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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: reliable]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/reliable</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Sun, 10 Aug 2008 17:27:28 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[250k of Harvested Hotmail Emails Go For?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/efaf965e7dacf43f06479ec7778d04e6</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/efaf965e7dacf43f06479ec7778d04e6</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[50 in this particular case, however, keeping in mind that the email harvester is anything but ethical, this very same database will be sold and re-sold more times than the original buyer would like to...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SNuLDFWiz9I/AAAAAAAACLo/fQ_TqPImTk0/s1600-h/harvested_hotmail_sale.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="113" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SNuLDFWiz9I/AAAAAAAACLo/YJqc75ZUQgE/s200-R/harvested_hotmail_sale.png" width="200" /></a>$50 in this particular case, however, keeping in mind that the email harvester is anything but ethical, this very same database will be sold and re-sold more times than the original buyer would like to know about. Moreover, what someone is offering for sale, may in fact be already available as a value-added addition to a managed spamming service.<br />
<br />
With metrics and quality assurance applied in a growing number of spam and phishing campaigns, filling in the niche of email harvesting by distinguishing between different types of obfuscated emails by releasing an easily embeddable module, was an anticipated move. What's to come? <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/harvesting-youtube-usernames-for.html">Spam and malware campaigns across social networks</a> "as usual" will propagate faster thanks to the ongoing harvesting of usernames within social networks, that would later on get imported in Web 2.0 "marketing" tools targeting the high-trafficked sites and automatically spamming them.<br />
<br />
From a spammer's perspective, geolocating these 250k emails could increase their selling prices since the buyers would be able to launch localized attacks with messages in the native languages of the receipts. Is the demand for quality email databases fueling the developments of this market segment, or are the spammers self-serving themselves and cashing-in by reselling what they've already abused a log time ago? That seems to be the case, since there's no way a buyer could verify the freshness of the harvested emails database and whether or not it has already been abused. <br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SNvGk2eGKcI/AAAAAAAACL4/yhy61idSl6I/s1600-h/segmented_harvested_emails.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="200" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SNvGk2eGKcI/AAAAAAAACL4/xFYzYTCaDes/s200-R/segmented_harvested_emails.JPG" width="152" /></a>For the time being, we've got several developed and many other developing market segments within spamming and phishing as different markets with different players. On one hand are the legitimately looking spamming providers offering "direct marketing services" working with lone spammers who find a reliable business partner in the face of the spamming vendor whose customers drive both side's business models. On the other hand, you've got the <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1835">spammers excelling in outsourcing the automatic account registration process</a>, coming up with ways to build a spamming infrastructure -- already available as a module to integrate in <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1899">managed spamming services</a> -- using legitimate services as a provider of the infrastructure.<br />
<br />
Despite that the arms race seems to be going on at several different fronts, spammers VS the industry and spammers VS spammers fighting for market share, the entire underground ecosystem is clearly allocating a lot of resources for research and development in order to ensure that they are always a step ahead of the industry.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/harvesting-youtube-usernames-for.html">Harvesting  Youtube Usernames for Spamming</a><b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/thousands-of-im-screen-names-in-wild.html">Thousands  of IM Screen Names in the Wild</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/automatic-email-harvesting-20.html">Automatic  Email Harvesting 2.0</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/dissecting-managed-spamming-service.html">Dissecting a Managed Spamming Service</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/managed-spamming-appliances-future-of.html">Managed Spamming Appliances - the Future of Spam</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/01/inside-email-harvesters-configuration.html">Inside an Email Harvester's Configuration File</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/segmenting-and-localizing-spam.html">Segmenting and Localizing Spam Campaigns</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/04/shots-from-malicious-wild-west-sample.html">Shots from the Malicious Wild West - Sample Four</a><br />
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      <pubDate>Thu, 25 Sep 2008 08:13:08 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/emails">emails</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email">email</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email harvester">email harvester</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam campaigns">spam campaigns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam">spam</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lone spammers">lone spammers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spammers">spammers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/250k emails">250k emails</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/automatic email">automatic email</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/402968423/250k-of-harvested-hotmail-emails-go-for.html">250k of Harvested Hotmail Emails Go For?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Interop NY Keynotes: BlackBerry]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/57d32695a026bc4921bcf73252eab4ea</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/57d32695a026bc4921bcf73252eab4ea</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[David Yach, Chief Technology Officer of Software at Research in Motion rounded out the final keynotes of the morning as part of the Mobile Business Expo (MBX). David focused on how enterprise and...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>David Yach, <a href="http://www.mobilebusinessexpo.com/conference/keynotes.php" target="_blank">Chief Technology Officer of Software at Research in Motion</a> rounded out the final keynotes of the morning as part of the Mobile Business Expo (MBX). David focused on how enterprise and mobility are tied together today.</p>
<p>Which of the following initiatives are likely to be a major telecommunications technology related priority for 2007? Mobility is a huge issue.</p>
<p>We&#8217;re starting to see traction with mobility.</p>
<ul>
<li>The evolution of enterprise mobility:
<ul>
