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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: hire]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/hire</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Mon, 18 Aug 2008 03:01:03 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[XRumer Spambot Cracks Captchas]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/8e16e4882509e89db49f04e7c4d2deb7</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/8e16e4882509e89db49f04e7c4d2deb7</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Weve known CAPTCHAs are insecure for some time, but now even the CAPTCHA-alternatives (often based on identifying cats from dogs or other animals) have proven insecure. Gmail, Windows Live hotmail and...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We&#8217;ve known CAPTCHAs are insecure for some time, but now even the CAPTCHA-alternatives (often based on identifying cats from dogs or other animals) have proven insecure. Gmail, Windows Live hotmail and other popular sites were hacked as early as <a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="http://http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080415-gone-in-60-seconds-spambot-cracks-livehotmail-captcha.html">February</a>. Recently another defeat has come in the form of <a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xrumer">XRumer,</a> a <a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20081002-right-back-at-ya-captcha-bad-guys-crack-gmail-hotmail.html">spam bot</a> that posts messages on blogs and through email in order to boost search engine rankings.</p>
<p>What&#8217;s the solution? Ars Technica suggests there might not be a good one, in part because malware distributors can go so far as to hire real people to do their dirty work:</p>
<blockquote><p>Instead of trying to build better CAPTCHA-cracking programs, the malware industry went out and got itself some humans of its own. This effectively bypasses the primary security strength of the CAPTCHA system and leaves it entirely dependent on what we&#8217;ll call secondary security characteristics. CAPTCHAs are often complex (particularly these days), which does increase the chance that they&#8217;ll be misread (and returned incorrectly), while the font and display of the characters themselves are at least somewhat unfamiliar to the CAPTCHA crackers sitting on the other side of the world.</p></blockquote>
<p>Sometimes those captcha phrases are pretty incoherent to me too. When I post over at Craigslist sometimes it says I&#8217;ve gotten its Captcha wrong, and I end up wondering if secretly I&#8217;m a bot?? Apparently not a very smart one either.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 03 Oct 2008 07:40:21 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/captchas">captchas</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bot">bot</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/primary security strength">primary security strength</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/windows live hotmail">windows live hotmail</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam bot">spam bot</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ars technica suggests">ars technica suggests</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hire real people">hire real people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/popular sites">popular sites</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/xrumer">xrumer</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/itsecurity/~3/410515365/">XRumer Spambot Cracks Captchas</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[About the SDL Pro Network]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/dc28bc3dae82ee1f5322434291949577</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/dc28bc3dae82ee1f5322434291949577</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Hello all, Dave here
I expect that a number of you have seen the announcement and various press articles or Steve Lipner's Tuesday post about our launch of the SDL Threat Modeling Tool 3.0, the SDL...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Hello all, Dave here... 
<P>I expect that a number of you have seen the <A href="http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/2008/sep08/09-16lipnersdl.mspx" mce_href="http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/2008/sep08/09-16lipnersdl.mspx">announcement</A> and various press articles or <A href="http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/archive/2008/09/16/sdl-press-tour-announcements.aspx" mce_href="http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/archive/2008/09/16/sdl-press-tour-announcements.aspx">Steve Lipner's Tuesday post</A> about our launch of the SDL Threat Modeling Tool 3.0, the SDL Optimization Model and the <A href="http://download.microsoft.com/download/0/E/9/0E9AC448-30B2-4451-9E23-46244AFABB7F/Microsoft%20SDL%20Pro%20Network%20_Fact%20Sheet.pdf" mce_href="http://download.microsoft.com/download/0/E/9/0E9AC448-30B2-4451-9E23-46244AFABB7F/Microsoft%20SDL%20Pro%20Network%20_Fact%20Sheet.pdf">SDL Pro Network</A>.&nbsp; Since I was intimately involved with the creation of the SDL Pro Network, I thought I'd write a few words about our objectives and chat a bit about the thinking behind our partner choices for the pilot phase.</P>
<P>So, what are we hoping to gain by creating a network of security consulting and training experts to work with customers who want to implement the SDL?&nbsp; Generally speaking, this question has a two-part answer:&nbsp; First, Microsoft is, and always will be a partner-driven company - we rely on the skills and capabilities of our partners to provide specialized services and broad geographic coverage for Microsoft products and services.&nbsp; Second, even though there are talented folks in the <A href="http://www.microsoft.com/services/microsoftservices/default.mspx" mce_href="http://www.microsoft.com/services/microsoftservices/default.mspx">Microsoft Services</A> organization, it's clear that we will need help from our partners to scale to meet the demand.&nbsp; I can't tell you how many times the folks on the SDL team have been approached by people - after an executive briefing, or a session at TechEd - asking for guidance in implementing SDL in their own organizations.&nbsp; When we look at the demand and pair it with the geographic diversity of our customer base, it's clear that a partner approach is the right answer.</P>
<P>Now a few words about the partners who will be participating in the pilot phase...</P>
<P>After the decision was made to work with partners on SDL delivery, we had two primary criteria that we had to address; partner quality, and manageability of the SDL Pro Network pilot. We have all seen instances where individuals or consulting organizations have represented themselves to the IT community as having security expertise when in reality the "experts for hire" were simply reading a page or two ahead of the customer in whatever security tome was "in vogue" at the time.&nbsp; </P>
