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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: layout]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/layout</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Mon, 26 May 2008 01:12:53 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Fake Windows XP Activation Trojan Wants Your CVV2 Code]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/fac8ba92dd4114941015e75bba3149c4</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/fac8ba92dd4114941015e75bba3149c4</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[In a self-contradicting social engineering attempt, a malware author is offering to sale a ( updated version of Kardphisher) DIY fake Windows XP activation builder, which despite the fact that it...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SOqbO7J3tvI/AAAAAAAACPg/YNDy4vo817c/s1600-h/fake_windows_xp_activation1.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SOqbO7J3tvI/AAAAAAAACPg/BYpcW4rkU0o/s200-R/fake_windows_xp_activation1.png" /></a>In a self-contradicting social engineering attempt, a malware author is offering to sale a (<a href="http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-042705-0108-99">updated version</a> of Kardphisher) DIY fake Windows XP activation builder, which despite the fact that it claims "<i>We will ask for your billing details, but your credit card will NOT be charged</i>", is requesting and remotely uploading all the credit card details required for a successfully credit card theft.<br />
<br />
Perhaps among the main reasons why such simplistic social engineering attempts never scaled in a "malicious economies of scale" approach, is because sophisticated crimeware kits capable of obtaining the very same data automatically, started leaking for everyone to start taking advantage of - including yesterday's cybercriminals using such DIY fake message builders. <br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div>Moreover, according to <a href="http://news.ncsu.edu/news/2008/09/wmswogalterfakemessage.php">recently reseased survey results</a>, end users cannot distinguish between fake popups and real ones, and on their way to continue doing what they were doing, click OK on that pesky warning message telling them that they're about to get infected with malware. Taking into consideration the fact that the popup windows the researchers used look like cheap creative compared to the average fake security software's layout high quality GUIs, it is perhaps worth restating your research questions with something in the lines of - <b>What motivates end users to install an antivirus application going under the name of Super Antivirus 2009 or Mega Virus Cleaner 2008?</b> The fact that the fake status bar is telling them that they're infected with 47 spyware cookies, or the fact that they ended up at the fake site while browsing their trusted web services? <br />
<br />
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SOqf_xbxL7I/AAAAAAAACPo/6uvXj2AuS_A/s1600-h/fake_windows_xp_activation2.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SOqf_xbxL7I/AAAAAAAACPo/fa1jUBjFGOU/s200-R/fake_windows_xp_activation2.png" /></a>The increase of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/09/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_30.html">rogue security software domains</a> is happening due to the high payout affiliation based model, the standardized creative allowing the participants to come up with their own fake names if they want to, and due to the fact that the fake security threats scareware approach seems to be perfectly taking advantage of the overall suspicion on the effectiveness of their legitimate security software.<div class="feedflare">
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      <pubDate>Mon, 06 Oct 2008 15:01:01 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card details">credit card details</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card">credit card</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card theft">credit card theft</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/details">details</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware author">malware author</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/social">social</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mega virus cleaner">mega virus cleaner</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/creative">creative</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/413264124/fake-windows-xp-activation-trojan-wants.html">Fake Windows XP Activation Trojan Wants Your CVV2 Code</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Modified Zeus Crimeware Kit Comes With Built-in MP3 Player]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/b4e5929a51488e98a9fe58b74de94b94</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/b4e5929a51488e98a9fe58b74de94b94</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Modified versions of popular open source crimeware kits rarely make the headlines due to the fact that anyone can hijack a crimeware kit's brand, build and innovate using its foundations , and claim...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SOFSuEL8pNI/AAAAAAAACMg/GaTGj9uQ9hA/s1600-h/zeus_modified_mp3_player.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="160" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SOFSuEL8pNI/AAAAAAAACMg/vkspv62-OAY/s200-R/zeus_modified_mp3_player.jpg" width="200" /></a>Modified versions of popular <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/zeus-crimeware-kit-vulnerable-to.html">open source crimeware kits</a> rarely make the headlines due to the fact that anyone can hijack a crimeware kit's brand, build and <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/custom-ddos-capabilities-within-malware.html">innovate using its foundations</a>, and claim it's a new version <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/custom-ddos-attacks-within-popular.html">released by the original authors</a>. That's of course in between the tiny time frame until he's exposed as the fake author of Zeus that may have in fact came up with a unique feature that the original authors didn't include.<br />