<li>Voice &#8211;&gt; messaging &#8211;&gt; e&#8211;mail &#8211;&gt; web, &#8211;&gt; business applications &#8211;&gt;  instant messaging/presence &#8211;&gt; what&#8217;s next?</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Cell phone to Smartphone:
<ul>
<li>1G &#8211;&gt; 2G &#8211;&gt; 3G</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Converging IT Responsibilities</strong></p>
<p>Collaboration, Web/Internet, Desktop Computer, Deskphone/PBX, Mobile Phone and Applications. All of this is under the umbrella of IT. IT departments are not a single cohesive unit where everyone gets along. They have different motivations, budgets, goals, etc.</p>
<p>BlackBerry manages all of these responsibilities in one, forcing these departments to collaborate and work together. This is key for interoperability between these systems, knowing how they work together.</p>
<p>Desktop capabilities are expected in mobility:</p>
<ul>
<li>Information</li>
<li>Collaboration</li>
<li>Voice</li>
<li>Transactions</li>
<li>Presence</li>
<li>Application</li>
</ul>
<p>Mobile devices are fundamentally changing the pace of which we all work. You can reach anybody at anytime. This changes business.</p>
<p>All of this is working with data that is behind a corporate firewall.</p>
<p>The big change in IT is that for almost any industry now, the data that you have and you manage is a core corporate asset. It doesn&#8217;t matter whether you&#8217;re in manufacturing, logistics, or a bakery. Information is king. This has the benefit of moving IT up to a C-level position. You are a core part of your business success. This has benefits, and also added stress.</p>
<p>Voice is still the &#8220;killer app&#8221; for mobility. Deskphones and smartphones need to overlap into a mobile voice system.</p>
<p>Another up and coming technology is the mobilization of enterprise applications. This provides the ultimate user experience. For example, Blackberry has mobilized the SAP Business Suite on BlackBerry smartphones. SAP CRM access is as seamless and intuitive as email on BlackBerry and incorporates push, alerting, security, GPS, Wi-Fi and media.</p>
<p>Enterprise grade platforms will extend core competencies of enterprise systems to mobile environments.</p>
<ul>
<li>Secure</li>
<li>Reliable</li>
<li>Manage</li>
<li>Control</li>
<li>Administration</li>
<li>Standardize</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Conclusion:</strong></p>
<p>Putting it together: integrating the wireless capabilities of today into the business tools of tomorrow.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2008 11:07:39 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/enterprise mobility">enterprise mobility</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blackberry">blackberry</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mobility">mobility</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business">business</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sap business suite">sap business suite</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/systems">systems</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/enterprise systems">enterprise systems</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/applications">applications</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/enterprise">enterprise</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/interop-ny-keynotes-blackberry/09/2008">Interop NY Keynotes: BlackBerry</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[EstDomains and Intercage VS Cybercrime]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/54303a8239cd0becf5843fb3552a50a8</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/54303a8239cd0becf5843fb3552a50a8</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Surreal, especially when you get to read that EstDomains has &quot; ruthlessly suspended over five thousand domains only for last week &quot;, and also, that it &quot; has a reliable ally in its battle against...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SM7tc-r3kHI/AAAAAAAACKc/aUL1ohUu-Zc/s1600-h/estdomain_alert.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SM7tc-r3kHI/AAAAAAAACKc/yiFaA33Sfdw/s200-R/estdomain_alert.png" /></a>Surreal, especially when you get to read that EstDomains has "<i>ruthlessly suspended over five thousand domains only for last week</i>", and also, that it "<i>has a reliable ally in its battle against malware in a face of Intercage, Inc</i>".<br />
<br />
Here's <a href="http://www.domainnews.com/en/general/estdomains-denies-links-to-malware-distribution.html">the press release</a> :<br />
<br />
"<i>The EstDomains, Inc management does not deny the fact that no one is secured from having a customer who uses provided services for delinquent purposes. But it must be noted that the carefully planned infrastructure of EstDomains, Inc makes the special provision for the cases of malware distribution that may originate from the domain name registered under the company's name. Such domain names are suspended immediately along with domain holder's account if there is an evidence of malware presence on the web site. <b>According to the most recent statistics over five thousand domain names were detected and ruthlessly suspended by EstDomains, Inc specialists only last week.</b><br />
<br />
<b>The company also has a reliable ally in its battle against malware in a face of Intercage, Inc which provides company with the hosting services of the highest quality.</b> But the outstanding performance of hosting services is not the sole reason why EstDomains, Inc appreciates this partnership so greatly. Intercage, Inc generously provides EstDomains, Inc specialists with reports regarding discovered malware vehicles. As the main database for additional domain name management services is located in Intercage Data Center, EstDomains, Inc has the perfect opportunity to get notifications of the slightest mark of malware presence in the shortest time and take measures in advance.</i> "<br />
<br />
The press release reminds me of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/hacked-by-rbn.html">RBN's defacement of my blog</a> posted on the 1st of April, and despite that <a href="http://www.malwarebytes.org/forums/index.php?showtopic=6159">EstDomains started "performing for the community"</a> as of recently, thanks to the collective intelligence and persistence of everyone turning their research into actionable intelligence against them, this performance aiming to minimize the effect of the negative PR is more or less futile considering <a href="http://www.spyware-techie.com/malicious-website-list/">all the cybercrime activities that they've been tolerating or ignoring</a> for the past couple of years. For future generations to see, <a href="http://www.malwarebytes.org/forums/index.php?showtopic=6159">this is how EstDomains "performs for the community"</a> :<br />
<br />
"<i>We've suspended all the domains listed in this topic. But please don't make posting these domains on this forum a habit. We have a 24/7 online tech support which can be contacted at <a href="https://support.estdomains.com/" target="_blank">https://support.estdomains.com</a><br />
<br />
Best regards,<br />
EstDomains Team&nbsp;</i><br />
<br />
<i>EstMate says : Ihatemondayand.com and antispycheck.com - both suspended. If any of the suspended websites are still active to you it maybe be because of your computer's or ISP's DNS-cache, others won't be able to access these websites</i><br />
<br />
