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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: military]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/military</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Fri, 11 Jul 2008 11:08:07 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[In the great NAC debate, Snyder KOs Stiennon in the first round!]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/257e5281878e732cc8ef2afaee430827</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/257e5281878e732cc8ef2afaee430827</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Just got done reading the transcript of yesterdays great NAC debate between Joel Snyder and Richard Stiennon. As I predicted Snyder scored a knockout early on and it was mostly over from that point...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/boxer.jpg"><img title="boxer" style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; margin: 0px 0px 5px 5px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" height="124" alt="boxer" src="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/boxer_thumb.jpg" width="142" align="right" border="0"></img></a> Just got done <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/chat/archive/2008/072308-snyder-stiennon-nac-debate.html">reading the transcript</a> of yesterdays great NAC debate between Joel Snyder and Richard Stiennon.  As I predicted Snyder scored a knockout early on and it was mostly over from that point on.  The knockout came earlier than I expected though, right off the first question.  Each combatant was asked to define NAC and that was when it happened.  Richard brought an EPAC (end point access control) to a NAC fight.  That was akin to him bringing a rubber knife to a gun fight.  A quick bullet between the eyes by Snyder and it was almost painlessly over for Richard.</p>  <p>I have been preaching for some time about what I call complete NAC. That is a complete network access control solution, not just network admission control and certainly not end point access control.  It is not an evil plot to extend Cisco/Microsoft dominance and most importantly Richard, no one and let me say this again, no one has ever said that NAC negates the need for a layered security model.  NAC is just another layer in that model.  Richard’s comments deriding the .edu and .mil markets were also laughable.  Richard, have you ever heard the term military grade?  Are you seriously trying to say that enterprises take security more seriously than the military does?  Come on now Richard.</p>  <p>The bottom line is Joel Snyder is not only a sharp dude technically, but is street savvy enough to run circles around my friend Richard.  He made Richard stay focused on the question at hand, did not let him wander and so Richard had to face reality a bit. I am sure Richard will still say NAC is useless and <a href="http://securityuncorked.squarespace.com/security-uncorked/2008/7/22/hps-nac-what-ive-been-wanting-to-tell-you-but-couldnt.html">will admonish people about hanging out with the likes of the StillSecure</a> crowd, but I guess some things will just never change.  Except, I don’t think Richard will be in anymore of these bouts.  Maybe he can start selling a grill that takes the fat out of meat or perhaps a reality TV show like the other washed up palookas ?</p>
<p><a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=ZeWwIp"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=ZeWwIp" border="0"></img></a></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=9TwouJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=9TwouJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=JHaO4J"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=JHaO4J" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=vbaihJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=vbaihJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=QDT1DJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=QDT1DJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=jnZSlj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=jnZSlj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=6zfMHj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=6zfMHj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~4/344260979" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 23 Jul 2008 20:13:54 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac">nac</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/richard">richard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/importantly richard">importantly richard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/richard stiennon">richard stiennon</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/snyder">snyder</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/friend richard">friend richard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/define nac">define nac</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac fight">nac fight</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/richard stay">richard stay</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~3/344260979/in-the-great-na.html">In the great NAC debate, Snyder KOs Stiennon in the first round!</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Langley Files]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/1d86287caa54b846b08a3d1020799d36</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/1d86287caa54b846b08a3d1020799d36</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The Central Intelligence Agency doesn't like to talk about its mistakes. It's not just embarrassing, but officials believe exposing details about how an operation went wrong reveals too much about how...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The Central Intelligence Agency doesn't like to talk about its mistakes. It's not just embarrassing, but officials believe exposing details about how an operation went wrong reveals too much about how it captures enemy secrets. But published statements and news reports suggest one recent error-the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo war last year, which killed three and injured 20-happened in part because CIA officers targeted what they thought was a Yugoslav Army warehouse based on outdated maps, and others failed to catch the mistake before the proposal was passed to the military.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 20 Jul 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/central intelligence agency">central intelligence agency</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/captures enemy secrets">captures enemy secrets</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cia officers">cia officers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/recent error-the">recent error-the</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kosovo war">kosovo war</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wrong reveals">wrong reveals</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/news reports">news reports</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/chinese embassy">chinese embassy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/statements">statements</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/072108-the-langley.html?fsrc=rss-security">The Langley Files</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Game Controllers Driving Drones, Nukes]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d7a3d7cafbc2cd8c635e15260c0162f4</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d7a3d7cafbc2cd8c635e15260c0162f4</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[War is getting more like a videogame, as hardware and software from the gaming industry is increasingly being adopted for military use. The latest sign of this appeared at the Farnborough air show...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[War is getting more like a videogame, as hardware and software from the gaming industry is increasingly being adopted for military use. The latest sign of this appeared at the Farnborough air show this week, where arms-maker Raytheon showed off its new Universal Control System for robotic aicraft.<br style="clear: both;"/>
  <img alt="" style="border: 0; height:1px; width:1px;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?i=2a2bc930a3bfd74d5c313d2f00fc1654" height="1" width="1"/>
<img src="http://www.pheedo.com/feeds/tracker.php?i=2a2bc930a3bfd74d5c313d2f00fc1654" style="display: none;" border="0" height="1" width="1" alt=""/><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=Bni5HJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=Bni5HJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=RPbjkj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=RPbjkj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=nTajCj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=nTajCj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=1SjhgJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=1SjhgJ" border="0"></img></a>
 <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=0A013J"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=0A013J" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=oTx4Qj"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=oTx4Qj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=i6mvAj"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=i6mvAj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=X7goRJ"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=X7goRJ" border="0"></img></a> </div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/wired/politics/privacy/~4/341048288" height="1" width="1"/><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~r/wired/politics/security/~4/341048289" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 20 Jul 2008 17:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/universal control system">universal control system</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/farnborough air">farnborough air</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/robotic aicraft">robotic aicraft</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/arms-maker raytheon">arms-maker raytheon</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/videogame">videogame</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/week">week</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/military">military</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/industry">industry</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/increasingly">increasingly</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.wired.com/~r/wired/politics/security/~3/341048289/wargames.html">Game Controllers Driving Drones, Nukes</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Gonzo: Two Thumbs In and Up]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6853c438c7bef73e63a300124d9cf5de</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6853c438c7bef73e63a300124d9cf5de</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Just saw the Hunter S. Thompson movie - Gonzo , and if you are a fan you should to. Lots of good stuff in there, the film links various part of his life and career, and gives a pretty unvarnished view...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hunter_S._Thompson"></a><a style="float: left;" href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/.a/6a00d83451c75869e200e553c045c48834-pi"><img  class="at-xid-6a00d83451c75869e200e553c045c48834 " alt="180px-Gonzo_citation" src="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/.a/6a00d83451c75869e200e553c045c48834-320wi" style="margin: 0px 5px 5px 0px;"></a> Just saw the Hunter S. Thompson movie - <a href="http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/gonzo_the_life_and_work_of_dr_hunter_s_thompson/">Gonzo</a>, and if you are a fan you should to. Lots of good stuff in there, the film links various part of his life and career, and gives a pretty unvarnished view of the high highs and the low lows. Weaves in writing, politics, and fame seamlessly.

