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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: half]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/half</link>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2008 05:38:33 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
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      <title><![CDATA[(ISC)2s Newest Cash Cow: The CSSLP Certification]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/4d2aae6d17ac0d88114660137a62c55f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/4d2aae6d17ac0d88114660137a62c55f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Earlier this week, during the OWASP AppSec 2008 Conference , the people behind the ubiquitous CISSP certification announced their latest creation the Certified Software Security Lifecycle Professional...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Earlier this week, during the <a href="http://www.owasp.org/index.php?title=OWASP_NYC_AppSec_2008_Conference">OWASP AppSec 2008 Conference</a>, the people behind the ubiquitous CISSP certification announced their latest creation &#8212; the <a href="http://isc2.org/csslp">Certified Software Security Lifecycle Professional</a> (CSSLP).  In front of a captive audience waiting for a 42&#8243; plasma TV to be raffled, the <a href="http://blog.isc2.org/isc2_blog/tipton/index.html">Executive Director of (ISC)2</a> outlined this new certification designed to appeal to application security professionals.  To his credit, Mr. Tipton stated very clearly that the CSSLP is not intended to measure one&#8217;s technical skillset.  Unfortunately, it&#8217;s inevitable that employers will treat it as such.</p>
<p>You can read all the details on their website (except for the part about the certification not being a measure of practical skills).  From what I can tell, the CSSLP is just the CISSP with different CBKs, or Common Bodies of Knowledge.  As with the CISSP, they are going for broad knowledge, not depth.  Starting in June 2009, you can get certified by taking a paper exam, likely a multiple choice test similar to the CISSP.  Why June?  Because the test isn&#8217;t even written yet &#8212; I&#8217;ve heard from several sources that they are actively soliciting their existing pool of CISSPs to help write test questions.</p>
<p>Ah, but what if you can&#8217;t wait that long and want to get certified <i>right away</i>?  You&#8217;re in luck. If you act before March 31, 2009, you can get grandfathered in without even having to take the exam!  That&#8217;s right, they call it the <a href="https://www.isc2.org/cgi-bin/content.cgi?category=1691">CSSLP Experience Assessment</a>, and here are the requirements:</p>
<div style="float:right; margin-left: 15px"><a href="http://www.veracode.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/101-hand_with_money.jpg"><img src="http://www.veracode.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/101-hand_with_money-191x300.jpg" alt="" title="101-hand_with_money" width="191" height="300" class="alignright size-medium wp-image-372 photoborder" /></a></div>
<ul>
<li>Upload a resume showing three years of experience related to software security, or four years if you don&#8217;t have a college degree</li>
<li>Write short essays (500 words maximum) discussing four CBKs of your choice</li>
<li>Get a CISSP to vouch for you</li>
<li>Pay $650</li>
<p>
</ul>
<p>Let&#8217;s examine these requirements one at a time.</p>
<p><b>Three years of experience</b>.  (ISC)2 doesn&#8217;t provide any requirements on depth of experience, other than citing the broadly-defined CBKs.  Considering they are targeting everyone from software developers to security assessors to business analysts (yes, really), chances are they are going to accept any experience that is even tangential to the SDLC or software security.</p>
<p><b>Short essays on four of the CBKs</b>.  I asked the (ISC)2 exhibitors specifically what they are looking for to satisfy this requirement, and they said the essays should be a general discussion of the CBK topic, <i>optionally</i> citing your personal experience in that area if you have any.  This messaging is not quite aligned with the website guidance, which states that the essays should be &#8220;Accomplishment Records&#8221; which are self-reported descriptions of experience.  Either way, with a maximum essay length of 500 words, it&#8217;s pretty obvious that substance is not (ISC)2&#8217;s first priority.  Here&#8217;s one data point for you: I spoke to someone who has already submitted the CSSLP Experience Assessment, and he said it took about an hour to write the essays.</p>
<p><b>Get a CISSP to vouch for you</b>.  Actually this can be any (ISC)2 certified person, not just CISSPs.  Contrary to what you&#8217;d expect, though, the person isn&#8217;t vouching for your skillset so much as they are confirming that the attestations on your resume are accurate.</p>
<p><b>Pay $650</b>.  You knew it was coming.  After all, there is money to be made.  How is it that qualifying for the CSSLP through professional experience should cost $650?  If you&#8217;re taking the written exam, fair enough, (ISC)2 does incur the cost of administering and grading that exam (even though the <a href="http://www.scantron.com/datacollection/scanners.aspx">Scantron machine</a> is probably paid off by now).  But $650 for the submitted-online Experience Assessment?  If we assume that the person reading these essay submissions makes a rather generous $100k per year, then $650 accounts for roughly a day and a half.  Will it really take that long to read a <i>maximum</i> of 2,000 words and pass judgment?  Of course not.  (ISC)2 wants to get as many people as possible to qualify based on &#8220;experience&#8221;, seeding the initial pool of CSSLPs and netting them $650 per head for doing next to nothing.</p>
<p>As <a href="http://www.ljkushner.com/about_mstr.html">Lee Kushner</a> stated during his OWASP AppSec presentation (<i>7 Habits of Highly Effective Career Managers</i>), &#8220;the more people who own a cert, the less relevant it becomes.&#8221;  Irrelevant &#8212; that&#8217;s exactly what the CISSP has become, and it&#8217;s exactly where the CSSLP is headed.  Meanwhile, (ISC)2 will sit back and watch while you and your employers continue to fill their coffers.</p>
<p>In closing, let me acknowledge that this blog entry probably comes across as judgmental.  I accept that.  I&#8217;m not ranting against the idea of certifications, though admittedly <a href="http://www.veracode.com/blog/2008/04/not-a-cissp/">I&#8217;m not a fan of them either</a>.  I am disappointed that (ISC)2, an organization with tremendous influence, could have created something more meaningful but chose not to. Why bother when people will just fork over the cash anyway?</p>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2008 11:08:38 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/csslp">csslp</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/csslp experience assessment">csslp experience assessment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/experience assessment">experience assessment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/certification">certification</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/experience">experience</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/isc">isc</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal experience">personal experience</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ubiquitous cissp certification">ubiquitous cissp certification</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cissp">cissp</category>
      <source url="http://www.veracode.com/blog/2008/09/isc2s-newest-cash-cow-csslp/">(ISC)2s Newest Cash Cow: The CSSLP Certification</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[Online Privacy Education is working, But.]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/b1cb1795e643c5b852d75e53cfdd120c</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/b1cb1795e643c5b852d75e53cfdd120c</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[If you want to be safe people, then educate yourselves in how to do it! Dont trust that all is warm and fuzzy out there in the ones and zeros place


clipped from www.webpronews.com
Americans Anxious...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div > If you want to be safe people, then educate yourselves in how to do it!<br/>Dont trust that all is warm and fuzzy out there in the ones and zeros place. </div>
