Congratulations to:

Apptix

Hughes

Merkle

Sourcefire

EM7 at the Merkle NOC

And we must point out that Hughes topped the Maryland Technology Fast 50 list with an astounding growth rate of 138,762% over the past 5 years! Wow, it would be tough for any company in the world to beat that growth rate, but all kudos must go to Hughes and this incredible achievement. I’m sure we’ll see them on the National Technology Fast 500 list coming out soon.

Now I would like to say that without ScienceLogic and EM7 much of this would not have been possible, but of course that statement would be an incredible stretch. What I can say is that our product and our technology has had a profound impact on the operational efficiency for HughesNet, so perhaps you can give us, using a basketball analogy, 12 assists in the game.

Interesting to note, several other award winners are in the midst of product evaluations as we speak. I think that EM7 Meta-Appliances are a strategic weapon within each of these businesses to leverage our technology in interesting ways which create huge organizational value and operational efficiencies.

So to all those companies who have won this year… a BIG congratulations from the bottom of my heart. For our existing customers who made the list this year… keep working hard so you can make it again next year. For ScienceLogic, stay tuned in: We were not quite big enough to make the list last year, however I am very excited about our growth in 2008 and am quietly confident that you will see us on the Virginia Fast 50 list next year!

• 123bingo.com
• 777dragon.com
• indiancasino.com
• jackpotcity.com
• powerbet.com
• crazypoker.com
• vegaslucky.com

I’d love to have another blog even more specific - “Ok, that Assurance is Evidence Of What, Exactly?

Today he has a great article called:

What’s the matter with Risk Management?

And “in short, it’s everything.” It pretty much sums up why I had to grow to re-evaluate how our industry does risk, risk management, approaches controls & vulnerability and find a new way.   A couple of things jump out at me in reading Chris’ article:

1.)  Just because that Deming cycle sucks and is full of unknowns doesn’t mean “risk” doesn’t exist, nor that it isn’t of primary importance. Nor does it mean that in the absence of model & methodology, we won’t be “doing” risk analysis anyway - just in an ad hoc method and completely from “the gut”.

Our industry calls these unstructured risk analysis “Best Practices”, as it’s an easy and convenient way of sweeping the unknowns under the rug of bureaucracy and enforcing it via peer pressure.

2.)  What this “suckiness” does mean is that your model and methodology aren’t helping you. As Chris intimates, there is too much uncertainty in the inputs for his model (they are, in the language of Bayesians - too subjective to be useful priors).

Take for example how we might be approaching the “controls” part of our analysis.  Chris writes:

“2. What are the controls that we have to employ?
800-53, ISO 27001, PCI, etc.

Still kinda good, but we basically know that ISO is relatively voluntary and NIST supplies a control catalog and not policies. So here we have to take the control catalog, and mash our policies into it.”

I wouldn’t call this “kinda good” at all :)  These control catalogs only provide a hierarchy within which to look for evidence of  our ability to resist an attacker.  They are incapable of making any claim about the effectiveness of the controls when they are operated at 100% efficiency, or more importantly, what % efficiency our specific organization operates at.

Let’s use Chris Hayes’ Initech as our fictional example.

Initech has a control (a back door on a loading dock).  Now the locks on the door are 100% capable of locking the door.  This is different than saying that they are capable of frustrating all but the top 5% of lockpicking burgalars.  It is also diffferent than saying that in a sample of several “walk around audits” the doors are left open 20% of the time (they are not in compliance with policy 100% of the time).  Even worse, that 80% of the time the door is not propped open?  Yeah, tailgating is a known issue.

So we have several different variables here that we need to account for (and it’s just a door).  But the analogy stands that most “risk management” methodologies are “We have a door, yes/no?” And most GRC platforms, when asked for their “opinion” will simply say “door is needed” or, even worse, “a door policy is needed”.

3.)  Criticality and the Source of Value is all messed up in these Risk Management models.

Chris writes:

Someone wants me to tell them which boxes are more critical than others. This is mainly because of budgetary or operational reasons. To which I usually say “All of them, it is a system after all”.

