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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: investments]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/investments</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 03 Jun 2008 03:23:29 +0000</pubDate>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[VCsChoosing How to Invest]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/c4d8ac0dd426afdf9ac1d38d36dad4e8</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/c4d8ac0dd426afdf9ac1d38d36dad4e8</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Don Dodge has a series going on about VCs and why startups fail, and he says VCs say no to startups 99% of the time, yet still choose failing companies 33% of the time or so. Interestingly he compares...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Don Dodge has a series going on about VCs and why startups fail, and he says VC&#8217;s say no to startups 99% of the time, yet still choose failing companies 33% of the time or so. Interestingly he <a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="http://dondodge.typepad.com/the_next_big_thing/2008/08/why-vcs-say-no-99-of-the-time.html">compares </a>the selection process to the way investors choose their stocks &#8211;</p>
<blockquote><p>I would guess that every one of you reading this blog have a stock portfolio with 5 to 10 individual stocks or mutual funds. There are more than 5,000 publicly listed companies to choose from, and another 5,000 mutual funds. But, out of 10,000 possible companies you chose 10 to invest in. Why? Why did you reject the other 9,990 companies? Obviously there are more than 10 good companies to invest in. Other investors chose to invest their money in the other 9,990 companies&#8230;why not you?</p></blockquote>
<p>I suppose the difference must be that many investors aren&#8217;t actively involved in their investments (maybe entrepreneurs are more so, since they have to know a certain investment space quite well)&#8230;</p>
<p>It sounds to me a lot like the editorial selection process for book manuscripts, articles, and so forth &#8212; editors receive a ton of submissions and they have to be choosy. Sometimes they don&#8217;t pick winners; sometimes they pick losers. More importantly, each has a personal style, opinions, preferences, and they are trying to appeal to a certain audience. It&#8217;s interesting to think that VCs are similar but makes sense&#8211;the end question of &#8220;What will be successful&#8221; really depends on the consumer base and industry, and VCs are just people who probably know and prefer to interact with a certain type of consumer base or audience.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 04 Aug 2008 06:23:13 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/investors chose">investors chose</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/chose">chose</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/investors">investors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/editorial selection process">editorial selection process</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/investors choose">investors choose</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/companies">companies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/selection process">selection process</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/choose">choose</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mutual funds">mutual funds</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/itsecurity/~3/355545351/">VCsChoosing How to Invest</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Collaboration in the Cloud, Virtual Worlds and the Hacker Mindset]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/451246868f8b52e293c9ac433dce53dd</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/451246868f8b52e293c9ac433dce53dd</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Collaboration in the Cloud
Forward thinking companies use collaboration technologies to melt away the physical distance between disparate offices, remote workers and suppliers. Investments in R&amp;D...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><img src="http://blogs.cisco.com/images/uploads/johnchamberspost.jpg" alt="" width="450" height="246" /></h4>
<h4>Collaboration in the Cloud</h4>
<p>Forward thinking companies use collaboration technologies to melt away the physical distance between disparate offices, remote workers and suppliers.  Investments in R&amp;D projects to create the next generation of business collaboration technologies and starting to bear early fruits and are worth paying attention to - especially if you get paid to &#8220;do security&#8221;.  One major focus area is Virtual Worlds.</p>
<h4>Teleporting Virgins</h4>
<p>The <a href="http://blog.secondlife.com/2008/07/08/ibm-linden-lab-interoperability-announcement/">big news</a> in the <a href="http://www.secondlife.com/">Second Life</a> research community is that avatars (&#8221;virtual people&#8221;) have successfully teleported between <em><strong>distinct </strong></em>virtual worlds.  The virgin teleporters went from a Second Life Preview Grid - an experimental grid completely disconnected from the Main Grid - to a virtual world running IBM OpenSIM.</p>
<p>At this stage there is intentionally no asset transfer going on at all - in other words, you can&#8217;t take your &#8220;stuff&#8221; from one world to another - but that will come in time as the <a href="http://secondlifegrid.net.s3.amazonaws.com/docs/specs/SLGOGP-draft-1.html">Open Grid Protocol</a> is extended.  Today just login and teleport are supported.  No stealing those trade secret &#8220;assets&#8221; yet ;-).</p>
<p>Linden Labs speaks to this issue:</p>
<blockquote><p>Q: How will Linden Lab prevent property from being copied into other virtual worlds?<br />
We’re paying extremely close attention to that question. We will be designing this with the Second Life community to ensure their needs are met. We want to stress that when it does become possible to move avatars between worlds, we will take the utmost care to protect the rights of Second Life property owners and creators. Linden Lab will not design a system that lets people openly violate the permissions of SL goods and take them to other worlds. We recognize that intellectual property is the engine that drives Second Life, and we are completely committed to preserving the qualities that make Second Life the unique, innovative and dynamic place that it is today.</p></blockquote>
<p>With my &#8220;hacker-vision&#8221; &#8482; enabled I see *all kinds* of opportunities for mischief here.  I&#8217;m betting we&#8217;ll see imaginative attacks as the usual cat and mouse game of vulnerability research and vendor response plays out.  &#8220;Sorry boss, someone hijacked my avatar and now I&#8217;m stuck on this desert island for who knows how long!&#8221;.</p>
<h4>Threat Profiling Second Life</h4>
<p>Getting back to reality, people are already exploring Virtual World security.  <a href="http://www.ernw.de/">Michael Thumann of ERNW</a> in Germany is a pen-tester and security researcher and in this 10 minute video, Michael shares the result of his security research on Second Life.</p>
<p>He covers:</p>
<ul>
<li> In-game cheating</li>
<li> Identity theft</li>
<li> Attacking 3rd party servers using Linden Scripting Language (think about the liability issues and the providers ability to track abusers)</li>
</ul>
<p><object classid="clsid:d27cdb6e-ae6d-11cf-96b8-444553540000" width="425" height="344" codebase="http://download.macromedia.com/pub/shockwave/cabs/flash/swflash.cab#version=6,0,40,0"><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true" /><param name="src" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/6MoptnBsNGc&amp;hl=en&amp;fs=1" /><embed type="application/x-shockwave-flash" width="425" height="344" src="http://www.youtube.com/v/6MoptnBsNGc&amp;hl=en&amp;fs=1" allowfullscreen="true"></embed></object></p>
<p>For those interested in more detail, the full presentation he gave at BlackHat Europe 2008 in Amsterdam is <a href="https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-europe-08/Thumann/Whitepaper/bh-eu-08-thumann-WP.pdf">here </a>(pdf).</p>
<p>Of particular note, Michael applied a formal threat model approach to the research - <a href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms954176.aspx">STRIDE </a>from Microsoft.</p>
