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  <channel>
    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: iron]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/iron</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Sat, 24 May 2008 03:44:15 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Around The Web For Friday]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/854f3c7cd7fbfd4b803df29d7a415b9d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/854f3c7cd7fbfd4b803df29d7a415b9d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Were frequently asked what were reading and what we like in blog posts, so here are some interesting things that hit our RSS readers that you may have missed
COBIT rivals ITIL from The IT Skeptic...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We&#8217;re frequently asked what we&#8217;re reading and what we like in blog posts, so here are some interesting things that hit our RSS readers that you may have missed:</p>
<p><a href="http://www.itskeptic.org/node/692"><strong>COBIT rivals ITIL from The IT Skeptic</strong></a></p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;Everyone is tiptoeing around the fact that COBIT offers a significant competitive body of knowledge (BOK) to ITIL. Sure ITIL goes into more depth in places, but to say COBIT sits over the top is to grossly understate the overlap. COBIT extends a long way down into the &#8220;how&#8221; and it does it with an intellectual rigour that ITIL lacks.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Interesting stuff that.  A detailed mapping might help some folks.  Either way, the good news for those keen on understanding risk management is that governance metrics, done right, allow us to understand a part of that &#8220;capability to manage risk&#8221; we&#8217;re always looking for.   Assurance, verification and the acquisition and interpretation of knowledge is king.   Speaking of which&#8230;.</p>
<p><a href="http://spiresecurity.typepad.com/spire_security_viewpoint/2008/09/how-to-tell-when-nothing-happens.html"><strong>How To Tell When &#8220;Nothing Happens&#8221; by Pete Lindstrom</strong></a></p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;&#8230;problem is that, it isn&#8217;t really true that &#8220;nothing happens&#8221; when you employ some specific security control to prevent an exploit. Not only that, but even when it is difficult to collect data on what didn&#8217;t happen, one can devise experiments to tell how frequently that nothing occurred.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p><em>Good</em> analysis is all about the uncertainty.   Speaking of accounting for uncertainty&#8230;</p>
<p><a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/09/assets-good-until-reached-for.html"><strong>Assets Good Until Reached For by Gunnar Peterson</strong></a></p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;If you have a 100,000 dekstops or 100,000 servers it hard to manage. You will need to automate and to do that you need to abstract, but you should also realize that its a drawing on a whiteboard not reality. You need abstraction assurance.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>And there&#8217;s the trick.  We might call &#8220;abstraction assurance&#8221; an analog to &#8220;confidence&#8221; or &#8220;uncertainty&#8221; in certain priors (metrics) or posteriors (calculated values based on those metrics).  The stronger that abstraction assurance is, the less uncertainty we have in our knowledge and the better our ability to create wisdom from that knowledge (you know, make decisions).</p>
<p><a href="http://www.emergentchaos.com/archives/2005/12/epstein_snow_an.html"><strong>Epstein, Snow and Flake: Three Views of Software Security by Adam Shostack</strong></a></p>
<p>Adam&#8217;s focus is on software security, but the discussion here can be abstracted out into the broader realm of risk management quite nicely.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/825?ref=rss"><strong>Two-thirds of firms hit by cybercrime from Security Focus</strong></a></p>
<p>The US DoJ says that in 2005 (there&#8217;s some timely data) 2/3 of their surveyed firms detected at least one cybercrime.  &#8220;Cybercrime&#8221; is &#8220;classified &#8230; into cyber attacks, cyber theft, and other incidents.&#8221;  Pretty general.  Also from the report:  &#8220;Computer viruses made up more than half of all cyber attacks.&#8221;</p>
<p>(That sound you hear is me tapping my forehead lightly on large iron object)</p>
<p><a href="http://blog.ca-grc.com/2008/09/lessons-learned-from-%E2%80%9Cpersonal%E2%80%9D-risk-management/"><strong>Lessons Learned from “Personal” Risk Management By: Christopher Daugherty</strong></a></p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;This process is what I call “personal risk management.”  All of us have done it and will continue to do so.  Why is it, then, many companies have ignored following similar principles with the on-going health of the business?  This is a debate with many different answers so I ask you to select the best answer for your employer:</p>
<p>a) Have not ignored as this keeps me awake at night!</p>
<p>b) Please restate the problem, I cannot hear well with my head buried in the sand.</p>
<p>c) We passed our SOX audit so we checked this off the list!</p>
<p>d) We are informed of the challenge but we have a business to run and profits to make</p>
