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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: networks]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/networks</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Fri, 18 Jul 2008 02:23:49 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Not-So-Sweet Life of Supplicants]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a7513e6c4a71a61081c2aa1aef143439</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a7513e6c4a71a61081c2aa1aef143439</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[There are plenty of integration and configuration challenges when we look at 802.1X , but one of the most notable issues is choosing the right supplicant to best serve your end users
Some of the major...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<P>There are plenty of integration and configuration challenges when we look at <A title="802.1X Primer" href="http://securityuncorked.squarespace.com/security-uncorked/2008/4/2/what-is-8021x-heres-a-technology-primer-for-you.html">802.1X</A>, but one of the most notable issues is <strong>choosing the right <A title="What is a supplicant?" href="http://securityuncorked.squarespace.com/security-uncorked/2008/6/5/know-the-difference-between-a-nac-client-and-a-1x-supplicant.html">supplicant</A> to best serve your end users</strong>. </P>
<P>Some of the major obstacles we face with 802.1X center around creating a smooth end user experience.&nbsp; We, as integrators, have the distinct ability to make &#8216;whatever&#8217; work- we find a way. But, what I hear most from my customers is &#8220;<em>it has to be easy for the end user.&#8221;</em>&nbsp; (Sometimes they go on a little further, but I&#8217;ll leave it at that.)</P>
<P><strong>Why does it matter?</strong> </P>
<P>Wireless, wireless, wireless. Although&nbsp;wired 1X is&nbsp;popular&nbsp;with our customer-base, the world isn&#8217;t quite flocking to it yet. However, 802.1X is certainly the best way to increase security and ease management of wireless networks. It&#8217;s standard, it&#8217;s flexible, it&#8217;s widely-supported by devices and endpoints and it eliminates the need for pre-shared keys or secondary passwords. It&#8217;s what most enterprises, government&nbsp;and educational organizations are implementing now, so it&#8217;s important. </P>
<P><strong>What are some of the problems?</strong> </P>
<P>The end user will have some adjustments to make, and network admins and support desks aren&#8217;t always thrilled with the propect of re-training users for these expectations.</P><span>
<ul>
<li>First of all, the <span style="TEXT-DECORATION: underline">time to authenticate</span> and connect to the network is going to drastically increase. I say drastically- it&#8217;s only a few seconds- but I&#8217;m sure it feels like minutes to a new 1X end user. 
<li>In addition, we&#8217;re in a transition and growing period where we&#8217;re trying to integrate and authenticate multiple pieces- the machine and/or user as well as any other clients residing on the endpoint, so there can be <span style="TEXT-DECORATION: underline">single-sign-on issues</span>. Not SSO in the traditional sense, but single-1X-sign-on vs logging in to authenticate and open the port, logging in again to get to network resources (such as Novell). 
<li>There may also be issues supporting <span style="TEXT-DECORATION: underline">multiple profiles</span>, so end users may need to understand the concept of enabling 802.1X on an interface at their office, then disabling it when they go home. 
<li>Or perhaps, in a shared or lab-type environment, we may have multiple unique users logging in to the same endpoint device, so we have to make it easy for end users to <span style="TEXT-DECORATION: underline">log off so there&#8217;s a forced re-auth</span> for the next user. </li>
</ul>
<P>There are plenty more, but this hits on the major concerns of most organizations planning to implement 802.1X (wired or wireless).</span></P>
<P><strong>How do we address the issues?</strong></P>
<P>There are different ways to deal with the complexity of supplicant and end-user interactions. First and foremost, a good <span style="TEXT-DECORATION: underline">end user training</span> program will be needed. There&#8217;s a learning curve, but eventually end users will get it- we just have to make sure the transition for &#8216;now&#8217; to &#8216;got it&#8217; is smooth and doesn&#8217;t overwhelm help desk resources. </P>
<P>As the operating systems and clients progress, we&#8217;re seeing <span style="TEXT-DECORATION: underline">more integration</span> and the ability to share 802.1X information between disparate pieces of the endpoint. </P>
<P>In the meantime, there are also <span style="TEXT-DECORATION: underline">3rd-party supplicants</span> that can ease several of the pains. <A class=offsite-link-inline title="Cisco SSC" href="http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps7034/index.html" target=_blank>Cisco&#8217;s&nbsp;Secure Services&nbsp;Client</A>&nbsp; (acquired from Meetinghouse&#8217;s Aegis supplicant) and <A class=offsite-link-inline title="Juniper OAC" href="http://www.juniper.net/products_and_services/aaa_and_802_1x/odyssey/index.html" target=_blank>Juniper&#8217;s Odyssey Access Client</A>&nbsp; (acquired from Funk) both offer options and configurations not currently available in native OS supplicants. (For example, both offer the GINA shim for integrating Windows 1X login with Novell as well as multiple profile support.) Although I haven&#8217;t tried it, my understanding is you can still operate both of these clients independent of the controllers provided from the same vendor. </P>
