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  <channel>
    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: hours]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/hours</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Fri, 24 Oct 2008 10:25:00 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[British Hospital System Hit by Computer Virus]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f1d8bd877d349859de699cde8caa6ac4</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f1d8bd877d349859de699cde8caa6ac4</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Three London hospitals that make up St Bartholomew's (Barts) and The London NHS Trust have been forced to shut down their computer systems for at least 24 hours due to a computer virus attack . The...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Three London hospitals that make up St Bartholomew's (Barts) and The London NHS Trust <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/london/7735502.stm">have been forced to shut down their computer systems for at least 24 hours due to a computer virus attack</a>. The three hospitals are Barts in the City, the Royal London Hospital in Whitechapel and The London Chest Hospital in Bethnal Green.

Neither a BBC report nor <a href="http://www.bartsandthelondon.org.uk/formedia/press/release.asp?id=2054&sid=10">a press release from the hospitals</a> said anything about the nature of the attack or the extent of the damage or if patient services were affected, although one would think this would have to be the case. The terse press release says that "The Trust's well rehearsed emergency procedures have been activated to ensure that key clinical systems continue safely while the system is being stabilised and a solution is being found."

The problem was first detected at 12:00 GMT Monday according to a spokesman.
<p><a href="http://feedads.googleadservices.com/~a/5O7UI8F7mHF--xx0jjKhwICpCgo/a"><img src="http://feedads.googleadservices.com/~a/5O7UI8F7mHF--xx0jjKhwICpCgo/i" border="0" ismap="true"></img></a></p><img src="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~4/OssPZ1W7pOw" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Nov 2008 06:01:25 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/press release">press release</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/terse press release">terse press release</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attack">attack</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/trust">trust</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/london hospitals">london hospitals</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer virus attack">computer virus attack</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hospitals">hospitals</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/london nhs trust">london nhs trust</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/royal london hospital">royal london hospital</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.ziffdavisenterprise.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~3/OssPZ1W7pOw/british_hospital_system_hit_by_computer_virus.html">British Hospital System Hit by Computer Virus</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[A late look at Interop NY 2008]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a809cae08aacaa70769cecc5883f1d96</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a809cae08aacaa70769cecc5883f1d96</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Boy, time flies when youre having fun. Ive just gotten my first opportunity to look back at the statistics from Interop NY 2008. Of all the statistics, the ticketing ones have proven to be the most...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Boy, time flies when you&#8217;re having fun.  I&#8217;ve just gotten my first opportunity to look back at the statistics from Interop NY 2008.  Of all the statistics, the ticketing ones have proven to be the most interesting - especially when you compare them to the Las Vegas show earlier in the year.  If you look back at the <a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/interop-vegas-2008-a-tale-of-user-error/06/2008" target="_blank">details of that ticketing review</a> the stats clearly showed that most tickets were opened due to user error.  In NY, while &#8220;user error&#8221; dominated the other categories, &#8220;facilities&#8221; came a close second.  The InteropNet Help Desk opened a total of 94 tickets during Interop NY.  Of these tickets, 42 turned out to be user error.  Coming in second, with 17 tickets were issues with the facilities, with the most common issue being cabling that had gotten damaged between installation and the time the exhibitor was trying to use it.   In Las Vegas, despite the show being significantly larger, we only saw 6 tickets of that type.  I guess you can chalk that up as yet another reason that doing shows at The Javits Center is so much fun! (Don&#8217;t ask Julia about dealing with the Javits Center. She&#8217;ll talk your ear off.)</p>
<p>After Interop Las Vegas you may have seen our analysis of the data that we collected and delivered in our NOC view.  I thought I&#8217;d recreate the same data for NY and do a short comparison.</p>
<p>1) Like in Vegas, uptime for the network 100%.  This is no small feat considering that we introduced a new wrinkle in NY, taking down the primary NOC while the education portion of the show was still going on.  This was a forced failover to the backup systems, and it went flawlessly.  I&#8217;d like to give a little credit to EM7 on the 100% uptime as it caught a failover to battery power that allowed AC to be restored before a series of critical equipment would have gone down.</p>
<p>2) Again like Vegas, the average monitored device in the show network didn&#8217;t even hit 10% CPU utilization.  Still lots of computing overhead availabe in the show network.</p>