I have never really had as much fun as early on in my career in the early-mid 90s I was a web programmer in Aspen, hacking CGI/PERL. Among the most fun things was building and running HST's site. My boss, Ed, was his neighbor. Ed was also seriously allergic to bees. One day he was alone in his house and got stung. He was dying. Luckily Hunter was due over to his house to watch a basketball game, walked in and called 911. My boss woke up in the ambulance with Hunter pounding on him chest and screaming at him. Ed said - "Waking up to that face screaming at me, I didn't know if I was alive or dead."

Seeing the movie it was also great to see a lot of the Woody Creek folks again like George Stranahan, who lovingly said about Hunter - "my friend and neighbor who never paid his rent, broke up my marriage and taught my children to smoke dope. "

Of course, there was no way he could match his early productivity and this is true of almost all artists. Most of the last two decades were wasted from a writing standpoint. However his <a href="http://proxy.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?id=1250751">piece</a> written on 9/11 is as good as its gets:

</p><blockquote><p>
	The towers are gone now, reduced to bloody rubble, along with all hopes for Peace in Our Time, in the United States or any other country. Make no mistake about it: We are At War now -- with somebody -- and we will stay At War with that mysterious Enemy for the rest of our lives. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>It will be a Religious War, a sort of Christian Jihad, fueled by religious hatred and led by merciless fanatics on both sides. It will be guerilla warfare on a global scale, with no front lines and no identifiable enemy. Osama bin Laden may be a primitive "figurehead" -- or even dead, for all we know -- but whoever put those All-American jet planes loaded with All-American fuel into the Twin Towers and the Pentagon did it with chilling precision and accuracy. The second one was a dead-on bullseye. Straight into the middle of the skyscraper. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Nothing -- even George Bush's $350 billion "Star Wars" missile defense system -- could have prevented Tuesday's attack, and it cost next to nothing to pull off. Fewer than 20 unarmed Suicide soldiers from some apparently primitive country somewhere on the other side of the world took out the World Trade Center and half the Pentagon with three quick and costless strikes on one day. The efficiency of it was terrifying. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>We are going to punish somebody for this attack, but just who or what will be blown to smithereens for it is hard to say. Maybe Afghanistan, maybe Pakistan or Iraq, or possibly all three at once. Who knows? Not even the Generals in what remains of the Pentagon or the New York papers calling for WAR seem to know who did it or where to look for them. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>This is going to be a very expensive war, and Victory is not guaranteed -- for anyone, and certainly not for anyone as baffled as George W. Bush. All he knows is that his father started the war a long time ago, and that he, the goofy child-President, has been chosen by Fate and the global Oil industry to finish it Now. He will declare a National Security Emergency and clamp down Hard on Everybody, no matter where they live or why. If the guilty won't hold up their hands and confess, he and the Generals will ferret them out by force. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Good luck. He is in for a profoundly difficult job -- armed as he is with no credible Military Intelligence, no witnesses and only the ghost of Bin Laden to blame for the tragedy.
	
</p></blockquote><p>


One unintended lesson I take away from Hunter's life is how important patience is. Obama is a politician and may yet disappoint us all, but I gotta believe Hunter would be seriously impressed. If he had waited another couple of years, he may have seen a lot of the stuff he fought for in 1968 and 72 come to fruition. Sometimes you are just 36-40 years ahead of your time and you have to be ok with that and figure out how to deal if possible. (Note - it sure sometimes feels this way in software security).

