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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: resolve]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/resolve</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 09 Jul 2008 22:54:02 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[PCI V1.2, a good start but still not enough]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/b3d495f448e9ce368683c921d97b7c28</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/b3d495f448e9ce368683c921d97b7c28</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Blogger: Randall Gamby
Two weeks ago the PCI Security Standards Council released the preliminary details of the PCI Data Security Standard (DSS) V1.2 thats due out in October. While many Analysts and...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Blogger: Randall Gamby</p>

<p>Two weeks ago the PCI Security Standards Council released the preliminary details of the <a href="https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pdfs/pci_dss_summary_of_changes_v1-2.pdf">PCI Data Security Standard (DSS) V1.2</a> that’s due out in October.&nbsp; While many Analysts and Reporters have already written on the topic (I’ll be releasing an extensive update on Burton Group’s PCI coverage around the October release date), they really haven’t commented on what’s still not been addressed by the standard for enterprises still working on attaining compliance.</p>

<p>While I applaud the PCI Security Standards Council in further clarifying and adjusting the standard, a lot of work still needs to be done.&nbsp; I receive about one or two PCI questions a week from our clients and they seem to revolve around a couple of topics I’ve yet to see addressed:</p>

<ul><li><strong>Guidelines for selecting a Qualified Security Assessor (QSA)</strong> – while there are a large number of QSA organizations listed on the PCI Security Standards Council web site; they can’t really recommend a particular QSA for an individual organization.&nbsp; This leads a lot of organizations to struggle with determining what criteria they should use in selecting a QSA for their certification.</li>

<li><strong>The role of the QSA</strong> – organizations are also still trying to understand the role of a QSA.&nbsp; Should they get a QSA involved in the gap and remediation process in advance of certification?&nbsp; If so, should it be the same QSA that will do their certification (knowing there’s a risk that the QSA will be pre-disposed to only care about certain vulnerabilities)?</li>

<li><strong>Industry-specific best practices</strong> – while each organization may have different infrastructures, in general, most industries try to be consistent with the major functions they perform.&nbsp; So are credit card transactions handled differently between say, a major retailer with 10,000 POS systems and an insurance company that has hundreds of independent agents receiving remittances? Probably, so what are best practices around these industry-specific configurations?</li>

<li><strong>Virtualized environments</strong> – while the PCI Security Standards Council recognizes that some organizations have moved to virtual services for consolidation and management, the DSS really doesn’t provide guidelines for QSAs to evaluate and certify these environments.</li>

<li><strong>Monitoring and audit</strong> – while the PCI DSS recommends minimum timeframes for scanning, doing pen tests, etc. what are the real levels of monitoring and audit needed for ensuring security?&nbsp; With the Hannaford and Okemo breaches that occurred (both where PCI compliant), neither discovered the problem until months after the breaches had happened.&nbsp; So identifying what should be scanned and tested and if some of this should be on a continuous basis still requires refinement.</li>

<li><strong>PCI as part of an overall security model</strong> – what are the best practices around merging PCI security requirements into an enterprise’s overall security model?&nbsp; Should it be maintained separately? Should some components be integrated with similar security mechanisms?&nbsp; Should PCI be at the top of the security model and other configurations be based upon its requirements?&nbsp; There are really no answers coming forth on this topic and the other question is where will they come from? Surely enterprises won’t expect the PCI Security Standards Council to tell them how to run their security services.</li></ul>

<p>I will be providing Burton Group’s perspective on most of these questions in my upcoming report, but rather than relying on third parties to resolve these, I’d hope that the PCI Security Standards Council will be able to continue to provide answers to the questions they can in future updates, and releases, of the PCI DSS.</p></div>
<img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityAndRiskManagementStrategiesBlog/~4/382655858" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 03 Sep 2008 12:56:31 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci">pci</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security assessor">security assessor</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security model">security model</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci dss">pci dss</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dss">dss</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci security requirements">pci security requirements</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/requirements">requirements</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/qsa">qsa</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityAndRiskManagementStrategiesBlog/~3/382655858/pci-v12-a-good.html">PCI V1.2, a good start but still not enough</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[PCI V1.2, a good start but still not enough]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/17aff72127a968eb7ecc82a4f6c94f6f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/17aff72127a968eb7ecc82a4f6c94f6f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Blogger: Randall Gamby
Two weeks ago the PCI Security Standards Council released the preliminary details of the PCI Data Security Standard (DSS) V1.2 that???s due out in October. While many Analysts...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Blogger: Randall Gamby</p>

<p>Two weeks ago the PCI Security Standards Council released the preliminary details of the <a href="https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pdfs/pci_dss_summary_of_changes_v1-2.pdf">PCI Data Security Standard (DSS) V1.2</a> that???s due out in October.&nbsp; While many Analysts and Reporters have already written on the topic (I???ll be releasing an extensive update on Burton Group???s PCI coverage around the October release date), they really haven???t commented on what???s still not been addressed by the standard for enterprises still working on attaining compliance.</p>

<p>While I applaud the PCI Security Standards Council in further clarifying and adjusting the standard, a lot of work still needs to be done.&nbsp; I receive about one or two PCI questions a week from our clients and they seem to revolve around a couple of topics I???ve yet to see addressed:</p>

<ul><li><strong>Guidelines for selecting a Qualified Security Assessor (QSA)</strong> ??? while there are a large number of QSA organizations listed on the PCI Security Standards Council web site; they can???t really recommend a particular QSA for an individual organization.&nbsp; This leads a lot of organizations to struggle with determining what criteria they should use in selecting a QSA for their certification.</li>