<p>3) The NY show network wasn&#8217;t nearly as busy as in Las Vegas, sustaining an average of only 27Mbps of usage (versus 56 Mbps) in Vegas.</p>
<p>4) Power consumption for the network and NOC in NY clocked in at 445kwh per day, about 25% less than the Las Vegas show.  This wasn&#8217;t because the equipment was any more power efficient, but instead because the show was smaller and therefore there was less network gear.</p>
<p>5) Finally, a stat we didn&#8217;t track too carefully in Las Vegas, but that I find interesting.  During show hours the wireless network average 1,100 users attached.  That&#8217;s a lot of people and a lot of wireless devices.</p>
<p>The good news is there was nothing too unexpected in the data, overall the smaller show led to a smaller number of tickets and smaller consumption of resources across the board.  We hope to have the opportunity to work with the InteropNet team again next year and take a look at this data year-over-year for each show.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Nov 2008 18:41:11 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vegas">vegas</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/interop las vegas">interop las vegas</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/las vegas">las vegas</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wireless network average">wireless network average</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network">network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/interop">interop</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network gear">network gear</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/user error">user error</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tickets">tickets</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/a-late-look-at-interop-ny-2008/11/2008">A late look at Interop NY 2008</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[They didn't go away you know....]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/265b22f7a3a1ac42a1aa3d3c8f7bd79d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/265b22f7a3a1ac42a1aa3d3c8f7bd79d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Listening to a discussion on CNN the day after President elect Obama won the U.S. Presidential race, made me think about what the terrorists may be thinking

It really is fairly easy for the average...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Listening to a discussion on CNN the day after President elect Obama won the U.S. Presidential race, made me think about what the terrorists may be thinking. <br /><span id="fullpost"><br />It really is fairly easy for the average citizen to push these thoughts out of their mind, but we should always keep it somewhere in our minds - close enough to recall it when necessary.<br /></span><br />Bill Clinton was "tested" early in his Presidency as was the U.K.'s new Prime Minister - Gordon Brown.  In PM Brown's case it came 72 hours after the Election in Britain.  How long may we wait to see something here..or overseas, but definitely aimed at inflciting U.S. casualties?<br /><br />Bottom line - we should always remian alert and open to the idea that something could happen and we can not afford to drop our guard and think "they have gone".  Terrorists have great amounts of patience.  They conduct surveillance right under the noses of their intended victims.  As the old saying goes; "we have to be successful every single time - they only have to be lucky once".<div class="blogger-post-footer">Visit Sexton Executive Security at www.sextonsecurity.com</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 14 Nov 2008 03:02:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/brown">brown</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/gordon brown">gordon brown</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/president elect obama">president elect obama</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/single time">single time</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/conduct surveillance">conduct surveillance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bill clinton">bill clinton</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/remian alert">remian alert</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/terrorists">terrorists</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/presidential race">presidential race</category>
      <source url="http://www.thebulletproofblog.com/2008/11/they-didnt-go-away-you-know.html">They didn't go away you know....</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Thirteen]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f98a08c6e830a559db2ccd85e32f048e</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f98a08c6e830a559db2ccd85e32f048e</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[What is the difference between a reactive and proactive threat intell? A reactive threat intell is assessing a campaign, individual, a group of individuals, how are they related to one another, and...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SRri0cTxwTI/AAAAAAAACb0/G9gmDkGawOk/s1600-h/fake_security_software_powerfull.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SRri0cTxwTI/AAAAAAAACb0/G9gmDkGawOk/s200/fake_security_software_powerfull.png" /></a>What is the difference between a reactive and proactive threat intell? A reactive threat intell is assessing a campaign, individual, a group of individuals, how are they related to one another, and what have they been doing in the past, based exclusively on a lead that's been found within the past couple of hours.<br />
<br />
