There are many weird things about the giant Humboldt squid, but here's one of the strangest: Its beak. The squid's beak is one of the hardest organic substances in existence -- such that the sharp point can slice through a fish or whale like a Ginsu knife. Yet the beak is attached to squid flesh that itself is the texture of jello. How precisely does a gelatinous animal safely wield such a razor-sharp weapon? Why doesn't it just sort of, y'know, rip off? It's as if you tried to carve a roast with a knife that doesn't have a handle: It would cut into your fingers as much as the roast.

Paper here.

I had every intention of blogging during the long holiday weekend. Catching up on email and work at some point was on the agenda as well.  However, this morning in the middle of email my laptop froze up.  I could not do anything with it and so had to power down.  On start up I got a missing media notice and it looks like my hard drive went kaput.  Luckily my Windows Mobile phone has everything I need to stay connected. Email, typepad blog platform, etc.  Well we went to my family in Hollywood Beach for a fireworks display and BBQ tonight.  I left my phone in a backpack, so I would not take it in the beach or water with me.  Great, it rained, the backpack got soaked and my phone is down now too! 

So I think it is God telling me to go off grid this weekend.  I am writing this on Bonnie's desktop machine. The kids are staying with my cousins and Bonnie and I are headed down to Key Largo for the weekend.  I have her spare pink Razor with my Sim card for phone calls, but that is it.  No email, no computers, no blogging!  Speak to you all Sunday night or Monday, enjoy your weekend!

Hopefully, I had one article written scheduled for tomorrow morning. I hope it publishes.

I had every intention of blogging during the long holiday weekend. Catching up on email and work at some point was on the agenda as well.  However, this morning in the middle of email my laptop froze up.  I could not do anything with it and so had to power down.  On start up I got a missing media notice and it looks like my hard drive went kaput.  Luckily my Windows Mobile phone has everything I need to stay connected. Email, typepad blog platform, etc.  Well we went to my family in Hollywood Beach for a fireworks display and BBQ tonight.  I left my phone in a backpack, so I would not take it in the beach or water with me.  Great it rained, the backpack got soaked and my phone is down now too! 

So I think it is God telling me to go off grid this weekend.  I am writing this on Bonnie's desktop machine. The kids are staying with my cousins and Bonnie and I are headed down to Key Largo for the weekend.  I have her spare pink Razor with my Sim card for phone calls, but that is it.  No email, no computers, no blogging!  Speak to you all Sunday night or Monday, enjoy your weekend!

Hopefully, I had one article written scheduled for tomorrow morning. I hope it publishes.

The reason is psychological. And it's the same dynamic when it's a security vendor trying to sell its products or services, a CIO trying to convince senior management to invest in security or a security officer trying to implement a security policy with her company's employees.

It's also true that the better you understand your buyer, the better you can sell.

First, a bit about Prospect Theory, the underlying theory behind the newly popular field of behavioral economics. Prospect Theory was developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in 1979 (Kahneman went on to win a Nobel Prize for this and other similar work) to explain how people make trade-offs that involve risk. Before this work, economists had a model of "economic man," a rational being who makes trade-offs based on some logical calculation. Kahneman and Tversky showed that real people are far more subtle and ornery.

Here's an experiment that illustrates Prospect Theory. Take a roomful of subjects and divide them into two groups. Ask one group to choose between these two alternatives: a sure gain of $500 and 50 percent chance of gaining $1,000. Ask the other group to choose between these two alternatives: a sure loss of $500 and a 50 percent chance of losing $1,000.

These two trade-offs are very similar, and traditional economics predicts that the whether you're contemplating a gain or a loss doesn't make a difference: People make trade-offs based on a straightforward calculation of the relative outcome. Some people prefer sure things and others prefer to take chances. Whether the outcome is a gain or a loss doesn't affect the mathematics and therefore shouldn't affect the results. This is traditional economics, and it's called Utility Theory.

But Kahneman's and Tversky's experiments contradicted Utility Theory. When faced with a gain, about 85 percent of people chose the sure smaller gain over the risky larger gain. But when faced with a loss, about 70 percent chose the risky larger loss over the sure smaller loss.

This experiment, repeated again and again by many researchers, across ages, genders, cultures and even species, rocked economics, yielded the same result. Directly contradicting the traditional idea of "economic man," Prospect Theory recognizes that people have subjective values for gains and losses. We have evolved a cognitive bias: a pair of heuristics. One, a sure gain is better than a chance at a greater gain, or "A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." And two, a sure loss is worse than a chance at a greater loss, or "Run away and live to fight another day." Of course, these are not rigid rules. Only a fool would take a sure $100 over a 50 percent chance at $1,000,000. But all things being equal, we tend to be risk-adverse when it comes to gains and risk-seeking when it comes to losses.

This cognitive bias is so powerful that it can lead to logically inconsistent results. Google the "Asian Disease Experiment" for an almost surreal example. Describing the same policy choice in different ways--either as "200 lives saved out of 600" or "400 lives lost out of 600"-- yields wildly different risk reactions.

