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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: multi-owner]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/multi-owner</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 13 Aug 2008 04:08:43 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[MSP Snapshot Monitoring with EM7]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5288692e82e0f23665e5086e43db9ed4</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5288692e82e0f23665e5086e43db9ed4</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Between the fifth anniversary for ScienceLogic and the Inc 500 milestone, weve become very nostalgic about the beginnings of the company and EM7. For instance, did you know that EM7 was originally...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Between the <a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/sciencelogics-5-year-anniversary/08/2008" target="_blank">fifth anniversary for ScienceLogic</a> and the Inc 500 milestone, we’ve become very nostalgic about the beginnings of the company and EM7. For instance, did you know that EM7 was originally designed with managed service providers in mind? Not so surprising when 5 of the first 6 employees (including all 3 founders) came from hosting and MSP backgrounds and had first-hand experience with the daily trials and tribulations of MSP operations – and the tools that didn’t quite work for them.
<p><a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/john-at-interop-vegas.jpg"><img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; margin: 0px 10px 10px 0px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" height="184" alt="John at Interop Vegas" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/john-at-interop-vegas-thumb.jpg" width="244" align="left" border="0"></a>Here we talk to John Proctor, who started out as one of our first customers (and the first MSP customer). And he believed in it so much, he eventually became part of the ScienceLogic team. (Remember &#8220;I&#8217;m not only the President, I&#8217;m also a client&#8221; from <a href="http://www.hairclub.com/inthenews_article1.php" target="_blank">the Hair Club for Men</a>?)
<p>John shares his perspectives about the service provider world and why he took a chance on a little-known product called EM7.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What is your background? How many years have you worked as a service provider and for what types of companies?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> I have been working with Service providers for over twelve years. I worked at a major regional service provider for six years and before that I designed and built national and international networks for ISP’s and Fortune 500 companies as a consultant for PriceWaterhouseCoopers and WorldComm.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> You were one of the first customers of EM7 – why did you choose it and how did you get over the hurdles associated with using a start-up company’s product?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> We were actually customer number five. Back in 2004 when we evaluated and purchased EM7 we could see that EM7 provided about 80% of what we were looking for in one integrated solution right out of the box. One of the things that sold us on EM7 was that the ScienceLogic founders had all previously worked for a service provider, so we knew they understood our business and our challenges. But in the end, it comes down to features. Once we compared EM7 functionality to the alternatives, it was clearly a “no brainer.”
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What other alternatives were being considered?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> Well, we had started with a few point solutions, but as our business and product offerings matured, this resulted in a growing number of point solutions. What started with 3 or 4 ended up as 14 separate tools. They all had strengths but what they didn’t have was integration and because of this they could not scale. And, if the tools could not scale, our business could not grow.
<p>So, naturally we started looking at framework solutions, but they are expensive to buy, expensive to implement, and expensive to maintain. At one point, we even considered some open source projects. There were several that showed promise, but we would still be stuck with tools that were not integrated. So then we considered hiring developers to cobble something together that would work for our business. The only problem with this alternative was that we felt it would take 6 to 8 months before we could have something viable to work with.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What products were you using before EM7? What were your goals?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> Before we purchased EM7 we used 14 different point solutions to deliver our products and services to the marketplace. Tools like NetCool, Openview, Argent, Heat, What’s Up Gold as well as several other point solutions, vendor specific applications and manually updated spreadsheets. And, as I mentioned before, this does not scale. This also adds a great deal of complexity when you begin to consider business continuity and disaster recovery. All these tools were vital to the delivery of our products and services. Any service provider will tell you it is all about uptime. So if the product is uptime, the tools used to deliver it have to be available 24&#215;7x365.
<p>Our goals were simple: scale and redundancy. As it turns out, the solution was simple as well. EM7 provided a tool that could replace the functionality of almost half of the existing point solutions and the applications that could not be replaced were integrated with EM7 to provide our staff with a “single pane of glass” to see the status and performance of each area of the business from one application. We had visibility into everything from facility systems to applications using EM7.
<p>ScienceLogic also delivers an extensible configuration that addressed uptime and redundancy. We deployed collectors throughout our network that reported back to a central pair of redundant database servers and with this configuration we were able to perform backups and add capacity without taking the system down.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> Why are service providers different from enterprises? How are their needs different?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> First and foremost, service providers face the same challenges that only the largest enterprises ever face and they also have many unique challenges that only service providers experience.
<p>One challenge we faced was that we had multiple datacenters in different states. They were all interconnected with plenty of bandwidth between each site, but the tools were not designed to be used across the WAN. Our staff in our remote data center did not have the same access as our staff in the corporate office. Since EM7 is web-based, it immediately eliminated this problem.
<p>Another challenge is that service providers must manage systems across multiple domains. Back in the early version of a specific tool we were using before EM7, the only way you could implement it across multiple domains was to put the same username and password on every computer that you monitored. Beyond the security concerns, maintenance was a nightmare. Anytime we had to change the password, we would get locked out of dozens upon dozens of systems. When the password was changed on the monitoring server, it would attempt to login to the remote machines and fail. Repeated attempts would result in the account getting locked. I think that vendor eventually addressed this issue, but service providers seldom find tools that were designed for their unique situations.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> How is EM7 geared to service providers?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> Enterprise IT is a trusted part of the business; they are one of the team. Service providers are outsiders that must earn trust by showing the customer exactly what they are doing.
<p>EM7 provides a multi-tenant environment that allows service providers to manage systems across many different customers while at the same time providing the customer access to see the same information but only what’s relevant to them.
<p>EM7 was built by service providers and even includes a few features just for them. Two of my favorites are bandwidth billing and the emergency notification system. Take bandwidth billing, for instance. EM7 provides a way to collect bandwidth utilization, store subscription information, and calculate a bill from any one of about 10 different methodologies. And at the end of the billing period, EM7 sends the completed report out to whomever you chose via email.
<p>Another unique service provider feature is the emergency notification system. EM7 allows the provider to track what customers used their unique infrastructure components. If they have to perform maintenance on the infrastructure component or have a problem they can send an email to all of the impacted customers in a matter of minutes.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What trends do you see for service providers? What about big trends such as virtualization and cloud computing – how will they impact service providers?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> Virtualization is really hot for service providers right now and for the same reasons as in the enterprise. Service providers run data centers and data centers must be powered and cooled. So, anytime they can use a virtual server instead of adding physical equipment it is a good thing. But then you add the complexity that multiple customers reside on the same host and you must track things like bandwidth utilizations by guest OS, and it all gets a little harder. Lucky for us this is not a problem for EM7.
<p>I still think it’s early days for cloud computing. Depending on who you talk to, much of what service providers (especially the big ones) have already been doing with SAAS offerings and hosted applications could be described as cloud computing already. In which case, service providers are ahead of the game. But whatever the “final” definition, cloud computing actually shares many similarities with virtualization – in that service providers (or enterprises) will need to be able to manage far more “devices” in real-time with “zero downtime” expectations by customers. What this really means is that you’re going to see much more automation in provisioning and IT monitoring tools to handle the scale and speed with which things can change in the data center given vm migration and the talked-about switching between “clouds” that can be used for high availability. </p>