This literally made me laugh out loud.  And this sort of “rate the firewall as Risk = 500 but rate the actual business application as Risk = 157″ thing is also endemic.  Now Chris is very smart here.  He correctly identifies that the value is tied to the business process the systems support, and not to a specific box.  Oh, we scan at the specific box level - but because of the nature of systemic failures - all the boxes in the process are inexorably interrelated.

One of the reasons I really like FAIR is that the losses are quantified (or qualified) based not on some amorphous value of the box or the process itself, but losses are linked to the actions that the threat will take. Take systems in a highly regulated industries as an example.  Usually the most probable losses aren’t due to system compromise per se, but in the disclosure the compromise causes (regulators are a threat source, after all).  But many “risk management” methodologies will say “online banking is worth $2 billion, the value of the systems is therefore $2 billion”.  And suddenly we’re telling executive management that there’s a 60% probability that they’ll lose $2 billion.

4.)  If the primary source of prior information for your “risk management” methodology is a vulnerability scanner - you’re doing it wrong.  Chris writes:

So we ran a scan and now we have a report. A snapshot in time to make all decisions. Where did these vulnerability ratings come from? Do I even know if my system is at risk? What if I spend my time on vulnerabilities that have no threat?

So first, my thoughts are that actual “vulnerability” must be a comparison of the force a threat can apply, and our ability to resist that force (this is a probability statement, btw).

Changing your thinking about vulnerability now helps us understand the problem in several new ways.  First, you can start to divorce yourself from the scanner.  After all, the scanner is simply providing you with current state information that is usually just relevant variance from policy. It doesn’t really tell you about real “weakness in a system” because the system is an interrelated mess of people, processes and IT assets.

5.)  Finally, most “risk management” approaches just *don’t* do a good job of helping us understand the how’s and why’s of managing risk. In the past, I’ve referred to these standards as really being “issue management” because they are at their heart, an act of discovery - a formal process around gathering prior information.  They are not, in and of themselves, capable of linking the issues discovered to the root cause.  And these root causes?  Yeah, they’re the things that create “risk”.  Not a threat, not a vulnerability, not the existence of an asset - the amount of risk that we have stems from our capability to manage it.

So Chris, I completely agree - but I wouldn’t give up yet.  There actually are a few of us who are focused on what you suggest:

Where to go from here: A fundamental revamp of how to deal with Risk. Where risk professionals focus on the treating the sickness and not the symptoms, and come up with some new success/actionable metrics.

Chris, there’s nothing I want to do more than that.

Now I’ve been “accused” of being a quant in the past (hi rybolov!) but in reality the only dogs I have in this fight are the model and the application of scientific method - and really, ethically speaking, I have to be tied to the latter while applying the former.

And I see a false dichotomy in this whole Quant vs. Qual thing.  We, as a profession, tend to create a political divide between the two which, if it even exists, I’d say is based more on our ignorance rather than our expertise.  After all, we are the profession that regularly multiplies across ordinal scales and uses wonderful models like R=VxTxI.   As someone  learning to deal in probabilities and rationalism, I have to recognize that this discussion is really just about the act of observation using different metrics of measurement.

But how we’re going about observing does not change the fact that there is measurement based on observation.  So if I’m working with you I can easily turn your qualitative scale into a quantitative one, and vice-versa.  Yes, Shrdlu, if we had the time, even your most seemingly Qual things could be Quant! (This flexible world view, btw, is an outcome of that new-fangled Bayesian thing).

