Charlie Rose:  
And so when you look at where we are going, there seems to be two issues that are apparent to me at least, risk and leverage.  We just lost sight of risk and leverage of what was appropriate?

Warren Buffett:  
Yeah.  Again, because it pays off for a while.  You know, you can lose leverage, and it's the only way a smart guy can go broke.  If you owe money, you can't pay them out.  You just pay for everything, you do smart things, you eventually get very rich.  If you do smart things and use leverage and do one wrong thing along the way, it could wipe you out, because anything times zero is zero.  But it's reinforcing when the people around you are doing it successfully, you're doing it successfully, and it's a lot like Cinderella at the ball.  I mean you know at midnight everything is going to turn to pumpkins and mice; right?  But if the evening goes along, I mean, you know, the guys look better all the time, the music sounds better, it's more and more fun, you think why the hell should I leave at quarter of 12.  I'll leave at two minutes to 12.  But the trouble is, there are no clocks on the wall.  And everybody thinks they're going to leave at two minutes to 12.

Charlie Rose:  
And should wise people have known better?

Warren Buffett:  
People should always know better.

Charlie Rose:  
Yeah.

Warren Buffett:  
I mean people -- people don't get -- they don't get smarter about things that get as basic as greed and you can't stand to see your neighbor getting rich.  You know you're smarter than he is, and he's doing these things, you know, and he's getting rich, and your spouse is getting unhappy with you because you aren't doing -- pretty soon you start doing it.  And so you get what I call the natural progression, the three Is.  The innovators, the imitators, and the idiots.  And that's what happens.  Everybody just kind of goes along.  And you look kind of silly if you disagree.  I mean, you know, you could have these crazy Internet valuations in the late 1990s, but they prove themselves out in the market.  The next day they were selling for more than they were the day before, and people said, you know, you're crazy if you don't get in on this.  So it's very human.  Now, with housing it's something even more dramatic than that, because most people aspire to own their own home.  And if you really think that houses prices are going to go up next year and the year after, you feel if I don't buy it this year, I'm going to have to buy it next year.  That's not true of an Internet stock.  But it's true of a home.  And when somebody makes it very easy for you to do it by saying you don't really have to put up my money, you can lie about your income a little, or we'll give you 100 percent mortgage, you're going to do it, because everybody that's done it has been proven right.  You have what they call social tools, and, you know, you're going to feel like an idiot if you didn't do it, because the house cost more.

Warren Buffett:  
Oh, I think confidence will come back.  I will tell you this.  This country is going -- be living better ten years from now than it is now.  It will be living better in 20 years from now than ten years from now.  The ingredients that made this country, you know, the miracle of the world -- I mean we had a seven for one improvement in the average American standard of living in the 20th century.  Now, we had the great depression, we had two world wars, we had the flu epidemic.  You know, we had oil shock.  You know, we had all these terrible things happen.  But something about the American system unleashed more and of a potential to human beings over that hundred years so that we had a seven for one improvement in -- there's never been any -- I mean, you have centuries where if you've got a 1 percent improvement, then it's something.  So we've got a great system.  And we've got more productive capacity now than we ever have.  The American worker is more productive than he's ever been.  We've got more people to do it.  We've got all the ingredients for a sensational future.  It's just that right now the athlete's on the floor.  But we -- this is a super athlete.

When a data owner's (a business) sensitive data is breached it is difficult to quantify the monetary loss. According to respectable survey sources, the average cost of sensitive data breach for a large size company is about $50,000. I am attempting here to think about this in simple mathametical terms:

There is a data breach. From the data owner's perspective the loss is:

Loss = Cost to protect data + Loss of business due to data theft aka cost of competitive disadvantage

From the data thief's perspective

Net Gain= [Cost of producing the data  *  Data freshness factor] - Cost to steal the data + Profit of business due to data aka gain of competitive advantage

From the above two equations it is very clear that this is not a zero sum game. There is a clear cost asymmetry for a data owner and for a data thief. When there is an asymmetry there is an opportunity. Data owner would not even know that the data is lost because the original copy of the data may be still intact - data thief could have simply copied the data. Data theft does not look like a car theft, there is no vacuum left behind. 