<p>e) Is this what internal audit and risk management has been telling us?&#8221;</p></blockquote>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 26 Sep 2008 08:56:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/call abstraction assurance">call abstraction assurance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/abstraction assurance">abstraction assurance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal risk management">personal risk management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk management">risk management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/assurance">assurance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/itil">itil</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/itil lacks">itil lacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cobit rivals itil">cobit rivals itil</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software security">software security</category>
      <source url="http://riskmanagementinsight.com/riskanalysis/?p=450">Around The Web For Friday</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[UPDATES GALORE! or, THE PRONOUN WE MEANS YOU AND ME!]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6ebd2507c3c7a5fbc11f6123a9af9559</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6ebd2507c3c7a5fbc11f6123a9af9559</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[So much traveling, so little blogging. Sorry everyone. Ive gotta say first that I really enjoyed meeting readers and friends of the blog this past two weeks
Today, allow me to update you on FAIR and...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>So much traveling, so little blogging.  Sorry everyone.  I&#8217;ve gotta say first that I really enjoyed meeting readers and friends of the blog this past two weeks.</p>
<p>Today, allow me to update you on FAIR and the movement towards a formal, open standard.  There&#8217;s a couple of cool things going on in our little risk-world.</p>
<p>First, The Open Group Security Forum continues to move towards a formal adoption of FAIR.</p>
<p><strong>WHAT DO YOU MEAN &#8220;WE&#8221; - YOU GOT A STANDARDS BODY IN YOUR POCKET OR SOMETHING?</strong></p>
<p>Our meeting in Chicago a few weeks ago was great, but also slightly disturbing for me. I got pronoun-confusion syndrome.   I&#8217;m used to using the &#8220;we&#8221; pronoun to refer to RMI, or Jack and myself as we vet the models.  So without even thinking I would said &#8220;we have been looking at how loss occurs, and may want to change the model some&#8221; and The Open Group Members freaked out (rightfully so).  Adrian Seccombe gently reminded me that the &#8220;we&#8221; was now the Security Forum, and that &#8220;we&#8221; didn&#8217;t go changing things at will without vetting against each other.  Man I love this stuff.  I get to run our thoughts and ideas past some great folks now - you know, those smart people who tend to have really complex problems and are trying hard to solve them.<br />
<span style="color: #000080;"><strong><br />
Formal Adoption:  Soon, Very Soon Now</strong></span></p>
<p>Formal Adoption basically means we&#8217;ve made this document, everyone is close to saying that they generally like it, and once that finally happens then &#8220;bam&#8221;, we&#8217;re ready to move onward and upward with better things (see Cookbooks, below).  We&#8217;ve got a couple of changes to the current document that have been requested that aren&#8217;t a big deal.  For example, one request is that we make some statement about general applicability of FAIR to risk domains outside of the IT realm.   But once additions like that and others are done, this long process should be complete.</p>
<p><span style="color: #000080;"><strong>New Document Moving Towards Public Release:</strong></span></p>
<p>We&#8217;ve got a basic document that should be public in the next few weeks on <em><strong>&#8220;What Makes a Good Risk Assessment Methodology&#8221;</strong></em> - written by yours truly and Jack.  It&#8217;s a very high-level document, and serves two purposes:</p>
<ul>
<li>For novices it helps parse out what is important in any undertaking to understand corporate risk (the repeated discussions on the ISO 27001 mailing list make me think it would be a place ripe for such a document).</li>
<li>For those who &#8220;know&#8221; risk, it helps to re-establish some fundamental principles like the use of scales (ratio, please), the implications of dealing in probabilities, what attributes like consistency and defensibility mean, how &#8220;risk&#8221; should be reported to the business (something you know, meaningful) and so on.</li>
</ul>
<p>When this doc is deemed ready for public consumption I&#8217;ll be sure to post on this blog here.</p>
<p><strong>COOKBOOKS, EUROPEAN AGENCIES, AND, IRON CHEF &#8220;RISK&#8221; - WHOSE CUISINE WILL REIGN SUPREME?</strong></p>
<p>One interesting thing that came up in the Chicago meeting was that <strong><a href="http://www.enisa.europa.eu/">ENISA</a></strong> (The European Network and Information Security Agency) developed a very nice document that reviewed something like 18 different risk assessment methodologies against their Criteria for Goodness.  FAIR was one of the ones they reviewed, and we (the royal &#8220;we&#8221; used there to include all us FAIR-Folk) did awfully well.  Things of interest:</p>
<ol>
<li>They based their work on the current introduction paper which is not at all a step-by-step guide towards an organizational risk assessment (what ENISA really wanted) and we did pretty well.  Well enough that if we had developed a paper along the lines of NIST 800-30 or OCTAVE for the use of FAIR in a formal process, we could have done <em><strong>really, really</strong></em> well.  Like won-the-bake-off kind of well.</li>
<li>FAIR is actually not at all incongruous to many of the risk assessment methodologies offered, and in fact compliments many of them by letting those methodologies develop real, structured probabilities.  Think OCTAVE, where they basically say &#8220;math is (probabilities are) hard, so if you want to do them for reals, good luck!  But here&#8217;s a nonsensical way to do things if you want to believe in <span style="color: #ff00ff;"><em>magic-fairy risk</em></span>&#8220;.  FAIR fits right in there by stomping on the magic-fairy risk with the jack-boots of rationality.  FAIR similarly helps other risk standards that might lack structured probability development.</li>