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      <pubDate>Wed, 08 Oct 2008 12:51:50 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/em7">em7</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service providers">service providers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service providers experience">service providers experience</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service providers seldom">service providers seldom</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/impact service providers">impact service providers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/em7 functionality">em7 functionality</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/em7 sends">em7 sends</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service provider">service provider</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service provider world">service provider world</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/msp-snapshot-monitoring-with-em7/10/2008">MSP Snapshot Monitoring with EM7</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[ePolicing - Tomorrow the world?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a75f8d8e609ad56200d2ab52efd2041c</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a75f8d8e609ad56200d2ab52efd2041c</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[This week has finally seen an announcement that the Police Central e-crime Unit (PCeU) is to be funded by the Home Office. However, the largesse amounts to just 3.5 million of new money spread over...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This week has finally seen an <a href="http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/press-releases/new-specialist-ecrime-unit">announcement</a> that the <a href="http://www.met.police.uk/pceu/index.htm">Police Central e-crime Unit</a> (PCeU) is to be funded by the Home Office. However, the largesse amounts to just £3.5 million of new money spread over three years, with the Met putting up a further £3.9 million &#8212; but whether the Met&#8217;s contribution is &#8220;new&#8221; or reflects a move of resources from their existing <a href="http://www.met.police.uk/computercrime/">Computer Crime Unit</a> I could not say.</p>
<p>The announcement is of course Good News &#8212; because once the PCeU is up and running next Spring, it should plug (to the limited extent that £2 million a year can plug) the &#8220;level 2&#8243; eCrime gap that I&#8217;ve <a href="http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/02/06/mysterious-and-menacing/">written</a> <a href="http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/10/13/mainstreaming-ecrime/">about</a> <a href="http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2007/02/11/soca-we-just-want-your-money/">before</a>. viz: that SOCA tackles &#8220;serious and organised crime&#8221; (level 3), your local police force tackles local villains (level 1), but if criminals operate outside their force&#8217;s area &#8212; and on the Internet this is more likely than not &#8212; yet they don&#8217;t meet SOCA&#8217;s threshold, then who is there to deal with them?</p>
<p>In particular, the PCeU is envisaged to be the unit that deals with the intelligence packages coming from the <a href="http://www.cityoflondon.police.uk/CityPolice/ECD/Fraud/">City of London Fraud Squad&#8217;s</a> new online Fraud Reporting <a href="http://www.kablenet.com/kd.nsf/Frontpage/356DD0A1942F3A998025745F0049092C?OpenDocument">website</a> (once intended to launch in November 2008, now scheduled for Summer 2009).</p>
<p>Of course everyone expects the website to generate more reports of eCrime than could ever be dealt with (even with much more money), so the effectiveness of the PCeU in dealing with eCriminality will depend upon their prioritisation criteria, and how carefully they select the cases they tackle.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, although the news this week shows that the Home Office have finally understood the need to fund more ePolicing, I don&#8217;t think that they are thinking about the problem in a sufficiently global context.</p>
<p>A little history lesson might be in order to explain why.<br />
<span id="more-401"></span></p>
<p>Back in 1930&#8217;s, <a href="http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/clyde/clyde.htm">Bonnie and Clyde</a> and other US bank robbers were using the new-fangled automobile to flee across state lines &#8212; creating jurisdictional problems as a result. The US solution was to make bank robbery (along with auto-theft and other related offences) into federal offences rather keeping them as state-specific infractions. In particular this meant that the FBI could provide federal level policing (tracking down and killing <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Dillinger">John Dillinger</a> for example).</p>
<p>We have the same jurisdictional issues dealing with cyberspace, with criminals in one country fleecing consumers in another while using systems hosted in a third. The <a href="http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/185.htm">Convention on Cybercrime</a> addresses part of the problem by trying to ensure international consistency where eLaws are specifically needed (which of course is only the case for small parts of eCriminality, <a href="http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/acts2006/ukpga_20060035_en_1">fraud</a> is fraud whether eEnabled or not). However, there is limited inter-jurisdictional <em>co-ordination</em> for eCrime investigations &#8212; for example <a href="http://www.interpol.int/">Interpol</a> (often <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpol#Interpol_in_popular_culture">incorrectly perceived</a> to be international police force)  merely keeps a large database and passes faxes from one place to another.</p>
<p>In practice, most cross-border investigations are done as &#8220;joint operations&#8221; and the jointness is usually very limited &#8212; one force does all the legwork and a liaison officer in the other country deals with local paperwork. There&#8217;s usually a <a href="http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/quid-pro-quo.html">quid pro quo</a> element to these joint operations, for budgeting reasons if no other.</p>
<p>What isn&#8217;t happening, or at least only in a handful of very specialised areas, is any international co-operation in setting priorities or selecting cases to pursue. Every country is doing its own thing about eCrime, and there&#8217;s a widespread impression that any criminal who can operate from &#8220;across the state line&#8221; is essentially immune from serious investigation.</p>
<p>We identified this problem last year when we (<a href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/">Ross Anderson</a>, <a href="http://www.inf.tu-dresden.de/index.php?node_id=489">Rainer Böhme</a>, <a href="http://people.seas.harvard.edu/~tmoore/">Tyler Moore</a> and <a href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/">myself</a>) wrote a report on <a href="http://www.enisa.europa.eu/doc/pdf/report_sec_econ_&#038;_int_mark_20080131.pdf">Security Economics and the Internal Market</a> for <a href="http://www.enisa.europa.eu/">ENISA</a>. It&#8217;s not an easy one to fix whilst politicians (and populaces) are unwilling to see &#8220;foreign&#8221; police officers operating in their country, and the establishment of a truly international &#8220;cyber police force&#8221; seems equally unlikely.</p>
<p>Our policy proposal to tackle the issue harks back to WWII&#8217;s <a href="http://www.archives.gov/research/holocaust/finding-aid/military/rg-331.html">SHAEF</a>, which has morphed into similar arrangements within <a href="http://www.nato.int/shape/about/background2.htm">NATO</a>. In essence liaison officers from multiple forces would sit around a single table, working with a central coordinator, to set policy and decide which investigations to pursue. They would then communicate back to their own countries, who have specifically budgeted to provide appropriate assistance. So it&#8217;s very like &#8220;joint operations&#8221;, but the scheme is multi-laterial, and has a true command and control function in the centre &#8212; who will quickly learn to shy away from politically sensitive topics and make a real impact on eCriminality.</p>
<p>To summarise then, a <a href="http://www.cartoonbank.com/item/34449">welcome</a> to the Home Office for finally finding a small amount of funding for some country-wide ePolicing; but it&#8217;s well past time to be working on world-wide initiatives.</p>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Oct 2008 13:57:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ecrime gap">ecrime gap</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ecrime">ecrime</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/provide federal level">provide federal level</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ecrime investigations">ecrime investigations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/online fraud">online fraud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/level">level</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/country deals">country deals</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/deals">deals</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fraud">fraud</category>
      <source url="http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2008/10/02/epolicing-tomorrow-the-world/">ePolicing - Tomorrow the world?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Plan-based Complex Event Detection across Distributed Sources]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/7f2d9ec37ddd235b47e10e69a8a18a32</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/7f2d9ec37ddd235b47e10e69a8a18a32</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Here is an interesting 2008 paper, Plan-based Complex Event Detection across Distributed Sources
Abstract
Complex Event Detection (CED) is emerging as a key capability for many monitoring applications...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Here is an interesting 2008 paper, <a class="l" onmousedown="return clk(this.href,'','','res','4','')" href="http://www.cs.brown.edu/%7Eugur/ced.pdf">Plan-based Complex Event Detection across Distributed Sources.</a></p>
<p><strong>Abstract</strong></p>
<blockquote><p><em>Complex Event Detection (CED) is emerging as a key capability for many monitoring applications such as intrusion detection, sensorbased activity &amp; phenomena tracking, and network monitoring. Existing CED solutions commonly assume centralized availability and processing of all relevant events, and thus incur significant overhead in distributed settings. In this paper, we present and evaluate communication efficient techniques that can efficiently perform CED across distributed event sources.</em></p>
<p><em>Our techniques are plan-based: we generate multi-step event acquisition and processing plans that leverage temporal relationships among events and event occurrence statistics to minimize event transmission costs, while meeting application-specific latency expectations. We present an optimal but exponential-time dynamic programming algorithm and two polynomial-time heuristic algorithms, as well as their extensions for detecting multiple complex events with common sub-expressions. We characterize the behavior and performance of our solutions via extensive experimentation on synthetic and real-world data sets using our prototype implementation.</em></p></blockquote>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 25 Sep 2008 12:49:02 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/complex event detection">complex event detection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sources">sources</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/multiple complex events">multiple complex events</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/events">events</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/communication efficient techniques">communication efficient techniques</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/efficiently perform ced">efficiently perform ced</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ced">ced</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/techniques">techniques</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/event sources">event sources</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/09/25/plan-based-complex-event-detection-across-distributed-sources/">Plan-based Complex Event Detection across Distributed Sources</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[TIBCO BusinessEvents 3.0]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/de1f0c5b81d2a653775eaade21547299</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/de1f0c5b81d2a653775eaade21547299</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I was pleased to read the Paul Vincents post, TIBCO BusinessEvents 3.0 . TIBCO has always had a forward thinking vision for distributed computing and this release of BE 3.0 is another step in the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I was pleased to read the Paul Vincent&#8217;s post, <a title="Permalink" href="http://tibcoblogs.com/cep/2008/09/22/tibco-businessevents-30/">TIBCO BusinessEvents 3.0</a>.    TIBCO has always had a forward thinking vision for distributed computing and this release of BE 3.0 is another step in the right direction.  TIBCO now has the only commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) event processing platform on the market that supports distributed event processing, multi-agent architectures, distributed object caching, extensibility, continuous queries, state management and state-of-the-art rules.</p>