<P><strong>Is it a deal-killer?</strong> </P>
<P>It can be. The struggle to provide a smooth transition for end users is often a deal-killer for organizations looking at deploying 802.1X. Although there are ways to combat most of these obstacles; often the time, planning and money required to&nbsp;proceed make it unattractive enough to abandon the project. In most cases, the more heterogeneous the endpoint environment is, the less attractive the solution becomes. In an all-Microsoft environment, you can have an 802.1X framework up in a matter of hours. With a mix of authentication directories, endpoint OSs and user expectations, you could spend weeks or&nbsp;months ironing out the details.</P>
<P><strong>The good news.</strong></P>
<P>Yes, there&#8217;s some good news here. The increased adoption of 802.1X is continually leading to increased integration of the software, operating systems and clients on endpoints. While 802.1X may never reach &#8216;plug-and-play&#8217; status, pretty soon the integration will reach a point where configuration is simplified enough for more wide-spread adoption, even in the most diverse environments. </P>
<P>Just hang tight, we&#8217;ll get there!</P>
<P># # #</P>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 23 Jul 2008 11:23:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/user">user</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/end-user interactions">end-user interactions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/user experience">user experience</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/machine andor user">machine andor user</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/users">users</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/multiple unique users">multiple unique users</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/user expectations">user expectations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/endpoint">endpoint</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/expectations">expectations</category>
      <source url="http://www.securityuncorked.com/security-uncorked/2008/7/23/the-not-so-sweet-life-of-supplicants.html">The Not-So-Sweet Life of Supplicants</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Growing Without Adding Overhead: Opus Interactive]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/b31466803f8417d2b35d5e511b6828a7</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/b31466803f8417d2b35d5e511b6828a7</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[We had the pleasure of interviewing client Opus Interactives Director of DataCenter Operations at Interop Las Vegas this year , and thought this was a great time to highlight some of the other...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We had the pleasure of <a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/green-it-and-virtualization-management-one-service-providers-tale/05/2008" target="_blank">interviewing client Opus Interactive’s Director of DataCenter Operations at Interop Las Vegas this year</a>, and thought this was a great time to highlight some of the other successes that Opus has had in managing their growth and IT operations.
<p>Like most of the service providers we talk to, they look to virtualization to provide immediate benefits to the business – e.g, cost savings from server consolidation and support for Green IT through cutting power/cooling requirements. And one more dimension to virtualization – Opus launched a new service, vClustr, which is a virtual dedicated server that provides the benefits of a fully managed dedicated server at a fraction of the cost&#8230;managed by EM7, of course.
<p>We were happy to help Opus by working with them to implement our EM7 solution. Their growth plan was severely limited by inefficient processes and tools. As Opus grew rapidly in 2006, the tools they had in place were not easy to integrate as they were managed independently. There was a manual billing and ticketing infrastructure in place, and valuable engineer time was spent on maintaining what they had instead of enabling business growth. The company faced a choice, either grow by adding overhead and bodies or grow through automation.
<p>Opus chose automation. They needed an automated solution to cover their immediate needs, and also enable them to scale processes for emerging technologies and future service offerings. Throughout their growth, Opus wanted to maintain their “customer first” philosophy and expand <a href="http://green-pc.blogspot.com/2008/07/green-technology-high-on-it-agenda.html" target="_blank">their green efforts</a>.
<p>By choosing EM7, Opus was able to replace their multiple, disparate tools with a single, integrated management system for networks, servers, applications, service desk assets and virtualization infrastructure. EM7 provided automated billing, ticketing, alerts and escalation options as well as a branded customer portal for transparency and self-service ticketing.
<p>The results were tremendous. Opus Interactive recouped $130k per year of engineering resources. They automated critical operations to increase efficiency, enabled proactive monitoring and prepared for growth, while giving the business the processes and tools to grow the business without additional human capital resources.