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<td valign="top"><a href="http://clipmarks.com/clipmark/4B87F6A2-F51E-412E-ABD1-7AE10DFEF398/" title="go to this clipmark"><img src="http://content.clipmarks.com/blog_icon/25c3f381-1ed4-4420-8c0d-a615edba6247/4B87F6A2-F51E-412E-ABD1-7AE10DFEF398/" alt="" width="19" height="19" border="0" style="vertical-align: middle; margin: 0px 4px; display: inline; border: none; float:none;" /></a>clipped from <a title="http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2008/09/25/americans-anxious-over-online-privacy" href="http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2008/09/25/americans-anxious-over-online-privacy" style="font-size: 11px;">www.webpronews.com</a></td>
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<td valign="top"><!-- CLIPPED FROM: http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2008/09/25/americans-anxious-over-online-privacy --><H2>Americans Anxious Over Online Privacy </H2></td>
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<td valign="top"><!-- CLIPPED FROM: http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2008/09/25/americans-anxious-over-online-privacy --><P>The majority (61%) believe what they do online is private and not shared without their permission. Just over half (57%) falsely believe that companies are required to identify themselves and indicate why they are collecting data.</P></td>
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<td valign="top"><!-- CLIPPED FROM: http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2008/09/25/americans-anxious-over-online-privacy --><P>Just under half (48%) incorrectly believe their consent is required for companies to use personal information they collect from online activities and 43 percent wrongly believe a court order is needed to monitor activities online.</P></td>
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<td valign="top"><!-- CLIPPED FROM: http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2008/09/25/americans-anxious-over-online-privacy --><P>People are aware that information about their surfing habits is being collected online, but many do not know what companies do with their information.</P></td>
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<td style="background:transparent;border-width:0px;padding:0px;">&nbsp;</td>
<td align="right" style="background:transparent;border-width:0px;padding:0px;width:107px" width="107"><a href="http://clipmarks.com/share/4B87F6A2-F51E-412E-ABD1-7AE10DFEF398/blog/" title="blog or email this clip"><img src="http://content8.clipmarks.com/images/c2b-foot.png" border="0" alt="blog it" width="107" height="17" style="border-width:0px;padding:0px;margin:0px;" /></a></td>
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      <pubDate>Sat, 27 Sep 2008 12:10:10 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/online">online</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/online privacy">online privacy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/online activities">online activities</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/monitor activities online">monitor activities online</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/safe people">safe people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/companies">companies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/people">people</category>
      <source url="http://spywarebiz.com/spywarebizblog/?p=632">Online Privacy Education is working, But.</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[Around The Web For Friday]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/854f3c7cd7fbfd4b803df29d7a415b9d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/854f3c7cd7fbfd4b803df29d7a415b9d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Were frequently asked what were reading and what we like in blog posts, so here are some interesting things that hit our RSS readers that you may have missed
COBIT rivals ITIL from The IT Skeptic...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We&#8217;re frequently asked what we&#8217;re reading and what we like in blog posts, so here are some interesting things that hit our RSS readers that you may have missed:</p>
<p><a href="http://www.itskeptic.org/node/692"><strong>COBIT rivals ITIL from The IT Skeptic</strong></a></p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;Everyone is tiptoeing around the fact that COBIT offers a significant competitive body of knowledge (BOK) to ITIL. Sure ITIL goes into more depth in places, but to say COBIT sits over the top is to grossly understate the overlap. COBIT extends a long way down into the &#8220;how&#8221; and it does it with an intellectual rigour that ITIL lacks.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Interesting stuff that.  A detailed mapping might help some folks.  Either way, the good news for those keen on understanding risk management is that governance metrics, done right, allow us to understand a part of that &#8220;capability to manage risk&#8221; we&#8217;re always looking for.   Assurance, verification and the acquisition and interpretation of knowledge is king.   Speaking of which&#8230;.</p>
<p><a href="http://spiresecurity.typepad.com/spire_security_viewpoint/2008/09/how-to-tell-when-nothing-happens.html"><strong>How To Tell When &#8220;Nothing Happens&#8221; by Pete Lindstrom</strong></a></p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;&#8230;problem is that, it isn&#8217;t really true that &#8220;nothing happens&#8221; when you employ some specific security control to prevent an exploit. Not only that, but even when it is difficult to collect data on what didn&#8217;t happen, one can devise experiments to tell how frequently that nothing occurred.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p><em>Good</em> analysis is all about the uncertainty.   Speaking of accounting for uncertainty&#8230;</p>
<p><a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/09/assets-good-until-reached-for.html"><strong>Assets Good Until Reached For by Gunnar Peterson</strong></a></p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;If you have a 100,000 dekstops or 100,000 servers it hard to manage. You will need to automate and to do that you need to abstract, but you should also realize that its a drawing on a whiteboard not reality. You need abstraction assurance.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>And there&#8217;s the trick.  We might call &#8220;abstraction assurance&#8221; an analog to &#8220;confidence&#8221; or &#8220;uncertainty&#8221; in certain priors (metrics) or posteriors (calculated values based on those metrics).  The stronger that abstraction assurance is, the less uncertainty we have in our knowledge and the better our ability to create wisdom from that knowledge (you know, make decisions).</p>
<p><a href="http://www.emergentchaos.com/archives/2005/12/epstein_snow_an.html"><strong>Epstein, Snow and Flake: Three Views of Software Security by Adam Shostack</strong></a></p>
<p>Adam&#8217;s focus is on software security, but the discussion here can be abstracted out into the broader realm of risk management quite nicely.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/825?ref=rss"><strong>Two-thirds of firms hit by cybercrime from Security Focus</strong></a></p>
<p>The US DoJ says that in 2005 (there&#8217;s some timely data) 2/3 of their surveyed firms detected at least one cybercrime.  &#8220;Cybercrime&#8221; is &#8220;classified &#8230; into cyber attacks, cyber theft, and other incidents.&#8221;  Pretty general.  Also from the report:  &#8220;Computer viruses made up more than half of all cyber attacks.&#8221;</p>
<p>(That sound you hear is me tapping my forehead lightly on large iron object)</p>
<p><a href="http://blog.ca-grc.com/2008/09/lessons-learned-from-%E2%80%9Cpersonal%E2%80%9D-risk-management/"><strong>Lessons Learned from “Personal” Risk Management By: Christopher Daugherty</strong></a></p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;This process is what I call “personal risk management.”  All of us have done it and will continue to do so.  Why is it, then, many companies have ignored following similar principles with the on-going health of the business?  This is a debate with many different answers so I ask you to select the best answer for your employer:</p>