<p>Even thought TIBCO&#8217;s BusinessEvents does not yet support Bayesian Classifiers, Artificial Neural Networks and other advanced decision support algorithms, it is just a matter of time before TIBCO will add these advanced features &#8220;out of the box&#8221;.  On the other hand, the extensible nature of TIBCO&#8217;s BE makes it possible to add probabalistic computing functionality, however this requires quite a lot of programming and integration work.</p>
<p>When I see a great release like this for TIBCO, it makes me a little nostalgic for &#8220;the good old days&#8221; travelling the world in the front of the aircraft for TIBCO.   TIBCO has a rich and diverse customer base.  This customer base includes financial services companies; however, TIBCO is much less dependent on financial services than other event processing companies.   So, with TIBCO you not only get great technology, but rock-solid stability in an unstable and uncertain business world.</p>
<p>As a side note, an S&amp;P analyst recently <a href="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/09/18/sp-downgrades-tibco-to-sell-on-financial-services-exposure/" target="_blank">downgraded</a> TIBCO&#8217;s stock <a href="http://online.barrons.com/quotes/main.html?symbol=tibx">(TIBX)</a>, primarily due to chao in the financial services sector.    Because of TIBCO&#8217;s global reach and stability, plus forward vision, advanced technologies and many years of commericial success, the S&amp;P downgrade will create a buying opportunity for TIBCO stock.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 24 Sep 2008 01:54:39 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tibco businessevents">tibco businessevents</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tibco">tibco</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tibco stock">tibco stock</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tibcos">tibcos</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tibcos businessevents">tibcos businessevents</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tibcos global reach">tibcos global reach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/financial services">financial services</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/financial services sector">financial services sector</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vision">vision</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/09/24/tibco-businessevents-30/">TIBCO BusinessEvents 3.0</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Can You Believe It? With the Financial Markets in Turmoil, the Hosting Industry Continues to Thrive!]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/b7bfb8c522ce436676068950e32e11a9</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/b7bfb8c522ce436676068950e32e11a9</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I am participating in the 4th annual Hosting Transformation Summit in sunny Las Vegas today and have just listened to some heartwarming news from Dan Golding the head of Tier1 Research . Dan kicked...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; margin: 5px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/datacenter-ani-optimized.gif" border="0" alt="Datacenter_ani_optimized" width="242" height="249" align="left" /> I am participating in the <a href="http://www.hostingtransformation.com/na/2008/" target="_blank">4th annual Hosting Transformation Summit</a> in sunny Las Vegas today and have just listened to some heartwarming news from <a href="http://www.hostingtransformation.com/na/2008/panelists.php" target="_blank">Dan Golding</a> the head of <a href="http://www.t1r.com/" target="_blank">Tier1 Research</a>. Dan kicked off the morning with his Keynote “Managed Hosting and Colocation in 2009 and beyond.” As you may know, ScienceLogic has maintained a large group of customers in the Managed Service Provider industry so we love to keep our ears to the pavement regarding industry trends. (<em><a href="http://www2.sea.siemens.com/NR/rdonlyres/4866BFD6-9181-41BD-90EA-D8380255E826/0/Datacenter_ani_optimized.gif" target="_blank">image from: Siemens</a>)</em></p>
<p>Dan described the Managed Hosting and colocation sector as “on fire” The sector is humming – incredible growth, outstanding execution, blowing away expectations. I must say, looking back 5 years ago after the tech bubble collapse, I can’t believe how strong the <a href="http://blog.wired.com/business/2008/09/why-the-tech-in.html" target="_blank">sector bounced back</a> from those very difficult times.</p>
<p>His presentation was focused on a future, and a longer view for the industry. The HTS conference is packed this year with the largest attendance of Datacenter owners, Managed hosting and colocation companies ever to attend this conference.</p>
<ul>
<li>Demand steady or increasing in all markets, driven largely by capex constraints and greater awareness and choices.</li>
<li>Supply is growing more slowly in the past 18 months as the credit crunch has hurt the ability of providers to expand ( it is very hard to get mortgages, loans only on new datacenter projects). Expansion build-out of existing shells is occurring, but very little on spec.</li>
<li>Demand Growth of 15% in 2008. (Steady and increasing in the out years) However after supply growth peaked at 7.5% in 2007 supply growth now has slowed to 5%</li>
<li>Dan believes that supply growth will pick back up again in 2011</li>
</ul>
<p>Conclusions – supply is tight, demand is high and growing…this very good news for the industry.</p>
<ul>
<li>Some other trends:
<ul>
<li>The <a href="http://royal.pingdom.com/?p=327" target="_blank">green initiatives</a> are more than just a <a href="http://www.greenm3.com/2008/09/cisco-and-ibm-s.html" target="_blank">trend as datacenter owners</a> who don’t figure out how to <a href="http://www.greenm3.com/2008/08/modeling-for-gr.html" target="_blank">maximize power efficiency</a> will be painted as villains.</li>
<li><a href="http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2008/09/02/us-getting-dominated-in-internet-traffic" target="_blank">Internet traffic</a> and services consumption are linked as Internet traffic growth has been doubling every year (2005-2007)</li>
<li>Prediction: 2011 -2012 - <a href="http://mashable.com/2008/08/31/is-the-us-becoming-a-part-of-the-internet-backwater/" target="_blank">internet traffic</a> will get an exaflood – it is coming with a new breed of applications (set to boxes HD Video, games, etc.) that will drive new traffic patterns. <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/30/business/30pipes.html?_r=1&amp;ref=technology&amp;oref=slogin" target="_blank">Growth driven by consumer broadband</a> + applications (HD video) applications, which in turn will drive demand for Managed Hosting / Colocation Services…</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p>Managed Hosting Services Highlights</p>
<ul>
<li>Incredibly fast growth 30%+</li>
<li>$10 Billion worldwide revenue by end of 2008</li>
<li>We’ll keep growth pace until at least 2011</li>
<li>Good news, Dan believes that fears about slowdown in growth are wildly overblown.</li>
</ul>
<p>Why is managed hosting growing so fast?</p>
<ul>
<li>Demographic shifts – new breed of IT employees that <a href="http://www.crcexchange.com/outsource-your-it" target="_blank">embrace outsourcing</a></li>
<li>Growth in internet applications <a href="http://www.infoworld.com/article/08/07/30/Clear_strategy_key_for_SaaS_ecommerce_success_1.html?source=rss&amp;url=http://www.infoworld.com/article/08/07/30/Clear_strategy_key_for_SaaS_ecommerce_success_1.html" target="_blank">(SaaS)</a> The acceptance and growth of browser based applications has been enormous!</li>
<li>Ambiguity between web hosting and managed hosting has turned positive</li>
</ul>
<p>Dan’s Key success factors <a href="http://blog.adspotlive.com/managed-hosting-and-related-things-to-be-considered/" target="_blank">managed hosting and services</a></p>
<ul>
<li>High margin services – and not too many – it is so tempting in our day to day business when a customer comes along and wants to come and give us money for a unique on-off service… at this point the answer has to be no – or do it through a partner.</li>
<li>High level of support delivery is critical – don’t cut pay in support people or outsource support to save a nickel… what you are selling is support. Keep doing this well or you will head into a bad place… just as examples in retail like Home Depot and others who have struggled with customer service challenges – the whole business starts to slide into the toilet… High levels of support delivers a strong word of mouth buying cycle</li>
</ul>
<p>Final thoughts, the industry is healthy and will continue to thrive. Customers are looking for the one stop shop, one company that is a trusted advisor to the customer. As customers place more eggs in the Managed Service bucket, the industry will need to tighten-up those SLA’s. Today some parts of the industry have been getting away with loose SLA’s… as customers get more sophisticated and have more on the line, they will become more demanding and require robust multi-component SLAs and back-it –up.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Sep 2008 11:00:18 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast">fast</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/demand steady">demand steady</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/demand">demand</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/incredibly fast growth">incredibly fast growth</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/growth">growth</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/drive demand">drive demand</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/drive">drive</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/internet traffic growth">internet traffic growth</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/industry">industry</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/can-you-believe-it-with-the-financial-markets-in-turmoil-the-hosting-industry-continues-to-thrive/09/2008">Can You Believe It? With the Financial Markets in Turmoil, the Hosting Industry Continues to Thrive!</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Commoditization of Anti Debugging Features in RATs]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d357b72fd1cde8f737f42b6043955d6b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d357b72fd1cde8f737f42b6043955d6b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Is it a Remote Administration Tool (RAT) or is it malware ? That's the rhetorical question , since RATs are not supposed to have built-in Virustotal submission for the newly generated server,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SL1nh-1oqdI/AAAAAAAACJc/FJtmUCHs730/s1600-h/anti_debugging_rat_malware.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SL1nh-1oqdI/AAAAAAAACJc/m8B4yux3_5I/s200-R/anti_debugging_rat_malware.png" /></a>Is it a <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/07/shark2-rat-or-malware.html">Remote Administration Tool</a> (RAT) or is it <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/08/rats-or-malware.html">malware</a>? That's the <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/08/shark-2-diy-malware.html">rhetorical question</a>, since <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/shark-malware-new-versions-coming.html">RATs are not supposed</a> to have built-in Virustotal submission for the newly generated server, antivirus software "killing" and <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/multiple-firewalls-bypassing.html">firewall bypassing capabilities</a>.<br />