<P>Based on those observations, it was clear that partner "quality" was a critical criterion. &nbsp;Fortunately for us, we didn't have to look far to satisfy our quality bar - many of the companies in the SDL Pro Network pilot have direct experience with executing portions of the SDL on <I>our</I> products, or have delivered services to Microsoft in a security context. Design reviews, code reviews, penetration testing, training&nbsp;and other tasks critical to SDL implementation were (and are) common fare for these folks.</P>
<P>Despite the customer demand for SDL that I alluded to above, starting with a small pilot was the right thing to do; a small group of trusted consultancies supports our imperative for quality and it allows us to pragmatically grow the SDL Pro Network as the market matures. &nbsp;As we continue to evolve and innovate with the SDL, we'll have a strong core of partners to help drive the software security message. </P>
<P>Will we grow the SDL Pro Network?&nbsp; The qualified answer is: "When the market demands it..." - there are a number of talented potential partners who meet the quality bar - and clearly, the need for security in software development will grow to demand additional talented specialists. However, it's our plan to begin with a small set of partners of known expertise, and then respond to growing demand as it materializes.</P>
<P>So there you have it - the nuanced beginning and bright future of the SDL Pro Network...&nbsp; I invite your comments, and encourage you to check in at the <A href="http://www.microsoft.com/sdl" mce_href="http://www.microsoft.com/sdl">SDL Portal</A> as we continue to build out the program</P><img src="http://blogs.msdn.com/aggbug.aspx?PostID=8958114" width="1" height="1">]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Sep 2008 23:12:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sdl">sdl</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sdl pro network">sdl pro network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sdl implementation">sdl implementation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network">network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sdl delivery">sdl delivery</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sdl optimization model">sdl optimization model</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/quality">quality</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/partner quality">partner quality</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <source url="http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/archive/2008/09/18/about-the-sdl-pro-network.aspx">About the SDL Pro Network</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[In the News: Naughty High School Students, FBI Fails Security Test]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/79f767396237db5dda9b580d9272355f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/79f767396237db5dda9b580d9272355f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Password Recovery Experts May Be Hackers in DisguiseThe distance between cops and crooks is always smaller than it looks. According to a new article in Dark Reading, when you hire a service to help...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Password Recovery Experts May Be Hackers in DisguiseThe distance between cops and crooks is always smaller than it looks. According to a new article in Dark Reading, when you hire a service to help fi...]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2008 10:36:42 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/password recovery experts">password recovery experts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/disguisethe distance">disguisethe distance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/crooks">crooks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service">service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hire">hire</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/article">article</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dark">dark</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hackers">hackers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cops">cops</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/itsecurity/~3/395597439/">In the News: Naughty High School Students, FBI Fails Security Test</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[NFL Players and Senseless Violence]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/9ba2dec13c340b4da207249c75e0576b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/9ba2dec13c340b4da207249c75e0576b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Scott Brown writes about the dangers that well known NFL players face on a regular basis. For some, it has even led to their untimely deaths

Interestingly, many players seem reluctant to hire...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a href="http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/sports/steelers/s_588150.html">Scott Brown writes </a>about the dangers that well known NFL players face on a regular basis.  For some, it has even led to their untimely deaths. <br /><span id="fullpost"><br />Interestingly, many players seem reluctant to hire professional security agents.  There is a fear that it will make them seem "self important" and may arouse "indignation".  Is it just me or does this strike anybody else as a stupid reason to forego concerns and plans to safeguard one's own personal safety?    <br /></span><br />Does anybody think any less of a country's President because he/she is flanked by highly trained personal protection specialists?  Of course not. Why? Because history has proven to us that there are disturbed individuals in society who would kill a well known person/celebrity just for their 15 minutes of fame.<br /><br />Why then should an NFL player not be entitled to have a security person(s) looking out for them?  I am fairly sure that the family of Sean Taylor wishes that he had employed personal security and that they had confronted those criminals who broke into his house rather than Mr. Taylor.  <br /><br />There is no shame in taking precautions.  Ask any security consultant for their opinion on whether a person is better off saying; "I wished I had..." or saying;  "I am going to, just in case".  <br /><br />Consider of all of the wonderful music John Lennon could have produced these past years had he employed a Personal Protection Agent to watch his back and protect him from the lunatics of this world.  Artists like Lennon and world class athletes need to be protected so that they can continue to entertain us and thrill us with the gifts that they have been given.  They deserve our support, not our indignation.<div class="blogger-post-footer">Visit Sexton Executive Security at www.sextonsecurity.com</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2008 18:58:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/players">players</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nfl players">nfl players</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/world class athletes">world class athletes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/taylor">taylor</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/world">world</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sean taylor wishes">sean taylor wishes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal protection specialists">personal protection specialists</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/scott brown writes">scott brown writes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/person">person</category>