<li><strong>The role of the QSA</strong> ??? organizations are also still trying to understand the role of a QSA.&nbsp; Should they get a QSA involved in the gap and remediation process in advance of certification?&nbsp; If so, should it be the same QSA that will do their certification (knowing there???s a risk that the QSA will be pre-disposed to only care about certain vulnerabilities)?</li>

<li><strong>Industry-specific best practices</strong> ??? while each organization may have different infrastructures, in general, most industries try to be consistent with the major functions they perform.&nbsp; So are credit card transactions handled differently between say, a major retailer with 10,000 POS systems and an insurance company that has hundreds of independent agents receiving remittances? Probably, so what are best practices around these industry-specific configurations?</li>

<li><strong>Virtualized environments</strong> ??? while the PCI Security Standards Council recognizes that some organizations have moved to virtual services for consolidation and management, the DSS really doesn???t provide guidelines for QSAs to evaluate and certify these environments.</li>

<li><strong>Monitoring and audit</strong> ??? while the PCI DSS recommends minimum timeframes for scanning, doing pen tests, etc. what are the real levels of monitoring and audit needed for ensuring security?&nbsp; With the Hannaford and Okemo breaches that occurred (both where PCI compliant), neither discovered the problem until months after the breaches had happened.&nbsp; So identifying what should be scanned and tested and if some of this should be on a continuous basis still requires refinement.</li>

<li><strong>PCI as part of an overall security model</strong> ??? what are the best practices around merging PCI security requirements into an enterprise???s overall security model?&nbsp; Should it be maintained separately? Should some components be integrated with similar security mechanisms?&nbsp; Should PCI be at the top of the security model and other configurations be based upon its requirements?&nbsp; There are really no answers coming forth on this topic and the other question is where will they come from? Surely enterprises won???t expect the PCI Security Standards Council to tell them how to run their security services.</li></ul>

<p>I will be providing Burton Group???s perspective on most of these questions in my upcoming report, but rather than relying on third parties to resolve these, I???d hope that the PCI Security Standards Council will be able to continue to provide answers to the questions they can in future updates, and releases, of the PCI DSS.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 03 Sep 2008 12:56:31 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci">pci</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security assessor">security assessor</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security model">security model</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci dss">pci dss</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dss">dss</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci security requirements">pci security requirements</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/requirements">requirements</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/qsa">qsa</category>
      <source url="http://srmsblog.burtongroup.com/2008/09/pci-v12-a-good.html">PCI V1.2, a good start but still not enough</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Open Letter to Verizon Wireless]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/33861048df9fa12f13bd8d46690d0a5b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/33861048df9fa12f13bd8d46690d0a5b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[After receiving no support from agents at the Verizon Wireless store or by agents on the phone, I decided to write them and make it an open letter. Its no secret that Verizon has a great network, but...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<P><FONT size=2><FONT face=Verdana>After receiving no support from agents at the Verizon Wireless store or by agents on the phone, I decided to write them and make it an open letter.<SPAN>&nbsp; </SPAN>It&#8217;s no secret that Verizon has a great network, but it&#8217;s also no secret that their phone selection stinks.<SPAN>&nbsp; </SPAN>I don&#8217;t want to leave them and am hoping that whatever little bad press I can cause will encourage them to resolve the issue.<SPAN>&nbsp; </SPAN>If not, I&#8217;m tapping out.<SPAN>&nbsp; </SPAN>For 3 years I have hated my phone and loved their network.<SPAN>&nbsp; </SPAN>I&#8217;m ready to feel mediocre about both.<SPAN>&nbsp; </SPAN>Here it goes: </FONT></FONT>
<P><FONT size=2><FONT face=Verdana>I am currently without a phone and would appreciate a speedy reply. </FONT></FONT>
<P><FONT size=2><FONT face=Verdana>I have been a Verizon Wireless customer for over 5 years and my monthly bill easily averages over $200 during that time frame.<SPAN>&nbsp; </SPAN>While I love your network, I have been completely unsatisfied by your selection of phones.<SPAN>&nbsp; </SPAN>It is a stretch to say that my last phone worked&#8212;it had a feature called a battery that allowed me to switch from the car charger to my office charger without dying.<SPAN>&nbsp; </SPAN>And I waited&#8212;under duress&#8212;until I was allowed to purchase a new phone with the discount. </FONT></FONT>
<P><FONT size=2><FONT face=Verdana>My current phone has a wonderful battery life, but this is the 4th time the charger has snapped off in the phone.<SPAN>&nbsp; </SPAN>The phone is fine, but I keep paying $30 for new chargers.<SPAN>&nbsp; </SPAN>I refuse to purchase another or wait until February when I will be eligible for a new phone.<SPAN>&nbsp; </SPAN>You sold a phone with a design flaw, and I&#8217;m not even asking for a refund or a free phone.<SPAN>&nbsp; </SPAN>Just allow me to take a chance on a new one at the 2 year contract renewal rate.<SPAN>&nbsp; </SPAN></FONT></FONT>
<P><FONT size=2><FONT face=Verdana><SPAN></SPAN></FONT></FONT><FONT size=2><FONT face=Verdana>If not, I will gladly pay the early termination fee and leave Verizon.<SPAN>&nbsp; </SPAN>On general principle, I will spend more money canceling my account with you than I would likely receive as a discount on a new phone.<SPAN>&nbsp; </SPAN>As a customer, I consider it unacceptable that you sell inferior phones and leave me with no recourse. </FONT></FONT>
<P><FONT size=2><FONT face=Verdana>The first time I waited haplessly to become eligible for a new phone.<SPAN>&nbsp; </SPAN>I will not suffer a second time.<SPAN>&nbsp; </SPAN>If you don&#8217;t like the fact that you will end up losing money by allowing me to purchase a new phone early, I suggest you take it up your vendors who supply you with awful products.<SPAN>&nbsp; </SPAN>I can promise you that we will both lose more money if you don&#8217;t. </FONT></FONT>
<P><FONT size=2><FONT face=Verdana>Sincerely, </FONT></FONT>
<P><FONT face=Verdana size=2>Eric Marvets</FONT></P><img src ="http://marvets.com/blog/aggbug/12205.aspx" width = "1" height = "1" />]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 25 Aug 2008 11:43:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/phone">phone</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/phone workedit">phone workedit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/free phone">free phone</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/current phone">current phone</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/verizon">verizon</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/phone selection stinks">phone selection stinks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/verizon wireless store">verizon wireless store</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/time">time</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/verizon wireless customer">verizon wireless customer</category>
      <source url="http://marvets.com/blog/archive/2008/08/25/12205.aspx">Open Letter to Verizon Wireless</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Spammers Take A Cheap Shot...]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2bd234de99d23ff4b013abce95e7d324</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2bd234de99d23ff4b013abce95e7d324</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I'm on holiday this week, but thought I'd better give this a mention anyway (plus, when did being on holiday ever stop me from posting stuff on blogs, right

