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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: pet]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/pet</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 21 May 2008 11:36:29 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Sarah Palin's E-Mail]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/22bb4b94d574654a5aab8a33a6ec3144</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/22bb4b94d574654a5aab8a33a6ec3144</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[People have been asking me to comment about Sarah Palin's Yahoo e-mail account being hacked. I've already written about the security problems with &quot;secret questions&quot; back in 2005: The point of all...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>People have been asking me to comment about Sarah Palin's Yahoo e-mail account being hacked.  I've <a href="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/the_curse_of_th.html">already written</a> about the security problems with "secret questions" back in 2005:</p>

<blockquote>The point of all these questions is the same: a backup password. If you forget your password, the secret question can verify your identity so you can choose another password or have the site e-mail your current password to you. It's a great idea from a customer service perspective -- a user is less likely to forget his first pet's name than some random password -- but terrible for security. The answer to the secret question is much easier to guess than a good password, and the information is much more public. (I'll bet the name of my family's first pet is in some database somewhere.) And even worse, everybody seems to use the same series of secret questions. 

<p>The result is the normal security protocol (passwords) falls back to a much less secure protocol (secret questions). And the security of the entire system suffers.</blockquote></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=4AnbL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=4AnbL" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=5j7HL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=5j7HL" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 24 Sep 2008 12:01:58 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/password">password</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/current password">current password</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/questions">questions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/secret questions">secret questions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/random password">random password</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/normal security protocol">normal security protocol</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/backup password">backup password</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/secret question">secret question</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/09/sarah_palins_e-.html">Sarah Palin's E-Mail</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[SSO Summit Day One Morning Session]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/500327e2eca382c04451c330dcc1e875</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/500327e2eca382c04451c330dcc1e875</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I am at the SSO Summit , high in the Colorado mountains (9200 feet elevation to be exact), the I-70 West sign is one of my favorite road signs. Ping Identity has done a great job putting this...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div>I am at the <a href="http://www.ssosummit.com/">SSO Summit</a>, high in the Colorado mountains (9200 feet elevation to be exact), the I-70 West sign is one of my favorite road signs. <a href="http://www.pingidentity.com/">Ping Identity</a> has done a great job putting this together. It is the perfect size around 125 people. Most of the best conferences I have been to have been around 60-150 people. There are a *lot* of enterprises involved here. </div><br><div>John Haggard who has an extensive background in SSO and lately is at Passfaces kicked off the sessions with a SSO history talk. Going through a lot of mainframe centric SSO protocols from the 80s and 90s, I am no expert in these areas and it was fascinating to see the way things vacillated between strength and weakness of SSO protocols.</div><br><div>A couple of points from the presentation:</div><br><div><blockquote><p>The history of SSO is a story of extreme complexities, compromises, vulnerabilities and unintended consequences.</p></blockquote></div><div><blockquote><br></blockquote></div><div><blockquote><p>SSO is a story of one simple objective - to spin off units of computation work to execute on behalf of an authenticated user without requiring the original user's password.</p></blockquote></div><div><blockquote><br></blockquote></div><div><blockquote><p>Phishing has always been completely avoidable</p></blockquote></div><br><div>He went through the various incarnations of mainframe SSO from logon id through things like ACF2, VTAM Session managers, terminal emulators, multiplatform access to web access through facades. The implication he drew from this last step are well worth repeating: "Time to rethink everything." Problem is - of course, people don't rethink, they put MQ Series in front of the mainframe and hook a web app in front of that and go. </div><br><div>Finally, he connected some interesting dots to SAML and SOA security issues. </div><br><div><blockquote><p>SSO without strong auth is and always will be simply nuts</p></blockquote></div><div><blockquote><br></blockquote></div><div><blockquote><p>SAML gets its right</p></blockquote></div><div>His points around common weaknesses in integration in SOA and Web 2.0 technologies for companies that are *not* using SAML were excellent. Of course, I will go into some more details on this tomorrow.</div><br><div>Ping's CTO Patrick Harding took the stage and gave an overview of the next generation of SSO options from Kerberos to present and as is his wont demonstrated various real world strengths and weaknesses, quoted a Gartner analyst (shock!) saying OpenID is the hare and Cardspace is the tortoise. Nice.</div><br><div>Andrew Cameron from GM is speaking now on GM's experiences implementing SSO, and there are a lot of real world lessons learned in his presentation.  Plus my favorite identity architecture, user has Kerberos, services speak SAML. very nice, very scalable. All in all, its my starting point for how to identity in an enterprise. He also spoke about a pet peeve of mine - how to globalize authorization. This is not a problem that vendors have historically attacked with relish. They are very happy to help you solve authentication, but they are perfectly happy to keep their authorization internal either for vendor lock in reasons and/or for sloppy authorization design. This will take a LIberty-esque consortium of enterprises to resolve. </div><br><div>So many conferences are dominated by vendors and consultants who conspire to what I call the "sacred church of things YOU should be doing." Instead this conference is bringing together a great mix of real world in the trenches practitioners who have problems to solve today, with rubber meets the road deployable solutions and an eye towards longer term strategy for SSO and identity.</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 24 Jul 2008 09:35:02 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sso">sso</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sso history talk">sso history talk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sso summit">sso summit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mainframe sso">mainframe sso</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sso options">sso options</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sso protocols">sso protocols</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/real world">real world</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/real world lessons">real world lessons</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/authorization internal">authorization internal</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/07/sso-summit-day-one-morning-session.html">SSO Summit Day One Morning Session</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[PET Award 2008]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/545a9a5c54156c491856c14204db6c2a</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/545a9a5c54156c491856c14204db6c2a</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[At last years Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS) , I presented the paper Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries, co-authored with Piotr Zieliński . In it, we...