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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: friend]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/friend</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Thu, 04 Sep 2008 04:28:19 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Justin Somaini is Blogging]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/3b1c4b39c4d84bb2785a9449fadeeaff</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/3b1c4b39c4d84bb2785a9449fadeeaff</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[My good friend Justin Somaini the CSO of Symantec is now...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[My good friend Justin Somaini the CSO of Symantec is now blogging!
&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;     ]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 25 Sep 2008 13:57:35 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/friend justin somaini">friend justin somaini</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/symantec">symantec</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cso">cso</category>
      <source url="http://securitybuddha.com/2008/09/25/justin-somaini-is-blogging/">Justin Somaini is Blogging</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[IDS/IPS - is it Vitamins?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/31be078399943afc01f74f3be65a1699</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/31be078399943afc01f74f3be65a1699</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Alan Shimel's post on &quot; IDS - the beast that just won't die &quot; triggered my hidden thoughts about IDS
Rather than thinking about IDS as a piece of device/software that provides fancy features. Let me...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<P>Alan Shimel's post on&nbsp; "<A href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/idsips/index.html">IDS - the beast that just won't die</A>" triggered my hidden thoughts about IDS.</P>
<P>Rather than thinking about IDS as a piece of device/software that provides fancy features. Let me try to summarize some assertions about&nbsp;IDS:&nbsp;</P>
<BLOCKQUOTE dir=ltr style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<P>IDS can capture&nbsp;tons of intrusion&nbsp;events, there is so much of don't care events it is difficult&nbsp;to single out event such as zero day event in the midst of such noise. </P>
<P>It requires tremendous effort to sift through the log and derive meaningful actions out of the log entries.</P>
<P>IDS needs a dedicated&nbsp;administrator to manage.&nbsp;An administrator&nbsp;who won't get bored of looking at all the packets and patterns, a truly boring job for a security engineer. Probably this job would interest a geekier person and&nbsp;geeks tend to their own interesting research!</P>
<P>There are companies that do without IDS, and they do just fine. I agree with Alan's assessment that IDS is like&nbsp;a Checkbox in most cases.&nbsp; Business can run without IDS just fine, why invest in such a technology?</P>
<P>Firewalls and other devices have built in features of IDS, so why invest in a separate product.</P>
<P>IDS is like Vitamins, nice to have, not having won't kill you in most cases. Customers are willing to pay for Pain Killers because they have to address their pain right away. For Vitamins, they can wait. Stop and think for moment, without Anti-virus&nbsp;product,&nbsp;businesses can't run for few days. But, without IDS, most&nbsp;businesses can run just fine and I base it out of my own experience.</P>
<P>Probably, I would have offended folks from the IDS camp. I have a good friend who is a founder of an IDS&nbsp;company, I am sure he will react differently if he reads my narratives about IDS.&nbsp;&nbsp;Once businesses start realizing that&nbsp;IDS is&nbsp;a Checkbox, they will scale down their investments in this area. In the current economic climate, financial institutions are not doing well. Financial&nbsp;institutions are big&nbsp;customers in terms of security products, with the current scenario of financial meltdown, they would scale down heavily on their spending on Vitamins. </P>
<P>Running IDS software on VMware sounds fancy.&nbsp;&nbsp;Technology does not matter unless you can address real world pain and prove the&nbsp;utilitarian value of such a technology. I am really surprised that&nbsp;IDS continues to exist. Proof&nbsp;of existence does not forebode&nbsp;great future. Running IDS on VMware does not make it any more utilitarian.&nbsp;I see a bleak future for IDS.</P></BLOCKQUOTE>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 24 Sep 2008 14:35:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ids">ids</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ids camp">ids camp</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ids continues">ids continues</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ids company">ids company</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ids software">ids software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vitamins">vitamins</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/businesses">businesses</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/financial institutions">financial institutions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vmware sounds fancy">vmware sounds fancy</category>
      <source url="http://ravichar.blogharbor.com/blog/_archives/2008/9/24/3899861.html">IDS/IPS - is it Vitamins?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[From the Executive Women's Forum on Information Security]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f2976566aba2a7d7042931766a835f14</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f2976566aba2a7d7042931766a835f14</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The theme of the 2008 Executive Women's Forum on Information Security, Risk Management &amp; Privacy is &quot;risk convergence is inevitable.&quot; The risks associated with information security, privacy, physical...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The theme of the 2008 Executive Women's Forum on Information Security, Risk Management & Privacy is "risk convergence is inevitable." The risks associated with information security, privacy, physical security and so forth are converging such that an integrated management approach is required from within the firm. <br />
<br />
Interestingly enough, business continuity management was not a key risk area mentioned by all panelists of the session titled "Convergence: The Good, The Bad & The Ugly." There were two pieces of strategic program management advice from the panelists. The first point is that you have to partner with all of your lines of business and corporate support areas. Since risk is related to the delivery of the business, no one department can address all of the issues. And, you might find that there are good practices already in place within your firm, so that you are not reinventing the wheel - leverage the good stuff throughout the firm. The second point is to focus on the budget issue - how many risk-related activities are already in place in your organization that could be combined, and possibly duplicated, so that more work gets done with less money spent? Pooling of already limited budgets can go a long way toward developing a program that is more mature, delivers more benefit to the organization and eliminates a lot of duplicative work. <br />
<br />
But all of this convergence comes at a price - mainly in fear, uncertainty and doubt of the workforce. Some feel that they will lose authority (especially in siloed risk approaches); others might lose their jobs as a result of the convergence. This human aspect was mentioned as the key challenge of an integrated approach. Therefore, communicating not only up within the firm but down to the workforce is critical to achieving a well-run and integrated program. <br />
<br />
