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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: glitch]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/glitch</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[License server glitch exposes SonicWall users to threats]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/1146b5e929cf48394af0a00cb19264d4</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/1146b5e929cf48394af0a00cb19264d4</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[A technical problem in a license management server at SonicWall created havoc Tuesday for users of the company's e-mail security products, leaving many customers temporarily unprotected against spam,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A technical problem in a license management server at SonicWall created havoc Tuesday for users of the company's e-mail security products, leaving many customers temporarily unprotected against spam, phishing and malware threats while others were unable to log into their own systems.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 02 Dec 2008 21:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/e-mail security products">e-mail security products</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/license management server">license management server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/havoc tuesday">havoc tuesday</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware threats">malware threats</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sonicwall">sonicwall</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/users">users</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/customers temporarily">customers temporarily</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/unable">unable</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/technical">technical</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/120308-license-server-glitch-exposes-sonicwall.html?fsrc=rss-security">License server glitch exposes SonicWall users to threats</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[License server glitch exposes SonicWall users to e-mail security threats]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/1fc806fa160add21ea877a1ea34aecb4</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/1fc806fa160add21ea877a1ea34aecb4</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[A technical problem in a license management server left some users of SonicWall's e-mail security appliances unprotected against spam, phishing and malware threats for several...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A technical problem in a license management server left some users of SonicWall's e-mail security appliances unprotected against spam, phishing and malware threats for several hours.<br style="clear: both;"/>
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]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 02 Dec 2008 02:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/e-mail security appliances">e-mail security appliances</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/license management server">license management server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware threats">malware threats</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sonicwall">sonicwall</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/users">users</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hours">hours</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/technical">technical</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam">spam</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.computerworld.com/click.phdo?i=b86105a0be6eb0e2abb874eb3447ffa2">License server glitch exposes SonicWall users to e-mail security threats</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The DDoS Attack Against Bobbear.co.uk]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/290801c330ee41caec63af5966719ea1</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/290801c330ee41caec63af5966719ea1</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[When you get the &quot;privilage&quot; of getting DDoS-ed by a high profile DDoS for hire service used primarily by cybercriminals attacking other cybercriminals, you're officially doing hell of a good job...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SSNmn4J-fjI/AAAAAAAACeM/iaTooLo_YGA/s1600-h/ddos_for_hire_bobbear.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SSNmn4J-fjI/AAAAAAAACeM/iaTooLo_YGA/s200/ddos_for_hire_bobbear.png" /></a>When you get the "privilage" of <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=2188">getting DDoS-ed by a high profile DDoS for hire service</a> used primarily by cybercriminals attacking other cybercriminals, you're officially doing hell of a good job exposing <a href="http://www.bobbear.co.uk/">money laundering scams</a>.<br />
<br />
The attached screenshot demonstrates how even the relatively more sophisticated countersurveillance approaches taken by a high profile DDoS for hire service can be, and were in fact bypassed, ending up in a real-time peek at how they've dedicated 4 out of their 10 BlackEnergy botnets to Bobbear exclusively.<br />
<br />