<br />
This <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/crimeware-in-middle-zeus.html">modified version of Zeus</a> is yet another example of how <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/localizing-open-source-malware.html">cybercriminals are actively modifying crimeware kits</a>, literally making such practices as keeping version numbers irrelevant. While the administrator is managing his botnet, he can load local, or tunein the built-in online radio stations the author of this modification included, next to changing Zeus entire graphical layout.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SOFXXUuuCcI/AAAAAAAACMo/amKui3kRUEU/s1600-h/pinchy_2008_modified_opensource.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SOFXXUuuCcI/AAAAAAAACMo/6el-_eHnyQs/s200-R/pinchy_2008_modified_opensource.jpg" /></a>Let's take into consideration another example, the infamous Pinch DIY malware builder, that's been around for over 4 years. With <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/russias-fsb-vs-cybercrime.html">the populist arrest of its authors in 2007</a>, cybercriminals are still innovating on the foundations offered by Pinch, and <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/pinch-vulnerable-to-remotely.html">thanks to its publicly obtainable source code</a>. It's also worth pointing out that these two Zeus and Pinch modifications are courtesy of a single individual, that in between modifications of popular crimeware kits, seems to be busy porting different modules on different malware kits and web based malware, knowingly or unknowingly contributing to the convergence of spamming, DDoS, web based malware, and botnet management kits.<br />
<br />
From a sarcastic perspective - what's next? Perhaps a built-in slideshow of random screenshots taken from malware infected desktops in the botnet, or even a pink layout modification for female botnet masters. Customerization, and <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">customer tailored services can make anything happen</a>, and naturally enjoy the higher profit margins.<div class="feedflare">
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</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/406690696" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2008 13:55:03 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web based malware">web based malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/botnet">botnet</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/female botnet masters">female botnet masters</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/popular crimeware kits">popular crimeware kits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/zeus">zeus</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/crimeware kits">crimeware kits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/authors">authors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/original authors">original authors</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/406690696/modified-zeus-crimeware-kit-comes-with.html">Modified Zeus Crimeware Kit Comes With Built-in MP3 Player</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Two Copycat Web Malware Exploitation Kits in the Wild]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/59660edd6ee56561c03dbddbfcbaac92</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/59660edd6ee56561c03dbddbfcbaac92</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[We're slowly entering into &quot;can you find the ten similarities&quot; stage in respect to web malware exploitation kits, and their coders continuous supply of copycat malware kits under different names,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SNqBEcPBZZI/AAAAAAAACLA/AJVrNj6P8JE/s1600-h/zopa01.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SNqBEcPBZZI/AAAAAAAACLA/of0mCvvFn4o/s200-R/zopa01.JPG" /></a>We're slowly entering into "can you find the ten similarities" stage in respect to web malware exploitation kits, and their coders continuous supply of copycat malware kits under different names, taking advantage of different exploits combination. <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/09/copycat-web-malware-exploitation-kits.html">Copycat web malware exploitation kits are faddish</a>, however, from a strategic perspective, releasing exploits kits like this one <a href="http://www.trustedsource.org/blog/153/Rise-Of-The-PDF-Exploits">covered by Trustedsource</a>, consisting entirely of PDF exploits, can greatly increase the exploitability level of Adobe vulnerabilities in general.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SNqC_oeGqgI/AAAAAAAACLI/tCvdE7XRFt4/s1600-h/zopa02.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SNqC_oeGqgI/AAAAAAAACLI/iSGUOgS9ZUg/s200-R/zopa02.JPG" /></a>A similar web malware exploitation kit, once again using only Adobe related exploits is Zopa. Have you seen this layout before? That's the very same layout <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/mpack-and-icepack-localized-to-chinese.html">MPack</a> and <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/07/icepack-malware-kit-in-action.html">IcePack</a> were using, were in the sense of cybercriminals preferring to use much mode modular alternatives these days. Ironically, Zopa is more expensive than MPack and IcePack, with the coder trying to cash-in on its biased exclusiveness and introduction stage buzz generated around it.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SNqFtIcwL7I/AAAAAAAACLQ/ZTdoCdSNYbA/s1600-h/stats_copycat_kit.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="200" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SNqFtIcwL7I/AAAAAAAACLQ/aGd-dPNq3TY/s200-R/stats_copycat_kit.jpg" width="151" /></a>The second web malware exploitation kit is relying on a mix of exploits targeting patched vulnerabilities affecting IE, Firefox and Opera, with its authors asking for $50 for monthly updates, updates of what yet remains unknown. Both of these kits once again demonstrate the current&nbsp; mentality of the kit's coders having to do with -- thankfully -- zero innovation, fast cash and no long-term value.<br />
<br />