<p>In a future post I&#8217;ll talk more about threat profiling in the context of Cloud Computing vulnerability research and specific API security vulnerability classes we can expect to see exploited.</p>
<img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/CloudSecurity/~4/338174255" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Jul 2008 11:51:24 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtual worlds">virtual worlds</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/worlds">worlds</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/research">research</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vulnerability research">vulnerability research</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security research">security research</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/life">life</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/life property owners">life property owners</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/life research community">life research community</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/collaboration">collaboration</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/CloudSecurity/~3/338174255/">Collaboration in the Cloud, Virtual Worlds and the Hacker Mindset</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a67e13e215d163e122340bffab059502</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a67e13e215d163e122340bffab059502</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[What is shaping the prices of stolen credit card details? The investments the cybercriminals or real life scammers ( through credit card cloning or ATM skimming ) put into the process of obtaining the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div>
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<a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHzyYjwnXTI/AAAAAAAAB6c/9rHV8A0Ggz4/s1600-h/ccz.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHzyYjwnXTI/AAAAAAAAB6c/WQG5_Cal0xY/s200-R/ccz.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>What is shaping the prices of stolen credit card details? The investments the cybercriminals or real life scammers ( through <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/02/credit-card-data-cloning-tactic.html">credit card cloning</a> or <a href="http://www.snopes.com/fraud/atm/atmcamera.asp">ATM skimming</a>) put into the process of obtaining the details, or can we even talk about investments being made where an experienced scammer has just purchased 1GB of raw credit cards data from a novice botnet master who isn't really aware of the actual value of his "botnet output"?<br />
<br />
Depends on which economic theory you believe in, or whether or not you'll take the "bottom-up approach" or the "top-down" one. And since I'm not aware of the existence of "the invisible hand of the underground market" and centralized power to increase the supply or decrease it to boost prices for the stolen credit card details, also indicating the existence of underground cartels putting everyone in a "price taker" position.<br />
<br />
The basics of demand and supply for anything underground will always apply unless of course, The more they want, the cheaper it gets, the less they want, the higher the price on per credit card basis gets, since the investment on behalf of the malicious party that originally stolen them is virtually the same, and he can theoretically break-even in every single case since the credit card details were obtained efficiently. It's up to the seller to follow or entirely ignore economic behavior, and do what they feel like doing with this good which must on the other hand reach its market liquidity as soon as possible, else it becomes obsolete. The current market model can be further explained as a good example of competitive equilibrium :<br />
<br />
"<i>Competitive market equilibrium is the traditional concept of economic equilibrium, appropriate for the analysis of commodity markets with flexible prices and many traders, and serving as the benchmark of efficiency in economic analysis. <b>It relies crucially on the assumption of a competitive environment where each trader decides upon a quantity that is so small compared to the total quantity traded in the market that their individual transactions have no influence on the prices.</b></i>"<br />
<br />
This can be easily explained in a single sentence - it's a mess and every participant is doing whatever they want to, so generalizing on the prices charged for stolen credit card numbers would be unrealistic, since it's the price a single seller with no real impact on the "average" market price for the same good. As for the average market price itself, it would be hard to measure it depending on the quality of the sample you want to rely on, since this is a type of market where sellers don't have to report price changes in their goods for the purpose of statistical research.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.finjan.com/Content.aspx?id=827#SecurityTrendsReport">A recently released report by Finjan</a>, with whom I've been on the same page of several high profile incidents so far, <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20080715/wr_nm/cybercrime_finjan_dc">touches this very same topic</a> :<br />
<br />
"<i>Prices charged by cybercriminals selling hacked bank and credit card details have fallen sharply as the volume of data on offer has soared, forcing them to look elsewhere to boost profit margins, a new report says. Researchers for Finjan, a Web security firm, said the high volumes traded had led to bank and credit card information becoming "commoditized" - account details with PIN codes that once fetched $100 or more each might now go for $10 or $20. In its latest quarterly survey of Web trends, the California-based company said cybercrime had evolved into "a major shadow economy ruled by business rules and logic that closely mimics the legitimate business world.</i>"<br />
<br />
Excluding the presence of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/price-discrimination-in-market-for.html">price discrimination</a> for a while, as well as open topic offers in the lines of "how much for X amount of Y?" answered as "how much are you willing to pay?", it's all a matter of the seller in a particular situation.<br />
<br />
Furthermore, in real-life market there's always the scarcity problem, however, in the underground market there's no shortage of resources despite the ever growing wants of the buyers. Generalizing even more, take for instance the butterfly effect of a price change in petrol, and result of which is inevitable increase of prices in every single aspect of your life, but in the underground market mostly due to the malicious economies of scale achieved, a price increase in renting a botnet would have no effect in the prices charged for the stolen credit card details obtained through the infected hosts. How come? Basically, the price and resources for malware infection are prone to decrease, if we take a malware infected host as a static foundation for the basis of any upcoming cybercrime activities using it.<br />
<br />