<i>googlescanners-360.com isn't registered with us. As for other domains, the ones, which were registered through us, have been suspended. Regarding our preventive measures, the fact that you don't see them doesn't mean there isn't any. Yes, we don't write about them but in most cases we suspend whole accounts with problematic domains and look for connections to other accounts etc. During the last week we've suspended over 15000 different domains.</i>"<br />
<br />
What's more disturbing regarding this particular domain registrar is that it's a U.S based operation, namely, using the lack of international cybercrime cooperation as an excuse for not taking actions earlier doesn't fit into the picture. Moreover, this is just the tip of the iceberg, and taking into consideration a personal mentality that the cybercriminals you know are better than the cybercriminals you don't know, the RBN or any of its "leftovers" aren't fully taking advantage of the tactics they could be using in order to make it harder to shut them down, but how come? Simply, they don't have to put extra efforts and would once again remain online for years to come, which is perhaps more disturbing at the first place.<br />
<br />
What in the world is the Russian Business Network, is it still alive and kicking, are the same people that used to maintain my favorite netblock ever, still the ones running it, and what tactics are they taking advantage of in order to make it harder for the community to establish direct links with a particular netblock and the RBN itself?<br />
<br />
With RBN's "leftovers" -- <b>InterCage, Inc., Softlayer Technologies, Layered Technologies, Inc., Ukrtelegroup Ltd, Turkey Abdallah Internet Hizmetleri, and Hostfresh --</b> making headlines just like the way it should be, what I've been researching for the past couple of months is how they've migrated from the centralized hosting provider to what appears to be a fully operational franchise. The business model is very simple, the RBN through its extensive underground networking skills supplies to customers to franchisers operating small anti-abuse netblocks across the globe, where they offer dedicated hosting and share revenue with the RBN. Anyone trusted enough and capable of supplying such netblocks starts running the RBN anti-abuse franchise. It's also worth pointing out that these franchises are in fact starting to cut the middle man, and disintermediate the RBN by actively advertising their services in order for them to create a self-sustainable business model without having to rely on the RBN connecting them with customers.<br />
<br />
What used to be a centralized cybercrime powerhouse operating several highly visible anti-abuse netblocks, is today's decentralized infrastructure, with the profit margins for the anti-abuse services that it's logically capable to break-even and earn profits even with a few high profile dedicated hosting customers. Anyone can be the Russian Business Network, gain experience into the market segment, then disintermediate them by starting to advertise their own services. From a powerhouse to a franchise model, what the RBN had to offer can be easily duplicated by a countless number of local RBN's, and this is only starting to take place.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lazy-summer-days-at-ukrtelegroup-ltds.html">Lazy Summer Days at UkrTeleGroup Ltd. </a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/malicious-isps-you-rarely-see-in-any.html">The Malicious ISPs you Rarely See in Any Report</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/geolocating-malicious-isps.html">Geolocationg Malicious ISPs</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/new-media-malware-gang-part-four.html">The New Media Malware Gang - Part Four</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/new-media-malware-gang-part-three.html">The New Media Malware Gang - Part Three</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/new-media-malware-gang-part-two.html">The New Media Malware Gang - Part Two</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/new-media-malware-gang.html">The New Media Malware Gang</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/01/rbns-fake-account-suspended-notices.html">RBN's Fake Account Suspended Notices </a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/hacked-by-rbn.html">HACKED BY THE RBN!</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/rogue-rbn-software-pushed-through.html">Rogue RBN Software Pushed Through Blackhat SEO</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/rbns-phishing-activities.html">RBN's Phishing Activities</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/rbns-malware-puppets-need-their-master.html">RBN's Puppets Need Their Master</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/01/rbns-fake-account-suspended-notices.html">RBN's Fake Account Suspended Notices</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/go-to-sleep-go-to-sleep-my-little-rbn.html">Go to Sleep, Go to Sleep my Little RBN</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/exposing-russian-business-network.html">Exposing the Russian Business Network</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/detecting-and-blocking-russian-business.html">Detecting the Blocking the Russian Business Network</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/over-100-malwares-hosted-on-single-rbn.html">Over 100 Malwares Hosted on a Single RBN IP</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/rbns-fake-security-software.html">RBN's Fake Security Software</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/russian-business-network.html">The Russian Business Network</a><b> <br />
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      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2008 05:09:44 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/single rbn">single rbn</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rbn">rbn</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rbn anti-abuse franchise">rbn anti-abuse franchise</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/estdomains">estdomains</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware distribution">malware distribution</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/thousand domain names">thousand domain names</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/domain names">domain names</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rogue rbn software">rogue rbn software</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/394232850/estdomains-and-intercage-vs-cybercrime.html">EstDomains and Intercage VS Cybercrime</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[EstDomains & Intercage: A Perfect Couple in Crime]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/8490240982532919695d5c4c9231e15f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/8490240982532919695d5c4c9231e15f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[If you track malware issues as readily as I do, you're likely aware of the failings of clownpacks like EstDomains and their hosting buddies Atrivo/Intercage. You need only follow Sunbelt's take on the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[If you track malware issues as readily as I do, you're likely aware of the failings of clownpacks like EstDomains and their hosting buddies Atrivo/Intercage. You need only follow Sunbelt's <a href="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=site%3Asunbeltblog.blogspot.com+estdomains+atrivo+intercage&btnG=Search" target="_blank">take</a> on the topic, or <a href="http://www.emergingthreats.net/index.php?searchword=intercage&option=com_search&Itemid=5" target="_blank">search</a> Emergingthreats to come up to speed.