However, modularity, convergence with traffic management kits, vertical integration with cybercrime services and bullet proof hosting providers, advanced metrics, <a href="http://securitylabs.websense.com/content/Blogs/3183.aspx">evasive practices</a>, improved OPSEC (operational security), and dedicated cybercrime campaign optimizing staff, are all in the works.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/web-based-botnet-command-and-control.html">Web  Based Botnet Command and Control Kit 2.0</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diy-botnet-kit-promising-eternal.html">DIY  Botnet Kit Promising Eternal Updates</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/pinch-vulnerable-to-remotely.html">Pinch  Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/zeus-crimeware-kit-vulnerable-to.html">The  Zeus Crimeware Kit Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/small-pack-web-malware-exploitation-kit.html">The  Small Pack Web Malware Exploitation Kit</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/crimeware-in-middle-zeus.html">Crimeware  in the Middle - Zeus</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2006/11/nuclear-grabber-toolkit.html">The  Nuclear Grabber Kit</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/rbns-phishing-activities.html">The  Apophis Kit</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/firepack-exploitation-kit-localized-to.html">The  FirePack Exploitation Kit Localized to Chinese</a><span style="font-weight: bold;"><br />
</span><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/mpack-and-icepack-localized-to-chinese.html">MPack  and IcePack Localized to Chinese</a><br />
<span style="font-weight: bold;"><span style="font-weight: bold;"></span></span><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/icepack-exploitation-kit-localized-to.html">The  Icepack Exploitation Kit Localized to French</a> <br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/firepack-exploitation-kit-part-two.html">The  FirePack Exploitation Kit - Part Two</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/firepack-web-malware-exploitation-kit.html">The  FirePack Web Malware Exploitation Kit</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/05/webattacker-in-action.html">The  WebAttacker in Action</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/08/nuclear-malware-kit.html">Nuclear  Malware Kit</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/01/random-js-malware-exploitation-kit.html">The  Random JS Malware Exploitation Kit</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/metaphisher-malware-kit-spotted-in-wild.html">Metaphisher  Malware Kit Spotted in the Wild</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/04/shots-from-malicious-wild-west-sample_7672.html">The  Black Sun Bot</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/04/shots-from-malicious-wild-west-sample_20.html">The  Cyber Bot</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/google-hacking-for-mpacks-zunkers-and.html">Google  Hacking for MPacks, Zunkers and WebAttackers</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/07/icepack-malware-kit-in-action.html">The  IcePack Malware Kit in Action</a><b> <br />
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      <pubDate>Wed, 24 Sep 2008 10:28:37 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/diy botnet kit">diy botnet kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kit">kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nuclear malware kit">nuclear malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/icepack exploitation kit">icepack exploitation kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nuclear grabber kit">nuclear grabber kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/apophis kit">apophis kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware exploitation kit">malware exploitation kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kits">kits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/control kit">control kit</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/402081047/two-copycat-web-malware-exploitation.html">Two Copycat Web Malware Exploitation Kits in the Wild</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Modelling Shoplifting]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/3943f3c70f24e801812a87cf0b0b61f8</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/3943f3c70f24e801812a87cf0b0b61f8</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The other day I was thinking that I should write about specific situation models and by coincident Marc Adler pens CEP and Shoplifting . In Marcs post, Marc begins to model shoplifting as if...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The other day I was thinking that I should write about specific situation models and by coincident Marc Adler pens <a href="http://magmasystems.blogspot.com/2008/09/cep-and-shoplifting.html" target="_blank">CEP and Shoplifting</a>.  In Marc&#8217;s post, Marc begins to model shoplifting as if shoplifting is &#8220;market data,&#8221; with Level 1 to Level 4 shoplifting &#8220;quotes&#8221; - the natural approach for a brilliant guy from Citi.   In reality, this model does not work very well, and I&#8217;ll touch on a few reasons why today.</p>
<p>Marc&#8217;s initial shoplifting model in his post is based on John <span id="SPELLING_ERROR_3" class="blsp-spelling-error">Colapinto&#8217;s concepts of matching a pattern of customer movements in the store with their estimated patterns of shoplifting behavioral patterns.    Marc&#8217;s asks how Coral8 might address this.   We are not ready to seek a vendor solution.  We do not yet have a workable detection model.</span></p>
<p><span class="blsp-spelling-error">As indicated above, I don&#8217;t think the example situation cited by John and Marc is a viable model for automated processing.    Tracking the behavior of customer&#8217;s movements, by machine, would require some very sophisticated image processing technology that would be too expensive compared to any possible loss at most retails stores.    This type of behavioral pattern recognition. in retail stores, is performed by people (security personnel), not machines, observing people.  </span></p>
