The following paragraphs list many papers that try to contribute to the P-versus-NP question. Among all these papers, there is only a single paper that has appeared in a peer-reviewed journal, that has thoroughly been verified by the experts in the area, and whose correctness is accepted by the general research community: The paper by Mihalis Yannakakis. (And this paper does not settle the P-versus-NP question, but "just" shows that a certain approach to settling this question will never work out.)

Of course, there's a million-dollar prize for resolving the question -- so expect the flawed proofs to continue.

Unfortunately, there's not really anything to his response. It's obvious he doesn't want to admit that they've been checking ID's all this time to no purpose whatsoever, so he just emits vague generalities like a frightened squid filling the water with ink. Yes, some of the stunts in article are silly (who cares if people fly with Hezbollah T-shirts?) so that gives him an opportunity to minimize the real issues.

Watch-lists and identity checks are important and effective security measures. We identify dozens of terrorist-related individuals a week and stop No-Flys regularly with our watch-list process.

It is simply impossible that the TSA catches dozens of terrorists every week. If it were true, the administration would be trumpeting this all over the press -- it would be an amazing success story in their war on terrorism. But note that Hawley doesn't exactly say that; he calls them "terrorist-related individuals." Which means exactly what? People so dangerous they can't be allowed to fly for any reason, yet so innocent they can't be arrested -- even under the provisions of the Patriot Act.

And if Secretary Chertoff is telling the truth when he says that there are only 2,500 people on the no-fly list and fewer than 16,000 people on the selectee list -- they're the ones that get extra screening -- and that most of them live outside the U.S., then it is statistically impossible that the TSA identifies "dozens" of these people every week. The math just doesn't make sense.

And I also don't believe this:

Behavior detection works and we have 2,000 trained officers at airports today. They alert us to people who may pose a threat but who may also have items that could elude other layers of physical security.

It does work, but I don't see the TSA doing it properly. (Fly El Al if you want to see it done properly.) But what I think Hawley is doing is engaging in a little bit of psychological manipulation. Like sky marshals, the real benefit of behavior detection isn't whether or not you do it but whether or not the bad guys believe you're doing it. If they think you are doing behavior detection at security checkpoints, or have sky marshals on every airplane, then you don't actually have to do it. It's the threat that's the deterrent, not the actual security system.

This doesn't impress me, either:

Items carried on the person, be they a 'beer belly' or concealed objects in very private areas, are why we are buying over 100 whole body imagers in upcoming months and will deploy more over time. In the meantime, we use hand-held devices that detect hydrogen peroxide and other explosives compounds as well as targeted pat-downs that require private screening.

Optional security measures don't work, because the bad guys will opt not to use them. It's like those air-puff machines at some airports now. They're probably great at detecting explosive residue off clothing, but every time I have seen the machines in operation, the passengers have the option whether to go through the lane with them or another lane. What possible good is that?

The closest thing to a real response from Hawley is that the terrorists might get caught stealing credit cards.

Using stolen credit cards and false documents as a way to get around watch-lists makes the point that forcing terrorists to use increasingly risky tactics has its own security value.

He's right about that. And, truth be told, that was my sloppiest answer during the original intervied. Thinking about it afterwards, it's far more likely is that someone with a clean record and a legal credit card will buy the various plane tickets.

This is new:

Boarding pass scanners and encryption are being tested in eight airports now and more will be coming.

Ignoring for a moment that "eight airports" nonsense -- unless you do it at every airport, the bad guys will choose the airport where you don't do it to launch their attack -- this is an excellent idea. The reason my attack works, the reason I can get through TSA checkpoints with a fake boarding pass, is that the TSA never confirms that the information on the boarding pass matches a legitimate reservation. If all TSA checkpoints had boarding pass scanners that connected to the airlines' computers, this attack would not work. (Interestingly enough, I noticed exactly this system at the Dublin airport earlier this month.)

Stopping the ‘James Bond’ terrorist is truly a team effort and I whole-heartedly agree that the best way to stop those attacks is with intelligence and law enforcement working together.