<p>We’re glad that we could help such a great company achieve their goals of providing an <a href="http://serverspecs.blogs.techtarget.com/2008/07/03/flash-advancements-help-data-center-efficiency/" target="_blank">efficient</a> “best-in-class” solution that combined superior customer service with a <a href="http://www.greenm3.com/2008/07/a-look-inside-m.html" target="_blank">green philosophy</a>.
<p>Get the entire <a href="http://www.sciencelogic.com/pdf/Opus_Interactive_Case_Study.pdf" target="_blank">case study</a> here.</p>
<p><a href="http://sharethis.com/item?&wp=abc&amp;publisher=ea11358c-69de-4e80-9804-e964a8930b70&amp;title=Growing+Without+Adding+Overhead%3A+Opus+Interactive&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fblog.sciencelogic.com%2Fgrowing-without-adding-overhead-opus-interactive%2F07%2F2008">ShareThis</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 22 Jul 2008 15:39:01 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/opus">opus</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/opus interactive">opus interactive</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization">virtualization</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization opus">virtualization opus</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/customer">customer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/customer portal">customer portal</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/superior customer service">superior customer service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service">service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/growth plan">growth plan</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/growing-without-adding-overhead-opus-interactive/07/2008">Growing Without Adding Overhead: Opus Interactive</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Foundry Networks - Brocade's 3 billion dollar baby]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/43c764744c98d93d29fa47b5a823b26f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/43c764744c98d93d29fa47b5a823b26f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[By now you have probably heard that Brocade is making a big push from storage networking switches into Ethernet switches by buying Foundry Networks for almost 3 billion in cash. Actually the deal is...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>By now you have probably heard that <a class="zem_slink" title="Brocade Communications Systems" href="http://www.brocade.com/" rel="homepage">Brocade</a> is making a big push from storage networking switches into Ethernet switches by buying <a class="zem_slink" title="Foundry Networks" href="http://www.foundrynet.com/" rel="homepage">Foundry Networks</a> for almost 3 billion in cash.&nbsp; Actually the deal is valued at about 2.8 billion.&nbsp; However, Foundry has about 800 million or so in cash and liquid assets.&nbsp; So taking that into account, the deal is for about 2 billion really, <a href="http://origin.mercurynews.com/business/ci_9950668">according to the San Jose Mercury News</a>. Still that is quite a number when you consider that $18.50 of the $19.25 price per share is in cash.&nbsp; That works out to about 2.7 billion.&nbsp; Considering Brocade only had about 700 to 800 million in cash itself, that means someone is lending them about a billion and half.&nbsp; Again according the Mercury News, it is Bank of America and Morgan Stanley. This is a 41% premium over Foundry's closing price.&nbsp; Pretty sweet!</p>

<p>The real question is what does Brocade do with this.&nbsp; With all of that debt, do they have what it takes to go on and take on Cisco now?&nbsp; The highways and byways of Silicon Valley are littered with companies that have tried to take Cisco out of this market.&nbsp; What about the 7 dwarfs who currently compete in this market.&nbsp; Companies like HP <a class="zem_slink" title="ProCurve" href="http://www.procurve.com/" rel="homepage">ProCurve</a>, <a class="zem_slink" title="Extreme Networks" href="http://www.extremenetworks.com/" rel="homepage">Extreme Networks</a>, <a class="zem_slink" title="Nortel" href="http://www.nortel.com/" rel="homepage">Nortel</a>, Enterasys, <a class="zem_slink" title="Alcatel-Lucent" href="http://www.alcatel-lucent.com/" rel="homepage">Alcatel-Lucent</a> and Force 10 are not small little companies. These are companies with 100's of millions, if not billions of dollars of market cap themselves.&nbsp; They are not going to roll over and die here. Will this set off a round of consolidation for these players to bulk up in order to compete in this brave new world of networking? I think so. What about next gen secure switches like ConSentry, Nevis and Napera? Or some of the other smaller switch vendors like D-link?&nbsp; Do they view this a a good opportunity to get bought by one of the giants or do they think they can run through the legs of these giants?&nbsp; I don't know but it is going to be a high barrier of entry into this market.</p>

<p>Ultimately though I don't think Cisco will lose its place of dominance very easily. Brocade will be another competitor among the other switch vendors fighting over 25% of the market. But it sure will be interesting in the switch market for a while. </p>

<fieldset class="zemanta-related"><legend class="zemanta-related-title">Related articles by Zemanta</legend><ul class="zemanta-article-ul"><li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a href="http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-9996033-94.html?hhTest=1&amp;part=rss&amp;subj=news">Brocade swinging for the fences with switching</a> </li>

<li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a href="http://www10.nytimes.com/2008/07/22/technology/22brocade.html?_r=5&amp;partner=rssnyt&amp;emc=rss&amp;oref=slogin&amp;oref=slogin&amp;oref=slogin&amp;oref=slogin">Brocade to Acquire Foundry for $3 Billion</a> </li>

<li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a href="http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-9995947-94.html?hhTest=1&amp;part=rss&amp;subj=news">Brocade to acquire Foundry Networks</a> </li>