<p>a) Have not ignored as this keeps me awake at night!</p>
<p>b) Please restate the problem, I cannot hear well with my head buried in the sand.</p>
<p>c) We passed our SOX audit so we checked this off the list!</p>
<p>d) We are informed of the challenge but we have a business to run and profits to make</p>
<p>e) Is this what internal audit and risk management has been telling us?&#8221;</p></blockquote>
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      <pubDate>Fri, 26 Sep 2008 08:56:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/call abstraction assurance">call abstraction assurance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/abstraction assurance">abstraction assurance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal risk management">personal risk management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk management">risk management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/assurance">assurance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/itil">itil</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/itil lacks">itil lacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cobit rivals itil">cobit rivals itil</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software security">software security</category>
      <source url="http://riskmanagementinsight.com/riskanalysis/?p=450">Around The Web For Friday</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[Over half admit they dont know if they are secure!]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f2c80233382d89f76c872775fe5df122</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f2c80233382d89f76c872775fe5df122</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Educating the masses continues to be a problem even with all the latest headlines about ID theft


clipped from www.net-security.org


Lack of awareness of privacy and security software



The results...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div > Educating the masses continues to be a problem even with all the latest headlines about ID theft.<br/> </div>
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<td valign="top"><a href="http://clipmarks.com/clipmark/EBD2CEAE-4FA1-4DC7-AB32-E49F7F600075/" title="go to this clipmark"><img src="http://content.clipmarks.com/blog_icon/055d2311-f252-453a-a9c5-8b82eaba411f/EBD2CEAE-4FA1-4DC7-AB32-E49F7F600075/" alt="" width="19" height="19" border="0" style="vertical-align: middle; margin: 0px 4px; display: inline; border: none; float:none;" /></a>clipped from <a title="http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=6567" href="http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=6567" style="font-size: 11px;">www.net-security.org</a></td>
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<td valign="top"><!-- CLIPPED FROM: http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=6567 --><DIV class="dernek-text"><br />
Lack of awareness of privacy and security software</DIV></td>
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<td valign="top"><!-- CLIPPED FROM: http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=6567 --><DIV><br />
The results show that an alarmingly high proportion of users did not know what software was running on their computers to ensure they had adequate protection from hackers, malware, viruses, ‘dirty’ websites, and other online threats. More than one-tenth of respondents (13%) said they did not have any anti-virus software installed on their machines at all, while a further 9% did not know if anti-virus was installed. Almost one-fifth of respondents (19%) did not know if they had firewalls installed.</DIV></td>
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<td align="right" style="background:transparent;border-width:0px;padding:0px;width:107px" width="107"><a href="http://clipmarks.com/share/EBD2CEAE-4FA1-4DC7-AB32-E49F7F600075/blog/" title="blog or email this clip"><img src="http://content9.clipmarks.com/images/c2b-foot.png" border="0" alt="blog it" width="107" height="17" style="border-width:0px;padding:0px;margin:0px;" /></a></td>
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      <pubDate>Wed, 24 Sep 2008 19:45:18 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security software">security software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software">software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/anti-virus software">anti-virus software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/anti-virus">anti-virus</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/respondents">respondents</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/online threats">online threats</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/masses continues">masses continues</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dirty websites">dirty websites</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/protection">protection</category>
      <source url="http://spywarebiz.com/spywarebizblog/?p=627">Over half admit they dont know if they are secure!</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Interop NY: IT Roundtable]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/4137ad5ff76308605c9861b27c7d0404</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/4137ad5ff76308605c9861b27c7d0404</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[This session is a bit different than the usual sessions at Interop. It provides insights from three CIOs in three different industries
Moderator: Jim Metzler, Vice President, Ashton, Metzler &amp;...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This session is a bit different than the usual sessions at Interop. It provides insights from three CIOs in three different industries.</p>
<ul>
<li>Moderator: Jim Metzler, Vice President, Ashton, Metzler &amp; Associates</li>
<li>Rowan Snyder, CIO, KPMG</li>
<li>David Michael, CIO, United Business Media Group</li>
<li>Joanna Young, Chief Information Officer, Corporate Information Systems &amp; Enterprise Services, Liberty Mutual</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Jim: Is the CIO a technical job anymore? For example, inside Liberty there are business projects with an IT component.</strong></p>
<p><strong>Joanna:</strong> We are organized to partner with internal business clients or vendors who provide objectives and business requirements. We strive to figure out the smallest amount of an IT investment we can make to get this to work.</p>
<p><strong>Rowan:</strong> We have both. Part of the dilemma is that the thing that sells the best is fear. I don&#8217;t want to use that to get business.</p>
<p><strong>Joanna:</strong> One good example is security from an application perspective. It&#8217;s hard to talk about security investments in business terms. We put it into terms like &#8220;this is what it will cost us if we DON&#8217;T do this.&#8221; For example, a solution for spam required us to do research into what it was costing us overall. Once we put it together, the business was all for it. You have to put your business hat on and think &#8220;how can I make this important for a businessperson?&#8221; If you can&#8217;t, you may need to ask yourself why you&#8217;re pushing services on them that they may not need.</p>
<p><strong>Jim: Can you give us insight into business-IT alignment? What about governance?</strong></p>
<p><strong>Rowan:</strong> Governance is the hardest part of IT. It&#8217;s not like the technology is easy. If it&#8217;s a business project with an IT component, I don&#8217;t usually get involved. It comes down to overall budget. The infrastructure we own and let people know exactly what it will cost to do it. We are a distributed IT firm, there are multiple groups. This is the most distributed and risk-prone organization I&#8217;ve worked in. It can be difficult for the business to exert control. It demonstrates risk, in security, compliance, methodologies, etc.</p>
<p><strong>Joanna:</strong> Governance has become a word that nobody wants to use. It suddenly implies that IT is the holder of all the money and they are the ones that get to decide. We stopped using that word and position IT as a strategic business partner.</p>
<p><strong>David:</strong> We have a highly decentralized IT set-up. We have about 600 globally and around 40 in the headquarters. We have 10 CIOs for each division, and within each division it is decentralized. We try to run each unit as autonomous. This is a close alignment with IT and business. However, then the problem of how do you have commonality between divisions and collaboration?</p>