Speaking of security:

</p><blockquote>
	<p><a href="http://www.ram.org/contrib/security.html">Security</a> 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>by Hunter S. Thompson (1955). 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Security ... what does this word mean in relation to life as we know it today? For the most part, it means safety and freedom from worry. It is said to be the end that all men strive for; but is security a utopian goal or is it another word for rut? 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Let us visualize the secure man; and by this term, I mean a man who has settled for financial and personal security for his goal in life. In general, he is a man who has pushed ambition and initiative aside and settled down, so to speak, in a boring, but safe and comfortable rut for the rest of his life. His future is but an extension of his present, and he accepts it as such with a complacent shrug of his shoulders. His ideas and ideals are those of society in general and he is accepted as a respectable, but average and prosaic man. But is he a man? has he any self-respect or pride in himself? How could he, when he has risked nothing and gained nothing? What does he think when he sees his youthful dreams of adventure, accomplishment, travel and romance buried under the cloak of conformity? How does he feel when he realizes that he has barely tasted the meal of life; when he sees the prison he has made for himself in pursuit of the almighty dollar? If he thinks this is all well and good, fine, but think of the tragedy of a man who has sacrificed his freedom on the altar of security, and wishes he could turn back the hands of time. A man is to be pitied who lacked the courage to accept the challenge of freedom and depart from the cushion of security and see life as it is instead of living it second-hand. Life has by-passed this man and he has watched from a secure place, afraid to seek anything better What has he done except to sit and wait for the tomorrow which never comes? 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Turn back the pages of history and see the men who have shaped the destiny of the world. Security was never theirs, but they lived rather than existed. Where would the world be if all men had sought security and not taken risks or gambled with their lives on the chance that, if they won, life would be different and richer? It is from the bystanders (who are in the vast majority) that we receive the propaganda that life is not worth living, that life is drudgery, that the ambitions of youth must he laid aside for a life which is but a painful wait for death. These are the ones who squeeze what excitement they can from life out of the imaginations and experiences of others through books and movies. These are the insignificant and forgotten men who preach conformity because it is all they know. These are the men who dream at night of what could have been, but who wake at dawn to take their places at the now-familiar rut and to merely exist through another day. For them, the romance of life is long dead and they are forced to go through the years on a treadmill, cursing their existence, yet afraid to die because of the unknown which faces them after death. They lacked the only true courage: the kind which enables men to face the unknown regardless of the consequences. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>As an afterthought, it seems hardly proper to write of life without once mentioning happiness; so we shall let the reader answer this question for himself: who is the happier man, he who has braved the storm of life and lived or he who has stayed securely on shore and merely existed?
</p></blockquote><p>

