1X implementations and can <em>usually</em> hit the bullseye the first time (unless there&#8217;s buggy software or firmware- <em>you guys know who you are</em>). But, if something doesn&#8217;t work, I start right back at Number 1 here and I follow this procedure. </p><p><strong>1) Configure wired 802.1X</strong><br />First setup the basic wired 802.1X. Ideally, start with a Windows test, using XP SP3 or a later server edition and PEAP. Provision RADIUS, I recommend Microsoft IAS because it&#8217;s well-documented and well supported. Even if you have other future plans, if you&#8217;re using Active Directory, start with IAS. You&#8217;ll need to setup a test RADIUS group and policy and link to AD. Get a test switch, add it as a RADIUS client, and configure it to talk to your RADIUS. Set up some ports for 1X and enable it on the switch. I recommend testing with PEAP as the authentication method and a Windows credential pass-thru. <em>Note- you&#8217;ll need to create a server certificate to use PEAP- a self-signed Microsoft cert is fine.</em> </p><p>If this simple configuration doesn&#8217;t work, you have some troubleshooting options. <strong>First</strong>, view the system events log in the RADIUS/AD server and look for informational events from IAS. If the authentication request is making it from the client -&gt; switch -&gt; RADIUS, you&#8217;ll see something here. The something you see should tell you if the EAP method is mismatched, or if the credentials were wrong, etc. <strong>Your second</strong> line of troubleshooting comes if you don&#8217;t see any RADIUS log activity. If that happens, throw on a packet capture utility like <a class="offsite-link-inline" href="http://www.wireshark.org/" target="_blank">Wireshark</a>. You want to search for 2&nbsp;things. First look for conversations from your Test Switch to the RADIUS server (filter on IP or MACs). If you see something here, see where the conversation drops off. If that comes up empty, it means the conversation is terminated between the Test Switch and Test Client. I have some neat tricks for troubleshooting I&#8217;ll share with you later. </p><p style="margin-right: 0px"><strong>2) Add in Wireless<br /></strong>If you&#8217;re planning to implement 802.1X for wireless, now is the time to throw 802.11 in the mix. It&#8217;s harder to sniff wireless traffic for troubleshooting, which is why I recommend starting with wired 1X. Keep it simple, and then start layering. Once you have the wired 1X configured, all you need to do is get your AP ready and configure it just as you did your switch- add it as a RADIUS client and configure it to talk to RADIUS. For wireless, you&#8217;ll need to configure encryption also. Note, I recommend (for testing) to begin with your primary VLAN. </p><p>If your wireless 802.1X isn&#8217;t working, follow our troubleshooting above and re-check settings based on the RADIUS event log contents. If nothing is making it to RADIUS, then most likely something is misconfigured in your AP/Controller and the AP isn&#8217;t communicating with the RADIUS server. You know the rest of it&#8217;s working (RADIUS, AD, Client) so you can narrow your troubleshooting scope. Once that&#8217;s working you can stop if wireless is your goal, or keep going if you&#8217;re layering on more security.</p><p style="margin-right: 0px"><strong>3) Replace with Custom Pieces</strong><br />If you&#8217;re planning to use a different RADIUS server or&nbsp;a different supplicant, now would be a good time to start swapping out our vanilla configuration with custom pieces. Replace 1 piece at a time and re-test. </p><p style="margin-right: 0px"><strong>4) Add in NAC or Endpoint Integrity</strong><br />Most NAC or EI solutions will integrate with your 802.1X infrastructure (if you want them to) and can be &#8216;consulted&#8217; prior to authenticating and opening the secured port. My suggestion is to always get 1X working 100% before you add any type of integrity or compliance testing. </p><p style="margin-right: 0px">If you follow these steps, you can turn a complex configuration into a set of simple baby-steps. It may sound stupid, but I promise it&#8217;ll work for you every time!</p><p style="margin-right: 0px"># # #</p><p>&nbsp;</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Jun 2008 00:18:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/test radius">test radius</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/radius">radius</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/radius log activity">radius log activity</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/test">test</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/radius client">radius client</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/test client">test client</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/time">time</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/radius server">radius server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/test switch">test switch</category>
      <source url="http://www.securityuncorked.com/security-uncorked/2008/6/20/successful-8021x-every-time.html">Successful 802.1X Every Time</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Business Case for WAFs + Testing]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/515c7e455db57564dbd88e0a78d6a88f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/515c7e455db57564dbd88e0a78d6a88f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Here is a real world story about a customer of ours, this was a few years ago and was one of the key points in bringing the F5/Mod security/WhiteHat integrated solution to market