Perhaps for the first time ever, I come across a related DoS service offered by the very same vendor - <b>insider sabotage on demand given they have their own people in a particular company/ISP in question</b>. Makes you think twice before considering a minor network glitch what could easily turn into a coordinated insider attack requested by a third-party. Moreover, now that I've also established the connection between this DDoS for hire service and one of the command and control locations (all active and online) of one of the botnets used in the <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1670">Russia vs Georgia cyberattack</a>, the <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/malware-infected-hosts-as-stepping.html">concept of engineering cyber warfare tensions</a> once again proves to be <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/whos-behind-georgia-cyber-attacks.html">a fully realistic one</a>. <br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1095">A U.S military botnet in the works</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/10/ddos-attack-graphs-from-russia-vs.html">DDoS Attack Graphs from Russia vs Georgia's Cyberattacks</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/botnet-on-demand-service.html">Botnet on Demand Service</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/04/osint-through-botnets.html">OSINT Through Botnets</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/05/corporate-espionage-through-botnets.html">Corporate Espionage Through Botnets</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/ddos-attack-against-cnncom.html">The DDoS Attack Against CNN.com</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/new-ddos-malware-kit-in-wild.html">A New DDoS Malware Kit in the Wild</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/electronic-jihad-v30-what-cyber-jihad.html">Electronic Jihad v3.0 - What Cyber Jihad Isn't</a><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=vAULN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=vAULN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=ReZlN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=ReZlN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=Xyy4n"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=Xyy4n" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=jkNqn"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=jkNqn" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=R21XN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=R21XN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=vKYRN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=vKYRN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=Mwlxn"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=Mwlxn" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/458461988" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 Nov 2008 05:35:01 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ddos">ddos</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ddos attack">ddos attack</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ddos-ed">ddos-ed</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ddos malware kit">ddos malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ddos attack graphs">ddos attack graphs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hire service">hire service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/profile ddos">profile ddos</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/botnets">botnets</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blackenergy botnets">blackenergy botnets</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/458461988/ddos-attack-against-bobbearcouk.html">The DDoS Attack Against Bobbear.co.uk</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Worm Risk Spurs Critical Microsoft Patch]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/8cf9511bc9ea45e86f1aba005afcf898</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/8cf9511bc9ea45e86f1aba005afcf898</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[A scary security flaw that would allow malicious worms to infect one PC and then automatically jump to others prompted Microsoft to release a rare out-of-cycle patch in October. The glitch is critical...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A scary security flaw that would allow malicious worms to infect one PC and then automatically jump to others prompted Microsoft to release a rare out-of-cycle patch in October. The glitch is critical for both 32-bit and 64-bit versions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, and for Windows Server 2000. Microsoft says that targeted attacks exploited the hole prior to the patch's release, and that "detailed exploit code" is currently available online.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 12 Nov 2008 21:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/patch">patch</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/windows">windows</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/windows server">windows server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rare out-of-cycle patch">rare out-of-cycle patch</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/microsoft">microsoft</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/scary security flaw">scary security flaw</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malicious worms">malicious worms</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/64-bit versions">64-bit versions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/critical">critical</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/111308-worm-risk-spurs-critical-microsoft.html?fsrc=rss-security">Worm Risk Spurs Critical Microsoft Patch</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Site tracking voting problems has glitch of its own]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ab39700fbd2cea01862918a5c0b89abc</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ab39700fbd2cea01862918a5c0b89abc</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[A Web site set up to monitor voting problems in the presidential election suffered some technical difficulties of its...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A Web site set up to monitor voting problems in the presidential election suffered some technical difficulties of its own.