</ol>
<p>So The Open Group Security Forum decided that though we could create a new document and totally p0wn any future ENISA bake-off, there wasn&#8217;t much demand for the development of that documentation by the membership  - a point which was made quite apparent at the beginning of the discussion when one large European company CISO asked &#8220;What&#8217;s ENISA?&#8221;  Relevancy is everything, I suppose.</p>
<p>But that second item up there - the one about helping rather than competing with other &#8220;risk assessment methodologies&#8221; - really struck a chord.  So &#8220;we&#8221; (The Security Forum) are going to develop some &#8220;Cookbooks&#8221; that basically are high-level documents that say &#8220;If you want to use FAIR with (OCTAVE/COSO/CoBIT/Whatever) here&#8217;s how it fits, makes it better, and improves your life.  I&#8217;m pretty excited about these, and our first document looks like it&#8217;s going to be COSO integration.</p>
<p><strong>THE OPEN GROUP SECURITY FORUM - THEY&#8217;RE A TRUSTING BUNCH (WITH QUALIFICATION, OF COURSE)<br />
</strong></p>
<p>Finally, many people have asked me &#8220;Why work with The Open Group?&#8221;  There are many reasons, to be sure, but I will give you one example.  Members of the Security Forum there are not only great at vetting the model and getting consensus on risk and risk factors - but they&#8217;re quick to start applying.  So in Chicago, I thought I&#8217;d be talking about FAIR and the standard and fighting groupthink.  Nope.  Not at all.  In fact, the forum members spent more time suddenly discussing use of FAIR in a new Trust Model they&#8217;re developing.  So all of the sudden, I&#8217;m part of a new and exciting project to develop a Trust Model - how cool is that?  While formal adoption of the Trust Model will be necessarily long and deliberate - the collaboration and development is happening much faster than I can keep up with.  But if you all will allow me, it will help me get my head around it all by blogging about it later this week.  So be prepared to read about me dealing in &#8220;Trust&#8221; a little bit.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 13 Aug 2008 11:24:17 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk">risk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk assessment methodologies">risk assessment methodologies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security forum">security forum</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/forum">forum</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/magic-fairy risk">magic-fairy risk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk standards">risk standards</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fair">fair</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk-world">risk-world</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fair similarly helps">fair similarly helps</category>
      <source url="http://riskmanagementinsight.com/riskanalysis/?p=381">UPDATES GALORE! or, THE PRONOUN WE MEANS YOU AND ME!</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[BlackHat Picks, Day 1]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5d32dc6f3a40de7f943638b5f611792e</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5d32dc6f3a40de7f943638b5f611792e</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Well, its almost BlackHat time. Here are my picks so far for Day 1. As you can see, I still havent narrowed it down completely
11:15-12:30 Option 1: Dan Kaminsky , DNS Goodness. On one hand, the DNS...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well, it&#8217;s almost BlackHat time.  Here are my picks so far for Day 1.  As you can see, I still haven&#8217;t narrowed it down completely.</p>
<p><b>11:15-12:30</b> Option 1: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Kaminsky">Dan Kaminsky</a>, &#8220;DNS Goodness&#8221;. On one hand, the DNS vulnerability is already public; on the other hand, the talk will probably still be interesting even if the 0day hype is missing.  Option 2: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Lawson">Nate Lawson</a>, &#8220;Highway to Hell: Hacking Toll Systems&#8221;.  My formal education and early work was in Electrical Engineering, so I&#8217;m always interested in hardware talks.  I haven&#8217;t touched a soldering iron in years so I have to live vicariously through people like Nate.  </p>
<p><b>13:45-15:00</b> Option 1: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Hoff">Chris Hoff</a>, &#8220;The Four Horsemen of the Virtualization Security Apocalypse&#8221;. I haven&#8217;t been paying enough attention to virtualization security and I think this talk will be quite informative.  Option 2: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Quist">Danny Quist and Colin Ames</a>, &#8220;Temporal Reverse Engineering&#8221;.  Sounds like an interesting approach.</p>
<p><b>15:15-16:30</b> Option 1: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Shacham">Hovav Shacham</a>, &#8220;Return-Oriented Programming: Exploits Without Code Injection&#8221;.  The topic sounds pretty straightforward conceptually but it will be interesting to see the implementation.  Option 2: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Stracener">Tom Stracener and Robert Hansen</a>, &#8220;Xploiting Google Gadgets: Gmalware and Beyond&#8221;.  Not expecting any huge revelations on this one but it&#8217;s likely to be entertaining.</p>
<p><b>18:00-19:00</b> The <a href="http://pwnie-awards.org/2008/">Pwnie Awards</a>.  Turnout last year was kind of slim, but I bet the room will be full this year as it&#8217;s been publicized more.</p>