<br />
Taking a peek into some of commodity features aiming to make it harder to analyze the malware found in pretty much all the average DIY malware builders available at the disposal at the average script kiddies, one of the latest releases pitched as RAT while it's malware clearly indicates the commoditization and availability of such modules :<br />
<br />
" <i>- FWB (DLL Injection, The DLL is Never Written to Disk)<br />
&nbsp;- Decent Strong Traffic Encryption<br />
&nbsp;- Try to Unhook UserMode APIs<br />
&nbsp;- No Plugins/3rd Party Applications<br />
&nbsp;- 4 Startup Methods (Shell, Policies, ActiveX, UserInIt)<br />
&nbsp;- Set Maximum Connections<br />
&nbsp;- Built In File Binder<br />
&nbsp;- Multi Threaded Transfers<br />
&nbsp;- Anti Debugging (Anti VMware, Anti Sandboxie, Anti Norman Sandbox, Anti VirtualPC, Anti Anubis Sandbox, Anti CW Sandbox)</i>"<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SL6CyJQUdnI/AAAAAAAACJk/b4Erkx13fpg/s1600-h/anti_debugging_rat_malware_stats.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SL6CyJQUdnI/AAAAAAAACJk/Lum7M48FdSQ/s200-R/anti_debugging_rat_malware_stats.png" /></a>Malware coders or "malware modulators"? With the currently emerging <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/08/malware-as-web-service.html">malware as a web service</a> toolkits porting common malware tools to the web, drag and drop web interfaces for malware building are <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">definitely in the works</a>.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=2qWlBL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=2qWlBL" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=BQjJaL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=BQjJaL" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=6b1sjl"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=6b1sjl" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=CVEqWl"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=CVEqWl" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=BzubfL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=BzubfL" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=7ZXFYL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=7ZXFYL" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=LhD8dl"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=LhD8dl" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/382311481" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 03 Sep 2008 03:46:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/anti">anti</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/anti vmware">anti vmware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/anti norman sandbox">anti norman sandbox</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/common malware tools">common malware tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/anti virtualpc">anti virtualpc</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware coders">malware coders</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/anti anubis sandbox">anti anubis sandbox</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware modulators">malware modulators</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/382311481/commoditization-of-anti-debugging.html">The Commoditization of Anti Debugging Features in RATs</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Golf Driven Security]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/97c3f2f6b2c052ca89495ba3c65d43d2</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/97c3f2f6b2c052ca89495ba3c65d43d2</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I don't have anything against the sport, in fact I think that if the software security people want to get in the enterprise security game they have to get a lot better at golf. I blogged about how the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: Helvetica; ">I don&#39;t have anything against the sport, in fact I think that if the software security people want to get in the enterprise security game they have to get a lot better at golf. I </span><a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/08/software-security-market.html"><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: Helvetica; ">blogged</span></a><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: Helvetica; "> about how the network security sector is about fifteen times larger than software security sector, prompting one person to write saying that we have invested wisely in network security, eliminated the problems and will address the software security problem with internal processes and tools.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: Helvetica; "><br /></span></p><div><p style="margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; font: 12.0px Helvetica"><span style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; font: normal normal normal 12px/normal Helvetica; font-size: 13px; "><span style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; font: normal normal normal 12px/normal Helvetica; font-size: 13px; font-family: Helvetica; ">The problem is that compared to software security we are clearly overspending on network security, the hardware/software is unchanged for a decade - </span><span style="font-weight: bold; font-size: 13px; font-family: Helvetica; ">in any other area of computing the cost would be falling like a rock (</span><span style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; font: normal normal normal 12px/normal Helvetica; font-size: 13px; font-family: Helvetica; ">how much would 1995 version of Oracle or Windows cost now? 5 cents on the dollar, yet CISOs still cut $900M worth of checks to Checkpoint each year). The problem is&#160;there is no market effect because the CISO&#39;s budget keeps increasing and they have no idea what/where/how to spend so they just play golf with their Checkpoint rep and send in the renewal.&#160;</span></span></p><p style="margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; font: 12.0px Helvetica"><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: Helvetica; "><br /></span></p><p style="margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; font: 12.0px Helvetica"><span style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; font: normal normal normal 12px/normal Helvetica; font-size: 13px; font-family: Helvetica; ">Internal processes and tools are necessary yet nowhere near sufficient to &quot;solve&quot; software security. One reason we &quot;have gotten rid of&quot; network attacks is that no one cares. its a 1990s 31337 attacker goal, not a mafia enterprise goal (botnets aside). business, be they legit or criminal, wants data and functionality. so its all about apps and data. we are just at the very begining crawl stage of even understanding how to solve these problems. That&#39;s why when i hear security consultants harsh on something like static analysis I just laugh. are they better than a top 1% resource in the world? no way. do we have a multi billion dollar gap to close? ya sure, ya betcha. We need things that scale.</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; font: 12.0px Helvetica; min-height: 14.0px"><span style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; font: normal normal normal 12px/normal Helvetica; min-height: 14px; font-size: 13px; font-family: Helvetica; "><br /></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; font: 12.0px Helvetica"><span style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; font: normal normal normal 12px/normal Helvetica; font-size: 13px; font-family: Helvetica; ">People dont write their own virus protection, but for some reason attempt to do their own input validation, it is the same exact problem. people routinely write their own authentication, authorization and audit. i could go on.</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; font: 12.0px Helvetica; min-height: 14.0px"><span style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; font: normal normal normal 12px/normal Helvetica; min-height: 14px; font-size: 13px; font-family: Helvetica; "><br /></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; font: 12.0px Helvetica"><span style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; font: normal normal normal 12px/normal Helvetica; font-size: 13px; font-family: Helvetica; ">I have rarely seen an industry so ripe for disruptive innovation as software security.&#160;</span></p><div><span style="font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal;"><br /></span></div></div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 26 Aug 2008 13:00:50 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software security">software security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software security sector">software security sector</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software security people">software security people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network security sector">network security sector</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network security">network security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/people">people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/golf">golf</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/internal processes">internal processes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/reason attempt">reason attempt</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/08/golf-driven-security.html">Golf Driven Security</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The web browser is sick but wheres the cure?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/c1a26694b7d3db2c185a5f976e06cc90</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/c1a26694b7d3db2c185a5f976e06cc90</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Blogger: Ramon Krikken
The web browser is one of those peculiar pieces of software, having to accept input from arbitrary sources and then parse and render the data that is sent to it. Part of this it...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Blogger: Ramon Krikken</p>