I was surprised to see this posted to the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
        I'm on holiday this week, but thought I'd better give this a mention anyway (plus, when did being on holiday ever stop me from posting stuff on blogs, right?)<br /><br />I was surprised to see this posted to the comments section of the <a href="http://sunbeltblog.blogspot.com/">Sunbelt Blog</a>:<br /><br /><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><img alt="spgspam1.gif" src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/spgspam1.gif" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="144" width="359" /></span><br /> <div><br />I was about as surprised as The Dean was!<br /><br />To quote a further post from The Dean:<br /><br /><i>"Well, that's weird. Isn't spywareguide Paperghost's blog? I know he
wouldn't spam here. And, the link on the first comment goes to a 404
page."</i><br /><br />So, we have someone spamming with broken English, dropping links to 404 pages on Spywareguide. Curious.<br /><br />Now, I did have some suspicions on this - for starters, the recent blogs regarding the pirate movie websites that pop Zango installers just hit a few <a href="http://computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&amp;taxonomyName=privacy&amp;articleId=9112881&amp;taxonomyId=84&amp;intsrc=kc_top">news</a> <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/08/18/dark_knight_zango_affiliate_gateway/">websites</a>. As <a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/2008/08/another-site-hiding-pirate-mov.html">this article</a> mentions, a lot of the sites involved in this are from Asian regions - China, Indonesia etc. I couldn't help but notice the name of the poster was "Tam" - a common name in certain parts of Asia.<br /><br />Coincidence? Or a possible affiliate not too happy about this being highlighted? Well, a quick email later and the results for the spammer are in:<br /><br /><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><img alt="spgspam2.gif" src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/spgspam2.gif" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="185" width="430" /></span>
<br /><br />A potentially forged Reverse DNS aside, it's a strange thing indeed that they just happen to resolve to Vietnam given that a good portion of these sites are in Asia, isn't it?<br /><br />I think I'll see if any are owned by someone called "Tam".<br /><br />When I return from my holiday, of course....<br /></div><div><br /></div>
        