<br style="clear: both;"/>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 04 Nov 2008 02:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web site set">web site set</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/presidential election">presidential election</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/technical difficulties">technical difficulties</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/monitor">monitor</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.computerworld.com/click.phdo?i=ad688ad74e0a64696ed56c81a2c0ffeb">Site tracking voting problems has glitch of its own</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[After password glitch, Firefox patch due next week]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f911e394b35d0360cca574c03a91753b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f911e394b35d0360cca574c03a91753b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Mozilla developers are rushing out a new release of their Firefox browser to fix a bug that has been preventing some Web surfers from using saved passwords this...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Mozilla developers are rushing out a new release of their Firefox browser to fix a bug that has been preventing some Web surfers from using saved passwords this week.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 24 Sep 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/week">week</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mozilla developers">mozilla developers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/saved passwords">saved passwords</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/firefox browser">firefox browser</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web surfers">web surfers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fix">fix</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/release">release</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bug">bug</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/092508-after-password-glitch-firefox-patch.html?fsrc=rss-security">After password glitch, Firefox patch due next week</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[VMware Bug Is Worse Than a Glitch To Some Users]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/c3f9ccedec4d1a69959b9d0bdf707eca</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/c3f9ccedec4d1a69959b9d0bdf707eca</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[There is an unfortunate trend at VMware these days. The trend is in the release of their...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[There is an unfortunate trend at VMware these days. The trend is in the release of their updates.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vmware">vmware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/trend">trend</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/release">release</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/days">days</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/081308-vmware-bug-is-worse-than.html?fsrc=rss-security">VMware Bug Is Worse Than a Glitch To Some Users</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Q&A with Sergey Katsev of Coyote Point Systems]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/e57e1ace426f0aef838f8f362c558571</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/e57e1ace426f0aef838f8f362c558571</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I recently had the opportunity to sit down with Sergey Katsev , an Engineering Project Manager at Coyote Point Systems and discuss his experiences with InteropNet and talk about the Coyote Point...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I recently had the opportunity to sit down with <a href="http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=24405331" target="_blank">Sergey Katsev</a>, an Engineering Project Manager at <a href="http://coyotepoint.com/" target="_blank">Coyote Point Systems</a> and discuss his experiences with InteropNet and talk about the Coyote Point products.  With a couple of years of experience as a vendor for Interop, he had some interesting insights in to how participating in the InteropNet can help a vendor.</p>
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> How long have you been involved in InteropNet?</p>
<p><strong>Katsev: </strong>I started at Coyote Point 3 years ago and <a href="http://blog.interop.com/2006" target="_blank">InteropNet 2006</a> was my first &#8220;big&#8221; assignment.  This was the first time Coyote Point had put in a proposal to participate, so we were very excited when we were selected.</p>
<p><strong></strong></p>
<p><strong>ScienceLogic: </strong>How long has Coyote Point been involved in Interop overall?</p>
<p><strong>Katsev: </strong>We&#8217;ve been exhibiting at Interop for a number of years, and after seeing the InteropNet in action, we decided to submit a proposal in &#8216;06.  We were actually one of the first companies in the load balancing/traffic management space (we&#8217;ve been doing this for almost 10 years), so we have a lot of experience to share with InteropNet.</p>
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What is your role at Coyote Point?</p>
<p>My official title is &#8220;Engineering Project Manager&#8221;.  Basically, that means that I&#8217;m in charge of product releases and maintenance.  It sounds like a weird title for someone participating in InteropNet, but I&#8217;ve actually found it extremely useful since my position means that I don&#8217;t get to see our systems out in the field a lot.  We&#8217;ve added several features and have ideas for others just from my experiences at InteropNet.</p>
<p><strong></strong></p>
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What do the Coyote Point products do?</p>
<p><strong>Katsev: </strong>Coyote Point makes a Traffic Management appliance called <a href="http://coyotepoint.com/products/e650.php" target="_blank">Equalizer</a>.  What this means is that any traffic destined for a datacenter&#8217;s servers goes through our appliances and we make sure that the server which is best equipped to handle it, does.  Our systems sit between the clients and the servers and monitor the client traffic and the state of the servers.  If the clients start sending more traffic, we&#8217;ll balance it out so that no server is overloaded.  If one of the servers stops responding or starts responding very slowly, we&#8217;ll steer traffic away from that server.</p>