This motivates a data thief to keep the cost to steal low, steal highly valuable data that has a long shelf life and in a way that data owner will never even be aware of theft.

From a data thief's perspective, the cost to steal data if kept high would disincentive him. Moreover, Data freshness factor, i.e. how valuable this data is over period of time plays an important role. A good example is content of today's newspaper is hardly valuable tomorrow, but the content of newspaper two days ahead (if can be procured)would be invaluable. Data relevance is a function of time and other marketplace variables -  Data freshness Factor accounts for that variable. A good way to discourage data thief is to increase his/her cost to steal the data. There are other inferences from the above equation. If there exists no competitive advantage with the stolen data, hardly any thief would even venture to steal the data in the first place. If the cost of producing data is very low, then probably thief can just produce the data himself and would not attempt to steal the data. If the cost of theft is kept high, it would definitely deter the data thief from stealing data using technical mechanisms, then the data thief would exploit weak links in data security such as use of social engineering to get access to the data.

From data owner perspective protecting data becomes very important. How much would the owner be willing to spend? Not definitely the cost equal to cost of producing the data. 1% to 10% of cost of producing data is considered prudent. For a data owner it is difficult to estimate cost of data protection of a specific data, because it is not easy to chunkify data protection costs. Moreover, as Dan Geer says in his book, a data owner has to protect himself from number of intruders not just one.

It pays for a data owner to: be aware of data breaches (or data leaks), employ appropriate mechanisms to protect the data; the cost of protection which is fractional cost of the valuable data and enhance information security awareness of personnel who handle the data.

Data loss is not a zero sum game. The advantage is in favor of a data thief (data thieves rather). Data owner does not give much thought on the value of data unless there is a data theft. But, a data thief has every reason to think about economics of data theft before he acts to steal the data else data thief won't survive in this game and he is very well aware of his advantageous position.

It's become a big deal in IT security, too. Many corporate customers are demanding ROI models to demonstrate that a particular security investment pays off. And in response, vendors are providing ROI models that demonstrate how their particular security solution provides the best return on investment.

It's a good idea in theory, but it's mostly bunk in practice.

Before I get into the details, there's one point I have to make. "ROI" as used in a security context is inaccurate. Security is not an investment that provides a return, like a new factory or a financial instrument. It's an expense that, hopefully, pays for itself in cost savings. Security is about loss prevention, not about earnings. The term just doesn't make sense in this context.

But as anyone who has lived through a company's vicious end-of-year budget-slashing exercises knows, when you're trying to make your numbers, cutting costs is the same as increasing revenues. So while security can't produce ROI, loss prevention most certainly affects a company's bottom line.

And a company should implement only security countermeasures that affect its bottom line positively. It shouldn't spend more on a security problem than the problem is worth. Conversely, it shouldn't ignore problems that are costing it money when there are cheaper mitigation alternatives. A smart company needs to approach security as it would any other business decision: costs versus benefits.

The classic methodology is called annualized loss expectancy (ALE), and it's straightforward. Calculate the cost of a security incident in both tangibles like time and money, and intangibles like reputation and competitive advantage. Multiply that by the chance the incident will occur in a year. That tells you how much you should spend to mitigate the risk. So, for example, if your store has a 10 percent chance of getting robbed and the cost of being robbed is $10,000, then you should spend $1,000 a year on security. Spend more than that, and you're wasting money. Spend less than that, and you're also wasting money.

Of course, that $1,000 has to reduce the chance of being robbed to zero in order to be cost-effective. If a security measure cuts the chance of robbery by 40 percent -- to 6 percent a year -- then you should spend no more than $400 on it. If another security measure reduces it by 80 percent, it's worth $800. And if two security measures both reduce the chance of being robbed by 50 percent and one costs $300 and the other $700, the first one is worth it and the second isn't.