COGNITIVE BIAS A-PLENTY

But back to what Rich is saying there about information security and risk - and he isn’t/won’t be the only one saying these sorts of things - we should try to understand what’s really going on rather than get caught up in the emotional hurricane.  Our profession suffers several forms of cognitive bias.  The nature of our jobs and what we do can cause us to be focused on the outcome and not the quality of the decision at the time it was made.  We want to bring in things from other professions that are useful, but at times we do view things outside our profession with false correlation to our own (unfortunately for those who write these sorts of articles, financial risk is completely different than operational risk).  We also have the tendency to focus on negative outcomes without acknowledging the positive outcomes (For example, I hear that Alan Greenspan’s new firm is up a couple of $billion in all this mess since he joined them, short sellers are doing quite well - must be because they have qualitative models or something -grin-).  The effect of these biases are compounded by the facts that proper correlation takes more work than we usually give it, and rational thought is not that easy when there’s a witch-hunt mentality.

What also floats in water? (link to Youtube)

WHAT SHOULD WE BE THINKING ABOUT?

So as you and I read opinions that seem to be the polar opposite of irrational exuberance (and there will be plenty between now and the election) we’ll have to ask ourselves, “what really failed here?”  At the risk (pun) of over-simplification:

• Was There an Error on the part of Probability Theory?

After all, Probability Science like all other fields of knowledge is always “advancing” as they say.  So perhaps probability theory is wrong somehow?

I’m personally disinclined to put the blame here, primarily because I would think that there would be evidence from other fields (like Quantum Mechanics) that something is amiss waaaaay before it hit a field like economics.

• Was There Error In The Model Used to Determine Risk?

Some people who understand real estate valuation and complex derivatives and financial risk want to put the blame here.  It’s a little too early to tell, but one thing is for sure - Financial risk is so different from operational risk I couldn’t begin to hazard an opinion on the subject.   But it would seem that this is really somewhere we might look.

• Was There Error In The  Scale Used (Quantitative vs. Qualitative)?

Honestly?  I find it extremely difficult to understand how this could be the source of financial ruin.

• Was There Error on the part of the Decision Maker?

What if all of the above were just fine, and the decision maker chose short term gain over long term stability?  What if this was (to simplify the matter greatly) a choice of “heads” over “tails” and the coin landed on tails?  What if the model represented the right risk (probability of negative outcome vs. positive outcome), but the complex derivative was sold to someone else who had poor “risk management” (ability to make a good decisions)?

Now I have no clue about complex derivatives, and I’m oversimplifying to be sure - chances are like most things, there are several problems that helped create the primary cause. But it seems to me that as we go into incident response mode for the economy, it’s more helpful to do so in a rational, logical manner.

OTHER THINGS WE MIGHT WANT TO CONSIDER

Consider the Source
Some authors (who I think tend to exploit outcome and hindsight bias,and then combine those with indirect ad hominem attacks in order to sell their books), are actually putting forth arguments against the use of analytics.  The source of this is a current epistemic debate between those who believe that only falsification is certain, and those who maintain that neither proof nor falsification are certain, there are only probabilities.    So before you go believing any “quadrants” of usefulness on faith - I encourage you to understand what is at the heart of the discussion.

We All Have to Live In The Real World
The sun will rise tomorrow, and someone will try to find the source of the problem and do a better job.  Now chances are, they’ll be doing it in a quantitative manner.  Chances are also that at some point their models will fail and we’ll need to build new ones.  And this will happen whether the field is cosmology, economics, meteorology, information security, or professional baseball.

WHAT ABOUT YOU, ALEX?

I’m far from certain and subject to change, but these days I lean towards Robin Hanson & MIchael Lewis w/regards to placing blame.

IBM’s presentation was cleverly titled 2mor0@Wrk - Tomororow work and Web 2.0.

Overview

Web 2.0 is delivering a whole different paradigm of communication. The slide is Lotus Symphony - NOT PPT. Over 2 million downloads.

There is an information overload that impacts individual productivity in the workplace. It has a profound effect on organizational productivity. A more complex organization entity provides more pressure and more inefficiencies in workplace. Up to 70% of time can be used looking for the WRONG information.

Collaboration mitigates information overload. It allows you to identify experts and opinions.

The collaboration agenda. Enterprises are at the onset of exploring these features. Web 2.0 is giving us the capacity to do more. Collaboration optimizes business outcomes - global, secure and dynamic.The most progressive companies are looking at UNIFIED COMMUNICATIONS. Making sure that directories and profiles are fully mobile.

