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  <channel>
    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: mom]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/mom</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Mon, 02 Jun 2008 09:30:31 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Distributing Malware Through Trusted Websites]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/cae6f541e7465dec204629e91bf2e209</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/cae6f541e7465dec204629e91bf2e209</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Why bother setting up dedicated websites to host malicious content when you can just infect trusted sites like BusinessWeek ? This is becoming something of a trend, as evidenced by the mass SQL...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Why bother setting up dedicated websites to host malicious content when you can just <a href="http://www.net-security.org/malware_news.php?id=990">infect trusted sites like BusinessWeek</a>?  This is becoming something of a trend, as evidenced by the <a href="http://hackademix.net/2008/04/26/mass-attack-faq/">mass SQL Injection</a> attacks from a few months ago.</p>
<p>The idea is simple &#8212; find SQL Injection vulnerabilities in high-traffic, trusted websites where the site&#8217;s content is dynamically fetched from a database (i.e. just about any content-rich site).  Then use an automated tool to prepend or append malicious content to that content in the database.  When the unsuspecting user visits the page to read an article, they will be treated to a barrage of &lt;script&gt; or other tags fetching content from sites in .ru, .cn, or who knows where else.</p>
<p>The guidance you give to mom and dad, &#8220;don&#8217;t visit sketchy looking sites in other countries,&#8221; is no longer good enough.  If BusinessWeek can be compromised, it&#8217;s a given that USA Today, CNN, the New York Times, and other establishments are being targeted as well.</p>
<p>For this and similar examples, <a href="http://noscript.net/">NoScript</a> would have thwarted the attack because it wouldn&#8217;t permit the .js file to be loaded from an off-domain location.  But what happens when the attackers start injecting the entire .js payload into the database instead of just a &lt;script&gt; tag?  Now the malicious code is coming from the trusted domain, and if I&#8217;ve configured NoScript to allow scripts from businessweek.com, I&#8217;m out of luck.  In fact, I have no idea why the attackers aren&#8217;t using this tactic already.  Any ideas?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 16:14:01 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/content">content</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/content-rich site">content-rich site</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/host malicious content">host malicious content</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sites content">sites content</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sites">sites</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/append malicious content">append malicious content</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/websites">websites</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/businessweek">businessweek</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql injection vulnerabilities">sql injection vulnerabilities</category>
      <source url="http://www.veracode.com/blog/2008/09/distributing-malware-through-trusted-websites/">Distributing Malware Through Trusted Websites</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[VP Nominee Sarah Palin, Hacker?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/8e3f93f782545f8440786e956b4d45a5</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/8e3f93f782545f8440786e956b4d45a5</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[John McCains pick for VP, Sarah Palin, knows a thing or two about retrieving evidence from a computer. The mainstream reporting calls her a hacker because she is able to retrieve files from the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>John McCain&#8217;s pick for VP, Sarah Palin, knows a thing or two about retrieving evidence from a computer.  The mainstream reporting calls her a &#8220;hacker&#8221; because she is able to retrieve files from the Windows recycle bin. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://dwb.adn.com/front/story/5572779p-5504444c.html">Anchorage Daily News reports</a> back in September 2004:</p>
<blockquote><p>Sarah Palin never thought of herself as an investigator.  Yet there she was, hacking uncomfortably into Randy Ruedrich&#8217;s computer, looking for evidence that the state Republican Party boss had broken the state ethics law while a member of the Alaska Oil &amp; Gas Conservation Commission.</p>
<p class="story_readable">The next week, when Palin went back to work at the AOGCC, she noticed that Ruedrich had removed his pictures from the walls and the personal effects from his desk. But as she and an AOGCC technician worked their way around his computer password at the behest of an assistant attorney general in Fairbanks, they found his cleanup had not extended to his electronic files.</p>
<p class="story_readable">The technician &#8220;said it looked like he tried to delete this, but she knew a way to go around and get some of the deleted stuff,&#8221; Palin said in an interview. &#8220;I didn&#8217;t know what I was looking for, but I was there.&#8221;</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And this is how <a href="http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2007/08/13/alaska/index1.html">Salon reports</a> the same incident:</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;In a neat symbolic fit, the agent responsible for Alaska&#8217;s current moment of reform and modernization is a woman, a breed once nearly as rare in far Northwest politics as a Democrat. Sarah Palin, a libertarian and hockey mom from the fast-growing suburbs of Anchorage, began her political career &#8212; as an appointed member of the state&#8217;s Oil and Gas Commission &#8212; by hacking into the computer of another commissioner, Randy Ruedrich, chairman of the Alaska Republican Party. Palin was seeking the evidence that she would eventually use to charge him with an improper relationship with lobbyists. (Ruedrich would later settle state ethics charges against him by paying a $12,000 fine.)&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Is this where the McCain administration is going to get their computer security expertise?  She&#8217;s not a security expert but it is nice to see someone at the level of state govenor who knows their way around a computer.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 30 Aug 2008 14:51:57 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/palin">palin</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sarah palin">sarah palin</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer">computer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/randy ruedrichs computer">randy ruedrichs computer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer password">computer password</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer security expertise">computer security expertise</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/technician">technician</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/aogcc technician">aogcc technician</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/randy ruedrich">randy ruedrich</category>
      <source url="http://www.veracode.com/blog/2008/08/vp-nominee-sarah-palin-hacker/">VP Nominee Sarah Palin, Hacker?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[You want the truth, you can't handle the truth!]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5e8ee0a0eb7aec0d6393e17e6cc64b3d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5e8ee0a0eb7aec0d6393e17e6cc64b3d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I am not sure what it is with Richard Stiennon. Maybe his mom beat him with a NAC stick when he was young. Hence his Jack Nicholson looks (more like the Joker in Batman , than Col Jessep in A Few Good...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><a href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/fewgoodmen.jpg"><img title="fewgoodmen" height="183" alt="fewgoodmen" src="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/fewgoodmen_thumb.jpg" width="179" align="left" border="0" style="BORDER-RIGHT: 0px; BORDER-TOP: 0px; MARGIN: 0px 10px 5px 0px; BORDER-LEFT: 0px; BORDER-BOTTOM: 0px" /></a> I am not sure what it is with Richard Stiennon.&nbsp; Maybe his mom beat him with a NAC stick when he was young.&nbsp; Hence his Jack Nicholson looks (more like the Joker in <a class="zem_slink" title="Batman" href="http://www.dccomics.com/sites/batman/" rel="homepage">Batman</a>, than Col Jessep in <a class="zem_slink" title="A Few Good Men" href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0104257" rel="imdb">A Few Good Men</a>) and his total disdain for NAC.&nbsp; In any event Richard never seems to miss a chance to take a pot shot at NAC.&nbsp; I have fired back and debated him many times on this.&nbsp; In fact I am convinced that Richard's problem with NAC is that like Uncle Joe, he is just moving a little slow.&nbsp; Richard still thinks of NAC as Cisco???s network admission control, circa Dec ???03.&nbsp; He has not gotten up to speed on anything happening with NAC since.&nbsp; Richard is going to debate NAC with Joel Snyder according to <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/newsletters/vpn/2008/070708nac2.html">this article</a> by Tim Greene today. My prediction is Snyder by a knockout in 3 rounds or less.</p>