A ship is safest at port, but thats not why we build ships. 
</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Jul 2008 06:10:12 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/life">life</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sought security">sought security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal security">personal security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/national security emergency">national security emergency</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software security">software security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/expensive war">expensive war</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/war">war</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hunter">hunter</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/07/gonzo-two-thumbs-in-and-up.html">Gonzo: Two Thumbs In and Up</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Q&A with Doug McClure: What Makes BSM Successful?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ac3c26a14f128a8ecb49f7c474cbb36e</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ac3c26a14f128a8ecb49f7c474cbb36e</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Yesterday we featured our initial Q&amp;A with Doug McClure , who took some time to answer some strategic questions on BSM Lite. Today, Doug shares his thoughts on BSM and CMDB strategies for companies...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yesterday we featured <a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/qa-with-doug-mcclure-is-bsm-lite-the-answer/07/2008" target="_blank">our initial Q&amp;A</a> with <a href="http://dougmcclure.net/blog/" target="_blank">Doug McClure</a>, who took some time to answer some strategic questions on BSM Lite. Today, Doug shares his thoughts on BSM and CMDB strategies for companies and how his stint in the U.S. Navy helped shape his future passion for BSM.</p>
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> Can you share any of the strategies/advice that you give to companies embarking on their BSM journeys?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> Well, first they&#8217;ve got to have a BSM strategy. Nearly all the clients I talk to or hear about wanting to do BSM do not have a BSM strategy. I talk a lot about this on my blog and with clients and it is relevant whether you&#8217;re going to think about &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; or &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; approaches.</p>
<p>Once we have a BSM strategy, we need to establish a BSM roadmap that guides us in how we’ll implement the BSM strategy in a more tactical manner, focusing on short term iterative quick wins and 30-60-90 day projects. For more of my thoughts on BSM strategy and roadmapping, see the following blog posts.</p>
<ul>
<li>
<h3><a href="http://dougmcclure.net/blog/2007/03/elements-of-business-service-management-part-3-getting-business-service-management-on-the-radar-screen/" target="_blank">Elements of Business Service Management Part 3: Getting Business Service Management on the Radar Screen</a></h3>
</li>
<li>
<h3><a href="http://dougmcclure.net/blog/2007/09/elements-of-business-service-management-part-4-what%e2%80%99s-your-business-service-management-strategy/" target="_blank">Elements of Business Service Management Part 4: What’s your Business Service Management Strategy?</a></h3>
</li>
</ul>
<p>As I&#8217;ve alluded to previously, a client first must define and understand what &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; may mean to them. Don&#8217;t take what the analysts or the vendors pitch for what you should do to achieve BSM or what value you should get from it.</p>
<p>For any type of BSM to be successful, each client must define what BSM means to them and state what they expect to get from BSM. They must make it personal, make it a part of their company culture and elevate it to be as an important initiative as compliance, risk management, SOA, ITIL, or other initiatives may be within the company.</p>
<p>Please don&#8217;t get scared off from this strategy thing. Please don&#8217;t blow this off as something that the secret enterprise architecture council should be doing. If you&#8217;re unable to get an audience in these areas within your company, start within your own sphere of influence.</p>
<p>Your strategy could be as simple as enabling the local operations center to more efficiently classify, triage and resolve problems based on a simple business service or application contextual understanding. Focus on how this changes the game within your environment. Come up with your own metrics and measures to assess the value this has to this organizational use. Trust me, you&#8217;ll need to justify your investment some time in the future.</p>
<p>Another trait of successful BSM implementations is that of the formal monitoring and management tools group has established some sort of database or knowledge repository that enables them to &#8220;manage the business of IT management and monitoring&#8221; if you will. In my opinion, the vendor community has let their clients down significantly in this area. The CMDB may be the correct answer, but most companies just don’t value monitoring enough to demand that this be included in their formal CMDB initiatives.</p>
<p>In my last job, we developed an application that I referred to as the &#8220;Service Management Database&#8221; or &#8220;SMDB&#8221;. Others may call it something else, but in essence, it was the database that captured what was monitored, how it was monitored, who owned it, what business services and applications it supported, the impact an outage or event from it had on the business services or applications, etc.</p>
<p>One key component of this “SMDB” was establishing the relationships of real and synthetic user and transaction monitoring steps to associated servers and applications. This is a significant gap area in many tools and vendor CMDBs.</p>
<p>Clients who have instituted something formal such as this generally have a very good handle on management and monitoring within their environment. Far too many clients do not have adequate monitoring (read visibility) in place to begin their BSM journey.</p>
<p>I&#8217;d strongly recommend a good hard look at how well the client&#8217;s monitoring and management practices are implemented and managed. Simply put, if they don&#8217;t have adequate visibility into how well those business services and applications are performing, you can&#8217;t expect to manage what you can&#8217;t “see” that may be impacting the business, clients, revenue, etc.</p>
<p>Just ask yourself this – can you explicitly state what monitoring is in place for a given business service or application? Can you quantify the impact of a simple event to a business service or application? Can you explain why something is red, yellow, purple or green and what causes it to change from one color to another? If you can’t, your BSM journey will be challenging.</p>
<p>Those with formal CMDB initiatives have their hands full with high risk, long time to value projects to just get a handle with traditional configuration management models. Taking these low level configuration items (CI&#8217;s) and establishing application and service dependencies comes after a lot of work getting through the organizational challenges of getting systems access to populate the CMDB.</p>
<p>I strongly recommend that the formal monitoring and management tools group create an authoritative database that enables them to establish end-to-end visibility into the service and application delivery chain and the impacts it has on the business, customer, etc. This ultimately becomes part of a more realistic federated CMDB within the business.</p>
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> Can you provide an example of a successful implementation of BSM? Were there specific factors that especially contributed to its success?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> I&#8217;ve touched on the highlights of the most successful BSM implementations throughout my previous answers. Clients that have rallied around an organizational change or transformation focusing every team member’s efforts and energy towards ensuring that the business goals and objectives are being met through the delivery of highly available business services and applications.</p>