<br />Yesterday, EstDomains posted the most inept, ridiculous <a href="http://www.domainnews.com/en/general/estdomains-denies-links-to-malware-distribution.html" target="_blank">response</a> ever issued to the endless and worthy criticism, largely <a href="http://technewsreview.com.au/article.php?article=5882" target="_blank">leveled</a> by Brian Krebs at the Washington Post. <br />Not only can't these morons from EstDomains write, they're either so deeply clueless or flagrantly malicious (likely both), it's beyond laughable. This section sums it up best:<br /><span style="font-style:italic;">"The company also has a reliable ally in its battle against malware in a face of Intercage, Inc which provides company with the hosting services of the highest quality. But the outstanding performance of hosting services is not the sole reason why EstDomains, Inc appreciates this partnership so greatly. Intercage, Inc generously provides EstDomains, Inc specialists with reports regarding discovered malware vehicles. As the main database for additional domain name management services is located in Intercage Data Center, EstDomains, Inc has the perfect opportunity to get notifications of the slightest mark of malware presence in the shortest time and take measures in advance."</span><br /><span style="font-weight:bold;">What? Really?</span> <br />Again, aside from the absolute butchery of the language, did they just say <span style="font-style:italic;">"The company also has a reliable ally in its battle against malware in a face of Intercage, Inc which provides company with the hosting services of the highest quality."</span>? SIGH...yes, they did.<br /><br />Allow me to exemplify just how ridiculous a claim that is.<br />Following is content from a packet capture I took during a recent Storm worm analysis.<br /><br />Using the ip2asn module included in <a href="http://writequit.org/projects/nsm-console/" target="_blank">NSM-console</a> availabe in <a href="http://www.rawpacket.org/projects/hex" target="_blank">HeX</a>, we find:<br />27595   | 216.255.189.211  | INTERCAGE - InterCage, Inc.<br /><br />Using Etherape, also included in <a href="http://www.rawpacket.org/projects/hex" target="_blank">HeX</a>, we see:<br /><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_kVOWaY1TAF0/SM880rNW5JI/AAAAAAAAACs/dWY8MUgSMUU/s1600-h/etherape_intercage.png"><img style="cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_kVOWaY1TAF0/SM880rNW5JI/AAAAAAAAACs/dWY8MUgSMUU/s320/etherape_intercage.png" border="0" alt=""id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5246478966559532178" /></a><br /><br />Using <a href="http://networkminer.wiki.sourceforge.net/NetworkMiner" target="_blank">Eric Hjelmvik's</a> <a href="http://holisticinfosec.org/toolsmith/docs/august2008.pdf" target="_blank">NetworkMiner</a>, we see:<br /><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_kVOWaY1TAF0/SM8-JQvlEKI/AAAAAAAAAC0/vjYvpHAoFDw/s1600-h/NetworMiner_intercage.png"><img style="cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_kVOWaY1TAF0/SM8-JQvlEKI/AAAAAAAAAC0/vjYvpHAoFDw/s320/NetworMiner_intercage.png" border="0" alt=""id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5246480419744190626" /></a><br /><br />See the recurring theme? Intercage, EstDomain's <span style="font-style:italic;">"reliable ally in its battle against malware"</span>.<br />Nice work, guys...keep it up.<br /><br />I'm submitting this to <a href="http://thedailywtf.com/" target="blank">The Daily WTF</a> as we speak.<br /><br /><a href="http://del.icio.us/post?url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/09/estdomains-intercage-perfect-couple-in.html&title=EstDomains%20&%20Intercage:%20A%20Perfect%20Couple%20in%20Crime " title="EstDomains & Intercage: A Perfect Couple in Crime ">del.icio.us</a> | <a href="http://digg.com/submit?phase=2&amp;url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/09/estdomains-intercage-perfect-couple-in.html" title="EstDomains & Intercage: A Perfect Couple in Crime ">digg</a>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 17:32:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/intercage">intercage</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/estdomains">estdomains</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware presence">malware presence</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/intercage data center">intercage data center</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/track malware issues">track malware issues</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/reliable ally">reliable ally</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/management services">management services</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware vehicles">malware vehicles</category>
      <source url="http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/09/estdomains-intercage-perfect-couple-in.html">EstDomains &amp; Intercage: A Perfect Couple in Crime</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Logging Poll #9 Analysis: Log Security]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/820b3554ec6a486561a49cb82afebbb2</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/820b3554ec6a486561a49cb82afebbb2</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[This is the analysis of my last poll; the responses are here and also below

First , the most obvious conclusion: people still don't care much about log security ; I am saying that since this was BY...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is the analysis of my last poll; the responses are <a href="http://www.misterpoll.com/polls/351660/results">here</a> and also below.</p>  <p><a href="http://lh6.ggpht.com/anton.chuvakin/SMGa_ncGU2I/AAAAAAAAEyo/01NCHG4omE8/s1600-h/poll9logsecurity2.png"><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="196" alt="poll9-log-security" src="http://lh3.ggpht.com/anton.chuvakin/SMGbAMHtGgI/AAAAAAAAEys/t2_vBRBKK7Q/poll9logsecurity_thumb.png?imgmax=800" width="244" border="0" /></a> </p>  <p><strong>First</strong>, the most obvious conclusion: people still don't <a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2007/10/top-11-reasons-to-secure-and-protect.html">care much about log security</a>; I am saying that since this was BY FAR the <em>least</em> popular of <a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/search/label/poll">my polls</a>. Only 24 people responded, so everything below is pretty unscientific :-)&#160; A good way to explain it: look at <a href="http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&amp;tab=wn&amp;ned=&amp;q=data+loss&amp;btnG=Search+News">the recent media</a>? Do these people care about their <strong>key business data</strong> and their <strong>customer data</strong> security? Nope. So, how on Earth do you make them care about securing their <strong>log data</strong>?</p>  <p><strong>Second,</strong>&#160; it is entirely unsurprising that 83% of respondents want &quot;Authenticated access to log server.&quot; In fact, I'd opine that 100% of people want authenticated access to <em>any</em> of their servers :-) But, this was my &quot;red herring&quot; to set the baselines for the rest of the questions...