<p>Richard???s latest NAC knock comes on a comment to an <a href="http://rationalsecurity.typepad.com/blog/2008/07/security-analys.html?cid=121871540#comment-121871540">excellent article by the Hoff</a>.&nbsp; Chris takes a bold stand for someone working for a vendor and calls BS on the whole analyst thing (I will write more about that later in this article). Richard being an ex-analyst himself (lets face it, with Richard you can take the man out of the analyst job, but you can???t take the analyst out of the man), takes exception to Hoff???s ???whining??? (Richards words, not mine) and tries to tell Hoff that giving up is not the answer and the way to show up analysts, is to prove them wrong.&nbsp; Great Richard you try to prove them wrong, when because of what they report you don???t have a market, can???t get any capital and have no visibility.&nbsp; I guess that is when it is time to move on to the next gig, right? Then Richard has a bad NAC deja vu and feels it necessary to write this: </p><blockquote><p><em>???Look how easy it is to one up the analyst firms, who as near as I can tell support Network Admission Control universally. Everyone except the folks at Updata Ventures know how seriously flawed NAC is with only one viable market, edu.???</em></p></blockquote><p>I assume Richard is referring to Updata recently leading the Bradford Networks VC round. But more importantly Richard it is time to call a code red on you and give you the cold hard truth.&nbsp; Richard the fact is that the edu market is not the only viable market for NAC.&nbsp; In fact, one of the biggest customers of NAC is the DoD.&nbsp; That is right Richard at least 3 of the 4 armed forces use NAC in helping to secure their networks. To paraphrase my friend Col Jessep - Richard, you want the truth, you can???t handle the truth!&nbsp; You sleep securely under the blanket of protection that NAC provides.&nbsp; If it is good enough to help ???clean the sand??? out of laptops coming home from SWA (that is SouthWest Asia, like in Iraq and Afghanistan, in case you don???t know Richard), it should be good enough for you. Think about that next time you are about to bad mouth NAC.</p>

<p>Let me give you some other truths you may not like Richard.&nbsp; Why do you think every switch vendor (of which we partner with many of them) is lining up and bringing out NAC solutions?&nbsp; Why has Microsoft put such a big push on NAP?&nbsp; Why despite the Luddites like you does NAC still draw crowds at conferences like Interop (ask Joel about that).&nbsp; Richard we are still signing new major OEM partners.&nbsp; I am afraid you are the one sadly out of touch on this one Richard.&nbsp; Just as you are out of touch in missing Hoff???s point in his article.</p>

<p>As to Hoff???s article, as I said I give Chris credit for speaking his mind. I spend an ungodly amount of my time speaking with analysts and trying to ???learn??? from them while at the same time trying to educate them.&nbsp; I am constantly amazed that so many analysts (and press for that matter) just take a vendors word as gospel. I have seen research reports from analysts big and small, that I am sure did not have any more research done than calling a handful of vendors and listening to their spiel. Too many of these vendors if they do speak to customers, base their findings on such a small sample that it is impossible to have an accurate picture.</p>

<p>Personally, like Hoff says, who watches the watchers is the truth. I would like to see a code of conduct among analysts. I would start by dictating that vendors cannot pay analysts.&nbsp; Take the payola out of the equation the way they did to the DJ/Radio business in the late 50s. Next analyst reports have to come with metrics to back up the findings. I want to know how many customers they spoke to, how big they were, how they were found, etc.&nbsp; A vendor giving an analyst a real live???pet??? customer is not real research. I want to know if the customer pays the analyst. It is a dirty business. </p>

<p>Hey let me be clear, I play the game as well as the next guy.&nbsp; But I agree with Hoff we need to clean up the rules to make the whole analyst thing more fair, viable and valuable.</p>