And finally, for those areas that just don't want to "play the game," use your internal audit department as the "stick" that can get them to act. When I was an IT risk manager, I always said that I was management's best friend - let me tell you the gaps in your risk program rather than having them come from the audit department, which then become part of the records of the firm.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Sep 2008 15:29:34 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk">risk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk approaches">risk approaches</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk program">risk program</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk management">risk management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/management">management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/management approach">management approach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/key risk">key risk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/audit department">audit department</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/internal audit department">internal audit department</category>
      <source url="http://blog.gartner.com/blog/security.php?x=0&amp;itemid=3879">From the Executive Women's Forum on Information Security</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[So Logically, If She Weighs The Same As A DuckShes A Witch!]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/3fa3a2c5641e284f4fc5fc76430d2faa</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/3fa3a2c5641e284f4fc5fc76430d2faa</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I usually try to stay far away from politics and current events, but my friend Rich has put up a blog post blaming the credit crisis on quantitative analysis, and then positing that because the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I usually try to stay far away from politics and current events, but my friend <strong><a href="http://securosis.com/2008/09/17/the-fallacy-of-complete-and-accurate-risk-quantification/">Rich has put up a blog post</a></strong> blaming the credit crisis on quantitative analysis, and then positing that because the economy sucks, Information Security should be only qualitative.</p>
<p>Now I&#8217;ve been &#8220;accused&#8221; of being a quant in the past (hi rybolov!) but in reality the only dogs I have in this fight are the model and the application of scientific method - and really, ethically speaking, I have to be tied to the latter while applying the former.</p>
<p>And I see a false dichotomy in this whole Quant vs. Qual thing.  We, as a profession, tend to create a political divide between the two which, if it even exists, I&#8217;d say is based more on our ignorance rather than our expertise.  After all, we are the profession that regularly multiplies across ordinal scales and uses wonderful models like R=VxTxI.   As someone  learning to deal in probabilities and rationalism, I have to recognize that this discussion is really just about the act of observation using different metrics of measurement.</p>
<p>But how we&#8217;re going about observing does not change the fact that there is measurement based on observation.  So if I&#8217;m working with you I can easily turn your qualitative scale into a quantitative one, and vice-versa.  Yes, Shrdlu, if we had the time, even your most seemingly Qual things could be Quant! (This flexible world view, btw, is an outcome of that new-fangled Bayesian thing).</p>
<p><strong>COGNITIVE BIAS A-PLENTY</strong></p>
<p>But back to what Rich is saying there about information security and risk - and he isn&#8217;t/won&#8217;t be the only one saying these sorts of things - we should try to understand what&#8217;s really going on rather than get caught up in the emotional hurricane.  Our profession suffers several forms of cognitive bias.  The nature of our jobs and what we do can cause us to be focused on the outcome and not the quality of the decision at the time it was made.  We want to bring in things from other professions that are useful, but at times we do view things outside our profession with false correlation to our own (unfortunately for those who write these sorts of articles, financial risk is <em><strong>completely different</strong></em> than operational risk).  We also have the tendency to focus on negative outcomes without acknowledging the positive outcomes (For example, I hear that Alan Greenspan&#8217;s new firm is up a couple of $billion in all this mess since he joined them, short sellers are doing quite well - must be because they have qualitative models or something <em>-grin-</em>).  The effect of these biases are compounded by the facts that proper correlation takes more work than we usually give it, and rational thought is not that easy when there&#8217;s a witch-hunt mentality.</p>
<div class="wp-caption alignnone" style="width: 257px"><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zrzMhU_4m-g"><img src="http://www.riskmanagementinsight.com/media/images/weblog/peasants.png" alt="Burn her anyway!" width="247" height="219" /></a><p class="wp-caption-text">What also floats in water? (link to Youtube)</p></div>
<p><strong>WHAT SHOULD WE BE THINKING ABOUT?</strong></p>
<p>So as you and I read opinions that seem to be the polar opposite of irrational exuberance (and there will be plenty between now and the election) we&#8217;ll have to ask ourselves, &#8220;what really failed here?&#8221;  At the risk (pun) of over-simplification:</p>
<ul>
<li>Was There an Error on the part of Probability Theory?</li>
</ul>
<p>After all, Probability Science like all other fields of knowledge is always &#8220;advancing&#8221; as they say.  So perhaps probability theory is wrong somehow?</p>
<p>I&#8217;m personally disinclined to put the blame here, primarily because I would think that there would be evidence from other fields (like Quantum Mechanics) that something is amiss waaaaay before it hit a field like economics.</p>
<ul>
<li>Was There Error In The Model Used to Determine Risk?</li>
</ul>
<p>Some people who understand real estate valuation and complex derivatives and financial risk want to put the blame here.  It&#8217;s a little too early to tell, but one thing is for sure - Financial risk is so different from operational risk I couldn&#8217;t begin to hazard an opinion on the subject.   But it would seem that this is really somewhere we might look.</p>
<ul>
<li>Was There Error In The  Scale Used (Quantitative vs. Qualitative)?</li>
</ul>
<p>Honestly?  I find it extremely difficult to understand how this could be the source of financial ruin.</p>
<ul>
<li>Was There Error on the part of the Decision Maker?</li>
</ul>
<p>What if all of the above were just fine, and the decision maker chose short term gain over long term stability?  What if this was (to simplify the matter greatly) a choice of &#8220;heads&#8221; over &#8220;tails&#8221; and the coin landed on tails?  What if the model represented the right risk (probability of negative outcome vs. positive outcome), but the complex derivative was sold to someone else who had poor &#8220;risk management&#8221; (ability to make a good decisions)?</p>
<p>Now I have no clue about complex derivatives, and I&#8217;m oversimplifying to be sure - chances are like most things, there are several problems that helped create the primary cause. But it seems to me that as we go into incident response mode for the economy, it&#8217;s more helpful to do so in a rational, logical manner.<br />
<strong><br />
OTHER THINGS WE MIGHT WANT TO CONSIDER</strong></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;"><strong>Consider the Source</strong></span><br />