    ]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Aug 2008 10:24:05 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/holiday">holiday</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pop zango installers">pop zango installers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sunbelt blog">sunbelt blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blogs">blogs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spywareguide paperghost">spywareguide paperghost</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/recent blogs">recent blogs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blog">blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spywareguide">spywareguide</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/news websites">news websites</category>
      <source url="http://blog.spywareguide.com/2008/08/spammers-take-a-cheap-shot.html">Spammers Take A Cheap Shot...</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Automated Spim on Microblogging Site Via MSN Messenger]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/e5a1fb1ee8285e5dda0e9ae590ea20f2</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/e5a1fb1ee8285e5dda0e9ae590ea20f2</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[There's been a fair amount of Twitter coverage recently, but it's worth noting that other countries have their own versions of Twittering and some of them have seem to be a little easier to use in...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
        There's been a fair amount of <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1640">Twitter coverage</a> recently, but it's worth noting that other countries have their own versions of Twittering and some of them have seem to be a little easier to use in conjunction with Instant Messaging, whereas Twitter still seems to have a need for <a href="http://www.twittermsn.com/">third party services</a>, <a href="http://kunal.kundaje.net/twessenger/">add-ins</a> and <a href="http://www.theyagar.com/2008/01/30/twitter-bot-for-yahoo/">other tools</a> to get the job done if the service used is something other than Google Talk, Livejournal Chat or Jabber (if it's now more straightforward for other clients too, please let me know!)<br /><br />Either way, the below illustrates why adding Instant Messaging features to services such as Twitter can cause problems in the long run and needs to be considered carefully.<br /><br />We were alerted to the fact that a large amount of Spam seemed to be coming out of China in the last day or two (indeed, one contact mentioned to me that this particular message had been sent to their Honeypot around 29,000+ times, which is a lot of spamming for one URL however you look at it). The spam in question seemed to have been sent via a Spambot, and the only mentions of this URL so far in search engines seems to be related to China - shall we take a look?<br /><br />The URL in question (with part of it redacted) is<br /><br />http: //5834******/ ;)<br /><br />You'll notice the spam is short, snappy and also includes a little smiley-face thing at the end. In fact, it looks a little bit like the kind of link people send to their contacts on Twitter, doesn't it?<br /><br />Well, let's see - a quick search and we find this:<br /><br /><div align="center"><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf1.html" onclick="window.open('http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf1.html','popup','width=780,height=584,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf1-thumb-380x284.jpg" alt="fanf1.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="284" width="380" /></a></span>
<br /><br />Click to Enlarge<br /></div><br />A page from Fanfou.com, which I believe is a Chinese site "<a href="http://www.twittown.com/fanfou">inspired</a>" by Twitter with much of the same features and functionality. In fact, it has one feature working straight off the bat that Twitter users previously had to rely on <a href="http://kunal.kundaje.net/twessenger/">plugins</a> for - the ability to send messages to their page via MSN Messenger updates.<br /><br />http: //5834****** doesn't actually resolve anywhere - however, a quick Ping to that address and we have an IP:<br /><br /><div align="center"><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf3.html" onclick="window.open('http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf3.html','popup','width=452,height=212,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf3-thumb-352x165.jpg" alt="fanf3.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="165" width="352" /></a></span>
<br /><br />Click to Enlarge<br /></div><br />Type the IP address into the browser, and via some geolocational technology, you'll see a region specific version of the following dating website:<br /><br /><div align="center"><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf4.html" onclick="window.open('http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf4.html','popup','width=780,height=564,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf4-thumb-380x274.jpg" alt="fanf4.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="274" width="380" /></a></span>
<br /><br />Click to Enlarge<br /></div><br />Go back to the page on Fanfou.com, scroll down and select any of the clickable links and surprise - the same page appears. This particular account on Fanfou has something like 30+ pages devoted to endless Spim links via MSN. They link to placeholder pages, sites that look as though they've been suspended and / or deleted with no way to determine what content was there previously - all interspersed with "Twitter" style messages throughout such as this:<br /><br /><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><img alt="fanf5.jpg" src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf5.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="27" width="208" /></span>
<br /><br />Again, note everything is coming via MSN. By this point, you're probably wondering exactly how they allow you to send messages to their Twitter-style pages. Well, the solution is quite clever - check out the <a href="http://help.fanfou.com/im.html">IM page</a>. You enter your MSN address, and when you login to your MSN account, you'll suddenly find you have a new IM buddy who wants to be a contact:<br /><br /><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><img alt="fanf6.jpg" src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf6.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="189" width="475" /></span>
<br /><br />Add it, and whenever you want to put a message on your page, send it an <a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/image/fanf7.jpg">instant message</a> and, lo and behold, your Tweet-style message has appeared on your page:<br /><br /><div align="center"><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf8.html" onclick="window.open('http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf8.html','popup','width=541,height=241,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf8-thumb-341x151.jpg" alt="fanf8.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="151" width="341" /></a></span><br /><br />Click to Enlarge<br /></div><br />In conclusion, the steps here appear to be<br /><br /><b>1)</b> Create a Spambot that infects users via MSN Messenger<br /><b>2)</b> Tailor the messages it sends to be short and sweet, just like a Twitter-style message<br /><b>3)</b> Set up an account on a service such as Fanfou.com that makes it easy to send messages to your page via MSN Messenger (or other IM services affected by your bot)<br /><b>4)</b> Infect the PC running your MSN Messenger account then watch as it spams the userpage with whatever messages you want it to send.<br /><br />Of course, the links can be anything from dating sites and ringtone adverts to infection files and exploits - all made so much more easier (and far less time consuming than manually typing in URLs to your userpage) by the functionality built into the site you happen to be using. It's also worth noting that the accounts sending the Spim don't <i>have</i> to be set up by the spammer - they could be compromised accounts that had been hijacked when clicking a rogue IM link, which is a great way of filling out the spamming ranks very quickly.<br /><br />This is definitely something Twitter - and any other site out there involved in <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Micro-blogging">microblogging</a> - need to keep an eye out for, and consider carefully when thinking of adding integration with popular Instant Messaging clients.<br /><br />We detect the file sending the weblinks via MSN as <a href="http://www.spywareguide.com/product_show.php?id=32320">Foubot</a>.<br /><br />Research and Writeup: Christopher Boyd, Director of Malware Research<br />Additional Research: Chris Mannon, Senior Threat Researcher<br /><div><br /></div>
        