<p>The web browser is one of those peculiar pieces of software, having to accept input from arbitrary sources and then parse and render the data that is sent to it. Part of this it does by itself, and other parts are taken care of by handlers and plug-ins. In doing so, it displays hypertext, images, videos, and even runs active content like Flash, JavaScript, and ActiveX. </p>

<p>But however much we love the browser, we’ve also come to hate the myriad of vulnerabilities that affect it. Everything from cross-site scripting to remote code execution via maliciously formed animated cursor files and Flash content can make browsing a hazardous activity. The browser is sick, and that’s not desirable for a platform we use for important business and personal transactions.</p>

<p>Worsening the browser’s diagnosis is the <a href="http://taossa.com.nyud.net:8080/archive/bh08sotirovdowdslides.pdf">recent paper</a> from Mark Dowd and Alexander Sotirov, sub-titled “Setting back browser security by 10 years,” which discusses how to bypass Microsoft Vista’s memory protection capabilities with some added effort for the exploit designers. It’s not that all of the techniques are necessarily new, but the browser appears to be particularly vulnerable to easy exploitation. </p>

<p>Surprising? Not exactly, when we take into account that the browser is suffering from the same disease as the general purpose operating system: bloat and compatibility. We expect the browser to do ever more, but everything we used it for before still needs to work as if it were yesterday. It feels a bit like people insisting on using a cardboard box as a safe, and wondering why their money keeps getting stolen.</p>

