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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: immediately]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/immediately</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2008 15:23:37 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Importance of Advance Planning in Executive Protection]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/e1d474ffbd2af02b7c262a8172d013f8</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/e1d474ffbd2af02b7c262a8172d013f8</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I was delighted to see the Herald Standard quoting an executive/close protection agent regarding the importance of Advance work

Sy Alli is an E.P./C.P. team leader for &quot;Limited Brands Inc.,&quot; and was...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[I was delighted to see the <a href="http://www.heraldstandard.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=20151834&BRD=2280&PAG=461&dept_id=480247&rfi=6">Herald Standard </a>quoting an executive/close protection agent regarding the importance of Advance work.<br /><span id="fullpost"><br />Sy Alli is an E.P./C.P. team leader for "Limited Brands Inc.," and was speaking at the California University of Pennsylvania's 2nd annual conference on Corporate and Homeland Security.<br /><br />Mr. Alli was describing a previous trip to Indonesia where he was in charge of the advance to make sure everything was in place before the Principal arrived out with the other protective agents.  Very accurately, he described the need to cover every minute detail from the routes of travel to the alternative routes and to include such important features as local hospitals should medical treatment be needed.<br /><br />Another important point highlighted was the need for agents to have access to contacts in different countries who could assist with logistics, general and specialized support on the ground, current political situations, etc.  <br /><br />Far too often I am approached by security persons (and not even all are qualified/trained in executive or close protection)who find out that we may have overseas work and want to be included.  On some occassions, those requesting to be included on the detail did not even have a current passport!<br /><br />If you are serious about making a career out of this line of work, you owe it to yourself to do your homework.  Over the years I have developed hundreds of contacts all over the world who will respond immediately and who can be trusted to support us in any number of situations and scenarios.  <br /><br />This took a lot of preparing and involved constant contact.  It is not something that you throw together a day before your client is scheduled to arrive in a country.  If you have people in different parts of the country, or world if you wish to work globally, who can assist when you are in need, you will be able to facilitate your client in a way that will not only gain his/her admiration, but will undoubtedly cement your position in that client's security detail.<br /><br />In these unsure times, there is a lot to be said for knowing your job is safe for the foreseeable future.<div class="blogger-post-footer">Visit Sexton Executive Security at www.sextonsecurity.com</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 12 Oct 2008 16:10:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/detail">detail</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security detail">security detail</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/current political situations">current political situations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/advance">advance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/situations">situations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/2nd annual conference">2nd annual conference</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/gain hisher admiration">gain hisher admiration</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/agents">agents</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/routes">routes</category>
      <source url="http://www.thebulletproofblog.com/2008/10/importance-of-advance-planning-in.html">The Importance of Advance Planning in Executive Protection</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[MSP Snapshot Monitoring with EM7]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5288692e82e0f23665e5086e43db9ed4</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5288692e82e0f23665e5086e43db9ed4</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Between the fifth anniversary for ScienceLogic and the Inc 500 milestone, weve become very nostalgic about the beginnings of the company and EM7. For instance, did you know that EM7 was originally...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Between the <a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/sciencelogics-5-year-anniversary/08/2008" target="_blank">fifth anniversary for ScienceLogic</a> and the Inc 500 milestone, we’ve become very nostalgic about the beginnings of the company and EM7. For instance, did you know that EM7 was originally designed with managed service providers in mind? Not so surprising when 5 of the first 6 employees (including all 3 founders) came from hosting and MSP backgrounds and had first-hand experience with the daily trials and tribulations of MSP operations – and the tools that didn’t quite work for them.
<p><a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/john-at-interop-vegas.jpg"><img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; margin: 0px 10px 10px 0px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" height="184" alt="John at Interop Vegas" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/john-at-interop-vegas-thumb.jpg" width="244" align="left" border="0"></a>Here we talk to John Proctor, who started out as one of our first customers (and the first MSP customer). And he believed in it so much, he eventually became part of the ScienceLogic team. (Remember &#8220;I&#8217;m not only the President, I&#8217;m also a client&#8221; from <a href="http://www.hairclub.com/inthenews_article1.php" target="_blank">the Hair Club for Men</a>?)
<p>John shares his perspectives about the service provider world and why he took a chance on a little-known product called EM7.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What is your background? How many years have you worked as a service provider and for what types of companies?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> I have been working with Service providers for over twelve years. I worked at a major regional service provider for six years and before that I designed and built national and international networks for ISP’s and Fortune 500 companies as a consultant for PriceWaterhouseCoopers and WorldComm.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> You were one of the first customers of EM7 – why did you choose it and how did you get over the hurdles associated with using a start-up company’s product?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> We were actually customer number five. Back in 2004 when we evaluated and purchased EM7 we could see that EM7 provided about 80% of what we were looking for in one integrated solution right out of the box. One of the things that sold us on EM7 was that the ScienceLogic founders had all previously worked for a service provider, so we knew they understood our business and our challenges. But in the end, it comes down to features. Once we compared EM7 functionality to the alternatives, it was clearly a “no brainer.”
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What other alternatives were being considered?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> Well, we had started with a few point solutions, but as our business and product offerings matured, this resulted in a growing number of point solutions. What started with 3 or 4 ended up as 14 separate tools. They all had strengths but what they didn’t have was integration and because of this they could not scale. And, if the tools could not scale, our business could not grow.
<p>So, naturally we started looking at framework solutions, but they are expensive to buy, expensive to implement, and expensive to maintain. At one point, we even considered some open source projects. There were several that showed promise, but we would still be stuck with tools that were not integrated. So then we considered hiring developers to cobble something together that would work for our business. The only problem with this alternative was that we felt it would take 6 to 8 months before we could have something viable to work with.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What products were you using before EM7? What were your goals?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> Before we purchased EM7 we used 14 different point solutions to deliver our products and services to the marketplace. Tools like NetCool, Openview, Argent, Heat, What’s Up Gold as well as several other point solutions, vendor specific applications and manually updated spreadsheets. And, as I mentioned before, this does not scale. This also adds a great deal of complexity when you begin to consider business continuity and disaster recovery. All these tools were vital to the delivery of our products and services. Any service provider will tell you it is all about uptime. So if the product is uptime, the tools used to deliver it have to be available 24&#215;7x365.