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At last year&#8217;s <a href="http://www.petsymposium.org/">Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS)</a>, I presented the paper &#8220;Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries&#8221;, co-authored with <a href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~pz215/">Piotr Zieliński</a>. In it, we discussed the risk of traffic-analysis at Internet exchanges (IXes). We then showed that given even a small fraction of the data passing through an IX it was still possible to track a substantial proportion of anonymous communications. Our results are summarized in a previous <a href="http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2007/05/28/sampled-traffic-analysis-by-internet-exchange-level-adversaries/">blog post</a> and full details are in the <a href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/papers/pet07ixanalysis.pdf">paper</a>.</p>
<p>Our paper has now been announced as a runner-up for the <a href="http://petworkshop.org/award/">Privacy Enhancing Technologies Award</a>. The prize is presented annually, for research which makes an outstanding contribution to the field. Microsoft, the sponsor of the award, have further details and summaries of the papers in their <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/emea/presscentre/pressreleases/23072008_PETSFS.mspx">press release</a>.</p>
<p>Congratulations to the winners, Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov, for <a href="http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_oak08netflix.pdf">&#8220;Robust De-Anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets&#8221;</a>; and the other runner-ups, Mira Belenkiy, Melissa Chase, C. Chris Erway, John Jannotti, Alptekin Küpçü, Anna Lysyanskaya and Erich Rachlin, for <a href="http://www.cs.brown.edu/~mira/papers/wpes07.pdf">&#8220;Making P2P Accountable without Losing Privacy&#8221;</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 24 Jul 2008 06:50:23 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/award">award</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/previous blog post">previous blog post</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/privacy">privacy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/technologies award">technologies award</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/paper">paper</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/erich rachlin">erich rachlin</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mira belenkiy">mira belenkiy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/p2p accountable">p2p accountable</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/technologies symposium">technologies symposium</category>
      <source url="http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2008/07/24/pet-award-2008/">PET Award 2008</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[You want the truth, you can't handle the truth!]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5e8ee0a0eb7aec0d6393e17e6cc64b3d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5e8ee0a0eb7aec0d6393e17e6cc64b3d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I am not sure what it is with Richard Stiennon. Maybe his mom beat him with a NAC stick when he was young. Hence his Jack Nicholson looks (more like the Joker in Batman , than Col Jessep in A Few Good...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><a href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/fewgoodmen.jpg"><img title="fewgoodmen" height="183" alt="fewgoodmen" src="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/fewgoodmen_thumb.jpg" width="179" align="left" border="0" style="BORDER-RIGHT: 0px; BORDER-TOP: 0px; MARGIN: 0px 10px 5px 0px; BORDER-LEFT: 0px; BORDER-BOTTOM: 0px" /></a> I am not sure what it is with Richard Stiennon.&nbsp; Maybe his mom beat him with a NAC stick when he was young.&nbsp; Hence his Jack Nicholson looks (more like the Joker in <a class="zem_slink" title="Batman" href="http://www.dccomics.com/sites/batman/" rel="homepage">Batman</a>, than Col Jessep in <a class="zem_slink" title="A Few Good Men" href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0104257" rel="imdb">A Few Good Men</a>) and his total disdain for NAC.&nbsp; In any event Richard never seems to miss a chance to take a pot shot at NAC.&nbsp; I have fired back and debated him many times on this.&nbsp; In fact I am convinced that Richard's problem with NAC is that like Uncle Joe, he is just moving a little slow.&nbsp; Richard still thinks of NAC as Cisco???s network admission control, circa Dec ???03.&nbsp; He has not gotten up to speed on anything happening with NAC since.&nbsp; Richard is going to debate NAC with Joel Snyder according to <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/newsletters/vpn/2008/070708nac2.html">this article</a> by Tim Greene today. My prediction is Snyder by a knockout in 3 rounds or less.</p>

<p>Richard???s latest NAC knock comes on a comment to an <a href="http://rationalsecurity.typepad.com/blog/2008/07/security-analys.html?cid=121871540#comment-121871540">excellent article by the Hoff</a>.&nbsp; Chris takes a bold stand for someone working for a vendor and calls BS on the whole analyst thing (I will write more about that later in this article). Richard being an ex-analyst himself (lets face it, with Richard you can take the man out of the analyst job, but you can???t take the analyst out of the man), takes exception to Hoff???s ???whining??? (Richards words, not mine) and tries to tell Hoff that giving up is not the answer and the way to show up analysts, is to prove them wrong.&nbsp; Great Richard you try to prove them wrong, when because of what they report you don???t have a market, can???t get any capital and have no visibility.&nbsp; I guess that is when it is time to move on to the next gig, right? Then Richard has a bad NAC deja vu and feels it necessary to write this: </p><blockquote><p><em>???Look how easy it is to one up the analyst firms, who as near as I can tell support Network Admission Control universally. Everyone except the folks at Updata Ventures know how seriously flawed NAC is with only one viable market, edu.???</em></p></blockquote><p>I assume Richard is referring to Updata recently leading the Bradford Networks VC round. But more importantly Richard it is time to call a code red on you and give you the cold hard truth.&nbsp; Richard the fact is that the edu market is not the only viable market for NAC.&nbsp; In fact, one of the biggest customers of NAC is the DoD.&nbsp; That is right Richard at least 3 of the 4 armed forces use NAC in helping to secure their networks. To paraphrase my friend Col Jessep - Richard, you want the truth, you can???t handle the truth!&nbsp; You sleep securely under the blanket of protection that NAC provides.&nbsp; If it is good enough to help ???clean the sand??? out of laptops coming home from SWA (that is SouthWest Asia, like in Iraq and Afghanistan, in case you don???t know Richard), it should be good enough for you. Think about that next time you are about to bad mouth NAC.</p>

<p>Let me give you some other truths you may not like Richard.&nbsp; Why do you think every switch vendor (of which we partner with many of them) is lining up and bringing out NAC solutions?&nbsp; Why has Microsoft put such a big push on NAP?&nbsp; Why despite the Luddites like you does NAC still draw crowds at conferences like Interop (ask Joel about that).&nbsp; Richard we are still signing new major OEM partners.&nbsp; I am afraid you are the one sadly out of touch on this one Richard.&nbsp; Just as you are out of touch in missing Hoff???s point in his article.</p>