Perhaps the most disturbing part is that the market for stolen credit card details is so mature, and its entry barriers so low these days, that the confidential data that cannot be efficiently obtained through real-life means like credit card cloning or ATM skimming on a large scale, is now purchased online for the purpose of abusing it in real-life by<a href="http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/06/citibank-atm-se.html"> embedding the valid information into plastic cards</a>.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=c5gmVJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=c5gmVJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=yABcqJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=yABcqJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=iuXpaj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=iuXpaj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=Ctkd2j"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=Ctkd2j" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=KJLEOJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=KJLEOJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=6teEcJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=6teEcJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=XpeGzj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=XpeGzj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/336435935" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2008 11:36:12 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/price">price</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/average market price">average market price</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/market price">market price</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card">credit card</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card details">credit card details</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/details">details</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/market">market</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/competitive market equilibrium">competitive market equilibrium</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card basis">credit card basis</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/336435935/are-stolen-credit-card-details-getting.html">Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[Q&A with Doug McClure: Is BSM Lite the Answer?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/183e734958786a07b2c4d4b988eb60cc</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/183e734958786a07b2c4d4b988eb60cc</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[We had the opportunity to chat with Doug McClure , who is currently the Senior Managing Consultant for Business Service Management (BSM) and IT Service Management (ITSM) for the IBM Software Services...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; margin: 0px 10px 10px 0px; border-right-width: 0px" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/dougmcclurefeb2008-web.jpg" border="0" alt="dougmcclureFeb2008-web" width="105" height="156" align="left" /> We had the opportunity to chat with <a href="http://dougmcclure.net/blog/" target="_blank">Doug McClure</a>, who is currently the Senior Managing Consultant for Business Service Management (BSM) and IT Service Management (ITSM) for the IBM Software Services for Tivoli (ISST) team at IBM Tivoli (part of Software Group (SWG)). He currently leads the Virtual BSM Practice within IBM Software Services for Tivoli.</p>
<p><em><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong></em> What is “BSM Lite” and how is it different from “heavy” BSM?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> I think the concepts that <a href="http://netforecast.com/" target="_blank">Peter Sevcik from Net Forecast</a> initially <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/27818" target="_blank">outlined in his blog post</a> sum up what &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; is all about: a simpler, less expensive, more responsive way of achieving the goals and objectives of Business Service Management (BSM).  He&#8217;s contrasted this nicely against what he termed &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; being the larger investments in time and resources to deploy domain specific tools and solutions each providing a view into the business service delivery with some aggregation and consolidation to tie up all of the disparate tool&#8217;s information into a concise end-to-end business service management story.</p>
<p>I&#8217;m pleased that he leveraged some of my thinking around a better working definition of what BSM really is from the <a href="http://dougmcclure.net/blog/business-service-management-bsm-defined/" target="_blank">BSM Defined page on my blog</a>. Of course, these definitions are going to vary depending on whom you talk with and how they see the overall BSM Maturity Model.  I&#8217;ve created a BSM Maturity Model that aligns with the famous Gartner IT maturity model.  I&#8217;d like to think that a &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; solution is one attacking the low hanging fruit, enabling one to achieve value quicker, and in a more tactical manner.  The &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; solutions are capable of the same, but span all along the BSM Maturity Model by adding additional point solutions, products and technologies from their broader portfolio. </p>
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> Does “BSM Lite” just refer to the tools, or can it refer to the process and methodology as well?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> I think that BSM is as much a philosophy as it is technology, process, people and methodology.  If we can get people to think, operate and respond differently than they do today with a focus on the business, customers, quality, revenue, or whatever else is most important to their business goals and objectives, than that is Business Service Management and could be &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; if you will. </p>
<p>Being that I work for IBM Tivoli, one of my personal objectives is to identify ways to use our key BSM enabling products in a more efficient, effective and BSM centric way. This was a huge driver for trying to hold DevCampTivoli focused on &#8220;Collaborative Development of End-to-End BSM Solutions&#8221;. </p>
<p>In my opinion, we don’t make things very easy for our clients and the answer can’t be to “buy this product, module or widget” to fill in the gaps.  In my opinion, we must establish a BSM overlay within IBM Tivoli’s development and product management organization that ensures that we have clearly thought about how to enable BSM with the hundreds or products that we sell.  In my opinion, every product release must incorporate the fundamentals of enabling BSM in addition to the core domain specific functionality intended. I hope to keep this spirit alive and get our smartest IBMers and clients thinking about the best way to take a &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; solution and make it &#8220;lighter&#8221;. I hope to share more about my plans here and guidance for the industry in general soon.</p>
<p>That said, I am always interested in consulting with clients and collaborate with peers in the industry to figure out how to get the focus on the people, process and technology as key components of their BSM strategies.  I am absolutely convinced that without a documented BSM strategy, roadmap and top level sponsorship within the business and IT, the chances of BSM success greatly diminish.</p>
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> Given the complexities involved in implementing a BSM strategy and dealing with the people and processes components of any business, how does “BSM Lite” really work? Should the expectations and outcomes be “lite” as well?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> Time will tell if &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; will work.  I&#8217;m seeing emerging companies that are already breaking down some of the barriers to BSM success.  I do not expect that those choosing to begin with a &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; approach should expect &#8220;lite&#8221; outcomes. </p>
<p>The outcomes are the same regardless of the approach IF you&#8217;ve got a documented BSM strategy, roadmap and top level sponsorship in place before you begin. New features, capabilities and technologies will be needed as the needs of the business change and companies mature in BSM and fundamental IT management. This will likely force companies to move in more &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; directions to fill those gaps. </p>
<p>In my opinion, this is the ideal scenario now as it gives &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; vendors opportunities to grow their products and solutions. It also GREATLY improves the chances for success with a &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; solution because the organization would have already had matured enough to approach a &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; solution than if they hadn&#8217;t done a &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; solution in the past.</p>