Try the very latest rogue security domains courtesy of three domainers (<b>Fedor Ibragimov cndomainz@yahoo.com, Anton Golovayk gpdomains@yahoo.com</b> and <b>Ivan Durov idomains.admin@gmail.com</b> ) whose portfolios can always keep you updated about the latest releases of such popular software as The Best Antivirus Cleaner 2008.<br />
<br />
<b>powerfullantivirusscan .com</b> (78.159.118.217; 89.149.253.215; 208.72.168.185)<br />
<b>protection-update .com</b><br />
<b>updatepcprotection .com</b><br />
<b>updateyourprotection .com</b><br />
<b>mac-imunizator .net</b> (67.205.75.10)<br />
<b>avproinstall .com</b> (78.157.141.26)<br />
<b>winavpro .com</b> (92.241.163.30)<br />
<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SRtYLfJhw0I/AAAAAAAACcM/NIA5Cb8GMjI/s1600-h/fake_security_software_november_.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SRtYLfJhw0I/AAAAAAAACcM/NIA5Cb8GMjI/s200/fake_security_software_november_.png" /></a>As far as proactive threat intell is concerned, try the following "upcoming fake security software domains" :<br />
<br />
<b>spywaredefender2009 .com<br />
spywaredestroyer2009 .com<br />
spywareeliminator2009 .com<br />
spywareprotector2009 .com</b><br />
<br />
It would be interesting to monitor whether or not the well known non-existent security software brands we've monitoring throughout 2008, will be basically typosquatted in a 2009 like fashion, or would they simply introduce new brands. With their business model under pressure, I'm starting to see evidence of schemes involving the illegal advertisement of affiliate links to legitimate security software, where the cybercriminals are actual resellers of it. There's also no shortage of surreal situations, where a fake security software is taking advantage of blackhat SEO practices promising the removal of competing fake security software brands.<br />
<br />
Last week, the <b>noadware .net </b>(69.20.71.82; 69.20.104.139) software was persistently advertised in such a way, mostly by generating Wordpress accounts promising to remove competing software :<br />
<br />
<b>antiviruspro2009.wordpress .com<br />
ultraantivirus2009.wordpress .com<br />
smartantivirus.wordpress .com<br />
antiviruslab2009.wordpress .com<br />
antivirusvip.wordpress .com<br />
personaldefender2009.wordpress .com<br />
malwareremoval.wordpress .com</b><br />
<br />
Naturally, it didn't take long before blackhat SEO farms were created for the purpose, like these very latest ones :<br />
<br />
<b>removal-tool.blogspot .com<br />
cgidoctor .com<br />
spywareremoval .net<br />
spyware-adware-remover .com<br />
spywarestop .com<br />
zero-adware .net<br />
adware-remove .com<br />
antispywaresecrets .com<br />
protectyourcomputerfromspyware .info<br />
cleanpcfree .net<br />
spyware-bot&nbsp; .com<br />
spywarezapper.co .uk<br />
thepcsecurity .com<br />
noadware-official-site .com<br />
spywaredoctorfavor .cn<br />
removespywareedge .cn<br />
thespywareremover .com<br />
virusremovalguru .com<br />
virusremovalguide .org</b> <br />
<br />
The day when fake security software sites start attracting traffic by promising to remove other fake security software, is the day when we have clear evidence that an ecosystem has emerged.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/11/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Twelve</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/10/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_28.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Eleven</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/10/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_22.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Ten</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/10/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_16.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Nine</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/10/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Eight</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/09/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_30.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Seven</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/09/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_24.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Six</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/09/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">A  Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Five</a> <br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_25.html">A  Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_20.html">A  Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three</a><b> </b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">A  Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">Diverse  Portfolio of Fake Security Software</a><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=AqTIN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=AqTIN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=GqbtN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=GqbtN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=AwMMn"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=AwMMn" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=wYg3n"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=wYg3n" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=xmYvN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=xmYvN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=lK1GN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=lK1GN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=uEj3n"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=uEj3n" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/451194751" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 12 Nov 2008 13:57:26 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security software">security software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software">software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fake security software">fake security software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/popular software">popular software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/diverse portfolio">diverse portfolio</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wordpress">wordpress</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wordpress accounts">wordpress accounts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/proactive threat intell">proactive threat intell</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/net">net</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/451194751/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_12.