<div class="zemanta-pixie" style="MARGIN-TOP: 10px; HEIGHT: 15px"><a class="zemanta-pixie-a" title="Zemified by Zemanta" href="http://reblog.zemanta.com/zemified/e6165b9b-253e-4392-a8dd-ef9917b5dc2e/"><img class="zemanta-pixie-img" alt="Zemanta Pixie" src="http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_e.png?x-id=e6165b9b-253e-4392-a8dd-ef9917b5dc2e" style="BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; BORDER-TOP: medium none; FLOAT: right; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none" /></a></div></div>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Jul 2008 18:50:16 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac">nac</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac stick">nac stick</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/richard">richard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/richard stiennon">richard stiennon</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bad mouth nac">bad mouth nac</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/importantly richard">importantly richard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac knock">nac knock</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/assume richard">assume richard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/event richard">event richard</category>
      <source url="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/2008/07/you-want-the-tr.html">You want the truth, you can't handle the truth!</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[You want the truth, you can't handle the truth!]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/8ffe83b77278161ca4798e9097d5d497</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/8ffe83b77278161ca4798e9097d5d497</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I am not sure what it is with Richard Stiennon. Maybe his mom beat him with a NAC stick when he was young. Hence his Jack Nicholson looks (more like the Joker in Batman , than Col Jessep in A Few Good...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><a href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/fewgoodmen.jpg"><img title="fewgoodmen" height="183" alt="fewgoodmen" src="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/fewgoodmen_thumb.jpg" width="179" align="left" border="0" style="BORDER-RIGHT: 0px; BORDER-TOP: 0px; MARGIN: 0px 10px 5px 0px; BORDER-LEFT: 0px; BORDER-BOTTOM: 0px" /></a> I am not sure what it is with Richard Stiennon.&nbsp; Maybe his mom beat him with a NAC stick when he was young.&nbsp; Hence his Jack Nicholson looks (more like the Joker in <a class="zem_slink" title="Batman" href="http://www.dccomics.com/sites/batman/" rel="homepage">Batman</a>, than Col Jessep in <a class="zem_slink" title="A Few Good Men" href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0104257" rel="imdb">A Few Good Men</a>) and his total disdain for NAC.&nbsp; In any event Richard never seems to miss a chance to take a pot shot at NAC.&nbsp; I have fired back and debated him many times on this.&nbsp; In fact I am convinced that Richard's problem with NAC is that like Uncle Joe, he is just moving a little slow.&nbsp; Richard still thinks of NAC as Cisco’s network admission control, circa Dec ‘03.&nbsp; He has not gotten up to speed on anything happening with NAC since.&nbsp; Richard is going to debate NAC with Joel Snyder according to <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/newsletters/vpn/2008/070708nac2.html">this article</a> by Tim Greene today. My prediction is Snyder by a knockout in 3 rounds or less.</p>

<p>Richard’s latest NAC knock comes on a comment to an <a href="http://rationalsecurity.typepad.com/blog/2008/07/security-analys.html?cid=121871540#comment-121871540">excellent article by the Hoff</a>.&nbsp; Chris takes a bold stand for someone working for a vendor and calls BS on the whole analyst thing (I will write more about that later in this article). Richard being an ex-analyst himself (lets face it, with Richard you can take the man out of the analyst job, but you can’t take the analyst out of the man), takes exception to Hoff’s “whining” (Richards words, not mine) and tries to tell Hoff that giving up is not the answer and the way to show up analysts, is to prove them wrong.&nbsp; Great Richard you try to prove them wrong, when because of what they report you don’t have a market, can’t get any capital and have no visibility.&nbsp; I guess that is when it is time to move on to the next gig, right? Then Richard has a bad NAC deja vu and feels it necessary to write this: </p><blockquote><p><em>“Look how easy it is to one up the analyst firms, who as near as I can tell support Network Admission Control universally. Everyone except the folks at Updata Ventures know how seriously flawed NAC is with only one viable market, edu.”</em></p></blockquote><p>I assume Richard is referring to Updata recently leading the Bradford Networks VC round. But more importantly Richard it is time to call a code red on you and give you the cold hard truth.&nbsp; Richard the fact is that the edu market is not the only viable market for NAC.&nbsp; In fact, one of the biggest customers of NAC is the DoD.&nbsp; That is right Richard at least 3 of the 4 armed forces use NAC in helping to secure their networks. To paraphrase my friend Col Jessep - Richard, you want the truth, you can’t handle the truth!&nbsp; You sleep securely under the blanket of protection that NAC provides.&nbsp; If it is good enough to help “clean the sand” out of laptops coming home from SWA (that is SouthWest Asia, like in Iraq and Afghanistan, in case you don’t know Richard), it should be good enough for you. Think about that next time you are about to bad mouth NAC.</p>

<p>Let me give you some other truths you may not like Richard.&nbsp; Why do you think every switch vendor (of which we partner with many of them) is lining up and bringing out NAC solutions?&nbsp; Why has Microsoft put such a big push on NAP?&nbsp; Why despite the Luddites like you does NAC still draw crowds at conferences like Interop (ask Joel about that).&nbsp; Richard we are still signing new major OEM partners.&nbsp; I am afraid you are the one sadly out of touch on this one Richard.&nbsp; Just as you are out of touch in missing Hoff’s point in his article.</p>

<p>As to Hoff’s article, as I said I give Chris credit for speaking his mind. I spend an ungodly amount of my time speaking with analysts and trying to “learn” from them while at the same time trying to educate them.&nbsp; I am constantly amazed that so many analysts (and press for that matter) just take a vendors word as gospel. I have seen research reports from analysts big and small, that I am sure did not have any more research done than calling a handful of vendors and listening to their spiel. Too many of these vendors if they do speak to customers, base their findings on such a small sample that it is impossible to have an accurate picture.</p>

