1. Great paper that complements the whole "SIEM is dead?" saga - "Most enterprises are looking for a product that will solve all of their problems in some sort of off-the-shelf miracle, and when they find out that the currently available tools can't do it, they either postpone their deployment or put them on the back burner. "
2. "The Mess: looking for someone to blame?" is an awesome piece on Internet security and its architecture - and so is Gunnar's follow-up ("If a tree falls in someone else's silo...")
3. Mike call to "Rise up against Mediocrity."  - "Dilbert makes the risk of the lowest common denominator approach abundantly clear."; in other words, you say 'best practices', I say 'mediocrity!' Mike also remind us, in vain, to do "Security FIRST!" (and compliance second)
4. A great piece from Burton: "On Response" - I think the world needs another 10-20 million reminders that PREVENTION FAILS. This is definitely a good one for those still in the "we'll just block the threat world" - "we will not win a continuing war of escalation" and "using response can be more cost effective than installing the latest and greatest preventative tool"
5. More on metrics, including the highly-awaited ISO27004.
6. Pretty dumb paper by a person confused by why PCI DSS exists (the guy needs to read this). PCI doesn't "fall short," it helps people who will otherwise not do anything and their systems will "power" those botnets of the future...
7. While we are on this subject: a really good coverage of PCI 1.2. changes, released Oct 1st. More PCI fun here. And more here ("PCI Compliance - dispelling some common myths"). And, more PCI myths. And more good ideas on PCI from Mike R. Sorry, can't stop thinking about PCI :-)  - also this is good.
8. Adrian on behavioral monitoring; mostly in DAM, but also elsewhere in security.
9. "Premature Chasm-Crossing"  - a must-read for all security vendors and especially their marketing (and  their easily-excitable PR teams...) - "Shouldn't vendors be spending more time fighting the problems that security managers are facing today, right this minute?" (Mike R also comments on that). A related - and  just as interesting point is made here: "Security is not a solution"
10. More on compliance and security checklists, good and bad: "I think this is a dangerous trend unless the "checklist" is all inclusive." (how can a checklist include ALL? :-))
11. "SANS Top 7 New IR/Forensic Trends In 2008"
12. Read "The three approaches to computer security!"  Why? Come on, it is from Joanna! :-)
13. A fun discussion about a hot new technology: network IDS. Is IDS absolutely indispensable to ALL companies? No. Can it be incredibly useful? You bet. End of discussion.
14. On an unrelated note, are lasers the future of warfare? Some say no.
15. Finally, some security humor from Gartner (!): "Get Rich Quick With Network Security"

Enjoy!

Previous security reading.

I’d love to have another blog even more specific - “Ok, that Assurance is Evidence Of What, Exactly?

Today he has a great article called:

What’s the matter with Risk Management?

And “in short, it’s everything.” It pretty much sums up why I had to grow to re-evaluate how our industry does risk, risk management, approaches controls & vulnerability and find a new way.   A couple of things jump out at me in reading Chris’ article:

1.)  Just because that Deming cycle sucks and is full of unknowns doesn’t mean “risk” doesn’t exist, nor that it isn’t of primary importance. Nor does it mean that in the absence of model & methodology, we won’t be “doing” risk analysis anyway - just in an ad hoc method and completely from “the gut”.

Our industry calls these unstructured risk analysis “Best Practices”, as it’s an easy and convenient way of sweeping the unknowns under the rug of bureaucracy and enforcing it via peer pressure.

2.)  What this “suckiness” does mean is that your model and methodology aren’t helping you. As Chris intimates, there is too much uncertainty in the inputs for his model (they are, in the language of Bayesians - too subjective to be useful priors).

Take for example how we might be approaching the “controls” part of our analysis.  Chris writes:

“2. What are the controls that we have to employ?
800-53, ISO 27001, PCI, etc.

Still kinda good, but we basically know that ISO is relatively voluntary and NIST supplies a control catalog and not policies. So here we have to take the control catalog, and mash our policies into it.”

I wouldn’t call this “kinda good” at all :)  These control catalogs only provide a hierarchy within which to look for evidence of  our ability to resist an attacker.  They are incapable of making any claim about the effectiveness of the controls when they are operated at 100% efficiency, or more importantly, what % efficiency our specific organization operates at.

Let’s use Chris Hayes’ Initech as our fictional example.

Initech has a control (a back door on a loading dock).  Now the locks on the door are 100% capable of locking the door.  This is different than saying that they are capable of frustrating all but the top 5% of lockpicking burgalars.  It is also diffferent than saying that in a sample of several “walk around audits” the doors are left open 20% of the time (they are not in compliance with policy 100% of the time).  Even worse, that 80% of the time the door is not propped open?  Yeah, tailgating is a known issue.