<p>Our goals were simple: scale and redundancy. As it turns out, the solution was simple as well. EM7 provided a tool that could replace the functionality of almost half of the existing point solutions and the applications that could not be replaced were integrated with EM7 to provide our staff with a “single pane of glass” to see the status and performance of each area of the business from one application. We had visibility into everything from facility systems to applications using EM7.
<p>ScienceLogic also delivers an extensible configuration that addressed uptime and redundancy. We deployed collectors throughout our network that reported back to a central pair of redundant database servers and with this configuration we were able to perform backups and add capacity without taking the system down.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> Why are service providers different from enterprises? How are their needs different?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> First and foremost, service providers face the same challenges that only the largest enterprises ever face and they also have many unique challenges that only service providers experience.
<p>One challenge we faced was that we had multiple datacenters in different states. They were all interconnected with plenty of bandwidth between each site, but the tools were not designed to be used across the WAN. Our staff in our remote data center did not have the same access as our staff in the corporate office. Since EM7 is web-based, it immediately eliminated this problem.
<p>Another challenge is that service providers must manage systems across multiple domains. Back in the early version of a specific tool we were using before EM7, the only way you could implement it across multiple domains was to put the same username and password on every computer that you monitored. Beyond the security concerns, maintenance was a nightmare. Anytime we had to change the password, we would get locked out of dozens upon dozens of systems. When the password was changed on the monitoring server, it would attempt to login to the remote machines and fail. Repeated attempts would result in the account getting locked. I think that vendor eventually addressed this issue, but service providers seldom find tools that were designed for their unique situations.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> How is EM7 geared to service providers?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> Enterprise IT is a trusted part of the business; they are one of the team. Service providers are outsiders that must earn trust by showing the customer exactly what they are doing.
<p>EM7 provides a multi-tenant environment that allows service providers to manage systems across many different customers while at the same time providing the customer access to see the same information but only what’s relevant to them.
<p>EM7 was built by service providers and even includes a few features just for them. Two of my favorites are bandwidth billing and the emergency notification system. Take bandwidth billing, for instance. EM7 provides a way to collect bandwidth utilization, store subscription information, and calculate a bill from any one of about 10 different methodologies. And at the end of the billing period, EM7 sends the completed report out to whomever you chose via email.
<p>Another unique service provider feature is the emergency notification system. EM7 allows the provider to track what customers used their unique infrastructure components. If they have to perform maintenance on the infrastructure component or have a problem they can send an email to all of the impacted customers in a matter of minutes.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What trends do you see for service providers? What about big trends such as virtualization and cloud computing – how will they impact service providers?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> Virtualization is really hot for service providers right now and for the same reasons as in the enterprise. Service providers run data centers and data centers must be powered and cooled. So, anytime they can use a virtual server instead of adding physical equipment it is a good thing. But then you add the complexity that multiple customers reside on the same host and you must track things like bandwidth utilizations by guest OS, and it all gets a little harder. Lucky for us this is not a problem for EM7.
<p>I still think it’s early days for cloud computing. Depending on who you talk to, much of what service providers (especially the big ones) have already been doing with SAAS offerings and hosted applications could be described as cloud computing already. In which case, service providers are ahead of the game. But whatever the “final” definition, cloud computing actually shares many similarities with virtualization – in that service providers (or enterprises) will need to be able to manage far more “devices” in real-time with “zero downtime” expectations by customers. What this really means is that you’re going to see much more automation in provisioning and IT monitoring tools to handle the scale and speed with which things can change in the data center given vm migration and the talked-about switching between “clouds” that can be used for high availability. </p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 08 Oct 2008 12:51:50 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/em7">em7</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service providers">service providers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service providers experience">service providers experience</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service providers seldom">service providers seldom</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/impact service providers">impact service providers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/em7 functionality">em7 functionality</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/em7 sends">em7 sends</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service provider">service provider</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service provider world">service provider world</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/msp-snapshot-monitoring-with-em7/10/2008">MSP Snapshot Monitoring with EM7</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[FileAdvisor: software file search engine]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/856af459093a6fe1d8cb8a725ef66103</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/856af459093a6fe1d8cb8a725ef66103</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Troy Larson sent me a heads up on Bit9's FileAdvisor , a service they describe as &quot;a comprehensive catalog of executables, drivers, and patches found in commercial Windows applications and software...