    ]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 07 Aug 2008 17:12:09 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/msn messenger">msn messenger</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/msn">msn</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/message">message</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/msn messenger account">msn messenger account</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/twitter-style message">twitter-style message</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/account">account</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/msn account">msn account</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/twitter-style pages">twitter-style pages</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pages">pages</category>
      <source url="http://blog.spywareguide.com/2008/08/automated-spim-on-microbloggin.html">Automated Spim on Microblogging Site Via MSN Messenger</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[SSO Summit Day One Morning Session]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/500327e2eca382c04451c330dcc1e875</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/500327e2eca382c04451c330dcc1e875</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I am at the SSO Summit , high in the Colorado mountains (9200 feet elevation to be exact), the I-70 West sign is one of my favorite road signs. Ping Identity has done a great job putting this...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div>I am at the <a href="http://www.ssosummit.com/">SSO Summit</a>, high in the Colorado mountains (9200 feet elevation to be exact), the I-70 West sign is one of my favorite road signs. <a href="http://www.pingidentity.com/">Ping Identity</a> has done a great job putting this together. It is the perfect size around 125 people. Most of the best conferences I have been to have been around 60-150 people. There are a *lot* of enterprises involved here. </div><br><div>John Haggard who has an extensive background in SSO and lately is at Passfaces kicked off the sessions with a SSO history talk. Going through a lot of mainframe centric SSO protocols from the 80s and 90s, I am no expert in these areas and it was fascinating to see the way things vacillated between strength and weakness of SSO protocols.</div><br><div>A couple of points from the presentation:</div><br><div><blockquote><p>The history of SSO is a story of extreme complexities, compromises, vulnerabilities and unintended consequences.</p></blockquote></div><div><blockquote><br></blockquote></div><div><blockquote><p>SSO is a story of one simple objective - to spin off units of computation work to execute on behalf of an authenticated user without requiring the original user's password.</p></blockquote></div><div><blockquote><br></blockquote></div><div><blockquote><p>Phishing has always been completely avoidable</p></blockquote></div><br><div>He went through the various incarnations of mainframe SSO from logon id through things like ACF2, VTAM Session managers, terminal emulators, multiplatform access to web access through facades. The implication he drew from this last step are well worth repeating: "Time to rethink everything." Problem is - of course, people don't rethink, they put MQ Series in front of the mainframe and hook a web app in front of that and go. </div><br><div>Finally, he connected some interesting dots to SAML and SOA security issues. </div><br><div><blockquote><p>SSO without strong auth is and always will be simply nuts</p></blockquote></div><div><blockquote><br></blockquote></div><div><blockquote><p>SAML gets its right</p></blockquote></div><div>His points around common weaknesses in integration in SOA and Web 2.0 technologies for companies that are *not* using SAML were excellent. Of course, I will go into some more details on this tomorrow.</div><br><div>Ping's CTO Patrick Harding took the stage and gave an overview of the next generation of SSO options from Kerberos to present and as is his wont demonstrated various real world strengths and weaknesses, quoted a Gartner analyst (shock!) saying OpenID is the hare and Cardspace is the tortoise. Nice.</div><br><div>Andrew Cameron from GM is speaking now on GM's experiences implementing SSO, and there are a lot of real world lessons learned in his presentation.  Plus my favorite identity architecture, user has Kerberos, services speak SAML. very nice, very scalable. All in all, its my starting point for how to identity in an enterprise. He also spoke about a pet peeve of mine - how to globalize authorization. This is not a problem that vendors have historically attacked with relish. They are very happy to help you solve authentication, but they are perfectly happy to keep their authorization internal either for vendor lock in reasons and/or for sloppy authorization design. This will take a LIberty-esque consortium of enterprises to resolve. </div><br><div>So many conferences are dominated by vendors and consultants who conspire to what I call the "sacred church of things YOU should be doing." Instead this conference is bringing together a great mix of real world in the trenches practitioners who have problems to solve today, with rubber meets the road deployable solutions and an eye towards longer term strategy for SSO and identity.</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 24 Jul 2008 09:35:02 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sso">sso</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sso history talk">sso history talk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sso summit">sso summit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mainframe sso">mainframe sso</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sso options">sso options</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sso protocols">sso protocols</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/real world">real world</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/real world lessons">real world lessons</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/authorization internal">authorization internal</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/07/sso-summit-day-one-morning-session.html">SSO Summit Day One Morning Session</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[A Note Of Caution....]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/85650b602aeedaee2136e9b994eb9818</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/85650b602aeedaee2136e9b994eb9818</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[In the last few days, we've discovered a program that attempts to get around certain privacy related features on Myspace groups (which are effectively mini-forums run by Myspace users). Note that the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
        In the last few days, we've discovered a program that attempts to get around certain privacy related features on Myspace groups (which are effectively mini-forums run by Myspace users). Note that the program doesn't attempt to do anything to individual end-users like infect their PC - and as long as you're <i>not</i> posting up personal / private information to Myspace groups that you don't want to risk being grabbed by nefarious individuals, you have nothing to worry about. (As a general rule of thumb, you shouldn't post sensitive information to <i>any</i> third-party website in any case, but that's another story).<br /><br />We're not posting up any additional information at this time, because we don't want to cause a mass stampede by people to grab the files in question and start using them left, right and center until Myspace has had a chance to tackle the problem.<br /><br />For now, we've passed on everything to Myspace and hopefully they'll be able to resolve this speedily.<br /> 
        