<li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a href="http://gigaom.com/2008/07/21/brocade-foundry/">Brocade Buying Foundry for $3 Billion</a></li></ul></fieldset> <div class="zemanta-pixie" style="MARGIN-TOP: 10px; HEIGHT: 15px"><a class="zemanta-pixie-a" title="Zemified by Zemanta" href="http://reblog.zemanta.com/zemified/6108c14f-0d05-4b69-af32-d08ae1a43192/"><img class="zemanta-pixie-img" alt="Zemanta Pixie" src="http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_e.png?x-id=6108c14f-0d05-4b69-af32-d08ae1a43192" style="BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; BORDER-TOP: medium none; FLOAT: right; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none" /></a></div></div>

<p><a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=sznQu7"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=sznQu7" border="0"></img></a></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=rbxcmJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=rbxcmJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=XQcLNJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=XQcLNJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=ZSH4UJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=ZSH4UJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=mzLTTJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=mzLTTJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=eU9Jcj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=eU9Jcj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=K4EnFj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=K4EnFj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~4/342185242" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jul 2008 19:04:10 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/foundry">foundry</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/foundry networks">foundry networks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/acquire foundry networks">acquire foundry networks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/acquire foundry">acquire foundry</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/brocade">brocade</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/billion">billion</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/market">market</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/switch market">switch market</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/market cap">market cap</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~3/342185242/foundry-network.html">Foundry Networks - Brocade's 3 billion dollar baby</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Virtualization and information-centric security]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ff2a437ce08ea0458e81253a590d4c9d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ff2a437ce08ea0458e81253a590d4c9d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Many more of the customers I talk to are focused on virtualization as a core infrastructure strategy. They obviously want to know more about how this will affect how they look at security. While I am...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Many more of the customers I talk to are focused on virtualization as a core infrastructure strategy. They obviously want to know more about how this will affect how they look at security. While I am not the expert on anti-virus/malware, NAC, intrusion prevention etc, one area that I get excited about is the data protection implications of this trend...<br /><br />As devices get abstracted and pushed to the background, it appears we are left, at the core, with applications and data. The interactions between the two dictate productivity, security et al. In this context, an information-centric security paradigm becomes even more important.<br /><br />There are no devices to lock down (these will be virtual - appearing and dissapearing as required). Much of the data will be accessed from virtual containers. Therefore, protecting the data itself, regardless of the applications, the devices, the networks will become crucial in this evolving landscape...<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/BitArmor1?a=m0SW5J"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/BitArmor1?i=m0SW5J" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/BitArmor1?a=KSbNxj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/BitArmor1?i=KSbNxj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/BitArmor1?a=JnpzqJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/BitArmor1?i=JnpzqJ" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/BitArmor1/~4/341722561" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jul 2008 12:33:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data protection implications">data protection implications</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/core">core</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security paradigm">security paradigm</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/core infrastructure strategy">core infrastructure strategy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtual containers">virtual containers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtual">virtual</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/devices">devices</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/BitArmor1/~3/341722561/virtualization-and-information-centric.html">Virtualization and information-centric security</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Social Engineering 101: Hackers Show How It's Done]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/b8e0d89660e53d7027b30146b5586377</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/b8e0d89660e53d7027b30146b5586377</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Kevin Mitnick knows that the weakest link in any security system is the person holding the information. As a young fugitive hacker,he went to jail for breaking into computer networks, mostly by using...