This customer had a...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Here is a real world story about a customer of ours, this was a few years ago and was one of the key points in bringing the F5/Mod_security/WhiteHat integrated solution to market.</p>
<p>This customer had a massive application written in ASP classic. Since it was in ASP classic it had massive numbers of SQLi vulnerabilities. Everything from Blind SQLi to the always fun SQL statements in the URL. The customer said this application was roughly 250,000 lines of code with SQL hardcoded throughout. The reason the customer had called WhiteHat is because they where working on a big deal with a potential client and this client was asking for a security report on the application. They where also in the early phases of rewriting the application in .NET (yeah) with an estimated completion date 1.5 years out.</p>
<p>After seeing our report (100+ SQLi and 300+ <a href='http://www.grumpysecurityguy.com/wp-content/plugins/wp-affiliate-pro.php?id=9' onmouseover="top.window.status='http://www.cgisecurity.com/articles/xss-faq.shtml'; return true" onmouseout="top.window.status=''; return true" target="_blank">XSS</a>) and after a protracted developer battle(yes XSS is not good) they where left with two not good options.</p>
<ol>
<li>Lose the customer.</li>
<li>Stop the rewrite and spend a few months digging through old code to fix these issues</li>
</ol>
<p>Now from a business point of view neither of those makes sense. At the time we where in the WAF hater camp but we saw that in this case it made total sense. The customer deployed a WAF, configured it using our vulnerability data, and was able to mitigate the risk in about 3 weeks.</p>
<p>Bottom line and what people continually fail it understand is that every current solution on the market today has its short comings. In security everything does. Is there one magic network solution that will prevent all network attacks? No. You have spent a ton of money protecting your network infrastructure. Let&#8217;s take a quick look at the list of things you probably have spent money on today:</p>
<ol>
<li>Firewalls</li>
<li>IDS/IPS</li>
<li>Network Vulnerability Scanning</li>
<li>AntiVirus</li>
<li>Configuration and Patch Management</li>
<li>Database Scanning</li>
<li>Database Encryption</li>
</ol>
<p>Guess what, none of that protects you from the rush of SQLi, XSS, and other web based attacks. All that money and you still have big gaping holes.</p>
<p>To properly attack the <a href='http://www.grumpysecurityguy.com/wp-content/plugins/wp-affiliate-pro.php?id=5' onmouseover="top.window.status='http://www.whitehatsec.com'; return true" onmouseout="top.window.status=''; return true" target="_blank">Web Application Security</a> problem you should be doing all of these things:</p>
<ol>
<li>Secure coding practices</li>
<li>Source code review</li>
<li>Black box testing</li>
<li>Web Application Firewalls</li>
<li>Developer Training</li>
<li>Configuration and change management</li>
</ol>
<p>The reality today is that people underestimate the size of the problem and therefore do not have the budget to do all these things. You can stretch those budget dollars pretty far with an open source scanner and mod_security (software cost $0). WhiteHat is not that cheap but we are very cost effective, combined with mod_security you can go a long way. Need a more robust solution, WhiteHat + F5 can scale to 1000 of web sites in a very cost effective manner. WhiteHat and our WAF partners can knock items 3-5 off your list while you go work on getting your coding practices in place. Even after you get those practices in place you are still going to find vulnerabilities and having that &#8220;instant&#8221; mitigation ability is very comforting.</p>
<p>Robert over at cgisec <a href="http://www.cgisecurity.com/2008/06/10" target="_blank">sees the light</a> as well. He has managed and is currently managing web site security for some of the largest most frequently attacked web sites on the planet.</p>
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	</p><div class="aizattos_related_posts"><span class="aizattos_related_posts_header" >Related Posts</span><ul><li><span class="aizattos_related_posts_title"><a href="http://www.grumpysecurityguy.com/the-big-announcement/" rel="bookmark" title="Permanent Link: The Big Announcement" >The Big Announcement</a></span><div class="aizattos_related_posts_excerpt">I've not been this pumped about something in a long time. Jeremiah actually has been pulling me into...</div></li><li><span class="aizattos_related_posts_title"><a href="http://www.grumpysecurityguy.com/10-reasons-not-to-deploy-a-web-application-firewall/" rel="bookmark" title="Permanent Link: 10 Reasons Not to Deploy a Web Application Firewall" >10 Reasons Not to Deploy a Web Application Firewall</a></span><div class="aizattos_related_posts_excerpt">I have a pretty good amount of experience with WAFs, although none in an actual deployed state (othe...