<p><strong>Jim: How can you minimize risk in distributed environment using standards and procedures?</strong></p>
<p><strong>David:</strong> The reality is it can be impractical for an organization. You end up with a patchwork of platforms and technologies. We have to accept that we&#8217;ll have multiple solutions. We can attempt to push a standard, but overall have a much more relaxed approach to manage everything. There is a lot of equality between divisions in what they can choose to purchase.</p>
<p><strong>Joanna:</strong> Standards are easier to apply the further down the staff you are. The most important thing with any of this is to understand why you are making the decisions. If there is a process and pros and cons are identified, there is a clear record of why decisions were made.</p>
<p><strong>Audience Poll: Everyone raised their hand that MORE standards were needed</strong>.</p>
<p><strong>Audience Question: Are there inefficiencies in the data center in terms of energy and green IT? What are you doing about it?</strong></p>
<p><strong>Joanna:</strong> Everyone focuses on cars for carbon footprints. But, it&#8217;s really buildings&#8230;and then data centers. The data center has the same importance as any other efficiency. They need to be running as cheaply as possible. Corporations have a responsibility to make sure they are energy efficient.</p>
<p><strong>Rowan:</strong> We recently did a carbon footprint analysis, and found that half of carbon comes from electricity, with half of that from the data center.</p>
<p><strong>David:</strong> Every company does have a responsibility to look at its carbon emission globally. Consider international travel, flying, etc. As much as possible, we are not building data centers. We are using other people&#8217;s data centers in an effort to get out of the data center business.</p>
<p><strong>Audience Question: How do you balance the good from standards with agile development and possible roadblocks?</strong></p>
<p><strong>Joanna:</strong> Luckily agile development is under the CIO&#8217;s control. You can see the lifecycle and savings that occur. When I look, I check what the standards are that I&#8217;m measuring by.</p>
<p><strong>Jim: Does web 2.0 have any business meaning in your environment? If so, what are you doing about it?</strong></p>
<p><strong>Joanna:</strong> I&#8217;ve been in IT for 20 years. It&#8217;s another component to business IT investment, and has to be presented as such. As IT professionals we have a responsibility to identify what Web 2.0 is, and then translate to see if there is anything the company should be doing with it. Monitor it based on your current portfolio, and consider its impact.</p>
<p><strong>David:</strong> It&#8217;s pretty important to our business as a media company. I don&#8217;t think it means one thing, it&#8217;s a term people use to talk about the web and what&#8217;s going on online. From mobile, to ajax, cloud computing or mashups - you can draw multiple conclusions. More and more business is being done online. We have a lot of growth opportunities online.</p>
<p><strong>Rowan:</strong> Compliance, security, and privacy issues just explode with Web 2.0.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2008 15:45:01 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business">business</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/terms">terms</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data center business">data center business</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data center">data center</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business terms">business terms</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business projects">business projects</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business-it alignment">business-it alignment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/internal business clients">internal business clients</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business hat">business hat</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/interop-ny-it-roundtable/09/2008">Interop NY: IT Roundtable</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[GPS Spoofing]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/301910a8390d678e528ed1556dd2bb4e</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/301910a8390d678e528ed1556dd2bb4e</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Interesting : Jon used a desktop computer attached to a GPS satellite simulator to create a fake GPS signal. Portable GPS satellite simulators can fit in the trunk of a car, and are often used for...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://philosecurity.org/2008/09/07/gps-spoofing">Interesting</a>:</p>

<blockquote>Jon used a desktop computer attached to a GPS satellite simulator to create a fake GPS signal. Portable GPS satellite simulators can fit in the trunk of a car, and are often used for testing. They are available as commercial off-the-shelf products. You can also rent them for less than $1K a week -- peanuts to anyone thinking of hijacking a cargo truck and selling stolen goods.

<p>In his first experiments, Jon placed his desktop computer and GPS satellite simulator in the cab of his small truck, and powered them off an inverter. The VAT used a second truck as the victim cargo truck. "With this setup," Jon said, "we were able to spoof the GPS receiver from about 30 feet away. If our equipment could broadcast a stronger signal, or if we had purchased stronger signal amplifiers, we certainly could have spoofed over a greater distance."</p>

<p>During later experiments, Jon and the VAT were able to easily achieve much greater GPS spoofing ranges. They spoofed GPS signals at ranges over three quarters of a mile. "The farthest distance we achieved was 4586 feet, at Los Alamos," said Jon. "When you radiate an RF signal, you ideally want line of sight, but in this case we were walking around buildings and near power lines. We really had a lot of obstruction in the way. It surprised us." An attacker could drive within a half mile of the victim truck, and still override the truck's GPS signals.</blockquote></p><div class="feedflare">
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</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2008 03:03:53 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/gps">gps</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fake gps signal">fake gps signal</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/signal">signal</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/gps satellite simulator">gps satellite simulator</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/truck">truck</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/victim truck">victim truck</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/victim cargo truck">victim cargo truck</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/stronger signal amplifiers">stronger signal amplifiers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cargo truck">cargo truck</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/09/gps_spoofing.html">GPS Spoofing</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[News from the Rock Phish Gang]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/dc125c8b2486a48f9daca3db254eb1ea</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/dc125c8b2486a48f9daca3db254eb1ea</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Definitely interesting : Based in Europe, the Rock Phish group is a criminal collective that has been targeting banks and other financial institutions since 2004. According to RSA, they are...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.rsa.com/blog/blog_entry.aspx?id=1338">Definitely</a> <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/09/05/rock_phish_and_asprox_team_up/">interesting</a>:</p>

<blockquote>Based in Europe, the Rock Phish group is a criminal collective that has been targeting banks and other financial institutions since 2004. According to RSA, they are responsible for half of the worldwide phishing attacks and have siphoned tens of millions of dollars from individuals' bank accounts. The group got its name from a now discontinued quirk in which the phishers used directory paths that contained the word "rock."