This isn't about "Stopping the 'James Bond' terrorist," it's about stopping terrorism. And if all this focus on airports, even assuming it starts working, shifts the terrorists to other targets, we haven't gotten a whole lot of security for our money.

FYI: I did a long interview with Kip Hawley last year. If you haven't read it, I strongly recommend you do. I pressed him on these and many other points, and didn't get very good answers then, either.

No big news -- we've seen stupid things like this regularly since 9/11 -- but this time people responded:

Added Director Tom Radulovich, "If somebody wants to break the law and bring flammable liquids on, they can. It's not like al Qaeda is waiting in their caves for us to have a sippy-cup rule."

Directing his comments to BART administrators, he said, "You know, it's just fearmongering and you should be ashamed."

Up first is a new MacBook Pro, with a buttonless trackpad, full glass screen (like the iMac), and all ports migrated to one side of the machine. The new buttonless trackpad adopts the iPhone’s multitouch functionality, offering a glass surface area that is both 39 percent larger than previous trackpads and allows for gestures involving up to four fingers. The new construction features an LED-backlit display, next-gen Nvidia GeForce 9400M and 9600M graphics with 512MB of GDDR3 RAM (and the ability to run them in Hybrid SLI mode), and a “precision aluminum unibody enclosure” that cuts down on parts costs while offering a much more rigid construction than the current aluminum design.

Some of the changes are great — more surface area on the trackpad and stronger construction–who can fault them for that? However, why on earth would they want to move all ports to one side? It’s really useful to bea ble to plug some things (like USB ports) from both sides, and honestly they need more than just 2 USB ports, so I’m sad to see that wasn’t updated.

The other great ergonomic change that could be made on the large MacBooks would be to move the speakers (currently at either side of the keyboard) to the center, and separate the keyboard sections to allow some space between your hands. But Apple might anticipate that this is a change that would be badly received by some users and that it can easily be corrected using a special ergonomic keyboard–everyone with a laptop should be using an external keyboard regularly anyway.

Conventional wisdom holds that terrorism is inherently political, and that people become terrorists for political reasons. This is the "strategic" model of terrorism, and it's basically an economic model. It posits that people resort to terrorism when they believe -- rightly or wrongly -- that terrorism is worth it; that is, when they believe the political gains of terrorism minus the political costs are greater than if they engaged in some other, more peaceful form of protest. It's assumed, for example, that people join Hamas to achieve a Palestinian state; that people join the PKK to attain a Kurdish national homeland; and that people join al-Qaida to, among other things, get the United States out of the Persian Gulf.

If you believe this model, the way to fight terrorism is to change that equation, and that's what most experts advocate. Governments tend to minimize the political gains of terrorism through a no-concessions policy; the international community tends to recommend reducing the political grievances of terrorists via appeasement, in hopes of getting them to renounce violence. Both advocate policies to provide effective nonviolent alternatives, like free elections.

Historically, none of these solutions has worked with any regularity. Max Abrahms, a predoctoral fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, has studied dozens of terrorist groups from all over the world. He argues that the model is wrong. In a paper published this year in International Security that -- sadly -- doesn't have the title "Seven Habits of Highly Ineffective Terrorists," he discusses, well, seven habits of highly ineffective terrorists. These seven tendencies are seen in terrorist organizations all over the world, and they directly contradict the theory that terrorists are political maximizers:

Terrorists, he writes, (1) attack civilians, a policy that has a lousy track record of convincing those civilians to give the terrorists what they want; (2) treat terrorism as a first resort, not a last resort, failing to embrace nonviolent alternatives like elections; (3) don't compromise with their target country, even when those compromises are in their best interest politically; (4) have protean political platforms, which regularly, and sometimes radically, change; (5) often engage in anonymous attacks, which precludes the target countries making political concessions to them; (6) regularly attack other terrorist groups with the same political platform; and (7) resist disbanding, even when they consistently fail to achieve their political objectives or when their stated political objectives have been achieved.

Abrahms has an alternative model to explain all this: People turn to terrorism for social solidarity. He theorizes that people join terrorist organizations worldwide in order to be part of a community, much like the reason inner-city youths join gangs in the United States.