<p>As to Hoff???s article, as I said I give Chris credit for speaking his mind. I spend an ungodly amount of my time speaking with analysts and trying to ???learn??? from them while at the same time trying to educate them.&nbsp; I am constantly amazed that so many analysts (and press for that matter) just take a vendors word as gospel. I have seen research reports from analysts big and small, that I am sure did not have any more research done than calling a handful of vendors and listening to their spiel. Too many of these vendors if they do speak to customers, base their findings on such a small sample that it is impossible to have an accurate picture.</p>

<p>Personally, like Hoff says, who watches the watchers is the truth. I would like to see a code of conduct among analysts. I would start by dictating that vendors cannot pay analysts.&nbsp; Take the payola out of the equation the way they did to the DJ/Radio business in the late 50s. Next analyst reports have to come with metrics to back up the findings. I want to know how many customers they spoke to, how big they were, how they were found, etc.&nbsp; A vendor giving an analyst a real live???pet??? customer is not real research. I want to know if the customer pays the analyst. It is a dirty business. </p>

<p>Hey let me be clear, I play the game as well as the next guy.&nbsp; But I agree with Hoff we need to clean up the rules to make the whole analyst thing more fair, viable and valuable.</p>

<div class="zemanta-pixie" style="MARGIN-TOP: 10px; HEIGHT: 15px"><a class="zemanta-pixie-a" title="Zemified by Zemanta" href="http://reblog.zemanta.com/zemified/e6165b9b-253e-4392-a8dd-ef9917b5dc2e/"><img class="zemanta-pixie-img" alt="Zemanta Pixie" src="http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_e.png?x-id=e6165b9b-253e-4392-a8dd-ef9917b5dc2e" style="BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; BORDER-TOP: medium none; FLOAT: right; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none" /></a></div></div>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Jul 2008 18:50:16 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac">nac</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac stick">nac stick</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/richard">richard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/richard stiennon">richard stiennon</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bad mouth nac">bad mouth nac</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/importantly richard">importantly richard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac knock">nac knock</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/assume richard">assume richard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/event richard">event richard</category>
      <source url="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/2008/07/you-want-the-tr.html">You want the truth, you can't handle the truth!</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Content Scrapers And Security Blogs]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/8436415bdcaf09b5d55ab2064e91c920</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/8436415bdcaf09b5d55ab2064e91c920</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I saw an interesting post over at Anti-Virus-Rants today, where Kurt Wismer linked to an article regarding content scraping. In essence, the site doing the scraping (Security Ratty) ended up with...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
        I saw an interesting post over at <a href="http://anti-virus-rants.blogspot.com/2008/07/how-not-to-comment-spam.html">Anti-Virus-Rants</a> today, where Kurt Wismer linked to an article regarding content scraping. In essence, the site doing the scraping (Security Ratty) ended up with "Security Ratty is a slimy, content stealing thief" on the <a href="http://securosis.com/2008/07/02/i-win/">front page</a>. I find this interesting, because not so long ago I'd considered doing something similar with one of those fake security spam blog things that lift the content and splatter a ton of adverts on their site, while removing correct attribution.<br /><br />Instead, I decided to do a little digging and quickly traced it back to a guy running a whole network of various sites, blogs and other networks. However - something didn't seem quite right. For all intents and purposes, he seemed like a normal, legit guy. He had pictures of himself on various portals. He openly advertised his main line of business, which (I think) was something to do with accountancy. There was a personal blog about pet dogs.<br /><br />Holding fire on the "Here's a post specifically for your scraper site poking fun at you, aren't I clever" post, we found out that the guy had purchased a bunch of ready-to-roll blogs in good faith and had no idea the sites were removing correct attribution (and replacing it with fake names), amongst various other things. Realistically, I didn't expect him to know the ins and outs of all the little details that turned reproduction in good faith into something that just about started to cross the line. A few helpful emails back and forth, and everything was fixed at their end and it didn't snowball into some big stupid argument over nothing.<br /><br />Coming from an arts background, I'm realistic enough to know that if you put something out there, it's going to get copied and / or republished without your permission (or worse) down the line. That's the risk of publishing material online, and to a large degree, there is absolutely <i>nothing</i> you can do about it. The way I see it, you spend the rest of your days on a futile hunt to shut down all the content scrapers, or accept that (at the very least) the information you hope may be of use to somebody will reach and help them in some way.<br /><br />If it doesn't have my name attached to it, I can live with that - but I'd rather invest my energies in research and writing than a few hours brief "victory" via a slow procession down an RSS feed. I'm not familiar with the ins and outs of the particular case linked to, but for all I know, the scraper site in question is entirely automated and devoid of any real life person manning the controls. If that's the case, the "victory" is rendered almost entirely pointless save for a cool-for-a-while screenshot.<br /><br />Is that really a good use of time and effort? Personally, I'm more pleased with our behind-the-scenes EMail resolution but different strokes, different folks and all that...<br /><br /><br /> 
        
    ]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 03 Jul 2008 03:48:19 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/content">content</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/content scrapers">content scrapers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blogs">blogs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/site">site</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/scraper site">scraper site</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/guy">guy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/line">line</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/main line">main line</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security ratty">security ratty</category>
      <source url="http://blog.spywareguide.com/2008/07/content-scrapers-and-security.html">Content Scrapers And Security Blogs</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[We're so big and other marketing games]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/74c7e0915df20bc9faac885618aba9b4</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/74c7e0915df20bc9faac885618aba9b4</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Andy Jaquith had a good post up that I first heard about from Mike Rothman's blog . Andy, fresh off of attending the Symantec Vision conference laments the obligatory &quot;we're so big&quot; slides that find...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Andy Jaquith had a <a href="http://blogs.yankeegroup.com/2008/06/16/were-so-big/">good post up</a> that I first heard about from <a href="http://securityincite.com/blog/mike-rothman/the-daily-incite-june-26-2008">Mike Rothman's blog</a>. Andy, fresh off of attending the Symantec Vision conference laments the obligatory "we're so big" slides that find themselves into almost every deck you see. Whether it is for analysts as Andy says or for customers or partners, from the biggest to the smallest, companies seek to show how good they are by how big they are. Numbers of customers, nodes, sensors, yada, yada. Usually these "we're so big" slides are followed by the obligatory circular diagrams that show the "life cycle" of the companies product or services being complete. After a while you seen one, you've seen them all. <br><br>But lets face it, even some of you men out there who may be resisting, size does matter! No one wants to say that we don't have the scale and success breeds success. It is just a fact of marketing. You will feel more comfortable if you see so many others (even brands you know) picking the same solution you are looking at. You feel good knowing that your vendor has an army of machines and/or people watching your back. Sounds better than 3 guys in a garage for sure.