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a href="http://www.itsec.e-symposium.com/speakers/troy-larson.php" target="_blank">Troy Larson</a> sent me a heads up on Bit9's <a href="http://fileadvisor.bit9.com/services/search.aspx" target="_blank">FileAdvisor</a>, a service they describe as "a comprehensive catalog of executables, drivers, and patches found in commercial Windows applications and software packages. Malware and other unauthorized software that affects Windows computers is also indexed." <br />I immediately checked the FileAdvisor db for malware results as well non-Windows binaries and was pleasantly surprised with immediate and comprehensive results. You do have to register, but I was further impressed with the fact that they offered the option for a short or full <a href="http://fileadvisor.bit9.com/services/register.aspx" target="_blank">registration</a>.<br />This appears to be worthy of a bookmark in your incident handler/malware researcher/forensic investigator toolkit.<br /><br /><a href="http://del.icio.us/post?url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/10/fileadvisor-software-file-search-engine.html&title=FileAdvisor:%20software%20file%20search%20engine " title="FileAdvisor: software file search engine ">del.icio.us</a> | <a href="http://digg.com/submit?phase=2&amp;url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/10/fileadvisor-software-file-search-engine.html" title="FileAdvisor: software file search engine ">digg</a>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Oct 2008 10:34:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software">software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fileadvisor">fileadvisor</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/commercial windows applications">commercial windows applications</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware results">malware results</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software packages">software packages</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/affects windows computers">affects windows computers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/comprehensive results">comprehensive results</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/incident handlermalware">incident handlermalware</category>
      <source url="http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/10/fileadvisor-software-file-search-engine.html">FileAdvisor: software file search engine</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Computer users overeager to click popup 'OKs']]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/fde0663046604ef5239deb67050b7662</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/fde0663046604ef5239deb67050b7662</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Surfers just immediately click on the 'OK' button to get rid of the irritant without even thinking about it, which leads to visits to unwanted Web sites, Trojans, keyloggers, malware and other...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Surfers just immediately click on the 'OK' button to get rid of the irritant without even thinking about it, which leads to visits to unwanted Web sites, Trojans, keyloggers, malware and other malicious security threats, study says.<br style="clear: both;"/>
    <a style='font-size: 10px; color: maroon;' href='http://www.pheedo.com/hostedMorselClick.php?hfmm=v3:d3bc04682b6a1c09ad286be6302f7fcf:eVZEcBN7paRvfUtxWKOO7av%2Bne8UqWQIw818x8l%2B%2Foi627s5A7miINclBY2%2Bj0ve9Z13hLxEkfDC'><img border='0' title='Add to digg' alt='Add to digg' src='http://www.pheedo.com/images/mm/digg.gif'/></a>
    <a style='font-size: 10px; color: maroon;' href='http://www.pheedo.com/hostedMorselClick.php?hfmm=v3:4be98432554d4aaadf836cf5c8fdd7c2:oarCSuD3qJrJnbMK0DSJQDhDOLv%2FO4weSb1KUFIjG3dZx6xwWZJXfs7vOIJRSsXq7wj8aX6jj1YjUg%3D%3D'><img border='0' title='Add to StumbleUpon' alt='Add to StumbleUpon' src='http://www.pheedo.com/images/mm/stumbleit.gif'/></a>
    <a style='font-size: 10px; color: maroon;' href='http://www.pheedo.com/hostedMorselClick.php?hfmm=v3:d6aa4670afe69ce505f8e39a05954fe5:9fmMzHGOaX15CMvsl1o0LtlQWz9spIzS64zPLLJlKuAxJCW8DBfEgnT0bz51RJ3Cu1s70CthHhJkbA%3D%3D'><img border='0' title='Add to Twitter' alt='Add to Twitter' src='http://www.pheedo.com/images/mm/twitter.png'/></a>
    <a style='font-size: 10px; color: maroon;' href='http://www.pheedo.com/hostedMorselClick.php?hfmm=v3:043ba4978651543274da92c8058607a0:MqubNKBg63RdNUGbMHAeKmrOHU5Qha6wxiMTQmU3IkWxXCgHOp5tK01Tb4qirGDsozQYg%2FdnB37JIw%3D%3D'><img border='0' title='Add to Slashdot' alt='Add to Slashdot' src='http://www.pheedo.com/images/mm/slashdot.png'/></a>
<br style="clear: both;"/>  <img alt="" style="border: 0; height:1px; width:1px;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?i=ae263a74ac016d59e3092f9e2165cfb9" height="1" width="1"/>
<img src="http://www.pheedo.com/feeds/tracker.php?i=ae263a74ac016d59e3092f9e2165cfb9" style="display: none;" border="0" height="1" width="1" alt=""/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 25 Sep 2008 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malicious security threats">malicious security threats</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web sites">web sites</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/immediately click">immediately click</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/visits">visits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/surfers">surfers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/keyloggers">keyloggers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/leads">leads</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/irritant">irritant</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.computerworld.com/click.phdo?i=ae263a74ac016d59e3092f9e2165cfb9">Computer users overeager to click popup 'OKs'</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Dell System with Useless Memory]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/61974cbdd2ec9059cb511964767ab701</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/61974cbdd2ec9059cb511964767ab701</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[In my e-mail this morning was a flier from Costco . I have to go buy some stuff there this morning, so I read it and noticed a Dell desktop computer among the items. Note that the Costco links above...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[In my e-mail this morning was <a href="http://click.online.costco.com/dm?id=172AAC0B8C772EF26473AE9104579909">a flier from Costco</a>. I have to go buy some stuff there this morning, so I read it and noticed <a href="http://www.costco.com/Browse/Product.aspx?Prodid=11188958&cm_mmc=BCEmail_341-_-BANNER-_-3-_-Dell518">a Dell desktop computer</a> among the items.

Note that the Costco links above probably have a short lifetime, so if you're reading this weeks after the posting date (9/20/2008), they won't work.

What immediately struck me about the newsletter was that it said that the system had 4GB of RAM. As I discussed in <a href="http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/When-Windows-Goes-All-64Bit/?kc=MPOP">my recent column on when Windows goes all 64-bit</a>, in 32-bit versions of Windows at most 3.1GB to 3.5GB of RAM are usable, probably more like the 3.1 number. You need 64-bit Windows to use all of the memory. Was Costco selling a Win64 system?

Nope, the ad says it has "Microsoft® Windows® Vista Home Premium 32-bit." 

Beware of this sort of thing. It's not a lot of wasted money, but it's still a waste. I suspect it will become more of an issue over time as vendors try, as they always do, to beef up computers and run up against this wall.