<p><span class="blsp-spelling-error">To develop a machine pattern recognition application to detect retail shoplifting we need to build detection models that are economically feasible.  If we are going to use a model of shoplifting pattern recognition versus anomaly detection, we need to define the objects we must track.   </span></p>
<p><span class="blsp-spelling-error">In the most simple model, we have merchandise-objects.   Stores normally (physically) track merchandise-objects only at the exit/entry points of the store using some electromagnetic proximity detection technology.   In this model, the detection configuration is a combination of simple alerting with humans watching the store (&#8221;minding the store&#8221;).    This is not complex event processing.</span></p>
<p><span class="blsp-spelling-error">However, if we added another object to our model, the customer-object, then we start to get more &#8220;complex,&#8221; but we have not defined &#8220;complexity&#8221; yet because we have not defined the object properties, the possible states of the objects, and the relationships between the objects that are the basis for estimated situations.</span></p>
<p><span class="blsp-spelling-error">Hence, model building is constrained by available resources, simple economics and risk (cost-benefit).  If we are detecting shoplifting in Walmart the cost-benefit model for implementing an automated shoplifting detection system would be different than at a top diamond store on 5th Avenue in NYC.   Protecting loss at a weapons-grade uranium respository follows a different model than protecting loss at a handicraft shop, naturally.</span></p>
<p><span class="blsp-spelling-error">Like Marc, I find models to automatically detect shoplifting interesting, so permit me to close with a general discussion of shoplifting in the context of our <a href="http://www.thecepblog.com/what-is-complex-event-processing/" target="_blank">CEP/EP reference model</a>.</span></p>
<p><span class="blsp-spelling-error"><span class="blsp-spelling-error">One approach would be do determine what objects will be represented in our model.   For example, if we are going to track merchandise, we need to model the &#8221;merchandise-object&#8221;.  If we are going to track people, we need to define the properties of this &#8220;person object.&#8221;  If we are going to represent the store layout, we need to define all these objects (store-object, table-object, shelf-object, entry-object and so forth).  The model can get &#8220;complex&#8221; quite quickly.  </span></span></p>
<blockquote><p><span class="blsp-spelling-error"><span class="blsp-spelling-error">Editorial Note:  <em>An object-oriented approach greatly assists complex model building because we can benefit from OO properties such as encapsulation and polymorphism.  For example, we can define a basic &#8220;person object class&#8221; and then create superclasses of this object for &#8220;customer-object&#8221;, &#8220;manager-object&#8221;, &#8220;or criminal-object.&#8221;</em></span></span></p></blockquote>
<p><span class="blsp-spelling-error"><span class="blsp-spelling-error">Generally speaking, each object we define will require a state-model, for example, in Marc&#8217;s example of a customer moving around the store, we would need to model the possible states (customer at the entrance, at table 1, at table 2, at shelf 1, in the bathroom, at the cashier, etc.)  Indeed Marc, this is complex event processing if we have modelled multiple objects and defined object-object relationships that indicate situations of interest.   For example, customer-object at table2 where merchandise-object has the property of  &#8221;very expensive, high risk&#8221; and then customer-object changes state to &#8220;in bathroom&#8221;.  Of course, we need more key indicators, but you get the idea.</span></span></p>
<p><span class="blsp-spelling-error"><span class="blsp-spelling-error">Right now, I am typing from the <a href="http://www.taste4heaven.com">Taste from Heaven Vegetarian Restaurant</a> in Chiang Mai and my battery is running low.  The owner of this excellent restaurant also runs the <a href="http://www.elephantnaturefoundation.org/" target="_blank">Elephant Nature Park</a>, a non-profit organization advocating and acting on behalf of the rights of the mighty elephants in Thailand.  Would be great if we could also automatically detect the situation of &#8220;elephant abuse&#8221; by poachers and other crimes against nature.   Time to get back to my delicious mushroom salad, Northeastern Thai style.</span></span></p>
<p><span class="blsp-spelling-error"><span class="blsp-spelling-error">As always, thanks for reading, time for me to get back to eating!</span></span></p>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 07 Sep 2008 03:30:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/store">store</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/store-object">store-object</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/complex">complex</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/model canget complex">model canget complex</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/model">model</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/simple">simple</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/simple economics">simple economics</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/simple model">simple model</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/object">object</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/09/07/modelling-shoplifting/">Modelling Shoplifting</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Bypassing Microsoft Vista's Memory Protection]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/217d89845b1fa03c96297819ebb76520</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/217d89845b1fa03c96297819ebb76520</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[This is huge: Two security researchers have developed a new technique that essentially bypasses all of the memory protection safeguards in the Windows Vista operating system, an advance that many in...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid14_gci1324395,00.html">This</a> is huge:</p>