<br><br>It is all part of the marketing game. Those same rules say that if you repeat a story enough times, <a href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/2008/06/the-used-car-sa.html">whether it is true or not, eventually people believe it</a>. The bigger the lie, the more times you repeat it, the more people will believe it. But that should not stop others from pointing out the facts and doing their best to call out those who just cross the line with marketing claims that are not true.<br><br>Here is another pet peeve of mine. Why do analysts base their market size numbers on what vendors tell them they do in revenue. With the <a href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/2008/06/the-used-car-sa.html">past performance</a> of some of these vendors, I wouldn't put much weight into what they say they do for revenue. I think analysts need to show market size independent of vendor revenue reports unless they are in fact audited or some how verified.</p>
<p><a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=lEo57F"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=lEo57F" border="0"></img></a></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=0lQb1I"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=0lQb1I" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=P0agrI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=P0agrI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=zWqM7I"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=zWqM7I" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=B5lvYI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=B5lvYI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=G8Fnpi"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=G8Fnpi" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=1vXOvi"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=1vXOvi" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~4/321406593" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Jun 2008 06:41:01 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vendor revenue reports">vendor revenue reports</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vendor">vendor</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/revenue">revenue</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/people">people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/machines andor people">machines andor people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/analysts base">analysts base</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/obligatory circular diagrams">obligatory circular diagrams</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/andy jaquith">andy jaquith</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/analysts">analysts</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~3/321406593/were-so-big-and.html">We're so big and other marketing games</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Open redirect vulnerabilities article - (IN)SECURE Issue 17]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2ddec9b22b5e79d94231d17d6c1b19bb</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2ddec9b22b5e79d94231d17d6c1b19bb</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I've written a comprehensive piece on the dangers of open redirects that's been published in Issue 17 of (IN)SECURE Magazine . Page 43 for your reading pleasure
An open redirect is a vulnerability...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://www.net-security.org/images/insecure/issue-main-17.pdf"><img style="display:block; margin:0px auto 10px; text-align:center;cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;width: 200px;" src="http://www.net-security.org/images/insecure/issue-main-17.jpg" border="0" alt="" /></a><br />I've written a comprehensive piece on the dangers of open redirects that's been published in <a href="http://www.net-security.org/dl/insecure/INSECURE-Mag-17.pdf">Issue 17</a> of <a href="http://www.net-security.org/insecuremag.php">(IN)SECURE Magazine</a>. Page 43 for your reading pleasure. <br />"An open redirect is a vulnerability that exists when a script allows redirection<br />to an external site by directly calling a specific URL in an unfiltered,<br />unmanaged fashion, which could be used to redirect victims to unintended,<br />malicious web sites."<br />This issue is a giant pet peeve of mine; the article is intended to increase awareness of the dangers of this vulnerability and promote mitigation.<br /><br /><a href="http://del.icio.us/post?url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/06/open-redirect-vulnerabilities-article.html&title=Open%20redirect%20vulnerabilities%20article%20-%20(IN)SECURE%20Issue%2017 " title="Open redirect vulnerabilities article - (IN)SECURE Issue 17 ">del.icio.us</a> | <a href="http://digg.com/submit?phase=2&amp;url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/06/open-redirect-vulnerabilities-article.html" title="Open redirect vulnerabilities article - (IN)SECURE Issue 17 ">digg</a>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 26 Jun 2008 06:18:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/redirect">redirect</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/issue">issue</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/redirect victims">redirect victims</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malicious web sites">malicious web sites</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/giant pet peeve">giant pet peeve</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/specific url">specific url</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vulnerability">vulnerability</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/article">article</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dangers">dangers</category>
      <source url="http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/06/open-redirect-vulnerabilities-article.html">Open redirect vulnerabilities article - (IN)SECURE Issue 17</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Mashup of the Titans]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6289294023616c0d4219941919c976a5</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6289294023616c0d4219941919c976a5</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Information Security - an Oxymoron for the information age

Always the beautiful answer who asks a more beautiful question. e. e. cummings
or why i am with Gelernter

This is a mashup of Saltzer &amp;...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div>Information Security - an Oxymoron for the information age</div><br /><div>“Always the beautiful answer who asks a more beautiful question.” e. e. cummings</div><div>...or why i am with Gelernter</div><br /><div>This is a mashup of Saltzer &amp; Schroeder&#39;s famous <a href="http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~evans/cs551/saltzer/">information security principles</a> with David Gelernter&#39;s <a href="http://www.edge.org/documents/archive/edge70.html">Manifesto</a>.</div><br /><div>The premise of this mashup is to examine the paper by Saltzer and Schroeder which was written in 1975 and serves as the basis for most information security programs against the Gelernter&#39;s manifesto as to where computing is actually going. Each of the eight principles in Saltzer and Schroeder&#39;s paper is listed in order, and followed by select excerpts of Gelernter&#39;s manifesto. This comparison is to examine theoretical information security principles vis a vis the actual utility of modern information systems. I will not make an attempt to reconcile theory and practice, but will point out where the two schools of thought agree. In fairness, Saltzer and Schroeder&#39;s paper was written 25 years before Gelernter&#39;s, however Saltzer and Schroeder&#39;s principles dominate the thinking about information security to this day and so its important to view them side by side with Gelernter&#39;s thinking on the direction of computing.