So we have several different variables here that we need to account for (and it’s just a door).  But the analogy stands that most “risk management” methodologies are “We have a door, yes/no?” And most GRC platforms, when asked for their “opinion” will simply say “door is needed” or, even worse, “a door policy is needed”.

3.)  Criticality and the Source of Value is all messed up in these Risk Management models.

Chris writes:

Someone wants me to tell them which boxes are more critical than others. This is mainly because of budgetary or operational reasons. To which I usually say “All of them, it is a system after all”.

This literally made me laugh out loud.  And this sort of “rate the firewall as Risk = 500 but rate the actual business application as Risk = 157″ thing is also endemic.  Now Chris is very smart here.  He correctly identifies that the value is tied to the business process the systems support, and not to a specific box.  Oh, we scan at the specific box level - but because of the nature of systemic failures - all the boxes in the process are inexorably interrelated.

One of the reasons I really like FAIR is that the losses are quantified (or qualified) based not on some amorphous value of the box or the process itself, but losses are linked to the actions that the threat will take. Take systems in a highly regulated industries as an example.  Usually the most probable losses aren’t due to system compromise per se, but in the disclosure the compromise causes (regulators are a threat source, after all).  But many “risk management” methodologies will say “online banking is worth $2 billion, the value of the systems is therefore $2 billion”.  And suddenly we’re telling executive management that there’s a 60% probability that they’ll lose $2 billion.

4.)  If the primary source of prior information for your “risk management” methodology is a vulnerability scanner - you’re doing it wrong.  Chris writes:

So we ran a scan and now we have a report. A snapshot in time to make all decisions. Where did these vulnerability ratings come from? Do I even know if my system is at risk? What if I spend my time on vulnerabilities that have no threat?

So first, my thoughts are that actual “vulnerability” must be a comparison of the force a threat can apply, and our ability to resist that force (this is a probability statement, btw).

Changing your thinking about vulnerability now helps us understand the problem in several new ways.  First, you can start to divorce yourself from the scanner.  After all, the scanner is simply providing you with current state information that is usually just relevant variance from policy. It doesn’t really tell you about real “weakness in a system” because the system is an interrelated mess of people, processes and IT assets.

5.)  Finally, most “risk management” approaches just *don’t* do a good job of helping us understand the how’s and why’s of managing risk. In the past, I’ve referred to these standards as really being “issue management” because they are at their heart, an act of discovery - a formal process around gathering prior information.  They are not, in and of themselves, capable of linking the issues discovered to the root cause.  And these root causes?  Yeah, they’re the things that create “risk”.  Not a threat, not a vulnerability, not the existence of an asset - the amount of risk that we have stems from our capability to manage it.

So Chris, I completely agree - but I wouldn’t give up yet.  There actually are a few of us who are focused on what you suggest:

Where to go from here: A fundamental revamp of how to deal with Risk. Where risk professionals focus on the treating the sickness and not the symptoms, and come up with some new success/actionable metrics.

Chris, there’s nothing I want to do more than that.

Blogger: Dan Blum

With the crisis in financial markets still unfolding, it is important to draw what lessons we can from the experience. Since the roots of the crisis lie in a monumental failure of risk management, it’s important to understand more about what happened, and then draw some parallels to our business risk management and  IT risk management situations.

The risk management failure in the housing market and on Wall Street had multiple interdependent dimensions:

• Mortgage lenders abandoned long standing prudent loan practices. They made too many loans that buyers might not be able to repay. Exotic instruments like ARMs, option ARMs, and interest only loans proliferated. In many cases, all pretense of lending standards were abandoned, so-called “liar loans” approved.
• Capital was grossly over-leveraged. Mortgage lenders and other financial services packaged loans into securities, which they sold to raise capital to support more lending. Real capital reserve requirements to back loans were reduced. Of course, if borrowers could not repay loans, all or parts of the derivative securities would become worthless.
• Risk was aggregated at Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and mortgage loan insurance companies. These companies bought or insured some mortgage loans, providing something of a backstop should loans fail. Government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie and Freddie in turn became over-leveraged and securities that they sold were in turn repackaged in the murky brew of mortgage-backed securities called collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and other exotic instruments returning generous yields.
• Non-Caveat Emptor. Institutional wealth funds and financial services firms who should have known better bought securities that had been deliberately structured to obfuscate risk. They bought securities they didn’t understand with buried tranches of toxic subprime loans..