</div></li><li><span class="aizattos_related_posts_title"><a href="http://www.grumpysecurityguy.com/penetration-test-vs-assessment/" rel="bookmark" title="Permanent Link: Penetration Test vs. Assessment" >Penetration Test vs. Assessment</a></span><div class="aizattos_related_posts_excerpt">This terminology has always been a peeve of mine. People asking for a penetration test rarely want a...</div></li><li><span class="aizattos_related_posts_title"><a href="http://www.grumpysecurityguy.com/5-lessons-on-public-disclosure-from-elliot-spitzer/" rel="bookmark" title="Permanent Link: 5 Lessons on Public Disclosure From Elliot Spitzer" >5 Lessons on Public Disclosure From Elliot Spitzer</a></span></li><li><span class="aizattos_related_posts_title"><a href="http://www.grumpysecurityguy.com/review-the-web-application-hackers-handbook/" rel="bookmark" title="Permanent Link: Review: The Web Application Hacker&#8217;s Handbook" >Review: The Web Application Hacker&#8217;s Handbook</a></span></li></ul></div><p>Post from: <a href="http://www.grumpysecurityguy.com">Grumpy Security Guy</a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.grumpysecurityguy.com/the-business-case-for-wafs-testing/">The Business Case for WAFs + Testing</a></p>

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      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Jun 2008 14:09:06 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/application">application</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web application security">web application security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/massive application">massive application</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mod security">mod security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web application firewall">web application firewall</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web site security">web site security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/robust solution">robust solution</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/solution">solution</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/GrumpySecurityGuy/~3/315597756/">The Business Case for WAFs + Testing</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[University of South Carolina Moore School of Business breach]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/337e47e0083fbc5d019fe4ba710c6c76</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/337e47e0083fbc5d019fe4ba710c6c76</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
6/9/08

Organization
University of South Carolina

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
Moore School of Business

Victims
faculty, staff and students

Number...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/usouthcarolina.jpg" align="right" height="75" width="78"><font size="2"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Date Reported: </span><br>6/9/08<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Organization: </span><br><a href="http://www.sc.edu/">University of South Carolina</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br><a href="http://mooreschool.sc.edu/moore/index.htm">Moore School of Business</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>"faculty, staff and students"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>~7,000<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>"some personally identifiable data"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"The University of South Carolina is warning about 7,000 faculty, staff and students that some of their personal information was on a desktop computer stolen from an office at the business school."<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://www.thestate.com/breaking/story/428754.html">The State</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>The State<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online source cited above:<br><br>The University of South Carolina is warning about 7,000 faculty, staff and students that some of their personal information was on a desktop computer stolen from an office at the business school.<br><br>Monday evening, May 26th, 2008 computer hardware containing data files was stolen from the Dean’s Office<br><br>"Among the items was a desktop computer belonging to Deputy Dean Dr. Scott Koerwer,"<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I am semi-sure that a business case could be made to allow Dr. Scott access to confidential information, but there should be NO business case allowing for the storage of this information on the desktop computer he uses.&nbsp; I also doubt that he needs access to Social Security numbers.</span><br><br>"As a result of the computer being stolen, we feel it is possible that some personally identifiable data could have been compromised."<br><br>There is a possibility that some personal information such as social security numbers, annual pay, and term of service at the University may have been compromised.<br><br>As soon as the unauthorized access was discovered (May 27, 2008), USC initiated its incident handling procedures, which includes notification of affected individuals.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I am glad to read that USC has incident handling procedures.&nbsp; Many organizations do not.