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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: lacey]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/lacey</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Thu, 03 Jan 2008 21:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Fort Lewis soldiers exposed by laptop theft]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/fd0ce367aedf3e489eb5d0a155241be5</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/fd0ce367aedf3e489eb5d0a155241be5</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
7/9/08 (UPDATED 7/11/08 - Laptop with information about soldier found; Lacey teen arrested

Organization
United States Army
...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/usarmy.jpg" width="88" align="right" height="119"><font size="2"><b>Date Reported: </b><br>7/9/08 (UPDATED 7/11/08 - </font><a href="http://www.theolympian.com/377/story/504243.html">Laptop with information about soldier found; Lacey teen arrested</a>)<br><font size="2"><br><b>Organization: </b><br><a href="http://www.army.mil/">United States Army</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br><a href="http://www.lewis.army.mil/index.asp">Fort Lewis</a>*<br><font size="1"><br>*The principal Fort Lewis maneuver units are the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and the 3d Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division. It is also home to the 593d Corps Support Group, the 555th Engineer Group, the 1st MP Brigade (Provisional), the I Corps NCO Academy, Headquarters, Fourth ROTC Region, the 1st Personnel Support Group, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), 2d Battalion (Ranger), 75th Infantry, and Headquarters, 5th Army (West).&nbsp; Fort Lewis has more than 25,000 soldiers and civilian workers, source: <a href="http://www.lewis.army.mil/about-ft-lewis.asp">About Fort Lewis</a> </font><br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>Soldiers<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>~800 - 900<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>"personal information"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"A laptop computer that was reported stolen from an Army employee’s truck last week contained personal information on about 800 to 900 Fort Lewis soldiers, said military and Lacey police officials."<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://www.king5.com/localnews/stories/NW_070808WAB_soldiers_ID_theft_KC.3e0bcdc6.html">KING Channel 5 News</a> <br><a href="http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/story/409911.html">Tacoma News</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>Elisa Hahn, KING Channel 5 News<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online sources cited above:<br><br>A laptop computer that was reported stolen from an Army employee’s truck last week contained personal information on about 800 to 900 Fort Lewis soldiers, said military and Lacey police officials.<br><br>In this case, an Army employee told Lacey police he left the laptop and a 500-gigabyte removable hard drive on the seat of his Dodge truck, parked unlocked in front of his house overnight July 3<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Storing personal information on removable devices such as laptops, external hard drives and flash drives without encryption, strike one.&nbsp; Moving the mobile device outside of a controlled area is strike two.&nbsp; Leaving the mobile device overnight in an unlocked vehicle in plain sight of passers-by is an emphatic strike three.</span><br><br>He reported them stolen about 10 a.m. on July 4.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] A soldier's personal information stolen on the day our country celebrates our independence is insulting.</span><br><br>A post spokeswoman said officials were notifying the involved soldiers out of concern that the case might put them at risk for identity theft.<br><br>the Army began no later than Wednesday notifying the affected soldiers through e-mail and phone calls. They’ll get follow-up letters.<br><br>Officials said the employee, a civilian military personnel specialist, appears to have violated Army standards and policies for protecting personal information and government property.<br><br>Army laptops and removable storage devices containing personal information are generally restricted to on-post workplaces but can be signed out with a supervisor’s permission.<br><br>They’re also supposed to be password-protected and personal information is supposed to be encrypted<br><br>The Army is assisting Lacey police with the theft investigation and conducting its own review, said Catherine Caruso, a Fort Lewis spokeswoman.<br><br>"We’re not releasing anything more about what information was inappropriately compromised or about the soldiers whose information was involved," Caruso said.<br><br>"Clearly it was personal information regarding 800 to 900 soldiers from Fort Lewis. Beyond that, we’d rather not specify."<br><br>there was no classified, secret or top-secret information on the laptop and the hard drive.<br><br>Caruso said the employee was working on a project regarding a particular unit at a location other than his office.<br><br>She said "it would be inappropriate to speculate" about what potential disciplinary action the worker might face if he is found to have broken security rules.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] It is probably inappropriate to speculate, but you know we will anyway.&nbsp; My guess is that there is another person looking for a job in the Olympia, Washington area.</span><br><br>Since the theft, post officials have set new training requirements for military personnel staff and prepared a memo for each employee to sign outlining the safeguarding and reporting requirements<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>When someone's poor judgment creates unnecessary risk to military personnel it carries a little more weight for me.&nbsp; These men and women give everything to protect us.&nbsp; Without them I wouldn't be able to write this, and without them you wouldn't be able to read it. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>United States Army:<br>June, 2008 - <a href="http://breachblog.com/2008/06/03/walterreed.aspx">Walter Reed Army Medical Center breach through P2P</a> <br>April, 2008 - <a href="http://breachblog.com/2008/04/13/usaasc.aspx%20">Excel Spreadsheet on the web exposes Army officers and civilians</a> <br><br></font><br>
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      <pubDate>Fri, 11 Jul 2008 09:44:02 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fort lewis soldiers">fort lewis soldiers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/soldiers">soldiers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fort lewis">fort lewis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lacey police officials">lacey police officials</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/officials">officials</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/army">army</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/army standards">army standards</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/07/11/usarmy.aspx">Fort Lewis soldiers exposed by laptop theft</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[We can't write secure code]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/79c47a2e1084bd1deba73b2fa9ab33e1</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/79c47a2e1084bd1deba73b2fa9ab33e1</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[David Lacey makes the important point that writing secure software is &quot;not just about cutting secure code or developing better testing tools. We need to get things right much earlier in the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
      <a href="http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/david_lacey">David Lacey</a> makes the important point that writing secure software is "not just about cutting secure code or developing better testing tools. We need to get things right much earlier in the development process." It's a subject I've been harping on about for some time, with many references to excellent resources such as <a href="http://www.owasp.org">OWASP</a>, and great leaders on the subject such as <a href="http://securitybuddha.com">Mark Curphey</a>.