</div><br /><div style="color: #bf5f00; ">Saltzer and Schroeder:</div><div>&quot;a) Economy of mechanism: Keep the design as simple and small as possible. This well-known principle applies to any aspect of a system, but it deserves emphasis for protection mechanisms for this reason: design and implementation errors that result in unwanted access paths will not be noticed during normal use (since normal use usually does not include attempts to exercise improper access paths). As a result, techniques such as line-by-line inspection of software and physical examination of hardware that implements protection mechanisms are necessary. For such techniques to be successful, a small and simple design is essential.&quot;</div><br /><div style="color: #0060bf; ">Gelernter:</div><div>&quot;9. The computing future is based on &quot;cyberbodies&quot; — self-contained, neatly-ordered, beautifully-laid-out collections of information, like immaculate giant gardens.&quot;</div><br /><div><span style="color: #00bf00; ">Conclusion(gp):</span>&#0160;So far, so good</div><br /><div>**</div><br /><div><span style="color: #bf5f00; ">Saltzer and Schroeder:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;b) Fail-safe defaults: Base access decisions on permission rather than exclusion. This principle, suggested by E. Glaser in 1965,8 means that the default situation is lack of access, and the protection scheme identifies conditions under which access is permitted. The alternative, in which mechanisms attempt to identify conditions under which access should be refused, presents the wrong psychological base for secure system design. A conservative design must be based on arguments why objects should be accessible, rather than why they should not. In a large system some objects will be inadequately considered, so a default of lack of permission is safer. A design or implementation mistake in a mechanism that gives explicit permission tends to fail by refusing permission, a safe situation, since it will be quickly detected. On the other hand, a design or implementation mistake in a mechanism that explicitly excludes access tends to fail by allowing access, a failure which may go unnoticed in normal use. This principle applies both to the outward appearance of the protection mechanism and to its underlying implementation.&quot;</div><br /><div><span style="color: #00bf00; ">Conclusion(gp):</span>&#0160;A conservative design principle that puts the object&#39;s owner in control of permissions. This makes a lot of sense from the object point of view, but does little to address the use case in which it executes.</div><br /><div>**</div><br /><div><span style="color: #bf5f00; ">Saltzer and Schroeder:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;c) Complete mediation: Every access to every object must be checked for authority. This principle, when systematically applied, is the primary underpinning of the protection system. It forces a system-wide view of access control, which in addition to normal operation includes initialization, recovery, shutdown, and maintenance. It implies that a foolproof method of identifying the source of every request must be devised. It also requires that proposals to gain performance by remembering the result of an authority check be examined skeptically. If a change in authority occurs, such remembered results must be systematically updated.&quot;</div><br /><div><span style="color: #0060bf; ">Gelernter:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;8. The software systems we depend on most today are operating systems (Unix, the Macintosh OS, Windows et. al.) and browsers (Internet Explorer, Netscape Communicator...). Operating systems are connectors that fasten users to computers; they attach to the computer at one end, the user at the other. Browsers fasten users to remote computers, to &quot;servers&quot; on the internet.</div><br /><div>Today&#39;s operating systems and browsers are obsolete because people no longer want to be connected to computers — near ones OR remote ones. (They probably never did). They want to be connected to information. In the future, people are connected to cyberbodies; cyberbodies drift in the computational cosmos — also known as the Swarm, the Cybersphere.</div><br /><div>13. Any well-designed next-generation electronic gadget will come with a ``Disable Omniscience&#39;&#39; button.</div><br /><div>17. A cyberbody can be replicated or distributed over many computers; can inhabit many computers at the same time. If the Cybersphere&#39;s computers are tiles in a paved courtyard, a cyberbody is a cloud&#39;s drifting shadow covering many tiles simultaneously.</div><br /><div>20. If a million people use a Web site simultaneously, doesn&#39;t that mean that we must have a heavy-duty remote server to keep them all happy? No; we could move the site onto a million desktops and use the internet for coordination. The &quot;site&quot; is like a military unit in the field, the general moving with his troops (or like a hockey team in constant swarming motion). (We used essentially this technique to build the first tuple space implementations. They seemed to depend on a shared server, but the server was an illusion; there was no server, just a swarm of clients.) Could Amazon.com be an itinerant horde instead of a fixed Central Command Post? Yes.&quot;</div><br /><div><span style="color: #00bf00; ">Conclusion(gp):</span>&#0160;Complete mediation provides the underpinning for Saltzer and Schroeder&#39;s system, but does not appear to scale to the desired itinerant horde at least in common interpretation.</div><br /><div>**</div><br /><div><span style="color: #bf5f00; ">Saltzer and Schroeder:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;d) Open design: The design should not be secret. The mechanisms should not depend on the ignorance of potential attackers, but rather on the possession of specific, more easily protected, keys or passwords. This decoupling of protection mechanisms from protection keys permits the mechanisms to be examined by many reviewers without concern that the review may itself compromise the safeguards. In addition, any skeptical user may be allowed to convince himself that the system he is about to use is adequate for his purpose. Finally, it is simply not realistic to attempt to maintain secrecy for any system which receives wide distribution.&quot;</div><br /><div><span style="color: #00bf00; ">Conclusion(gp):</span>&#0160;both seem to agree, hard to get the itinerant horde moving in a swarm without open standards.</div><br /><div>**</div><br /><div><span style="color: #bf5f00; ">Saltzer and Schroeder:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;e) Separation of privilege: Where feasible, a protection mechanism that requires two keys to unlock it is more robust and flexible than one that allows access to the presenter of only a single key. The relevance of this observation to computer systems was pointed out by R. Needham in 1973. The reason is that, once the mechanism is locked, the two keys can be physically separated and distinct programs, organizations, or individuals made responsible for them. From then on, no single accident, deception, or breach of trust is sufficient to compromise the protected information. This principle is often used in bank safe-deposit boxes. It is also at work in the defense system that fires a nuclear weapon only if two different people both give the correct command. In a computer system, separated keys apply to any situation in which two or more conditions must be met before access should be permitted. For example, systems providing user-extendible protected data types usually depend on separation of privilege for their implementation.&quot;</div><br /><div><span style="color: #0060bf; ">Gelernter:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;37. Elements stored in a mind do not have names and are not organized into folders; are retrieved not by name or folder but by contents. (Hear a voice, think of a face: you&#39;ve retrieved a memory that contains the voice as one component.) You can see everything in your memory from the standpoint of past, present and future. Using a file cabinet, you classify information when you put it in; minds classify information when it is taken out. (Yesterday afternoon at four you stood with Natasha on Fifth Avenue in the rain — as you might recall when you are thinking about &quot;Fifth Avenue,&quot; &quot;rain,&quot; &quot;Natasha&quot; or many other things. But you attached no such labels to the memory when you acquired it. The classification happened retrospectively.)