The Data Imperative

The key to making this work is good data; the term of art is "actuarial tail." If you're doing an ALE analysis of a security camera at a convenience store, you need to know the crime rate in the store's neighborhood and maybe have some idea of how much cameras improve the odds of convincing criminals to rob another store instead. You need to know how much a robbery costs: in merchandise, in time and annoyance, in lost sales due to spooked patrons, in employee morale. You need to know how much not having the cameras costs in terms of employee morale; maybe you're having trouble hiring salespeople to work the night shift. With all that data, you can figure out if the cost of the camera is cheaper than the loss of revenue if you close the store at night -- assuming that the closed store won't get robbed as well. And then you can decide whether to install one.

Cybersecurity is considerably harder, because there just isn't enough good data. There aren't good crime rates for cyberspace, and we have a lot less data about how individual security countermeasures -- or specific configurations of countermeasures -- mitigate those risks. We don't even have data on incident costs.

One problem is that the threat moves too quickly. The characteristics of the things we're trying to prevent change so quickly that we can't accumulate data fast enough. By the time we get some data, there's a new threat model for which we don't have enough data. So we can't create ALE models.

But there's another problem, and it's that the math quickly falls apart when it comes to rare and expensive events. Imagine you calculate the cost -- reputational costs, loss of customers, etc. -- of having your company's name in the newspaper after an embarrassing cybersecurity event to be $20 million. Also assume that the odds are 1 in 10,000 of that happening in any one year. ALE says you should spend no more than $2,000 mitigating that risk.

So far, so good. But maybe your CFO thinks an incident would cost only $10 million. You can't argue, since we're just estimating. But he just cut your security budget in half. A vendor trying to sell you a product finds a Web analysis claiming that the odds of this happening are actually 1 in 1,000. Accept this new number, and suddenly a product costing 10 times as much is still a good investment.

It gets worse when you deal with even more rare and expensive events. Imagine you're in charge of terrorism mitigation at a chlorine plant. What's the cost to your company, in money and reputation, of a large and very deadly explosion? $100 million? $1 billion? $10 billion? And the odds: 1 in a hundred thousand, 1 in a million, 1 in 10 million? Depending on how you answer those two questions -- and any answer is really just a guess -- you can justify spending anywhere from $10 to $100,000 annually to mitigate that risk.

Or take another example: airport security. Assume that all the new airport security measures increase the waiting time at airports by -- and I'm making this up -- 30 minutes per passenger. There were 760 million passenger boardings in the United States in 2007. This means that the extra waiting time at airports has cost us a collective 43,000 years of extra waiting time. Assume a 70-year life expectancy, and the increased waiting time has "killed" 620 people per year -- 930 if you calculate the numbers based on 16 hours of awake time per day. So the question is: If we did away with increased airport security, would the result be more people dead from terrorism or fewer?

Caveat Emptor

This kind of thing is why most ROI models you get from security vendors are nonsense. Of course their model demonstrates that their product or service makes financial sense: They've jiggered the numbers so that they do.

This doesn't mean that ALE is useless, but it does mean you should 1) mistrust any analyses that come from people with an agenda and 2) use any results as a general guideline only. So when you get an ROI model from your vendor, take its framework and plug in your own numbers. Don't even show the vendor your improvements; it won't consider any changes that make its product or service less cost-effective to be an "improvement." And use those results as a general guide, along with risk management and compliance analyses, when you're deciding what security products and services to buy.

This essay previously appeared in CSO Magazine.

Howard Schmidt, who was once the CSO of Microsoft, knows a thing or two about vendors shipping insecure software.  He offers this advice relating to his iPhone, “Just because a piece of software was distributed through Apple’s App Store, don’t assume that it is vulnerability free.”  I think that sums up the problem pretty well.  Customers assume the software they are getting is vulnerability free until it is proved otherwise.

If it’s distributed by the Apple Store it is coming from a trusted brand. “It must be secure”, many think.  The same thinking is used by people who install social networking applets and give them access to their personal data.  Someone, somewhere is taking care of the software security so I don’t have to.  It must be the platform provider, the store, some industry body, my antivirus provider, or maybe even the government.