<p>Day 2 picks coming soon!</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 28 Jul 2008 16:35:32 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/option">option</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization security apocalypse">virtualization security apocalypse</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization security">virtualization security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/day">day</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/picks">picks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dns goodness">dns goodness</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hovav shacham">hovav shacham</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/chris hoff">chris hoff</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/code injection">code injection</category>
      <source url="http://www.veracode.com/blog/?p=124">BlackHat Picks, Day 1</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[BlackHat Picks, Day 1]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/19d38c709dce2ad6b5ba03224fc5c97d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/19d38c709dce2ad6b5ba03224fc5c97d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Well, its almost BlackHat time. Here are my picks so far for Day 1. As you can see, I still havent narrowed it down completely
11:15-12:30 Option 1: Dan Kaminsky , DNS Goodness. On one hand, the DNS...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well, it&#8217;s almost BlackHat time.  Here are my picks so far for Day 1.  As you can see, I still haven&#8217;t narrowed it down completely.</p>
<p><b>11:15-12:30</b> Option 1: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Kaminsky">Dan Kaminsky</a>, &#8220;DNS Goodness&#8221;. On one hand, the DNS vulnerability is already public; on the other hand, the talk will probably still be interesting even if the 0day hype is missing.  Option 2: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Lawson">Nate Lawson</a>, &#8220;Highway to Hell: Hacking Toll Systems&#8221;.  My formal education and early work was in Electrical Engineering, so I&#8217;m always interested in hardware talks.  I haven&#8217;t touched a soldering iron in years so I have to live vicariously through people like Nate.  </p>
<p><b>13:45-15:00</b> Option 1: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Hoff">Chris Hoff</a>, &#8220;The Four Horsemen of the Virtualization Security Apocalypse&#8221;. I haven&#8217;t been paying enough attention to virtualization security and I think this talk will be quite informative.  Option 2: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Quist">Danny Quist and Colin Ames</a>, &#8220;Temporal Reverse Engineering&#8221;.  Sounds like an interesting approach.</p>
<p><b>15:15-16:30</b> Option 1: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Shacham">Hovav Shacham</a>, &#8220;Return-Oriented Programming: Exploits Without Code Injection&#8221;.  The topic sounds pretty straightforward conceptually but it will be interesting to see the implementation.  Option 2: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Stracener">Tom Stracener and Robert Hansen</a>, &#8220;Xploiting Google Gadgets: Gmalware and Beyond&#8221;.  Not expecting any huge revelations on this one but it&#8217;s likely to be entertaining.</p>
<p><b>18:00-19:00</b> The <a href="http://pwnie-awards.org/2008/">Pwnie Awards</a>.  Turnout last year was kind of slim, but I bet the room will be full this year as it&#8217;s been publicized more.</p>
<p>Day 2 picks coming soon!</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 28 Jul 2008 16:35:32 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/option">option</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization security apocalypse">virtualization security apocalypse</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization security">virtualization security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/day">day</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/picks">picks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dns goodness">dns goodness</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hovav shacham">hovav shacham</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/chris hoff">chris hoff</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/code injection">code injection</category>
      <source url="http://www.veracode.com/blog/2008/07/blackhat-picks-day-1/">BlackHat Picks, Day 1</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Marriott takes disaster recovery, virtualization underground]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/cb95dde7151eaec3ef3738bb11765244</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/cb95dde7151eaec3ef3738bb11765244</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Next year Marriott expects to complete a new &quot;in-sourced&quot; Recovery and Development Center in 12,500 square feet of space leased on a long-term basis from Iron Mountain. Marriott anticipates it will...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Next year Marriott expects to complete a new "in-sourced" Recovery and Development Center in 12,500 square feet of space leased on a long-term basis from Iron Mountain. Marriott anticipates it will slash recovery time for business systems to within four hours.