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Kevin Mitnick knows that the weakest link in any security system is the person holding the information. As a young fugitive hacker,he went to jail for breaking into computer networks, mostly by using his cunning and persuasion than his tech skills. He was an early master of the science of social engineering -- making people into doing what you want]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jul 2008 05:20:03 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tech skills">tech skills</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/social">social</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security system">security system</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kevin mitnick">kevin mitnick</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer networks">computer networks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fugitive hacker">fugitive hacker</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/link">link</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/master">master</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <source url="http://digg.com/security/Social_Engineering_101_Hackers_Show_How_It_s_Done">Social Engineering 101: Hackers Show How It's Done</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Metrics for security and performance in low-latency anonymity systems]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/fad1cb42a51fdba1643f542416f2a5f3</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/fad1cb42a51fdba1643f542416f2a5f3</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[In Tor , and in other similar anonymity systems, clients choose a random sequence of computers (nodes) to route their connections through. The intention is that, unless someone is watching the whole...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In <a href="https://www.torproject.org/">Tor</a>, and in other similar anonymity systems, clients choose a random sequence of computers (nodes) to route their connections through. The intention is that, unless someone is watching the whole network at the same time, the tracks of each user&#8217;s communication will become hidden amongst that of others. Exactly how a client chooses nodes varies between system to system, and is important for security.</p>
<p>If someone is simultaneously watching a user&#8217;s traffic as it enters and leaves the network, it is possible to de-anonymise the communication. This could occur if the first and last node for a connection is controlled by the same person. Tor takes some steps to avoid this possibility e.g. no two computers on the same /16 network may be chosen for each connection. However, someone with access to several networks could circumvent this measure.</p>
<p>Not only is route selection critical for security, but it&#8217;s also a significant performance factor. Tor nodes vary dramatically in their capacity, mainly due to their network connections. If all nodes were chosen with equal likelihood, the slower ones would cripple the network. This is why Tor weights the selection probability for a node proportional to its contribution to the network bandwidth.</p>
<p>Because of the dual importance of route selection, there are a number of proposals which offer an alternative to Tor&#8217;s bandwidth-weighted algorithm. Later this week at <a href="http://petsymposium.org/2008/">PETS</a> I&#8217;ll be presenting my paper, co-authored with <a href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnw24">Robert N.M. Watson</a>, &#8220;<a href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/papers/pets08metrics.pdf">Metrics for security and performance in low-latency anonymity systems</a>&#8221;.  In this paper, we examine several route selection algorithms and evaluate their security and performance.</p>
<p>Intuitively, a route selection algorithm which weights all nodes equally appears the most secure because an attacker can&#8217;t make their node count any more than the others. This has been formalized by two measures: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gini_coefficient">Gini coefficient</a> and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_entropy">entropy</a>. In fact the reality is more complex &#8212; uniform node selection resists attackers with lots of bandwidth, whereas bandwidth-weighting is better against attackers with lots of nodes.</p>
<p>Our paper explores the probability of path compromise of different route selection algorithms, when under attack by a range of different adversaries. We find that none of the proposals are optimal against all adversaries, and so summarizing effective security in terms of a single figure is not feasible. We also model the performance of the schemes and show that bandwidth-weighting offers both low latency and high resistance to attack by bandwidth-constrained adversaries.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jul 2008 04:16:12 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/route selection">route selection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/route selection critical">route selection critical</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/route selection algorithms">route selection algorithms</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/route">route</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nodes">nodes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tor nodes vary">tor nodes vary</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/performance">performance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/route selection algorithm">route selection algorithm</category>
      <source url="http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2008/07/21/metrics-for-security-and-performance/">Metrics for security and performance in low-latency anonymity systems</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Companies getting the knack of NAC]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/c970d537713fe4f43fb7490094c9e20a</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/c970d537713fe4f43fb7490094c9e20a</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[For too long we have heard the NAC knockers bad mouthing the benefits of NAC and bemoaning its lack of adoption. I have always believed that much of this was marketing spin and that companies were...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For too long we have heard the NAC knockers bad mouthing the benefits of NAC and bemoaning its lack of adoption. I have always believed that much of this was marketing spin and that companies were finding NAC highly useful.  Typical hype cycle kind of stuff. At the end of the day though nothing speaks like real world references by customers stepping up and publicly saying they use the product.  Of course, those of us in the security industry know that this is probably one of the hardest things to do. No one wants to stand up and say what they use for security.  