<p>Personally, like Hoff says, who watches the watchers is the truth. I would like to see a code of conduct among analysts. I would start by dictating that vendors cannot pay analysts.&nbsp; Take the payola out of the equation the way they did to the DJ/Radio business in the late 50s. Next analyst reports have to come with metrics to back up the findings. I want to know how many customers they spoke to, how big they were, how they were found, etc.&nbsp; A vendor giving an analyst a real live“pet” customer is not real research. I want to know if the customer pays the analyst. It is a dirty business. </p>

<p>Hey let me be clear, I play the game as well as the next guy.&nbsp; But I agree with Hoff we need to clean up the rules to make the whole analyst thing more fair, viable and valuable.</p>

<div class="zemanta-pixie" style="MARGIN-TOP: 10px; HEIGHT: 15px"><a class="zemanta-pixie-a" title="Zemified by Zemanta" href="http://reblog.zemanta.com/zemified/e6165b9b-253e-4392-a8dd-ef9917b5dc2e/"><img class="zemanta-pixie-img" alt="Zemanta Pixie" src="http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_e.png?x-id=e6165b9b-253e-4392-a8dd-ef9917b5dc2e" style="BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; BORDER-TOP: medium none; FLOAT: right; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none" /></a></div></div>

<p><a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=dcwJi7"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=dcwJi7" border="0"></img></a></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=Tb6DcJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=Tb6DcJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=MtzjiJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=MtzjiJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=BbZUEJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=BbZUEJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=zXRM7J"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=zXRM7J" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=9dGsDj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=9dGsDj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=IUwOmj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=IUwOmj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~4/332294950" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Jul 2008 18:35:46 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac">nac</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac stick">nac stick</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/richard">richard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bad mouth nac">bad mouth nac</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/richard stiennon">richard stiennon</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/importantly richard">importantly richard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac knock">nac knock</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/assume richard">assume richard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac solutions">nac solutions</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~3/332294950/you-want-the-tr.html">You want the truth, you can't handle the truth!</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[CBAC & Medical Identity Theft]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/02105d066a63c57c66a00f92ef63e99d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/02105d066a63c57c66a00f92ef63e99d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Good story to keep in mind for those of you working on CBAC. Claims neeed protection and verification. Why steal an identity when you can capture a claim? (hattip: askelizabeth
The Sopranokovs
The...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Good story to keep in mind for those of you working on CBAC. Claims neeed protection and verification. Why steal an identity when you can capture a claim? (hattip: <a href="http://askelizabeth.typepad.com/weblog/2008/07/medical-identity-theft-the-new-frontier-for-organized-crime.html">askelizabeth</a>)

</p><blockquote><p>
	The Sopranokovs 
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>The Russian mob comes to town with a new scam—medical identity theft. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>When FBI special agent Ted Price peered through the window of a dingy brick storefront on Southwest Morrison Street in March, it was what he didn’t see that caught his attention. 	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>The business, called UnimedCorner, claimed to provide ailing seniors with orthotics—braces and other devices to correct foot, joint and back problems. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Price and other federal investigators were skeptical. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>On Unimed’s showroom floor, Price saw wheelchairs, motorized scooters, a variety of canes and, on the walls, a selection of amateurish paintings and framed photographs. There was no evidence, however, of the kinds of equipment for which Unimed had billed Medicare nearly $2 million in the previous couple of months. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>“I observed wheelchairs and canes through the window but did not see any orthotics in the store,” Price later wrote in a search-warrant affidavit. “It is a sign of fraud that the store is not stocking the items [for which] it is billing.” 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>By the time Price arrived on the scene, the company’s owner, a shadowy Russian immigrant named Alexandr Shcherbakov, was long gone. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Today, Shcherbakov’s store sits undisturbed. The message light on the phone blinks, dead potted plants droop and a stuffed toy monkey slumps in a glass display case. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>And behind the cash register hangs a framed poster of television’s best-known mobsters, the Sopranos. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>From interviews and information presented in federal affidavits, it is clear Shcherbakov moved to Oregon to commit a crime elegant and lucrative enough to make Tony Soprano envious: medical identity theft. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>... 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>“Medical identity theft is the new frontier for organized crime,” says Alex Johnson, a former FBI agent who investigates fraud for Regence BlueShield. “Pretty much anybody can set up a mom-and-pop operation and start cranking out claims.”
	
	Someday, most Americans will need a cane, wheelchair, home hospital bed or another of the items healthcare professionals call “durable medical equipment,” or DME. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>For those over 64 and without private insurance, there’s a good chance federally funded Medicare will pick up the tab for that equipment. Last year, according to federal statistics, Medicare spent $8.6 billion on DME. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Here’s the way the system is supposed to work: A doctor prescribes a device such as a wheelchair for a patient, who presents his prescription to a DME supplier. The supplier provides the equipment and bills Medicare, which typically pays 80 percent of the cost.
	
	Unlike pharmacists, who fill prescriptions under strict scrutiny of state and federal watchdogs, DME suppliers are lightly regulated.
	
	“DME is very vulnerable to fraud,” says Consuelo Woodhead, the chief healthcare fraud prosecutor for the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles. “It doesn’t require any background in medicine, any kind of professional licensure or appreciable capital. </p></blockquote><blockquote><p>There are barriers of entry in other medical fields, but not in DME.”
	
	To operate, DME suppliers simply need a place of business, a business license and liability insurance. Unlike pharmacists, DME suppliers operate under an honor system: The feds count on them to supply the equipment they claim to provide to the beneficiaries who need it. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>That honor system is not working. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>The epicenter of DME fraud, according to the federal Department of Health and Human Services, is South Florida, where Medicare billing for DME quadrupled from 2002 to 2006 to $1.7 billion.
	
	Investigators found much of that increase was due to fraud. In 2006, federal inspectors revoked the licenses of 634 DME suppliers in South Florida, nearly half the DME dealers in the region. </p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Later the same year, raids in Southern California yielded similar results: The feds shut down 95 DME suppliers.
	