      <source url="http://www.thebulletproofblog.com/2008/09/nfl-players-and-senseless-violence.html">NFL Players and Senseless Violence</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Is an incorrectly implemented security program better than a non-existent one ?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5893399324f415d7cb19e54c1340401b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5893399324f415d7cb19e54c1340401b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Think carefully before you answer that one. A large majority of you would be inclined to give a resounding 'yes' - but I really want you to think carefully on this one. Think long term. Think about...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Think carefully before you answer that one. A large majority of you would be inclined to give a resounding 'yes' - but I really want you to think <em>carefully </em>on this one. Think long term. Think about implementation hurdles, think about project documentation.<br /><br />The answer to this IMHO is a big "DEPENDS". <br /><br />To explain:<br /><br />Imagine you're working in a company that has no security controls in place - and is in desperate need of getting a security program impemented. They hire a new CISO to make sure their physical and logical controls are in place, network and applications are secured appropriately and their incident management and forensics capabilities are upto date. At this point the CISO clearly  knows that he needs to create and implement a number of programs and hires a bunch of people to perform and manage a series of tasks. Till this point, things are going smoothly. Everyone understands the need, and is working towards meeting a common goal. The program is not in place yet, but people know and understand the urgency need to act immediately. The CISO's risk radar has a list of projects ranked by priority and everone begins to tackle them. <br /><br />Now consider the scenario when certain security programs are not done right - say, a few of the high risk  applications are not considered in the initial risk matrix or there are certain business units that have been granted an 'exception'to the process that is being put in place, with the most common excuses of:<br /><br />1. This is a pilot<br />2. We will get to this in the next phase<br />3. The group has a number of high profile clients who don't want it implemented right now<br />4. &ltplug your own excuse here&gt<br /><br />Well - initially, everyone is completely aware that they have more issues to remediate and and have honest intentions to fix that too, once the pilot and<br />PoC is well established and in place. But then things change. Leaders change. Managers change. People's roles change. What doesn't, is the documentation regarding the project. But documents usually tend to highlight what the project <em>does</em>, not what it <em>doesn't do</em>. Nobody seems to remember there are additional tasks that need to get completed. People take a quick look at documents detailing what was done in the program and begin to assume that it is well established, completely ignoring the fact that a very important Phase 2 still needs to be in place. A false sense of security is now well in place... and life goes on. <br /><br />Till you get hacked. <br /><br />..and then a forensics team attempts to determine the cause. A new CISO comes in, reviews the existing program, decides it is too complex and structureless and decides to do away with it entirely and create a new security program.. and the cycle continues.<br /><br />The moral of the story: When you have no security program - be very careful while diligently working to get one in place<br /><br />But when you have a partial one, be extremely careful and don't leave any loose ends while getting it completely and correctly put in place.<br /><br /><br />On a lighter note - here's an email I received from a school I was doing some courses from ..<br /><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_XTqu2iQGpYM/SL8CCfFxwwI/AAAAAAAAAq8/dQfN6tdLU-M/s1600-h/blog1.JPG"><img style="display:block; margin:0px auto 10px; text-align:center;cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_XTqu2iQGpYM/SL8CCfFxwwI/AAAAAAAAAq8/dQfN6tdLU-M/s400/blog1.JPG" border="0" alt=""id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5241910733011272450" /></a><br />Beautiful !! Here is your PIN (username). But we will not give you your password over email. I was sooo impressed when I got that! - Could it be that schools and universities are finally waking up and trying to understand security ? No more SSNs as IDs ? No more default 'password' passwords ?  This was great. I followed the procedure outlined to receive a new password - it asked for my name, DOB and email.. and then .. I receive this:<br /><br /><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_XTqu2iQGpYM/SL7-9CTJaKI/AAAAAAAAAq0/ZY9Q0SqaxkU/s1600-h/blog2.JPG"><img style="display:block; margin:0px auto 10px; text-align:center;cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_XTqu2iQGpYM/SL7-9CTJaKI/AAAAAAAAAq0/ZY9Q0SqaxkU/s400/blog2.JPG" border="0" alt=""id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5241907340848490658" /></a><br /><br /><br />For those who cannot see the image:<br /><br /><br />the email says:<br /><br />blah blah blah blah blah blah..<br />your PIN: <my PIN><br />your password: password1234<br /><br />blah blah blah blah blah blah]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 03 Sep 2008 12:02:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security program">security program</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/program">program</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security controls">security controls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/change">change</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/leaders change">leaders change</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/programs">programs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security programs">security programs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/roles change">roles change</category>