</span><br><br>university officials have no evidence anyone's personal information was accessed<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] It's probably too soon for evidence.</span><br><br>"We feel the responsible thing for us to do is to notify those persons whose data was contained in the computer, and advise them of the fact, and share with them some useful steps they may want to take for additional protection,"<br><br>the university is notifying about 130 faculty and staff at the Moore School, and just under 7,000 students who took business courses in the last academic year<br><br>the university’s Division of Law Enforcement and Safety and Office of Information Technology are investigating the matter<br><br>The Moore School of Business has taken precautions to minimize future security risks.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Like what?&nbsp; Anybody can make a statement like this.&nbsp; People should be provided with some details.&nbsp; Details that don't give away too much, but enough to instill confidence.&nbsp; This statement means little to me.</span><br><br>Deputy Dean Koerwer circulated a letter to students dated June 6 that suggested some steps they might take to protect themselves from identity theft.<br><br>Guidance regarding the burglary, including answers to frequently asked questions that we anticipate on identity protection, identity theft, and precautionary measures is available at the University’s website: <a href="http://www.sc.edu/identity/index.shtml<br><br>We">www.sc.edu/identity/index.shtml<br><br>We</a> deeply regret any inconvenience or concern that this incident may cause. We assure you that the University, along with the Dean’s Office, is working diligently to prevent this type of incident from recurring.<br><br>Please know that the university faculty and staff are committed to protecting all personal information. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>This is a physical, administrative and potentially logical information security breach.&nbsp; There is no information provided about what physical controls were present to prevent an intruder from stealing the desktop computer, so it is difficult to comment.&nbsp; There is little information provided around the administrative controls in place, but we can imply some things.&nbsp; Due to the fact that the school did not state that the storage of confidential information on client computers is prohibited, maybe we can assume that it is permitted.&nbsp; There was no mention of encryption, so I question whether or not this is a logical control that may have been lacking.<br><br>Information security is a holistic discipline and the controls I mention above are a very, very small part of the big picture. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>September, 2007 - <a href="http://breachblog.com/2007/09/06/university-of-south-carolina-mistake-leads-to-breach-of-3199-records.aspx">University of South Carolina Mistake Leads to Breach of 3,199 Records</a></font><br><br>
<script src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/%7Es/breachblog?i=http://breachblog.com/2008/06/09/usouthcarolina.aspx" type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8"></script>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 09 Jun 2008 09:38:01 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/school">school</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/university">university</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business">business</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business school">business school</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/university officials">university officials</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer">computer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/moore school">moore school</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/06/09/usouthcarolina.aspx">University of South Carolina Moore School of Business breach</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[JJ's Security Q&A Month...]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f3cded3cb437b0381503876adae241da</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f3cded3cb437b0381503876adae241da</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[What do you want to hear about
In addition to our Black Hat Blogging time between now and early August, Im declaring June Ask JJ month. I frequently get questions emailed from readers, either in...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>What do you want to hear about?</strong></p><p>In addition to our Black Hat Blogging time between now and early August, I&#8217;m declaring June <strong>&#8216;Ask JJ&#8217;</strong> month. I frequently get questions emailed from readers, either in response to a previous post, or with questions on a new subject. It occured to me that others probably have the same questions, so I figured a month of <strong>Q&amp;A free-for-all</strong> would be a fun way to address all those burning IT and security questions you&#8217;ve been bottling up inside&#8230; </p><p>The plan is to collect questions in June and post replies in July, or perhaps in earlier if I can manage to squeeze in a few extra hours&nbsp;in the day. </p><p><strong>What to&nbsp;ask?