Collaboration should be a contextual part of the workflow, going directly into applications.

IBM’s collaboration strategy is to deliver these services through online or offline services.

Demonstration

Executive IT architect Ron Sebastian provided a demonstration of IBM’s collaboration strategy. IBM’s Web 2.0 solutions span delivery platforms:

• Platform - web as  platform
• Application - development
• People - social computing

Lotus Connections - a family of social computing software that provides profile lookup and community capabilities. Think of Facebook, Yahoo Groups, and delicious combined in one portal.

Ron demonstrated these social services embedded into a healthcare provider application. Semantic tagging is available, contact information and commenting. Not only are we providing service to customers, you can integrate sync capability to directly call the person you want.

The biggest aspect of Lotus Connection? It’s all integrated.

A new service - Project Bluehouse. This is a SaaS delivery of these collaborated capabilities. The store and share can manage and share documents within and outside the company. Access control is no longer an issue.

Collaborative Web 2.0 services available as standalone products that also work in a mobile environment.

Case Study: Natural Disaster Management Mashup

Boeing came up with twenty different scenarios that they could handle through their systems. The problem was the one they didn’t count on. One example was Katrina - how to deliver supplies to the area: what airports were open? Where could they land? The problem was they could not find one list of public, private and military airports, nor what was open. The mashup took different feeds to allow the deacon maker to make a more rapid and intelligent decision based on information on where they could fly in the appropriate supplies. From open information sites like AirNav.com and personal contacts, users were able to mashup the information to make better decisions.

Conclusion

IBM announced the IBM Center for Social Software, proving their commitment to connect, collaborate, and innovate. Users and academics can work together to how these innovations can be applied to businesses and provide value to the market.

There has been some question of whether or not IBM can pull this off and move into the collaborative Web 2.0 market. Despite some criticism, it looks like IBM has really taken a step forward in advancing their products and services to meet market needs.

People drive better business outcomes. Connecting, collaboration, and innovation is key. Having the right tools and information to do that eases pressure that many organizations feel and brings Web 2.0 technologies to the heart of businesses.

IT manager Andrew Chapman purchased a used drive on eBay, for just 77 British pounds, only to find that it contained the financial history and information for several million people, customers of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and its subsidiary, Natwest. Luckily for them, Chapman had their best interests at heart and reported the problem, rather than selling or using the information.

According to Evan at the Breach Blog:

The University of Glamorgan conducted research about hard drives bought on eBay that contained sensitive information and published their findings in September 2007. If people don’t think that criminals are buying hard drives on eBay, searching for sensitive information (personal information, health information, corporate secrets, intellectual property, etc.), then they are deluded

Click here to read the full article.

Hackers getting a free T pass may be the least of our worries — local hackers-turned-security experts suggest RFID keycards, wireless networks and medical devices implanted in the body are also vulnerable to hacks.

At last week’s Defcon hacker convention in Las Vegas, a team of researchers showed it was possible to get information such as Social Security numbers and medical diagnoses, and change the settings on an implantable defibrillator by impersonating the computer it communicates with wirelessly. By doing so, a hacker could send a fatal shock to a patient’s heart, said William Maisel of the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center.

It is almost like things haven’t changed since the 90’s when the L0pht worked to change the mindset of security:

1. Don’t trust vendor claims around security
2. Attacks aren’t “theoretical”
3. Security by obscurity is no security

The L0pht worked as an independent security research think tank.  For us it was non-profit side job researching and publishing vulnerabilities in software and hardware.  We did it for our love of technology and published what we found out because purchasers and users of the vulnerable systems deserve to know.

It’s 10 years later and the situation hasn’t improved much.  Mudge talks about the vulnerabilities the L0pht found in highway transponder systems that are still in systems being fielded today.  But more important than the vulnerabilities themselves is the nature of how these vulnerabilities are coming to light.  They are being found by hobbyists, students, and IT people working in their spare time.  How can something as important as the security of public fare collection systems and medical equipment not have a standard process for security acceptance testing? 