      <source url="http://securitycoin.blogspot.com/2008/09/is-incorrectly-implemented-security.html">Is an incorrectly implemented security program better than a non-existent one ?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Network skill level gap is growing, but growth opportunities abound!]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a4929ca88458feb902376bc7bd38e824</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a4929ca88458feb902376bc7bd38e824</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[A recent IDC report sponsored by the Cisco Learning Institute reveals a huge networking skills gap is emerging in North America, which spells trouble for enterprises. Listen to this: 600,000 IT...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; margin: 0px 10px 10px 0px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/exam.jpg" border="0" alt="Test Quiz" width="240" height="160" align="left" /> A recent IDC report sponsored by the Cisco Learning Institute reveals <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/newsletters/itlead/2008/080408itlead1.html" target="_blank">a huge networking skills gap</a> is emerging in North America, which spells trouble for enterprises. Listen to this: “600,000 IT workers were needed to install, configure, manage and secure networks in North America in 2007, 14% of the total IT workforce.” However, IDC reports that another 180,000 engineers with wireless as well as traditional network engineering experience will need to be added by 2011 to keep pace with advances in technology that is transforming the role of the network.</p>
<p>The convergence of voice and video traffic are quickly transforming the growing complexity of networks at a torrid pace. IDC estimates that the skills gap in VOIP should grow to 19% by 2011.</p>
<p>This changing profile in the role of the network plays a key role in the skills shortage. Network enabled collaboration tools such as social networking apps and the Webex conferencing/collaboration solutions we use in our business each and every day are demanding a new set of IT skills to deliver business value.</p>
<p>My perspective is two-fold on this issue; the first is what I have seen in the resources we have attempted to hire! We give a very straightforward quick written/oral test to all new technical hires. This requires basic networking knowledge and some Unix commands. On average, (after filters from reputable recruiting firms, some with 5-10 years experience) less than 10% pass muster for the first filter we use in our hiring process. This is a troubling fact, which has cost us considerable time and effort to secure the right resources with competent skills. So I can say from our market assessment in a very strong technological job skills market, core Unix and networking foundation skills are slipping.</p>
<p>The second is that we as an IT Operations Management (ITOM) industry need to keep pushing hard to build better proactive and intuitive solutions to aggregate instrumentation from all Data Center tools, including more work around VOIP, video streaming, and collaboration so that we can ease this transition. If ITOM solutions become more proactive across the typical Cisco infrastructure that is commonly installed in the Data Center, we can free up some additional time for advanced “emerging technologies” training where existing IT workers can enhance their core skills and re-invigorate their careers. We have to do a much better job of getting our existing IT professionals trained on emerging technologies!</p>
<p>While there’s less that ScienceLogic can do around <a href="http://www.cisco.com/web/learning/le3/learning_career_certifications_and_learning_paths_home.html" target="_blank">training</a>, we certainly strive to do our part to enhance a day in the life of the networking engineers who use our solutions to simplify monitoring of increasingly complex networking, <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/080608-p-g.html" target="_blank">Wireless, VOIP, and collaboration needs</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 25 Aug 2008 17:06:07 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/skills">skills</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/foundation skills">foundation skills</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network">network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/skills gap">skills gap</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/skills shortage">skills shortage</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/intuitive solutions">intuitive solutions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/solutions">solutions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/traditional network">traditional network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/recent idc report">recent idc report</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/network-skill-level-gap-is-growing-but-growth-opportunities-abound/08/2008">Network skill level gap is growing, but growth opportunities abound!</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Reputation Damage & Measurement]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d9577961443ca1c3cd93223077fbca5f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d9577961443ca1c3cd93223077fbca5f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Reputation damage can be one of the most difficult concepts to build measurements around. In fact, it can be difficult to develop the actual metrics for the measurements, as well. Damage to things...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Reputation damage can be one of the most difficult concepts to build measurements around.  In fact, it can be difficult to develop the actual metrics for the measurements, as well.  Damage to things like &#8220;corporate reputation&#8221; and &#8220;goodwill&#8221; and &#8220;brand equity&#8221; can be difficult to wrap even reasonable dollar estimates around (When I use FAIR, I really only care to use one metric when describing loss magnitudes - the almighty currency).</p>
<p>Complicating factors is the impact (or lack thereof) of incidents on stock price.  Many researchers who identify themselves with the <strong><a href="http://www.amazon.com/New-School-Information-Security/dp/0321502787">New School of Information Security</a></strong> (yours truly included) want to immediately look at stock price as a bell-weather metric for incident impact.  I think this stems from our days of slinging FUD, back when we could scream &#8220;Buy a firewall or we&#8217;ll have an incident and you&#8217;ll be on the front page of the paper and the stock price will go down!&#8221;  But these days notable incidents seem to suggest that the impact on stock price for an incident is short lived.  <em><strong>With qualifications, of course.</strong></em></p>