Some authors (who I think tend to exploit outcome and hindsight bias,and then combine those with indirect ad hominem attacks in order to sell their books), are actually putting forth arguments against the use of analytics.  The source of this is a current epistemic debate between those who believe that only falsification is certain, and those who maintain that neither proof nor falsification are certain, there are only probabilities.    So before you go believing any &#8220;quadrants&#8221; of usefulness on faith - I encourage you to understand what is at the heart of the discussion.<br />
<span style="color: #008000;"><strong><br />
We All Have to Live In The Real World</strong></span><br />
The sun will rise tomorrow, and someone will try to find the source of the problem and do a better job.  Now chances are, they&#8217;ll be doing it in a quantitative manner.  Chances are also that at some point their models will fail and we&#8217;ll need to build new ones.  And this will happen whether the field is cosmology, economics, meteorology, information security, or professional baseball.<br />
<strong><br />
WHAT ABOUT YOU, ALEX?</strong></p>
<p>I&#8217;m far from certain and subject to change, but these days I lean towards <strong><a href="http://www.overcomingbias.com/2008/09/who-to-blame.html">Robin Hanson &amp; MIchael Lewis</a></strong> w/regards to placing blame.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Sep 2008 10:59:47 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk">risk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/financial risk">financial risk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/poor risk management">poor risk management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/operational risk">operational risk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/outcome">outcome</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/exploit outcome">exploit outcome</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/probability">probability</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/qualitative models">qualitative models</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/models">models</category>
      <source url="http://riskmanagementinsight.com/riskanalysis/?p=420">So Logically, If She Weighs The Same As A DuckShes A Witch!</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Urgent Message]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/45b6472544e2a40586277ebec5c17ecf</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/45b6472544e2a40586277ebec5c17ecf</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[From Minyanville
Good Day To You My Friend
It is understandable that you might be a little bit apprehensive because you do not know me but I have a lucrative business proposal of mutual interest to...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From <a href="http://www.minyanville.com/articles/GS-Bernanke-lehman-Fed-LEH-aig/index/a/18992">Minyanville</a></p><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #494848; font-family: Arial; font-size: 12px; font-style: italic; line-height: 18px; ">Good Day To You My Friend.&#160;</span></p><p><span style="color: #494848; font-family: Arial; font-size: 12px; font-style: italic; line-height: 18px; ">It is understandable that you might be a little bit apprehensive because you do not know me but I have a lucrative business proposal of mutual interest to share with you. I got your reference in my search for someone who suits my proposed business relationship.&#160;</span></p><p><span style="color: #494848; font-family: Arial; font-size: 12px; font-style: italic; line-height: 18px; ">I am 54 years old and happily married with children, and&#160;I have an obscured business suggestion for you. I will need you to assist me in executing a business project from Hong Kong to your country. It involves the transfer of a large sum of money. Everything concerning this&#160;transaction&#160;shall be legally done without hitch. Please endeavor to observe utmost discretion in all matters concerning this issue.&#160;</span></p><p><span style="color: #494848; font-family: Arial; font-size: 12px; font-style: italic; line-height: 18px; ">Once the funds have been successfully transferred into your account, we shall share in the ratio to be agreed by both of us.&#160;</span></p><p><span style="color: #494848; font-family: Arial; font-size: 12px; line-height: 18px; "><em style="font-size: 12px; font-family: Arial; font-style: italic; ">I will prefer you reach me on my private email address below (</em>xxxxxxxxx@yahoo.com.hk<em style="font-size: 12px; font-family: Arial; font-style: italic; ">) and finally after that I shall furnish you with more information&#39;s about this operation. Should you be interested, please forward the following to me urgently:&#160;</em></span></p><p><span style="color: #494848; font-family: Arial; font-size: 12px; font-style: italic; line-height: 18px; ">1. Full names&#160;</span><br /><span style="color: #494848; font-family: Arial; font-size: 12px; font-style: italic; line-height: 18px; ">2. Occupation&#160;</span><br /><span style="color: #494848; font-family: Arial; font-size: 12px; font-style: italic; line-height: 18px; ">3. Private phone number&#160;</span><br /><span style="color: #494848; font-family: Arial; font-size: 12px; font-style: italic; line-height: 18px; ">4. Current contact address&#160;</span></p><p><span style="color: #494848; font-family: Arial; font-size: 12px; font-style: italic; line-height: 18px; ">Please if you are not interested delete this email and do not hunt me because I am putting my career and the life of my family at stake with this venture. Although nothing ventured is nothing gained.&#160;</span></p><p><span style="color: #494848; font-family: Arial; font-size: 12px; font-style: italic; line-height: 18px; ">Your earliest response to this letter will be appreciated.&#160;</span></p><p><span style="color: #494848; font-family: Arial; font-size: 12px; font-style: italic; line-height: 18px; ">Kind Regards,&#160;</span></p><p><span style="color: #494848; font-family: Arial; font-size: 12px; font-style: italic; line-height: 18px; ">Ben S. Bernanke</span></p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2008 15:57:30 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email">email</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/current contact address">current contact address</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lucrative business proposal">lucrative business proposal</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email address">email address</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/observe utmost discretion">observe utmost discretion</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business project">business project</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business relationship">business relationship</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hong kong">hong kong</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business suggestion">business suggestion</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/09/urgent-message.html">Urgent Message</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Interop NY Keynotes: Cisco]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/c55a3293fe594f4363a5830f6da4d48c</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/c55a3293fe594f4363a5830f6da4d48c</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[After some rousing introduction music, Marie Hatter , Vice President, Network Systems and Security Solutions Marketing / CMO of Cisco began her presentation on virtualization
Introduction...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After some rousing introduction music, <a href="http://blogs.cisco.com/authors/bio/83" target="_blank">Marie Hatter</a>, Vice President, Network Systems and Security Solutions Marketing / CMO of Cisco began her presentation on virtualization.</p>
<p><strong>Introduction</strong></p>
<p>Virtualization is a word used by consumers and also by IT. But, do we all mean the same thing?</p>