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Thirteen</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Vulnerabilities quickly mitigated by security-conscious vendors]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/7953938c09c36aba1397daeec84ac8ab</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/7953938c09c36aba1397daeec84ac8ab</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[As you are likely aware, I spend a fair bit of time heckling those I believe deserving due to their shortcomings with regard to protecting online consumers
I do, however, continue to seek...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[As you are likely aware, I spend a fair bit of time heckling those I believe deserving due to their shortcomings with regard to protecting online consumers.<br />I do, however, continue to seek opportunities to shed positive light as well, and recent responses from a number of vendor/developers warrant an opportunity to do just that.<br />In the last 30 days, I've discovered vulnerabilities in products from four different vendors, and <a href="http://holisticinfosec.org/content/category/6/23/45/" target="_blank">advised</a> them all immediately upon discovery. Usually, that's where the story ends, as sadly, my repeated requests for action are often ignored. The last 30 days have proven to be entirely different, with swift responses and action from ALL vendors to whom I reported vulnerabilities. In all cases I received replies within 24 hours or less, and patches/fixes/updates were typically released within 24-72 additional hours. These are exemplary responses, and reflect why I choose to conduct vulnerability research. I believe we, as web application professionals (both developers and security practitioners), are beholden to the greater public and must endeavor to protect the online safety of the Internet consumer. <br />To each of these vendors/developers I'd like to issue a hearty "well done" and issue public kudos for their diligence and security consciousness, on behalf of consumers and website operators.<br />To Lukas of <a href="http://planetluc.com/en/" target="_blank">PlanetLuc</a>, Jasper and Eric of <a href="http://infrae.com/products/silva" target="_blank">Infrae/Silva</a>, Alexander of <a href="http://www.compactcms.nl/" target="_blank">CompactCMS</a>, and Peter from <a href="http://activecampaign.com/" target="_blank">ActiveCampaign</a> may I say that your efforts are greatly appreciated. Where too few choose to do the right thing, your responses leave us with the perception of caring and integrity.<br />Thank you.<br /><br /><a href="http://del.icio.us/post?url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/11/vulnerabilities-quickly-mitigated-by.html&title=Vulnerabilities%20quickly%20mitigated%20by%20security-conscious%20vendors " title="Vulnerabilities quickly mitigated by security-conscious vendors ">del.icio.us</a> | <a href="http://digg.com/submit?phase=2&amp;url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/11/vulnerabilities-quickly-mitigated-by.html" title="Vulnerabilities quickly mitigated by security-conscious vendors ">digg</a> | <a href="http://slashdot.org/submit.pl?url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/11/vulnerabilities-quickly-mitigated-by.html">Submit to Slashdot</a>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Nov 2008 17:10:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/responses">responses</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/swift responses">swift responses</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/exemplary responses">exemplary responses</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/issue public kudos">issue public kudos</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/public">public</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/issue">issue</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vendors">vendors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vulnerabilities">vulnerabilities</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web application professionals">web application professionals</category>
      <source url="http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/11/vulnerabilities-quickly-mitigated-by.html">Vulnerabilities quickly mitigated by security-conscious vendors</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Silent Break-Ins: How Technology Compromises Physical Security Too]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/037bb160455e2a7c95f039f67e29cad0</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/037bb160455e2a7c95f039f67e29cad0</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I could have used this technique last night I got home to my apartment in Oakland at 11:30, only to realize Id left my keys in Sacramento. Two hours later a locksmith finally came and charged me $100...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I could have used this technique last night &#8212; I got home to my apartment in Oakland at 11:30, only to realize I&#8217;d left my keys in Sacramento. Two hours later a locksmith finally came and charged me $100 to let me in my own apartment. Expensive? Maybe, but comparable to other services, and compared to the havoc that a lock-breaker could wreak if he was trying to use his talents for crime rather than service, it&#8217;s a small price.</p>