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> Is “BSM Lite” more appropriate for a small or midsized organization, or does it apply equally to large companies? Is there an ideal profile for a company that can successfully implement a BSM strategy? Is there a different profile for “BSM Lite”?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> From an economic perspective, the concepts of &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; are appropriate for all companies.  Remember, with &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; we&#8217;re focused on identifying ways to make the goals and objectives of BSM easier to implement and in a more cost effective way.  Any company concerned about their IT cost overhead should care about this, especially when the risks of starting out with a &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; type deployment are much greater and the time to value generally much longer.</p>
<p>The &#8220;ideal&#8221; profile for any company is one where the BSM initiative begins by establishing top level buy in through creation of a formal BSM strategy for the company. This BSM strategy personalizes how the company defines what BSM is, what value the company expects from it, and how it will use BSM as a competitive differentiator for delivery of its business and IT services, products, etc.</p>
<p>The organizational &#8220;profile&#8221; I&#8217;ve seen most successful is when implementing a BSM strategy originates from within or actively includes a group that many companies have now that serves as a liaison or relationship management role between the various lines of business and IT. Sometimes this group is often seen as the gatekeeper to filter (and hinder) business driven requirements into the IT organization. In the ideal scenario, this group works very closely with the business and IT (usually staffed by business people and not IT people) to understand both the business side and IT side of complex business services and applications. </p>
<p>Apart from the traditional IT components, what this group can do is help IT really understand the business perspective.  Analysis of the impact on the business in business terms is only possible by collaborating with a group such as this.  True value oriented BSM becomes attainable when we get to this level of IT and business alignment, cooperation, collaboration and communication.</p>
<p>If BSM is an IT only initiative, this will likely result in an IT centric perspective severely lacking in the necessary business perspective.  In these cases where IT doesn&#8217;t invest their BSM efforts with the business as an equal partner, the implementation ultimately becomes a &#8220;CYA&#8221; tool for IT and not achieve the desired value oriented expected.</p>
<p>To some degree &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; may have an entirely different profile. If we see the price points, complexity and time to value change significantly we may see these types of deployments originate exclusively within the Line of Business. The possibility may exist where large enterprises operating in a shared IT services or IT outsourcing type model that the Line of Business brings in a &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; solution to gain the visibility, checks and balances needed to ensure that the LoB’s needs are being met from the internal/external provider. I&#8217;d envision that &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; may even be capable of operating within a &#8220;SaaS&#8221; model or other managed service type offering where the price points are below the signing levels triggering broader IT involvement and review.</p>
<p><em>To Be Continued&#8230;</em></p>
<p><a href="http://sharethis.com/item?&wp=abc&amp;publisher=ea11358c-69de-4e80-9804-e964a8930b70&amp;title=Q%26amp%3BA+with+Doug+McClure%3A+Is+BSM+Lite+the+Answer%3F&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fblog.sciencelogic.com%2Fqa-with-doug-mcclure-is-bsm-lite-the-answer%2F07%2F2008">ShareThis</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 14 Jul 2008 20:02:59 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lite">lite</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bsm heavy">bsm heavy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bsm heavy directions">bsm heavy directions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bsm">bsm</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/outcomes">outcomes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/expect lite outcomes">expect lite outcomes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bsm lite approach">bsm lite approach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/approach">approach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bsm heavy solution">bsm heavy solution</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/qa-with-doug-mcclure-is-bsm-lite-the-answer/07/2008">Q&amp;A with Doug McClure: Is BSM Lite the Answer?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Issue That Virtually Everybody and Their Dog Is Confused About]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/7da2b7bc70a4d1f923895972926d6c3b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/7da2b7bc70a4d1f923895972926d6c3b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Here is an issue that everybody and their dog (and, likely, their dog's fleas :-)) is confused about

What does PCI DSS Requirement 2.2.1 (&quot;Implement only one primary function
per server (for example,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Here is an issue that <span style="font-weight: bold;">everybody </span>and their dog (and, likely, their dog's fleas :-)) is  confused about:<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">What does PCI DSS Requirement 2.2.1 ("Implement only one primary function</span><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;"> per server (for example, web servers, database servers, and DNS should</span><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;"> be implemented on separate servers)") mean in <span style="font-style: italic;">virtualized </span>environments?<br /><br /></span>Is it "one function per VM instance" or "one function per physical server?"<br /><br />I've heard reports of QSA interpreting it either way, which means that millions of dollars of IT investments might be at stake.<br /><br />Here are some arguments that I've heard about:<br /><ul><li>"VM instance is NOT a server" - thus physical separation is required.</li><li>"VM IS a different machine, might be different OS, etc" - thus it IS sufficient separation.</li><li>"VM is like a VLAN" - thus VM separation IS adequate separation.  Then again: some say VLANs are not sufficient separation either.</li></ul>I hereby call upon the unholy wisdom of <a href="http://rationalsecurity.typepad.com/">Hoff </a>to answer this little bugger...<div class="blogger-post-footer">About me: http://www.chuvakin.org</div><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=Tic15J"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=Tic15J" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=Ql1M0J"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=Ql1M0J" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=7eElzJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=7eElzJ" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~4/332018087" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Jul 2008 08:34:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/separation">separation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/physical separation">physical separation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sufficient separation">sufficient separation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/database servers">database servers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/servers">servers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server">server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/primary function">primary function</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/function">function</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/physical server">physical server</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/332018087/issue-that-virtually-everybody-and.html">Issue That Virtually Everybody and Their Dog Is Confused About</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[SQL injections compromise Balmar e-commerce site]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/1ad001b3e4efe3fadaa1926c5be9eb9f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/1ad001b3e4efe3fadaa1926c5be9eb9f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