<p>The first sign the group was expanding operations came in April, when it introduced a trojan known alternately as Zeus or WSNPOEM, which steals sensitive financial information in transit from a victim's machine to a bank. Shortly afterward, the gang added more crimeware, including a custom-made botnet client that was spread, among other means, using the Neosploit infection kit.</p>

<p>[...]</p>

<p>Soon, additional signs appeared pointing to a partnership between Rock Phishers and Asprox. Most notably, the command and control server for the custom Rock Phish crimeware had exactly the same directory structure of many of the Asprox servers, leading RSA researchers to believe Rock Phish and Asprox attacks were using at least one common server. (Researchers from Damballa were able to confirm this finding after observing malware samples from each of the respective botnets establish HTTP proxy server connections to a common set of destination IPs.)</blockquote> </p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=DDIkL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=DDIkL" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=LsDIL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=LsDIL" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 03:47:38 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rock">rock</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rock phish">rock phish</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/phishers">phishers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rock phishers">rock phishers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attacks">attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/asprox attacks">asprox attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/asprox">asprox</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rsa researchers">rsa researchers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rsa">rsa</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/09/news_from_the_r.html">News from the Rock Phish Gang</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Summarizing August's Threatscape]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/01c05fcd5f209b7515be2cee57a93c9b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/01c05fcd5f209b7515be2cee57a93c9b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Following the previous summaries of June's and July's threatscape based on all the research published during the month, it's time to summarize August's threatscape

August's threatscape was dominated...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SL_ZoXre4vI/AAAAAAAACJ0/LKtKpSt0igQ/s1600-h/ddanchev_august.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SL_ZoXre4vI/AAAAAAAACJ0/Phtgyl6rLXQ/s200-R/ddanchev_august.png" /></a>Following the previous summaries of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/summarizing-junes-threatscape.html">June's</a> and <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/summarizing-julys-threatscape.html">July's threatscape</a> based on all the research published during the month, it's time to summarize August's threatscape.<br />
<br />
August's threatscape was dominated by a huge increase of rogue security software domains made possible due to the easily obtainable templates for the sites, several malware campaigns targeting popular social networking sites, Russian's organized cyberattack against Georgia with evidence on who's behind it pointing to "everyone" and a few botnets dedicated to the attack making the whole process easy to outsource and turn responsibility into an "open topic", several new web based botnet management kits and tools found in the wild, evidence that the 76service may in fact be going mainstream since the concept of cybercrime as a service is already emerging, and, of course, a peek at India's CAPTCHA solving economy, where the best comment I've received so far is that every site should embrace reCAPTCHA, so that while solving CAPTCHAs and participating in the abuse of these services in question, they would be also digitizing books. As usual, August was a pretty dynamic month for the middle of summer, with everyone excelling in their own malicious field.<br />
<br />
<b>01.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/mcafees-site-advisor-blocking-nruns-ag.html">McAfee's Site Advisor Blocking n.runs AG - "for starters"</a><br />
False positives are rather common, especially when you're aiming to protect the end user from himself and not let him gain access to "hacking tools", but you're flagging security tools as badware and missing over half the SQL injected domains currently in the wild due to the fact that SiteAdvisor's community still haven't reviewed them - that's not good<br />
<br />
<b>02.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/twitter-malware-campaign-wants-to-bank.html">The Twitter Malware Campaign Wants to Bank With You</a><br />
Twitter, just like every Web 2.0 application, isn't and shouldn't be treated as a unique platform for dissemination of malware, since it's dissemination of malware "as usual". This particular malware campaign was not just executed by a lone gunman, but also, was taking advantage of a flaw allowing the author to add new followers potentially exposing them to the malicious links serving banker malware. For the the time being, MySpace, Facebook and Twitter accounts are the very last thing a malicious attacker is interesting in puchasing accounting data for, but how come? It's all due to the oversupply of automatically registered accounts at other popular services, whose ecosystem of Internet properties empower cybercriminals with the ability to launch, host and distribute malware in between abusing the very same company's services for the blackhat SEO campaign and redirection services. Theoretically, a distributed network build upon the services provided by a single company is faily easy to accomplish due to the single login authentication applied everywhere. A singly bogus Gmail account results in a blackhat SEO hosting blogspot account, flash based redirector hosted at Picasa, and a couple of thousands of spam emails sent automatically sent through Gmail in order to abuse it's trusted email reputation<br />
&nbsp; <br />
<b>03.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/compromised-web-servers-serving-fake.html">Compromised Web Servers Serving Fake Flash Players</a><br />
If aggressiveness matter, this campaign consisting of remotely injected redirection scripts at legitimate sites next to on purposely introduced malware oriented domains, was perhaps the most aggressive one during the month. Fake flash players, fake windows media players and fake youtube players are prone to increase as a social engineering tactic of choice due to the template-ization of malware serving sites for the sake of efficiency<br />
<br />
<b>04.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/pinch-vulnerable-to-remotely.html">Pinch Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw</a><br />
With Zeus vulnerable to a remotely exploitable flaw allowing cybercriminals to hijack other cybercriminal's Zeus botnet, private exploits targeting the still rather popular at least in respect to usefulness Pinch malware are leaking, allowing everyone including security researchers to take a peek at a particular campaign running unpatched Pinch gateway<br />
<br />
<b>05.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/phishers-backdooring-phishing-pages-to.html">Phishers Backdooring Phishing Pages to Scam One Another</a><br />
Backdooring phishing pages is perhaps the most minimalistic approach a cybercriminal wanting to scam another cybercriminal is going to take. The far more beneficial approach that I've encountered on a couple of occassions so far, would be to backdoor a proprietary web malware exploitation kit, release it in the wild, let them put the time and efforts into launching the campaigns, then hijack their botnet. In fact, the possibilities for backdooring copycat web malware exploitation kits in order to take advantage of the momentum while introducing a non-existent kit has always been there at the disposal of malicious attackers. One thing's for sure - there's no such thing as a free web malware exploitation kit, just like there isn't such thing as a free phishing page<br />