	Many of the DME suppliers shut down around Los Angeles were run by immigrants from the former Soviet Union. It’s probably no coincidence that when the feds raided Los Angeles DME suppliers, some Angelenos fled to cities where there was less scrutiny—such as Portland.</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Jul 2008 06:09:41 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dme suppliers simply">dme suppliers simply</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dme suppliers">dme suppliers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dme fraud">dme fraud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fraud">fraud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dme">dme</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/identity">identity</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/medical identity theft">medical identity theft</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dme dealers">dme dealers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dme supplier">dme supplier</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/07/cbac-medical-identity-theft.html">CBAC &amp; Medical Identity Theft</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Mr Bump has a problem with me being frustrated by loving customers]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/1f44fa47d39bc9ab7afac7c6afcf84a5</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/1f44fa47d39bc9ab7afac7c6afcf84a5</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[So my friend Mr Bump has a problem with my post on vendor frustrations with customers. For those who don't know Mr Bump, he writes about &quot;NAC in the real world&quot;, originally about his deployment of...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>So my friend <a href="http://www.bumpinthewire.com/?p=194#comment-727">Mr Bump has a problem</a> with my post on vendor frustrations with customers. For those who don't know Mr Bump, he writes about &quot;NAC in the real world&quot;, originally about his deployment of Nevis Networks product. At first I thought Mr Bump was a pseudonym for Dom Wilde over at Nevis, but over time I actually like some of what Mr Bump writes and he contributes to the security blogosphere in a positive way. I just like to give him crap about his choice of NAC vendors, but it is all in good fun. Plus I actually like and respect Dom Wilde and that kind of unscrupulous behavior is not his thing.&nbsp; There is another NAC vendor who plays fast and loose like that though and I will be writing more about that this week, so stay tuned.<br /><br />Mr Bump responds to each of my three points, but before I get to that, let me clear up a few things. First of all Mr Bump says that this is his problem with 90% of all &quot;sales&quot; people. Mr Bump, you obviously have some issues with sales people. Were they mean to you when you were young? Did your Mom like the salesperson sibling better? Do you secretly dream of being a sales person? Just kidding, but seriously, I did not write my article from the point of view of a sales person. Sorry you confused me with one, though as I have said before we all sell everyday, whether we admit it or not. I was writing from the point of view of a business owner, trying to build a solid business one customer at a time. I am not concerned with short term commissions, but building out a solid customer base. This way I can sell the business for a huge profit and you can call me a slimy entrepreneur ;-).<br /><br />Also, I can complain as a customer, that is my right. Equally so it is my right to complain about customers as well. I guess I can complain about anything I want on my own blog, not sure why that should bother you. Think of it this way. We all wear different masks in different roles in our lives. Sometimes we wear the Daddy mask, sometimes the boss, sometimes the employee, etc, etc. Being one in one situation, does not preclude you from being another in another situation.<br /><br />Now, on to the show. Mr Bump doubts my sincerity about being upset when a new guy comes into a customer replacing the guy who bought the product and we have to start all over with them. He says I am kidding him. I made my sale and collected my commission and am on my way. Well Mr Bump, I suggest that if that is the kind of security vendors you deal with, find new ones! Any good business person can tell you that one unhappy customer is worth 10 happy ones. It is about building long term customers. That is how you build a business, not about being bandits who come in, rape and pillage, collect the commission and move on. I have known sales people who have sold to the same people over and over again, because they do care for more than the short term commission. I am sorry you can't believe it and you can't see how it frustrates a vendor. But sometimes we will work with a person for months or even years and build a deep relationship. As part of the game, they move on, I get it and that is the way it is. But it is very frustrating starting from square one with the new guy who may have a pre-conceived prejudice. <br /><br />Next Mr Bump finds it unbelievable that I would care if a product implementation got delayed. Again, this speaks wonders to the kind of security vendors he deals with. It is not about if my resources are committed at all. Mr Bump I can't wait to get you up and running so you can tell your friends and others about what a great product and company you deal with and we can continue building the business. Also, believe it or not I care that all of a sudden a maintenance fee comes up because the time starts running from the date of sale and the customer hasn't even used the product yet. Shelfware is a failure for a vendor. Delaying implementation is the first step to shelfware. Please Mr Bump spare me your &quot;in the trenches and grenades&quot; story. Most hard working people at security vendors or anywhere else for that matter are not sitting around playing foosball either! We all deal with emergencies and priorities. I am keenly aware of the security and network admins job pressures and have tried to build a company that actually makes your life easier. Again, I can only assume you are dealing with quite a bunch of vendors if you feel this way.<br /><br />Lastly Mr Bump almost agrees with me about using the product in unintended ways. Mr Bump I can put you in touch with people who have done this. You have to remember that unlike your NAC vendor, our stuff is built on off the shelf hardware with open, standards based OS and database, etc. People who are comfortable around a command line and Linux like to play. We don't mind, just realize how hard that makes our support obligations though and don't expect us to fix what you &quot;developed&quot; <br /><br />So I hope that clears that up. Like I said in my comment on your blog, too bad you didn't pick a better NAC solution you might have a different opinion of security vendors and maybe even sales people ;-)</p></div>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Jun 2008 21:10:08 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bump">bump</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bump responds">bump responds</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sales people">sales people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/people">people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bump doubts">bump doubts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bump writes">bump writes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security vendors">security vendors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/person">person</category>