<p><strong>ScienceLogic: </strong>In what way are your products being used as part of InteropNet?</p>
<p><strong>Katsev: </strong>In the InteropNet, we&#8217;re utilizing a lot of our expertise:  We&#8217;re making sure that traffic is balanced and servers are redundant for show services such as DNS and SMTP.  We&#8217;re also using our geographic load balancing technology to ensure that the ScienceLogic EM7 appliances and some other internal NOC services are available from anywhere, with the lowest latency, with our <a href="http://www.coyotepoint.com/products/xcel.php" target="_blank">SSL acceleration </a>and <a href="http://www.coyotepoint.com/products/express.php" target="_blank">GZIP compression technology</a>.  Finally, we&#8217;re helping logistics in the NOC by allowing a physical separation between systems <a href="http://blog.interop.com/interopnet/2008/04/what-are-these-peds-you-speak-of" target="_blank">located in the NOC</a> and those in an emergency rack outside of the NOC.  If either of these two locations were to fail, the network will continue operating without a glitch.</p>
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> Are there any special considerations for Interop that cause you to deploy your systems there differently that any other place?</p>
<p><strong>Katsev: </strong>Interop is definitely different than most of our customer installations.   One difference from a standard environment is that the network (at least this year) is one large flat network, with pieces carved out where extra security is needed.  Because of this, we can actually run our failover pairs of Equalizer systems in a non-standard configuration where the two peers are in different racks, or even on different floors.  That&#8217;s one of the things that I really like about InteropNet &#8212; it definitely brings new ideas to mind, which end up becoming &#8217;special configuration&#8217; white papers after the show.</p>
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> Has InteropNet taught you anything that caused you to actually change your product?</p>
<p><strong>Katsev: </strong>In addition to the failover configuration differences I mentioned above, participating in InteropNet has actually caused us to add several new features and allowed configurations.  One example is the &#8220;no-spoof&#8221; option for <a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/dcmmpmb53rjp5hr8/" target="_blank">Layer 4 clusters</a>.  Prior to the 2006 shows, we always &#8217;spoofed&#8217; the client&#8217;s IP address when talking to a server so that the server would see the client&#8217;s IP address instead of our own.  At Interop, we ran into a special configuration which would&#8217;ve been very difficult to set up in this manner, so our engineers added this feature, and it&#8217;s been very a very popular configuration with our customers ever since.</p>
<p>We have also had a couple of business relationships that extended outside of the show.  In 2006, we had a good experience using <a href="http://www.spirent.com/analysis/index.cfm?media=3&amp;ws=2" target="_blank">Spirent Communications</a> gear to benchmark the network, so we ended up purchasing a couple of these systems to test our products.  More recently, we have found a way to bundle our Equalizer e350si load balancers with the ScienceLogic <a href="http://www.sciencelogic.com/techdiagram.htm" target="_blank">EM7 collector appliances</a> to help ScienceLogic get the best performance in load balancing large quantities of syslog messages to be processed.  If it wasn&#8217;t for our participation in InteropNet, neither of these relationships would&#8217;ve happened.</p>
<p><strong>ScienceLogic: </strong>What’s the best part of being involved with InteropNet?  What do you most look forward to?</p>
<p><strong>Katsev: </strong>InteropNet is an amazing networking opportunity (no pun intended).  The group of engineers that put the network together every year is, well, amazing.  There is so much combined experience that any question instantly has several possible answers, and the best answer is chosen very quickly.  One of the &#8217;sayings&#8217; at Interop is &#8220;if you run into a problem, ask someone&#8230; we&#8217;ve probably seen that problem before&#8230; five times.&#8221;  One would think that being part of InteropNet is the same thing, year after year.  However, in the two years that I&#8217;ve been part of this (for four shows), there have been huge differences in the way that the network is designed and put together.  These are both because the vendors selected every year are different, and because the engineers who design the network change from year to year.  Somehow, though, when all is said and done, we have a <a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/interop-las-vegas-2008-some-interesting-stats/06/2008" target="_blank">network that works</a>.</p>
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> You don’t have to answer this one if you’re not comfortable… What would you like to see changed with the way things are done at InteropNet?</p>
<p><strong>Katsev: </strong>This isn&#8217;t a cop-out&#8230; I really can&#8217;t think of anything I would do differently.  Sure, there are small problems that pop up sometimes, but every project has those, and the people at InteropNet are more than capable of figuring them all out.  In fact, I know that Interop started out as a show to test the interoperability of devices&#8230; but I&#8217;m still amazed that all of these devices actually talk to each other and <a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/qa-with-geoff-horne-of-interopnet/06/2008" target="_blank">&#8220;play nice&#8221; together</a>.</p>