<p>So what would/should we make of this from <a href="http://www.money.co.uk/article/1001229-12-million-wiped-off-helphire-stock-after-malicious-gmail-sent-to-clients.htm">Money.co.uk</a>?</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong>£12million ($24m) Wiped off Helphire Stock after Malicious Email Sent to Clients</strong></p>
<blockquote><p>Car hire firm Helphire have taken Google to court after a malicious email sent from a Gmail account saw their shares plummet £12million in a single day.</p>
<p>The Bath-based business who specialise in providing replacement cars to &#8216;no-fault&#8217; drivers involved in accidents on behalf of car insurance companies, initiated legal proceedings against the search engine giant as part of their attempt to find out who is responsible for sending the defamatory mailing.</p>
<p>Google are now known to have complied with the court order and have controversially supplied details of the email account and ISP used by the meddler.</p>
<p>Written under the psudoname Peter Franks, the 1200 word email is know to have been sent from a gmail account that was opened specifically for this purpose and closed a few minutes after the damage had been done&#8230;</p>
<p>&#8230;The misdemeanour couldn’t have come at a worse time for the struggling firm who have undergone a £45million rights issue and seen a 75% drop in the value of their stock already this year.</p></blockquote>
<p>That last paragraph, for me, explains some of the difficulty in tying reputation damage to stock decreases.  It&#8217;s like when you read the headlines from Bloomberg about why the days stocks (or commodity) prices are up or down.  You know, the &#8220;Oil closes $3 higher on news that a notable South American dictator has a rather unpleasant boil in a very uncomfortable area&#8221; type of headlines.  You really do have to question the causality and correlation.  So in the Helphire case above - is this new drop in stock really because of the email sent?  If so, should we view that $24mil number as an independent data point to describe this sort of attack on reputation, or is the magnitude aggravated due to the long-term trend of stock price?</p>
<p>Even when we have &#8220;Objective Data&#8221; (an in-joke for Adam S.) like this decline in stock price, it is really difficult to provide any sort of precise estimate or measurement - about the future, present or past.  The best we can do is use ranges, distributions, that are reasonable based on evidence and observation.</p>
<p>So it&#8217;s worth filing away this sort of datum for future use - while dutifully acknowledging the qualifiers we might place around it.</p>
<p>So the questions I ask here - what should we make of this new information, and how should we view the $24million drop - they&#8217;re not rhetorical.  I am very interested in your views and welcome your comments!</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 22 Aug 2008 10:33:56 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/stock">stock</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/helphire stock">helphire stock</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/reputation damage">reputation damage</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/reputation">reputation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/stock price">stock price</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/damage">damage</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email">email</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email account">email account</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malicious email">malicious email</category>
      <source url="http://riskmanagementinsight.com/riskanalysis/?p=387">Reputation Damage &amp; Measurement</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Web Based Botnet Command and Control Kit 2.0]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/4f945955ba8a424fe6b9352583602062</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/4f945955ba8a424fe6b9352583602062</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The average web based command and control kit for a botnet consisting of single user, single campaign functions only, has just lost its charm, with a recent discovery of a proprietary botnet kit whose...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK7vNKA_3xI/AAAAAAAACFk/bFba_0dWvI4/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_1.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK7vNKA_3xI/AAAAAAAACFk/TqKIw6bxpjw/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_1.JPG" /></a>The average web based command and control kit for a botnet consisting of single user, single campaign functions only, has just lost its charm, with a recent discovery of a proprietary botnet kit whose features clearly indicate that the kit's coder know exactly which niches to fill - presumably based on his personal experience or market research into competing products.<br />
<br />
What are some its key differentiation factors? <b>Multitasking</b> at its best, for instance, the kits provides the botnet master with the opportunity to manage numerous different task such as several malware campaigns and DDoS attacks simultaneously, where each of these gets a separate metrics page.  <b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<br />
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8Bf1BEKoI/AAAAAAAACFs/Yicbw9alvSs/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_2.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8Bf1BEKoI/AAAAAAAACFs/rzG7g1DxhQs/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_2.JPG" /></a><b>Automation</b> of malicious tasks, by setting up tasks, and issuing notices on the status of the task, when it was run and when it was ended. Just consider the possibilities for a scheduling malware and DDoS attacks for different quarters. <b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<br />
<b>Segmentation</b> in every aspect of the tasks, for instance, a DDoS attacks against a particular site can be scheduled to launched on a specific date from infected hosts based in chosen countries only. <b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8BqO4a_VI/AAAAAAAACF0/UMGxAh9uGF0/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_3.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8BqO4a_VI/AAAAAAAACF0/ZlxV-mc44fM/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_3.JPG" /></a><b>Customized DDoS</b> in the sense of empowering the botnet master with point'n'click ability to dedicate a precise number of the bots to participate, which countries they should be based in, and for how long the attack should remain active. <b>Quality and assurance in DDoS attacks</b> based on the measurement of the bot's bandwidth against a particular country, in this case the object of the attack, so theoretically bots from neighboring countries would DDoS the country in question far more efficiently. <b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<br />