The evidence supports this. Individual terrorists often have no prior involvement with a group's political agenda, and often join multiple terrorist groups with incompatible platforms. Individuals who join terrorist groups are frequently not oppressed in any way, and often can't describe the political goals of their organizations. People who join terrorist groups most often have friends or relatives who are members of the group, and the great majority of terrorist are socially isolated: unmarried young men or widowed women who weren't working prior to joining. These things are true for members of terrorist groups as diverse as the IRA and al-Qaida.

For example, several of the 9/11 hijackers planned to fight in Chechnya, but they didn't have the right paperwork so they attacked America instead. The mujahedeen had no idea whom they would attack after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, so they sat around until they came up with a new enemy: America. Pakistani terrorists regularly defect to another terrorist group with a totally different political platform. Many new al-Qaida members say, unconvincingly, that they decided to become a jihadist after reading an extreme, anti-American blog, or after converting to Islam, sometimes just a few weeks before. These people know little about politics or Islam, and they frankly don't even seem to care much about learning more. The blogs they turn to don't have a lot of substance in these areas, even though more informative blogs do exist.

All of this explains the seven habits. It's not that they're ineffective; it's that they have a different goal. They might not be effective politically, but they are effective socially: They all help preserve the group's existence and cohesion.

This kind of analysis isn't just theoretical; it has practical implications for counterterrorism. Not only can we now better understand who is likely to become a terrorist, we can engage in strategies specifically designed to weaken the social bonds within terrorist organizations. Driving a wedge between group members -- commuting prison sentences in exchange for actionable intelligence, planting more double agents within terrorist groups -- will go a long way to weakening the social bonds within those groups.

We also need to pay more attention to the socially marginalized than to the politically downtrodden, like unassimilated communities in Western countries. We need to support vibrant, benign communities and organizations as alternative ways for potential terrorists to get the social cohesion they need. And finally, we need to minimize collateral damage in our counterterrorism operations, as well as clamping down on bigotry and hate crimes, which just creates more dislocation and social isolation, and the inevitable calls for revenge.

This essay previously appeared on Wired.com.

Conventional wisdom holds that terrorism is inherently political, and that people become terrorists for political reasons. This is the "strategic" model of terrorism, and it's basically an economic model. It posits that people resort to terrorism when they believe -- rightly or wrongly -- that terrorism is worth it; that is, when they believe the political gains of terrorism minus the political costs are greater than if they engaged in some other, more peaceful form of protest. It's assumed, for example, that people join Hamas to achieve a Palestinian state; that people join the PKK to attain a Kurdish national homeland; and that people join al-Qaida to, among other things, get the United States out of the Persian Gulf.

If you believe this model, the way to fight terrorism is to change that equation, and that's what most experts advocate. Governments tend to minimize the political gains of terrorism through a no-concessions policy; the international community tends to recommend reducing the political grievances of terrorists via appeasement, in hopes of getting them to renounce violence. Both advocate policies to provide effective nonviolent alternatives, like free elections.

Historically, none of these solutions has worked with any regularity. Max Abrahms, a predoctoral fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, has studied dozens of terrorist groups from all over the world. He argues that the model is wrong. In a paper (.pdf) published this year in International Security that -- sadly -- doesn't have the title "Seven Habits of Highly Ineffective Terrorists," he discusses, well, seven habits of highly ineffective terrorists. These seven tendencies are seen in terrorist organizations all over the world, and they directly contradict the theory that terrorists are political maximizers:

Terrorists, he writes, (1) attack civilians, a policy that has a lousy track record of convincing those civilians to give the terrorists what they want; (2) treat terrorism as a first resort, not a last resort, failing to embrace nonviolent alternatives like elections; (3) don't compromise with their target country, even when those compromises are in their best interest politically; (4) have protean political platforms, which regularly, and sometimes radically, change; (5) often engage in anonymous attacks, which precludes the target countries making political concessions to them; (6) regularly attack other terrorist groups with the same political platform; and (7) resist disbanding, even when they consistently fail to achieve their political objectives or when their stated political objectives have been achieved.

Abrahms has an alternative model to explain all this: People turn to terrorism for social solidarity. He theorizes that people join terrorist organizations worldwide in order to be part of a community, much like the reason inner-city youths join gangs in the United States.