6/3/08

Organization
Balmar Incorporated
Arts Education Partnership (&quot;AEP

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
Unnamed hosting provider

Victims
Online...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/balmar.jpg" width="193" align="right" height="53"><font size="2"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Date Reported: </span><br>6/3/08<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Organization: </span><br><a href="http://www.balmar.com/home.htm">Balmar Incorporated</a> <br><a href="http://www.aep-arts.org/#">Arts Education Partnership ("AEP")</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br>Unnamed hosting provider<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>Online customers<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>Unknown<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>Names, addresses, telephone numbers, emails, and credit card information.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>Balmar Incorporated notified the Maryland State Attorney General of a breach that occurred sometime between April 4, 2008 and April 30, 2008, in which sensitive customer information was compromised through their ecommerce site.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://www.oag.state.md.us/idtheft/Breach%20Notices/ITU-153502.pdf">Maryland State Attorney General breach notification</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>Maryland State Attorney General<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online source cited above:<br><br>Balmar Incorporated ("Balmar") recently experienced a data security breach in its e-commerce site server.<br><br>Balmar has reason to believe that the personal information of seven (7) of its online customers who reside in the State of Maryland may have been accessed sometime between April 4, 2008 and April 30, 2008 without proper authorization.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] The sensitive information may have been accessed sometime during the 26 days listed above, but as you will read later on in the notification, the attack started as early as March 27th.</span><br style="font-style: italic;"><br>The personal information affected may include customer names, addresses, telephone numbers, emails, and credit card information.<br><br>Balmar has determined that at least one fraudulent credit card transaction has occurred as a result of this incident.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] This is likely confirmation that the sensitive information WAS accessed, not "may have been" as stated previously.</span><br><br>A full analysis of our e-commerce server logs revealed on March 27, 2008, an individual initiated several SQL-injections queries on the main page of our e-commerce website from an IP address in Viet Nam.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I am pleased to read that Balmar had/has implemented enough logging to determine the type and source of the attack.&nbsp; I am curious to know why the e-commerce site was under attack from March 27th until as late as April 30th without detection?&nbsp; Either the Balmar e-commerce site was not protected by intrusion detection/prevention or information security personnel didn't know how to use intrusion detection/prevention.&nbsp; IDS/IPS is a must-have for e-commerce platforms in most circumstances.&nbsp; Part of using IDS/IPS is to review and investigate alerts ASAP.</span><br><br>Random queries were attempted over time through March 31st.<br><br>By March 31st, the individual had gathered enough information to pipe the queries to a search bot.<br><br>By April 4th, the search bot was able to access and transfer data from our e-commerce server to a web page.<br><br>Once discovered, Balmar immediately undertook the following actions:<br></font><ul><li><font size="2">Reported the incident to the Virginia State Police and the FBI;</font></li><li>Contacted the web page host to demand that the page be disabled;</li><li>Removed all credit card information from the affected area of our database and moved it to a secured area of the database that cannot be accessed by the method used during the incident;</li><li>Installed an additional database security solution to detect and prevent any future attempted security breaches;</li><li>Sent notice to affected customers by letter and e-mail<br></li></ul><font size="2"><br>Balmar's investigation of this incident is ongoing.<br><br>We sincerely apologize to you for this situation and want to assure you that protecting the security and privacy of your information remains our top priority.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] This letter is signed by the President of Balmar, Bruce Seger.&nbsp; I respect a business leader that speaks (or writes) about information security issues.&nbsp; It demonstrates his/her ownership.</span><br style="font-style: italic;"><br>We have made and will continue to make significant investments in security software, systems, and procedures, and will remain vigilant in protecting you.<br><br>For more information, contact us by telephone at 1 (800) 265-2724 or by email at bseger@balmar.com.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>Was this an e-commerce site running code that was susceptible to SQL injection attacks and no host or network intrusion detection/prevention? <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>Unknown</font><br><br>
<script src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/%7Es/breachblog?i=http://breachblog.com/2008/06/23/balmar.aspx" type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8"></script>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 23 Jun 2008 18:07:43 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sensitive information">sensitive information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/balmar">balmar</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sensitive customer information">sensitive customer information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/breach description">breach description</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/breach">breach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/balmar e-commerce site">balmar e-commerce site</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security breach">security breach</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/06/23/balmar.aspx">SQL injections compromise Balmar e-commerce site</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Capital Market CEP Fantasy Land]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/34d9a8128d15d52ecec3bfe7b769f285</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/34d9a8128d15d52ecec3bfe7b769f285</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[In Tech Spending Hit by Subprime Mess , Jeffery Schwartz says
According to Tabb, spending on development is being refocused on projects that can help firms improve their margins and, not surprisingly,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class='snap_preview'><br /><p>In <a href="http://reddevnews.com/news/article.aspx?editorialsid=9988" target="_blank">Tech Spending Hit by Subprime Mess</a>, Jeffery Schwartz says,</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;According to Tabb, spending on development is being refocused on projects that can help firms improve their margins and, not surprisingly, do a better job at risk management. As such, investments in capabilities such as algorithmic trading and complex event processing (CEP) are likely to be pivotal in some firms&#8217; efforts to become more competitive and improve their efforts at mitigating risks.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;But for some banks that have deployed such technologies &#8212; the now-defunct Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch &#8212; the question is: How did these companies fail to mitigate the risks that have slammed their businesses if their development teams were developing and deploying sophisticated systems?</p>
