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LogLogic Lunch and Learn Presentation
- "Worst Practices" of Log Management
- Speaker: Dr. Anton Chuvakin, GCIA, GCIH, GCFA
- Wednesday, July 23rd, 2008 * 12:30pm - 1:15 pm

Want to learn all the embarrassing mistakes and pitfalls that await you on the path to log management nirvana? Attend "'Worst Practices' of Log Management" presentation by LogLogic's Logging Evangelist Dr Anton Chuvakin that covers all the things that can go wrong while planning, evaluating, deploying and running a log management solution. Insufficient planning, unrealistic expectations, choosing tools on price alone, lack of logging configuration guidance are among such "worst practices." Each common "worst practice" will be accompanied by suggestions to avoid the errors and do things correctly! Everybody touts "best practices", but this is the place to learn how to avoid the opposite - and have fun in the process.

if you want to meet, drop me an email/call or just show up for "lunch and learn." Unfortunately, I am going back right after my presentation tomorrow...

I had a long crappy day as anyone who might follow my Twitter may have seen. I was wallowing in my own discontent when I met up with Myrcurial for lunch today. The cheshire grin on his face was something to behold. As it turns out, the weasel had been sitting on a rather significant announcement (for the last month) that he alluded to in his earlier posting today.

Myrcurial will be speaking at Last Hope! Very cool brother! His talk entitled, “From a Black Hat to a Black Suit” will be a must see for any propeller heads that have aspirations for a corner office one day.

From the talk summary:

You want it all. You can see the brass ring and you want to jump for it. But you’re scared. You don’t want to put on a suit and watch your soul shrivel like the spot price on RAM. There is another way.In this session, you will learn: why you want to do this to yourself, how to get the first job (which will suck), how to turn the first job into the next job (while still having fun), how to get the top job (sooner than you thought you could), and how to do it all without feeling like a corporate whore. You want to hack the planet? You’ve got to start somewhere.

I’ll be the smart ass in the back crackin wise.

Article Link

The reason is psychological. And it's the same dynamic when it's a security vendor trying to sell its products or services, a CIO trying to convince senior management to invest in security or a security officer trying to implement a security policy with her company's employees.

It's also true that the better you understand your buyer, the better you can sell.

First, a bit about Prospect Theory, the underlying theory behind the newly popular field of behavioral economics. Prospect Theory was developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in 1979 (Kahneman went on to win a Nobel Prize for this and other similar work) to explain how people make trade-offs that involve risk. Before this work, economists had a model of "economic man," a rational being who makes trade-offs based on some logical calculation. Kahneman and Tversky showed that real people are far more subtle and ornery.

Here's an experiment that illustrates Prospect Theory. Take a roomful of subjects and divide them into two groups. Ask one group to choose between these two alternatives: a sure gain of $500 and 50 percent chance of gaining $1,000. Ask the other group to choose between these two alternatives: a sure loss of $500 and a 50 percent chance of losing $1,000.

These two trade-offs are very similar, and traditional economics predicts that the whether you're contemplating a gain or a loss doesn't make a difference: People make trade-offs based on a straightforward calculation of the relative outcome. Some people prefer sure things and others prefer to take chances. Whether the outcome is a gain or a loss doesn't affect the mathematics and therefore shouldn't affect the results. This is traditional economics, and it's called Utility Theory.

But Kahneman's and Tversky's experiments contradicted Utility Theory. When faced with a gain, about 85 percent of people chose the sure smaller gain over the risky larger gain. But when faced with a loss, about 70 percent chose the risky larger loss over the sure smaller loss.

This experiment, repeated again and again by many researchers, across ages, genders, cultures and even species, rocked economics, yielded the same result. Directly contradicting the traditional idea of "economic man," Prospect Theory recognizes that people have subjective values for gains and losses. We have evolved a cognitive bias: a pair of heuristics. One, a sure gain is better than a chance at a greater gain, or "A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." And two, a sure loss is worse than a chance at a greater loss, or "Run away and live to fight another day." Of course, these are not rigid rules. Only a fool would take a sure $100 over a 50 percent chance at $1,000,000. But all things being equal, we tend to be risk-adverse when it comes to gains and risk-seeking when it comes to losses.

This cognitive bias is so powerful that it can lead to logically inconsistent results. Google the "Asian Disease Experiment" for an almost surreal example. Describing the same policy choice in different ways--either as "200 lives saved out of 600" or "400 lives lost out of 600"-- yields wildly different risk reactions.

Evolutionarily, the bias makes sense. It's a better survival strategy to accept small gains rather than risk them for larger ones, and to risk larger losses rather than accept smaller losses. Lions, for example, chase young or wounded wildebeests because the investment needed to kill them is lower. Mature and healthy prey would probably be more nutritious, but there's a risk of missing lunch entirely if it gets away. And a small meal will tide the lion over until another day. Getting through today is more important than the possibility of having food tomorrow. Similarly, it is better to risk a larger loss than to accept a smaller loss. Because animals tend to live on the razor's edge between starvation and reproduction, any loss of food -- whether small or large -- can be equally bad. Because both can result in death, and the best option is to risk everything for the chance at no loss at all.

How does Prospect Theory explain the difficulty of selling the prevention of a security breach? It's a choice between a small sure loss -- the cost of the security product -- and a large risky loss: for example, the results of an attack on one's network. Of course there's a lot more to the sale. The buyer has to be convinced that the product works, and he has to understand the threats against him and the risk that something bad will happen. But all things being equal, buyers would rather take the chance that the attack won't happen than suffer the sure loss that comes from purchasing the security product.