<p><a href="http://feedads.googleadservices.com/~a/yFKaURv9RpBEFXiIwea1hKw7F3g/a"><img src="http://feedads.googleadservices.com/~a/yFKaURv9RpBEFXiIwea1hKw7F3g/i" border="0" ismap="true"></img></a></p><img src="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~4/TXvq0jKWjCM" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 20 Sep 2008 03:03:21 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/system">system</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/64-bit">64-bit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/64-bit windows">64-bit windows</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/windows">windows</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/costco links">costco links</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/costco">costco</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dell desktop computer">dell desktop computer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/win64 system">win64 system</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/32-bit versions">32-bit versions</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.ziffdavisenterprise.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~3/TXvq0jKWjCM/dell_system_with_useless_memory.html">Dell System with Useless Memory</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[EstDomains and Intercage VS Cybercrime]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/54303a8239cd0becf5843fb3552a50a8</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/54303a8239cd0becf5843fb3552a50a8</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Surreal, especially when you get to read that EstDomains has &quot; ruthlessly suspended over five thousand domains only for last week &quot;, and also, that it &quot; has a reliable ally in its battle against...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SM7tc-r3kHI/AAAAAAAACKc/aUL1ohUu-Zc/s1600-h/estdomain_alert.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SM7tc-r3kHI/AAAAAAAACKc/yiFaA33Sfdw/s200-R/estdomain_alert.png" /></a>Surreal, especially when you get to read that EstDomains has "<i>ruthlessly suspended over five thousand domains only for last week</i>", and also, that it "<i>has a reliable ally in its battle against malware in a face of Intercage, Inc</i>".<br />
<br />
Here's <a href="http://www.domainnews.com/en/general/estdomains-denies-links-to-malware-distribution.html">the press release</a> :<br />
<br />
"<i>The EstDomains, Inc management does not deny the fact that no one is secured from having a customer who uses provided services for delinquent purposes. But it must be noted that the carefully planned infrastructure of EstDomains, Inc makes the special provision for the cases of malware distribution that may originate from the domain name registered under the company's name. Such domain names are suspended immediately along with domain holder's account if there is an evidence of malware presence on the web site. <b>According to the most recent statistics over five thousand domain names were detected and ruthlessly suspended by EstDomains, Inc specialists only last week.</b><br />
<br />
<b>The company also has a reliable ally in its battle against malware in a face of Intercage, Inc which provides company with the hosting services of the highest quality.</b> But the outstanding performance of hosting services is not the sole reason why EstDomains, Inc appreciates this partnership so greatly. Intercage, Inc generously provides EstDomains, Inc specialists with reports regarding discovered malware vehicles. As the main database for additional domain name management services is located in Intercage Data Center, EstDomains, Inc has the perfect opportunity to get notifications of the slightest mark of malware presence in the shortest time and take measures in advance.</i> "<br />
<br />
The press release reminds me of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/hacked-by-rbn.html">RBN's defacement of my blog</a> posted on the 1st of April, and despite that <a href="http://www.malwarebytes.org/forums/index.php?showtopic=6159">EstDomains started "performing for the community"</a> as of recently, thanks to the collective intelligence and persistence of everyone turning their research into actionable intelligence against them, this performance aiming to minimize the effect of the negative PR is more or less futile considering <a href="http://www.spyware-techie.com/malicious-website-list/">all the cybercrime activities that they've been tolerating or ignoring</a> for the past couple of years. For future generations to see, <a href="http://www.malwarebytes.org/forums/index.php?showtopic=6159">this is how EstDomains "performs for the community"</a> :<br />
<br />
"<i>We've suspended all the domains listed in this topic. But please don't make posting these domains on this forum a habit. We have a 24/7 online tech support which can be contacted at <a href="https://support.estdomains.com/" target="_blank">https://support.estdomains.com</a><br />
<br />
Best regards,<br />
EstDomains Team&nbsp;</i><br />
<br />
<i>EstMate says : Ihatemondayand.com and antispycheck.com - both suspended. If any of the suspended websites are still active to you it maybe be because of your computer's or ISP's DNS-cache, others won't be able to access these websites</i><br />
<br />
<i>googlescanners-360.com isn't registered with us. As for other domains, the ones, which were registered through us, have been suspended. Regarding our preventive measures, the fact that you don't see them doesn't mean there isn't any. Yes, we don't write about them but in most cases we suspend whole accounts with problematic domains and look for connections to other accounts etc. During the last week we've suspended over 15000 different domains.</i>"<br />
<br />
What's more disturbing regarding this particular domain registrar is that it's a U.S based operation, namely, using the lack of international cybercrime cooperation as an excuse for not taking actions earlier doesn't fit into the picture. Moreover, this is just the tip of the iceberg, and taking into consideration a personal mentality that the cybercriminals you know are better than the cybercriminals you don't know, the RBN or any of its "leftovers" aren't fully taking advantage of the tactics they could be using in order to make it harder to shut them down, but how come? Simply, they don't have to put extra efforts and would once again remain online for years to come, which is perhaps more disturbing at the first place.<br />
<br />
What in the world is the Russian Business Network, is it still alive and kicking, are the same people that used to maintain my favorite netblock ever, still the ones running it, and what tactics are they taking advantage of in order to make it harder for the community to establish direct links with a particular netblock and the RBN itself?<br />
<br />
With RBN's "leftovers" -- <b>InterCage, Inc., Softlayer Technologies, Layered Technologies, Inc., Ukrtelegroup Ltd, Turkey Abdallah Internet Hizmetleri, and Hostfresh --</b> making headlines just like the way it should be, what I've been researching for the past couple of months is how they've migrated from the centralized hosting provider to what appears to be a fully operational franchise. The business model is very simple, the RBN through its extensive underground networking skills supplies to customers to franchisers operating small anti-abuse netblocks across the globe, where they offer dedicated hosting and share revenue with the RBN. Anyone trusted enough and capable of supplying such netblocks starts running the RBN anti-abuse franchise. It's also worth pointing out that these franchises are in fact starting to cut the middle man, and disintermediate the RBN by actively advertising their services in order for them to create a self-sustainable business model without having to rely on the RBN connecting them with customers.<br />
<br />
