There are two classes of contraband at airport security checkpoints: the class that will get you in trouble if you try to bring it on an airplane, and the class that will cheerily be taken away from you if you try to bring it on an airplane. This difference is important: Making security screeners confiscate anything from that second class is a waste of time. All it does is harm innocents; it doesn't stop terrorists at all.

Let me explain. If you're caught at airport security with a bomb or a gun, the screeners aren't just going to take it away from you. They're going to call the police, and you're going to be stuck for a few hours answering a lot of awkward questions. You may be arrested, and you'll almost certainly miss your flight. At best, you're going to have a very unpleasant day.

This is why articles about how screeners don't catch every -- or even a majority -- of guns and bombs that go through the checkpoints don't bother me. The screeners don't have to be perfect; they just have to be good enough. No terrorist is going to base his plot on getting a gun through airport security if there's decent chance of getting caught, because the consequences of getting caught are too great.

Contrast that with a terrorist plot that requires a 12-ounce bottle of liquid. There's no evidence that the London liquid bombers actually had a workable plot, but assume for the moment they did. If some copycat terrorists try to bring their liquid bomb through airport security and the screeners catch them -- like they caught me with my bottle of pasta sauce -- the terrorists can simply try again. They can try again and again. They can keep trying until they succeed. Because there are no consequences to trying and failing, the screeners have to be 100 percent effective. Even if they slip up one in a hundred times, the plot can succeed.

The same is true for knitting needles, pocketknives, scissors, corkscrews, cigarette lighters and whatever else the airport screeners are confiscating this week. If there's no consequence to getting caught with it, then confiscating it only hurts innocent people. At best, it mildly annoys the terrorists.

To fix this, airport security has to make a choice. If something is dangerous, treat it as dangerous and treat anyone who tries to bring it on as potentially dangerous. If it's not dangerous, then stop trying to keep it off airplanes. Trying to have it both ways just distracts the screeners from actually making us safer.

There are two classes of contraband at airport security checkpoints: the class that will get you in trouble if you try to bring it on an airplane, and the class that will cheerily be taken away from you if you try to bring it on an airplane. This difference is important: Making security screeners confiscate anything from that second class is a waste of time. All it does is harm innocents; it doesn't stop terrorists at all.

Let me explain. If you're caught at airport security with a bomb or a gun, the screeners aren't just going to take it away from you. They're going to call the police, and you're going to be stuck for a few hours answering a lot of awkward questions. You may be arrested, and you'll almost certainly miss your flight. At best, you're going to have a very unpleasant day.

This is why articles about how screeners don't catch every -- or even a majority -- of guns and bombs that go through the checkpoints don't bother me. The screeners don't have to be perfect; they just have to be good enough. No terrorist is going to base his plot on getting a gun through airport security if there's decent chance of getting caught, because the consequences of getting caught are too great.

Contrast that with a terrorist plot that requires a 12-ounce bottle of liquid. There's no evidence that the London liquid bombers actually had a workable plot, but assume for the moment they did. If some copycat terrorists try to bring their liquid bomb through airport security and the screeners catch them -- like they caught me with my bottle of pasta sauce -- the terrorists can simply try again. They can try again and again. They can keep trying until they succeed. Because there are no consequences to trying and failing, the screeners have to be 100 percent effective. Even if they slip up one in a hundred times, the plot can succeed.

The same is true for knitting needles, pocketknives, scissors, corkscrews, cigarette lighters and whatever else the airport screeners are confiscating this week. If there's no consequence to getting caught with it, then confiscating it only hurts innocent people. At best, it mildly annoys the terrorists.

To fix this, airport security has to make a choice. If something is dangerous, treat it as dangerous and treat anyone who tries to bring it on as potentially dangerous. If it's not dangerous, then stop trying to keep it off airplanes. Trying to have it both ways just distracts the screeners from actually making us safer.

---

Bruce Schneier is chief security technology officer of BT. His new book is Schneier on Security.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security wrote a letter to Labbé in 2004, saying he had been placed on their watch list after falling victim to identity theft. At the time, the department said there was no way for his name to be removed.

Although Labbé wrote letters to the U.S. department, his efforts were in vain, prompting him to legally change his name.

"So now, my official name is François Mario Labbé," he said.

"Then you have to change everything: driver's license, social insurance, medicare, credit card -- everything."

Although it's not a big change from Mario Labbé, he said it's been enough to foil the U.S. customs computers.

Interop NY

• East Coast version of this major networking show. ScienceLogic is the official provider for network monitoring and help desk for InteropNet, the world’s largest temporary network. See us in action in the NOC. Stop by the booth, #1045, to chat, pick up your own deck of EM7 cards, or fill out a survey for a free t-shirt.
• When: Conference runs from Mon 9/15 – Friday 9/19. Expo days are Wed 9/17 – Thurs 9/18.
• Where: The Javits Center, NYC.

VMworld 2008

• The largest virtualization show put on by VMware, the leader in the space. VMworld is only a couple of years old but growing like gangbusters. This year’s show should be an interesting one in light of all the turmoil surrounding VMware and Microsoft’s putsch, oops I meant push, into the space with Hyper-V.
• When: Mon 9/15 is Partner Day. Conference runs from Tues 9/16 – Thurs 9/18
• Where: The Venetian Hotel, Las Vegas.

Hosting Transformation Summit

• Executive-level hosting/service provider show run by The 451 Group (and Tier 1). The analysts at The 451 Group and Tier 1 discuss state of the industry and trends.
• When: Mon 9/15 – Wed 9/17
• Where: The Mirage, Las Vegas

ICE Summit

• Also run by The 451 Group, the ICE (Infrastructure Computing for the Enterprise) Summit will focus on “virtualization in context”. This overlaps the last day of VMworld (personally making my life a little harder).
• When: Thurs 9/18
• Where: The Mirage, Las Vegas

Inc 500 / Inc 5000 Conference & Awards Ceremony

• Since we made it on the list (#350!), we thought we should show the flag at the Inc 500 conference, culminating in an awards gala on Saturday night.
• When: Thurs 9/18 – Sat 9/20
• Where: Gaylord National Resort & Convention Center at the National Harbor (DC)

Stay tuned for live blogging and video from the various events with always lively commentary from the ScienceLogicians.