&#160; </p>  <p>However, this is where the buck stops: other security measures are notably less popular.</p>  <p><strong>Third</strong>, &quot;Logging all access to logs&quot; is my favorite and I am happy to see it reported as popular. But do you really do it?&#160; Do you log access to log server OR access to actual logs? Think about it... I think a lot of people who do the latter still answered &quot;yes&quot; to this one.</p>  <p><strong>Fourth</strong>,&#160; &quot;Reliable / acknowledged network transfer of log data&quot; and &quot;Encryption of log data in transit &quot; are two true &quot;no-brainer&quot; security features; they took the next spot at 45% and 50% of those who answered. They are simple, they are easy, they make&#160; sense - and, obviously, they don't make logs <em>entirely</em> secure so you need to do more. Why only 50%? Where is THE OTHER 50%?! </p>  <p><strong>Fifth</strong>, &quot;all things crypto&quot; are below 40%. &quot;Cryptographic hashing of stored logs&quot;, &quot;Cryptographic signing of stored log data&quot; and &quot;Encryption of stored log data&quot; all hover at around 30%. I attribute them to general disregard of log security AND reliance on &quot;system security&quot; (separate server, etc) over &quot;data security&quot; measures for log protection. </p>  <p><strong>Finally</strong>, I am embarrassed to say that I missed&#160; the obvious security measure &quot;<strong>Separate server for logging, not accessible from the Internet;&quot; </strong>one of my readers added this using &quot;Other security measures&quot; choice. Indeed, this is a good point - and <a href="http://www.loglogic.com">a good idea to do it</a>. Another option mention there was &quot;<strong>Destroy old logs.</strong>&quot; Amen to that too!</p>  <p><strong>Possibly related posts:</strong></p>  <ul>   <li><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2007/10/top-11-reasons-to-secure-and-protect.html">Top 11 Reasons to Secure and Protect Logs</a> </li>    <li><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/search/label/poll">All other polls and their analysis</a> </li> </ul>  <div class="blogger-post-footer">About me: http://www.chuvakin.org</div><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=X4btL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=X4btL" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=25k4L"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=25k4L" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=jN7qL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=jN7qL" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~4/384501630" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 05 Sep 2008 09:48:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/log data">log data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/log security">log security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/people care">people care</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/logs">logs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/care">care</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/protect logs">protect logs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/people">people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/log server">log server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/access">access</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/384501630/logging-poll-9-analysis-log-security.html">Logging Poll #9 Analysis: Log Security</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[CEP and Analytics]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/7167551d00ca26f4a0df8a91ba7a3054</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/7167551d00ca26f4a0df8a91ba7a3054</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Peter Lin comments in A Complex Event = Sum (Events) + Situational Knowledge ,continuingthe discussion by asking What is the definition of analytics? Is it purely a calculation, or something else
A...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Peter Lin <a href="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/08/16/a-complex-event-sum-events-knowledge/#comment-1079" target="_blank">comments</a> in <a title="A Complex Event = Sum (Events) + Situational Knowledge" rel="bookmark" href="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/08/16/a-complex-event-sum-events-knowledge/"><span style="color: #105cb6;">A Complex Event = Sum (Events) + Situational Knowledge</span></a>, continuing the discussion by asking &#8221;<em>What is the definition of analytics? Is it purely a calculation, or something else?&#8221;</em></p>
<p>A good place to being to look for clues to an answer is <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytics" target="_blank">Wikipedia</a>, where the opinion of the author there is,</p>
<blockquote><p><em> &#8221;A simple and practical definition, however, would be how an entity (i.e., business) arrives at an optimal or realistic decision based on existing data.&#8221;</em></p></blockquote>
<p>Quoting the Wikipedia author(s) further,</p>
<blockquote><p><em>&#8220;Common applications of Analytics include the study of business data using statistical analysis in order to discover and understand historical patterns with an eye to predicting and improving business performance in the future. Also, some people use the term to denote the use of mathematics in business. Others hold that field of analytics include the use of Operations Research, Statistics and Probability. However, it would be erroneous to limit the field of analytics to only statistics and mathematics.&#8221;</em></p></blockquote>
<p>The Wikipedia author(s) continue their discussion of analytics, as follows;</p>
<blockquote><p><em>&#8220;Analytics closely resembles </em><a class="mw-redirect" title="Statistical analysis" href="http://www.thecepblog.com/wiki/Statistical_analysis"><em>statistical analysis</em></a><em> and </em><a title="Data mining" href="http://www.thecepblog.com/wiki/Data_mining"><em>data mining</em></a><em>, but tends to be based on modeling involving extensive computation. Some fields within the area of analytics are </em><a class="new" title="Enterprise decision management (page does not exist)" href="http://www.thecepblog.com/w/index.php?title=Enterprise_decision_management&amp;action=edit&amp;redlink=1"><em>enterprise decision management</em></a><em>, marketing analytics, predictive science, strategy science, credit risk analysis and fraud analytics.&#8221;</em></p></blockquote>
<p>All of these topics above are CEP-related areas involving complex events and situations based on the need for optimal and reliable real-time capabilities to make meaningful (business) decisions. </p>
<p>Simple pattern matching, event mediation and routing, and basic mathematical calculations do not really fall into the realm of complex event processing.  Instead, CEP is real-time decision support based on modeling and &#8220;extensive&#8221; computation.  In a nutshell, complex events and situations require analytical models that are non-trivial and that is why without analytics, there is no true &#8220;complex event processing.&#8221;</p>
<p>See also:</p>
<p><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Predictive_analytics" target="_self">WIkipedia on Predictive Analytics</a></p>