Over the last few years I've heard many solutions proposed to fix the problem of insecure software, ranging from sacking the developers to improving the  software development lifecycle so that security requirements are stated from outset and followed through into production and beyond. The evidence is that none of it works. OK, the folk at <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/twc/security/default.mspx">Microsoft</a>, for example, will say that security is now embedded in their culture, and they've certainly generated a nice new stream of revenue for themselves out of all the books, tools and journals on the subject. But they are still releasing security patches with a frequency and schedule that the I wish the rail company I use each day could achieve with their trains. And other vendors are coming up with clangers at an alarming rate. For example, this <a href="http://secunia.com/advisories/29843/">latest one</a> from leading CMS vendor RedDot. An SQL Injection vulnerability in an enterprise level CMS system - what were they playing at with their quality control?!

So, here's the thing. We can't write secure code. It's true. Can you show me any decent commercial, consumer focused product (that people actually want to use - not just techies who haven't seen daylight in 12 years and live on a diet of digestive biscuits) that is secure from the off as soon as it's exposed to the Internet and where 12 months later it hasn't required a patch of some sort? Systems are simply too complicated with too many lines of code for anyone to expect that they can be released without containing bugs and security holes. That doesn't mean that we shouldn't try, it just means that we should take a different approach. That approach, in my opinion, is to take a leaf out of the new edition of the <a href="https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/">PCI standards </a>and stick a ruddy great application firewall in front of everything. That doesn't make the code secure, it's a sticking plaster over a wound. But  - to continue the analogy - a plaster stops the bleeding, prevents germs getting in, and while it's not a cure, it's good enough.

I'm not knocking OWASP et al. It's the first resource I recommend developers go to and will remain so. Just that the business expects more functionality, cheaper costs, more complexity, better performance, and a more rapid deployment for its products. Chucking in security with all that lot is like rubbing your belly and patting your head at the same time, while riding a motorbike. So, let's make it easy on ourselves. Application firewalls! 
      
   ]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 16 May 2008 03:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/code">code</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/secure">secure</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/code secure">code secure</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/secure code">secure code</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/secure software">secure software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security holes">security holes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security requirements">security requirements</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security patches">security patches</category>
      <source url="http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/stuart_king/2008/05/david-lacey-makes-the-importan.html">We can't write secure code</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Infosec Europe]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/46b5afc201cb0fae76eec90375b8d310</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/46b5afc201cb0fae76eec90375b8d310</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Only a week to go until this years Infosec Europe at Olympia. The program this year looks, in my opinion, to be the best yet including input from some well known industry names such as Bruce Schneier,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
      Only a week to go until this years <a href="http://www.infosec.co.uk/">Infosec Europe</a> at Olympia. The program this year looks, in my opinion, to be the best yet including input from some well known industry names such as Bruce Schneier, Alan Paller, as well as my fellow bloggers David Lacey ("Locking Down Social Networking Vulnerabilities" on the 22nd) and Philip Virgo ("Why Do We Need an E-Crime Unit?" on the 23rd). 

I'll be participating in the "The Mock trial of A.N.Corporate" on the 24th in the Interactive Theatre, where, according to the blurb "The excitement of a real courtroom is brought to Olympia, when a mock trial is conducted where various members of a corporation (It Manager, CISO, CIO and CEO) are put in the dock, and questioned by the defence and prosecution." It should be fun!