<blockquote>Two security researchers have developed a new technique that essentially bypasses all of the memory protection safeguards in the Windows Vista operating system, an advance that many in the security community say will have far-reaching implications not only for Microsoft, but also on how the entire technology industry thinks about attacks.

<p>In a presentation at the Black Hat briefings, Mark Dowd of IBM Internet Security Systems (ISS) and Alexander Sotirov, of VMware Inc. will discuss the new methods they've found to get around Vista protections such as Address Space Layout Randomization(ASLR), Data Execution Prevention (DEP) and others by using Java, ActiveX controls and .NET objects to load arbitrary content into Web browsers.</p>

<p>By taking advantage of the way that browsers, specifically Internet Explorer, handle active scripting and .NET objects, the pair have been able to load essentially whatever content they want into a location of their choice on a user's machine.</blockquote></p>

<p>Paper <a href="http://taossa.com/archive/bh08sotirovdowd.pdf">here</a>.</p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=FyAOXK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=FyAOXK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=IdCKPK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=IdCKPK" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 11 Aug 2008 12:26:11 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/load">load</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/load arbitrary content">load arbitrary content</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/content">content</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/net objects">net objects</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/black hat briefings">black hat briefings</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/browsers">browsers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/memory protection safeguards">memory protection safeguards</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data execution prevention">data execution prevention</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/entire technology industry">entire technology industry</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/08/bypassing_micro.html">Bypassing Microsoft Vista's Memory Protection</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Controlling column width in a GridView]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ae0aa0fbe27711f6caa8fb16924a9208</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ae0aa0fbe27711f6caa8fb16924a9208</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I've been building some internal pages for our sales team here at Pluralsight , and many of those pages make use of the ASP.NET GridView control to display rectangular data. It's generally a really...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#39;ve been building some internal pages for our sales team here at <a href="http://www.pluralsight.com/main/" target="_blank">Pluralsight</a>, and many of those pages make use of the ASP.NET GridView control to display rectangular data. It&#39;s generally a really easy to use control, but I&#39;ve always struggled with getting column widths to look right.</p>  <p>My goal is to fix the width of each column at design time, and any field that contains text that may be longer than my fixed width should wrap around, taking up more vertical space in the table. If you are trying to accomplish this goal, you might find these tips helpful.</p>  <blockquote>   <p>1) Set up a CssClass for the GridView itself and include the <a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-CSS2/tables.html#fixed-table-layout" target="_blank">table-layout:fixed</a> style. This tells the browser that you&#39;re going to specify the width of each cell. You may also want to include the overall width of the grid here as I mention in (3).</p>    <p>2) The first row of the table sets the width for each cell, and that&#39;s usually the HEADER row, not the item row, so use either HeaderStyle-CssClass or HeaderStyle-Width to set the width of the cell. I wasted a lot of time trying to set the width using the ItemStyle.</p>    <p>3) Make certain the table itself is wide enough to hold all of the cells. I added up all of my cell widths and used that to set the width via the CssClass attribute on the GridView.</p> </blockquote>  <p>Using these guidelines, I&#39;m having much better luck controlling the layout of my GridView controls. I hope this simple advise helps someone else!</p><div style="clear:both;"></div><img src="http://www.pluralsight.com/community/aggbug.aspx?PostID=52286" width="1" height="1">]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 30 Jul 2008 13:23:27 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/width">width</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/gridview">gridview</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fixed width">fixed width</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/gridview controls">gridview controls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/net gridview control">net gridview control</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/column">column</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/control">control</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/table">table</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/row">row</category>
      <source url="http://www.pluralsight.com/community/blogs/keith/archive/2008/07/30/controlling-column-width-in-a-gridview.aspx">Controlling column width in a GridView</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Follow the Yellow Brick Road]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/887593779bb99c69b570648c6cdcc8d6</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/887593779bb99c69b570648c6cdcc8d6</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Marc Adlerfollows on from Muddy Waters to The First Annual Fluffies for CEP where Marc also calls into question the transparency, credibility and accuracy of the various fluffy awards we see from...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Marc Adler follows on from <a title="Muddy Waters" rel="bookmark" href="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/07/16/muddy-waters/"><span style="color: #105cb6;">Muddy Waters</span></a> to <a href="http://magmasystems.blogspot.com/2008/07/first-annual-fluffies-for-cep.html" target="_blank">The First Annual Fluffies for CEP</a> where Marc also calls into question the transparency, credibility and accuracy of the various fluffy &#8220;awards&#8221; we see from time-to-time.</p>
<p>When I discussed this openly with Waters in <a title="Muddy Waters" rel="bookmark" href="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/07/16/muddy-waters/"><span style="color: #105cb6;">Muddy Waters</span></a> comments they kindly replied that &#8220;customers are loath to be a reference client for a vendor,&#8221;  like this fact somehow justifies having 600 people, most who have never actually used the software in practice, vote on how great it is.  </p>
<blockquote><p><em>Follow the Yellow Brick Road.</em></p></blockquote>
<p>Or, as Mark Adler pointed out in his well written blog post <a href="http://magmasystems.blogspot.com/2008/07/first-annual-fluffies-for-cep.html" target="_blank">The First Annual Fluffies for CEP</a> , a secretive &#8220;panel of renowned judge&#8221; is going to tell us, via Jolt, who has the better solution?  Holy Cow Batman!   Let me buy a nice layout in your magazine  or web site,  please, so &#8220;my software company&#8221; will be on the short list for the &#8220;the awards&#8221;.  </p>
<blockquote><p><em>Follow the Yellow Brick Road.</em></p></blockquote>
<p>All this smoke-and-mirrors. share-the-love, marketing reminds me of The Matrix a bit, where the world as we observe it, is a complete artificial construction, where most people in the Matrix believe they are &#8220;real&#8221; because they do not know that they really just a computer generated program designed to keep humans happy as they sleep in some cold goop with electrodes stuck up their you-know-what, really just bio-batteries insuring the light bill is paid.</p>
<blockquote><p><em>Follow the Yellow Brick Road.</em></p></blockquote>
<p>Or better yet, these fluffies are similar to most of the Webinars we see where there are questions from &#8220;the audience&#8221; but we know that most of these questions did not come from the &#8220;audience&#8221; - yet we all seem to continue &#8221;the  audience&#8221; myth just like Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny! </p>
<blockquote><p><em>Follow the Yellow Brick Road.</em></p></blockquote>
<p>The Easter Bunny, Santa Claus, the Tooth Fairy and the Fluffy Awards are real, if you want them to be real.  Just close your eyes and click your heels three times&#8230;.</p>
<blockquote><p>Follow the Yellow Brick Road. Follow the Yellow Brick Road.<br />
Follow, follow, follow, follow,<br />
Follow the Yellow Brick Road.<br />
Follow the Yellow Brick, Follow the Yellow Brick,<br />
Follow the Yellow Brick Road.</p></blockquote>
<blockquote><p>We&#8217;re off to see the Wizard, The Wonderful Wizard of Oz.<br />
You&#8217;ll find he is a whiz of a Wiz! If ever a Wiz! there was.<br />
If ever oh ever a Wiz! there was The Wizard of Oz is one because,<br />
Because, because, because, because, because.<br />
Because of the wonderful things he does.<br />
We&#8217;re off to see the Wizard. The Wonderful Wizard of Oz</p></blockquote>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 Jul 2008 15:57:20 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/yellow brick">yellow brick</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/yellow brick road">yellow brick road</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/follow">follow</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wonderful wizard">wonderful wizard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wizard">wizard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/awards">awards</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fluffy awards">fluffy awards</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wonderful">wonderful</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/audience">audience</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/07/19/follow-the-yellow-brick-road/">Follow the Yellow Brick Road</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Clever Museum Theft]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6a56823b5152f1872fe26e870cf20b38</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6a56823b5152f1872fe26e870cf20b38</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Some expensive and impressive stuff was stolen from the University of British Columbia's Museum of Anthropology: A dozen pieces of gold jewelry designed by prominent Canadian artist Bill Reid were...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Some <a href="http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/news/story.html?id=fc613f5f-3f35-467f-bf9d-0259586bf634">expensive and impressive</a> stuff was stolen from the University of British Columbia's Museum of Anthropology:</p>