<p>&#8220;There is definitely an awareness that perhaps the systems that existed in place to assess the value of portfolios or judge risk [are being scrutinized],&#8221; said Stevan Vidich, an industry architect in Microsoft&#8217;s financial services group. &#8220;</p></blockquote>
<blockquote><p>He added that there is strong interest in CEP and other risk management methodologies. A growing number of shops have started deploying such solutions based on the .NET Framework, Vidich said, and he believes such investments will continue.</p></blockquote>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;Clearly, there&#8217;s a lot of need to deal with the immense influx of data and being able to analyze data in a timely manner,&#8221; Vidich said. &#8220;It also drives need for systems like business intelligence, or BI, applied to a near-real-time scenario, which is a very attractive proposition.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>What are these guys on Wall Street smoking? </p>
<p>This is the precise &#8220;over hyping&#8221; problem I have warned about repeatedly.   Folks selling rule engines that perform basic calculations over a time window of streaming data have been marketing their wares as &#8220;superbrains&#8221; that can solve very complicated problems and, at the same time, save Wall Street and The Planet.</p>
<p>Let me be perfectly clear here Wall Street.  Listen very carefully.</p>
<p>There is nothing in any of the so called CEP products in the market place that is going to stop losses related to the subprime meltdown effecting the &#8220;<em>now-defunct Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch</em>,&#8221; as Jeffery Schwartz implies.</p>
<p>To imply that the risk management (and corporate governance) required to mitigate the current crisis on Wall Street can be foreseen, solved, or even mitigated, by a rules engine (or any software) is complete and absolute fantasy.   </p>
<p>I think the fever created by the subprime flu is putting folks on Wall Street, or at least the vendors and the analysts pandering to them, in a Capital Market CEP Fantasy Land.</p>
<p> </p>
<img alt="" border="0" src="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/categories/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/255/" /> <img alt="" border="0" src="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/tags/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/255/" /> <a rel="nofollow" href="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/gocomments/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/255/"><img alt="" border="0" src="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/comments/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/255/" /></a> <a rel="nofollow" href="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/godelicious/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/255/"><img alt="" border="0" src="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/delicious/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/255/" /></a> <a rel="nofollow" href="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/gostumble/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/255/"><img alt="" border="0" src="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/stumble/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/255/" /></a> <a rel="nofollow" href="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/godigg/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/255/"><img alt="" border="0" src="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/digg/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/255/" /></a> <a rel="nofollow" href="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/goreddit/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/255/"><img alt="" border="0" src="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/reddit/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/255/" /></a> <img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=thecepblog.com&blog=1100533&post=255&subd=eventprocessing&ref=&feed=1" /></div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 23 Jun 2008 09:38:13 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cep">cep</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk management methodologies">risk management methodologies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk management">risk management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wall street">wall street</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/now-defunct bear stearns">now-defunct bear stearns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/time">time</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/jeffery schwartz implies">jeffery schwartz implies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/jeffery schwartz">jeffery schwartz</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/subprime">subprime</category>
      <source url="http://thecepblog.com/2008/06/23/capital-market-cep-fantasy-land/">Capital Market CEP Fantasy Land</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Capital Market CEP Fantasy Land]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2b86dd3c2e87f7b28f8b7b7da7d5e9d5</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2b86dd3c2e87f7b28f8b7b7da7d5e9d5</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[In Tech Spending Hit by Subprime Mess , Jeffery Schwartz says
According to Tabb, spending on development is being refocused on projects that can help firms improve their margins and, not surprisingly,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In <a href="http://reddevnews.com/news/article.aspx?editorialsid=9988" target="_blank">Tech Spending Hit by Subprime Mess</a>, Jeffery Schwartz says,</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;According to Tabb, spending on development is being refocused on projects that can help firms improve their margins and, not surprisingly, do a better job at risk management. As such, investments in capabilities such as algorithmic trading and complex event processing (CEP) are likely to be pivotal in some firms&#8217; efforts to become more competitive and improve their efforts at mitigating risks.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;But for some banks that have deployed such technologies &#8212; the now-defunct Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch &#8212; the question is: How did these companies fail to mitigate the risks that have slammed their businesses if their development teams were developing and deploying sophisticated systems?</p>
<p>&#8220;There is definitely an awareness that perhaps the systems that existed in place to assess the value of portfolios or judge risk [are being scrutinized],&#8221; said Stevan Vidich, an industry architect in Microsoft&#8217;s financial services group. &#8220;</p></blockquote>
<blockquote><p>He added that there is strong interest in CEP and other risk management methodologies. A growing number of shops have started deploying such solutions based on the .NET Framework, Vidich said, and he believes such investments will continue.</p></blockquote>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;Clearly, there&#8217;s a lot of need to deal with the immense influx of data and being able to analyze data in a timely manner,&#8221; Vidich said. &#8220;It also drives need for systems like business intelligence, or BI, applied to a near-real-time scenario, which is a very attractive proposition.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>What are these guys on Wall Street smoking? </p>
<p>This is the precise &#8220;over hyping&#8221; problem I have warned about repeatedly.   Folks selling rule engines that perform basic calculations over a time window of streaming data have been marketing their wares as &#8220;superbrains&#8221; that can solve very complicated problems and, at the same time, save Wall Street and The Planet.</p>
<p>Let me be perfectly clear here Wall Street.  Listen very carefully.</p>
<p>There is nothing in any of the so called CEP products in the market place that is going to stop losses related to the subprime meltdown effecting the &#8220;<em>now-defunct Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch</em>,&#8221; as Jeffery Schwartz implies.</p>
<p>To imply that the risk management (and corporate governance) required to mitigate the current crisis on Wall Street can be foreseen, solved, or even mitigated, by a rules engine (or any software) is complete and absolute fantasy.   </p>