<p><a href="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~a/Computerworld/Security/News?a=rKM8tW"><img src="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~a/Computerworld/Security/News?i=rKM8tW" border="0"></img></a></p><img src="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~r/Computerworld/Security/News/~4/333024815" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 11 Jul 2008 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/recovery">recovery</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/marriott">marriott</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/slash recovery time">slash recovery time</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/marriott expects">marriott expects</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/square feet">square feet</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business systems">business systems</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/iron mountain">iron mountain</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/development center">development center</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/long-term basis">long-term basis</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~r/Computerworld/Security/News/~3/333024815/article.do">Marriott takes disaster recovery, virtualization underground</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The new golden age of comics]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/e709010bf68453fe0f3479f47b6ac0d5</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/e709010bf68453fe0f3479f47b6ac0d5</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The golden age of comics in the 30's and 40's saw the creation of the superhero. The good versus evil storylines mimicked the real life events of the day. It elevated the comic book to an art form....]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div class="wlWriterSmartContent" id="scid:5737277B-5D6D-4f48-ABFC-DD9C333F4C5D:3c7efc74-ecca-4398-bcf6-14a4a27f1220" style="PADDING-RIGHT: 0px; DISPLAY: inline; PADDING-LEFT: 0px; FLOAT: right; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; MARGIN: 0px; PADDING-TOP: 0px"><div id="5e0d2370-fa0b-4e1d-91b0-6043ab9882cd" style="PADDING-RIGHT: 0px; DISPLAY: inline; PADDING-LEFT: 0px; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; MARGIN: 0px; PADDING-TOP: 0px"><div><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/pB_v5w9NwUU&amp;hl=en" width="425" height="355" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" wmode="transparent"></embed></div></div></div>

<p>The <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_Age_of_comic_books">golden age of comics</a> in the 30's and 40's saw the creation of the superhero.&nbsp; The good versus evil storylines mimicked the real life events of the day. It elevated the comic book to an art form.&nbsp; Comic style illustration and story telling in short dialog balloons had never before or since reached those heights. Than after WW II, with the advent of TV and one evil empire ending, comic books seemed to recede back into the background of young boys play things.&nbsp; Their numbers never again reached the levels seen during the war and many of the characters faded away. </p>

<p>Over the years the comic industry tried to regain their former glory, but the age of the superhero was over.&nbsp; Yeah there was the TV cartoons, who didn't watch Superman or Batman when you were little.&nbsp; Some of you like me, may have even watched the Marvel Superhero Show that had short segments of many of the Marvel characters (check them out in the You Tube video), but they were campy and never appealed to an audience beyond young boys.&nbsp; The Superman movies with Christopher Reeves market a turning point on the return of the superhero and the Batman movies were very successful.&nbsp; But beyond those two, there were many flops. </p>

<p>With better technology and better story lines, Spiderman, Iron Man and now the latest, The Incredible Hulk have brought comic book superheroes from the page to the screen in a big way. I know that <a href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/2008/05/iron-man-was-ju.html" target="_blank">I was not a big fan</a> of the Iron Man movie, but seeing Tony Stark come in at the end of the Hulk movie did get even me excited by the possibilities. Also seeing the Hulk and Iron Man, I began to see that these movies are not aimed at adolescent boys with stories that I am used to from comic books and TV shows.&nbsp; These are movies aimed at adults with adult storylines.&nbsp; The technology is great, the heroes are played by big stars (I hear Brad Pitt is playing Thor) rather than unknowns and the productions are first class. </p>

<p>Besides the movies already out, Thor, Captain America, and Namor, the submariner are all headed for the big screen. Once each of these and more have their movie debuts, the subsequent combinations and sequels are almost infinite.&nbsp; This could be the biggest movie franchise of all time and make the original comic book owners more money then they ever dreamed of!&nbsp; In the meantime, I am excited to see many of my boyhood heroes get this new big screen treatment!&nbsp; </p>

<p><a href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/hulk.jpg"><img height="106" alt="hulk" src="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/hulk_thumb.jpg" width="283" /></a></p></div>

<p><a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=n2Nb1K"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=n2Nb1K" border="0"></img></a></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=cKDMLI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=cKDMLI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=PqFLNI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=PqFLNI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=lPznlI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=lPznlI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=s6AlgI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=s6AlgI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=tjrD6i"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=tjrD6i" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=mliYKi"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=mliYKi" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~4/317107512" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 21 Jun 2008 13:31:58 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/batman movies">batman