<p>Far too often the “change” never happens and it’s the “talking heads” that are preaching to the choir about what should be done. Every person on the front line, in the support teams, at the help desk, etc. must understand how they support or impact the business in business terms. Try putting this simple phrase after job titles “Hi, my name is Doug. I’m a Systems Administrator, Supporting the Business”.</p>
<p>That was a mouthful, but simply put, these clients have an impressively instrumented business and IT environment with the right amount of visibility into each area, joined together with an organization that thinks, operates and responds based on their understanding of the business goals and objectives and how these business services and applications enable business success.</p>
<p>The operational model for an organization fully adopting BSM identifies ways to establish a service management mentality across the entire business service and application delivery and support chain. The delivery, operations and support organizations must be incented to manage the services and applications being delivered with this end-to-end context.</p>
<p>A leading, outside the box “service management organization” may include the traditional IT silos but within a matrixed fashion focused on one or more key business services and applications. The &#8220;service management organization&#8221; is then incented to work together, as a team, for the end-to-end delivery and support of these services or applications.</p>
<p>It’s no longer one’s job to just be the systems administrator, database administrator or network engineer, their job is now to support specific business services and applications. They provide the subject matter expertise needed to support the services and applications together, as a team, eliminating the finger pointing or “not my problem” attitudes that exist in the majority of IT organizations today.</p>
<p>Overall, the KISS approach is what will enable BSM of any type (lite, heavy) to be the most successful. If it just feels natural, doesn&#8217;t take any additional effort, clicks or tasks to do then it&#8217;s going to work. BSM should be transparent and not just another buzz word. It&#8217;s not a form that gets filled out or a special process to follow in the run book. It&#8217;s doing the right thing for the business, no matter what the situation, crisis, buzz word or technology initiative of the day is.</p>
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> How did you get involved in BSM?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> I think the foundations of my service management background and passion were initially established during my service in the US Navy. Today, I relate that experience to what I call BSM for the Military or Mission Services Management (MSM).</p>
<p>We had been taught over and over that extreme attention to the details of the mission at hand (aka &#8220;the business&#8221;) was the number one priority and that all of our technology, services, and applications existed for those Sailors and Marines on the other end (the &#8220;customer&#8221;). I can recall countless instances where mission critical communications services (telephony, orderwires, teletypes, command and control systems, etc.) were impacted in one way or another. It was extremely critical that we understood who was impacted and to what degree so that contingency plans could be activated. We weren’t just talking about lost revenue, poor sales or customer experience; we were talking about human lives and the security of the United States.</p>
<p>It is that military bearing, attention to detail and real world experience that drives me with many of my modern day BSM endeavors. That migration from &#8220;Mission Services Management&#8221; to BSM was honed working for over 10 years working in the Internet Service Provider (ISP) and datacenter, hosting and colocation business.</p>
<p>In those rapid growth businesses during the Internet boom, service differentiation was what &#8220;made you millions&#8221; or paved your way to bankruptcy. The companies I worked for had an extreme passion and focus on ensuring that their services, applications and Internet access products were of the highest quality, highly reliable and just plain better than the competition.</p>
<p>Again, the IT infrastructure, service quality and customer experience relationship was ingrained in all of our heads. It was all hands on deck when Webmail, Internet access, DNS, or the network experienced problems. We were measured in terms of how many customers experienced a busy signal or dropped connection or if you couldn’t log in fast enough to read your email. Companies like Keynote Systems and LionBridge/Veritest/Inverse tested the quality of our networks, services and applications and publicly ranked us against our competition. We thought in terms of customer experience and impact every minute of the day, 24&#215;7.</p>
<p>It was in my last job managing a traditional enterprise management and monitoring development group for a nationwide ISP where I was able to work with emerging technology to help get a handle on the complexities of these rapidly growing IT environments filled with emerging technologies and products. Applying this early technology to complex service problems in our environment proved to me that the technology, coupled with the right emphasis on how the technology was implemented and an emphasis on the people and processes within the organization could bring BSM to life.</p>
<p>Where I felt left out in the cold was with my vendor relationship. While their technology gave me the potential, they didn&#8217;t teach me how to work through the organizational and technological problems to successfully implement the BSM strategy. My very first end-to-end BSM pilot was extremely successful and provided visibility into the IT environment and business service impact that have never been available before.</p>
<p>And here I am today, working at a software vendor for the first time. Welcome to the &#8220;dark side&#8221; as they say. The approach and methodology we followed for BSM has become the basis of the core BSM Methodology that I teach IBMers and our clients around the world today.</p>
<p>My personal mission and drive here at IBM Tivoli is to ensure that BSM is something that the typical monitoring tools administrator can actually implement and that our BSM story is something that any of our clients can be successful with. The sales and marketing slicks must be backed up by something like this whomever you are these days. Clients shouldn&#8217;t put up for “marketecture”, me too and gee whiz buzz words.</p>
<p>BSM takes a partnership and commitment to every client&#8217;s success, and I want to be involved in those BSM efforts in every industry or market worldwide. We need more thought leaders collaborating together in an open and public forum to change legacy attitudes about BSM and do what we can to enable client’s to be as successful as they can be.</p>
<p><a href="http://sharethis.com/item?&wp=abc&amp;publisher=ea11358c-69de-4e80-9804-e964a8930b70&amp;title=Q%26amp%3BA+with+Doug+McClure%3A+What+Makes+BSM+Successful%3F&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fblog.sciencelogic.com%2Fqa-with-doug-mcclure-what-makes-bsm-successful%2F07%2F2008">ShareThis</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2008 15:02:39 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/management">management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service management database">service management database</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/management tools">management tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service management mentality">service management mentality</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business service management">business service management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business service">business service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business service impact">business service impact</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mission services management">mission services management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/database">database</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/qa-with-doug-mcclure-what-makes-bsm-successful/07/2008">Q&amp;A with Doug McClure: What Makes BSM Successful?</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[Very few details are available for Missouri National Guard breach]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a9da228def34f73b19354bb07ad9da29</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a9da228def34f73b19354bb07ad9da29</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
7/15/08