</strong>&nbsp;Whatever YOU want to know about- just ask! If you read my blog, you know my specialties&nbsp;are in network security, <strong>NAC</strong> and <strong>802.1X</strong> as well as <strong>general networking</strong> and <strong>standards</strong> and <strong>wireless technologies</strong> and <strong>security</strong>. You can ask about a technology, a product, a vendor, even my &#8216;opinion&#8217;, if you really want to hear that. </p><p><strong>You can ask other stuff too&#8230;</strong> If it strikes my fancy and&nbsp;I think it&#8217;s interesting enough,&nbsp;I&#8217;ll research it and get an answer, or perhaps invite a guest expert to respond. And if it&#8217;s not so interesting I may just ignore it, so be prepared for that too.</p><p><strong>How to ask?</strong> Oh we&#8217;re full of options here. Either post a reply/comment to this topic, or use the email form on my blog at <a href="http://www.securityuncorked.com/">www.SecurityUncorked.com</a> to submit a request by email. You can include your name and/or contact info or not- up to you. </p><p># # # </p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 06 Jun 2008 11:05:46 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security questions">security questions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/questions">questions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/post">post</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/collect questions">collect questions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/post replies">post replies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/month">month</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network security">network security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email">email</category>
      <source url="http://www.securityuncorked.com/security-uncorked/2008/6/6/jjs-security-qa-month.html">JJ's Security Q&amp;A Month...</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[IT Vendor VAR Relationships 101]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/e37cfd5f29e489e7fe32ff1fba5059c9</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/e37cfd5f29e489e7fe32ff1fba5059c9</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I guess Ive been in the VAR business so long it surprises me when we run across customers that really are clueless as to how the whole process works and the value of underlying relationships. I...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I guess I&#8217;ve been in the VAR business so long it surprises me when we run across customers that really are clueless as to how the whole process works and the value of underlying relationships. I <u>shouldn&#8217;t </u>be surprised- only a relative handful have really mastered the customer -&gt; vendor/VAR -&gt; distributor -&gt; manufacturer relationship. The rest have no clue. </p><p><strong>So, if you&#8217;re in &#8216;the rest&#8217; category, here&#8217;s a quick overview of how the chain of love works top-down from manufacturers to&nbsp;VARs to you</strong>. </p><p><strong>Manufacturer -&gt; Reseller.</strong> <br />First it&#8217;s&nbsp;important to note that most IT Manufacturers have some level of <strong>Partner Programs</strong>.&nbsp;These programs are structured agreements between a Reseller and the Manufacturer and are usually based on 1) volume&nbsp;of their&nbsp;product sold and/or 2) technical expertise. Each Manufacturer is different, but they usually offer 2-4 tiers of partner programs depending on those 2 things, and each tier may have a different discount offered to the Reseller. </p><p>Commodity items may just require a Reseller to request to be in the Partner Program, and sign a couple of documents. More involved products, such as the network and security products we deal with, usually require the Reseller to demonstrate competencies and a high level of technical expertise with that product. Some product lines or specific products may require a Reseller to have <strong>authorization or certification</strong> to sell and/or provide services for a product. </p><p>When <strong>selecting a Reseller</strong> or VAR, it&#8217;s important to keep these things in mind and be sure your choice is comfortable with that product line- you should be able to ask them for recommendations and help specifying the correct products and possibly help with the installation and integration. If you send a Reseller a list of part numbers and it&#8217;s the wrong &#8216;stuff&#8217;- you&#8217;re less likely to get help exchanging it for the correct items, from the Reseller or Manufacturer. It&#8217;s also nice to know you have a friend to lean on when you&#8217;re installing new products. </p><p>You&#8217;ll see more info from me on understanding the <strong>difference between a</strong> <strong>Reseller and a VAR</strong> soon. Your VAR should be able to help every step along the way, and a Reseller should at least be able to help you select the correct part numbers as part of their pre-sales support. </p><p><strong>Distributor -&gt; Reseller</strong><br />There&#8217;s another interesting twist in our chain of IT relationships- the Distributor, or Disti for short. Understanding distribution of a product can be advantageous- <strong>some products are sold directly</strong> from the Manufacturer to Reseller, but <strong>most go through a Disti</strong>. The Disti can be another advantage for