&quot;</div><br /><div><span style="color: #00bf00; ">Conclusion(gp):</span>&#0160;Information Security models tend to look at things statically through information classification lenses, but its how information is used that makes it valuable. In practice this is how information security theory breaks down in the face of reality - what does an access control matrix look like for a mashup? What does it look like for a data mining app?</div><br /><div>**</div><br /><div><span style="color: #bf5f00; ">Saltzer and Schroeder:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;f) Least privilege: Every program and every user of the system should operate using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the job. Primarily, this principle limits the damage that can result from an accident or error. It also reduces the number of potential interactions among privileged programs to the minimum for correct operation, so that unintentional, unwanted, or improper uses of privilege are less likely to occur. Thus, if a question arises related to misuse of a privilege, the number of programs that must be audited is minimized. Put another way, if a mechanism can provide &quot;firewalls,&quot; the principle of least privilege provides a rationale for where to install the firewalls. The military security rule of &quot;need-to-know&quot; is an example of this principle.&quot;</div><br /><div><span style="color: #0060bf; ">Gelernter:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;28. Metaphors have a profound effect on computing: the file-cabinet metaphor traps us in a &quot;passive&quot; instead of &quot;active&quot; view of information management that is fundamentally wrong for computers.</div><br /><div>29. The rigid file and directory system you are stuck with on your Mac or PC was designed by programmers for programmers — and is still a good system for programmers. It is no good for non-programmers. It never was, and was never intended to be.</div><br /><div>30. If you have three pet dogs, give them names. If you have 10,000 head of cattle, don&#39;t bother. Nowadays the idea of giving a name to every file on your computer is ridiculous.&quot;</div><br /><div><span style="color: #00bf00; ">Conclusion(gp):</span>&#0160;Least Privilege is the point where the practical matter of applying Saltzer and Schroeder&#39;s principles breaks down in modern systems. Its a deployment issue, and a matter of insufficient models and modes.</div><br /><div>**</div><br /><div><span style="color: #bf5f00; ">Saltzer and Schroeder:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;g) Least common mechanism: Minimize the amount of mechanism common to more than one user and depended on by all users [28]. Every shared mechanism (especially one involving shared variables) represents a potential information path between users and must be designed with great care to be sure it does not unintentionally compromise security. Further, any mechanism serving all users must be certified to the satisfaction of every user, a job presumably harder than satisfying only one or a few users. For example, given the choice of implementing a new function as a supervisor procedure shared by all users or as a library procedure that can be handled as though it were the user&#39;s own, choose the latter course. Then, if one or a few users are not satisfied with the level of certification of the function, they can provide a substitute or not use it at all. Either way, they can avoid being harmed by a mistake in it.&quot;</div><br /><div><span style="color: #0060bf; ">Gelernter:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;6. Miniaturization was the big theme in the first age of computers: rising power, falling prices, computers for everybody. Theme of the Second Age now approaching: computing transcends computers. Information travels through a sea of anonymous, interchangeable computers like a breeze through tall grass. A dekstop computer is a scooped-out hole in the beach where information from the Cybersphere wells up like seawater.</div><br /><div>16. The future is dense with computers. They will hang around everywhere in lush growths like Spanish moss. They will swarm like locusts. But a swarm is not merely a big crowd. The individuals in the swarm lose their identities. The computers that make up this global swarm will blend together into the seamless substance of the Cybersphere. Within the swarm, individual computers will be as anonymous as molecules of air.</div><br /><div>55. Software can solve hard problems in two ways: by algorithm or by making connections — by delivering the problem to exactly the right human problem-solver. The second technique is just as powerful as the first, but so far we have ignored it.</div><br /><div>56. Lifestreams and microcosms are the two most important cyberbody types; they relate to each other as a single musical line relates to a single chord. The stream is a &quot;moment in space,&quot; the microcosm a moment in time.&quot;</div><br /><div>**</div><br /><div><span style="color: #bf5f00; ">Saltzer and Schroeder:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;h) Psychological acceptability: It is essential that the human interface be designed for ease of use, so that users routinely and automatically apply the protection mechanisms correctly. Also, to the extent that the user&#39;s mental image of his protection goals matches the mechanisms he must use, mistakes will be minimized. If he must translate his image of his protection needs into a radically different specification language, he will make errors.&quot;</div><br /><div><span style="color: #0060bf; ">Gelernter:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;7. &quot;The network is the computer&quot; — yes; but we&#39;re less interested in computers all the time. The real topic in astronomy is the cosmos, not telescopes. The real topic in computing is the Cybersphere and the cyberstructures in it, not the computers we use as telescopes and tuners.</div><br /><div>27. Modern computing is based on an analogy between computers and file cabinets that is fundamentally wrong and affects nearly every move we make. (We store &quot;files&quot; on disks, write &quot;records,&quot; organize files into &quot;folders&quot; — file-cabinet language.) Computers are fundamentally unlike file cabinets because they can take action.</div><br /><div>31. Our standard policy on file names has far-reaching consequences: doesn&#39;t merely force us to make up names where no name is called for; also imposes strong limits on our handling of an important class of documents — ones that arrive from the outside world. A newly-arrived email message (for example) can&#39;t stand on its own as a separate document — can&#39;t show up alongside other files in searches, sit by itself on the desktop, be opened or printed independently; it has no name, so it must be buried on arrival inside some existing file (the mail file) that does have a name. The same holds for incoming photos and faxes, Web bookmarks, scanned images...</div><br /><div>32. You shouldn&#39;t have to put files in directories. The directories should reach out and take them. If a file belongs in six directories, all six should reach out and grab it automatically, simultaneously.</div><br /><div>33. A file should be allowed to have no name, one name or many names. Many files should be allowed to share one name. A file should be allowed to be in no directory, one directory, or many directories. Many files should be allowed to share one directory. Of these eight possibilities, only three are legal and the other five are banned — for no good reason.</div><br /><div>53. Your car, your school, your company and yourself are all one-track vehicles moving forward through time, and they will each leave a stream-shaped cyberbody (like an aircraft&#39;s contrail) behind them as they go. These vapor-trails of crystallized experience will represent our first concrete answer to a hard question: what is a company, a university, any sort of ongoing organization or institution, if its staff and customers and owners can all change, its buildings be bulldozed, its site relocated — what&#39;s left? What is it? The answer: a lifestream in cyberspace.