As we become more reliant on digital systems, with some even keeping us alive, it is high time for security testing to move beyond student papers and part time IT work.  Security testing needs to become a formal part of the process of purchasing and fielding digital systems.  Our lives are starting to depend on it.

Four chains, four Wi-Fi pay policies: CIO magazine looks at Borders, McDonald's, Panera, and Starbucks, and how they're offering Wi-Fi. I'd like to suggest you read this article, but the author writes, "Right now, according to Hotspot Locations, there are more than 33,000 WLAN hotspots worldwide, and more than 10,000 in the United States alone." I don't know who "Hotspot Locations" is, and I need to disclose that I have a financial interest in what must be their competitor, JiWire, but any hotspot finder that calls them "WLAN Hotspots" and reports 11,712 in the U.S. and 33,106 worldwide just isn't working very hard. JiWire lists over 230,000 hotspots worldwide, and notes over 60,000 in the U.S., while Boingo and iPass each resell access to over 100,000 hotspots worldwide.

Up, up, and away in my beautiful, my beautiful warballoon: Defcon hackers deployed a balloon with Wi-Fi receivers on it 150 feet in the air to scan for network vulnerabilities in Las Vegas last week. They found 1/3rd of networks had no encryption--although I always wonder if they're using passive scanning where 802.1X allows a limited connection for authentication and appears "open" in some ways, or if they were actively scanning, in which case 802.1X networks would be unavailable.

Cincinnati Metro service has Wi-Fi on 20 buses: The free service supplied by AT&T in an ads-for-access deal with the authority was placed after a couple years of testing on a relatively long commuter run. The authority spends $15,000 per bus to setup a connection, which seems rather pricey. Other authorities are paying in the low thousands, from what I've seen, so I'm not sure what their particular case is.

Doesn’t this seem backwards to you? Shouldn’t the MBTA be suing the vendor who sold them the flawed system? Security problems go away by mandating independant security testing before a product is accepted, not by trying to get security researchers to be quiet. This is a good example of how the reactive approach doesn’t work. The flaws are still in the system and suing researchers has just shined a bright light on them.

Update 08/09/2008 6:00pm EST:

The EFF is appealing the injunction which is blocking the students from speaking about the results of their testing.

A telling quote from Kurt Opsahl, staff attorney at the EFF gets to the heart of the issue:

“Courts have found that the First Amendment covers these things. We believe that this is a protected speech activity. When you discuss security issues, if you are telling the truth, that is something that should be protected.”

Apparently the MBTA has known about this problem since at least March, 2008 when a graduate student from the University of Virginia announced he was able to break the encryption system.

The U of VA researcher gave an interview where he described why security by obscurity is not a valid security approach for a cryptosystem:

Q: What are your thoughts on security by obscurity? Is NXP using this method of protection?

A: Security-through-obscurity hardly ever works. The lack of proper peer-review often even hurts the security of the system. Our Mifare work discovered several vulnerabilities that could be fixed without increasing the cost of the cards. NXP did for a long time rely on obscurity for the security of some of their products, but now decided against this outdated design approach and instead bases the security of newer RFID cards on publicly scrutinized cryptography and independent evaluations.

Q: Can you explain “Kerckhoffs Principle” and why it applies to your work?

A: Kerchoff, who lived in the 19th century, observed that keeping anything secret is really hard. So instead of relying on the secrecy of your whole system, it would a lot easier to only rely on the secrecy of a small secret key. Security systems should hence be publicly known and analyzed, and only the key should be secret. When properly realised for RFID cards, Kerchoff’s principle means that by analyzing their own cards, thieves cannot compromise your cards. This is contrary to our Mifare work, where we only analyzed a few copies of the the secret algorithm that is found in all cards and were consequently able affect the security of all the other billion cards out there.

The MBTA not only accepted a security system which relied on security by obscurity but once accepting this flawed model must try to maintain this obscurity with the court system.

The documents detailing the presentation are here.