<p>It’s not like we haven’t been working on the browser’s cure, though. There have been some improvements in the browsers themselves, the operating systems have also implemented compensating controls, but most of all, there has been an enormous push for securing the web applications that deliver the data in the first place. Unfortunately, the latter two won’t help secure the browser in the long run.</p>

<p>The first issue is that not all content will come from ‘nice’ servers, the second that the server can only make an educated guess on how a browser will parse and render a given set of data, and the third that operating system controls have their own limitations, whether by design or implementation (for example needing to re-compile existing code to enable certain protections.) The browser, in the end, has to be mostly responsible for keeping itself safe; the operating system must assist it in doing so.</p>

<p>So we’re in a pickle. The browser is sick (and the operating system is too), but it’s hard to cure it without a redesign that will undoubtedly impact compatibility, the ever-so-desired multi-functionality, or its ease of use. We can layer defenses by using web filtering in the enterprise environment, but in the end – for the consumer market in particular – we need to fix the browser itself. I can think of a few things I think might help: </p>

<ul><li>Some kind of <a href="http://people.mozilla.com/~bsterne/site-security-policy/">site security policy</a>&nbsp; to restrict where the browser loads auxiliary content from, and which data it can ‘trust’, when loading a web page (I’d prefer mandatory enforcement, and adding an HTML tag to be able to indicate blocks of untrustworthy data.)</li>

<li>Restricted compartments for plug-ins to run in, ensuring that their bugs cannot easily affect the whole browser.</li>