It was a great Ponzi scheme – one that kept working as long as housing prices were going up; the recipients of subprime loans could always flip that house to the next buyer. Everyone made money. As Chuck Prince of Citigroup famously put it during a July, 2007 interview: “So long as the music is playing, you’ve got to keep dancing. We’re still dancing.” But one month later, the music stopped. Since then, Citigroup and other financial institutions have taken massive writeoffs with more to come. Wall Street titans like Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and AIG have fallen or been bought out.

What can we learn from this risk management debacle?

As business risk managers and investors, we should ask questions like these:

• Does the executive incentive structure of the company encourage managers to dance around risk? Many Wall Street firms paid senior managers 5 times their salary in bonuses tied to annual growth alone.
• Is the company over-leveraged? Is it borrowing too much money and betting it on ventures with uncertain outcomes?
• Are financial models used for risk management realistic? Earlier, I described the mortgage market of the past few years as a Ponzi scheme, where risk management models must have assumed prices would keep rising. Unlike the dotcom boom whose demise many predicted, very few in the industry foresaw the sharp declines to come in housing prices and sales volumes. Historically, the U.S. housing market has been a steadily rising one, but on the other hand the 2000s saw unprecedented rates of price increases. In reality, what goes up must come down.
• Has your company’s risk council ever performed worst case scenario analysis and built adequate reserves? In the days before economics emerged as a would-be “hard” deterministic science, business leaders may have been more cautious, more aware of and more accepting of uncertainty. Events like the Great Tulip Bubble came once in decades or centuries – not every few years. Note that legendary investor George Soros has proposed a Theory of Reflexivity that, if true, helps explain the recent extremes of boom and bust cycles. This theory holds that market participants model market behaviors based on self-interest, and for a time, their manipulations change the reality of the market – until gravitational forces bring it back to earth. Has the music of ephemeral success played to the backbeat of deterministic-sounding economic models gone to your heads and infected your risk management models?
• Are cost cutting efforts pursued blindly? Outsourcing and other forays into treacherous global waters may be giving away the crown jewels. Smart companies cut costs, but they do it in smart ways. Smart companies think like intelligence agencies as they parcel out work to different partners with varying levels of dependability, and they check on those partners.

Risk management failures can also occur at the more technical level of IT security. As IT risk managers, we might ask questions like these:

• Are the accounting and financial systems your IT department supports under adequate control? As Fred Cohen wrote in one of our documents: “Many companies use computers to manage financial systems, and despite the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) claims about accounts being properly kept, there are many attacks on financial systems that remain. For example, most of the largest financial systems in the world running on common financial databases do not use double-entry bookkeeping and are thus susceptible to all manner of frauds by insiders.” We find it troubling that a prudent control dating back to the 12th century is going out of style in the name of convenience and cost cutting. Kind of like credit checking became anachronistic during the housing bubble, eh?
• Is the “separation” in your “separation of duty” (SoD) for real? Sure the SOX auditors are looking for SoD, and maybe you have different administrators with different accounts maintaining different systems or functions. But when they say Western civilization may be but one weak password from collapse they’re not lying. Look what happened to Sarah Palin’s email account! Weak and straggly SoD is a problem across all critical IT systems where deperimiterization and server consolidation may be bringing down protective barriers, identity management is weak, and strong process controls (e.g., where two people must sign on, one perform a critical operation such as backbone router reconfiguration, and the second observe) abandoned in the name of expediency.
• Are risks being aggregated to unacceptable levels in centralized control systems? There are many ways that risks aggregate within enterprise IT infrastructures as we pursue automation and cost cutting. Network risks aggregate when centralized domain name system control is implemented. Application risks aggregate when common infrastructure is shared among applications. And enterprises aggregate platform risks when they use low-assurance endpoints, authentication, and directory systems with single sign-on to access large numbers of resources and don’t separate high consequence systems.
• Non-caveat emptor: Has IT security really done the worst case consequence analysis, attack graphs, and vulnerability analysis to know when putting more eggs in a supposedly stronger basket aggregates risks to an unacceptable level? Or are you depending only on vendor claims about some black box appliance equivalent of a risk-obfuscated CDO security? Caveat emptor (buyer beware) again! (The good news is we’ll keep talking about promoting vendor and product rating systems so you don’t have to do all the detailed product analysis yourself, but that’s another post.)

There are many parallels between the monumental risk management failure in the financial markets, and the probable weaknesses in our day to day business risk management and IT risk management. Abandonment of prudent practices for profit; excessive leverage and centralization; ill-constructed risk analysis models; risk obfuscation; and a failure of caveat emptor seem to be common problems. Please take this as a wakeup call to sharpen up the risk management thinking, process, and execution.