Organization
National Guard Bureau

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
Missouri National Guard (&quot;MOGUARD

Victims
Citizen-Soldier and employee&quot;s
...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/moguard.jpg" width="155" align="right" height="155"><font size="2"><b>Date Reported: </b><br>7/15/08<br><br><b>Organization: </b><br><a href="http://www.ngb.army.mil/default.aspx">National Guard Bureau</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br><a href="http://www.moguard.com/">Missouri National Guard ("MOGUARD")</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>"Citizen-Soldier and employee"s<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>"approximately 2,000"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>"some personal information"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"The Missouri National Guard learned on Monday, July 14, 2008, that some personal information was compromised. Details of how this information was compromised are being withheld at this time, so as not to interfere with the ongoing law enforcement investigation."<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://www.moguard.com/What%20Happened%20in%20July%202008%20and%20How%20Does%20this%20Affect%20Me%20(Final%20Version)%2015JUL08.pdf">Missouri National Guard Press Release</a> <br><a href="http://www.stltoday.com/stltoday/news/stories.nsf/news/missouristatenews/story/ca0fe7785a2d8471862574870051f7fd?OpenDocument">St. Louis Post-Dispatch</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>Missouri National Guard<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online sources cited above:<br><br>The Missouri National Guard learned on Monday, July 14, 2008, that some personal information was compromised.<br><br>Details of how this information was compromised are being withheld at this time, so as not to interfere with the ongoing law enforcement investigation.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Sounds like a good excuse to not reveal details.</span><br><br>It is important to note that we have no reason to believe that the information that was compromised was for the purpose of gaining Citizen-Soldier or employee information or that the information has been or will be used inappropriately.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] It's nice that MOGUARD can make this judgment call on behalf of the victims.&nbsp; Its too bad the victims are not allowed to make a determination themselves based on the facts surrounding this breach.</span><br><br>The Missouri National Guard has a list of those Citizen-Soldiers or employees whose information was compromised.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Keyword is "was", and not the phrase "may have been".</span><br><br>Letters are being sent to these individuals and/or their Families.<br><br>The list includes approximately 2,000 individuals.<br><br>At this time we have no confirmation of misuse of Citizen-Soldier or employee information resulting from the loss.<br><br>"I am distressed that sensitive information has been compromised," <a href="http://www.moguard.com/tag/MONG.tag.asp">Major General King Sidwell</a> <br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I am impressed when a leader of an organization steps forward and speaks about a breach.&nbsp; In my opinion it demonstrates strong leadership and the understanding that the "buck" ultimately stops with him.</span><br><br>"I am especially concerned about the problems and inconveniences this may cause for our Missouri National Guard Citizen-Soldiers and their families," King said.<br><br>Because Social Security Numbers may have been contained within the missing information, we advise individuals to monitor financial accounts continuously for suspicious activity as a matter of good practice.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] This statement provide a clue as to what "some personal information" may be.</span><br><br>The Missouri National Guard has safeguards in place to protect private information.<br><br>We provide ongoing privacy training to all employees.<br><br>The Missouri National Guard has taken action to rectify this unfortunate situation, and is working to insure our Citizen-Soldier’s or employee’s information receives the highest standard of security and privacy protection.<br><br>Any soldier or family member with questions should call a hotline number at 1-888-526-6664 extension 7888.<br><br>If the soldier is deployed overseas, the soldier may use the Defense Switching Network and call 312-555-9500 extension. 7888. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>We have no idea as to what the cause of this breach may have been.&nbsp; Anyone want to guess?&nbsp; If so, post a comment.<br><br>It’s a little ironic.&nbsp; I was just typing an email response to an information security friend of mine about military breaches and the way the military has a completely different way of disclosing details (if any).&nbsp; This breach is proof positive.&nbsp; We'll have to see if further details emerge over time.<br><br>I sincerely hope that the owners of the "personal information" (the victims) get all of the answers that they require in order to evaluate risk themselves and make educated decisions on how they will proceed. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>Unknown<br></font><br>
<script src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/%7Es/breachblog?i=http://breachblog.com/2008/07/15/moguard.aspx" type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8"></script>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2008 10:15:48 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/missouri national guard">missouri national guard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/breach">breach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/employee information">employee information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sensitive information">sensitive information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/employees information receives">employees information receives</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/details">details</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/breach description">breach description</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/07/15/moguard.aspx">Very few details are available for Missouri National Guard breach</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Man-in-the-Middle Attacks]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/4886f7013362b82e729992218c60dc53</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/4886f7013362b82e729992218c60dc53</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Last week's dramatic rescue of 15 hostages held by the guerrilla organization FARC was the result of months of intricate deception on the part of the Colombian government. At the center was a classic...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Last week's dramatic rescue of 15 hostages held by the guerrilla organization FARC was the result of months of intricate deception on the part of the Colombian government. At the center was a classic man-in-the-middle attack.

In a man-in-the-middle attack, the attacker inserts himself between two communicating parties. Both believe they're talking to each other, and the attacker can delete or modify the communications at will. </p><p><cite>The Wall Street Journal</cite> reported how this <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121518490923829025.html">gambit played out in Colombia</a>: 

<blockquote>"The plan had a chance of working because, for months, in an operation one army officer likened to a 'broken telephone,' military intelligence had been able to convince Ms. Betancourt's captor, Gerardo Aguilar, a guerrilla known as 'Cesar,' that he was communicating with his top bosses in the guerrillas' seven-man secretariat. Army intelligence convinced top guerrilla leaders that they were talking to Cesar. In reality, both were talking to army intelligence."</blockquote>

This ploy worked because Cesar and his guerrilla bosses didn't know one another well. They didn't recognize one anothers' voices, and didn't have a friendship or shared history that could have tipped them off about the ruse. Man-in-the-middle is defeated by context, and the FARC guerrillas didn't have any.

And that's why man-in-the-middle, abbreviated MITM in the computer-security community, is such a problem online: Internet communication is often <a href="http://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/">stripped of any context</a>. There's no way to <a href="http://www.oxid.it/">recognize someone's face</a>. There's no way to <a href="http://ettercap.sourceforge.net/">recognize someone's voice</a>. When you receive an e-mail purporting to come from a person or organization, you have no idea who actually sent it. When you visit a website, you have no idea if you're really visiting that website. We all like to pretend that we know who we're communicating with -- and for the most part, of course, there isn't any attacker inserting himself into our communications -- but in reality, we don't. And there are lots of <a href="http://sourceforge.net/projects/airjack/">hacker tools</a> that exploit this <a href="http://www.wsniff.com/">unjustified trust</a>, and <a href="http://www.theta44.org/karma/">implement MITM attacks</a>.

Even with context, it's still possible for MITM to fool both sides -- because electronic communications are often intermittent. Imagine that one of the FARC guerrillas became suspicious about who he was talking to. So he asks a question about their shared history as a test: "What did we have for dinner that time last year?" or something like that. On the telephone, the attacker wouldn't be able to answer quickly, so his ruse would be discovered.  But e-mail conversation isn't synchronous. The attacker could simply pass that question through to the other end of the communications, and when he got the answer back, he would be able to reply.