<li>Better software development practices for the plug-ins and content parsers themselves, so that they’re less vulnerable, and compiled with the latest protection measures to begin with.</li></ul>

<p>All of this means more work, and some of it means a lot of unhappy reactions when things stop working. Even then we will of course still have to deal with additional vulnerabilities, such as those that may be present in hardware, but we will at least have taken prudent steps to ‘find a cure.’</p>

</div>
<img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityAndRiskManagementStrategiesBlog/~4/364862623" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Aug 2008 07:11:14 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/browser">browser</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web browser">web browser</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/browser appears">browser appears</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web">web</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cure">cure</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/browser security">browser security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/content">content</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/runs active content">runs active content</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/browsers cure">browsers cure</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityAndRiskManagementStrategiesBlog/~3/364862623/the-web-browser.html">The web browser is sick but wheres the cure?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The web browser is sick ??? but where???s the cure?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ed0b490e06092c5b7a4f3957bd361fa2</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ed0b490e06092c5b7a4f3957bd361fa2</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Blogger: Ramon Krikken
The web browser is one of those peculiar pieces of software, having to accept input from arbitrary sources and then parse and render the data that is sent to it. Part of this it...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Blogger: Ramon Krikken</p>

<p>The web browser is one of those peculiar pieces of software, having to accept input from arbitrary sources and then parse and render the data that is sent to it. Part of this it does by itself, and other parts are taken care of by handlers and plug-ins. In doing so, it displays hypertext, images, videos, and even runs active content like Flash, JavaScript, and ActiveX. </p>

<p>But however much we love the browser, we???ve also come to hate the myriad of vulnerabilities that affect it. Everything from cross-site scripting to remote code execution via maliciously formed animated cursor files and Flash content can make browsing a hazardous activity. The browser is sick, and that???s not desirable for a platform we use for important business and personal transactions.</p>

<p>Worsening the browser???s diagnosis is the <a href="http://taossa.com.nyud.net:8080/archive/bh08sotirovdowdslides.pdf">recent paper</a> from Mark Dowd and Alexander Sotirov, sub-titled ???Setting back browser security by 10 years,??? which discusses how to bypass Microsoft Vista???s memory protection capabilities with some added effort for the exploit designers. It???s not that all of the techniques are necessarily new, but the browser appears to be particularly vulnerable to easy exploitation. </p>

<p>Surprising? Not exactly, when we take into account that the browser is suffering from the same disease as the general purpose operating system: bloat and compatibility. We expect the browser to do ever more, but everything we used it for before still needs to work as if it were yesterday. It feels a bit like people insisting on using a cardboard box as a safe, and wondering why their money keeps getting stolen.</p>

<p>It???s not like we haven???t been working on the browser???s cure, though. There have been some improvements in the browsers themselves, the operating systems have also implemented compensating controls, but most of all, there has been an enormous push for securing the web applications that deliver the data in the first place. Unfortunately, the latter two won???t help secure the browser in the long run.</p>

<p>The first issue is that not all content will come from ???nice??? servers, the second that the server can only make an educated guess on how a browser will parse and render a given set of data, and the third that operating system controls have their own limitations, whether by design or implementation (for example needing to re-compile existing code to enable certain protections.) The browser, in the end, has to be mostly responsible for keeping itself safe; the operating system must assist it in doing so.</p>

<p>So we???re in a pickle. The browser is sick (and the operating system is too), but it???s hard to cure it without a redesign that will undoubtedly impact compatibility, the ever-so-desired multi-functionality, or its ease of use. We can layer defenses by using web filtering in the enterprise environment, but in the end ??? for the consumer market in particular ??? we need to fix the browser itself. I can think of a few things I think might help: </p>

<ul><li>Some kind of <a href="http://people.mozilla.com/~bsterne/site-security-policy/">site security policy</a>&nbsp; to restrict where the browser loads auxiliary content from, and which data it can ???trust???, when loading a web page (I???d prefer mandatory enforcement, and adding an HTML tag to be able to indicate blocks of untrustworthy data.)</li>

<li>Restricted compartments for plug-ins to run in, ensuring that their bugs cannot easily affect the whole browser.</li>

<li>Better software development practices for the plug-ins and content parsers themselves, so that they???re less vulnerable, and compiled with the latest protection measures to begin with.</li></ul>

<p>All of this means more work, and some of it means a lot of unhappy reactions when things stop working. Even then we will of course still have to deal with additional vulnerabilities, such as those that may be present in hardware, but we will at least have taken prudent steps to ???find a cure.???</p>