What used to be a centralized cybercrime powerhouse operating several highly visible anti-abuse netblocks, is today's decentralized infrastructure, with the profit margins for the anti-abuse services that it's logically capable to break-even and earn profits even with a few high profile dedicated hosting customers. Anyone can be the Russian Business Network, gain experience into the market segment, then disintermediate them by starting to advertise their own services. From a powerhouse to a franchise model, what the RBN had to offer can be easily duplicated by a countless number of local RBN's, and this is only starting to take place.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lazy-summer-days-at-ukrtelegroup-ltds.html">Lazy Summer Days at UkrTeleGroup Ltd. </a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/malicious-isps-you-rarely-see-in-any.html">The Malicious ISPs you Rarely See in Any Report</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/geolocating-malicious-isps.html">Geolocationg Malicious ISPs</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/new-media-malware-gang-part-four.html">The New Media Malware Gang - Part Four</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/new-media-malware-gang-part-three.html">The New Media Malware Gang - Part Three</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/new-media-malware-gang-part-two.html">The New Media Malware Gang - Part Two</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/new-media-malware-gang.html">The New Media Malware Gang</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/01/rbns-fake-account-suspended-notices.html">RBN's Fake Account Suspended Notices </a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/hacked-by-rbn.html">HACKED BY THE RBN!</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/rogue-rbn-software-pushed-through.html">Rogue RBN Software Pushed Through Blackhat SEO</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/rbns-phishing-activities.html">RBN's Phishing Activities</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/rbns-malware-puppets-need-their-master.html">RBN's Puppets Need Their Master</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/01/rbns-fake-account-suspended-notices.html">RBN's Fake Account Suspended Notices</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/go-to-sleep-go-to-sleep-my-little-rbn.html">Go to Sleep, Go to Sleep my Little RBN</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/exposing-russian-business-network.html">Exposing the Russian Business Network</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/detecting-and-blocking-russian-business.html">Detecting the Blocking the Russian Business Network</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/over-100-malwares-hosted-on-single-rbn.html">Over 100 Malwares Hosted on a Single RBN IP</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/rbns-fake-security-software.html">RBN's Fake Security Software</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/russian-business-network.html">The Russian Business Network</a><b> <br />
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</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/394232850" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2008 05:09:44 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/single rbn">single rbn</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rbn">rbn</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rbn anti-abuse franchise">rbn anti-abuse franchise</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/estdomains">estdomains</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware distribution">malware distribution</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/thousand domain names">thousand domain names</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/domain names">domain names</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rogue rbn software">rogue rbn software</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/394232850/estdomains-and-intercage-vs-cybercrime.html">EstDomains and Intercage VS Cybercrime</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Microsoft defends IE 'phone home' feature, clarifies privacy policy]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5bfeb51f0c0b05f8f39974a36d75d7ce</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5bfeb51f0c0b05f8f39974a36d75d7ce</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Microsoft Friday defended the Internet Explorer 8 (IE8) tool that suggests sites based on the URLs typed into its address bar, saying that the browser &quot;phones home&quot; only a limited amount of...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Microsoft Friday defended the Internet Explorer 8 (IE8) tool that suggests sites based on the URLs typed into its address bar, saying that the browser "phones home" only a limited amount of information to Microsoft and that the company discards all user IP addresses almost immediately.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 13 Sep 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/microsoft">microsoft</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/microsoft friday">microsoft friday</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/suggests sites based">suggests sites based</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/phones home">phones home</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/internet explorer">internet explorer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/address bar">address bar</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/urls typed">urls typed</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/company discards">company discards</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/browser">browser</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/091208-ms-defends-ie-phone-home.html?fsrc=rss-security">Microsoft defends IE 'phone home' feature, clarifies privacy policy</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Blamestorming]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/95618fa2d7ec7b889e72d37343245d7a</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/95618fa2d7ec7b889e72d37343245d7a</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[So, let's recap the sequence of events
The Sun-Sentinel newspaper in Fort Lauderdale accidentally republishes a six-year-old news story about the bankruptcy of UAL. It wasn't on the home page, but...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>So, let's recap the sequence of events:</p>  <ol>   <li>The <em>Sun-Sentinel</em> newspaper in Fort Lauderdale accidentally republishes a six-year-old news story about the bankruptcy of UAL. It wasn't on the home page, but instead buried somewhere inside the web site. </li>    <li>Google's news crawler (an automated thing, remember) finds the story and incorporates it as part of its news feed. </li>    <li>Investors see the story, and immediately react. When UAL's stock <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/08/news/companies/united_airlines/index.htm" target="_blank">plunged 76% to a low of $3</a>, Nasdaq shut down trading. Eventually trading resumed, and the stock closed at just under $11, losing about 11%. </li>    <li>United blamed Tribune Company (the owner of the <em>Sun-Sentinel</em>) for <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/id/26608126" target="_blank">&quot;irresponsibly&quot; changing the date</a> on the story and <a href="http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/83/83680/articles/bankruptcy_statementFINAL2.pdf" target="_blank">demanded a retraction</a>. </li>    <li>Tribune Company blamed Google, claiming they've <a href="http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Search-Engines/Tribune-Blames-Google-for-UAL-Bankruptcy-Story/?kc=rss" target="_blank">had issues</a> with Google's crawler &quot;for months.&quot; </li> </ol>  <p>Who will blame be shifted to next?</p>  <p>Look -- if people haven't realized by now that the Internet pretty much <a href="http://www.archive.org/index.php" target="_blank">lacks a delete function</a>, then (IMNSHO) it becomes the requirement of <em>each and every one of us</em> to pay close attention to what we're reading, to use our own big brains and fine-tuned bullshit detectors to suss out whether something makes sense.</p>  <p>Since this is my blog, I'm going to parcel out blame the way I see it:</p>  <ul>   <li><strong>United: 0%.</strong> If the concept of &quot;negative blame&quot; made any sense, then I'd actually write <strong>&#8722;&#8734;</strong> (that's a negative infinity, in case your character set is different than mine). </li>    <li><strong>Google: 5%.</strong> How can an automated crawler know that a newly-dated story isn't really new? Well, those folks over there at Google are smart. Certainly it shouldn't be that difficult to compare a &quot;new&quot; article against existing ones. Content hashes won't work as a comparison tool, because the date would be included in the hash computation, thus making the hashes different anyway. Full-text comparisons? Sure, it would take a lot of horsepower. Perhaps not every &quot;new&quot; story needs comparison, but at least the crawler could submit to the comparator any stories that ought to be verified (say those with the word &quot;bankruptcy&quot; in them). </li>    <li><strong>Tribune Company: 30%.</strong> Hey guys, <em>you changed the date on the article.</em> Don't go blaming someone else for your screw-up. </li>    <li><strong>Investors: 65%.</strong> If you're using an automated news aggregator (remember, an aggregator is not a <em>source</em> of news) to make major financial decisions -- decisions that affect the livelihoods of thousands (maybe millions) of people -- well, you're a moron. You should know that incorrect information can be just as instantly available as correct information. Verify potentially damaging claims before engaging in reckless behavior. </li> </ul>  <p>What's this got to do with security? I don't know, maybe nothing directly related. But it certainly raises the question -- what if someone intentionally wanted to cause nearly permanent damage to a person or a corporation? Malicious content, disguised as &quot;news,&quot; certainly seems to have become a potentially successful attack vector this week.</p>  <p>Worried about a social engineering attack on a massive scale? I suspect that what happened Monday (8 September) <em>was</em> the largest social engineering attack in history -- although I wouldn't classify it as intentionally malicious. Just you wait until the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meme" target="_blank">idea spreads</a>.</p><img src="http://blogs.technet.com/aggbug.aspx?PostID=3122810" width="1" height="1">]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 12 Sep 2008 02:03:42 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/news">news</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/news aggregator">news aggregator</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/news feed">news feed</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/six-year-old news story">six-year-old news story</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/story">story</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/news crawler">news crawler</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tribune company">tribune company</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/google">google</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/successful attack vector">successful attack vector</category>