      <source url="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/2008/06/mr-bump-has-a-p.html">Mr Bump has a problem with me being frustrated by loving customers</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Mr Bump has a problem with me being frustrated by loving customers]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/4e41c81d400ce1b191d4774628571080</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/4e41c81d400ce1b191d4774628571080</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[So my friend Mr Bump has a problem with my post on vendor frustrations with customers. For those who don't know Mr Bump, he writes about &quot;NAC in the real world&quot;, originally about his deployment of...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>So my friend <a href="http://www.bumpinthewire.com/?p=194#comment-727">Mr Bump has a problem</a> with my post on vendor frustrations with customers. For those who don't know Mr Bump, he writes about &quot;NAC in the real world&quot;, originally about his deployment of Nevis Networks product. At first I thought Mr Bump was a pseudonym for Dom Wilde over at Nevis, but over time I actually like some of what Mr Bump writes and he contributes to the security blogosphere in a positive way. I just like to give him crap about his choice of NAC vendors, but it is all in good fun. Plus I actually like and respect Dom Wilde and that kind of unscrupulous behavior is not his thing.&nbsp; There is another NAC vendor who plays fast and loose like that though and I will be writing more about that this week, so stay tuned.<br /><br />Mr Bump responds to each of my three points, but before I get to that, let me clear up a few things. First of all Mr Bump says that this is his problem with 90% of all &quot;sales&quot; people. Mr Bump, you obviously have some issues with sales people. Were they mean to you when you were young? Did your Mom like the salesperson sibling better? Do you secretly dream of being a sales person? Just kidding, but seriously, I did not write my article from the point of view of a sales person. Sorry you confused me with one, though as I have said before we all sell everyday, whether we admit it or not. I was writing from the point of view of a business owner, trying to build a solid business one customer at a time. I am not concerned with short term commissions, but building out a solid customer base. This way I can sell the business for a huge profit and you can call me a slimy entrepreneur ;-).<br /><br />Also, I can complain as a customer, that is my right. Equally so it is my right to complain about customers as well. I guess I can complain about anything I want on my own blog, not sure why that should bother you. Think of it this way. We all wear different masks in different roles in our lives. Sometimes we wear the Daddy mask, sometimes the boss, sometimes the employee, etc, etc. Being one in one situation, does not preclude you from being another in another situation.<br /><br />Now, on to the show. Mr Bump doubts my sincerity about being upset when a new guy comes into a customer replacing the guy who bought the product and we have to start all over with them. He says I am kidding him. I made my sale and collected my commission and am on my way. Well Mr Bump, I suggest that if that is the kind of security vendors you deal with, find new ones! Any good business person can tell you that one unhappy customer is worth 10 happy ones. It is about building long term customers. That is how you build a business, not about being bandits who come in, rape and pillage, collect the commission and move on. I have known sales people who have sold to the same people over and over again, because they do care for more than the short term commission. I am sorry you can't believe it and you can't see how it frustrates a vendor. But sometimes we will work with a person for months or even years and build a deep relationship. As part of the game, they move on, I get it and that is the way it is. But it is very frustrating starting from square one with the new guy who may have a pre-conceived prejudice. <br /><br />Next Mr Bump finds it unbelievable that I would care if a product implementation got delayed. Again, this speaks wonders to the kind of security vendors he deals with. It is not about if my resources are committed at all. Mr Bump I can't wait to get you up and running so you can tell your friends and others about what a great product and company you deal with and we can continue building the business. Also, believe it or not I care that all of a sudden a maintenance fee comes up because the time starts running from the date of sale and the customer hasn't even used the product yet. Shelfware is a failure for a vendor. Delaying implementation is the first step to shelfware. Please Mr Bump spare me your &quot;in the trenches and grenades&quot; story. Most hard working people at security vendors or anywhere else for that matter are not sitting around playing foosball either! We all deal with emergencies and priorities. I am keenly aware of the security and network admins job pressures and have tried to build a company that actually makes your life easier. Again, I can only assume you are dealing with quite a bunch of vendors if you feel this way.<br /><br />Lastly Mr Bump almost agrees with me about using the product in unintended ways. Mr Bump I can put you in touch with people who have done this. You have to remember that unlike your NAC vendor, our stuff is built on off the shelf hardware with open, standards based OS and database, etc. People who are comfortable around a command line and Linux like to play. We don't mind, just realize how hard that makes our support obligations though and don't expect us to fix what you &quot;developed&quot; <br /><br />So I hope that clears that up. Like I said in my comment on your blog, too bad you didn't pick a better NAC solution you might have a different opinion of security vendors and maybe even sales people ;-)</p></div>