There are some exciting <a href="http://www.infosec.co.uk/page.cfm/Action=ShowCategory/CatPageID=7">new exhibitors </a>on the list for this year including <a href="http://www.behaviosec.se/">Behaviosec </a>whose product "Behavio identifies unauthorized users within seconds by detecting anomalies in keyboard and mouse behavior."

I'm looking forward to seeing you there. 

      
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      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Apr 2008 03:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/infosec europe">infosec europe</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mock trial">mock trial</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bruce schneier">bruce schneier</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/industry names">industry names</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/real courtroom">real courtroom</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/interactive theatre">interactive theatre</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/e-crime unit">e-crime unit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/behavio identifies">behavio identifies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/olympia">olympia</category>
      <source url="http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/stuart_king/2008/04/infosec-europe.html">Infosec Europe</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[Network IPS Systems - still worth buying?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/cda0828ab342bef8b0fad504fd1e044c</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/cda0828ab342bef8b0fad504fd1e044c</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I was involved in an interesting debate a couple of nights ago about the relative merits or otherwise of IPS. It's a subject I've talked about a couple of times before on this blog ( for instance here...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
      I was involved in an interesting debate a couple of nights ago about the relative merits or otherwise of IPS. It's a subject I've talked about a couple of times before on this blog ( for instance <a href="http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/stuart_king/2007/10/roi-of-ips.html">here </a>talking about the ROI of an IPS device and <a href="http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/stuart_king/2007/10/to-buy-or-not-to-buy-what-is-t.html">here </a>where the decision about whether or not to purchase an IPS device is debated) . The general concensus around the table was that IPS is prone to false positives, difficult to monitor, and adds too much latency to network traffic. 

The question of latency can certainly be a problem for an organisation reliant on transaction speed - take share trading for instance. Within my own industry a few false positives and the odd extra millisecond on a transaction will not make a whole lot of difference however, I'm beginning to lean towards the view that network IPS might have had its day.

David Lacey's <a href="http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/david_lacey/">blog </a>today makes the point that "nine out of ten security managers still prefer to monitor rather than block." That's a fine strategy if you have the organic resource (i.e. a person) to do the monitoring. In some businesses I've visited over the years, the monitoring habit had worn off and IDS logs were only being reviewed at fixed times. That's hardly the way to get benefit out of the investment. One of the supposed benefits of IPS is it's alleged pro-activeness in blocking attacks. I've heard this called into question in some instances.

So, what is the best way forward? Innovative products such as the <a href="www.secerno.com">Secerno </a>solution mentioned by David seem like a good idea. More generally, as we de-perimeterise, we need solutions closer to where the important assets are and more tailored to protect them. Host-based IPS systems that reliably block attacks are a good approach. Web application firewalls another.

There is a certain comfort level that's difficult to shake off in having the network IPS - so, it'll still be around for a while mitigating a bit of the risk, but I'm becoming less certain about exactly how much.
      
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      <pubDate>Wed, 19 Mar 2008 03:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ips">ips</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ips systems">ips systems</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network ips">network ips</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ips device">ips device</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/reliably block attacks">reliably block attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/block">block</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attacks">attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/false positives">false positives</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/transaction speed">transaction speed</category>
      <source url="http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/stuart_king/2008/03/i-was-involved-in-an.html">Network IPS Systems - still worth buying?</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[Links for 2008-01-03 [del.icio.us]]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/c536f55c7e134d18b2a78ccd27df76ba</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/c536f55c7e134d18b2a78ccd27df76ba</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Report Card: 2007 Incite #1 - Get with the Program | Security Incite: Analysis on Information Security
SANS Technology Institute: Stephen Northcutt's favorite Security Predictions for 2008
Financial...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<ul>
<li><a href="http://securityincite.com/blog/mike-rothman/report-card-2007-incite-1-get-with-the-program">Report Card: 2007 Incite #1 - Get with the Program | Security Incite: Analysis on Information Security</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.sans.edu/resources/musings/2008_predictions.php">SANS Technology Institute: Stephen Northcutt's favorite Security Predictions for 2008</a></li>
<li><a href="https://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/000989.html">Financial Cryptography: 2008 -- The Year of the Raven!</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/david_lacey/2007/12/security-forecasts-for-2008-1.html">Security Forecasts for 2008 (David Lacey's IT Security Blog)</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.andrewhay.ca/archives/219">www.andrewhay.ca &raquo; Andrew Hay&rsquo;s Predictions for 2008</a></li>
<li><a href="http://searchcio-midmarket.techtarget.com/tip/0,289483,sid183_gci1287637,00.html">Security's crystal ball for 2008</a></li>
</ul><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~4/210936976" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 03 Jan 2008 21:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
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      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/210936976/anton18">Links for 2008-01-03 [del.icio.us]</source>
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