<p>A very cool video from Cisco provided answers to &#8220;what is virtualization&#8221; from an  engineering perspective, data center perspective, IT perspective and the user perspective (virtual world).</p>
<p>Virtualization is about breaking the bonds between applications and server hardware, nodes and networks, applications and operating systems.</p>
<p>Why is this interesting? Virtualization holds the promise to transform the way we work, live, learn and play.</p>
<p><strong>Why virtualize?</strong></p>
<p>The real estate boom over the last 30 years has driven people to the suburbs. People didn&#8217;t mind commuting for an hour with lower gas prices. Today, we have a weak economy and gas prices are high. Something has to change.</p>
<p>Many are opting to stay at home. Businesses are trying out telecommuting, some (like Cisco) are even offering telepresence. This helps by reducing carbon footprint. Corporations are breaking free from physical requirements. The global workforce is also having an impact on the network. These changes are having a huge impact on the network.</p>
<p>We are on the cusp of transitioning from virtualization to VIRTUALIZATION.</p>
<p><strong>&#8220;One to many&#8230;.many to one.&#8221;</strong></p>
<p>This is Cisco&#8217;s idea of virtualization.</p>
<p>Consider the different roles we play in life - one to many. Spouse, executive, friend, parent, gym rat. This would be &#8220;one to many&#8221;. This is exactly what virtualization does. It allows you to partition resources off that you can use on the fly.</p>
<p><strong>Where do I start?</strong></p>
<p>Virtualization starts with server and storage. But, it&#8217;s the network that touches everything - it spans the physical, the virtual, and the cloud. This provides the connectivity to all these resources. The network brings transparency to the picture. It allows you to better monitor performance and better implement security - great benefits!</p>
<p><strong>Why do I need this?</strong></p>
<p>At Cisco, we saw that we were only using 20% of our storage utilization. We wanted to virtualize our datacenters. When we did that, we were able to get 68% storage utilization. For each year that we were able to defer buildup, we saved $40 million.</p>
<p>From a business standpoint, virtualization helps you differentiate and work faster. Provisioning in minutes, improved productivity and competitive differentiation, using less power (environmental impact), and up the ante of business continuity. If VMWare fails? It&#8217;s OK. You can reprovision it on the fly.</p>
<p><strong>Is it for everyone?</strong></p>
<p>IT organizations tend to be siloed. You have the IT side and the Operations side. Each has responsibility. For virtualization to work, these walls have to come down. The concept of virtualization depends on shared resources.</p>
<p><strong><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metcalfe%27s_law" target="_blank">Metcalfe&#8217;s Law of the Network</a> Effect</strong></p>
<p>Everytime you add a node to the network, you increase the value. This is what happens with virtualization. Every device you virtualize increases the power of each device. More control of environment and more efficiency.</p>
<p>This leads to&#8230;</p>
<p><strong>Cloud computing.</strong></p>
<p>Wow, show of hands from the audience when Marie asked &#8220;how many are using cloud computing?&#8221; and &#8220;how many are using your own clouds?&#8221; - not a lot of hands were raised. Interesting considering the coverage cloud computing has and the focus of it.</p>
<p>Cloud computing has three possibilities at Cisco:</p>
<ul>
<li>Flexible infrastructure (hosting)</li>
<li>Abstract services (APIs)</li>
<li>Application services (SaaS)</li>
</ul>
<p>Automation is going to be key, and will need to integrate virtualization-aware elements.</p>
<p>Can you imagine if you wanted interoperability in the cloud? People haven&#8217;t even begun thinking about it.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>As you virtualize, your role will change. You will think more about strategy. But keep in mind these &#8220;minefields&#8221; of virtualization:</p>
<ul>
<li>Insufficient planning</li>
<li>Lack of standards</li>
<li>Weak security</li>
</ul>
<p>Security cannot be an afterthought. It has to be planned. We&#8217;ve seen new forms of malware, hypervisor attacks, and root kit infections.</p>
<p>As higher expectations from end users evolve, we&#8217;re becoming not server oriented, but SERVICE oriented.</p>
<p><strong>Tips:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Think holistically</li>
<li>Consider IT culture - equipment and people</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2008 10:11:05 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization">virtualization</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization starts">virtualization starts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization helps">virtualization helps</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/helps">helps</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization depends">virtualization depends</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization holds">virtualization holds</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network">network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network brings transparency">network brings transparency</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cisco">cisco</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/interop-ny-keynotes-cisco/09/2008">Interop NY Keynotes: Cisco</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[PCI vs. SEPA - Friend or Foe?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/36f6a00921fe4aaf9539f1edb660b106</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/36f6a00921fe4aaf9539f1edb660b106</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Ive just attended a PCI special interest group meeting for the payments community in Europe, run by one of the key trade associations in that industry over here, Vendorcom . It was an interesting...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span lang="EN-GB">I&rsquo;ve just attended a PCI special   interest group meeting for the payments community in Europe, run by one of the   key trade associations in that industry over here, <a title="http://www.vendorcom.com/" href="http://www.vendorcom.com/">Vendorcom</a>.   It was an interesting session with a number of different presentations from   various vendors, <a title="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualified_Security_Assessor" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualified_Security_Assessor">QSAs</a> and a   special guest, <B>the Head of IS Governance and Security from one of the   UK&rsquo;s top five retailers on their path   to PCI compliance...</b>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/key trade associations">key trade associations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci compliance">pci compliance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci special">pci special</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/special guest">special guest</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/payments community">payments community</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/uks top">uks top</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/retailers">retailers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/governance">governance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/qsas">qsas</category>
      <source url="http://www.rsa.com/blog/blog_entry.aspx?id=1343">PCI vs. SEPA - Friend or Foe?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Summarizing August's Threatscape]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/01c05fcd5f209b7515be2cee57a93c9b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/01c05fcd5f209b7515be2cee57a93c9b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Following the previous summaries of June's and July's threatscape based on all the research published during the month, it's time to summarize August's threatscape