your Reseller to leverage, but the Customer really should not be involved in any way in these transactions. Sometimes Distis offer an additional discount to a specific product line or type. Other times the Distis may be offering a volume discount or bundles. Sometimes the incentives are for the Reseller, and some times they&#8217;re designed to pass through&nbsp;to the Customer. It&#8217;s a good idea to just ask your Reseller if there are any additional discounts that could be applied. </p><p><strong>Reseller -&gt; Customer<br /></strong>A lot of Customers like to get information directly from the horse&#8217;s mouth and at times this Reseller-Customer relationship is bypassed at critical times. Keep in mind the <strong>Manufacturer sales rep</strong> is most interested in selling you something- and they may be interested in selling you a <em>specific</em> something,&nbsp;depending on what their&nbsp;incentives are. If you, as the Customer, call in a Manufacturer directly for pre-sales support, do you really expect them to honestly tell you &#8220;<em>Hey Mr Customer, you really don&#8217;t need my widget.&#8221;?</em> On the other hand, if you call in a trusted <strong>Reseller or VAR</strong>, they have a more vested interest in your success, and the success of whatever solution is put in place because they&#8217;re responsible for making sure it all works. </p><p>Another distinct advantage of a good Reseller/VAR -&gt; Customer relationship is the ability to leverage <strong>your Reseller&#8217;s relationship with the Manufacturer</strong>. Maybe you&#8217;re a huge buyer of the Manufacturer&#8217;s stuff- and maybe you have enough clout with them directly to get what you want. Congratulations if you&#8217;re in that position, but for 99% of Customers, that&#8217;s not the case. If your Reseller or VAR is in good standing and either moves a large volume or has extensive technical expertise, they can offer you some <strong>great advantages, in pricing, services</strong> and more. Your VAR can frequently negotiate additional discounts, maybe free training or reduced service costs and competitive trade-ups. </p><p>Another tip- <strong>don&#8217;t discount smaller Resellers</strong>. Our company, for example, is not an International online box-pusher, but we have the best pricing tier with most or all of our Manufacturer partners and offer the majority of our product lines at less than you&#8217;ll find from those online e-tailers and wholesalers. Surprise! </p><p><strong>That&#8217;s a very brief overview- you&#8217;ll see more on Vendor-VAR relationships coming soon.</strong></p><p># # #</p><p>&nbsp;</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 31 May 2008 16:52:07 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/manufacturer">manufacturer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/manufacturer directly">manufacturer directly</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/manufacturer partners">manufacturer partners</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/specific">specific</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/specific product line">specific product line</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/manufacturer sales rep">manufacturer sales rep</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/reseller">reseller</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/manufacturer relationship">manufacturer relationship</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/resellers relationship">resellers relationship</category>
      <source url="http://www.securityuncorked.com/security-uncorked/2008/5/31/it-vendor-var-relationships-101.html">IT Vendor VAR Relationships 101</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Vengeance]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/e735bc3ded97e2908f3138b40b6495d6</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/e735bc3ded97e2908f3138b40b6495d6</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Jared Diamond on vengeance and human nature: This question of state government's recent origins, and, conversely, of its long failure to originate throughout most of human history, is a fundamental...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Jared Diamond on <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/04/21/080421fa_fact_diamond">vengeance</a> and human nature:</p>

<blockquote>This question of state government's recent origins, and, conversely, of its long failure to originate throughout most of human history, is a fundamental concern for social scientists. Until fifty-five hundred years ago, there were no state governments anywhere in the world. Even as late as 1492, all of North America, sub-Saharan Africa, Australia, New Guinea, and the Pacific islands, and most of Central and South America didn't have states and instead operated under simpler forms of societal organization (chiefdoms, tribes, and bands). Today, though, the whole world map is divided into states. Of course, most of that extension of state government has involved existing states from elsewhere imposing their government on stateless societies, as happened in New Guinea. But the first state in world history, at least, must have arisen de novo, and we now know that states arose independently in many parts of the world. How did it happen?