<blockquote>A dozen pieces of gold jewelry designed by prominent Canadian artist Bill Reid were stolen from the museum sometime on May 23, along with three pieces of gold-plated Mexican jewelry. The pieces that were taken are estimated to be worth close to $2 million.</blockquote>

<p>Of course, it's not the museum's fault:</p>

<blockquote>But museum director Anthony Shelton said that elaborate computer program printouts have determined that the museum's security system did not fail during the heist and that the construction of the building's layout did not compromise security.</blockquote>

<p>Um, isn't having stuff get stolen the very definition of security failing?  And does anyone have any idea how "elaborate computer program printouts" can determine that security didn't fail?  What in the world is this guy talking about?</p>

<p>A few days later, we learned that <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british-columbia/story/2008/06/04/bc-ubc-security-ruse.html?ref=rss">security did indeed fail</a>:</p>

<blockquote>Four hours before the break-in on May 23, two or three key surveillance cameras at the Museum of Anthropology mysteriously went off-line.

<p>Around the same time, a caller claiming to be from the alarm company phoned campus security, telling them there was a problem with the system and to ignore any alarms that might go off.</p>

<p>Campus security fell for the ruse and ignored an automated computer alert sent to them, police sources told CBC News.</p>

<p>Meanwhile surveillance cameras that were still operating captured poor pictures of what was going on inside the museum because of a policy to turn the lights off at night.</p>

<p>Then, as the lone guard working overnight in the museum that night left for a smoke break, the thief or thieves broke in, wearing gas masks and spraying bear spray to slow down anyone who might stumble across them.</blockquote></p>