August's threatscape was dominated...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SL_ZoXre4vI/AAAAAAAACJ0/LKtKpSt0igQ/s1600-h/ddanchev_august.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SL_ZoXre4vI/AAAAAAAACJ0/Phtgyl6rLXQ/s200-R/ddanchev_august.png" /></a>Following the previous summaries of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/summarizing-junes-threatscape.html">June's</a> and <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/summarizing-julys-threatscape.html">July's threatscape</a> based on all the research published during the month, it's time to summarize August's threatscape.<br />
<br />
August's threatscape was dominated by a huge increase of rogue security software domains made possible due to the easily obtainable templates for the sites, several malware campaigns targeting popular social networking sites, Russian's organized cyberattack against Georgia with evidence on who's behind it pointing to "everyone" and a few botnets dedicated to the attack making the whole process easy to outsource and turn responsibility into an "open topic", several new web based botnet management kits and tools found in the wild, evidence that the 76service may in fact be going mainstream since the concept of cybercrime as a service is already emerging, and, of course, a peek at India's CAPTCHA solving economy, where the best comment I've received so far is that every site should embrace reCAPTCHA, so that while solving CAPTCHAs and participating in the abuse of these services in question, they would be also digitizing books. As usual, August was a pretty dynamic month for the middle of summer, with everyone excelling in their own malicious field.<br />
<br />
<b>01.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/mcafees-site-advisor-blocking-nruns-ag.html">McAfee's Site Advisor Blocking n.runs AG - "for starters"</a><br />
False positives are rather common, especially when you're aiming to protect the end user from himself and not let him gain access to "hacking tools", but you're flagging security tools as badware and missing over half the SQL injected domains currently in the wild due to the fact that SiteAdvisor's community still haven't reviewed them - that's not good<br />
<br />
<b>02.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/twitter-malware-campaign-wants-to-bank.html">The Twitter Malware Campaign Wants to Bank With You</a><br />
Twitter, just like every Web 2.0 application, isn't and shouldn't be treated as a unique platform for dissemination of malware, since it's dissemination of malware "as usual". This particular malware campaign was not just executed by a lone gunman, but also, was taking advantage of a flaw allowing the author to add new followers potentially exposing them to the malicious links serving banker malware. For the the time being, MySpace, Facebook and Twitter accounts are the very last thing a malicious attacker is interesting in puchasing accounting data for, but how come? It's all due to the oversupply of automatically registered accounts at other popular services, whose ecosystem of Internet properties empower cybercriminals with the ability to launch, host and distribute malware in between abusing the very same company's services for the blackhat SEO campaign and redirection services. Theoretically, a distributed network build upon the services provided by a single company is faily easy to accomplish due to the single login authentication applied everywhere. A singly bogus Gmail account results in a blackhat SEO hosting blogspot account, flash based redirector hosted at Picasa, and a couple of thousands of spam emails sent automatically sent through Gmail in order to abuse it's trusted email reputation<br />
&nbsp; <br />
<b>03.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/compromised-web-servers-serving-fake.html">Compromised Web Servers Serving Fake Flash Players</a><br />
If aggressiveness matter, this campaign consisting of remotely injected redirection scripts at legitimate sites next to on purposely introduced malware oriented domains, was perhaps the most aggressive one during the month. Fake flash players, fake windows media players and fake youtube players are prone to increase as a social engineering tactic of choice due to the template-ization of malware serving sites for the sake of efficiency<br />
<br />
<b>04.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/pinch-vulnerable-to-remotely.html">Pinch Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw</a><br />
With Zeus vulnerable to a remotely exploitable flaw allowing cybercriminals to hijack other cybercriminal's Zeus botnet, private exploits targeting the still rather popular at least in respect to usefulness Pinch malware are leaking, allowing everyone including security researchers to take a peek at a particular campaign running unpatched Pinch gateway<br />
<br />
<b>05.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/phishers-backdooring-phishing-pages-to.html">Phishers Backdooring Phishing Pages to Scam One Another</a><br />
Backdooring phishing pages is perhaps the most minimalistic approach a cybercriminal wanting to scam another cybercriminal is going to take. The far more beneficial approach that I've encountered on a couple of occassions so far, would be to backdoor a proprietary web malware exploitation kit, release it in the wild, let them put the time and efforts into launching the campaigns, then hijack their botnet. In fact, the possibilities for backdooring copycat web malware exploitation kits in order to take advantage of the momentum while introducing a non-existent kit has always been there at the disposal of malicious attackers. One thing's for sure - there's no such thing as a free web malware exploitation kit, just like there isn't such thing as a free phishing page<br />
<br />
<b>06.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/email-hacking-going-commercial-part-two.html">Email Hacking Going Commercial - Part Two</a><br />
In between the scammers promising the Moon and asking for anything between $20 to $250 to hack into an email account, there are "legitimate" services taking advantage of web email hacking kits consisting of each and every known XSS vulnerability for a particular service in an attempt to increase the chances of the attacker. And given that the majority of these have been patched a long time ago, social engineering comes into play. Do these services have a future? Definitely as more and more people are in fact looking for and requesting such services, in fact, they're willing to pay a bonus considering how exotic it is for them to have any email that they provide hacked into and the accounting data sent back to them<br />
<br />
<b>07.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/russia-vs-georgia-cyber-attack.html">The Russia vs Georgia Cyber Attack</a><br />
Event of the month? Could be, but just like every "event of the moth" everyone seems to be once again restating their "selective retention" preferences. What is selective retention anyway? Selective retention is basically a situation where once Russian is attacking another country's infrastructure, you would automatically conclude that it's Russian FSB behind the attacks and consciously and subconsciously ignore all the research and articles telling you otherwise, namely that the FSB wouldn't even bother acknowledging Georgia's online presence, at least not directly. Moreover, talking about the FSB as the agency behind the cyberattacks indicates "selective retention", talking about FAPSI indicates better understanding of the subject.<br />
<br />