This could give information to the bad guys and attract attention that many companies would rather not do.  At StillSecure this has always been a double edged sword for us. With many DoD networks using the product, we have not really been able to talk a lot about the great job our NAC product does on some of the most sensitive, mission critical networks in the world.  By the same token, usually we don’t announce or publicize many of the infrastructure providers who we partner with and who sell a re-branded version of our NAC product.</p>  <p>Recently several NAC customers have been stepping up and talking about how they use NAC and why. Last week there was a <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/071808-estee-lauder.html?fsrc=netflash-rss">good article on Estee Lauder</a> using NAC first for guest access control and most recently an expansion of their NAC deployment to help with PCI compliance.  This week in an article with the usual left-handed compliments, Tim Greene in between quotes by the so called analyst experts, talks about several NAC companies rolling out NAC.  One is <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/072108-network-access-control.html?page=2">American Bancard, another StillSecure customer</a> who uses NAC to help with PCI and keep their network secure. The article talks about several other companies using NAC solutions from other vendors as well, which is also very encouraging.  Of course the companies I have spoken about I know for a fact are using NAC.  With some of the competition, you cannot always be sure as <a href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/2008/06/the-used-car-sa.html">I have written about</a> in the past.</p>  <p>In any event, I think it is important that we are starting to see some real public references for NAC deployments.  Nothing proves the point of a products value than real live customers stepping up and talking about it!</p>
<p><a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=VrwPHb"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=VrwPHb" border="0"></img></a></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=eDlNrJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=eDlNrJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=wQZUwJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=wQZUwJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=Hbf4XJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=Hbf4XJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=vuh3hJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=vuh3hJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=MifvMj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=MifvMj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=6EXjKj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=6EXjKj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~4/341505996" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jul 2008 03:43:53 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac">nac</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac deployments">nac deployments</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac solutions">nac solutions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac deployment">nac deployment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac companies">nac companies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac knockers bad">nac knockers bad</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac customers">nac customers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac product">nac product</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac highly">nac highly</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~3/341505996/companies-getti.html">Companies getting the knack of NAC</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[RIM fixes critical BlackBerry Enterprise Server bug]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/bfc871ac37ef3d48c54598e291c7f14f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/bfc871ac37ef3d48c54598e291c7f14f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Research In Motion patched a critical bug in its BlackBerry Enterprise Server to stymie hackers trying to break into company networks by tricking users of the smart phone into opening rigged...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Research In Motion patched a critical bug in its BlackBerry Enterprise Server to stymie hackers trying to break into company networks by tricking users of the smart phone into opening rigged PDFs.
<p><a href="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~a/Computerworld/Security/News?a=qmRMdE"><img src="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~a/Computerworld/Security/News?i=qmRMdE" border="0"></img></a></p><img src="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~r/Computerworld/Security/News/~4/339214709" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 18 Jul 2008 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blackberry enterprise server">blackberry enterprise server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/company networks">company networks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/critical bug">critical bug</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/smart phone">smart phone</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/stymie hackers">stymie hackers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/research">research</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/users">users</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pdfs">pdfs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/motion">motion</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~r/Computerworld/Security/News/~3/339214709/article.do">RIM fixes critical BlackBerry Enterprise Server bug</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Wormlike malware transcodes MP3s to try to infect PCs]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/35264f2b91b5439d692d49d18c1f44c4</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/35264f2b91b5439d692d49d18c1f44c4</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[A new variety of malicious software could pose a danger to those who download music files on peer-to-peer...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A new variety of malicious software could pose a danger to those who download music files on peer-to-peer networks.