<p>It's a particular kind of security failure, but it's definitely a failure.</p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=YwAwhI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=YwAwhI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=Uvs3aI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=Uvs3aI" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 06 Jun 2008 01:04:38 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/compromise security">compromise security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/museum">museum</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/campus security">campus security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security failure">security failure</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security system">security system</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer program printouts">computer program printouts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/system">system</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/key surveillance cameras">key surveillance cameras</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/06/clever_museum_t.html">Clever Museum Theft</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Trip Report: PH-Neutral]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/16f4b3a55157f829576693064e2b93d2</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/16f4b3a55157f829576693064e2b93d2</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I spent the weekend in Berlin attending a conference called PH-Neutral, run primarily by the Phenoelit crew. This was the first European security conference Ive attended and I found it quite different...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I spent the weekend in Berlin attending a conference called PH-Neutral, run primarily by the <a href="http://www.phenoelit.de/">Phenoelit</a> crew.  This was the first European security conference I&#8217;ve attended and I found it quite different from any North American security gathering I&#8217;ve been to, such as <a href="http://blackhat.com">BlackHat</a>, <a href="http://cansecwest.com/">CanSecWest</a>, <a href="http://www.sourceboston.com/">SOURCE Boston</a>, <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bluehat/default.mspx">BlueHat</a>, or <a href="http://rsaconference.com/">RSA</a>.  Everything was far more casual and laid back, which is something I had heard about European conferences but hadn&#8217;t experienced until now (even EUSecWest is held in a club whereas CanSecWest is in a Marriott).</p>
<p><a href='http://www.veracode.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/2525962901_6c15d2f291_o.jpg'><center><img src="http://www.veracode.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/2525962901_6c15d2f291_o-300x225.jpg" alt="PH-Neutral Bridge" title="2525962901_6c15d2f291_o" width="300" height="225" class="aligncenter size-medium wp-image-103 photoborder" /></center></a></p>
<p>The event was held at <a href="http://www.insel-berlin.net/">Die Insel</a>, on a tiny island a few kilometers outside of Berlin&#8217;s city center, near Treptower Park.  The venue is mostly used for live music so basically it feels like a dark, somewhat dingy club (certainly the bathrooms are reminiscent of a club).  The presentations were on the 3rd floor in a room that probably held about 60 people in close quarters; to handle overflow, a closed-circuit feed was being simulcast on the 4th floor, which was a bit less crowded and, more importantly, opened out onto a rooftop deck which meant better ventilation.  The bottom floor led out to a Biergarten with tables, beach chairs, and a stage which was used for DJing.  The layout was actually pretty efficient for allowing around 200 people to mill about and socialize/network while not having to stray too far from where the talks were presented.</p>
<p><a href='http://www.veracode.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/2525962813_b842faf96d_o.jpg'><center><img src="http://www.veracode.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/2525962813_b842faf96d_o-225x300.jpg" alt="Bridge to Die Insel" title="2525962813_b842faf96d_o" width="225" height="300" class="aligncenter size-medium wp-image-102 photoborder" /></center></a></p>
<p>As far as the event itself, when I said &#8220;laid back&#8221; earlier, don&#8217;t interpret that to mean disorganized or watered down in any way.  It was run with stereotypical German efficiency, from badging to presentations to the after-hours parties.  The presentations were just as technical and relevant as any of the more &#8220;corporate&#8221; conferences.  Unfortunately for me, I don&#8217;t know that many people in European security circles, and most of the ones I do know weren&#8217;t in attendance.  Those I did meet, however, were impressively smart and well-versed.  Nobody was trying to conduct business transactions or slip away for meetings, which is inevitably what happens when only technical folks are present!</p>
<p><a href='http://www.veracode.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/2526783152_fed88680d4_o.jpg'><center><img src="http://www.veracode.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/2526783152_fed88680d4_o-225x300.jpg" alt="PH-Neutral Registration" title="2526783152_fed88680d4_o" width="225" height="300" class="alignnone size-medium wp-image-101 photoborder" /></center></a></p>
<p>For me, a few talks stood out.  Fukami and BeF&#8217;s talk on <a href="https://www.flashsec.org/mediawiki/images/5/57/SWF_and_the_Malware_Tragedy.pdf">SWF and the Malware Tragedy</a> discussed methods for automated static detection of malware in Flash movies.  Much of it centered on heuristics related to inconsistencies in the file format or tag structure, abnormal concentrations of strings in the constant pool, or the existence of various obfuscation techniques.  Ultimately, there are false positive issues to be addressed but that is just a fact of life with static analysis, and it will be an iterative process to refine those heuristics as the attack vectors evolve.  I thought this talk was particularly timely given the increasing prevalence of Flash as a conduit for exploits/malware, such as the most recent <a href="http://trailofbits.com/2008/05/28/flash-zero-day-attacks-wow/">Flash 0day</a> that made the news (granted, this was an exploit against Flash itself, not just using Flash as a delivery mechanism, but close enough).</p>
<p>I also enjoyed pierre&#8217;s talk on counterintelligence, basically a mélange of wiretapping and other bugging devices discovered in the wild.  War stories are always interesting, particularly when it comes to the realm of physical security.  One of the x-ray images he showed of a bugged pen was identical to a pen that I own (minus the bugging device of course&#8230; I hope).  The feel of the talk reminded me a bit of James Atkinson&#8217;s talk at SOURCE, &#8220;Telephone Defenses Against the Dark Arts&#8221; (video: <a href="http://sourceboston2008.blip.tv/file/799027/">Part 1</a> and <a href="http://sourceboston2008.blip.tv/file/800299/">Part 2</a>), which also got rave reviews.  </p>