<p>It&#8217;s kind of frightening to see how quickly a skilled lock-picker can jimmy a lock and get in. But new technology makes it even simpler &#8212; apparently all you need is a good telephoto lens to break in to someone&#8217;s house &#8212; just wait till they leave their keys out on a table, snap a picture, and take it to an unethical key maker, and wha-la, a perfect replica:</p>
<blockquote><p><span id="intelliTXT"> &#8220;We built our key duplication <a rel="nofollow" class="iAs" style="border-bottom:0.075em solid darkgreen important;font-weight:normal;font-size:100%;text-decoration:underline;padding-bottom:1px;color:darkgreen important;background-color:transparent important;" target="_blank" href="http://www.physorg.com/news144519246.html#">software</a> system to show people that their keys are not inherently secret,&#8221; said Stefan Savage, the <a rel="nofollow" class="iAs" style="border-bottom:0.075em solid darkgreen important;font-weight:normal;font-size:100%;text-decoration:underline;padding-bottom:1px;color:darkgreen important;background-color:transparent important;" target="_blank" href="http://www.physorg.com/news144519246.html#">computer</a> science professor from UC San Diego&#8217;s Jacobs School of Engineering who led the student-run project. &#8220;Perhaps this was once a reasonable assumption, but advances in digital imaging and optics have made it easy to duplicate someone&#8217;s keys from a distance without them even noticing.&#8221;<br />
</span></p>
<p><span id="intelliTXT">Professor Savage presents this work on October 30 at ACM&#8217;s Conference on Communications and Computer Security (CCS) 2008, one of the premier academic computer security conferences. </span></p></blockquote>
<p><a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="http://www.secureconsulting.net/2008/11/remote_key_copying_eep.html">Read</a> the <a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="http://www.physorg.com/news144519246.html">full article</a> here.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Nov 2008 12:17:53 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/someones keys">someones keys</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/keys">keys</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lock">lock</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer science professor">computer science professor</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/unethical key maker">unethical key maker</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lock-picker">lock-picker</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lock-breaker">lock-breaker</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/apartment">apartment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/reasonable assumption">reasonable assumption</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/itsecurity/~3/450105958/">Silent Break-Ins: How Technology Compromises Physical Security Too</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[10 Worst Computer Viruses of All Time]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/836da7848c2df35fd84e5feded98ac50</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/836da7848c2df35fd84e5feded98ac50</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Computer viruses can be a nightmare. Some can wipe out the information on a hard drive, tie up traffic on a computer network for hours, turn an innocent machine into a zombie and replicate and send...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Computer viruses can be a nightmare. Some can wipe out the information on a hard drive, tie up traffic on a computer network for hours, turn an innocent machine into a zombie and replicate and send themselves to other computers. Let's take a look at 10 of the worst computer viruses to cripple a computer system.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2008 05:00:02 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer viruses">computer viruses</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/worst computer viruses">worst computer viruses</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer system">computer system</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/innocent machine">innocent machine</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hard drive">hard drive</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer network">computer network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/traffic">traffic</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hours">hours</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wipe">wipe</category>
      <source url="http://digg.com/security/10_Worst_Computer_Viruses_of_All_Time_3">10 Worst Computer Viruses of All Time</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[10 Worst Computer Viruses of All Time]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2e591832f293016558508252bbd13698</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2e591832f293016558508252bbd13698</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Computer viruses can be a nightmare. Some can wipe out the information on a hard drive, tie up traffic on a computer network for hours, turn an innocent machine into a zombie and replicate and send...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Computer viruses can be a nightmare. Some can wipe out the information on a hard drive, tie up traffic on a computer network for hours, turn an innocent machine into a zombie and replicate and send themselves to other computers. Let's take a look at 10 of the worst computer viruses to cripple a computer system.