The evidence supports this. Individual terrorists often have no prior involvement with a group's political agenda, and often join multiple terrorist groups with incompatible platforms. Individuals who join terrorist groups are frequently not oppressed in any way, and often can't describe the political goals of their organizations. People who join terrorist groups most often have friends or relatives who are members of the group, and the great majority of terrorist are socially isolated: unmarried young men or widowed women who weren't working prior to joining. These things are true for members of terrorist groups as diverse as the IRA and al-Qaida.

For example, several of the 9/11 hijackers planned to fight in Chechnya, but they didn't have the right paperwork so they attacked America instead. The mujahedeen had no idea whom they would attack after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, so they sat around until they came up with a new enemy: America. Pakistani terrorists regularly defect to another terrorist group with a totally different political platform. Many new al-Qaida members say, unconvincingly, that they decided to become a jihadist after reading an extreme, anti-American blog, or after converting to Islam, sometimes just a few weeks before. These people know little about politics or Islam, and they frankly don't even seem to care much about learning more. The blogs they turn to don't have a lot of substance in these areas, even though more informative blogs do exist.

All of this explains the seven habits. It's not that they're ineffective; it's that they have a different goal. They might not be effective politically, but they are effective socially: They all help preserve the group's existence and cohesion.

This kind of analysis isn't just theoretical; it has practical implications for counterterrorism. Not only can we now better understand who is likely to become a terrorist, we can engage in strategies specifically designed to weaken the social bonds within terrorist organizations. Driving a wedge between group members -- commuting prison sentences in exchange for actionable intelligence, planting more double agents within terrorist groups -- will go a long way to weakening the social bonds within those groups.

We also need to pay more attention to the socially marginalized than to the politically downtrodden, like unassimilated communities in Western countries. We need to support vibrant, benign communities and organizations as alternative ways for potential terrorists to get the social cohesion they need. And finally, we need to minimize collateral damage in our counterterrorism operations, as well as clamping down on bigotry and hate crimes, which just creates more dislocation and social isolation, and the inevitable calls for revenge.

---

Bruce Schneier is Chief Security Technology Officer of BT, and author of Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World.

Now I’ve been “accused” of being a quant in the past (hi rybolov!) but in reality the only dogs I have in this fight are the model and the application of scientific method - and really, ethically speaking, I have to be tied to the latter while applying the former.

And I see a false dichotomy in this whole Quant vs. Qual thing.  We, as a profession, tend to create a political divide between the two which, if it even exists, I’d say is based more on our ignorance rather than our expertise.  After all, we are the profession that regularly multiplies across ordinal scales and uses wonderful models like R=VxTxI.   As someone  learning to deal in probabilities and rationalism, I have to recognize that this discussion is really just about the act of observation using different metrics of measurement.

But how we’re going about observing does not change the fact that there is measurement based on observation.  So if I’m working with you I can easily turn your qualitative scale into a quantitative one, and vice-versa.  Yes, Shrdlu, if we had the time, even your most seemingly Qual things could be Quant! (This flexible world view, btw, is an outcome of that new-fangled Bayesian thing).

COGNITIVE BIAS A-PLENTY

But back to what Rich is saying there about information security and risk - and he isn’t/won’t be the only one saying these sorts of things - we should try to understand what’s really going on rather than get caught up in the emotional hurricane.  Our profession suffers several forms of cognitive bias.  The nature of our jobs and what we do can cause us to be focused on the outcome and not the quality of the decision at the time it was made.  We want to bring in things from other professions that are useful, but at times we do view things outside our profession with false correlation to our own (unfortunately for those who write these sorts of articles, financial risk is completely different than operational risk).  We also have the tendency to focus on negative outcomes without acknowledging the positive outcomes (For example, I hear that Alan Greenspan’s new firm is up a couple of $billion in all this mess since he joined them, short sellers are doing quite well - must be because they have qualitative models or something -grin-).  The effect of these biases are compounded by the facts that proper correlation takes more work than we usually give it, and rational thought is not that easy when there’s a witch-hunt mentality.