    ]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 23 Jul 2008 08:45:25 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/additional information">additional information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/myspace users">myspace users</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/myspace">myspace</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/post sensitive information">post sensitive information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nefarious individuals">nefarious individuals</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mass stampede">mass stampede</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/third-party website">third-party website</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/program">program</category>
      <source url="http://blog.spywareguide.com/2008/07/a-note-of-caution.html">A Note Of Caution....</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Q&A with Doug McClure: What Makes BSM Successful?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ac3c26a14f128a8ecb49f7c474cbb36e</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ac3c26a14f128a8ecb49f7c474cbb36e</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Yesterday we featured our initial Q&amp;A with Doug McClure , who took some time to answer some strategic questions on BSM Lite. Today, Doug shares his thoughts on BSM and CMDB strategies for companies...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yesterday we featured <a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/qa-with-doug-mcclure-is-bsm-lite-the-answer/07/2008" target="_blank">our initial Q&amp;A</a> with <a href="http://dougmcclure.net/blog/" target="_blank">Doug McClure</a>, who took some time to answer some strategic questions on BSM Lite. Today, Doug shares his thoughts on BSM and CMDB strategies for companies and how his stint in the U.S. Navy helped shape his future passion for BSM.</p>
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> Can you share any of the strategies/advice that you give to companies embarking on their BSM journeys?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> Well, first they&#8217;ve got to have a BSM strategy. Nearly all the clients I talk to or hear about wanting to do BSM do not have a BSM strategy. I talk a lot about this on my blog and with clients and it is relevant whether you&#8217;re going to think about &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; or &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; approaches.</p>
<p>Once we have a BSM strategy, we need to establish a BSM roadmap that guides us in how we’ll implement the BSM strategy in a more tactical manner, focusing on short term iterative quick wins and 30-60-90 day projects. For more of my thoughts on BSM strategy and roadmapping, see the following blog posts.</p>
<ul>
<li>
<h3><a href="http://dougmcclure.net/blog/2007/03/elements-of-business-service-management-part-3-getting-business-service-management-on-the-radar-screen/" target="_blank">Elements of Business Service Management Part 3: Getting Business Service Management on the Radar Screen</a></h3>
</li>
<li>
<h3><a href="http://dougmcclure.net/blog/2007/09/elements-of-business-service-management-part-4-what%e2%80%99s-your-business-service-management-strategy/" target="_blank">Elements of Business Service Management Part 4: What’s your Business Service Management Strategy?</a></h3>
</li>
</ul>
<p>As I&#8217;ve alluded to previously, a client first must define and understand what &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; may mean to them. Don&#8217;t take what the analysts or the vendors pitch for what you should do to achieve BSM or what value you should get from it.</p>
<p>For any type of BSM to be successful, each client must define what BSM means to them and state what they expect to get from BSM. They must make it personal, make it a part of their company culture and elevate it to be as an important initiative as compliance, risk management, SOA, ITIL, or other initiatives may be within the company.</p>
<p>Please don&#8217;t get scared off from this strategy thing. Please don&#8217;t blow this off as something that the secret enterprise architecture council should be doing. If you&#8217;re unable to get an audience in these areas within your company, start within your own sphere of influence.</p>
<p>Your strategy could be as simple as enabling the local operations center to more efficiently classify, triage and resolve problems based on a simple business service or application contextual understanding. Focus on how this changes the game within your environment. Come up with your own metrics and measures to assess the value this has to this organizational use. Trust me, you&#8217;ll need to justify your investment some time in the future.</p>
<p>Another trait of successful BSM implementations is that of the formal monitoring and management tools group has established some sort of database or knowledge repository that enables them to &#8220;manage the business of IT management and monitoring&#8221; if you will. In my opinion, the vendor community has let their clients down significantly in this area. The CMDB may be the correct answer, but most companies just don’t value monitoring enough to demand that this be included in their formal CMDB initiatives.</p>
<p>In my last job, we developed an application that I referred to as the &#8220;Service Management Database&#8221; or &#8220;SMDB&#8221;. Others may call it something else, but in essence, it was the database that captured what was monitored, how it was monitored, who owned it, what business services and applications it supported, the impact an outage or event from it had on the business services or applications, etc.</p>
<p>One key component of this “SMDB” was establishing the relationships of real and synthetic user and transaction monitoring steps to associated servers and applications. This is a significant gap area in many tools and vendor CMDBs.</p>
<p>Clients who have instituted something formal such as this generally have a very good handle on management and monitoring within their environment. Far too many clients do not have adequate monitoring (read visibility) in place to begin their BSM journey.</p>
<p>I&#8217;d strongly recommend a good hard look at how well the client&#8217;s monitoring and management practices are implemented and managed. Simply put, if they don&#8217;t have adequate visibility into how well those business services and applications are performing, you can&#8217;t expect to manage what you can&#8217;t “see” that may be impacting the business, clients, revenue, etc.</p>
<p>Just ask yourself this – can you explicitly state what monitoring is in place for a given business service or application? Can you quantify the impact of a simple event to a business service or application? Can you explain why something is red, yellow, purple or green and what causes it to change from one color to another? If you can’t, your BSM journey will be challenging.</p>
<p>Those with formal CMDB initiatives have their hands full with high risk, long time to value projects to just get a handle with traditional configuration management models. Taking these low level configuration items (CI&#8217;s) and establishing application and service dependencies comes after a lot of work getting through the organizational challenges of getting systems access to populate the CMDB.</p>
<p>I strongly recommend that the formal monitoring and management tools group create an authoritative database that enables them to establish end-to-end visibility into the service and application delivery chain and the impacts it has on the business, customer, etc. This ultimately becomes part of a more realistic federated CMDB within the business.</p>
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> Can you provide an example of a successful implementation of BSM? Were there specific factors that especially contributed to its success?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> I&#8217;ve touched on the highlights of the most successful BSM implementations throughout my previous answers. Clients that have rallied around an organizational change or transformation focusing every team member’s efforts and energy towards ensuring that the business goals and objectives are being met through the delivery of highly available business services and applications.</p>