&quot;</div><br /><br /><div>**</div><div style="color: #00bf00; ">Conclusion(gp):</div><br /><div>The Saltzer and Schroeder principles of Open Design and Economy of Mechanism hold up well in the face of modern computing realities, and to a certain extent Fail Safe Defaults does as well; however if we information security people are to be effective we need to re-think the other principles.</div><br /><div>**</div><br /><div>Last word:&#0160;<span style="color: #0060bf; ">Gelernter:</span></div><div>We&#39;ll know the system is working when a butterfly wanders into the in-box and (a few wingbeats later) flutters out — and in that brief interval the system has transcribed the creature&#39;s appearance and analyzed its way of moving, and the real butterfly leaves a shadow-butterfly behind. Some time soon afterward you&#39;ll be examining some tedious electronic document and a cyber-butterfly will appear at the bottom left corner of your screen (maybe a Hamearis lucina) and pause there, briefly hiding the text (and showing its neatly-folded rusty-chocolate wings like Victorian paisley, with orange eyespots) — and moments later will have crossed the screen and be gone.</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 25 Jun 2008 13:29:25 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/protection mechanisms">protection mechanisms</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/protection mechanisms correctly">protection mechanisms correctly</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/implements protection mechanisms">implements protection mechanisms</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information travels">information travels</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security people">information security people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/protection">protection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/potential information path">potential information path</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/06/mashup-of-the-titans.html">Mashup of the Titans</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[NHTI loses thumb drive that may have contained student information]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/472742115c3208716a34d4a38a0986b1</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/472742115c3208716a34d4a38a0986b1</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
5/30/08

Organization
NHTI, Concord's Community College

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
None

Victims
Nursing program graduates form the classes of 2006...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/NHTI.jpg" width="159" align="right" height="62"><font size="2"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Date Reported: </span><br>5/30/08<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Organization: </span><br><a href="http://www.nhti.edu/">NHTI, Concord's Community College</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br>None<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>Nursing program graduates form the classes of 2006 and 2007<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>128<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>"names, social security numbers, addresses, phone numbers, and email addresses"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>NHTI has notified the New Hampshire State Attorney General of a lost flash drive that may have contained sensitive personal information belonging to nursing program 2006 and 2007 graduates.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://doj.nh.gov/consumer/pdf/NHTI.pdf">New Hampshire State Attorney General breach notification</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>New Hampshire State Attorney General<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online source cited above:<br><br>We are writing to notify you that NHTI, Concord's Community College recently learned of a data security incident involving personal information of individuals who have graduated from the College.<br><br>On April 23, 2008, it was discovered that a data storage device, or flash drive, was missing.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Are unsecured flash drives allowed for use with NHTI information resources?&nbsp; There is no mention in the breach notification.</span><br><br>The flash drive may have contained the names, social security numbers, addresses, phone numbers, and email addresses of our nursing program graduates from the classes of 2006 and 2007.<br><br>Our Campus Safety Department conducted a thorough investigation to locate the flash drive.<br><br>The investigation concluded that we cannot determine whether a security breach has occurred.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] What is the school's definition of a security breach?&nbsp; Was the Campus Safety Department unable to confirm that personal information was stored on the lost flash drive?&nbsp; If not a breach, then poor information management at the least.</span><br><br>The potential security breach involved personal identification information of 128 former students.<br><br>While we do not believe the flash drive was taken for purposes of identity theft, we have recommended that the affected individuals take steps to protect themselves from the possible misuse of personal information.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Really, at the end of the day I don't think it matters how many steps people take to protect themselves if the custodians of confidential information do not take proper care of the information entrusted to them.&nbsp; Everyone needs to play their role.&nbsp; Owner, custodians and users.</span><br><br>There is no indication that the disappearance of the device, a USB flash drive, was motivated by identity theft.<br><br>We do not have any evidence that your information has been misused, and we believe the likelihood of such misuse is low.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] "Low" is subjective and hard to measure.&nbsp; This reminds me of some informal research we conducted a while back.&nbsp; We were curious.&nbsp; We found a left-over box of unused flash drives that a marketing department had been giving away (s.w.a.g.) at a trade show.&nbsp; We wanted to find out #1, how many people pick-up a flash drive if they find one lying around, and #2, how many people plug them in and peruse the contents/use them.&nbsp; We had 40 flash drives.&nbsp; 29% of people picked them up (meaning it took 137 people walking by to nab 40 flash drives).&nbsp; We tried to vary the locations of the flash drives both out in the open and semi-private.&nbsp; Of the 40 people that picked up the flash drives, all 40 used them.&nbsp; I suppose that this particular flash drive could have ended up in the garbage or destroyed somehow, but if someone found it, I think chances are pretty good that someone will find the information.&nbsp; The difficult part is trying to determine what someone will do with the information once they have it, I suppose.</span><br><br>However, out of an abundance of caution, we are informing everyone who may be affected by this incident so that they may properly evaluate what actions -if any -they wish to take in this matter.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] The "abundance of caution" phrase is quickly becoming my pet peeve.&nbsp; An abundance of caution would have gone a long way towards preventing the breach.&nbsp; Storing confidential information on an insecure flash drive certainly does not demonstrate an abundance of caution.</span><br><br>We have obtained the services of a credit monitoring organization to provide free credit monitoring for one year to the affected individuals.<br><br>NHTI takes the protection of confidential information very seriously.<br><br>We sincerely regret that this incident occurred and are taking steps to prevent this type of breach from occurring again.<br><br>The College has instituted safeguards to prevent such incidents in the future.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Like?</span><br><br>If you have any questions or concerns, please contact NHTI's Director of Communications, Alan Blake, at (603) 271-8904. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>Most of my commentary is included above.&nbsp; Flash drives are very convenient, but sometimes the thought of them sends a slight shiver down my spine.&nbsp; If their use cannot be properly controlled, their use can be disastrous.&nbsp; So, if you can't control their use, then prohibit their use.&nbsp; I know of quite a few companies that have banned flash drives and disabled USB and FireWire ports.<br><br>I was a little tardy in finding this breach.&nbsp; I thought is was still good information for readers though. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>Unknown</font><br><br>