movies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/batman">batman</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/movies">movies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/movie">movie</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/movie debuts">movie debuts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/movies aimed">movies aimed</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/aimed">aimed</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hulk movie">hulk movie</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/superman movies">superman movies</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~3/317107512/the-new-golden.html">The new golden age of comics</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Framing Computers Under the DMCA]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/02d661a8c41d1249899afed1677135a6</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/02d661a8c41d1249899afed1677135a6</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Researchers from the University of Washington have demonstrated how lousy the MPAA/RIAA/etc tactics are by successfuly framing printers on their network. These printers, who can't download anything,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Researchers from the University of Washington have demonstrated how lousy the MPAA/RIAA/etc tactics are by successfuly framing printers on their network. These printers, who can't download anything, <a href="http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/05/the-inexact-science-behind-dmca-takedown-notices/">received over 400 takedown notices</a>:</p>

<blockquote>The researchers rigged the software agents to implicate three laserjet printers, which were then accused in takedown letters by the M.P.A.A. of downloading copies of “Iron Man” and the latest Indiana Jones film.</blockquote>

<p>Research, including the paper, <a href="http://dmca.cs.washington.edu/">here</a>.</p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=C1NDEI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=C1NDEI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=WrrzWI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=WrrzWI" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 09 Jun 2008 02:47:47 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/laserjet printers">laserjet printers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/printers">printers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/indiana jones film">indiana jones film</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/takedown letters">takedown letters</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/researchers">researchers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/takedown notices">takedown notices</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mpaariaaetc tactics">mpaariaaetc tactics</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software agents">software agents</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network">network</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/06/framing_compute.html">Framing Computers Under the DMCA</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Framing Computers Under the DMCA]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/46848f090006761935a79ff1dfae79c3</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/46848f090006761935a79ff1dfae79c3</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Researchers from the University of Washington have demonstrated how lousy the MPAA/RIAA/etc. tactics are by successfuly framing printers on their network. These printers, which can't download...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Researchers from the University of Washington have demonstrated how lousy the MPAA/RIAA/etc. tactics are by successfuly framing printers on their network. These printers, which can't download anything, <a href="http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/05/the-inexact-science-behind-dmca-takedown-notices/">received over 400 takedown notices</a>:</p>

<blockquote>The researchers rigged the software agents to implicate three laserjet printers, which were then accused in takedown letters by the M.P.A.A. of downloading copies of “Iron Man” and the latest Indiana Jones film.</blockquote>

<p>Research, including the paper, <a href="http://dmca.cs.washington.edu/">here</a>.</p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=rqI7xI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=rqI7xI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=GprRfI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=GprRfI" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 09 Jun 2008 02:47:47 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/laserjet printers">laserjet printers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/printers">printers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/indiana jones film">indiana jones film</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/takedown letters">takedown letters</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/researchers">researchers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/takedown notices">takedown notices</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software agents">software agents</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network">network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tactics">tactics</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/06/framing_compute_1.html">Framing Computers Under the DMCA</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Webinar Alert: Theyre Letting Us Speak Again!]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/53770e64fd6cf1362b311d314c1de760</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/53770e64fd6cf1362b311d314c1de760</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Our friends at Cisco have asked Jack Jones to be part of their InfoSec Leadership Forum Webinar Series. Hell be talking about FAIR and risk in a two part series and I really think youll enjoy...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Our friends at Cisco have asked Jack Jones to be part of their InfoSec Leadership Forum Webinar Series.  He&#8217;ll be talking about FAIR and risk in a two part series and I really think you&#8217;ll enjoy watching.</p>