<p><a href="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~a/Computerworld/Security/News?a=CrFmzp"><img src="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~a/Computerworld/Security/News?i=CrFmzp" border="0"></img></a></p><img src="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~r/Computerworld/Security/News/~4/339202749" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 18 Jul 2008 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/download music files">download music files</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/peer-to-peer networks">peer-to-peer networks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malicious software">malicious software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/variety">variety</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/danger">danger</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pose">pose</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~r/Computerworld/Security/News/~3/339202749/article.do">Wormlike malware transcodes MP3s to try to infect PCs</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/56322fa6d09fc3127cbaf772115cd182</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/56322fa6d09fc3127cbaf772115cd182</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Just consider this scheme for a second. A well known money mule recruitment site Cash Transfers is maintaining a fast-flux infrastructure on behalf of the Asprox botnet, that is also providing hosting...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SIB2JwZOw4I/AAAAAAAAB7c/c7TMX064n4w/s1600-h/cash_transfers_money_mule_recruitment.png" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SIB2JwZOw4I/AAAAAAAAB7c/CaeHtWn_06M/s200-R/cash_transfers_money_mule_recruitment.png" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>Just consider this scheme for a second. A well known <a href="http://www.docep.wa.gov.au/ConsumerProtection/scamnet/Scams/Cash-Transfers_Inc.html">money mule recruitment site Cash Transfers</a> is maintaining a fast-flux infrastructure on behalf of the Asprox botnet, that is also providing hosting services for several hundred domains used on the last wave of SQL injection attacks. Ironically, <a href="http://www.banksafeonline.org.uk/moneymule_explained.html">the money mule recruitment site</a> is sharing IPs with many of them. Who are these money launderers (<b>cashtransfers.tk</b>; <b>cashtransfers.eu; type53.eu</b>; <b>sid57.tk</b>; <b>catdbw.mobi</b>; <b>cdrpoex.com </b>etc.&nbsp; ) anyway?<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;">"<i>Cash-Transfers Inc. is an online-to-offline international money transfer service. We offer a secure, fast, and inexpensive means of sending money from the UK to offline recipients worldwide. Recipients do not require a bank account or Internet connection to receive funds. We have teamed with select local disbursement partners to provide a convenient, secure, and cost-effective means of sending money to family, friends and business partners abroad. The basic requirements to send money/transfer money are:</i></div><i><br />
1) Senders must have Internet access and a bank account or credit/debit card to transfer money. However, recipients do not require either a bank account or Internet connection.<br />
<br />
2) Money sent through Cash-Transfers Inc. is available for pick up at the distribution partner instantly, or, in most countries, money can be delivered to the recipient in a matter of hours.<br />
<br />
3) Our local agents will call your recipient (during local business hours) to provide additional details, including: forms of identification required, hours of operation, and other locations. The sender will also receive an email confirmation with transaction details and tracking information.</i>"<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="text-align: left; clear: both;"><a href="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SIB3agOgfJI/AAAAAAAAB7k/qtHLcMs6sVs/s1600-h/cash_transfers_asprox_SQL_injection.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SIB3agOgfJI/AAAAAAAAB7k/y-aSv2_Sztk/s200-R/cash_transfers_asprox_SQL_injection.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a></div>The fast-flux infrastructure they're currently using is also providing services to domains that are currently used, or have been used in previous SQL injection attacks. Some info on the current DNS servers used in the fast-flux :<br />
<br />
<b>ns10.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns11.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns1.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns12.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns2.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns13.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns3.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns14.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns4.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns15.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns5.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns16.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns6.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns17.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns7.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns8.cashtransfers.tk</b><br />
<br />
With the distributed and dynamic hosting infrastructure courtesy of the malware infected user, scammers, spammers, phishers and malware authors are only starting to experiment with the potential abuses of such an underground ecosystem build on the foundations of compromises hosts.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/storm-worms-fast-flux-networks.html">Storm Worm's Fast Flux Networks</a><br />
<b> </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/managed-fast-flux-provider.html">Managed Fast Flux Provider</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/fast-flux-spam-and-scams-increasing.html">Fast Flux Spam and Scams Increasing</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/fast-fluxing-yet-another-pharmacy-scam.html">Fast Fluxing Yet Another Pharmacy Spam</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/obfuscating-fast-fluxed-sql-injected.html">Obfuscating Fast Fluxed SQL Injected Domains</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/storm-worm-hosting-pharmaceutical-scams.html">Storm Worm Hosting Pharmaceutical Scams</a><br />
<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1122">Fast-Fluxing SQL injection attacks executed from the Asprox botnet</a><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=aMnYfJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=aMnYfJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=wo8AkJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=wo8AkJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=22rmej"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=22rmej" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=ec2OKj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=ec2OKj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=LfbMJJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=LfbMJJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=2LYf9J"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=2LYf9J" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=2LO3zj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=2LO3zj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/338919917" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 18 Jul 2008 02:23:49 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast">fast</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast flux networks">fast flux networks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/money">money</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast-flux">fast-flux</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cashtransfers">cashtransfers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast flux provider">fast flux provider</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast flux spam">fast flux spam</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/transfer money">transfer money</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast-flux infrastructure">fast-flux infrastructure</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/338919917/money-mule-recruiters-use-asproxs-fast.html">Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services</source>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