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8B0rE_rgI/AAAAAAAACF8/NKwLnKmmH44/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_4.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8B0rE_rgI/AAAAAAAACF8/pVosEgAltxk/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_4.JPG" /></a><b>Historical malware campaign performance</b>, is perhaps the most quality assurance feature in the entire kit, presumably created in order to allow the person behind it to measure which were the most effective malware and DDoS campaigns that he executed in the past. From an OSINT perspective, sacrificing his operational security by maintaing detailed logs from previous attacks is a gold mine directly establishing his relationships with previous malware campaigns.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8B8T36-3I/AAAAAAAACGE/BhFmeDoa8Lk/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_5.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8B8T36-3I/AAAAAAAACGE/vij9THb60ow/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_5.JPG" /></a><b>Bot Description</b>:  &nbsp; <br />
<div dir="ltr" id="result_box">1. Completely invisible Bot work in the system.  <br />
2. Not loads system.  <br />
3. Invisible in the process.  <br />
4. Workaround all firewall.  <br />
5. Bot implemented as a driver.  </div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8CIQJHsKI/AAAAAAAACGM/SzpE6NqryP8/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_6.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8CIQJHsKI/AAAAAAAACGM/CptzW9_ji-k/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_6.JPG" /></a><b>Functions Bot</b> (constantly updated):&nbsp;</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box">1. Downloading a file (many options). <br />
2. HTTP DDoS (many options, including http authentication).  </div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8CQZXzF1I/AAAAAAAACGU/LI52hSDJhpA/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_7.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8CQZXzF1I/AAAAAAAACGU/AIaGhGUL0Fk/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_7.JPG" /></a><b>The web interface</b>&nbsp;</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box">-- Convenient manager tasks. <br />
-- Every task can be stopped, put on pause, etc. ... <br />
-- Interest and visual scale of the task.&nbsp;&nbsp;</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box">-- A task manager for DDoS and Loader <br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8Cvw3fTbI/AAAAAAAACGc/Zqcrn6XWYEw/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_8.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8Cvw3fTbI/AAAAAAAACGc/0PQgE_timh4/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_8.JPG" /></a>-- <b>For DDoS tasks</b> </div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box">Bots involved in DDoS 'f. <br />
Condition of the victim (works, fell).  <br />
</div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8C5JVrIeI/AAAAAAAACGk/HNHO_ar0MgA/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_9.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8C5JVrIeI/AAAAAAAACGk/Y1z0VIR3B9k/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_9.JPG" /></a>2. <b>Bots manager  </b><br />
-- Displays a list of bots (postranichno). <br />
-- Obratseniya date of the first and last. <br />
-- ID Bot. <br />
-- Country Bot. <br />
-- Type Bot. <br />
-- The status Bot (online / offline). <br />
-- Bot bandwidth to different parts of the world (europe, asia). <br />
-- The possibility of removing bots</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box">-- When you click on ID Bot loadable still a wealth of information about it</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8D0Vm4XxI/AAAAAAAACGs/BM5pm1_Rtag/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_11.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8D0Vm4XxI/AAAAAAAACGs/mQEa7wVxDNc/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_11.JPG" /></a>3. <b>Statistics botneta  </b><br />
-- Statistics both common and build Bot. <br />
-- Information on the growth and decline botneta dates (and build). <br />
-- Bots online <br />
-- All bots</div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8D6Gv_qnI/AAAAAAAACG0/JTOJS-ZHQek/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_12.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8D6Gv_qnI/AAAAAAAACG0/ujbOfFEX9TA/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_12.JPG" /></a>-- Dead bots. <br />
<br />
4. <b>Statistics botneta country</b></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box">-- All countries to work on&nbsp;</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box">-- New work by country&nbsp;</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box">-- Online work from country to country</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box">-- Dead bots by country</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box">5. <b>Detailed history botneta</b>&nbsp;</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box">6. <b>Convenient user-friendly interface adding teams</b> <br />
8. <b>Admin minimal server loads</b>  <br />
-- Use php5/mysql  <br />
</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8EKSfrczI/AAAAAAAACG8/3oulo2cgTtM/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_13.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8EKSfrczI/AAAAAAAACG8/xEI9xAwNGNM/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_13.JPG" /></a><b>Upcoming features : </b><br />
1. Form grabber (price increase substantially), for old customers will be charged as an upgrade <br />
2. Public key cryptography<br />
3. Clustering campaigns and DDoS attacks<br />
<br />
Despite it's proprietary nature, it's quality and innovative features will sooner or later leak out for everyone to take advantage of, a rather common lifecycle for the majority of proprietary malware kits in general.</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><br />
<b>Related posts:</b></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/blackenergy-ddos-bot-web-based-c.html">BlackEnergy DDoS Bot Web Based<br />