This is the way MITM attacks work against web-based financial systems. A bank demands authentication from the user: a password, a one-time code from a token or whatever. The attacker sitting in the middle receives the request from the bank and passes it to the user.  The user responds to the attacker, who passes that response to the bank. Now the bank assumes it is talking to the legitimate user, and the attacker is free to send transactions directly to the bank. This kind of attack completely bypasses any <a href="http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0503.html#2">two-factor authentication mechanisms</a>, and is becoming a more popular identity-theft tactic.

There are cryptographic solutions to MITM attacks, and there are secure web protocols that implement them. Many of them require shared secrets, though, making them useful only in situations where people already know and trust one another.

The NSA-designed <a href="http://www.fas.org/irp/program/security/_work/stu3.html">STU-III and STE</a> secure telephones solve the MITM problem by embedding the identity of each phone together with its key. (The NSA creates all keys and is trusted by everyone, so this works.) When two phones talk to each other securely, they exchange keys and display the other phone's identity on a screen. Because the phone is in a secure location, the user now knows who he is talking to, and if the phone displays another organization -- as it would if there were a MITM attack in progress -- he should hang up.

Zfone, a <a href="http://zfoneproject.com/faq.html#mitm">secure VoIP system</a>, protects against MITM attacks with a short authentication string. After two Zfone terminals exchange keys, both computers display a four-character string. The users are supposed to manually verify that both strings are the same -- "my screen says 5C19; what does yours say?" -- to ensure that the phones are communicating directly with each other and not with an MITM. The <a href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/21746901@N08/2275723713/">AT&T TSD-3600</a> worked similarly.

This sort of protection is embedded in SSL, although no one uses it. As it is normally used, SSL provides an encrypted communications link to whoever is at the other end: bank and phishing site alike. And the better phishing sites create valid SSL connections, so as to more effectively fool users. But if the user wanted to, he could manually <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/protect/yourself/phishing/spoof.mspx">check the SSL certificate</a> to see if it was issued to "National Bank of Trustworthiness" or "Two Guys With a Computer in Nigeria."  
 
No one does, though, because you have to both remember and be willing to do the work. (The browsers could make this easier if they wanted to, but they don’t seem to want to.) In the real world, you can easily tell a branch of your bank from a money changer on a street corner. But on the internet, a phishing site can be easily made to look like your bank's legitimate website. Any method of telling the two apart takes work. And that's the first step to fooling you with a MITM attack.
 
Man-in-the-middle isn't new, and it doesn't have to be technological. But the internet makes the attacks easier and more powerful, and that's not going to change anytime soon.

This essay <a href="http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2008/07/securitymatters_0710">originally appeared</a> on Wired.com.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=bCKMKJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=bCKMKJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=1NNFNJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=1NNFNJ" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2008 02:47:19 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/implement mitm attacks">implement mitm attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/implement">implement</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mitm attacks">mitm attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mitm">mitm</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mitm attack">mitm attack</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bank">bank</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bank demands authentication">bank demands authentication</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bank assumes">bank assumes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attacker inserts">attacker inserts</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/07/maninthemiddle_1.html">Man-in-the-Middle Attacks</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[Arnon Rotem-Gal-Oz on SOA Security]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/75344fddc00a8df3f17a15b008ddae69</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/75344fddc00a8df3f17a15b008ddae69</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Arnon cites his paper which builds on Deutsch, Gosling and Joy's famous Fallacies of Distributed Computing, specifically Fallacy #4 &quot;the network is secure&quot; These are common mistakes people make when...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Arnon cites his paper which builds on Deutsch, Gosling and Joy's famous Fallacies of Distributed Computing, specifically Fallacy #4 "the network is secure" These are common mistakes people make when building disiributed apps. Arnon <a href="http://www.rgoarchitects.com/nblog/2008/07/12/SOASecurityReminder.aspx">blogged</a> this:</p><br><div><span style="line-height: normal; "><blockquote><p> In my opinion, assuming the network is secure for an SOA is not only naïve but negligence pure and simple. The whole premise of moving an organization to SOA is connectedness and integration. So, unless your SOA will fail it will be connected to other systems. Whether you  are building RESTful systems, WS-* SOAs, EDAs or any combination of these architectural styles, If you won’t treat the services boundary as a border and secure it – you will be sorry…</p><p>Security in SOA should be considered at the "grand-scheme" level with issues like authertication, authorization but also at the single service level, looking at issues like DDOS, SQL injection, elevation of privilige and what not. A trivial thing like exposing a transaction beyond service boundaries can translate to an attacker denying services in your system simply by locking out your database. Again, this is just a simple example.</p><p>The other thing about Security is that you have to consider it early. patching security "later on" can have devestating effects on a system's capabilites esp. in areas related to performance. I have seen even military systems that had to go through serious rework, just  because Security was added as an afterthought instead of handled early on</p></blockquote>This is a great way to think about the problem, and as Arnon says its not just an issue with SOA security, its </span>a pervasive issue. If you think REST+SSL is a security architecture then you should consider what threats you are choosing *not* to deal with.</div><br><div>Also, Arnon articulated what I call the gateway vulnerability problem. SOA, Web services, REST et al are fundamentally gateway, interoperability focused technologies. And they are for the most part, great at providing simplified access to back end systems. The problem is that your mainframe, ERP, CRM, et al were never designed for anything remotely resembling an Internet threat model. So you just provided a gateway to a system that from a security standpoint is underpowered. The gateway is not the problem but what lies behind it.</div><br><div>In school they called marijuana a gateway drug because it led to heroin usage, in web services security if you put a Web service in front of your back end creating a vulnerable gateway to that which runs your business then your sys admin may wind doing heroin.</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 14 Jul 2008 09:40:01 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/soa">soa</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/soa security">soa security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/services">services</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web services security">web services security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web services">web services</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security standpoint">security standpoint</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/arnon">arnon</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/gateway">gateway</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/07/arnon-rotem-gal-oz-on-soa-security.html">Arnon Rotem-Gal-Oz on SOA Security</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[Chinese Cyber Attacks]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6da7a571e68f430abd0a03fd33ea55f7</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6da7a571e68f430abd0a03fd33ea55f7</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The popular media conception is that there is a coordinated attempt by the Chinese government to hack into U.S. computers -- military, government corporate -- and steal secrets. The truth is a lot...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The popular media conception is that there is a coordinated attempt by the Chinese government to hack into U.S. computers -- military, government corporate -- and steal secrets. The truth is a lot more complicated.