<p><a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=yZy0VM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=yZy0VM" border="0"></img></a></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=5wvvOI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=5wvvOI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=gWpzQI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=gWpzQI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=nBriSI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=nBriSI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=mrfD0I"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=mrfD0I" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=ZYOPti"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=ZYOPti" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=qyWSTi"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=qyWSTi" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~4/311620759" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Jun 2008 20:26:46 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bump">bump</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bump responds">bump responds</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sales people">sales people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/people">people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bump doubts">bump doubts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bump writes">bump writes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security vendors">security vendors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/person">person</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~3/311620759/mr-bump-has-a-p.html">Mr Bump has a problem with me being frustrated by loving customers</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Planning a Virtualization Infrastructure What You Need to Know]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6115e1ac1bc3f443e6a376a3461275e3</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6115e1ac1bc3f443e6a376a3461275e3</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Theres a lot of noise about virtualization out in the marketplace from the latest company VMware bought to speculation about Hyper-V to the myriad solutions for virtualization management. I wanted to...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There’s a lot of noise about virtualization out in the marketplace – from the <a href="http://vmblog.com/archive/2008/05/28/vmware-to-acquire-b-hive-networks-to-further-enhance-virtualization-platform-with-application-performance-management.aspx" target="_blank">latest company VMware bought</a> to <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/microsoft/?p=1182" target="_blank">speculation about Hyper-V</a> to the myriad solutions for virtualization management. I wanted to take a more practical approach to talking about virtualization and share advice and best practices that I’ve learned based upon my own experiences planning, deploying and managing large-scale multi-datacenter virtualization infrastructure.</p>
<p>In this first post, I cover the planning process and various considerations that anyone - from a small “mom and pop” shop to a large enterprise – should take into account for successful deployment.</p>
<p><strong>1) What problem(s) are you trying to solve? What are you trying to achieve?</strong></p>
<p>It should come as no surprise that this is the first step but surprisingly it’s a step that is sometimes ignored or not enough time and thought are spent against it in the rush to virtualize. Without really understanding what problem you’re trying to solve and what you’re trying to achieve, how will you ever know that you’ve been successful? Some typical reasons to virtualize:</p>
<ul>
<li>Server consolidation and cost savings. ROI and TCO.</li>
<li>Efficient resource utilization. <a href="http://www.computerworld.com.au/index.php/id;1175625790;fp;4;fpid;2359" target="_blank">Chargeback model</a> and measurement.</li>
<li>Cost-effective growth strategy. Cost avoidance.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>2) What resources do you have and what additional resources do you need?</strong></p>
<p>You need to understand your current environment before adding virtualization to the mix. Peel back the onion and look at historical performance. You may not have the right hardware to handle an increase in virtual servers.</p>
<p>Factor in the pattern of the behavior of servers, whether they are running hot during business hours or at night, peak cycles, etc. Are they CPU-intensive or is the gating factor disk or memory or a combination of these? This information forms the performance baseline you must factor into any <a href="http://weblog.infoworld.com/virtualization/archives/2008/03/virtualization_38.html" target="_blank">virtualization capacity planning</a>.</p>
<p>I can’t emphasize enough how important it is to have a capacity plan. People tend to virtualize but don’t always have a capacity plan in place to know when they’re running at full.</p>
<p>Beyond computing assets, you need to look at staffing as well. How will virtualization effect staff resource utilization? Virtualization, done the right way, should gain you efficiencies on the staffing side as well, freeing up resources for other initiatives. But in order to do it the “right way”, that takes an investment in training that should always be factored into your planning.</p>
<p><strong>3) What are your success metrics?</strong></p>
<p>Make sure to draft a document to formally measure your success before, during, and after implementing a virtualized environment. This relates back to the problem you were trying to solve. Depending on what you need to measure, you need to plan for tools and processes to make this a reality.</p>
<p>In the next post, I’ll talk about roadblocks to successful virtualization deployment and how to avoid them.</p>
<p><a href="http://sharethis.com/item?&wp=2.3.3&amp;publisher=f8a81d13-50d0-4a5c-833d-8e5f2341e305&amp;title=Planning+a+Virtualization+Infrastructure+%26ndash%3B+What+You+Need+to+Know&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fblog.sciencelogic.com%2Fplanning-a-virtualization-infrastructure-what-you-need-to-know%2F06%2F02%2F2008%2F">ShareThis</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 02 Jun 2008 09:30:31 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization">virtualization</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization capacity">virtualization capacity</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization infrastructure">virtualization infrastructure</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/successful deployment">successful deployment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/successful">successful</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization management">virtualization management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/successful virtualization deployment">successful virtualization deployment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/plan">plan</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/capacity plan">capacity plan</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/planning-a-virtualization-infrastructure-what-you-need-to-know/06/02/2008/">Planning a Virtualization Infrastructure What You Need to Know</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Planning a Virtualization Infrastructure What You Need to Know]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/1d10cfcecf5c9ae0c869424816f4c541</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/1d10cfcecf5c9ae0c869424816f4c541</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Theres a lot of noise about virtualization out in the marketplace from the latest company VMware bought to speculation about Hyper-V to the myriad solutions for virtualization management. I wanted to...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There’s a lot of noise about virtualization out in the marketplace – from the <a href="http://vmblog.com/archive/2008/05/28/vmware-to-acquire-b-hive-networks-to-further-enhance-virtualization-platform-with-application-performance-management.aspx" target="_blank">latest company VMware bought</a> to <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/microsoft/?p=1182" target="_blank">speculation about Hyper-V</a> to the myriad solutions for virtualization management. I wanted to take a more practical approach to talking about virtualization and share advice and best practices that I’ve learned based upon my own experiences planning, deploying and managing large-scale multi-datacenter virtualization infrastructure.</p>
<p>In this first post, I cover the planning process and various considerations that anyone - from a small “mom and pop” shop to a large enterprise – should take into account for successful deployment.</p>
<p><strong>1) What problem(s) are you trying to solve? What are you trying to achieve?</strong></p>