<p>Far too often the “change” never happens and it’s the “talking heads” that are preaching to the choir about what should be done. Every person on the front line, in the support teams, at the help desk, etc. must understand how they support or impact the business in business terms. Try putting this simple phrase after job titles “Hi, my name is Doug. I’m a Systems Administrator, Supporting the Business”.</p>
<p>That was a mouthful, but simply put, these clients have an impressively instrumented business and IT environment with the right amount of visibility into each area, joined together with an organization that thinks, operates and responds based on their understanding of the business goals and objectives and how these business services and applications enable business success.</p>
<p>The operational model for an organization fully adopting BSM identifies ways to establish a service management mentality across the entire business service and application delivery and support chain. The delivery, operations and support organizations must be incented to manage the services and applications being delivered with this end-to-end context.</p>
<p>A leading, outside the box “service management organization” may include the traditional IT silos but within a matrixed fashion focused on one or more key business services and applications. The &#8220;service management organization&#8221; is then incented to work together, as a team, for the end-to-end delivery and support of these services or applications.</p>
<p>It’s no longer one’s job to just be the systems administrator, database administrator or network engineer, their job is now to support specific business services and applications. They provide the subject matter expertise needed to support the services and applications together, as a team, eliminating the finger pointing or “not my problem” attitudes that exist in the majority of IT organizations today.</p>
<p>Overall, the KISS approach is what will enable BSM of any type (lite, heavy) to be the most successful. If it just feels natural, doesn&#8217;t take any additional effort, clicks or tasks to do then it&#8217;s going to work. BSM should be transparent and not just another buzz word. It&#8217;s not a form that gets filled out or a special process to follow in the run book. It&#8217;s doing the right thing for the business, no matter what the situation, crisis, buzz word or technology initiative of the day is.</p>
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> How did you get involved in BSM?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> I think the foundations of my service management background and passion were initially established during my service in the US Navy. Today, I relate that experience to what I call BSM for the Military or Mission Services Management (MSM).</p>
<p>We had been taught over and over that extreme attention to the details of the mission at hand (aka &#8220;the business&#8221;) was the number one priority and that all of our technology, services, and applications existed for those Sailors and Marines on the other end (the &#8220;customer&#8221;). I can recall countless instances where mission critical communications services (telephony, orderwires, teletypes, command and control systems, etc.) were impacted in one way or another. It was extremely critical that we understood who was impacted and to what degree so that contingency plans could be activated. We weren’t just talking about lost revenue, poor sales or customer experience; we were talking about human lives and the security of the United States.</p>
<p>It is that military bearing, attention to detail and real world experience that drives me with many of my modern day BSM endeavors. That migration from &#8220;Mission Services Management&#8221; to BSM was honed working for over 10 years working in the Internet Service Provider (ISP) and datacenter, hosting and colocation business.</p>
<p>In those rapid growth businesses during the Internet boom, service differentiation was what &#8220;made you millions&#8221; or paved your way to bankruptcy. The companies I worked for had an extreme passion and focus on ensuring that their services, applications and Internet access products were of the highest quality, highly reliable and just plain better than the competition.</p>
<p>Again, the IT infrastructure, service quality and customer experience relationship was ingrained in all of our heads. It was all hands on deck when Webmail, Internet access, DNS, or the network experienced problems. We were measured in terms of how many customers experienced a busy signal or dropped connection or if you couldn’t log in fast enough to read your email. Companies like Keynote Systems and LionBridge/Veritest/Inverse tested the quality of our networks, services and applications and publicly ranked us against our competition. We thought in terms of customer experience and impact every minute of the day, 24&#215;7.</p>
<p>It was in my last job managing a traditional enterprise management and monitoring development group for a nationwide ISP where I was able to work with emerging technology to help get a handle on the complexities of these rapidly growing IT environments filled with emerging technologies and products. Applying this early technology to complex service problems in our environment proved to me that the technology, coupled with the right emphasis on how the technology was implemented and an emphasis on the people and processes within the organization could bring BSM to life.</p>
<p>Where I felt left out in the cold was with my vendor relationship. While their technology gave me the potential, they didn&#8217;t teach me how to work through the organizational and technological problems to successfully implement the BSM strategy. My very first end-to-end BSM pilot was extremely successful and provided visibility into the IT environment and business service impact that have never been available before.</p>
<p>And here I am today, working at a software vendor for the first time. Welcome to the &#8220;dark side&#8221; as they say. The approach and methodology we followed for BSM has become the basis of the core BSM Methodology that I teach IBMers and our clients around the world today.</p>
<p>My personal mission and drive here at IBM Tivoli is to ensure that BSM is something that the typical monitoring tools administrator can actually implement and that our BSM story is something that any of our clients can be successful with. The sales and marketing slicks must be backed up by something like this whomever you are these days. Clients shouldn&#8217;t put up for “marketecture”, me too and gee whiz buzz words.</p>
<p>BSM takes a partnership and commitment to every client&#8217;s success, and I want to be involved in those BSM efforts in every industry or market worldwide. We need more thought leaders collaborating together in an open and public forum to change legacy attitudes about BSM and do what we can to enable client’s to be as successful as they can be.</p>
<p><a href="http://sharethis.com/item?&wp=abc&amp;publisher=ea11358c-69de-4e80-9804-e964a8930b70&amp;title=Q%26amp%3BA+with+Doug+McClure%3A+What+Makes+BSM+Successful%3F&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fblog.sciencelogic.com%2Fqa-with-doug-mcclure-what-makes-bsm-successful%2F07%2F2008">ShareThis</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2008 15:02:39 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/management">management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service management database">service management database</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/management tools">management tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service management mentality">service management mentality</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business service management">business service management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business service">business service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business service impact">business service impact</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mission services management">mission services management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/database">database</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/qa-with-doug-mcclure-what-makes-bsm-successful/07/2008">Q&amp;A with Doug McClure: What Makes BSM Successful?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[What Dans DNS Checker Doesnt Do]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/3a3f567aeaff1247a93f33602937d3ff</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/3a3f567aeaff1247a93f33602937d3ff</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Despite what various commenters around the blogosphere think (Ive read a few but cant find the links now), Dan Kaminskys online Check My Dns utility doesnt