      <source url="http://blogs.technet.com/steriley/archive/2008/09/11/blamestorming.aspx">Blamestorming</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Summarizing August's Threatscape]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/01c05fcd5f209b7515be2cee57a93c9b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/01c05fcd5f209b7515be2cee57a93c9b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Following the previous summaries of June's and July's threatscape based on all the research published during the month, it's time to summarize August's threatscape

August's threatscape was dominated...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SL_ZoXre4vI/AAAAAAAACJ0/LKtKpSt0igQ/s1600-h/ddanchev_august.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SL_ZoXre4vI/AAAAAAAACJ0/Phtgyl6rLXQ/s200-R/ddanchev_august.png" /></a>Following the previous summaries of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/summarizing-junes-threatscape.html">June's</a> and <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/summarizing-julys-threatscape.html">July's threatscape</a> based on all the research published during the month, it's time to summarize August's threatscape.<br />
<br />
August's threatscape was dominated by a huge increase of rogue security software domains made possible due to the easily obtainable templates for the sites, several malware campaigns targeting popular social networking sites, Russian's organized cyberattack against Georgia with evidence on who's behind it pointing to "everyone" and a few botnets dedicated to the attack making the whole process easy to outsource and turn responsibility into an "open topic", several new web based botnet management kits and tools found in the wild, evidence that the 76service may in fact be going mainstream since the concept of cybercrime as a service is already emerging, and, of course, a peek at India's CAPTCHA solving economy, where the best comment I've received so far is that every site should embrace reCAPTCHA, so that while solving CAPTCHAs and participating in the abuse of these services in question, they would be also digitizing books. As usual, August was a pretty dynamic month for the middle of summer, with everyone excelling in their own malicious field.<br />
<br />
<b>01.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/mcafees-site-advisor-blocking-nruns-ag.html">McAfee's Site Advisor Blocking n.runs AG - "for starters"</a><br />
False positives are rather common, especially when you're aiming to protect the end user from himself and not let him gain access to "hacking tools", but you're flagging security tools as badware and missing over half the SQL injected domains currently in the wild due to the fact that SiteAdvisor's community still haven't reviewed them - that's not good<br />
<br />
<b>02.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/twitter-malware-campaign-wants-to-bank.html">The Twitter Malware Campaign Wants to Bank With You</a><br />
Twitter, just like every Web 2.0 application, isn't and shouldn't be treated as a unique platform for dissemination of malware, since it's dissemination of malware "as usual". This particular malware campaign was not just executed by a lone gunman, but also, was taking advantage of a flaw allowing the author to add new followers potentially exposing them to the malicious links serving banker malware. For the the time being, MySpace, Facebook and Twitter accounts are the very last thing a malicious attacker is interesting in puchasing accounting data for, but how come? It's all due to the oversupply of automatically registered accounts at other popular services, whose ecosystem of Internet properties empower cybercriminals with the ability to launch, host and distribute malware in between abusing the very same company's services for the blackhat SEO campaign and redirection services. Theoretically, a distributed network build upon the services provided by a single company is faily easy to accomplish due to the single login authentication applied everywhere. A singly bogus Gmail account results in a blackhat SEO hosting blogspot account, flash based redirector hosted at Picasa, and a couple of thousands of spam emails sent automatically sent through Gmail in order to abuse it's trusted email reputation<br />
&nbsp; <br />
<b>03.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/compromised-web-servers-serving-fake.html">Compromised Web Servers Serving Fake Flash Players</a><br />
If aggressiveness matter, this campaign consisting of remotely injected redirection scripts at legitimate sites next to on purposely introduced malware oriented domains, was perhaps the most aggressive one during the month. Fake flash players, fake windows media players and fake youtube players are prone to increase as a social engineering tactic of choice due to the template-ization of malware serving sites for the sake of efficiency<br />
<br />
<b>04.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/pinch-vulnerable-to-remotely.html">Pinch Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw</a><br />
With Zeus vulnerable to a remotely exploitable flaw allowing cybercriminals to hijack other cybercriminal's Zeus botnet, private exploits targeting the still rather popular at least in respect to usefulness Pinch malware are leaking, allowing everyone including security researchers to take a peek at a particular campaign running unpatched Pinch gateway<br />
<br />
<b>05.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/phishers-backdooring-phishing-pages-to.html">Phishers Backdooring Phishing Pages to Scam One Another</a><br />
Backdooring phishing pages is perhaps the most minimalistic approach a cybercriminal wanting to scam another cybercriminal is going to take. The far more beneficial approach that I've encountered on a couple of occassions so far, would be to backdoor a proprietary web malware exploitation kit, release it in the wild, let them put the time and efforts into launching the campaigns, then hijack their botnet. In fact, the possibilities for backdooring copycat web malware exploitation kits in order to take advantage of the momentum while introducing a non-existent kit has always been there at the disposal of malicious attackers. One thing's for sure - there's no such thing as a free web malware exploitation kit, just like there isn't such thing as a free phishing page<br />
<br />
<b>06.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/email-hacking-going-commercial-part-two.html">Email Hacking Going Commercial - Part Two</a><br />
In between the scammers promising the Moon and asking for anything between $20 to $250 to hack into an email account, there are "legitimate" services taking advantage of web email hacking kits consisting of each and every known XSS vulnerability for a particular service in an attempt to increase the chances of the attacker. And given that the majority of these have been patched a long time ago, social engineering comes into play. Do these services have a future? Definitely as more and more people are in fact looking for and requesting such services, in fact, they're willing to pay a bonus considering how exotic it is for them to have any email that they provide hacked into and the accounting data sent back to them<br />
<br />
<b>07.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/russia-vs-georgia-cyber-attack.html">The Russia vs Georgia Cyber Attack</a><br />