<img src="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/digg/topic/security/popular/~4/qTvgSp6Ujoc" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2008 05:00:02 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer viruses">computer viruses</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/worst computer viruses">worst computer viruses</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer system">computer system</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/innocent machine">innocent machine</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hard drive">hard drive</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer network">computer network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/traffic">traffic</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hours">hours</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wipe">wipe</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.digg.com/~r/digg/topic/security/popular/~3/qTvgSp6Ujoc/10_Worst_Computer_Viruses_of_All_Time_3">10 Worst Computer Viruses of All Time</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Money Mules Syndicate Actively Recruiting Since 2002]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a33470c5ef01ff61333511853f9e63cc</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a33470c5ef01ff61333511853f9e63cc</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Money mules have already been an inseparable part of the underground ecosystem. And while others try to hide their activities by outsourcing their hosting needs to botnet masters partitioning their...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SQcPr1E8aJI/AAAAAAAACYE/NAdxaAzEnw8/s1600-h/money_mules_syndicate_U.S_U.K.bmp" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SQcPr1E8aJI/AAAAAAAACYE/6noTDuaSIow/s320-R/money_mules_syndicate_U.S_U.K.bmp" /></a>Money mules have already been an inseparable part of the underground ecosystem. And while others try to hide their activities by <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/money-mule-recruiters-use-asproxs-fast.html">outsourcing their hosting needs to botnet masters partitioning their botnets</a>, the experienced ones apply a decent level of OPSEC (operational security) by establishing a trust based model based on recommendations in order to even consider letting you register for their services. Their geographical location not only reflects the average time it would take to take action against their activities and expose yet another extensive network of fraudulent operations, but also, has the potential to increase or decrease the commissions that the mules take based on the risk factor of getting caught.<br />
<br />
There are several different types of money mules, those serving themselves, and those offering their services to others, in this particular case, we have a money mules syndicate that's been operating since 2002, and is only serving the high profile customers. What happens when such a money mule syndicate (naturally) starts vertically integrating by offering value-added services like credit card balance checking and date of birth lookups? Profits apparently increase, since the syndicate is actively recruiting and is currently looking for 20 to 30 mules -- their current staff is said to be approximately 100 people -- to cash out anything from bank account logins, Paypal accounts, to stolen credit card data. Here's a translated description of the service :<br />
<br />
<b>"<i>Who we are?</i></b><i><br />
</i><br />
<i>- First place at (cyber crime community) top list of trusted service providers for 2008</i><br />
<i>- We serve the big guys only since 2002</i><br />
<i>- We never scam, in business since 2002 without a single scam complaint</i><br />
<i>- We look for you, you don't look for us</i><br />
<i>- We offer outstanding working conditions and high commissions<b>&nbsp;</b></i><br />
<br />
<i><b>Who you should be?</b></i><br />
<i>- Dedicated person with experience in the field</i><br />
<i>- Have been in the business for at least 6 months</i><br />
<i>- Have been recommended by at least 1 person from (cybercrime community) and from (cybercrime community)</i><br />
<i>- You take 45% commission of the processed check, minimal amount is $3000</i><br />
<i>- You pay a membership fee</i><br />
<br />
<i>In the next two months we draw the command of 20-30 people who will most satisfy our requirements. For the selected team will be Paradise conditions:</i><br />
<br />
<i>- Instant payment (a few hours after delivered)  <br />
- Large numbers to drop service in the USA and the UK (30)  <br />
- Individual drop in the number of large islands  <br />
- 3-5 fresh weekly drop<br />
- Round-the-clock support</i>"  <br />
<br />
In case some of their customers get scammed -- appreciate the irony here as scammers compensate the scammers getting scammed by the scammer's outsourced personnel -- by some of their money mules, the service is offering compensation for the stolen goods/amount of money, clearly speaking for the revenues it is to prone to be generating. OPSEC (Operational Security) has been taking place across high-profile cybercrime communities during the last quarter, mostly in response to their increasing awareness that in the very same way they keep track of the major anti-fraud features implemented across their services of (ab)use, those implementing them could be monitoring them as well.