There certainly is a lot of hacking coming out of China. Any company that does security monitoring sees it all the time.

These hacker groups seem not to be working for the Chinese government. They don't seem to be coordinated by the Chinese military. They're basically young, male, patriotic Chinese citizens, trying to demonstrate that they're just as good as everyone else. As well as the American networks the media likes to talk about, their targets also include pro-Tibet, pro-Taiwan, Falun Gong and pro-Uyghur sites.

The hackers are in this for two reasons: fame and glory, and an attempt to make a living. The fame and glory comes from their nationalistic goals. Some of these hackers are heroes in China. They're upholding the country's honor against both anti-Chinese forces like the pro-Tibet movement and larger forces like the United States.

And the money comes from several sources. The groups sell owned computers, malware services, and data they steal on the black market. They sell hacker tools and videos to others wanting to play. They even sell T-shirts, hats and other merchandise on their Web sites.

This is not to say that the Chinese military ignores the hacker groups within their country. Certainly the Chinese government knows the leaders of the hacker movement and chooses to look the other way. They probably buy stolen intelligence from these hackers. They probably recruit for their own organizations from this self-selecting pool of experienced hacking experts. They certainly learn from the hackers.

And some of the hackers are good. Over the years, they have become more sophisticated in both tools and techniques. They're stealthy. They do good network reconnaissance. My guess is what the Pentagon thinks is the problem is only a small percentage of the actual problem.

And they discover their own vulnerabilities. Earlier this year, one security company noticed a unique attack against a pro-Tibet organization. That same attack was also used two weeks earlier against a large multinational defense contractor.

They also hoard vulnerabilities. During the 1999 conflict over the two-states theory conflict, in a heated exchange with a group of Taiwanese hackers, one Chinese group threatened to unleash multiple stockpiled worms at once. There was no reason to disbelieve this threat.

If anything, the fact that these groups aren't being run by the Chinese government makes the problem worse. Without central political coordination, they're likely to take more risks, do more stupid things and generally ignore the political fallout of their actions.

In this regard, they're more like a non-state actor.

So while I'm perfectly happy that the U.S. government is using the threat of Chinese hacking as an impetus to get their own cybersecurity in order, and I hope they succeed, I also hope that the U.S. government recognizes that these groups are not acting under the direction of the Chinese military and doesn't treat their actions as officially approved by the Chinese government.


This essay <a href="http://dsc.discovery.com/technology/my-take/computer-hackers-china.html or http://tinyurl.com/5lv3ac">originally appeared</a> on the Discovery Channel website.<div class="feedflare">
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      <pubDate>Mon, 14 Jul 2008 03:08:18 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/chinese">chinese</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/chinese military ignores">chinese military ignores</category>
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      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/07/chinese_cyber_a.html">Chinese Cyber Attacks</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[You dont think they would install Vista do you?]]></title>
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      <description><![CDATA[For the love of all thats holy, dont install Vista


clipped from www.theregister.co.uk
Upgrade drags Stealth Bomber IT systems into the 90s


While it might seem odd to some readers that the US Air...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div > For the love of all thats holy, dont install Vista! </div>
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<td valign="top"><!-- CLIPPED FROM: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/07/11/stealth_bomber_upgrades/ --><H2>Upgrade drags Stealth Bomber IT systems into the 90s</H2></td>
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<td valign="top"><!-- CLIPPED FROM: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/07/11/stealth_bomber_upgrades/ --><P>While it might seem odd to some readers that the US Air Force&#8217;s multibillion dollar flagship plane is only now &#8220;upgrading&#8221; to fairly basic tech, this is commonplace in advanced aerospace and military kit. The space shuttle&#8217;s flight computers, similarly critical to it remaining under control, are likewise basic. In the early years of the 21st century, the main battle computer of a Royal Navy destroyer was still based around two 24-bit, 1 MHz processors each with 25KB of RAM.</P></td>
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      <pubDate>Fri, 11 Jul 2008 11:08:07 +0000</pubDate>
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      <source url="http://spywarebiz.com/spywarebizblog/?p=500">You dont think they would install Vista do you?</source>
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