Event of the month? Could be, but just like every "event of the moth" everyone seems to be once again restating their "selective retention" preferences. What is selective retention anyway? Selective retention is basically a situation where once Russian is attacking another country's infrastructure, you would automatically conclude that it's Russian FSB behind the attacks and consciously and subconsciously ignore all the research and articles telling you otherwise, namely that the FSB wouldn't even bother acknowledging Georgia's online presence, at least not directly. Moreover, talking about the FSB as the agency behind the cyberattacks indicates "selective retention", talking about FAPSI indicates better understanding of the subject.<br />
<br />
In times when cybercrime is getting ever easier to outsource, anyone following the news could basically orchestrate a large scale DDoS attack against a particular country in order to forward the responsibility to any country that they want to. In Russia vs Georgia, you have a combination of a collectivist society that's possessing the capabilities to launch DDoS attacks, knows where and how to order them, and that in times when your country is engaged in a war conflict drinking beer instead of DDoS-sing the major government sites of the adversary is not an option.<br />
<br />
Selective retention when combined with a typical mainstream media's mentality to "slice the threat on pieces" instead of turning the page as soon as possible, is perhaps the worst possible combination. Furthermore, coming up with <a href="http://intelfusion.net/wordpress/?p=398">Social Network analysis of the cyberattacks</a> would produce nothing more but a few fancy graphs of over enthusiastic Russian netizen's distributing the static list of the targets. The real conversations, as always, are <a href="http://blogs.nyu.edu/blogs/agc282/zia/2008/08/intelfusions_sna_of_russian_cy.html">happening in the "Dark Web" limiting the possibilities for open source intelligence</a> using a data mining software. Things changed, OPSEC is slowly emerging as a concept among malicious parties, whenever some of the "calls for action" in the DDoS attacks were posted at mainstream forums, they were immediately removed so that they don't show up in such academic initiatives<br />
<br />
<b>08.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/76service-cybercrime-as-service-going.html">76Service - Cybercrime as a Service Going Mainstream</a><br />
The reappearance of the 76Service allowing everyone to log into a web based interface and collect all the accounting and financial data coming from malware infected hosts across the globe for the period of time for which they've bought access, indicates that what used to be proprietary services which were supposedly no longer available, are now being operated in a do-it-yourself fashion. Goods and products mature into services, so from a cost-benefit analysis perspective, outsourcing is naturally most beneficial even when it comes to cybercrime <br />
<br />
<b>09.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/whos-behind-georgia-cyber-attacks.html">Who's Behind the Georgia Cyber Attacks?</a><br />
If it's the botnets used in the attacks, they are known, if it's about who's providing the hosting for the command and control, it's the "usual suspects", but just like previous discussion of the Russian Business Network, it remains questionable on whether or not they work on a revenue-sharing basis, are simply providing the anti-abuse hosting, or are the shady conspirators that every newly born RBN expert is positioning them to be.<br />
<br />
Cheap conversation regarding the RBN ultimately serves the RBN, and just for the record, there's a RBN alternative in every country, but the only thing that remains the same are the customers, tracking the customers means exposing the RBN and the international franchises of their services, making it harder to identify their international operations. And given that the "tip of the iceberg", namely RBN's U.S operations remain in tact, talking about taking actions against their international operations in countries where cybercrime law is still pending, is yet another quality research into the topic building up the pile of research into the very same segments of the very same ISPs.<br />
<br />
Just for the record - these "very same ISPs" are regular readers of my blog, and if you analyze their activities, they're definitely reading yours too, ironically, surfing through gateways residing within their netblock that are so heavily blacklisted due to the guestbook and forum spamming activities that their bad reputation usually ends up in another massive blackhat SEO campaign exposed.<br />
<br />
<b>10.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/guerilla-marketing-for-conspiracy-site.html">Guerilla Marketing for a Conspiracy Site</a><br />
Conspiracy theorists may in fact have a new wallpaper to show off with<br />
<br />
<b>11.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/banker-malware-targetting-brazilian.html">Banker Malware Targeting Brazilian Banks in the Wild</a><br />
When misinformed and not knowing anything about a particular underground segment, a potential cybercriminal would stick to using such primitive compared to the sophisticated banker malware kits currently in the wild. These sophisticated banker malware kits are often coming in a customer-tailored proposition, with their price increasing or decreasing based on the specific module to be included or excluded. For instance, a module targeting all the U.S banks that has been put in a "learning mode" long before it was made available to the customers can be requested and is often available with the business model build around the customer's wants&nbsp; <br />
<br />
<b>12.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/compromised-cpanel-accounts-for-sale.html">Compromised Cpanel Accounts For Sale</a><br />
Despite the massive SQL injection attacks, accounting data for Cpanel accounts coming from malware infected hosts seems to be once again coming into play, which isn't surprising given the filtering capabilities and log parsing tools today's botnet masters are empowered with. These very same compromised Cpanel accounts and the associated domains often end up so heavility abused that it's tactics like these that are driving the underground multitasking mentality, namely, abusing a single compromised account for each and every malicious online activity you can think of - even hosting banners for their blackhat SEO services <br />
<br />
<b>13.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two</a><br />
In August we saw a peek of fake security software, neatly typosquatted domains whose authors earn revenue each and every time someone installs the software. The vendors behind this software are forwarding the entire process of driving traffic to those excelling in aggregating traffic and abusing it. As anticipated, underground multitasking started taking place within the fake security software domains, with the people behind them introducing client-side exploits in order to improve the monetization of the traffic coming to the sites<br />
<br />
<b>14.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diy-botnet-kit-promising-eternal.html">DIY Botnet Kit Promising Eternal Updates</a><br />
There's no such thing as a (quality) free botnet kit. What's for free is often the leftovers from a single feature of a more sophisticated proprietary botnet kit. This one in particular is however trying to demonstrate that even a plain simple GUI botnet command and control software can achieve the results desired by an average script kiddie, and not necessarily satisfy the needs of the experienced botnet master<br />
<br />
<b>15.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_20.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three</a><br />
As far as trends and fads are concerned, the majority of the domains are currently parked at up to four different IPs, with most of them going into a stand by mode once they get detected and reappear back couple of weeks later<br />
<br />
<b>16.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/fake-celebrity-video-sites-serving.html">Fake Celebrity Video Sites Serving Malware - Part Two</a><br />
Due to the template-ization of fake celebrity video sites, and simple traffic management tools combined with blackhat SEO tactics, these sites are also prone to increase in the next couple of months<br />
<br />
<b>17.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/web-based-botnet-command-and-control.html">Web Based Botnet Command and Control Kit 2.0</a><br />
It's releases like these that remind us of the amount of time, efforts and personal touch that a malicious attacker would put into such a management kit, currently acting as a personal benchmark as far as complexity and features indicating the coder's experience with botnets is concerned. What's he's failing to anticipate is that this kit is sooner or later going to turn into the "MPack of botnet management"<br />
<br />
<b>18.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_25.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four</a><br />
Keep it coming, we'll keep it exposing until we end up getting down to the "fake software vendor" itself<br />
<br />
<b>19.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/automatic-email-harvesting-20.html">Automatic Email Harvesting 2.0</a><br />