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=fGWOM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=fGWOM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=f3mhM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=f3mhM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=Wr9Sm"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=Wr9Sm" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=f0Zkm"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=f0Zkm" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=i6KYM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=i6KYM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=7W3IM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=7W3IM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=sc0Km"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=sc0Km" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/434724736" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 28 Oct 2008 05:44:21 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/money mules">money mules</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/money">money</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mules">mules</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/drop service">drop service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service">service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service providers">service providers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/services">services</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/scam">scam</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cybercrime community">cybercrime community</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/434724736/money-mules-syndicate-actively.html">Money Mules Syndicate Actively Recruiting Since 2002</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Malware? We don't need no stinking malware!]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/cbb029a08a78820b5ef90b69579719a1</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/cbb029a08a78820b5ef90b69579719a1</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Written by Oliver Fisher

This site may harm your computer
You may have seen those words in Google search results but what do they mean? If you click the search result link you get another warning...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<span class="byline-author">Written by Oliver Fisher</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">"This site may harm your computer"</span><br />You may have seen those words in Google search results — but what do they mean? If you click the search result link you get another warning page instead of the website you were expecting. But if the web page was your grandmother's baking blog, you're still confused. Surely your grandmother hasn't been secretly honing her l33t computer hacking skills at night school. Google must have made a mistake and your grandmother's web page is just fine...<br /><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_LMSk7hTEaIE/SQI_1LfaQYI/AAAAAAAAtcc/zI4emYNyj4g/s1600-h/example.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 320px; height: 125px;" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_LMSk7hTEaIE/SQI_1LfaQYI/AAAAAAAAtcc/zI4emYNyj4g/s320/example.png" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5260837497572311426" border="0" /></a><br /><br />I work with the team that helps put the warning in Google's search results, so let me try to explain. The good news is that your grandmother is still kind and <a href="http://fitz.blogspot.com/2008/10/everybody-should-have-one.html">loves turtles</a>. She isn't trying to start a botnet or steal credit card numbers. The bad news is that her website or the server that it runs on probably has a security vulnerability, most likely from some out-of-date software. That vulnerability has been exploited and malicious code has been added to your grandmother's website. It's most likely an invisible script or iframe that pulls content from another website that tries to attack any computer that views the page. If the attack succeeds, then viruses, spyware, key loggers, botnets, and other nasty stuff will get installed.<br /><br />If you see the warning on a site in Google's search results, it's a good idea to pay attention to it. Google has automatic scanners that are constantly looking for these sorts of web pages. I help build the scanners and continue to be surprised by how accurate they are. There is almost certainly something wrong with the website even if it is run by someone you trust. The automatic scanners make unbiased decisions based on the malicious content of the pages, not the reputation of the webmaster.<br /><br />Servers are just like your home computer and need constant updating. There are lots of tools that make building a website easy, but each one adds some risk of being exploited. Even if you're diligent and keep all your website components updated, your web host may not be. They control your website's server and may not have installed the most recent OS patches. And it's not just innocent grandmothers that this happens to. There have been warnings on the websites of banks, sports teams, and corporate and government websites.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Uh-oh... I need help!</span><br />Now that we understand what the malware label means in search results, what do you do if you're a webmaster and Google's scanners have found malware on your site?<br /><br />There are some resources to help clean things up. The Google Webmaster Central blog has <a href="http://googlewebmastercentral.blogspot.com/2008/04/my-sites-been-hacked-now-what.html">some tips</a> and a <a href="http://googlewebmastercentral.blogspot.com/2007/09/quick-security-checklist-for-webmasters.html">quick security checklist for webmasters</a>. <a href="http://stopbadware.org/">Stopbadware.org</a> has great information, and their <a href="http://groups.google.com/group/stopbadware">forums</a> have a number of helpful and knowledgeable volunteers who may be able to help (sometimes I'm one of them). You can also use the Google SafeBrowsing diagnostics page for your site (http://www.google.com/safebrowsing/diagnostic?site=<i>&lt;site-name-here&gt;</i>) to see specific information about what Google's automatic scanners have found. If your site has been flagged, Google's <a href="http://www.google.com/webmasters/tools/">Webmaster Tools</a> lists some of the URLs that were scanned and found to be infected.