</div>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Aug 2008 07:11:14 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/browser">browser</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web browser">web browser</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/browser appears">browser appears</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/browser security">browser security</category>
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      <source url="http://srmsblog.burtongroup.com/2008/08/the-web-browser.html">The web browser is sick ??? but where???s the cure?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[76Service - Cybercrime as a Service Going Mainstream]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/35bdaf104e9aecf7703834d959f39050</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/35bdaf104e9aecf7703834d959f39050</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Disintermediating the intermediaries in the cybercrime ecosystem, ultimately results in more profitable operations. Controversial to the concept of outsourcing, some cybercriminals are in fact so...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKKs5L3ihpI/AAAAAAAACBs/vEaSMC2S8nI/s1600-h/76service.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKKs5L3ihpI/AAAAAAAACBs/qhgjQh39ej8/s200-R/76service.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>Disintermediating the intermediaries in the cybercrime ecosystem, ultimately results in more profitable operations. Controversial to the concept of outsourcing, some cybercriminals are in fact so self-sufficient, that the stereotype of a mysterious 76service server offered for rent could in fact easily cease to exist in an ecosystem so vibrant that literally everyone can partion their botnet and start offering access to it on a multi-user basis. Evil? Obviously. Extending the lifecycle of a proprietary malware tool? Definitely.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lw9IeuKkNbc">The infamous 76service</a>, a cybercrime as a service web interface where customers basically collect the final output out of the banking malware botnet during the specific period of time for which they've purchases access to the service, is going mainstream, with 76Service's Spring Edition apparently leaking out, and cybercriminals enjoying its interoperability potential by introducing different banking trojans in their campaigns. <br />
<br />
In this post, I'll discuss the 76service's spring.edition that has been combined with a <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/metaphisher-malware-kit-spotted-in-wild.html">Metaphisher banking malware</a>, an a popular <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/crimeware-in-middle-zeus.html">web malware exploitation kit</a>, with two campaigns currently hosting 5.51GB of stolen banking data based on over 1 million compromised hosts 59% of which are based in Russia. Screenshots courtesy of an egocentric underground show-off.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.cio.com/article/print/135500">Some general info on the 76service</a> :<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKKyWAXgYGI/AAAAAAAACB0/JXHZFuBb6Rs/s1600-h/76service1.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKKyWAXgYGI/AAAAAAAACB0/2qZfVy6YfU8/s200-R/76service1.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>"<i>Subscribers could log in with their assigned user name and     password any time during the 30-day project. They’d be     met with a screen that told them which of their bots was     currently active, and a side bar of management options. For     example, they could pull down the latest drops—data     deposits that the Gozi-infected machines they subscribed to     sent to the servers, like the 3.3 GB one Jackson had     found. A project was like an investment portfolio. Individual     Gozi-infected machines were like stocks and subscribers bought     a group of them, betting they could gain enough personal     information from their portfolio of infected machines to make a     profit, mostly by turning around and selling credentials on the     black market. (In some cases, subscribers would use a few of     the credentials themselves). Some machines, like some stocks, would under perform and     provide little private information. But others would land the     subscriber a windfall of private data. The point was to     subscribe to several infected machines to balance that risk,     the way Wall Street fund managers invest in many stocks to     offset losses in one company with gains in another.</i>"<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKKy5q1ebVI/AAAAAAAACB8/uGe8GuhDvRg/s1600-h/76service2.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKKy5q1ebVI/AAAAAAAACB8/88IxypeBf74/s200-R/76service2.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>The 76service empowers everyone who is either not willing to spend time and resources for building and maintaining a botnet, launching campaigns, and SQL injecting hundreds of thousands of sites in order to take advantage of the long tail of malware infected sites that theoretically can outpace the traffic that could come from a SQL injected high-profile site.<br />
<br />
Next to the spring.edition, <a href="http://secureworks.com/research/threats/gozi/">the winter edition's price starts from $1000 and goes to $2000</a>, which is all a matter of who you're buying it from, unless of course you haven't come across leaked copies :<br />
<br />
"<i>Assuming that the dealer offering what he claimed was the 76service kit was correct, the profit is not only in the kit, but in selling value added services like exploitation, compromised servers/accounts, database configuration, and customization of the interface. Prices start between $1000 to $2000 and go up based on added services. The underground payment methods generally involve hard-to-track virtual currencies, whose central authority is in a jurisdiction where regulation is liberal to non-existent, and feature non-reversible transactions. The individual or group called "76service" was easy to track down on the Web, but not in person.</i>" <br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKLUyA7g9LI/AAAAAAAACCE/nl-OA3FHPs0/s1600-h/76service3.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKLUyA7g9LI/AAAAAAAACCE/8zS6gcoEdvk/s200-R/76service3.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>It's interesting to monitor how services aiming to provide specific malicious services are vertically integrating by expanding their portfolio of related services -- taka a spamming vendor that will offer the segmented email databases, the advanced metrics, and the localization of the spam messages to different languages -- or letting the buyer have full control of anything that comes out of a particular botnet for a specific period of time in which he has bought access to it. For instance, DDoS for hire matured into botnet for hire, which evolved into today's "What type of stolen data do you want?" for hire mentality I'm starting to see emerging, next to the usual interest in improving the metrics and thereby the probability for a more succesful campaign. <br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKLa2TO4yAI/AAAAAAAACCM/4s3Mkgb-NOY/s1600-h/metafisher1_ukstories.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKLa2TO4yAI/AAAAAAAACCM/Bt7wKW7IPcE/s200-R/metafisher1_ukstories.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>Ironically, this cybercrime model is so efficient that the people behind it cannot seem to be able to process all of the stolen data, which like a great deal of underground assets loses its value if not sold as fast as possible. The result of this oversupply of stolen data are the increasing number of services selling raw logs segmented based on a particular country for a specific period of time.<br />
<br />
Time for a remotely exploitable vulnerability in yet another malware kit about to go mainstream? Definitely, unless of course backdooring it and releasing it doesn't achieve the obvious results of controlling someone else's cybercrime ecosystem.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/03/underground-economys-supply-of-goods.html">The Underground Economy's Supply of Goods and Services</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/dynamics-of-malware-industry.html">The Dynamics of the Malware Industry - Proprietary Malware Tools</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/using-market-forces-to-disrupt-botnets.html">Using Market Forces to Disrupt Botnets</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/multiple-firewalls-bypassing.html">Multiple Firewalls Bypassing Verification on Demand</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/managed-spamming-appliances-future-of.html">Managed Spamming Appliances - The Future of Spam</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/localizing-cybercrime-cultural.html">Localizing Cybercrime - Cultural Diversity on Demand</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/01/e-crime-and-socioeconomic-factors.html">E-crime and Socioeconomic Factors</a><b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/08/malware-as-web-service.html">Malware as a Web Service</a><b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/are-stolen-credit-card-details-getting.html">Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-team-leaving-it-underground.html">Neosploit Team Leaving the IT Underground</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/zeus-crimeware-kit-vulnerable-to.html">The Zeus Crimeware Kit Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/pinch-vulnerable-to-remotely.html">Pinch Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/dissecting-managed-spamming-service.html">Dissecting a Managed Spamming Service</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/managed-spamming-appliances-future-of.html">Managed "Spamming Appliances" - The Future of Spam</a><br />
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      <pubDate>Wed, 13 Aug 2008 04:08:43 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/76service">76service</category>
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      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/363878623/76service-cybercrime-as-service-going.html">76Service - Cybercrime as a Service Going Mainstream</source>
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