</a></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/new-ddos-malware-kit-in-wild.html">A New DDoS Malware Kit in the Wild</a></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/04/shots-from-malicious-wild-west-sample_20.html">The Cyber Bot - Web Based Malware</a></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/04/shots-from-malicious-wild-west-sample_7672.html">The Black Sun Bot - Web Based Malware</a> </div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/custom-ddos-capabilities-within-malware.html">Custom DDoS Capabilities Within a Malware</a></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/botnet-on-demand-service.html">Botnet on Demand Service</a></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/loadsccs-ddos-for-hire-service.html">Loads.cc - DDoS for Hire Service</a></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/using-market-forces-to-disrupt-botnets.html">Using Market Forces to Disrupt Botnets</a>&nbsp;</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/03/botnet-communication-platforms.html">Botnet Communication Platforms</a></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/botnet-masters-to-do-list.html">A Botnet Master's To-Do List</a></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/05/ddos-on-demand-vs-ddos-extortion.html">DDoS on Demand VS DDoS Extortion</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/how-does-botnet-with-100k-infected-pcs.html">How Does a Botnet with 100k Infected PCs Look Like?</a></div><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=Y5dBtK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=Y5dBtK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=WsNccK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=WsNccK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=ToV4Pk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=ToV4Pk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=I6a7ak"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=I6a7ak" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=2S7WNK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=2S7WNK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=Qk66sK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=Qk66sK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=8S5ask"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=8S5ask" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/372102101" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 22 Aug 2008 10:02:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ddos attacks based">ddos attacks based</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ddos attacks">ddos attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/previous malware campaigns">previous malware campaigns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ddos attacks simultaneously">ddos attacks simultaneously</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/botnet">botnet</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/country">country</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/country bot">country bot</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ddos">ddos</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/372102101/web-based-botnet-command-and-control.html">Web Based Botnet Command and Control Kit 2.0</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Growing Security Skills Shortage]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6f0a31fa5334384c34fb7f51cba96b5b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6f0a31fa5334384c34fb7f51cba96b5b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[We are regularly hearing from our security clients about their difficulties finding people with the right skills or when they do finally find them, these people are too costly to employ because their...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img title="Jonathan Penn" alt="Jonathan Penn" src="http://www.forrester.com/role_based/images/author/imported/forresterDotCom/Analyst_Photos/Silhouette/Color/Jonathan-Penn.gif" border="0" style="FLOAT: left; MARGIN: 0px 5px 5px 0px" /></p>

<p>We are regularly hearing from our security clients about their difficulties finding people with the right skills – or when they do finally find them, these people are too costly to employ because their skills are in such demand.</p>



<p>Indeed, the “unavailability of people with the right skills” was cited as a top challenge for security groups in both our <a href="http://www.forrester.com/go?docid=44366">enterprise</a> and <a href="http://www.forrester.com/go?docid=44692">SMB</a> surveys.</p>



<p>In comparing need for talent across 25 different IT roles, Forrester analysts came to the conclusion that information security experts are among <a href="http://www.forrester.com/go?docid=46400">the hottest roles in IT</a>, sharing the top spot with information/data architects.</p>



<p>The skills shortage is likely to get worse before it gets better. We’re unlikely to see a significant spike in security experts’ salaries to attract those we need to hire: large changes in compensation for senior security personnel would run against the current of economic belt-tightening. Another typical approach to offsetting the shortage would be to train up: foster the career development and advancement of existing security personnel on our payroll. However, with all the outsourcing that is going on – and which will increasingly occur – there is a shrinking pool from which to find people with “the right stuff” worth championing their advancement.</p>



<p>We could look outside of security to others in IT, or even to co-workers in other departments or business groups. But given how poor a job IT Security does of marketing its value proposition, I don’t hold much hope for attracting non-security people.</p>



<p>What do you think? Are we about to hit a very big wall when it comes to skills and staffing? Are you presently feeling the pain of a skills shortage? Do you see such a shortage looming? What measures are you taking to acquire and nurture talent? Which ones are successful and why?</p>



<p>I welcome your thoughts on the topic.</p>

]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Aug 2008 05:02:06 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/senior security personnel">senior security personnel</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security clients">security clients</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security experts salaries">security experts salaries</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/skills shortage">skills shortage</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/shortage">shortage</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security experts">information security experts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/skills">skills</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security personnel">security personnel</category>