<p>[...]</p>

<p>...anthropologists, historians, and archeologists tell us that state governments have arisen independently under one of two sets of circumstances. Sometimes external pressure from an encroaching state has placed a people under such duress that it ceded individual rights to a government of its own that would be capable of offering effective resistance. For instance, about two centuries ago, the formerly separate Cherokee chiefdoms gradually formed a unified Cherokee government in a desperate attempt to resist pressure from whites. More frequently, chronic competition among warring non-state entities has ended when one gained a military advantage over the others by developing proto-state institutions: one example is the formation of the Zulu state by a particularly talented chief named Dingiswayo, in the early nineteenth century, out of an assortment of chiefdoms fighting each other.</p>

<p>[...]</p>

<p>We regularly ignore the fact that the thirst for vengeance is among the strongest of human emotions. It ranks with love, anger, grief, and fear, about which we talk incessantly. Modern state societies permit and encourage us to express our love, anger, grief, and fear, but not our thirst for vengeance. We grow up being taught that such feelings are primitive, something to be ashamed of and to transcend.</p>

<p>There is no doubt that state acceptance of every individual's right to exact personal vengeance would make it impossible for us to coexist peacefully as fellow-citizens of the same state. Otherwise, we, too, would be living under the conditions of constant warfare prevailing in non-state societies like those of the New Guinea Highlands.</blockquote></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=iO3MBH"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=iO3MBH" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=tp7lvH"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=tp7lvH" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 29 May 2008 09:07:04 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vengeance">vengeance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cherokee government">cherokee government</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/government">government</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/exact personal vengeance">exact personal vengeance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/world map">world map</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/world">world</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/societies">societies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/stateless societies">stateless societies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/individual">individual</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/05/vengeance.html">Vengeance</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[New Research Results for Electronic Voting]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/0e20133d88f59ccc075d718e7ea6c81e</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/0e20133d88f59ccc075d718e7ea6c81e</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Voting systems have become controversial in the years following the multiple election disasters that occurred in the United States during and after 2000. Of particular note were the electronic voting...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Voting systems have become controversial in the years following the multiple election disasters that occurred in the United States during and after 2000. Of particular note were the electronic voting (e-voting) systems that were widely deployed to replace the pre-scored punch-card systems, systems that had have been frequently judged to be central to the problem in the 2000 Florida general election. The (premature) deployment of e-voting machines stimulated a new field of security and privacy research around the subject of elections, a subject that has turned out to be more complex and deeper than anyone would have predicted a decade ago. Here we present a sample of some of the finest recent work on election technology from authors on three continents.<br style="clear: both;"/>
  <img alt="" style="border: 0; height:1px; width:1px;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?i=e1ddb59e8bafee5d150749b3fed25d33" height="1" width="1"/>
<img src="http://www.pheedo.com/feeds/tracker.php?i=e1ddb59e8bafee5d150749b3fed25d33" style="display: none;" border="0" height="1" width="1" alt=""/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 May 2008 10:32:01 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/election">election</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/election technology">election technology</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/punch-card systems">punch-card systems</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/systems">systems</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/multiple election disasters">multiple election disasters</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/decade ago">decade ago</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/electronic">electronic</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/subject">subject</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/privacy research">privacy research</category>
      <source url="http://www.pheedo.com/click.phdo?i=e1ddb59e8bafee5d150749b3fed25d33">New Research Results for Electronic Voting</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Security in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/247d78d4b3f9b520dcc2fd4f26f89ce6</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/247d78d4b3f9b520dcc2fd4f26f89ce6</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[One of the most critical roles security researchers have is keeping up with new technologies and considering the security implications that go along with themessentially, ensuring that security is...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[One of the most critical roles security researchers have is keeping up with new technologies and considering the security implications that go along with them—essentially, ensuring that security is "baked in" to new ideas from the earliest possible moment. Because of this, researchers have had significant interest in the field of mobile ad hoc networks (Manets). Such networks are frequently viewed as a key communications technology enabler for network-centric warfare and disaster relief operations, and as the technology matures, Manets are increasingly reaching many other applications in areas such as intelligent transportation systems and fault-tolerant mobile sensor grids. Manets can operate in isolation or in coordination with a wired infrastructure, often through a gateway node participating in both networks for traffic relay. This flexibility, along with their self-organizing capabilities, are some of Manet's biggest strengths, as well as their biggest security weaknesses.<br style="clear: both;"/>