In times when cybercrime is getting ever easier to outsource, anyone following the news could basically orchestrate a large scale DDoS attack against a particular country in order to forward the responsibility to any country that they want to. In Russia vs Georgia, you have a combination of a collectivist society that's possessing the capabilities to launch DDoS attacks, knows where and how to order them, and that in times when your country is engaged in a war conflict drinking beer instead of DDoS-sing the major government sites of the adversary is not an option.<br />
<br />
Selective retention when combined with a typical mainstream media's mentality to "slice the threat on pieces" instead of turning the page as soon as possible, is perhaps the worst possible combination. Furthermore, coming up with <a href="http://intelfusion.net/wordpress/?p=398">Social Network analysis of the cyberattacks</a> would produce nothing more but a few fancy graphs of over enthusiastic Russian netizen's distributing the static list of the targets. The real conversations, as always, are <a href="http://blogs.nyu.edu/blogs/agc282/zia/2008/08/intelfusions_sna_of_russian_cy.html">happening in the "Dark Web" limiting the possibilities for open source intelligence</a> using a data mining software. Things changed, OPSEC is slowly emerging as a concept among malicious parties, whenever some of the "calls for action" in the DDoS attacks were posted at mainstream forums, they were immediately removed so that they don't show up in such academic initiatives<br />
<br />
<b>08.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/76service-cybercrime-as-service-going.html">76Service - Cybercrime as a Service Going Mainstream</a><br />
The reappearance of the 76Service allowing everyone to log into a web based interface and collect all the accounting and financial data coming from malware infected hosts across the globe for the period of time for which they've bought access, indicates that what used to be proprietary services which were supposedly no longer available, are now being operated in a do-it-yourself fashion. Goods and products mature into services, so from a cost-benefit analysis perspective, outsourcing is naturally most beneficial even when it comes to cybercrime <br />
<br />
<b>09.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/whos-behind-georgia-cyber-attacks.html">Who's Behind the Georgia Cyber Attacks?</a><br />
If it's the botnets used in the attacks, they are known, if it's about who's providing the hosting for the command and control, it's the "usual suspects", but just like previous discussion of the Russian Business Network, it remains questionable on whether or not they work on a revenue-sharing basis, are simply providing the anti-abuse hosting, or are the shady conspirators that every newly born RBN expert is positioning them to be.<br />
<br />
Cheap conversation regarding the RBN ultimately serves the RBN, and just for the record, there's a RBN alternative in every country, but the only thing that remains the same are the customers, tracking the customers means exposing the RBN and the international franchises of their services, making it harder to identify their international operations. And given that the "tip of the iceberg", namely RBN's U.S operations remain in tact, talking about taking actions against their international operations in countries where cybercrime law is still pending, is yet another quality research into the topic building up the pile of research into the very same segments of the very same ISPs.<br />
<br />
Just for the record - these "very same ISPs" are regular readers of my blog, and if you analyze their activities, they're definitely reading yours too, ironically, surfing through gateways residing within their netblock that are so heavily blacklisted due to the guestbook and forum spamming activities that their bad reputation usually ends up in another massive blackhat SEO campaign exposed.<br />
<br />
<b>10.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/guerilla-marketing-for-conspiracy-site.html">Guerilla Marketing for a Conspiracy Site</a><br />
Conspiracy theorists may in fact have a new wallpaper to show off with<br />
<br />
<b>11.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/banker-malware-targetting-brazilian.html">Banker Malware Targeting Brazilian Banks in the Wild</a><br />
When misinformed and not knowing anything about a particular underground segment, a potential cybercriminal would stick to using such primitive compared to the sophisticated banker malware kits currently in the wild. These sophisticated banker malware kits are often coming in a customer-tailored proposition, with their price increasing or decreasing based on the specific module to be included or excluded. For instance, a module targeting all the U.S banks that has been put in a "learning mode" long before it was made available to the customers can be requested and is often available with the business model build around the customer's wants&nbsp; <br />
<br />
<b>12.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/compromised-cpanel-accounts-for-sale.html">Compromised Cpanel Accounts For Sale</a><br />
Despite the massive SQL injection attacks, accounting data for Cpanel accounts coming from malware infected hosts seems to be once again coming into play, which isn't surprising given the filtering capabilities and log parsing tools today's botnet masters are empowered with. These very same compromised Cpanel accounts and the associated domains often end up so heavility abused that it's tactics like these that are driving the underground multitasking mentality, namely, abusing a single compromised account for each and every malicious online activity you can think of - even hosting banners for their blackhat SEO services <br />
<br />
<b>13.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two</a><br />
In August we saw a peek of fake security software, neatly typosquatted domains whose authors earn revenue each and every time someone installs the software. The vendors behind this software are forwarding the entire process of driving traffic to those excelling in aggregating traffic and abusing it. As anticipated, underground multitasking started taking place within the fake security software domains, with the people behind them introducing client-side exploits in order to improve the monetization of the traffic coming to the sites<br />
<br />
<b>14.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diy-botnet-kit-promising-eternal.html">DIY Botnet Kit Promising Eternal Updates</a><br />
There's no such thing as a (quality) free botnet kit. What's for free is often the leftovers from a single feature of a more sophisticated proprietary botnet kit. This one in particular is however trying to demonstrate that even a plain simple GUI botnet command and control software can achieve the results desired by an average script kiddie, and not necessarily satisfy the needs of the experienced botnet master<br />
<br />
<b>15.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_20.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three</a><br />
As far as trends and fads are concerned, the majority of the domains are currently parked at up to four different IPs, with most of them going into a stand by mode once they get detected and reappear back couple of weeks later<br />
<br />
<b>16.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/fake-celebrity-video-sites-serving.html">Fake Celebrity Video Sites Serving Malware - Part Two</a><br />
Due to the template-ization of fake celebrity video sites, and simple traffic management tools combined with blackhat SEO tactics, these sites are also prone to increase in the next couple of months<br />
<br />
<b>17.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/web-based-botnet-command-and-control.html">Web Based Botnet Command and Control Kit 2.0</a><br />