Security sellers know this, even if they don't understand why, and are continually trying to frame their products in positive results. That's why you see slogans with the basic message, "We take care of security so you can focus on your business," or carefully crafted ROI models that demonstrate how profitable a security purchase can be. But these never seem to work. Security is fundamentally a negative sell.

One solution is to stoke fear. Fear is a primal emotion, far older than our ability to calculate trade-offs. And when people are truly scared, they're willing to do almost anything to make that feeling go away; lots of other psychological research supports that. Any burglar alarm salesman will tell you that people buy only after they've been robbed, or after one of their neighbors has been robbed. And the fears stoked by 9/11, and the politics surrounding 9/11, have fueled an entire industry devoted to counterterrorism. When emotion takes over like that, people are much less likely to think rationally.

Though effective, fear mongering is not very ethical. The better solution is not to sell security directly, but to include it as part of a more general product or service. Your car comes with safety and security features built in; they're not sold separately. Same with your house. And it should be the same with computers and networks. Vendors need to build security into the products and services that customers actually want. CIOs should include security as an integral part of everything they budget for. Security shouldn't be a separate policy for employees to follow but part of overall IT policy.

Security is inherently about avoiding a negative, so you can never ignore the cognitive bias embedded so deeply in the human brain. But if you understand it, you have a better chance of overcoming it.

This essay originally appeared in CIO.

The experts at the FBI's newly accredited Regional Computer Forensics Lab in San Diego have already helped solve murders, child porn cases and robberies. They're among the best in the nation at pulling evidence from hard drives, cellphones and memory cards.

There are now 14 such labs in the United States, with two more coming online this year. Last year, the FBI labs collectively performed more than 13,000 forensics examinations. The San Diego lab alone handled more than 1,000 requests from 40 law enforcement agencies in 2007, including 171 child pornography cases and 160 murder investigations.

Wired.com got a rare look at the inner workings of the San Diego lab this week, and we snapped some photos of the toys inside.

Left: Darrell Foxworth greets members of the media in the entrance of the San Diego Regional Computer Forensic Laboratory.

Jeff Cable, assistant director of RCFL, opens the door in to the lab to start the tour. Cable notes that it is very rare that they ever allow anyone but FBI agents through this door.

This device copies the data off the hard drives and makes sure it can't be overwritten.

FBI agent Dan Dandridge plugs a hard drive into a "lunch box," which clones the data off the drive as the first step of a noninvasive examination.

Cellphones can be a treasure-trove of forensic evidence. In one case, a man was robbing a store when his cellphone rang. Captured by a security camera, and studied by the lab, the robber's unique ringtone eventually led to his conviction.

This set of equipment is the AVID video processing system at the San Diego Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory.

Forensic examiner Tim Hamon shows off the inside of the RCFL mobile unit.

Lacking in subtlety, the rolling lab is not used in covert surveillance missions.

Evolutionarily, presumably it is a better survival strategy to -- all other things being equal, of course -- accept small gains rather than risking them for larger ones, and risk larger losses rather than accepting smaller losses. Lions chase young or wounded wildebeest because the investment needed to kill them is lower. Mature and healthy prey would probably be more nutritious, but there's a risk of missing lunch entirely if it gets away. And a small meal will tide the lion over until another day. Getting through today is more important than the possibility of having food tomorrow.

Similarly, it is evolutionarily better to risk a larger loss than to accept a smaller loss. Because animals tend to live on the razor's edge between starvation and reproduction, any loss of food -- whether small or large -- can be equally bad. That is, both can result in death. If that's true, the best option is to risk everything for the chance at no loss at all.

This behavior has been demonstrated in animals as well: "species of insects, birds and mammals range from risk neutral to risk averse when making decisions about amounts of food, but are risk seeking towards delays in receiving food."

A recent study examines the relative risk preferences in two closely related species: chimanzees and bonobos.

Abstract

Human and non-human animals tend to avoid risky prospects. If such patterns of economic choice are adaptive, risk preferences should reflect the typical decision-making environments faced by organisms. However, this approach has not been widely used to examine the risk sensitivity in closely related species with different ecologies. Here, we experimentally examined risk-sensitive behaviour in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus), closely related species whose distinct ecologies are thought to be the major selective force shaping their unique behavioural repertoires. Because chimpanzees exploit riskier food sources in the wild, we predicted that they would exhibit greater tolerance for risk in choices about food. Results confirmed this prediction: chimpanzees significantly preferred the risky option, whereas bonobos preferred the fixed option. These results provide a relatively rare example of risk-prone behaviour in the context of gains and show how ecological pressures can sculpt economic decision making.

The basic argument is that in the natural environment of the chimpanzee, if you don't take risks you don't get any of the high-value rewards (e.g., monkey meat). Bonobos "rely more heavily than chimpanzees on terrestrial herbaceous vegetation, a more temporally and spatially consistent food source." So chimpanzees are less likely to avoid taking risks -- as most species are.

Fascinating stuff, but there are at least two problems with this study. The first one, the researchers explain in their paper. The animals studied -- five of each species -- were from the Wolfgang Koehler Primate Research Center at the Leipzig Zoo, and the experimenters were unable to rule out differences in the "experiences, cultures and conditions of the two specific groups tested here."

The second problem is more general: we know very little about the life of bonobos in the wild. There's a lot of popular stereotypes about bonobos, but they're sloppy at best.

Even so, I like seeing this kind of research.