Evolutionarily, the bias makes sense. It's a better survival strategy to accept small gains rather than risk them for larger ones, and to risk larger losses rather than accept smaller losses. Lions, for example, chase young or wounded wildebeests because the investment needed to kill them is lower. Mature and healthy prey would probably be more nutritious, but there's a risk of missing lunch entirely if it gets away. And a small meal will tide the lion over until another day. Getting through today is more important than the possibility of having food tomorrow. Similarly, it is better to risk a larger loss than to accept a smaller loss. Because animals tend to live on the razor's edge between starvation and reproduction, any loss of food -- whether small or large -- can be equally bad. Because both can result in death, and the best option is to risk everything for the chance at no loss at all.

How does Prospect Theory explain the difficulty of selling the prevention of a security breach? It's a choice between a small sure loss -- the cost of the security product -- and a large risky loss: for example, the results of an attack on one's network. Of course there's a lot more to the sale. The buyer has to be convinced that the product works, and he has to understand the threats against him and the risk that something bad will happen. But all things being equal, buyers would rather take the chance that the attack won't happen than suffer the sure loss that comes from purchasing the security product.

Security sellers know this, even if they don't understand why, and are continually trying to frame their products in positive results. That's why you see slogans with the basic message, "We take care of security so you can focus on your business," or carefully crafted ROI models that demonstrate how profitable a security purchase can be. But these never seem to work. Security is fundamentally a negative sell.

One solution is to stoke fear. Fear is a primal emotion, far older than our ability to calculate trade-offs. And when people are truly scared, they're willing to do almost anything to make that feeling go away; lots of other psychological research supports that. Any burglar alarm salesman will tell you that people buy only after they've been robbed, or after one of their neighbors has been robbed. And the fears stoked by 9/11, and the politics surrounding 9/11, have fueled an entire industry devoted to counterterrorism. When emotion takes over like that, people are much less likely to think rationally.

Though effective, fear mongering is not very ethical. The better solution is not to sell security directly, but to include it as part of a more general product or service. Your car comes with safety and security features built in; they're not sold separately. Same with your house. And it should be the same with computers and networks. Vendors need to build security into the products and services that customers actually want. CIOs should include security as an integral part of everything they budget for. Security shouldn't be a separate policy for employees to follow but part of overall IT policy.

Security is inherently about avoiding a negative, so you can never ignore the cognitive bias embedded so deeply in the human brain. But if you understand it, you have a better chance of overcoming it.

This essay originally appeared in CIO.

Evolutionarily, presumably it is a better survival strategy to -- all other things being equal, of course -- accept small gains rather than risking them for larger ones, and risk larger losses rather than accepting smaller losses. Lions chase young or wounded wildebeest because the investment needed to kill them is lower. Mature and healthy prey would probably be more nutritious, but there's a risk of missing lunch entirely if it gets away. And a small meal will tide the lion over until another day. Getting through today is more important than the possibility of having food tomorrow.

Similarly, it is evolutionarily better to risk a larger loss than to accept a smaller loss. Because animals tend to live on the razor's edge between starvation and reproduction, any loss of food -- whether small or large -- can be equally bad. That is, both can result in death. If that's true, the best option is to risk everything for the chance at no loss at all.

This behavior has been demonstrated in animals as well: "species of insects, birds and mammals range from risk neutral to risk averse when making decisions about amounts of food, but are risk seeking towards delays in receiving food."

A recent study examines the relative risk preferences in two closely related species: chimanzees and bonobos.

Abstract

Human and non-human animals tend to avoid risky prospects. If such patterns of economic choice are adaptive, risk preferences should reflect the typical decision-making environments faced by organisms. However, this approach has not been widely used to examine the risk sensitivity in closely related species with different ecologies. Here, we experimentally examined risk-sensitive behaviour in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus), closely related species whose distinct ecologies are thought to be the major selective force shaping their unique behavioural repertoires. Because chimpanzees exploit riskier food sources in the wild, we predicted that they would exhibit greater tolerance for risk in choices about food. Results confirmed this prediction: chimpanzees significantly preferred the risky option, whereas bonobos preferred the fixed option. These results provide a relatively rare example of risk-prone behaviour in the context of gains and show how ecological pressures can sculpt economic decision making.

The basic argument is that in the natural environment of the chimpanzee, if you don't take risks you don't get any of the high-value rewards (e.g., monkey meat). Bonobos "rely more heavily than chimpanzees on terrestrial herbaceous vegetation, a more temporally and spatially consistent food source." So chimpanzees are less likely to avoid taking risks -- as most species are.

Fascinating stuff, but there are at least two problems with this study. The first one, the researchers explain in their paper. The animals studied -- five of each species -- were from the Wolfgang Koehler Primate Research Center at the Leipzig Zoo, and the experimenters were unable to rule out differences in the "experiences, cultures and conditions of the two specific groups tested here."

The second problem is more general: we know very little about the life of bonobos in the wild. There's a lot of popular stereotypes about bonobos, but they're sloppy at best.

Even so, I like seeing this kind of research.

The machine-shredded stuff is confetti, largely unrecoverable. But in May 2007, a team of German computer scientists in Berlin announced that after four years of work, they had completed a system to digitally tape together the torn fragments. Engineers hope their software and scanners can do the job in less than five years ­ even taking into account the varying textures and durability of paper, the different sizes and shapes of the fragments, the assortment of printing (from handwriting to dot matrix) and the range of edges (from razor sharp to ragged and handmade.) "The numbers are tremendous. If you imagine putting together a jigsaw puzzle at home, you have maybe 1,000 pieces and a picture of what it should look like at the end," project manager Jan Schneider says. "We have many millions of pieces and no idea what they should look like when we're done."