You can see how this thinking pervades the consumer space because there are regulatory bodies governing all other aspects of safety and security in our personal lives.  I’m safe in a plane or car because the government is looking out for me with standards and testing requirements.  I am safe in the mall parking lot because the men in the white SUV are patrolling.

This thinking also pervaded the b2b space.  I talk to companies which are outsourcing critical applications to offshore development companies and they assume that security testing is taking place as part of the development process.  I ask them if they have made security quality part of the requirements of the project and they say no.  Then I ask them what evidence does the offshore developer provide to demonstrate they have a certain level of security quality in the software they are producing and they tell me they have never asked.

I can tell you what would happen if they did ask because I have also spoken with the offshore developers.  They have no evidence.  Their concern is getting the software functionality done on time and on budget. They consider fixing security vulnerabilities, once discovered, rework which the customer pays for.  So not only are they not looking for vulnerabilities and relying on the customer to find them, they are charging the customer to fix the problems.  The customer has to this date accepted this model.

The same goes for commercial off the shelf software and open source.  Surely the developers writing the software are trained in secure software engineering.  Surely commercial software companies are using 3rd parties to test their software just like the banks have the big 4 audit their accounting or auto manufacturers submit to testing by the NHTSA. And of course open source has “many eyes” reviewing the code for security defects and informing the developers.  The customer has accepted a model where this is almost never true.

But times are changing and it is partially due to the availability of software that can automate the process of looking for security vulnerabilities. David Rice, the author of “Geekanomics: The Real Cost of Insecure Software” was interviewed recently by Drazin Drazic his Beast or Buddha blog.  He said the trend is toward a future of secure software and automated security analysis is one of the sparks:

BorB: I recently wrote in a post that little is changing. We are not learning from the lessons of the past. There are few, if any new technologies that exist today, that we have great faith and trust in as being secure now, and expecting them to continue to be secure in the future. Any solutions to even basic security issues need a starting point and a significant change to current thinking, and even then, it will takes years to see the impacts of this. What are your thoughts on this? Are we seeing anything at present to make us more confident of the future?

DR: It is true that it takes years to see the positive impacts of a change of mindset. And we are in the unfortunate position of repeating many old lessons.

At base, human history is a collection of exhaustive, expensive, and protracted engagements; only the relentless survive and have a chance at succeeding (notice no guarantee here). Confronting some of our most complex problems like highway safety, nuclear proliferation, or insecure software is painful, difficult, complicated, and troublesome. Human endeavors of any significance are like this. But we must do it. The inertia of culture and status quo is difficult to overcome, but overcome it we can; otherwise, we would not have the better parts of the world we enjoy today.

I believe the technology space is no different. We are just a little dazed and bewildered by all the changes technology has introduced so quickly and on such a grand scale. For every change we react to, another two or three rapidly appear.

I do see sparks of hope emerging. In the United States some members of government are beginning to understand the problem and are willing to start discussing how to approach insecure software from a policy perspective. On the technology front, companies like Ounce, Fortify, and Veracode are beginning to give software buyers an automated method of evaluating assurance levels of software. While not complete in and of themselves, these solutions are, as I stated, “sparks” that can help us progress down paths that were once not easily open to us.

As for the larger issue of cyber security, which software assurance is only a part of, society has a lot of adjusting to do. The Internet is a new environment for many still, and many more to come. There is a learning curve that must be confronted. It took the United States almost 80 years to develop the highway system we know and enjoy today. Nearly $400 billion was spent on this endeavor with hundreds of thousands of lives lost. As this shows, learning how to govern and navigate a new environment is expensive. Failing to learn even more so.

Independent, automated, and repeatable software security testing is an essential component of a safe and secure online environment.  Without it we are stuck with the assumption of vendors perfoming software security as our imaginary security blanket that allows us to operate in the current online world.

Howard Schmidt, who was once the CSO of Microsoft, knows a thing or two about vendors shipping insecure software. He offers this advice relating to his iPhone, “Just because a piece of software was distributed through Apple’s App Store, don’t assume that it is vulnerability free.” I think that sums up the problem pretty well. Customers assume the software they are getting is vulnerability free until it is proved otherwise.