<p><a href="http://sharethis.com/item?&wp=abc&amp;publisher=ea11358c-69de-4e80-9804-e964a8930b70&amp;title=Q%26%23038%3BA+with+Sergey+Katsev+of+Coyote+Point+Systems&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fblog.sciencelogic.com%2Fqa-with-sergey-katsev-of-coyote-point-systems%2F08%2F2008">ShareThis</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 05 Aug 2008 12:34:35 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/katsev">katsev</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sergey katsev">sergey katsev</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/interopnet">interopnet</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/coyote">coyote</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/systems">systems</category>
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      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network">network</category>
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      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/qa-with-sergey-katsev-of-coyote-point-systems/08/2008">Q&amp;A with Sergey Katsev of Coyote Point Systems</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Summarizing July's Threatscape]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2860027a1eaa69350d814429c3bf6070</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2860027a1eaa69350d814429c3bf6070</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[July's threatscape -- consider going through June's summary as well -- once again demonstrated that nothing is impossible, the impossible just takes a little longer where the incentive would be the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJLdSTaizDI/AAAAAAAAB_E/WogqT88LBdc/s1600-h/ddanchev_july.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJLdSTaizDI/AAAAAAAAB_E/Bb9z-K3ib7c/s200-R/ddanchev_july.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>July's threatscape -- consider going through <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/summarizing-junes-threatscape.html">June's summary</a> as well -- once again demonstrated that nothing is impossible, the impossible just takes a little longer where the incentive would be the ultimate monetization of the process.<br />
<br />
Russian hacktivists attacking Lithuania and Georgia, several Storm Worm campaigns, a couple of new malware tools, Neosploit team abandoning support for their web malware exploitation kit, CAPTCHA for several of the most popular free email providers getting efficiently attacked in order to resell the bogus accounts registered in the process, several copycat SQL injects next to the evasion techniques applied by the copycats, botnets continuing to commit click fraud and generate revenue for those who own or have rented them, an infamous money mule recruitment service taking advantage of the fast-fluxed network provided by the ASProx botnet - pretty interesting month indeed.<br />
<br />
<b>01.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/decrypting-and-restoring-gpcode.html">Decrypting and Restoring GPcode Encrypted Files</a> -<br />
The GPcode authors read the news too, and are catching up with the major weaknesses pointed out in their previous release in order to come with a virtually unbreakable algorithm. And since more evidence of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/whos-behind-gpcode-ransomware.html">who's behind the GPcode ransomware</a> was gathered, vendors and independent researchers realized that the latest release is also susceptible to a plain simple flaw, namely the encrypted files were basically getting deleting and not securely erased making them fairly easy to recover.<br />
<br />
<b>02.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/chinese-bloggers-bypassing-censorship.html">Chinese Bloggers Bypassing Censorship by Blogging Backward</a> -<br />
When you know how it works, you can either improve, abuse or destroy it in that very particular order. Chinese bloggers are always very adaptive in respect to spreading their message by obfuscating their messages in a way that common keywords filtering software wouldn't be able to pick them.<br />
<br />
<b>03.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/gmail-yahoo-and-hotmails-captcha-broken.html">Gmail, Yahoo and Hotmail’s CAPTCHA Broken</a> -<br />
This has been an urban legend for a while, but with more services starting to offer hundreds of thousands of pre-registered accounts at these providers, it's surprising that <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1514">spam and phishing emails coming from legitimate email providers is increasing</a>. The "vendors" behind these propositions are naturally starting to "vertically integrate" by offering value-added services for extra payments, namely, scripts to automatically abuse the pre-registered accounts for automatic registration of splogs and anything else malicious or blackhat SEO related.<br />
<br />
<b>04.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/antivirus-industry-in-2008.html">The Antivirus Industry in 2008</a> -<br />
If it were anyone else but a security vendor to come up with such a realistic cartoon aiming to stimulate innovation by emphasizing on how prolific and sophisticated malware groups have become, it would have been a biased cartoon. However, this one is courtesy of a security vendor, and it's pretty objective.<br />
<br />
<b>05.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lithuania-attacked-by-russian.html">Lithuania Attacked by Russian Hacktivists, 300 Sites Defaced</a> -<br />
This attack is a good example of a decent PSYOPS operation. Of course they have already build the capabilities to deface and even execute DDoS attacks against Lithuania, so why not put them in a "stay tuned" mode, by speculating on the upcoming attack and then executing it making it look like they delived what they've promised? This a lone gunman mass defacement given that the sites were all hosted on a single ISP, with no indication of any kind of coordination whatsoever. The same for the <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1533">Georgia President’s web site which was under DDoS attack from Russian hackers</a> later this month. Despite that the hacktivists behind it dedicated a separate C&amp;C for the attack, one that hasn't been used in any type of previous attacks so far, they did a minor mistake by using a secondary command and control location that's known to have been connected with a particular "botnet on demand" service in the past. The second attack once again proves that you don't need to build capacity when you can basically outsource the process to someone else.<br />