<br />
<b>06.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/email-hacking-going-commercial-part-two.html">Email Hacking Going Commercial - Part Two</a><br />
In between the scammers promising the Moon and asking for anything between $20 to $250 to hack into an email account, there are "legitimate" services taking advantage of web email hacking kits consisting of each and every known XSS vulnerability for a particular service in an attempt to increase the chances of the attacker. And given that the majority of these have been patched a long time ago, social engineering comes into play. Do these services have a future? Definitely as more and more people are in fact looking for and requesting such services, in fact, they're willing to pay a bonus considering how exotic it is for them to have any email that they provide hacked into and the accounting data sent back to them<br />
<br />
<b>07.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/russia-vs-georgia-cyber-attack.html">The Russia vs Georgia Cyber Attack</a><br />
Event of the month? Could be, but just like every "event of the moth" everyone seems to be once again restating their "selective retention" preferences. What is selective retention anyway? Selective retention is basically a situation where once Russian is attacking another country's infrastructure, you would automatically conclude that it's Russian FSB behind the attacks and consciously and subconsciously ignore all the research and articles telling you otherwise, namely that the FSB wouldn't even bother acknowledging Georgia's online presence, at least not directly. Moreover, talking about the FSB as the agency behind the cyberattacks indicates "selective retention", talking about FAPSI indicates better understanding of the subject.<br />
<br />
In times when cybercrime is getting ever easier to outsource, anyone following the news could basically orchestrate a large scale DDoS attack against a particular country in order to forward the responsibility to any country that they want to. In Russia vs Georgia, you have a combination of a collectivist society that's possessing the capabilities to launch DDoS attacks, knows where and how to order them, and that in times when your country is engaged in a war conflict drinking beer instead of DDoS-sing the major government sites of the adversary is not an option.<br />
<br />
Selective retention when combined with a typical mainstream media's mentality to "slice the threat on pieces" instead of turning the page as soon as possible, is perhaps the worst possible combination. Furthermore, coming up with <a href="http://intelfusion.net/wordpress/?p=398">Social Network analysis of the cyberattacks</a> would produce nothing more but a few fancy graphs of over enthusiastic Russian netizen's distributing the static list of the targets. The real conversations, as always, are <a href="http://blogs.nyu.edu/blogs/agc282/zia/2008/08/intelfusions_sna_of_russian_cy.html">happening in the "Dark Web" limiting the possibilities for open source intelligence</a> using a data mining software. Things changed, OPSEC is slowly emerging as a concept among malicious parties, whenever some of the "calls for action" in the DDoS attacks were posted at mainstream forums, they were immediately removed so that they don't show up in such academic initiatives<br />
<br />
<b>08.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/76service-cybercrime-as-service-going.html">76Service - Cybercrime as a Service Going Mainstream</a><br />
The reappearance of the 76Service allowing everyone to log into a web based interface and collect all the accounting and financial data coming from malware infected hosts across the globe for the period of time for which they've bought access, indicates that what used to be proprietary services which were supposedly no longer available, are now being operated in a do-it-yourself fashion. Goods and products mature into services, so from a cost-benefit analysis perspective, outsourcing is naturally most beneficial even when it comes to cybercrime <br />
<br />
<b>09.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/whos-behind-georgia-cyber-attacks.html">Who's Behind the Georgia Cyber Attacks?</a><br />
If it's the botnets used in the attacks, they are known, if it's about who's providing the hosting for the command and control, it's the "usual suspects", but just like previous discussion of the Russian Business Network, it remains questionable on whether or not they work on a revenue-sharing basis, are simply providing the anti-abuse hosting, or are the shady conspirators that every newly born RBN expert is positioning them to be.<br />
<br />
Cheap conversation regarding the RBN ultimately serves the RBN, and just for the record, there's a RBN alternative in every country, but the only thing that remains the same are the customers, tracking the customers means exposing the RBN and the international franchises of their services, making it harder to identify their international operations. And given that the "tip of the iceberg", namely RBN's U.S operations remain in tact, talking about taking actions against their international operations in countries where cybercrime law is still pending, is yet another quality research into the topic building up the pile of research into the very same segments of the very same ISPs.<br />
<br />
Just for the record - these "very same ISPs" are regular readers of my blog, and if you analyze their activities, they're definitely reading yours too, ironically, surfing through gateways residing within their netblock that are so heavily blacklisted due to the guestbook and forum spamming activities that their bad reputation usually ends up in another massive blackhat SEO campaign exposed.<br />
<br />
<b>10.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/guerilla-marketing-for-conspiracy-site.html">Guerilla Marketing for a Conspiracy Site</a><br />
Conspiracy theorists may in fact have a new wallpaper to show off with<br />
<br />
<b>11.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/banker-malware-targetting-brazilian.html">Banker Malware Targeting Brazilian Banks in the Wild</a><br />
When misinformed and not knowing anything about a particular underground segment, a potential cybercriminal would stick to using such primitive compared to the sophisticated banker malware kits currently in the wild. These sophisticated banker malware kits are often coming in a customer-tailored proposition, with their price increasing or decreasing based on the specific module to be included or excluded. For instance, a module targeting all the U.S banks that has been put in a "learning mode" long before it was made available to the customers can be requested and is often available with the business model build around the customer's wants&nbsp; <br />
<br />
<b>12.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/compromised-cpanel-accounts-for-sale.html">Compromised Cpanel Accounts For Sale</a><br />
Despite the massive SQL injection attacks, accounting data for Cpanel accounts coming from malware infected hosts seems to be once again coming into play, which isn't surprising given the filtering capabilities and log parsing tools today's botnet masters are empowered with. These very same compromised Cpanel accounts and the associated domains often end up so heavility abused that it's tactics like these that are driving the underground multitasking mentality, namely, abusing a single compromised account for each and every malicious online activity you can think of - even hosting banners for their blackhat SEO services <br />
<br />
<b>13.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two</a><br />
In August we saw a peek of fake security software, neatly typosquatted domains whose authors earn revenue each and every time someone installs the software. The vendors behind this software are forwarding the entire process of driving traffic to those excelling in aggregating traffic and abusing it. As anticipated, underground multitasking started taking place within the fake security software domains, with the people behind them introducing client-side exploits in order to improve the monetization of the traffic coming to the sites<br />
<br />