<script src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/%7Es/breachblog?i=http://breachblog.com/2008/06/24/NHTI.aspx" type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8"></script>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 24 Jun 2008 13:21:39 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/flash">flash</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lost flash drive">lost flash drive</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/usb flash drive">usb flash drive</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/usb">usb</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sensitive personal information">sensitive personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/flash drive">flash drive</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/confidential information">confidential information</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/06/24/nhti.aspx">NHTI loses thumb drive that may have contained student information</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[FISMA Report Cards IssuedResponse is Rote by Now]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/c4fec28ddd80fa55d26b93033e54c7fc</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/c4fec28ddd80fa55d26b93033e54c7fc</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Yay, FISMA report card for 2007 has been issued. You can go check it out here . I cant believe it, but DHS scored a B against all odds
And of course, by now the response to the report card is all...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yay, FISMA report card for 2007 has been issued.  You can go <a href="http://republicans.oversight.house.gov/media/PDFs/Reports/FY2007FISMAReportCard.pdf" target="_blank">check it out here</a>.  I can&#8217;t believe it, but DHS scored a &#8220;B&#8221; against all odds. =)</p>
<p>And of course, by now the response to the report card is all rote&#8211;everybody wonders what the letters really mean:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.scmagazineus.com/Federal-agencies-FISMA-grade-up-slightly/article/110375/" target="_blank">SC Magazine</a></li>
<li><a href="http://news.idg.no/cw/art.cfm?id=08F0A29C-17A4-0F78-3113197D5C06A6C5" target="_blank">IDG</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.itbusinessedge.com/blogs/hdw/?p=2238" target="_blank">IT Business Edge</a></li>
<li><a href="http://federaltimes.com/index.php?S=3539078" target="_blank">Federal Times</a></li>
<li><a href="http://blog.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/05/govt_earns_grade_of_c_for_comp.html?nav=rss_blog" target="_blank">Washington Post</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/741" target="_blank">Security Focus</a></li>
</ul>
<p>Yeah, yeah, I guess it just goes to prove what we say about the classified world: the people who know don&#8217;t talk and the people who talk don&#8217;t know.  In this case, everybody attacks the metric because, well, it&#8217;s a bad metric&#8211;what action are we supposed to take because of what the results are?  It&#8217;s also pretty much ignored by this point anyway except for the witty sound bites from some of my &#8220;favorite people&#8221;, so it&#8217;s nothing to get all hot and bothered about.  The GAO and OMB reports that <a href="http://www.guerilla-ciso.com/archives/348" target="_blank">I&#8217;ve covered in much detail </a>are much better and have a pretty decent level of analysis.</p>
<p>But fer chrissakes, the report card is issued by Congress, how much detail do you think it will ever contain?  =)</p>
<p>My rapidly expanding queue of pet peeves about this time of the year:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>People who think that FISMA is just a report card and that we should re-examine how we measure security:</strong>  the grades are not even required by the law, it&#8217;s just technique and we can change that easily enough.</li>
<li><strong>People who criticize but do not offer an alternative:</strong>  even if you had an alternative plan, the environment for execution still involves the same IT assets and the same front-line employees.</li>
<li><strong>People who don&#8217;t understand enterprise-wide security much less a federation of semi-independent enterprises:</strong> it&#8217;s the nature of government-wide security metrics that they&#8217;ll be indicators which can be faked.</li>
<li><strong>Sound bites from people who have never implemented any aspect of FISMA:</strong>  come on, SANS and Gartner?  GAO and the Cyber Security Industry Alliance are a little bit better but taken out of context.</li>
<li><strong>Nobody ever asks me for a quote on FISMA numminess:</strong>  I&#8217;ll be pouting for the rest of the week, TYVM.  =)</li>
</ul>
<p>Not that I&#8217;m the world&#8217;s best expert at fact-checking, but something caught my eye in the report:  it&#8217;s issued by Tom Davis and the url is from the <a href="http://republicans.oversight.house.gov/" target="_blank">Minority Office</a> for the <a href="http://oversight.house.gov/" target="_blank">House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform</a>.  Tom Davis is the representative from Northern Virginia and is the sponsor for FISMA back when it was signed.  Until the last election, he was the chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.  The committee is now chaired by <a href="http://oversight.house.gov/about/chairmanwaxman.asp" target="_blank">Henry Waxman</a>. </p>
<p>Time for a new concept in your vocabulary:  LGOPP (OK, actually it&#8217;s <a href="http://pagentsprogress.com/?p=555" target="_blank">LGOP</a>, but I added an extra &#8220;P&#8221; for comedy purposes).  Imagine June 6th, 1944, paratroopers scattered all over the French countryside.  What happens is you pick up the people around you, the senior person becomes the leader, and you carry out the mission.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><img src="http://farm1.static.flickr.com/115/299334216_8f9593d01f.jpg?v=0" alt="Paratrooper Stained Glass Window" width="257" height="500" /></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><em>Photo of Paratrooper Stained Glass in Sainte Mère Église by</em><a href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/nelsonminar/" target="_blank"><em> Nelson Minar</em></a></p>
<p>Hence the true meaning of LGOPP: Little Groups of P*ssed-off Paratroopers.  An equivalent phrase is &#8220;isolated pockets of brilliance&#8221;.</p>
<p>In the words of somebody I went off to war with: <em> &#8220;LGOPPS are the spirit of the infantry:  a handfull of 18- and 19-year-olds with fully automatic weapons who can barely remember what their mission is running around the woods raising hell&#8221;</em>.</p>
<p>Now, I know you guys, you&#8217;re wondering what this has to do with security?  Well, this is relevant because it&#8217;s an election year.  What that means is that instead of being bothered with all this security stuff, Congress is involved in playing &#8220;gotcha&#8221; with the Executive branch.  After the election, it&#8217;s rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic and all of the leadership will change.</p>
<p>Instead of any national-level security agendas and strategizing, we&#8217;ll have to be content with security LGOPPs fighting the fight wherever they end up gaining enough critical mass.</p>
<p>And in the case of this year&#8217;s FISMA report card, the LGOPP that is Tom Davis&#8217;s staffers issued the report while the rest of the committee was busy worrying about elections.</p>
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      <pubDate>Wed, 21 May 2008 11:36:29 +0000</pubDate>
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