<br />
<b>06.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/icann-responds-to-dns-hijacking-its.html">The ICANN Responds to the DNS Hijacking, Its Blog Under Attack</a> -<br />
The ICANN finally issued a statement concerning the DNS hijacking of some of their domains, which is in fact what Comcast.net and Photobucket.com should have done as well, next to stating it was a "glitch". The ICANN also took advantage of the moment and also pointed out that their blog has also been under attack during the month. There's no better example of how the combination of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/icann-and-ianas-domain-names-hijacked.html"> tactics can result in the hijacking of the domains</a> of the organizations implementing procedures aiming to protect against these very same attacks. And while Photobucket.com remained silent during the entire incident, the hosting provider that was used by the Netdevilz team in the two attacks, since they were also responsible for the ICANN and IANA DNS hijackings, <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/update-to-photobuckets-dns-hijacking.html">technological and social engineeringissued a statement</a>.<br />
<br />
<b>07.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/risks-of-outdated-situational-awareness.html">The Risks of Outdated Situational Awareness</a> -<br />
Security vendors are often in a "catch-up mode" and if I were an average Internet user not knowing that real-time situational awareness speaks for the degree to which my vendor knows what going on online, I'd be pretty excited. However, I'm not. <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1085">Prevx were catching up with a service which I covered approximately two months ago</a>, I even had the chance to constructively confront with one of the affected sites on how despite their security measures in place, this attack was still possible. Recently <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/07/18/limbo_trojan/">Prevx have once again demonstrated an outdated situational awareness</a> by coming across a banking malware in July 2008, whereas the malware has been around since July 2007, and earlier depending on which version you're referring to.<br />
<br />
<b>08.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/fake-porn-sites-serving-malware-part.html">Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Two</a> -<br />
Yet another domain portfolio of fake porn sites serving rogue codecs and live exploit URLs, just the tip of the iceberg as usual, however their centralization is greatly assisting in tracking them down.<br />
<br />
<b>09.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/storm-worms-us-invasion-of-iran.html">Storm Worm's U.S Invasion of Iran Campaign</a> -<br />
Stormy Wormy is once again making the headlines with their ability to actually make up the headlines on their own.<br />
<br />
<b>10.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/mobile-malware-scam-isexplayer-wants.html">Mobile Malware Scam iSexPlayer Wants Your Money</a> -<br />
The best scams are the ones to which you've personally agreed to be scammed with without even knowing it. Like this one, which was tracked down and analyzed a couple of hours once a uset tipped on it.<br />
<br />
<b>11.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/template-ization-of-malware-serving.html">The Template-ization of Malware Serving Sites</a> -<br />
The increase of fake porn and celebrity sites is due to the overall template-ization of these, with the people behind them basically implementing several malicious doorways to ensure that the domains get rotated on the fly. Despite that they all look the same, they all sever different type of malware, and zero porn of celebrity content at all except the thumbnails.<br />
<br />
<b>12.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/violating-opsec-for-increasing.html">Violating OPSEC for Increasing the Probability of Malware Infection</a> -<br />
No better way to expose your affiliations and several unknown bad netblocks so far, by adding the netblocks and the malicious domains as trusted sites upon infecting a PC with the malware. Of course, the usual suspects lead the "trusted netblocks".<br />
<br />
<b>13.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/monetizing-compromised-web-sites.html">Monetizing Compromised Web Sites</a> -<br />
Several years ago, a script kiddie would install Apache on a mail server, they claim that they defaced it. Today, these amusing situations are replaced by monetization of the compromised sites, by reselling the access to them to blackhat SEO-ers, malware authors, phishers, or personally starting to manage a scammy infrastructure on them, by earning money on an affiliate based model, like this particular attack.<br />
<br />
<b>14.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/malware-and-office-documents-joining.html">Malware and Office Documents Joining Forces</a> -<br />
A recent DIY malware kit, sold as a proprietary tool basically crunching out malware infected office documents, whose built-in obfuscation makes them harder to detect. It will sooner or later leak out, turning into a commodity tool, a process that's been pretty evident for web malware exploitation kits as well.<br />
<br />
<b>15.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/are-stolen-credit-card-details-getting.html">Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?</a> -<br />