Poison anybodys DNS cache
Expose how the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Despite what various commenters around the blogosphere think (I&#8217;ve read a few but can&#8217;t find the links now), Dan Kaminsky&#8217;s online <a href="http://doxpara.com/">&#8220;Check My Dns&#8221; utility</a> doesn&#8217;t:</p>
<ul>
<li>Poison anybody&#8217;s DNS cache</li>
<li>Expose how the actual exploit works</li>
<p>
</ul>
<p>What it does is check whether your ISP&#8217;s DNS server is patched.  Plain and simple.  It looks for one thing &#8212; source port randomization.  This does not give away the exploit, it checks for the existence of the <a href="http://www.doxpara.com/?p=1162">sledgehammer fix</a> that prevents the exploit from working.</p>
<p>More specifically, there&#8217;s some Javascript code that generates a random hex string which is used to create a URL, e.g. http://6313d97e498e.toorrr.com.  Your OS then does a DNS lookup for that unique hostname.  Your ISP&#8217;s DNS server asks toorrr.com&#8217;s DNS server (a server Dan controls) to resolve that funky DNS name to an IP address.  It sends a few packets in the process.  Dan&#8217;s server makes a note of the source port of each request and sends back the webserver&#8217;s IP address to your DNS server, which sends it back to you.</p>
<p>Now that you have the IP address, your browser can fetch the results page.  The web page is generated dynamically by parsing the hex string out of the URL you requested, using Ajax to fetch the relevant port and TXID data stored on Dan&#8217;s server, and printing out a &#8220;safe&#8221; or &#8220;vulnerable&#8221; message such as:</p>
<blockquote><p>
Your name server, at 71.243.0.38, appears to be safe.<br />
Requests seen for 6313d97e498e.toorrr.com:</p>
<p>71.243.0.38:45298 TXID=13926<br />
71.243.0.38:45310 TXID=25412<br />
71.243.0.38:45338 TXID=30829<br />
71.243.0.38:45332 TXID=13934<br />
71.243.0.38:45321 TXID=2701
</p></blockquote>
<p>That&#8217;s all.  Nothing tricky.  This particular DNS server is deemed safe because the source port varies from one request to the next.  </p>
<p>Come to think of it, those source ports don&#8217;t really look that random, do they.  For anybody &#8220;in the know&#8221;, is that amount of randomness sufficient to protect against the attack?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Jul 2008 19:03:03 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server">server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dans server">dans server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/isps dns server">isps dns server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server dan controls">server dan controls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/coms dns server">coms dns server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dns server">dns server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/source port">source port</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/source port varies">source port varies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/source port randomization">source port randomization</category>
      <source url="http://www.veracode.com/blog/?p=120">What Dans DNS Checker Doesnt Do</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA['The' DNS Issue of 2008]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/8315adcbb13e33219dfe0b230098982c</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/8315adcbb13e33219dfe0b230098982c</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Its been a day since the public announcement, so by now youve probably heard about the DNS issue. The bug was found earlier this year, but the discoverer ( Dan Kaminsky ) and team worked fervently...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It&#8217;s been a day since the public announcement, so by now you&#8217;ve probably heard about <em>the</em> DNS issue. The bug was found earlier this year, but the discoverer (<a class="offsite-link-inline" href="http://www.doxpara.com/" target="_blank">Dan Kaminsky</a>) and team worked fervently with leaders of the technology industry to create patches for all platforms before the big announcement. <em>And- kudos to them all for keeping zipped lips until the problem could be contained (despite all the heckling and harassing).</em> </p><p><strong>You can find out a little more right now</strong>- I&#8217;m including some links below for you to read more. </p><p><strong>If you don&#8217;t know what DNS is</strong> or why you care, see the bottom of this post for a little background info.</p><p><strong>As for the real deal on disclosure</strong>- you&#8217;ll have to wait for <a class="offsite-link-inline" href="http://www.blackhat.com/" target="_blank">Black Hat</a>&nbsp;in August. I&#8217;ll be there, along with other members of the <a class="offsite-link-inline" href="http://networks.feedburner.com/Security-Bloggers-Network" target="_blank">Security Bloggers Network</a>&nbsp;(a (<em>non-exclusive but highly visible and well-respected)</em> security bloggers channel for Black Hat and RSA). I&#8217;m sure you&#8217;ll see *plenty* of post-Black Hat blogs, tweets and podcasts recapping the story. </p><blockquote><p>Hear the buzz&#8230;</p><ul><li><div><a class="offsite-link-inline" href="http://www.doxpara.com/?p=1162" target="_blank">Dan Kaminsky&#8217;s (discoverers)&nbsp;site</a></div></li><li><div><a class="offsite-link-inline" href="http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/800113" target="_blank">US Cert Vulnerability Note</a></div></li><li><div><a class="offsite-link-inline" href="http://www.informationweek.com/news/internet/security/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=208808229" target="_blank">InformationWeek Article: Security Community Comes Together</a></div></li><li><div><a class="offsite-link-inline" href="http://securosis.com/2008/07/09/more-on-the-dns-vulnerability/" target="_blank">Rich Mogull helps spread the word to CIOs</a></div></li><li><div><a class="offsite-link-inline" href="http://www.heise-online.co.uk/security/Massive-DNS-security-problem-endangers-the-internet--/news/111070" target="_blank">Heise Securiy Blog: Nice overview</a></div></li><li><div><a class="offsite-link-inline" href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121557348238938533.html?mod=googlenews_wsj" target="_blank">Wall Street Journal</a></div></li></ul></blockquote><p>&nbsp;</p><p><strong>What is a DNS Server?</strong> DNS are servers throughout the Internet (and inside networks) that resolve domain names (ie <a href="http://www.securityuncorked.com/">www.SecurityUncorked.com</a>) to the IP address of the hosting server. The idea is, if you can trick a DNS server, your request for ESPN.com may just take you to a malicious site where you&#8217;ll be immediately infected with a virus, malware or other undesirable creepy Internet-bred monster. They&#8217;ve found a bug that could be exploited to do just that. </p><p><strong>What do we do?</strong> It&#8217;s not the end of the world.&nbsp;For now, know that almost all DNS servers need to have a patch installed to protect them from this vulnerability. It&#8217;s pretty universal and every manufacturer is on board and offering a patch as of yesterday, July 8th. </p><p># # #</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 09 Jul 2008 22:54:02 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dns">dns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dns issue">dns issue</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dns servers">dns servers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/servers">servers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/post-black hat blogs">post-black hat blogs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/black hat">black hat</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dns server">dns server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server">server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/post">post</category>
      <source url="http://www.securityuncorked.com/security-uncorked/2008/7/10/the-dns-issue-of-2008.html">'The' DNS Issue of 2008</source>
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