<b>14.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diy-botnet-kit-promising-eternal.html">DIY Botnet Kit Promising Eternal Updates</a><br />
There's no such thing as a (quality) free botnet kit. What's for free is often the leftovers from a single feature of a more sophisticated proprietary botnet kit. This one in particular is however trying to demonstrate that even a plain simple GUI botnet command and control software can achieve the results desired by an average script kiddie, and not necessarily satisfy the needs of the experienced botnet master<br />
<br />
<b>15.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_20.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three</a><br />
As far as trends and fads are concerned, the majority of the domains are currently parked at up to four different IPs, with most of them going into a stand by mode once they get detected and reappear back couple of weeks later<br />
<br />
<b>16.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/fake-celebrity-video-sites-serving.html">Fake Celebrity Video Sites Serving Malware - Part Two</a><br />
Due to the template-ization of fake celebrity video sites, and simple traffic management tools combined with blackhat SEO tactics, these sites are also prone to increase in the next couple of months<br />
<br />
<b>17.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/web-based-botnet-command-and-control.html">Web Based Botnet Command and Control Kit 2.0</a><br />
It's releases like these that remind us of the amount of time, efforts and personal touch that a malicious attacker would put into such a management kit, currently acting as a personal benchmark as far as complexity and features indicating the coder's experience with botnets is concerned. What's he's failing to anticipate is that this kit is sooner or later going to turn into the "MPack of botnet management"<br />
<br />
<b>18.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_25.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four</a><br />
Keep it coming, we'll keep it exposing until we end up getting down to the "fake software vendor" itself<br />
<br />
<b>19.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/automatic-email-harvesting-20.html">Automatic Email Harvesting 2.0</a><br />
Email harvesting is slowly maturing into a vertically integrated service provided by vendors of managed spamming services. This email harvesting module is aiming to close the page on text obfuscation in respect to fighting spam, and is successfully recognizing and collecting such publicly available emails. From a psychological perspective though, the end users who bothered to obfuscate their emails are less likely to fall victims into phishing scams, with the obfuscation speaking for a relatively decent situational awareness on how they emails end up in a spammer's campaign<br />
<br />
<b>20.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/fake-porn-sites-serving-malware-part.html">Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Three</a><br />
As a firm believer in sampling in order to draw conclusions on the big picture, an approach that has proven highly accurate in modeling historical and upcoming tactics and behavior, a single fake porn site serving malware campaign usually exposes a dozen of misconfigured redirectors, which thanks to their misconfiguration despite the evasive features available within the kits, expose another dozen of malware campaigns<br />
<br />
<b>21.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/facebook-malware-campaigns-rotating.html">Facebook Malware Campaigns Rotating Tactics</a><br />
With no particular flaw exploited other than the social engineering tactic of using already compromised Facebook accounts who would automatically spam all their friends with links to flash files hosted at legitimate services, the more persistent the campaign is, the higher the chance that it will scale enough. This campaign in particular is mainly relying on rotation of tactics, namely different messages, different services and file extensions used in order to trick someone's friend into visiting the URL. With the number of users increasing, the most popular social networking sites are naturally going to be permanently under attacks from cybercriminals<br />
<br />
<b>22.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/fake-security-software-domains-serving.html">Fake Security Software Domains Serving Exploits</a><br />
Despite that it's a single brand, namely the International Virus Research Lab that's introducing client-side exploits within it's portfolio of domains, the opportunity for abuse may be noticed by the rest of the brands pretty fast<br />
<br />
<b>23.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/exposing-indias-captcha-solving-economy.html">Exposing India’s CAPTCHA Solving Economy</a><br />
Taking into consideration the mentality surrounding a particular country's cybercriminals, how they think, how they operate, what do they define as an opportunity, and how much personal efforts are they willing to put into their campaigns, I wouldn't be surpised if a Russian vendor offering 100,000 bogus Gmail accounts for sale has in fact outsourcing the account registration process to Indian workers, paid them pocket change and is then reselling them ten to twenty times higher than the price he originally paid for them. <br />
<br />
The text based CAPTCHAs used at the major Internet portals and services, are so efficiently abused by this approach that continuing to use is directly undermining the trust these email providers and services often come with as granted<div class="feedflare">
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</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/388609194" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 02:57:32 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/facebook malware campaigns">facebook malware campaigns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/usefulness pinch malware">usefulness pinch malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/banker malware kits">banker malware kits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware campaigns">malware campaigns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/botnet">botnet</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/diy botnet kit">diy botnet kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/distribute malware">distribute malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/banker malware">banker malware</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/388609194/summarizing-augusts-threatscape.html">Summarizing August's Threatscape</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Employee Fraud Spiralling Out of Control in the UK]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/e73530104c782e83900fa4a31dabab72</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/e73530104c782e83900fa4a31dabab72</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[You have read it before on TheBulletProofBlog - the tougher times get, the more likelihood that people will resort to criminal measures