<p>It should come as no surprise that this is the first step but surprisingly it’s a step that is sometimes ignored or not enough time and thought are spent against it in the rush to virtualize. Without really understanding what problem you’re trying to solve and what you’re trying to achieve, how will you ever know that you’ve been successful? Some typical reasons to virtualize:</p>
<ul>
<li>Server consolidation and cost savings. ROI and TCO.</li>
<li>Efficient resource utilization. <a href="http://www.computerworld.com.au/index.php/id;1175625790;fp;4;fpid;2359" target="_blank">Chargeback model</a> and measurement.</li>
<li>Cost-effective growth strategy. Cost avoidance.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>2) What resources do you have and what additional resources do you need?</strong></p>
<p>You need to understand your current environment before adding virtualization to the mix. Peel back the onion and look at historical performance. You may not have the right hardware to handle an increase in virtual servers.</p>
<p>Factor in the pattern of the behavior of servers, whether they are running hot during business hours or at night, peak cycles, etc. Are they CPU-intensive or is the gating factor disk or memory or a combination of these? This information forms the performance baseline you must factor into any <a href="http://weblog.infoworld.com/virtualization/archives/2008/03/virtualization_38.html" target="_blank">virtualization capacity planning</a>.</p>
<p>I can’t emphasize enough how important it is to have a capacity plan. People tend to virtualize but don’t always have a capacity plan in place to know when they’re running at full.</p>
<p>Beyond computing assets, you need to look at staffing as well. How will virtualization effect staff resource utilization? Virtualization, done the right way, should gain you efficiencies on the staffing side as well, freeing up resources for other initiatives. But in order to do it the “right way”, that takes an investment in training that should always be factored into your planning.</p>
<p><strong>3) What are your success metrics?</strong></p>
<p>Make sure to draft a document to formally measure your success before, during, and after implementing a virtualized environment. This relates back to the problem you were trying to solve. Depending on what you need to measure, you need to plan for tools and processes to make this a reality.</p>
<p>In the next post, I’ll talk about roadblocks to successful virtualization deployment and how to avoid them.</p>
<p><a href="http://sharethis.com/item?&wp=2.3.3&amp;publisher=f8a81d13-50d0-4a5c-833d-8e5f2341e305&amp;title=Planning+a+Virtualization+Infrastructure+%26ndash%3B+What+You+Need+to+Know&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fblog.sciencelogic.com%2F06%2F2008%2Fplanning-a-virtualization-infrastructure-what-you-need-to-know">ShareThis</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 02 Jun 2008 09:30:31 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization">virtualization</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization capacity">virtualization capacity</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization infrastructure">virtualization infrastructure</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/successful deployment">successful deployment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/successful">successful</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization management">virtualization management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/successful virtualization deployment">successful virtualization deployment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/plan">plan</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/capacity plan">capacity plan</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/06/2008/planning-a-virtualization-infrastructure-what-you-need-to-know">Planning a Virtualization Infrastructure What You Need to Know</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Planning a Virtualization Infrastructure What You Need to Know]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5d2f580068535837ea4964daa52cc4ed</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5d2f580068535837ea4964daa52cc4ed</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Theres a lot of noise about virtualization out in the marketplace from the latest company VMware bought to speculation about Hyper-V to the myriad solutions for virtualization management. I wanted to...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There’s a lot of noise about virtualization out in the marketplace – from the <a href="http://vmblog.com/archive/2008/05/28/vmware-to-acquire-b-hive-networks-to-further-enhance-virtualization-platform-with-application-performance-management.aspx" target="_blank">latest company VMware bought</a> to <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/microsoft/?p=1182" target="_blank">speculation about Hyper-V</a> to the myriad solutions for virtualization management. I wanted to take a more practical approach to talking about virtualization and share advice and best practices that I’ve learned based upon my own experiences planning, deploying and managing large-scale multi-datacenter virtualization infrastructure.</p>
<p>In this first post, I cover the planning process and various considerations that anyone - from a small “mom and pop” shop to a large enterprise – should take into account for successful deployment.</p>
<p><strong>1) What problem(s) are you trying to solve? What are you trying to achieve?</strong></p>
<p>It should come as no surprise that this is the first step but surprisingly it’s a step that is sometimes ignored or not enough time and thought are spent against it in the rush to virtualize. Without really understanding what problem you’re trying to solve and what you’re trying to achieve, how will you ever know that you’ve been successful? Some typical reasons to virtualize:</p>
<ul>
<li>Server consolidation and cost savings. ROI and TCO.</li>
<li>Efficient resource utilization. <a href="http://www.computerworld.com.au/index.php/id;1175625790;fp;4;fpid;2359" target="_blank">Chargeback model</a> and measurement.</li>
<li>Cost-effective growth strategy. Cost avoidance.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>2) What resources do you have and what additional resources do you need?</strong></p>
<p>You need to understand your current environment before adding virtualization to the mix. Peel back the onion and look at historical performance. You may not have the right hardware to handle an increase in virtual servers.</p>
<p>Factor in the pattern of the behavior of servers, whether they are running hot during business hours or at night, peak cycles, etc. Are they CPU-intensive or is the gating factor disk or memory or a combination of these? This information forms the performance baseline you must factor into any <a href="http://weblog.infoworld.com/virtualization/archives/2008/03/virtualization_38.html" target="_blank">virtualization capacity planning</a>.</p>
<p>I can’t emphasize enough how important it is to have a capacity plan. People tend to virtualize but don’t always have a capacity plan in place to know when they’re running at full.</p>
<p>Beyond computing assets, you need to look at staffing as well. How will virtualization effect staff resource utilization? Virtualization, done the right way, should gain you efficiencies on the staffing side as well, freeing up resources for other initiatives. But in order to do it the “right way”, that takes an investment in training that should always be factored into your planning.</p>
<p><strong>3) What are your success metrics?</strong></p>
<p>Make sure to draft a document to formally measure your success before, during, and after implementing a virtualized environment. This relates back to the problem you were trying to solve. Depending on what you need to measure, you need to plan for tools and processes to make this a reality.</p>
<p>In the next post, I’ll talk about roadblocks to successful virtualization deployment and how to avoid them.</p>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 02 Jun 2008 09:30:31 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization">virtualization</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization capacity">virtualization capacity</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization infrastructure">virtualization infrastructure</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/successful deployment">successful deployment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/successful">successful</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization management">virtualization management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/successful virtualization deployment">successful virtualization deployment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/plan">plan</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/capacity plan">capacity plan</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/planning-a-virtualization-infrastructure-what-you-need-to-know/06/2008">Planning a Virtualization Infrastructure What You Need to Know</source>
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