Introduction

Virtualization is a word used by consumers and also by IT. But, do we all mean the same thing?

A very cool video from Cisco provided answers to “what is virtualization” from an  engineering perspective, data center perspective, IT perspective and the user perspective (virtual world).

Virtualization is about breaking the bonds between applications and server hardware, nodes and networks, applications and operating systems.

Why is this interesting? Virtualization holds the promise to transform the way we work, live, learn and play.

Why virtualize?

The real estate boom over the last 30 years has driven people to the suburbs. People didn’t mind commuting for an hour with lower gas prices. Today, we have a weak economy and gas prices are high. Something has to change.

Many are opting to stay at home. Businesses are trying out telecommuting, some (like Cisco) are even offering telepresence. This helps by reducing carbon footprint. Corporations are breaking free from physical requirements. The global workforce is also having an impact on the network. These changes are having a huge impact on the network.

We are on the cusp of transitioning from virtualization to VIRTUALIZATION.

“One to many….many to one.”

This is Cisco’s idea of virtualization.

Consider the different roles we play in life - one to many. Spouse, executive, friend, parent, gym rat. This would be “one to many”. This is exactly what virtualization does. It allows you to partition resources off that you can use on the fly.

Where do I start?

Virtualization starts with server and storage. But, it’s the network that touches everything - it spans the physical, the virtual, and the cloud. This provides the connectivity to all these resources. The network brings transparency to the picture. It allows you to better monitor performance and better implement security - great benefits!

Why do I need this?

At Cisco, we saw that we were only using 20% of our storage utilization. We wanted to virtualize our datacenters. When we did that, we were able to get 68% storage utilization. For each year that we were able to defer buildup, we saved $40 million.

From a business standpoint, virtualization helps you differentiate and work faster. Provisioning in minutes, improved productivity and competitive differentiation, using less power (environmental impact), and up the ante of business continuity. If VMWare fails? It’s OK. You can reprovision it on the fly.

Is it for everyone?

IT organizations tend to be siloed. You have the IT side and the Operations side. Each has responsibility. For virtualization to work, these walls have to come down. The concept of virtualization depends on shared resources.

Metcalfe’s Law of the Network Effect

Everytime you add a node to the network, you increase the value. This is what happens with virtualization. Every device you virtualize increases the power of each device. More control of environment and more efficiency.

This leads to…

Cloud computing.

Wow, show of hands from the audience when Marie asked “how many are using cloud computing?” and “how many are using your own clouds?” - not a lot of hands were raised. Interesting considering the coverage cloud computing has and the focus of it.

Cloud computing has three possibilities at Cisco:

• Flexible infrastructure (hosting)
• Abstract services (APIs)
• Application services (SaaS)

Automation is going to be key, and will need to integrate virtualization-aware elements.

Can you imagine if you wanted interoperability in the cloud? People haven’t even begun thinking about it.

Conclusion

As you virtualize, your role will change. You will think more about strategy. But keep in mind these “minefields” of virtualization:

• Insufficient planning
• Lack of standards
• Weak security

Security cannot be an afterthought. It has to be planned. We’ve seen new forms of malware, hypervisor attacks, and root kit infections.

As higher expectations from end users evolve, we’re becoming not server oriented, but SERVICE oriented.

Tips:

• Think holistically
• Consider IT culture - equipment and people

The Cisco 7600 OSR consists of a 256 Gbps switching fabric and a 30 million packets per second (mpps) forwarding engine. Its breadth of IP services comes from Cisco IOS, which provides features such as security, enhanced QoS, and destination sensitive services. In addition, the Cisco 7600 OSR allows the migration of existing port adapters from Cisco 7500 series routers, via the Cisco FlexWAN module, giving service providers one the industry’s widest array of interface options in any single platform. This provides service providers great flexibility in deploying the Cisco 7600 OSR for a variety of applications, protects their investment in existing systems, and gives them a practical migration path to the New World Optical Internet.

A Revolutionary Platform For Evolving Networks

The Cisco 7600 OSR helps service providers break through service and bandwidth barriers today, while designing networks to scale for future growth. The Cisco 7600 OSR achieves this through “adaptive network processing,” or the ability to evolve the platform for new IP services without hardware upgrades. Unlike fixed, ASIC-based platforms, which are hardware encoded, the Cisco 7600 OSR relies on the highly flexible Parallel eXpress Forwarding (PXF) technology for scalable performance of services. PXF is a patented, Cisco-developed network processor capable of line-rate IP services delivery that can support new IP services through periodic software upgrades. Each OSM has two PXF processors capable of 12 mpps of IP services delivery per interface card.