<p><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Predictive_analytics"></a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Aug 2008 10:09:59 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/analytics">analytics</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wikipedia author">wikipedia author</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/quotingthe wikipedia author">quotingthe wikipedia author</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fraud analytics">fraud analytics</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/author">author</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/predictive analytics">predictive analytics</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/analytics include">analytics include</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business data">business data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business">business</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/08/19/cep-and-analytics/">CEP and Analytics</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Leading Travel Writer Reams Out In-Flight Internet]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f64004c5f420a4aa7be1520dea970d4b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f64004c5f420a4aa7be1520dea970d4b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Joe Brancatelli pokes beneath the surface of claims that in-flight Internet is imminent: I've covered some of the same ground, but veteran travel writer Brancatelli connected the dots by checking with...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="http://wifinetnews.com/images/plane.jpg" align="right" border="0" hspace="5" /><a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/19/AR2008081901066.html"><strong>Joe Brancatelli pokes beneath the surface of claims that in-flight Internet is imminent:</strong></a> I've covered some of the same ground, but veteran travel writer Brancatelli connected the dots by checking with the FAA to find the status of applications for aircraft certification by Aircell and others. </p>

<p>He's not very positive about it, because his research shows a mismatch between claims and work. He writes that an unnamed American airline executive is frustrated by the delay in launching the 3-to-6 month pilot on their trans-continental fleet; that Aircell hasn't submitted paperwork for Virgin's Airbus models for certification; and that the FAA just received a request to certify Delta's MD-80 craft, which makes a launch with 75 planes this year on that airline less likely.</p>

<p>Competitor Row 44 doesn't fare better in his analysis, as they promised spring and summer 2008 tests that still haven't happened, with Southwest and Alaska Airlines.</p>

<p>I'm a little more positive about the future of in-flight broadband. There's no particular conspiracy. It's hard to make it work. Development and testing is tricky due to FAA limits, and getting in-flight handoffs to work for seamless service at 35,000 feet is far more difficult than, say, cellular handoffs in a moving car at 100 feet above sea level. My suspicion is that tuning the service to be entirely reliable at launch is what's taking so long.</p>

<p>Brancatelli blames the high price of Connexion on its failure, but I don't think the $27 fee for long-haul flights deterred users. Lufthansa, which deployed all its long-haul fleet, apparently had very good usage. Most other airlines had few craft equipped, which didn't allow business travelers, able to expense several hours of work for a $27 fee, the reliability of having on-board Internet when they needed it. Connexion also had many reports of spotty service in certain areas. </p>

<p>Connexion's failure came from deploying technology that was old when it was deployed, which weighed too much, and which was too expensive to install. Connexion's revenue and expenses were forecast based on having several hundred aircraft with Connexion service--recall that it was supposed to be a domestic U.S. service, too. In the end they had about 100, I believe. </p>

<p>Brancatelli is also modest when he says Boeing "lost" $300m. That's part of what they wrote down. My sources say they spent more than a billion in R&D, transponder leases, ground station operation, airline incentives, and payoffs at the end.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Aug 2008 05:34:03 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service">service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/seamless service">seamless service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spotty service">spotty service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/connexion service">connexion service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/connexion">connexion</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/airline incentives">airline incentives</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/airline">airline</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/in-flight internet">in-flight internet</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ground">ground</category>
      <source url="http://wifinetnews.com/archives/008422.html">Leading Travel Writer Reams Out In-Flight Internet</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[BlackHat Recap]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/bec2ea65daab94e0e7001ef1ba7b1b9a</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/bec2ea65daab94e0e7001ef1ba7b1b9a</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Another BlackHat has come and gone. As usual, it was a very busy week juggling customer meetings, recruiting, conference planning, vendor parties, and, oh yes, the actual BlackHat presentations. I had...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Another BlackHat has come and gone.  As usual, it was a very busy week juggling customer meetings, recruiting, conference planning, vendor parties, and, oh yes, the actual BlackHat presentations.  I had a fantastic time catching up with old friends and finally getting the opportunity to meet more of the <a href="http://n0where.org/security-twits/">Security Twits</a> and others in the security community.  I didn&#8217;t submit a talk this year, but nevertheless, fake Dan Kaminsky was still excited to see me.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.veracode.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/chris_2742966251_1b47297b33_b.jpg"><center><img src="http://www.veracode.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/chris_2742966251_1b47297b33_b-300x225.jpg" alt="" title="chris_2742966251_1b47297b33_b" width="300" height="225" class="aligncenter size-medium wp-image-215 photoborder" /></center></a></p>
<p>My favorite talk, as expected, was the Sotirov/Dowd talk on <a href="http://taossa.com/archive/bh08sotirovdowd.pdf">How To Impress Girls With Browser Memory Protection Bypasses</a>.  The attack is a conceptually simple, yet completely reliable technique for exploiting vulnerabilities in web browsers.  Of course, the media has <a href="http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid14_gci1324395,00.html">sensationalized </a> the impact of their findings, but ultimately, this is still significant as far as browser-based exploits are concerned.  It&#8217;s worth mentioning that part of the technique allowing them to load a .NET DLL at an arbitrary location under Vista was reliant on an implementation bug wherein the OS disables ASLR if the version in the .NET COR header was below a certain value.  However, the address space spraying and stack spraying techniques are likely to be extended to other platforms utilizing similar memory protection mechanisms.  </p>