Depends on who you're buying them from, and whether or not they offer discounts on a volume basis, namely the more you buy the cheaper the price of a card is supposed to get. With the current oversupply of stolen credit card details, what used to be an exclusive good once where they could enjoy a higher profit-margin, is today's commodity good.<br />
<br />
<b>16.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-malware-kit-updated-with.html">The Neosploit Malware Kit Updated with Snapshot ActiveX Exploit</a> -<br />
Since alll the web malware exploitation kits are open source, and leaked in the wild at large, their modularity allows everyone to easily embed any type of exploit that they want to, resulting in Neosploit's single most beneficial feature, the fact that certain versions include all the publicly available exploits targeting Internet Explorer, Firefox and Opera. Moreover, the open source nature of the kit is resulting in a countless number of modified versions yet to be detected and analyzed, therefore keeping track of the exploits included in a malware kit can only be realistic if you take into considered the exploits that come with the default installation.<br />
<br />
<b>17.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/obfuscating-fast-fluxed-sql-injected.html">Obfuscating Fast-fluxed SQL Injected Domains</a> -<br />
Now that's a very good example of different tactics combined to attack, ensure survivability, and apply a certain degree of evasion in between.<br />
<br />
<b>18.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/unbreakable-captcha.html">The Unbreakable CAPTCHA</a> -<br />
There's never been a shortage of ideas, there's always been an issue of usability.<br />
<br />
<b>19.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/ayyildiz-turkish-hacking-group-vs.html">The Ayyildiz Turkish Hacking Group VS Everyone</a> -<br />
That's a pretty inspiring mission if you are to ensure your future in the next couple of years, by targeting everyone, everywhere that has ever publicly stated their disagreement with the Turkish foreign policy.<br />
<br />
<b>20.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/money-mule-recruiters-use-asproxs-fast.html">Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services</a> -<br />
A true multitasking in action with a botnet that's been crunching out phishing emails, SQL injecting and now hosting a well known money mule recruitment service. <br />
<br />
<b>21.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/sql-injecting-malicious-doorways-to.html">SQL Injecting Malicious Doorways to Serve Malware</a> -<br />
Constantly switching tactics and combining different ones to achive an objective that used to be accomplished by plain simple techniques, is only starting to take place. In this case, instead of a hard coded SQL injected domain, we have the typical malicious doorways the result of the converging traffic management tools with web malware exploitation kits.<br />
<br />
<b>22.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/impersonating-stopbadwareorg-to-serve.html">Impersonating StopBadware.org to Serve Fake Security Warnings</a> -<br />
Typosquatting popular security vendors and services is nothing new, by having HostFresh providing the hosting for the parked domains promoting the rogue security software, is a privilege and flattery for the success of the Stopbadware initiative.<br />
<br />
<b>23.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire</a> -<br />
Customerization -- not customization -- has been taking place for a while, that's the process of tailoring your upcoming products to the needs of your future customers, compared to the product concept myopia where the malware coder would code something that he believes would be valuable to the potential customers. End user agreements, issuing licenses for the malware tool, as well as forbidding the reverse engineering of the malware so that no remotely exploitable flaws could be, are among the requirements the coder assists on.<br />
<br />
<b>24. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lazy-summer-days-at-ukrtelegroup-ltds.html">Lazy Summer Days at UkrTeleGroup Ltd</a><b> -</b><br />
Taking a random snapshot of the current malicious activity at a well known provider of hosting services for rogue security applications, live exploit URLs and botnet command&amp;control locations, always provides an insight into what are their customers up to. In this case, centralization of their scammy ecosystem, and parking a countless number of rogue domains on the same server.<br />
<br />
<b>25. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/email-hacking-going-commercial.html">Email Hacking Going Commercial</a> -<br />
Cybercrime is in fact getting easier to outsource, and while the number of scammers trying to offer non-existent services, or at least services where they cannot deliver the goods, the business model of this service that is that you only pay once they show you a proof that they've managed to hack the email address you game them. How are they doing it? Social engineering and enticing the user to click on live exploit URL from where they'll infect the PC and obtain the email password, of course, next to definitely abusing it for many other purposes in the process.<br />
<br />
<b>26.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/vulnerabilities-in-antivirus-software.html">Vulnerabilities in Antivirus Software - Conflict of Interest</a> -<br />
You can easily twist the number of vulnerabilities found in your antivirus solution, but not recognizing them as vulnerabilities at the first place. It's all a matter of what you define as a vulnerability, or perhaps what you admit as a serious vulnerability - remote code execution through a security software, or a flaw that's allowing malware to bypass the security solution itself.<br />
<br />
<b>27. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/counting-bullets-on-malware-front.html">Counting the Bullets on the (Malware) Front</a> -<br />