It's releases like these that remind us of the amount of time, efforts and personal touch that a malicious attacker would put into such a management kit, currently acting as a personal benchmark as far as complexity and features indicating the coder's experience with botnets is concerned. What's he's failing to anticipate is that this kit is sooner or later going to turn into the "MPack of botnet management"<br />
<br />
<b>18.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_25.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four</a><br />
Keep it coming, we'll keep it exposing until we end up getting down to the "fake software vendor" itself<br />
<br />
<b>19.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/automatic-email-harvesting-20.html">Automatic Email Harvesting 2.0</a><br />
Email harvesting is slowly maturing into a vertically integrated service provided by vendors of managed spamming services. This email harvesting module is aiming to close the page on text obfuscation in respect to fighting spam, and is successfully recognizing and collecting such publicly available emails. From a psychological perspective though, the end users who bothered to obfuscate their emails are less likely to fall victims into phishing scams, with the obfuscation speaking for a relatively decent situational awareness on how they emails end up in a spammer's campaign<br />
<br />
<b>20.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/fake-porn-sites-serving-malware-part.html">Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Three</a><br />
As a firm believer in sampling in order to draw conclusions on the big picture, an approach that has proven highly accurate in modeling historical and upcoming tactics and behavior, a single fake porn site serving malware campaign usually exposes a dozen of misconfigured redirectors, which thanks to their misconfiguration despite the evasive features available within the kits, expose another dozen of malware campaigns<br />
<br />
<b>21.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/facebook-malware-campaigns-rotating.html">Facebook Malware Campaigns Rotating Tactics</a><br />
With no particular flaw exploited other than the social engineering tactic of using already compromised Facebook accounts who would automatically spam all their friends with links to flash files hosted at legitimate services, the more persistent the campaign is, the higher the chance that it will scale enough. This campaign in particular is mainly relying on rotation of tactics, namely different messages, different services and file extensions used in order to trick someone's friend into visiting the URL. With the number of users increasing, the most popular social networking sites are naturally going to be permanently under attacks from cybercriminals<br />
<br />
<b>22.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/fake-security-software-domains-serving.html">Fake Security Software Domains Serving Exploits</a><br />
Despite that it's a single brand, namely the International Virus Research Lab that's introducing client-side exploits within it's portfolio of domains, the opportunity for abuse may be noticed by the rest of the brands pretty fast<br />
<br />
<b>23.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/exposing-indias-captcha-solving-economy.html">Exposing India’s CAPTCHA Solving Economy</a><br />
Taking into consideration the mentality surrounding a particular country's cybercriminals, how they think, how they operate, what do they define as an opportunity, and how much personal efforts are they willing to put into their campaigns, I wouldn't be surpised if a Russian vendor offering 100,000 bogus Gmail accounts for sale has in fact outsourcing the account registration process to Indian workers, paid them pocket change and is then reselling them ten to twenty times higher than the price he originally paid for them. <br />
<br />
The text based CAPTCHAs used at the major Internet portals and services, are so efficiently abused by this approach that continuing to use is directly undermining the trust these email providers and services often come with as granted<div class="feedflare">
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      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 02:57:32 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/facebook malware campaigns">facebook malware campaigns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/usefulness pinch malware">usefulness pinch malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/banker malware kits">banker malware kits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware campaigns">malware campaigns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/botnet">botnet</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/diy botnet kit">diy botnet kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/distribute malware">distribute malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/banker malware">banker malware</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/388609194/summarizing-augusts-threatscape.html">Summarizing August's Threatscape</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Modelling Air Traffic Control]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/7f9e569822e0521bce9615d70124032f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/7f9e569822e0521bce9615d70124032f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Today I will discussa general approach to model air traffic control (ATC)using our CEP/EP reference architecture which is an application of the mature JDL multisensor data fusion model
ATC is an...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Today I will discuss a general approach to model air traffic control (ATC) using our <a href="http://www.thecepblog.com/what-is-complex-event-processing/" target="_blank">CEP/EP reference architecture </a>which is an application of the mature <a href="http://www.data-fusion.org/article.php?sid=70" target="_blank">JDL multisensor data fusion model</a>.</p>
<p>ATC is an excellent working example of complex event processing.   Radar and GPS provide the basic sensory information to accurately track and trace the position of each aircraft in the area of responsibility (AOR) of a particular control tower/zone.     Naturally,  sensory information is preprocessed and formatted in such a way that the data can be processed upstream by multiple real-time applications.</p>
<p>Before we look at complex ATC scenarios, such as &#8220;potential collision&#8221; or &#8220;aircraft off approach vector&#8221; we must trace and trace individual objects, aircraft-objects, accurately with very high confidence.    In addition to tracking aircraft-objects, there is a database of information about the aircraft (ideally), such as make, model, age, range, passengers and other properties about the aircraft-object.      In addition, there is a state-model for each aircraft, for example the aircraft might be &#8220;on the ground&#8221;, &#8220;approaching the runway&#8221;, &#8220;cleared for takeoff&#8221;, &#8220;cruising altitude&#8221;, &#8220;approaching runway&#8221;, &#8220;final decent&#8221; etc.  </p>
<p>Tracking and tracing individual aircraft is what is generally referred to as &#8220;object refinement&#8221; in our CEP/EP reference architecture.   The reason we call this function &#8220;object refinement&#8221; is that system engineers are focused on optimizing the situational knowledge about individual objects.     Sometimes we refer to this function as &#8220;track and trace&#8221; because that is what we are doing to  each object in the model.  In Marc Adler&#8217;s recent <a href="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/09/07/modelling-shoplifting/" target="_blank">shoplifting scenario</a>, Marc was interested in tracking and tracing people in a store using imaging processing techniques to estimate their behavioral patterns.  In the same way, before we can process for scenarios such as &#8220;potential shoplifter&#8221; or &#8220;suspicious criminal gang activity&#8221; we must be able to accurately process (track and trace) individual object, such as people or merchandise.</p>