<p>I think the fever created by the subprime flu is putting folks on Wall Street, or at least the vendors and the analysts pandering to them, in a Capital Market CEP Fantasy Land.</p>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 23 Jun 2008 09:38:13 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cep">cep</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk management methodologies">risk management methodologies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk management">risk management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wall street">wall street</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/now-defunct bear stearns">now-defunct bear stearns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/time">time</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/jeffery schwartz implies">jeffery schwartz implies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/jeffery schwartz">jeffery schwartz</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/subprime">subprime</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/06/23/capital-market-cep-fantasy-land/">Capital Market CEP Fantasy Land</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[CHECKLISTS ARE NOT FOR DUMMIES, BUT THEY SURE ARE DUMB!]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a4d082b5e73846a16a60945cf10205ef</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a4d082b5e73846a16a60945cf10205ef</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[My friend Mark Curphey writes an article Checklists are Not For Dummies, Dummy which looks at the use of checklists and how they are important for quality and the reduction of variance. I think its...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>My friend Mark Curphey writes an article &#8220;<a href="http://securitybuddha.com/2008/05/24/checklists-are-not-for-dummies-dummy/">Checklists are Not For Dummies, Dummy</a>&#8220;  which looks at the use of checklists and how they are important for quality and the reduction of variance.  I think it&#8217;s important in this day and age of &#8220;Security Through Diligence&#8221; to take a look at what checklists can and cannot do, because Mark makes an important point - reminding us that there is a time and place for everything under the sun, even the much maligned checklists.  Before we get into this, let&#8217;s discuss some terminology, because I&#8217;ll be using these terms to make some distinction:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>State of Nature.</strong> State of Nature just means what the current state is.  There are two ISSA Journals on my desk right now - State of Nature statement.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><strong>State of Knowledge</strong>:  Analysis derived from examination of State of Nature.  &#8220;One of these ISSA Journals has an article co-authored Donn Parker on ROI.  I&#8217;ve read it, and it makes some statements he regards as truth.  Looking at those, well, I know that risk is quantifiable, best practices have significant issues, and there are many, many other statements of authority in the article that I can refute on evidence.&#8221; - Analysis or State of Knowledge.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><strong>State of Wisdom</strong>:  Synthesis from the analysis.  The &#8220;So&#8221; moment.  &#8220;So since there are many statements of authority made in the article that I can refute on evidence, I should be open <em>but skeptical</em> about whether the conclusions of this article are likely to have much value to me in my quest to understand the value of risk reducing investments.&#8221;  What I&#8217;ve synthesized from the quality of the article - State of Wisdom.</li>
</ul>
<p>(<em>Just a clue for our readers, anytime you read someone talk about risk and mention the term &#8220;actuarial&#8221; - be skeptical about the conclusions they have you draw from the statement using that word. 9 times out of 10 what I&#8217;ve read after someone says actuarial is made as authoritative but shows a level of ignorance on the subject.  If you really want to mess with them - say &#8220;Really! Well, tell me how you feel about the use of non-parametric Bayesian Methods&#8221; and wait&#8230;</em> )</p>
<p><strong>MMMMM-MMMMMMM CHECKLISTS!</strong></p>
<p><img src="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/a/a7/Opie_Pickle.JPG" alt="" width="300" height="199" /></p>
<p>So what about Checklists?  They&#8217;re worth discussing because we&#8217;re swamped by them!  Heck, we&#8217;ve got people in love with the idea of checklists of checklists and claiming <strong><a href="http://brightfly.com/content/view/314/1/">GRC nirvana is not in the checklist itself, but in the mapping of checklists.</a></strong></p>
<p>Here ya go:  Checklists have one of two uses -</p>
<p><strong><span style="color: #008080;">First</span></strong> they can give us a path to accomplish something.  I make a checklist every morning I call a &#8220;Todo List&#8221;.   Useful Checklists could be as Curphey mentions - steps for operating machinery or performing a certain task (heck, scientific method could be said to be a checklist of steps in analysis).  Checklists are useful in this way because, well, we&#8217;re fallible, absent minded, and <a href="http://www.longnow.org/views/essays/articles/ArtFeynman.php">novices</a>.  They serve to reduce some level of variability in a process.</p>
<p><strong><span style="color: #008000;">Second</span></strong>, they can help us develop a State of Nature.  PCI or the ISO are very nice checklists that, once you&#8217;re done, certifies that you have the existence of a certain amount of control.  Again, this serves to reduce some level of variability, comparing you to a &#8220;best practice&#8221;.</p>
<p>And so&#8230;..</p>
<p>They are both useful in each use - as long as the limitations therein are understood!   And that&#8217;s where we get into trouble.  Too many times we believe that checklists are a State of Knowledge.  Checklists allow for some limited analysis, just like the use of <a href="http://riskmanagementinsight.com/riskanalysis/?p=362">ordinal numbers to describe &#8220;risk&#8221;</a> - they only serve to identify some level of variability, nothing more.</p>
<p>But outside of that they usually offer us no analytical function at all, they cannot provide a State of Knowledge and therefore, more succinctly, <em><strong>Checklists are dumb</strong></em>.</p>
<p>As slightly paranoid, skeptical and jaded risk management professionals, we know this to be true.  A PCI compliant company may or may not be at all &#8220;secure&#8221; or &#8220;risk-free&#8221; or even &#8220;risk-reduced&#8221;.  That&#8217;s an aspect of analysis that the checklist is some prior information for, but not nearly all the information we need for an analysis of risk or even a statement about the ability to control or resist.  We know an ISO certified organization did what they claim they do enough to at least fool an auditor once, but cannot arrive at any other State of Knowledge without more effort.</p>
<p>Make no mistake, the checklists we commonly deal with provide a very, very limited State of Knowledge.  Only analysis (with rigor and <a href="http://taosecurity.blogspot.com/2008/06/what-would-galileo-think.html">testing</a>) will provide that.  And note that a State of Wisdom (what we&#8217;re really after, after all) is predicated on a strong State of Knowledge.</p>
<p><strong>WHAT ARE YOU MANAGING TOWARDS, REDUX</strong><br />
So if checklists only provide a State of Nature, and are incapable of really giving us Knowledge or Wisdom - then let me encourage you to think about the amount of time you spend just getting a certain State of Nature and the relative return on that investment vs. the amount of time you spend in analysis and synthesis.  Is your time best spent mapping checklist to checklist - or is it better spent developing the analytics that allow us to synthesize wisdom?</p>
<p><strong>AMAZE AND CONFUSE YOUR <span style="text-decoration: line-through;">FRIENDS</span> AUDITORS</strong><br />