<br /><br />Once you've cleaned up your website, use Google's <a href="http://www.google.com/webmasters/tools/">Webmaster Tools</a> to <a href="http://googlewebmastercentral.blogspot.com/2008/08/hey-google-i-no-longer-have-badware.html">request a malware review</a>. The automatic systems will rescan your website and the warning will be removed if the malware is gone.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Advance warning</span><br />I often hear webmasters asking Google for advance warning before a malware label is put on their website. When the label is applied, Google usually <a href="http://www.google.com/support/webmasters/bin/answer.py?answer=45432#2">emails the website owners</a> and then posts a warning in Google's <a href="http://www.google.com/webmasters/tools/">Webmaster Tools</a>. But no warning is given ahead of time - <span style="font-weight: bold;">before</span> the label is applied - so a webmaster can't quickly clean up the site before a warning is applied.<br /><br />But, look at the situation from the user's point of view. As a user, I'd be pretty annoyed if Google sent me to a site it knew was dangerous. Even a short delay would expose some users to that risk, and it doesn't seem justified. I know it's frustrating for a webmaster to see a malware label on their website. But, ultimately, protecting users against malware makes the internet a safer place and everyone benefits, both webmasters and users.<br /><br />Google's <a href="http://www.google.com/webmasters/tools/">Webmaster Tools</a> has started a test to provide <a href="http://googlewebmastercentral.blogspot.com/2008/10/message-center-warnings-for-hackable.html">warnings to webmasters</a> that their server software may be vulnerable. Responding to that warning and updating server software can prevent your website from being compromised with malware. The best way to avoid a malware label is to never have any malware on the site!<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reviews</span><br />You can request a review via Google's <a href="http://www.google.com/webmasters/tools/">Webmaster Tools</a> and you can see the status of the review there. If you think the review is taking too long, make sure to check the status. Finding all the malware on a site is difficult and the automated scanners are far more accurate than humans. The scanners may have found something you've missed and the review may have failed.  If your site has a malware label, Google's <a href="http://www.google.com/webmasters/tools/">Webmaster Tools</a> will also list some sample URLs that have problems. This is not a full list of all of the problem URLs (because that's often very, very long), but it should get you started.<br /><br />Finally, don't confuse a malware review with a <a href="http://googlewebmastercentral.blogspot.com/2008/07/requesting-reconsideration-using-google.html">request for reconsideration</a>. If Google's automated scanners find malware on your website, the site will usually not be removed from search results. There is also a different process that removes spammy websites from Google search results. If that's happened and you disagree with Google, you should submit a <a href="http://googlewebmastercentral.blogspot.com/2008/07/requesting-reconsideration-using-google.html">reconsideration request</a>. But if your site has a malware label, a reconsideration request won't do any good — for malware you need to file a malware review from the Overview page.<br /><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_LMSk7hTEaIE/SQJAJQN-pYI/AAAAAAAAtck/DOkV2_QwJdQ/s1600-h/example2.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 320px; height: 202px;" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_LMSk7hTEaIE/SQJAJQN-pYI/AAAAAAAAtck/DOkV2_QwJdQ/s320/example2.png" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5260837842438759810" border="0" /></a><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">How long will a review take?</span><br />Webmasters are eager to have a Google malware label removed from their site and often ask how long a review of the site will take. Both the original scanning and the review process are fully automated. The systems analyze large portions of the internet, which is big place, so the review may not happen immediately. Ideally, the label will be removed within a few hours. At its longest, the process should take a day or so.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog?a=Cuj5M"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog?i=Cuj5M" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog?a=v7cwm"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog?i=v7cwm" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog/~4/431137747" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 24 Oct 2008 10:25:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/google malware label">google malware label</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/label">label</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware review">malware review</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tools">tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/webmaster tools lists">webmaster tools lists</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware label">malware label</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/webmaster tools">webmaster tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/google">google</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog/~3/431137747/malware-we-dont-need-no-stinking.html">Malware? We don't need no stinking malware!</source>
    </item>
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