Email harvesting is slowly maturing into a vertically integrated service provided by vendors of managed spamming services. This email harvesting module is aiming to close the page on text obfuscation in respect to fighting spam, and is successfully recognizing and collecting such publicly available emails. From a psychological perspective though, the end users who bothered to obfuscate their emails are less likely to fall victims into phishing scams, with the obfuscation speaking for a relatively decent situational awareness on how they emails end up in a spammer's campaign<br />
<br />
<b>20.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/fake-porn-sites-serving-malware-part.html">Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Three</a><br />
As a firm believer in sampling in order to draw conclusions on the big picture, an approach that has proven highly accurate in modeling historical and upcoming tactics and behavior, a single fake porn site serving malware campaign usually exposes a dozen of misconfigured redirectors, which thanks to their misconfiguration despite the evasive features available within the kits, expose another dozen of malware campaigns<br />
<br />
<b>21.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/facebook-malware-campaigns-rotating.html">Facebook Malware Campaigns Rotating Tactics</a><br />
With no particular flaw exploited other than the social engineering tactic of using already compromised Facebook accounts who would automatically spam all their friends with links to flash files hosted at legitimate services, the more persistent the campaign is, the higher the chance that it will scale enough. This campaign in particular is mainly relying on rotation of tactics, namely different messages, different services and file extensions used in order to trick someone's friend into visiting the URL. With the number of users increasing, the most popular social networking sites are naturally going to be permanently under attacks from cybercriminals<br />
<br />
<b>22.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/fake-security-software-domains-serving.html">Fake Security Software Domains Serving Exploits</a><br />
Despite that it's a single brand, namely the International Virus Research Lab that's introducing client-side exploits within it's portfolio of domains, the opportunity for abuse may be noticed by the rest of the brands pretty fast<br />
<br />
<b>23.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/exposing-indias-captcha-solving-economy.html">Exposing India’s CAPTCHA Solving Economy</a><br />
Taking into consideration the mentality surrounding a particular country's cybercriminals, how they think, how they operate, what do they define as an opportunity, and how much personal efforts are they willing to put into their campaigns, I wouldn't be surpised if a Russian vendor offering 100,000 bogus Gmail accounts for sale has in fact outsourcing the account registration process to Indian workers, paid them pocket change and is then reselling them ten to twenty times higher than the price he originally paid for them. <br />
<br />
The text based CAPTCHAs used at the major Internet portals and services, are so efficiently abused by this approach that continuing to use is directly undermining the trust these email providers and services often come with as granted<div class="feedflare">
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      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 02:57:32 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/facebook malware campaigns">facebook malware campaigns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/usefulness pinch malware">usefulness pinch malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/banker malware kits">banker malware kits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware campaigns">malware campaigns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/botnet">botnet</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/diy botnet kit">diy botnet kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/distribute malware">distribute malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/banker malware">banker malware</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/388609194/summarizing-augusts-threatscape.html">Summarizing August's Threatscape</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Another VMware Founder Leaves]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/8e31d391fee4200c824ddc048a2d952b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/8e31d391fee4200c824ddc048a2d952b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Im getting a little depressed for my upcoming trip to Vegas next week. Instead of a festive party atmosphere, I fear VMworld (and especially the Partner Day on Monday) is going to consist of a bunch...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; margin: 0px 10px 10px 0px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" height="244" alt="Rosenblum_VMware" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/rosenblum-vmware.jpg" width="164" align="left" border="0"> I’m getting a little depressed for my upcoming trip to Vegas next week. Instead of a festive party atmosphere, I fear <a href="http://www.vmworld.com/conferences/2008/" target="_blank">VMworld</a> (and especially the Partner Day on Monday) is going to consist of a bunch of long faces on people wondering whether they should have gone to the <a href="https://www.getvirtualnow.com/main.aspx" target="_blank">Microsoft virtualization party</a> instead.
<p>Just a few months after CEO and founder <a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/diane-greene-ousted-from-vmware/07/2008">Diane Greene was ousted</a>, it <a href="http://www.virtualization.info/2008/09/mendel-rosenblum-co-founder-and-chief.html" target="_blank">comes as no surprise</a> that her <a href="http://virtualization.com/news/2008/09/09/mendel-rosenblum-vmware/" target="_blank">husband and co-founder</a>, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/09/technology/09vmware.html?_r=1&amp;oref=slogin" target="_blank">Mendel Rosenblum, has also resigned</a> via a company wide message last night. Turns out he’s going back to Stanford to teach. What a lovely way to get out of the political mess VMware has become. Admit it, haven’t we all had a point where we get fed up with the latest work snafu and wondered, maybe I should go back to college and teach? I had a really good time in college… Kudos to Rosenblum for doing it and doing it in style.
<p>And if you believe <a href="http://www.tarrysingh.blogspot.com/2008/09/vmware-co-founder-mendel-rosenblum.html" target="_blank">Tarry Singh</a>, <a href="http://blog.scottlowe.org/2008/09/09/as-expected-rosenblum-leaves-vmware/" target="_blank">the company knew</a> this was going to happen but waited until after registrations were closed for VMworld before making it official. Hmm.
<p>From the New York Times, more on Greene’s firing and just <a href="http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/09/09/technology/09vmware.php" target="_blank">what kind of atmosphere</a> is forcing executives to leave VMware:<br />
<blockquote>
<p>After Ms. Greene made a special presentation to VMware’s board, Mr. Tucci, who heads VMware’s parent company, EMC, pulled her aside, according to people familiar with the events, who asked for anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss internal company decisions.
<p>Inviting Mendel Rosenblum, Ms. Greene’s husband and the co-founder of VMware, into the room, Mr. Tucci told Ms. Greene she was fired, effective immediately. And he said the board wanted Mr. Rosenblum, VMware’s chief scientist, to take her seat on the board. Mr. Rosenblum declined the offer.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Honestly, what kind of a judgement call was made to first <a href="http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2008/09/09/rosenblum-leaves-vmware/" target="_blank">fire the man’s wife in front of him</a> and then offer him her board seat? Has Tucci never seen an episode of Survivor?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2008 15:23:37 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vmware">vmware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/board seat">board seat</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/board">board</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rosenblum">rosenblum</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mendel rosenblum">mendel rosenblum</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/political mess vmware">political mess vmware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/founder diane greene">founder diane greene</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/greene">greene</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vmwares board">vmwares board</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/another-vmware-founder-leaves/09/2008">Another VMware Founder Leaves</source>
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