“IP+Optical combines the dynamism of the Internet world with the foundation of the transport world, creating an infrastructure that can deliver the services that service providers need,” said Lele Nardin, vice president of the Internet Systems Business Unit at Cisco. “Cisco will continue to add innovative solutions on top of this solid foundation to make service providers better equipped to meet the constantly escalating and changing customer demands for new networking services.”

Pricing and Availability

The base Cisco 7600 OSR system is list priced at $73,000 and the entry level system, with interfaces, start at $100,000. The interfaces modules are priced between $27,000 to $180,000. The Cisco 7600 OSR is available now worldwide.

I arrived in Austin Sunday night to get ready for a factory tour on Monday, a kickoff dinner and then two days of briefings from Dell executives, including Michael Dell himself! Dell’s ISG business is growing at a very fast pace and continues to build momentum and focus within the broader organization.

We had a nice overview of the product roadmap, including some of the exciting enhancements Dell is making to their storage products such as the MD3000 and the new EqualLogic PS5000 series iSCSI solutions.

I really enjoyed the Council meeting and it reminds me all over again; what I admire about Dell is the way they and Michael Dell himself stay close to the customer. The entire purpose of this event is to “get it right” and determine meaningful ways to embrace change (including change in the manufacturing process) in order to make their customers more successful. Ah shucks, you may say that all companies behave this way… well I must tell you that is not true and at times, I find it difficult as we continue to grow to stay as close as I would like to all of our customers varying needs and directions.

This concept of gathering, internalizing and embracing customer feedback is a simple principle of Business Success stories. Always trying to improve the pace of change and build meaningful sticky relationships with customers. Dell’s very successful Ideastorm site where customers post product feedback and are active participants in the Dell community is a great example of how to do this right. No other hardware vendor that we have worked with or attempted to work with has ever gone to the extent of embracing change that Dell has during our 5-year relationship.

From the custom factory integration services to the attention to detail in the order and manufacturing, and logistics processes, Dell helps us execute for our customers and I must admit that we could not have built the business as quickly or efficiently without Dell!

So thank you Michael Dell for building a business that embraces change and is focused on helping your ISG customers succeed.

• ValidationSummary controls look at the ErrorMessage field to figure out what to display, so always use ErrorMessage in a verbose enough way that it will be helpful from a ValidationSummary control.
• If you need a shorter message to display inline (i.e., where the validation control is on the form, as opposed to the ValidationSummary) use the body of the control to define it.

In the past, I've used RequiredFieldValidator controls on my web forms to remind users that certain fields are required. I would set the ErrorMessage to something vanilla like, "This field is required", or even something simpler like "*" (an asterisk) if I didn't have much room on the form to display more prose for an error.

A friend was recently testing a new feature that I'd built for our sales team and she had a hard time seeing the little red asterisks that were showing up next to required fields. It felt to her as though she was pushing the submit button on the form but nothing was happening. It was clear that a ValidationSummary control would be helpful, especially if placed close to the submit button for the form.

I've been a bit lazy in the past about using ValidationSummary controls, partially because most of my forms are simple enough that they feel a bit redundant. But on a more complicated form, they can be very helpful to guide users back to the places on the form where there's problems.

So I threw one of those puppies on the form and immediately saw that there was a problem - my error message was set to "*", which meant that my validation summary was pretty useless - it just displayed a bunch of red asterisks! And in places where I'd used the prose, "This field is required", well that was pretty useless as an error message in the summary.

After a bit of research and experimentation, I discovered that the ValidationSummary control looks at the ErrorMessage property on each validation control in order to figure out what to display in the summary. So it's important to use ErrorMessage with a summary in mind! Don't use text like "*" or "This field is required". Be more specific so the user can find her way up to the problem field, as in, "PostalCode is required".

But if you make ErrorMessage verbose so that it's helpful in a summary, it may make your form really ugly when displayed inline next to the control being validated. The trick is to use the body of the validation control element to specify the inline error message. Then you end up with two messages: a verbose one that's used in your summary, and a more localized, brief message that shows up right next to the control being validated. Note the asterisk that's in the body of the RequiredFieldValidator below:

<asp:RequiredFieldValidator
      ErrorMessage="Zip/postal code is required"
      ControlToValidate='txtPostalCode'
      ValidationGroup='BasicInfo'
      Display="Dynamic"
      runat='server'>*</asp:RequiredFieldValidator>

I've learned a lesson from all of this. In the future when I use validation controls I'll always provide a summary-friendly message in the ErrorMessage field, and if I need something different (typically shorter) to display inline, I'll put it in the body of the validation control element.

Hope this helps!