<p>The good news is that you&#8217;ll even get a free copy of <em><strong>The Zero Day Threat</strong></em> from Iron Port just for signing up.  The bad news is, they opened registration yesterday afternoon and it&#8217;s already half full.  Here&#8217;s the link, get on it!:</p>
<p><a href="http://tinyurl.com/5wgh2s"><strong>http://tinyurl.com/5wgh2s</strong></a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 29 May 2008 09:30:39 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/registration yesterday afternoon">registration yesterday afternoon</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bad news">bad news</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/news">news</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/iron port">iron port</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/day threat">day threat</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/free copy">free copy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/jack jones">jack jones</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/half">half</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fair">fair</category>
      <source url="http://riskmanagementinsight.com/riskanalysis/?p=361">Webinar Alert: Theyre Letting Us Speak Again!</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The best way to get customer service? Blog or Twit them]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d37d7096488b80fac5676e7d97c43601</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d37d7096488b80fac5676e7d97c43601</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I was reading an article in the Orlando Sentinel newspaper this morning (I know who reads newspapers anymore), about how so many companies are tracking unhappy customers by monitoring blogs and even...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I was reading an <a href="http://www.orlandosentinel.com/orl-horowitz2408may24,0,4901151.column">article in the Orlando Sentinel newspaper</a> this morning (I know who reads newspapers anymore), about how so many companies are tracking unhappy customers by monitoring blogs and even twitter messages. It reminded me of a <a href="http://rationalsecurity.typepad.com/blog/2008/04/off-topic-south.html">story that Chris Hoff</a> had a while back about Southwest Airlines monitoring his Twitter message <br><br>The story in the Sentinel had two opposite corporate views on this. One was Comcast who quickly turned a negative blog post and experience into a positive one by reaching out to the customer and fixing their problem. The customer than ran an updated blog post to commend Comcast. Much the same way Hoff did in his post on Southwest. The polar opposite of this was Spirit Airlines, whose spokesperson according to the article said, "she wasn't concerned and that Spirit doesn't let blog posts affect its policies and procedures." Well a year later that article is still the number 3 search result on Google if you pull up Spirit Airlines. It has over a 1000 comments with many people saying they didn't fly Spirit as a result. I wonder if Spirit Airlines still feels the same way about not listening to blogs?<br><br>The article mentions a few other companies that monitor blogs and twitter and message boards. It also mentions a web site called <a href="http://www.getsatisfaction.com/">getsatisfaction.com</a> where over 3000 companies monitor to help consumers iron out customer service issues.<br><br>They always said the pen was mightier than the sword. In todays world maybe the keyboard is too.</p>
<p><a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=5rfdlw"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=5rfdlw" border="0"></img></a></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=0IGncH"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=0IGncH" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=x6Y8IH"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=x6Y8IH" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=7456SH"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=7456SH" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=uZInIH"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=uZInIH" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=D5oAsh"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=D5oAsh" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=40Q85h"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=40Q85h" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~4/297188965" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 24 May 2008 03:44:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/negative blog post">negative blog post</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blog post">blog post</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/customer">customer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spirit airlines">spirit airlines</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/airlines">airlines</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spirit">spirit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/post">post</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/article">article</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/article mentions">article mentions</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~3/297188965/the-best-way-to.html">The best way to get customer service? Blog or Twit them</source>
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