<p>Back to aircraft and ATC, the &#8220;complex event processing&#8221; begins when we are looking about object-object relationships, in this model, aircraft-to-aircraft, but this is an overly simplistic model, as we have not yet added (to our model) ground features (towers, buildings, power lines), weather (storm cells, wind) and other flying objects (known migratory bird paths, swarms of insects) to our simple model.  </p>
<p>Complex event processing occurs when we are processing multiple objects in our model looking for threats in real-time.     Practically speaking, all ATC applications are CEP applications.  This means that vendors and integrators who build ATC applications are also CEP vendors.   </p>
<blockquote><p>Editorial Note: CEP/EP has been around for a long time and was not recently invented in the past decade as some &#8220;inventors&#8221; would like for us to believe. </p></blockquote>
<p>As you can imagine, there is considerable &#8220;complex event processing&#8221; that goes on &#8220;behind the scenes&#8221; to provide air traffic controllers and pilots situational knowledge into the &#8220;friendly skies&#8221;.   As you might further imagine, the situation is more complex when the skies are &#8220;not so friendly&#8221;, for example, in air combat situations.   </p>
<p>Processing myriad objects is not the end of the processing &#8220;chain&#8221;.  For example, decisions are being made constantly about potential damage, alternative airports, and more.    In our reference model, we refer to this, generally speaking, as &#8220;impact assessment&#8221; because we must take an estimated detected complex event, for example &#8220;aircraft collision,&#8221; and estimate potential damage based on numerous factors such as, the amount of jet fuel in the aircrafts and the location of the aircrafts (over a large city or rural area, near a hospital and emergency services).   Regardless of the scenario, an impact assessment is normally required before optimal decisions can be made.</p>
<blockquote><p>This is true, by the way, for our <a href="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/09/07/modelling-shoplifting/" target="_blank">shoplifting example</a> (the impact is different if a piece of gum is stolen versus a $1,000,000 diamond necklace or weapons-grade nuclear material) and other scenarios and models.  Static data (information about objects) is required for accurate decision processing.  </p></blockquote>
<p>Impact assessment is not the end of the &#8220;knowledge chain&#8221;.    Decisions are constantly being made that effect resources.  For example, suggestion an alternative route for an aircraft is a resource management decision.    Turning on and off radar or switching to alternative tracking devices is a resource management function.  In our CEP/EP reference model (based on the JDL data fusion model), we call this &#8220;resource management&#8221;.   This function includes contacting emergency services and directing them to a potential crash location or sending out a message to instruct all aircraft to stay off a certain radio frequency.  Resource management is critical.</p>
<p>Our simple ATC model today is by no means complete, it just scratches the surface.  In fact, I have a very close friend, <a href="http://www.linkedin.com/pub/0/b45/b16" target="_blank">Mark Secrist</a>, who is a former Marine fighter pilot and currently a senior captain for <a href="http://www.aa.com" target="_blank">American Airlines</a>.   I have asked Mark to read this post and help me further refine this crude &#8220;laymans&#8221; ATC model (Thanks Mark!).</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 08 Sep 2008 09:27:26 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/model">model</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/crude laymansatc model">crude laymansatc model</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/state-model">state-model</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/simple atc model">simple atc model</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/complex">complex</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/isconsiderable complex event">isconsiderable complex event</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/overly simplistic model">overly simplistic model</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/complex event">complex event</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/simple model">simple model</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/09/08/modelling-air-traffic-control/">Modelling Air Traffic Control</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[A New Way to Back Up Digital Files on paper]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f29b43ae964909cbeacf815e65f8018e</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f29b43ae964909cbeacf815e65f8018e</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[This is pretty funny a free open source application where you can backup your data by printing it, on paper, in a bar code format. A friend of mine says he tried it and that it even works
PaperBack is...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is pretty funny &#8212; a free open source application where you can backup your data by printing it, on paper, in a bar code format. A friend of mine says he tried it and that it even works &#8211;</p>
<blockquote><p>PaperBack is a free application that allows you to back up your precious files on the ordinary paper in the form of the oversized bitmaps. If you have a good laser printer with the 600 dpi resolution, you can save up to 500,000 bytes of uncompressed data on the single A4/Letter sheet. Integrated packer allows for much better data density - up to 3,000,000+ (three megabytes) of C code per page.</p>
<p>You may ask - why? Why, for heaven&#8217;s sake, do I need to make paper backups, if there are so many alternative possibilities like CD-R&#8217;s, DVD±R&#8217;s, memory sticks, flash cards, hard disks, streamer tapes, ZIP drives, network storages, magnetooptical cartridges, and even 8-inch double-sided floppy disks formatted for DEC PDP-11? (I still have some). The answer is simple: you don&#8217;t. However, by looking on CD or magnetic tape, you are not able to tell whether your data is readable or not. You must insert your medium into the drive (if you have one!) and try to read it.</p>
<p>Paper is different. Do you remember the punched cards? EBCDIC and all this stuff. For years, cards were the main storage medium for the source code. I agree that 100K+ programs were&#8230; unhandly, but hey, only real programmers dared to write applications of this size. And used cards were good as notepads, too. Punched tapes were also common. And even the most weird codings, like CDC or EBCDIC, were readable by humans (I mean, by real programmers).</p></blockquote>
<p>Read the <a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="http://www.ollydbg.de/Paperbak/index.html">whole thing here.<br />
</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 04 Sep 2008 04:28:19 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/paper">paper</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/code">code</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/source code">source code</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/paper backups">paper backups</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/real programmers dared">real programmers dared</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data density">data density</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/real programmers">real programmers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/flash cards">flash cards</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/itsecurity/~3/383345885/">A New Way to Back Up Digital Files on paper</source>
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