What also floats in water? (link to Youtube)

WHAT SHOULD WE BE THINKING ABOUT?

So as you and I read opinions that seem to be the polar opposite of irrational exuberance (and there will be plenty between now and the election) we’ll have to ask ourselves, “what really failed here?”  At the risk (pun) of over-simplification:

• Was There an Error on the part of Probability Theory?

After all, Probability Science like all other fields of knowledge is always “advancing” as they say.  So perhaps probability theory is wrong somehow?

I’m personally disinclined to put the blame here, primarily because I would think that there would be evidence from other fields (like Quantum Mechanics) that something is amiss waaaaay before it hit a field like economics.

• Was There Error In The Model Used to Determine Risk?

Some people who understand real estate valuation and complex derivatives and financial risk want to put the blame here.  It’s a little too early to tell, but one thing is for sure - Financial risk is so different from operational risk I couldn’t begin to hazard an opinion on the subject.   But it would seem that this is really somewhere we might look.

• Was There Error In The  Scale Used (Quantitative vs. Qualitative)?

Honestly?  I find it extremely difficult to understand how this could be the source of financial ruin.

• Was There Error on the part of the Decision Maker?

What if all of the above were just fine, and the decision maker chose short term gain over long term stability?  What if this was (to simplify the matter greatly) a choice of “heads” over “tails” and the coin landed on tails?  What if the model represented the right risk (probability of negative outcome vs. positive outcome), but the complex derivative was sold to someone else who had poor “risk management” (ability to make a good decisions)?

Now I have no clue about complex derivatives, and I’m oversimplifying to be sure - chances are like most things, there are several problems that helped create the primary cause. But it seems to me that as we go into incident response mode for the economy, it’s more helpful to do so in a rational, logical manner.

OTHER THINGS WE MIGHT WANT TO CONSIDER

Consider the Source
Some authors (who I think tend to exploit outcome and hindsight bias,and then combine those with indirect ad hominem attacks in order to sell their books), are actually putting forth arguments against the use of analytics.  The source of this is a current epistemic debate between those who believe that only falsification is certain, and those who maintain that neither proof nor falsification are certain, there are only probabilities.    So before you go believing any “quadrants” of usefulness on faith - I encourage you to understand what is at the heart of the discussion.

We All Have to Live In The Real World
The sun will rise tomorrow, and someone will try to find the source of the problem and do a better job.  Now chances are, they’ll be doing it in a quantitative manner.  Chances are also that at some point their models will fail and we’ll need to build new ones.  And this will happen whether the field is cosmology, economics, meteorology, information security, or professional baseball.

WHAT ABOUT YOU, ALEX?

I’m far from certain and subject to change, but these days I lean towards Robin Hanson & MIchael Lewis w/regards to placing blame.

That being said, there are some interesting implications that XSS Filter and other user-specified defenses have for the SDL. Given that XSS Filter is effective in stopping many types of reflected XSS attacks, should we relax the SDL coding and testing requirements around server-side XSS defense? Of course not. For one reason, the SDL requirements are effective in preventing forms of XSS that XSS Filter does not address, like persistent XSS. For another, not everyone uses IE 8. If we were to relax server-side requirements now, we would jeopardize IE 7 users, as well as Firefox, Safari, Opera, Chrome, and all the other browsers’ users.

But what if these conditions change? What if David and others on the security science team develop a new version of XSS Filter that’s effective against all forms of XSS? And what if all the browser manufacturers develop similar technology and implement it in their browsers? (Or alternatively, what if every user on the planet switches to IE 8? ☺) Then would we relax the server-side XSS defense requirements? Yes, we probably would.

I’ve always been more of a security pragmatist than a security purist. While the security purist in me would want to keep the requirements around to prevent developers from falling back into bad habits, the security pragmatist in me would recognize that development teams have a limited amount of bandwidth, and making them defend against rare, obscure vulnerabilities is a poor use of their time. Unfortunately, we’re not likely to face this scenario any time in the near future, so the SDL will continue to require server-side input validation and output encoding to prevent XSS attacks.

We now return you to your regularly scheduled development-focused blog.