<p>Mike Eddington&#8217;s presentation on the <a href="http://peachfuzz.sourceforge.net/">Peach 2</a> fuzzing framework was also quite interesting.  Peach 2 was released several months back but I haven&#8217;t really been paying much attention to it or any other fuzzing tool for some time.  In fact the last time I really had to implement a protocol fuzzer, I was using SPIKE 2.9, so that gives you some indication of how long it&#8217;s been.  Peach 2 includes some powerful built-in capabilities such as node relationships (e.g. field 1 represents the length of field 2; field 10 is a CRC-32 of fields 1 through 9), data transforms (those with battle scars from ASN.1 will be happy), state machines (packets 1 and 2 have to be normal in order to fuzz packet 3), monitoring agents (detecting when a crash happens and under what conditions), and much more.  I am itching to go fuzz something now just so I can tinker with Peach.</p>
<p>All in all, it was a good trip and I enjoyed the opportunity to see how things are done across the pond, and to do a little sightseeing in a historic and beautiful city.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 28 May 2008 16:56:40 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/talk">talk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/james atkinsons talk">james atkinsons talk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/flash">flash</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/flash movies">flash movies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/recent flash 0day">recent flash 0day</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/befs talk">befs talk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dingy club">dingy club</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/conference">conference</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/european security conference">european security conference</category>
      <source url="http://www.veracode.com/blog/?p=98">Trip Report: PH-Neutral</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[A Review of Hakin9 IT Security Magazine]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/b464c78700cb20a1a56428a5380df7f6</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/b464c78700cb20a1a56428a5380df7f6</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[A new issue of the Hakin9 - Hard Core IT Security Magazin e is &quot;in the wild&quot;, and since the editorial staff has been kind enough to provide me with issues of the magazine for a while now, in this post...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SDgo4-zK7VI/AAAAAAAABvQ/NF_theSCxD8/s1600-h/hakin9_issue_3_2008.JPG"><img style="margin: 0pt 10px 10px 0pt; float: left; cursor: pointer;" src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SDgo4-zK7VI/AAAAAAAABvQ/NF_theSCxD8/s200/hakin9_issue_3_2008.JPG" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5203954328822017362" border="0" /></a>A new issue of the <a href="http://www.en.hakin9.org/">Hakin9 - Hard Core IT Security Magazin</a>e is "in the wild", and since the editorial staff has been kind enough to provide me with issues of the magazine for a while now, in this post I'll review the latest issue with the idea that constructive confrontation leads to the best output achievable.<br /><br />There are many different ways to review a magazine, however, I'm always sticking to the following critical success factors for a quality magazine :<br /><div> </div><br />- <span style="font-weight: bold;">The presence of a vision</span><br />While a vision is often taken for granted, or even worse, a mission gets misunderstood for a vision, in Hakin9's case the vision could be perhaps best rephrased as "Spoiling the geeks who beg for a nerdy talk to them".<br /><br /><div>- <span style="font-weight: bold;">Content quality</span></div>The magazine truly delivers what it promises, namely, hardcode content in sections such as tools review, basics, attack, defense, book reviews, consumers test, and interviews. And whereas the key topic in this issue is LDAP cracking, I really enjoyed the Javascript obfuscation article, with the practical examples provided. A bit ironic, the issue is also reviewing a commercial source code obfuscator, which just like legitimate anti-piracy tools used by malware authors to make their binaries harder to analyze, can also be abused for malicious purposes.<br /><br />- <span style="font-weight: bold;">Relevance of information<br /></span>The information provided in the articles is highly relevant, and timely, lacking any retrospective approaches and focusing on current and emerging threats only. The same goes for the extensive external resources provided, emphasizing on the importance of self-education.<br /><br /><div>- <span style="font-weight: bold;">Layout</span></div>Very well structured, and so far I haven't come across an article where the images weren't syndicated the way they should be, for instance the figures mentioned on a certain page, are the same figures available at that page. Three differentiation points make a very good impression, the level of difficulty for the article, what you should know before reading it in order to understand it, and what you will know after reading it, which you can find at the end of every article.<br /><br />- <span style="font-weight: bold;">Visual materials</span><br />The surplus of visual materials is perhaps what won me as a reader from the first moment. In fact, the issues are so rich on visual material illustrating the topic covered in such details, that you can actually take entire sniffing, and javascript obfuscation sessions offline with you, and never ever have to picture the output of a certain process in your mind again.<br /><br /><div>- <span style="font-weight: bold;">Ads</span></div>Highly targeted, and primary security related, and best of all, very well spread across the magazine, so you're exposed to more content than ads.<br /><br /><div> </div><div> </div><div>Overall, the magazine successfully delivers what it promises to deliver - hardcode technical content from the geeks, for the geeks. Informative reading!</div><div class="feedflare">
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</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/298237798" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 26 May 2008 01:12:53 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/magazine">magazine</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/content">content</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/review">review</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hardcode technical content">hardcode technical content</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/quality magazine">quality magazine</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/javascript obfuscation article">javascript obfuscation article</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/article">article</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/content quality">content quality</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/issue">issue</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/298237798/review-of-hakin9-it-security-magazine.html">A Review of Hakin9 IT Security Magazine</source>
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