Let me finish by encouraging you to have a frank discussion with those who perform your audit function.  You must really pin them down if they are out to give you any analysis at all - and when/if they do provide analysis - press them on what rigor they use to create a State of Nature, and then the means by which they create a State of Knowledge (that belief statement based on the State of Nature they see).</p>
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      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Jun 2008 09:51:33 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/checklists">checklists</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/article checklists">article checklists</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/article">article</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mmmmm-mmmmmmm checklists">mmmmm-mmmmmmm checklists</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nice checklists">nice checklists</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/provide analysis">provide analysis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/provide">provide</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nature">nature</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nature statement">nature statement</category>
      <source url="http://riskmanagementinsight.com/riskanalysis/?p=365">CHECKLISTS ARE NOT FOR DUMMIES, BUT THEY SURE ARE DUMB!</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[Price Discrimination in the Market for Stolen Credit Cards]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/cdb8d46e8dd9bdb9c839091a75b5f749</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/cdb8d46e8dd9bdb9c839091a75b5f749</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[What would be the price of a stolen credit card with an already verified balance, and based on what factors would the sellers come up with the price range? Depends on who you're buying the goods from....]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SETi0ojgL_I/AAAAAAAABw4/fcvOye2Mi78/s1600-h/credit_cards_price_discrimination.JPG"><img style="margin: 0pt 10px 10px 0pt; float: left; cursor: pointer;" src="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SETi0ojgL_I/AAAAAAAABw4/fcvOye2Mi78/s200/credit_cards_price_discrimination.JPG" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5207536463014539250" border="0" /></a>What would be the price of a stolen credit card with an already verified balance, and based on what factors would the sellers come up with the price range? Depends on who you're buying the goods from. Continuing the discussion on the <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/03/underground-economys-supply-of-goods.html">Underground Economy's Supply of Goods</a>, the service I'll comment on in this post is among the countless number of others offering stolen credit card numbers, however, in this one we have <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Price_discrimination">a great example of price discrimination</a> compared to the majority of other propositions, emphasizing on a volume basis propositions - the more you buy the cheaper it gets.<br /><br />Let's go through this proposition differentiating itself on the basis of the balance available on a per bank basis :<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">- Bank Of America/Between 2k - 50k/400$</span><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">- WellsFargo/Between 4k - 40k/300$</span><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">- Chase Bank/Between 2k - 30k/250$</span><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">- Citibank/Between 9k - 70k/300$</span><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">- Wachovia/Between 2k - 18k/275$</span><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">- Barclays/Any Balance/400$</span><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">- HSBC/Between 30k - 312k/400$ up to 100k=600$</span><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">- Halifax/Between 20k 180k/450$</span><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">- Nationwide/Between 15k - 230k/450$</span><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">- Lloyds TSB/Between 10k - 400k/600$</span><br /><br />How they come up with these prices remains a subject to speculation, what's important to point out is that in between the price discrimination used here on a good that in reality is a commodity good, is that they're cashing-in on the high profit margins since when investing the time and efforts into stealing these credit card numbers though banker malware infected PCs, they weren't even aware of what their ROI would be, consequently any price set would be a profitable price outpacing the investments they've made into obtaining the accounting data.<br /><br />We can also theoretically have the same seller making propositions on a volume basis, operating another site this time targeting different marketing segment, where the site itself would have also been advertised to reach that very segment. What he's enjoying is the overall lack of market transparency and the fact that it's not a daily practice for someone to come across sites selling stolen credit card details, which is where the first proposition would take place. The second, the one on a volume basis, would be targeting the experienced identity thieves who never even consider spending so much money on a good that they come across to, and have good understanding of the market, thus, know where to find bargain deals for it.<br /><br />Who's supplying the bargain deals anyway, and how are the bargain deals affecting the behavior of the experienced sellers in the market? New market entrants that suddenly managed to get hold of huge amounts of stolen credit cards, consciously or subconsciously introduce <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penetration_pricing">penetration pricing</a> in the market. Basically, they are aware of several services and they prices they charge for the goods offered, so on the basis of these prices they start to on purposely undercutting them in order to achieve the necessary growth during the introduction period.<br /><br />With the ever decreasing cost required to conduct cybercrime, any investment made would automatically result in a positive return on investment. Moreover, for the time being, there's no way we can even consider talking about the average price for a stolen credit card number, as everyone is playing by their own rules, with only a few exceptions using basic market principles. So if you even come across an article or a report stating that the price of a certain good is the specific amount of money pointed out, don't take the number of granted, as this is just one of the many such servics and propositons the researchers came across to, not the average.<br /><br />Ironically, just like you have publicly available backdoored versions of Mpack and Icepack aiming to trick the average script kiddies into providing those who backdoored the kits with the opportunity to hijack their successful campaigns, that's of course next to the backdoored phishing pages released in the very same fashion, we also have scammers trying to scam other scammers by pitching the stolen credit cards and never "delivering the goods".<div class="feedflare">
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</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/303643755" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 03 Jun 2008 03:23:29 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/price">price</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/price discrimination">price discrimination</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/volume basis">volume basis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/basis">basis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/market">market</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/average price">average price</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bank basis">bank basis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/volume basis propositions">volume basis propositions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card">credit card</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/303643755/price-discrimination-in-market-for.html">Price Discrimination in the Market for Stolen Credit Cards</source>
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