  <img alt="" style="border: 0; height:1px; width:1px;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?i=faf1054c28c6849438d230ffbb0e73e2" height="1" width="1"/>
<img src="http://www.pheedo.com/feeds/tracker.php?i=faf1054c28c6849438d230ffbb0e73e2" style="display: none;" border="0" height="1" width="1" alt=""/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 May 2008 02:22:47 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hoc networks">hoc networks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/networks">networks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security implications">security implications</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security weaknesses">security weaknesses</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/disaster relief operations">disaster relief operations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/manets">manets</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/intelligent transportation systems">intelligent transportation systems</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wired infrastructure">wired infrastructure</category>
      <source url="http://www.pheedo.com/click.phdo?i=faf1054c28c6849438d230ffbb0e73e2">Security in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[10 Ways To Cheat At Being An IT Security Professional.]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/0e597656f62b35ec58b09e46325aaac1</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/0e597656f62b35ec58b09e46325aaac1</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[photo credit: нσвσ
Be A Security Cool Cat : Place penguin stickers on every surface in your cubicle. Stick at least 3 on the dual boot company issued laptop (that hasnt had a kernel upgrade in 6...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span class="center"><a href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/68799045@N00/229151398/" title="About myths and t-shirts" target="_blank"><img class="center" src="http://farm1.static.flickr.com/84/229151398_5d7d461f09_m.jpg" alt="About myths and t-shirts" border="0" /></a><br /><small><a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/" title="Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike License" target="_blank"><img src="http://securitywannabe.com/blog/wp-content/plugins/photo_dropper/images/cc.png" alt="Creative Commons License" border="0" width="16" height="16" align="absmiddle" /></a> <a href="http://www.photodropper.com/photos/" target="_blank">photo</a> credit: <a href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/68799045@N00/229151398/" title="нσвσ" target="_blank">нσвσ</a></small></span></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Be A Security Cool Cat</strong>: Place <a href="http://www.uoregon.edu/~cchapma2/penguin.jpg">penguin stickers</a> on every surface in your cubicle.  Stick at least 3 on the dual boot company issued laptop (that hasn&#8217;t had a kernel upgrade in 6 months).  Use BlackHat stickers for bonus points.</li>
<li><strong>Be An Undercover Open Source Evangelist</strong>: Unfailingly, recommend open source solutions as more secure.  Be sure to quote &#8216;more eyes, less vulnerabilities&#8217;.  Recite frequently .  Always forward security advisories about commercial products to your boss.</li>
<li><strong>Walk the Tech Talk</strong>: Learn at Least 10 Bash Keyboard Shortcuts.  Treat this as a party trick.  Perform rapidly in sequence whenever anyone watches your screen.  Giggle and pass the keyboard over and say &#8216;Your turn!&#8217;.</li>
<li><strong>Be All Knowing, Jedi Warrior!</strong>:  Say &#8216;Trust but verify&#8217; whenever you are asked a question you do not understand.  Make it clear in meetings that you trust no-one and &#8220;verify&#8221; solely through a Google/Secunia search.</li>
<li><strong>Impress with a Penetration Test!</strong>:  Download Metasploit, spend 7 hours modifying the web interface: create custom graphics and hack up the CSS files.  Start Metasploit running before you leave for the day.  Use Camtasia to capture all screen activity so you can review in the morning.  If all went well upload to YouTube and link out via facebook.</strong></li>
<li><strong>Practice Defense In Depth&#8217;</strong>: When you are asked &#8216;What is the Risk?&#8217;, grin inanely and say &#8216;I&#8217;ll tell you after I break out the vulnerability scanners&#8217;.  Run at least 3 vulnerability scanners to get &#8216;defense in depth&#8217;.</li>
<li><strong>Latest *Is* Greatest!</strong>: Clipboard stealing attacks are *always* a bigger issue than the CISCO infrastructure with default passwords (how did they get there?!).</li>
<li><strong>Educate The Great Unwashed with a Deep Dive Security Awareness Program</strong>.  Educate end-users about Cross Site Scripting and SQL injection attacks.  Don&#8217;t invite the outsourced developers - they already know this stuff and have deadlines to meet.</li>
<li><strong>Impress Your Peers - Perfect the RFC Shoutout</strong>:  Pick at least 10 common protocols and learn the associated RFC numbers.  Intimidate IT colleagues by shouting out the RFC numbers whenever they mention the protocol.</li>
<li><strong>Start A Security Blog</strong>: What Can I Say? <img src='http://securitywannabe.com/blog/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_biggrin.gif' alt=':D' class='wp-smiley' /> </li>
</ol>
<img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityWannabe/~4/293080251" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 18 May 2008 18:36:01 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vulnerability scanners">vulnerability scanners</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rfc">rfc</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attacks">attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql injection attacks">sql injection attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rfc shoutout">rfc shoutout</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bash keyboard shortcuts">bash keyboard shortcuts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/keyboard">keyboard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/trust no-one">trust no-one</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security cool cat">security cool cat</category>
      <source url="http://securitywannabe.com/blog/2008/05/18/10-ways-to-cheat-at-being-an-it-security-professional/">10 Ways To Cheat At Being An IT Security Professional.</source>
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