If it’s distributed by the Apple Store it is coming from a trusted brand. “It must be secure”, many think. The same thinking is used by people who install social networking applets and give them access to their personal data. Someone, somewhere is taking care of the software security so I don’t have to. It must be the platform provider, the store, some industry body, my antivirus provider, or maybe even the government.

You can see how this thinking pervades the consumer space because there are regulatory bodies governing all other aspects of safety and security in our personal lives. I’m safe in a plane or car because the government is looking out for me with standards and testing requirements. I am safe in the mall parking lot because the men in the white SUV are patrolling.

This thinking also pervaded the b2b space. I talk to companies which are outsourcing critical applications to offshore development companies and they assume that security testing is taking place as part of the development process. I ask them if they have made security quality part of the requirements of the project and they say no. Then I ask them what evidence does the offshore developer provide to demonstrate they have a certain level of security quality in the software they are producing and they tell me they have never asked.

I can tell you what would happen if they did ask because I have also spoken with the offshore developers. They have no evidence. Their concern is getting the software functionality done on time and on budget. They consider fixing security vulnerabilities, once discovered, rework which the customer pays for. So not only are they not looking for vulnerabilities and relying on the customer to find them, they are charging the customer to fix the problems. The customer has to this date accepted this model.

The same goes for commercial off the shelf software and open source. Surely the developers writing the software are trained in secure software engineering. Surely commercial software companies are using 3rd parties to test their software just like the banks have the big 4 audit their accounting or auto manufacturers submit to testing by the NHTSA. And of course open source has “many eyes” reviewing the code for security defects and informing the developers. The customer has accepted a model where this is almost never true.

But times are changing and it is partially due to the availability of software that can automate the process of looking for security vulnerabilities. David Rice, the author of “Geekanomics: The Real Cost of Insecure Software” was interviewed recently by Drazin Drazic his Beast or Buddha blog. He said the trend is toward a future of secure software and automated security analysis is one of the sparks:

BorB: I recently wrote in a post that little is changing. We are not learning from the lessons of the past. There are few, if any new technologies that exist today, that we have great faith and trust in as being secure now, and expecting them to continue to be secure in the future. Any solutions to even basic security issues need a starting point and a significant change to current thinking, and even then, it will takes years to see the impacts of this. What are your thoughts on this? Are we seeing anything at present to make us more confident of the future?

DR: It is true that it takes years to see the positive impacts of a change of mindset. And we are in the unfortunate position of repeating many old lessons.

At base, human history is a collection of exhaustive, expensive, and protracted engagements; only the relentless survive and have a chance at succeeding (notice no guarantee here). Confronting some of our most complex problems like highway safety, nuclear proliferation, or insecure software is painful, difficult, complicated, and troublesome. Human endeavors of any significance are like this. But we must do it. The inertia of culture and status quo is difficult to overcome, but overcome it we can; otherwise, we would not have the better parts of the world we enjoy today.

I believe the technology space is no different. We are just a little dazed and bewildered by all the changes technology has introduced so quickly and on such a grand scale. For every change we react to, another two or three rapidly appear.

I do see sparks of hope emerging. In the United States some members of government are beginning to understand the problem and are willing to start discussing how to approach insecure software from a policy perspective. On the technology front, companies like Ounce, Fortify, and Veracode are beginning to give software buyers an automated method of evaluating assurance levels of software. While not complete in and of themselves, these solutions are, as I stated, “sparks” that can help us progress down paths that were once not easily open to us.

As for the larger issue of cyber security, which software assurance is only a part of, society has a lot of adjusting to do. The Internet is a new environment for many still, and many more to come. There is a learning curve that must be confronted. It took the United States almost 80 years to develop the highway system we know and enjoy today. Nearly $400 billion was spent on this endeavor with hundreds of thousands of lives lost. As this shows, learning how to govern and navigate a new environment is expensive. Failing to learn even more so.

Independent, automated, and repeatable software security testing is an essential component of a safe and secure online environment. Without it we are stuck with the assumption of vendors perfoming software security as our imaginary security blanket that allows us to operate in the current online world.