      <source url="http://blogs.forrester.com/srm/2008/08/the-growing-sec.html">The Growing Security Skills Shortage</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Banker Malware Targeting Brazilian Banks in the Wild]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/4c146364a5e5366271bb42a4f795af8d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/4c146364a5e5366271bb42a4f795af8d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Despite the ongoing customerization of malware, and the malware coding for hire customer tailored services, certain malware authors still believe in the product concept, namely, they build it and wait...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKldLvANUBI/AAAAAAAACC8/4JM_2PVEVY4/s1600-h/banker_malware_brazil_banks.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKldLvANUBI/AAAAAAAACC8/zzcjUAMw61E/s200-R/banker_malware_brazil_banks.jpg" /></a>Despite the ongoing customerization of malware, and the malware coding for hire customer tailored services, certain malware authors still believe in the product concept, namely, they build it and wait for someone to come. In this underground proposition for a proprietary banker malware targeting primarily Brazillian bank, the author is relying on the localized value added to his malware forgetting a simply fact - that the most popular banker malware is generalizing E-banking transactions in such a way that it's successfully able to hijack the sessions of banks it hasn't originally be coded to target in general.<br />
<br />
<b>Banks targetted in this banker malware :</b><br />
<i>Bank Equifax<br />
Bank Itau<br />
Bank Check<br />
Bank Vivo<br />
Bank Banrisul<br />
Tim Bank Brazil<br />
Bank Nossa Caixa<br />
Bank Santander Banespa<br />
Bank Infoseg<br />
Bank Paypal <br />
Bank Caixa Economica Federal<br />
Bank Bradesco<br />
Bank Northeast<br />
Royal Bank<br />
Bank Itau Personnalite<br />
Bank PagSeguro<br />
Australia Bank<br />
Credicard Citi Bank<br />
Credicard Bank Itau<br />
Rural Bank</i><br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKlgsZBqOLI/AAAAAAAACDE/kN2MQLJqjls/s1600-h/banker_malware_brazil_banks1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKlgsZBqOLI/AAAAAAAACDE/niBpSaKVaTE/s200-R/banker_malware_brazil_banks1.jpg" /></a>Taking into consideration the fact that not everyone would be willing to pay a couple of thousand dollars for a <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/metaphisher-malware-kit-spotted-in-wild.html">banker malware kit targeting banks the customer isn't interested in at the first place</a>, malware authors have long been tailoring their propositions on the basis of modules. Adding an additional module for stealtness increases the prices, as well as an additional module forwarding the process of updating the malware binary to the "customer support desk". Moreover, stripping the banker kit from modules in which the customer doesn't have interest, like for instance exclude all Asian banks the kit has already built-in capabilities to hijack and log transactions from, decreases its price.<br />
<br />
In a truly globalized IT underground, Brazillian cybercriminals tend to prefer using the <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/crimeware-in-middle-zeus.html">market leading tools courtesy of Russian malware authors</a>, so this localized banker malware with its basic session screenshot taking capabilities and accounting data logging has a very long way to go before it starts getting embraced by the local underground.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/twitter-malware-campaign-wants-to-bank.html">The Twitter Malware Campaign Wants to Bank With You</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/targeted-spamming-of-bankers-malware.html">Targeted Spamming of Bankers Malware</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/localized-bankers-malware-campaign.html">A Localized Bankers Malware Campaign</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/76service-cybercrime-as-service-going.html">76Service - Cybercrime as a Service Going Mainstream</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/03/underground-economys-supply-of-goods.html">The Underground Economy's Supply of Goods and Services</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/dynamics-of-malware-industry.html">The Dynamics of the Malware Industry - Proprietary Malware Tools</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/using-market-forces-to-disrupt-botnets.html">Using Market Forces to Disrupt Botnets</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/multiple-firewalls-bypassing.html">Multiple Firewalls Bypassing Verification on Demand</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/managed-spamming-appliances-future-of.html">Managed Spamming Appliances - The Future of Spam</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/localizing-cybercrime-cultural.html">Localizing Cybercrime - Cultural Diversity on Demand</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/01/e-crime-and-socioeconomic-factors.html">E-crime and Socioeconomic Factors</a><b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/08/malware-as-web-service.html">Malware as a Web Service</a><b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/are-stolen-credit-card-details-getting.html">Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-team-leaving-it-underground.html">Neosploit Team Leaving the IT Underground</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/zeus-crimeware-kit-vulnerable-to.html">The Zeus Crimeware Kit Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/pinch-vulnerable-to-remotely.html">Pinch Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/dissecting-managed-spamming-service.html">Dissecting a Managed Spamming Service</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/managed-spamming-appliances-future-of.html">Managed "Spamming Appliances" - The Future of Spam</a><div class="feedflare">
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      <pubDate>Mon, 18 Aug 2008 03:01:03 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/banker malware">banker malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/banker malware kit">banker malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kit">kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/popular banker malware">popular banker malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bank itau personnalite">bank itau personnalite</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bank itau">bank itau</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware authors">malware authors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/russian malware authors">russian malware authors</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/368038328/banker-malware-targetting-brazilian.html">Banker Malware Targeting Brazilian Banks in the Wild</source>
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