<p>As for the girls?  I can report first-hand that the ladies at TAO on Wednesday night were hanging on <a href="http://twitter.com/alexsotirov">Alex</a>&#8217;s every word.  They were particularly impressed when he whipped out the laptop for a live demo.  Unfortunately, none of the dozen iPhone owners in the immediate vicinity thought to snap a picture (too busy Twittering).  Oh well.  </p>
<p>I also enjoyed Hovav Shacham&#8217;s talk on return-oriented programming.  Simply put, he described a generalization of the return-to-libc shellcode approach with the intent to demonstrate that one could achieve Turing-complete computation using &#8220;found code&#8221; in process images.  By chaining together series of mini-computations ending in return (RET) instructions, it was possible to build higher-level programming constructs such as branches and loops.  The nature of the x86 instruction set provides some flexibility because instructions are interpreted differently depending on how you align the instruction pointer (i.e. the old shellcode trick of searching the process image for any JMP EBX instruction and using that as your EIP).  In RISC architectures such as SPARC, however, you don&#8217;t have that luxury; if your %pc isn&#8217;t aligned properly you get a bus error.  So it was quite interesting to see that they were able to extend the concept to RISC.  The practicality of the attack technique is limited by the fact that the shellcode is tuned to a particular binary image &#8212; if the shellcode was built using instructions extrapolated from glibc 2.3.5, it won&#8217;t work for a system running glibc 2.4.  </p>
<p>I thought Scott Stender&#8217;s talk on <a href="http://isecpartners.com/files/iSEC%20Partners%20-%20Concurrency%20Attacks%20in%20Web%20Applications.pdf">Concurrency Attacks in Web Applications</a> was interesting as well.  In a nutshell, spewing thousands of simultaneous requests at web application transactions that are not thread-safe can create interesting problems.  In the presentation, Scott ran his demo against a VM running on the attack machine.  I found myself wondering how effective the same attack would be over the Internet &#8212; would it be significantly less reliable (or not at all)?  Race conditions are generally easier to exploit locally than remotely due to more predictable execution conditions.  Certainly this is an under-tested vulnerability class though.</p>
<p>One presentation I wasn&#8217;t able to attend but want to follow up on is <a href="http://twitter.com/nate_mcfeters">Nate McFeters</a>, John Heasman, and Rob Carter&#8217;s talk which discussed the GIFAR attack I&#8217;ve been hearing so much about lately.  The gist is that you can create a file that is both a valid GIF and a valid JAR, then use some Java applet tricks to initiate HTTP requests on behalf of the victim.  </p>
<p>Finally, the <a href="http://pwnie-awards.org/2008/">Pwnie Awards</a> didn&#8217;t fail to disappoint.  Drama ensued over the Most Overhyped award, but at least this year some of the winners showed up to claim their awards!  <a href="http://twitter.com/halvarflake">Halvar</a> rapping Symantec lyrics was also quite memorable.</p>
<p>All in all, a fun and informative week, but as usual, I was relieved to get the hell out of Vegas and head home on Friday morning. </p>
<p>P.S. For a much more entertaining BlackHat/Defcon Recap, read <a href="http://securityuncorked.net/2008/08/anecdotes-blackhat-defcon/">Jennifer Jabbusch&#8217;s account</a> of the week&#8217;s events.  It&#8217;s my favorite one so far!</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2008 18:43:18 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/favorite">favorite</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/favorite talk">favorite talk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/talk">talk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sotirovdowd talk">sotirovdowd talk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/scott stenders talk">scott stenders talk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/completely reliable technique">completely reliable technique</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/reliable">reliable</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attack">attack</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/technique">technique</category>
      <source url="http://www.veracode.com/blog/?p=202">BlackHat Recap</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[BlackHat Recap]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6b779e65a6ad790dd8e631057208ff77</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6b779e65a6ad790dd8e631057208ff77</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Another BlackHat has come and gone. As usual, it was a very busy week juggling customer meetings, recruiting, conference planning, vendor parties, and, oh yes, the actual BlackHat presentations. I had...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Another BlackHat has come and gone.  As usual, it was a very busy week juggling customer meetings, recruiting, conference planning, vendor parties, and, oh yes, the actual BlackHat presentations.  I had a fantastic time catching up with old friends and finally getting the opportunity to meet more of the <a href="http://n0where.org/security-twits/">Security Twits</a> and others in the security community.  I didn&#8217;t submit a talk this year, but nevertheless, <a href="http://flickr.com/photos/fakedankaminsky/">fake Dan Kaminsky</a> was still excited to see me.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.veracode.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/chris_2742966251_1b47297b33_b.jpg"><center><img src="http://www.veracode.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/chris_2742966251_1b47297b33_b-300x225.jpg" alt="" title="chris_2742966251_1b47297b33_b" width="300" height="225" class="aligncenter size-medium wp-image-215 photoborder" /></center></a></p>
<p>My favorite talk, as expected, was the Sotirov/Dowd talk on <a href="http://taossa.com/archive/bh08sotirovdowd.pdf">How To Impress Girls With Browser Memory Protection Bypasses</a>.  The attack is a conceptually simple, yet completely reliable technique for exploiting vulnerabilities in web browsers.  Of course, the media has <a href="http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid14_gci1324395,00.html">sensationalized</a> the impact of their findings, but ultimately, this is still significant as far as browser-based exploits are concerned (here is a <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/Bott/?p=513">more accurate report</a>).  It&#8217;s worth mentioning that part of the technique allowing them to load a .NET DLL at an arbitrary location under Vista was reliant on an implementation bug wherein the OS disables ASLR if the version in the .NET COR header was below a certain value.  However, the address space spraying and stack spraying techniques are likely to be extended to other platforms utilizing similar memory protection mechanisms.  </p>
<p>As for the girls?  I can report first-hand that the ladies at TAO on Wednesday night were hanging on <a href="http://twitter.com/alexsotirov">Alex</a>&#8217;s every word.  They were particularly impressed when he whipped out the laptop for a live demo.  Unfortunately, none of the dozen iPhone owners in the immediate vicinity thought to snap a picture (too busy Twittering).  Oh well.  </p>