Emphasizing on the number of malware/threats/viruses/worms/slugs your solution detects may be marketable in the short-term, but is damaging the end user's understanding of the threatscape in the long-term. So, by the time he catches up with what exactly is going on, he'll recall the moment in time where he was using the number of threats his solution was detecting as the main benchmark for its usefulness. In reality through, the number is irrelevant from a pro-active point of view, with zero day malware like the one coded for hire undermining the signatures based scanning model.<br />
<br />
<b>28. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/smells-like-copycat-sql-injection-in.html">Smells Like a Copycat SQL Injection In the Wild</a> -<br />
It was pretty obvious that copycats seeing the success of SQL injections the the huge number of sites susceptible to exploitation, would also starting taking advantage of the practice. Some are, however, targeting local communities and trying to avoid detection by using targeted SQL injections.<br />
<br />
<b>29. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/click-fraud-botnets-and-parked-domains.html">Click Fraud, Botnets and Parked Domains - All Inclusive</a> -<br />
The scheme is nothing new, what's new is that the botnet masters are trying to limit the revenues that used to go out to affiliate networks they were participating in, and are trying to own or rent the entire infrastructure on their own.<br />
<br />
<b>30. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/over-80-percent-of-storm-worm-spam-sent.html">Over 80 percent of Storm Worm Spam Sent by Pharmaceutical Spam Kings</a><b> -</b><br />
With access to Storm Worm sold and resold, and new malware introduced on Storm Worm infected hosts used as foundation for the propagation of the new malware in this case, it's questionable whether or not the Storm Worm-ers themselves are sending out the junk emails, or are they people who've rented access to the botnet doing it. <br />
<br />
<b>31. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-team-leaving-it-underground.html">Neosploit Team Leaving the IT Underground</a> -<br />
Pretty surprising at the first place, but in reality it clearly demonstrates that when you cannot enforce the end user agreement on your crimeware kit, but continue seeing it used in a very profitable malware operations, you basically shut down the support for the public version. The team is not going to stop innovating for their own purposes, and in the long-term they may in fact re-appear with an updated malware kit that's converging different services next to the product itself.<br />
<br />
<b>32. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/dissecting-managed-spamming-service.html">Dissecting a Managed Spamming Service</a> - <br />
Managed spamming services using botnets as the foundation for the campaigns are starting to introduce improved metrics for the delivery, as well as experienced customer support ensuring the spam messages make it through spam filters, or at least increase the probability of making the happen. This is an example of a random service emphasizing on the improved metrics they're capable of delivering.<br />
<br />
<b>33. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/storm-worms-lazy-summer-campaigns.html">Storm Worm's Lazy Summer Campaigns</a> -<br />
Looks like a "cybercrime intern" launched this campaign, lacking any of the usual Storm Worm evasive practices, no exploitation of client side vulnerabilities, as well as no survivability offered by their usual fast-flux nodes.<div class="feedflare">
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</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/352993637" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Aug 2008 12:08:24 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/profitable malware operations">profitable malware operations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware authors">malware authors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware tools">malware tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware coder">malware coder</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware kit">malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware infection">malware infection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/neosploit malware kit">neosploit malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam">spam</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/352993637/summarizing-julys-threatscape.html">Summarizing July's Threatscape</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Facebook bug leaks members' birthday data]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a64eb129aea14fb47c362bc5525d48ee</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a64eb129aea14fb47c362bc5525d48ee</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[A glitch in a test version of Facebook's Web site inadvertently exposed the birthdays of Facebook's 80 million members this...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A glitch in a test version of Facebook's Web site inadvertently exposed the birthdays of Facebook's 80 million members this week.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/facebook">facebook</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web site inadvertently">web site inadvertently</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/test version">test version</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/million">million</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/week">week</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/birthdays">birthdays</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/glitch">glitch</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/071608-facebook-bug-leaks-members-birthday.html?fsrc=rss-security">Facebook bug leaks members' birthday data</source>
    </item>
  </channel>
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