We reported it regarding the theft of copper from Churches,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[You have read it before on TheBulletProofBlog - the tougher times get, the more likelihood that people will resort to criminal measures.  <br /><br /><span id="fullpost"><br />We reported it regarding the theft of copper from Churches, Hospitals, Schools - even from new homes still under construction.  We brought to your attention the fact that thieves have become bolder, evidenced by the theft of manhole covers in public streets and drilling into fuel tanks on vehicles as petrol and diesel prices rise.<br /></span><br />In "<a href="http://www.personneltoday.com/articles/2008/09/01/47259/employee-fraud-rises-as-credit-crunch-hits.html">Personneltoday</a>", it is reported that employers have been put on "red alert" as the downturn in the economy is prompting employees to make ends meet by dishonest means.  One figure that employers every where are bound to find shocking is the fact that employee fraud has cost UK companies more than 77 Million Pounds Sterling (approx. $150,000,000.00),just in the first half of this year alone.<br /><br />The most disturbing aspect of this figure is the fact that it is up from 10 Million Pounds Sterling (approx. $18,000,000.00)in the same period last year.  This represents more than an 8 fold increase in employee fraud in a 12 month period.<br /><br />The report was conducted by the accountancy firm BDO Stoy Hayward.  Mr. Simon Bevan, the head of fraud services there attributes the escalation in criminal activity amongst employees to; "spiralling personal debt as a result of mortgage,food and fuel price hike".  Sound familiar?<br /><br />The population of the UK is one sixth that of the United States.  It is frightening to imagine what the figures will look like from U.S. businesses at the end of this year and beyond.  In 2002, employee fraud and abuse cost U.S. businesses $6 Billion Dollars (independently reported by the "Association of Certified Fraud Examiners" of which SEXTON is a member).<br /><br />What would be the outcome to U.S, businesses if fraud costs escalated 8 fold to $48 Billion Dollars by year's end?  How many would go under? How much further damage would that inflict on the already struggling economy?  The economic circumstances in the U.S. are certainly similar to those of the UK.  <br /><br />U.S. businesses beware.  Be proactive and fight fraud and abuse before it is too late.  Your very survival just may depend upon it.<div class="blogger-post-footer">Visit Sexton Executive Security at www.sextonsecurity.com</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2008 06:08:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/employee fraud">employee fraud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/businesses">businesses</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/businesses beware">businesses beware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/million pounds">million pounds</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/billion dollars">billion dollars</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/period">period</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fold increase">fold increase</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fold">fold</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fuel price hike">fuel price hike</category>
      <source url="http://www.thebulletproofblog.com/2008/09/employee-fraud-spiralling-out-of.html">Employee Fraud Spiralling Out of Control in the UK</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Real Migration Problem]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/066428c6b802b3676a2c3982d275cbbd</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/066428c6b802b3676a2c3982d275cbbd</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Preview of Tom Friedman's thinking for his new book - Hot, Flat and Crowded. Killer quote (emphasis added

FP: And what about drilling? Republican presidential candidate Sen. John McCain, his running...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4463">Preview</a> of Tom Friedman&#39;s thinking for his new book - Hot, Flat and Crowded. Killer quote (emphasis added):</p><br /><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: 16px; "><span class="fp_red" style="color: #8c182d; font-weight: bold; "><strong>FP:&#160;</strong></span>And what about drilling? Republican presidential candidate Sen. John McCain, his running mate Gov. Sarah Palin, and President George W. Bush are implying that lifting environmental restrictions on drilling is the way to promote energy independence.</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: 16px;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: 16px; "><strong>TF:&#160;</strong>Well, I think it’s patent nonsense. No one believes that somehow offshore, there’s enough oil in any near term and even the long term to provide us oil independence. It’s the wrong approach because in a world that’s hot, flat, and crowded, fossil fuels—and particularly crude oil—are going to be expensive and exhausting. Therefore the focus should be on the next great global industry: clean energy technology. <span style="font-weight: bold;">When I hear McCain pounding the table for “drill, drill, drill,” it reminds me of someone pounding the table for IBM Selectric typewriters on the eve of the IT revolution.</span></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: 16px;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: 16px; ">I’m not against offshore drilling, by the way, because I believe the technology and the safety has improved far beyond where it was back in the 70s, 80s, and 90s, even. What I’m against is making it the centerpiece of our energy policy. If all McCain said was, “Let’s drill, but let’s also throw everything into innovating the next generation of clean-energy technologies,” I’d say, “You’ve got it exactly right, pal.”</span></p></blockquote><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: 16px;"><br /></span></p><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: 16px;">Its funny because as someone who has done a half dozen legacy migration projects (with mental and emotional scars to prove it), I was thinking the same thing. The entrenched mindset. &quot;If we just dig our trench deeper (in this case literally) then we will be ok.&quot;...at least until the person in question retires...</span></div><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: 16px;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: 16px;">One of the legacy migration project I worked on, I was the third consultant that tried to get this company off of mainframe and onto distributed systems (which are no panacea but this company really did need to make the move). The core developers of the mainframe were actively hostile to change, as opposed to simply passive aggressive, which we expect. For example, if you asked about how a piece of functionality worked, say a report writer, the developer would not answer, stand up, walk out of the room, come back with a 800 page &quot;data model&quot;, slam it on the table and walk out of the room. Good times.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: 16px;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: 16px;">A chief objection beyond fear of the unknown was the perceived lack of elegance in the distributed systems as opposed to the control from say JCL. Anyway, what progress I made was due to analogizing that we were leaving Greece which has a rich culture, history, philosophy and moving to Rome which maybe was not as elegant as Greece but still people like circuses, roads and acqueducts. So when, several times a day, a perceived go/ no go issue arose, I would gently remind &#160;the developers that &quot;we are now in Rome and things work differently here.&quot;</span></div><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: 16px;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: 16px;">Intransigently digging the trench deeper is not the way, instead we need to better understanding the energy &#160;problem in a larger context, and finding deployable technologies to help address it. If you think drill, drill, drill is the answer, then I think the answer for you is the same as someone who knows COBOL and flat refuses to learn modern languages even when that is required - a nice retirement house on a golf course somewhere.</span></div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2008 05:38:33 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/energy">energy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/clean-energy technologies">clean-energy technologies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/clean energy technology">clean energy technology</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/drill">drill</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/energy policy">energy policy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/technology">technology</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/promote energy independence">promote energy independence</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/trench deeper">trench deeper</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mccain">mccain</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/09/the-real-migration-problem.html">The Real Migration Problem</source>
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