<p>I also enjoyed Hovav Shacham&#8217;s talk on return-oriented programming.  Simply put, he described a generalization of the return-to-libc shellcode approach with the intent to demonstrate that one could achieve Turing-complete computation using &#8220;found code&#8221; in process images.  By chaining together series of mini-computations ending in return (RET) instructions, it was possible to build higher-level programming constructs such as branches and loops.  The nature of the x86 instruction set provides some flexibility because instructions are interpreted differently depending on how you align the instruction pointer (i.e. the old shellcode trick of searching the process image for any JMP EBX instruction and using that as your EIP).  In RISC architectures such as SPARC, however, you don&#8217;t have that luxury; if your %pc isn&#8217;t aligned properly you get a bus error.  So it was quite interesting to see that they were able to extend the concept to RISC.  The practicality of the attack technique is limited by the fact that the shellcode is tuned to a particular binary image &#8212; if the shellcode was built using instructions extrapolated from glibc 2.3.5, it won&#8217;t work for a system running glibc 2.4.  </p>
<p>I thought Scott Stender&#8217;s talk on <a href="http://isecpartners.com/files/iSEC%20Partners%20-%20Concurrency%20Attacks%20in%20Web%20Applications.pdf">Concurrency Attacks in Web Applications</a> was interesting as well.  In a nutshell, spewing thousands of simultaneous requests at web application transactions that are not thread-safe can create interesting problems.  In the presentation, Scott ran his demo against a VM running on the attack machine.  I found myself wondering how effective the same attack would be over the Internet &#8212; would it be significantly less reliable (or not at all)?  Race conditions are generally easier to exploit locally than remotely due to more predictable execution conditions.  Certainly this is an under-tested vulnerability class though.</p>
<p>One presentation I wasn&#8217;t able to attend but want to follow up on is <a href="http://twitter.com/nate_mcfeters">Nate McFeters</a>, John Heasman, and Rob Carter&#8217;s talk which discussed the GIFAR attack I&#8217;ve been hearing so much about lately.  The gist is that you can create a file that is both a valid GIF and a valid JAR, then use some Java applet tricks to initiate HTTP requests on behalf of the victim.  </p>
<p>Finally, the <a href="http://pwnie-awards.org/2008/">Pwnie Awards</a> didn&#8217;t fail to disappoint.  Drama ensued over the Most Overhyped award, but at least this year some of the winners showed up to claim their awards!  <a href="http://twitter.com/halvarflake">Halvar</a> rapping Symantec lyrics was also quite memorable.</p>
<p>All in all, a fun and informative week, but as usual, I was relieved to get the hell out of Vegas and head home on Friday morning. </p>
<p>P.S. For a much more entertaining BlackHat/Defcon Recap, read <a href="http://securityuncorked.net/2008/08/anecdotes-blackhat-defcon/">Jennifer Jabbusch&#8217;s account</a> of the week&#8217;s events.  It&#8217;s my favorite one so far!</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2008 18:43:18 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/favorite">favorite</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/favorite talk">favorite talk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/talk">talk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sotirovdowd talk">sotirovdowd talk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/scott stenders talk">scott stenders talk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/completely reliable technique">completely reliable technique</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/reliable">reliable</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attack">attack</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/technique">technique</category>
      <source url="http://www.veracode.com/blog/2008/08/blackhat-recap/">BlackHat Recap</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Sun To Pick Up Java Droppings In Future]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/75f4432050f492630a7682f7f127e94a</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/75f4432050f492630a7682f7f127e94a</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Thanks to a reader for pointing out that a planned update to Sun's Java platform, at least on Windows, will address the old version problem . As I have blogged recently, the current Java versions...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Thanks to a reader for pointing out that <a href="https://jdk6.dev.java.net/6u10ea.html">a planned update to Sun's Java platform, at least on Windows, will address the old version problem</a>. As I have blogged recently, <a href="http://blogs.eweek.com/cheap_hack/content/patches/java_droppings_on_my_pc.html">the current Java versions leave all the old updates in place when you install a new one</a>. Just this morning, while visiting my mother-in-law I uninstalled about a dozen old Java updates.

Scheduled for release this summer or fall, Java 6 Update 10 (the current version is Update 7; I'm not sure 10 is really going to be the number) will address the problem, at least partly. According to Sun: <blockquote>For current users of Java SE, the JRE update mechanism has also been improved, using a patch-in-place mechanism that translates in a faster and more reliable update process (the patch in place mechanism will take effect for end users who upgrade from this update release or later to a new update release). As an added benefit, follow-on update releases will no longer be listed as separate items in the Windows "Add or Remove Programs" dialog. </blockquote> 

It sounds to me from that description as if currently old versions will still be there, but going forward new versions will overwrite the most recent one instead of leaving it in place and installing a new one.

As I said, timing cues in the docs are a little confusing; Can it really be 3 updates from now (Java 6 Update 7 is very recent), yet still come out this fall? The sooner the better if you ask me.<img src="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~4/ZdVMy8-i2WA" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 10 Aug 2008 17:27:28 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/java">java</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/java platform">java platform</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/current java versions">current java versions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/patch-in-place mechanism">patch-in-place mechanism</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mechanism">mechanism</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/versions">versions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sun">sun</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/current users">current users</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/patch">patch</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.ziffdavisenterprise.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~3/ZdVMy8-i2WA/sun_to_pick_up_java_droppings_in_future.html">Sun To Pick Up Java Droppings In Future</source>
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