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  <channel>
    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: restrict]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/restrict</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 17 Jun 2008 20:36:22 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Bot Hunter: An Event Processing Challenge]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ad344d30f5d4c2ad499d08baf386a23b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ad344d30f5d4c2ad499d08baf386a23b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Recently we penned The Attack of the Spiders from the Clouds where we mentioned how cloud computing infrastructures can be used to stage malicous or accidential network attacks
Today I challenge our...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Recently we penned <a href="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/07/31/the-attack-of-the-spiders-from-the-clouds/" target="_blank">The Attack of the Spiders from the Clouds</a> where we mentioned how cloud computing infrastructures can be used to stage malicous or accidential network attacks.</p>
<p>Today I challenge our CEP/ESP/EP vendors (or SIs) to create the following solution to detect and block rogue bots on Apache web sites.   I will install and test each submitted solution on <a href="http://www.unix.com" target="_blank">The UNIX Forums</a> and post the results here.</p>
<p>Here are some basic requirements:</p>
<ol>
<li>Your solution must run on Linux and be installable and configurable remotely with SSH or HTTP.  There will be no physical access to the server. No exceptions.</li>
<li>Preferrably, the configuration can be done with a Web-Based Interface (WBI) - a browser.</li>
<li>Your solution will listen to continuous updates to the Apache2 access log, exact location configurable in your solution, and identify robots ( bots), also known as spiders, from the log.</li>
<li>Your solution will provide a confidence metric, key indicator (KI), for each bot detected, from 0 to 10, where 10 indicates &#8220;absolutely a bot,&#8221; 0 is &#8220;absolutely not a bot.&#8221;</li>
<li>Your solution will update the IP address of each bot and KI you identify in a file/table called, for example, ./bot_scorecard.txt where each line is an IP address of a bot, followed by a semicolon (or other delimiter of your choice) and the confidence factor, for example,  10.0.0.1;10 means that 10.0.0.1 is a bot, 100% sure.</li>
<li>Your solution must compare bots detected to a file/table called, for example, ./bots_allowed.txt and ./bots_denied.txt that are in the format IP address/mask, for example 10.0.0.1/24, or 10.0.0.1/32.</li>
<li>If the KI &#8220;confidence factor&#8221; of the IP address of your detected bot is higher than the tunable &#8220;is a bot&#8221; KI, then your solution should update the tables/files and then call iptables and block the bot.</li>
<li>It should send an email to one or more email addresses with a message, for example:  &#8220;New Bot Detected - Confidence 8&#8243; with IP address, etc. in the message.  Another example would be an email, &#8220;Bot Blocked&#8221; - with details, etc.</li>
<li>You cannot automatically block any traffic that is not a bot.  Blocking one &#8220;non-bot&#8221; results in failure, no exceptions.</li>
<li>The Prize:  The winner will get their logo (w/link) on this site in a block called &#8220;Bot Hunter Winner&#8221; (or something like that.)</li>
</ol>
<p>These are some basic requirements; I don&#8217;t want to restrict your thinking or solution, so be creative!  Feel free to ask any questions in the comment section of this thread.</p>
<p>Remember, sometimes you may have to manage the state of IP addresses for days, or hours, before you can accurately deterimine if it is a bot based on behavior alone.   So, you will need to work with both long and short time windows.  Latency is not important. Detection accurate is importance.</p>
<p>Anyone care to submit a solution for testing?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 15 Aug 2008 05:35:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bot">bot</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/winner">winner</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bot hunter winner">bot hunter winner</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bot based">bot based</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/non-bot results">non-bot results</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/results">results</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bot scorecard">bot scorecard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/solution">solution</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/block rogue bots">block rogue bots</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/08/15/the-bot-hunter-an-event-processing-challenge/">The Bot Hunter: An Event Processing Challenge</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The web browser is sick but wheres the cure?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/c1a26694b7d3db2c185a5f976e06cc90</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/c1a26694b7d3db2c185a5f976e06cc90</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Blogger: Ramon Krikken
The web browser is one of those peculiar pieces of software, having to accept input from arbitrary sources and then parse and render the data that is sent to it. Part of this it...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Blogger: Ramon Krikken</p>

<p>The web browser is one of those peculiar pieces of software, having to accept input from arbitrary sources and then parse and render the data that is sent to it. Part of this it does by itself, and other parts are taken care of by handlers and plug-ins. In doing so, it displays hypertext, images, videos, and even runs active content like Flash, JavaScript, and ActiveX. </p>

<p>But however much we love the browser, we’ve also come to hate the myriad of vulnerabilities that affect it. Everything from cross-site scripting to remote code execution via maliciously formed animated cursor files and Flash content can make browsing a hazardous activity. The browser is sick, and that’s not desirable for a platform we use for important business and personal transactions.</p>

<p>Worsening the browser’s diagnosis is the <a href="http://taossa.com.nyud.net:8080/archive/bh08sotirovdowdslides.pdf">recent paper</a> from Mark Dowd and Alexander Sotirov, sub-titled “Setting back browser security by 10 years,” which discusses how to bypass Microsoft Vista’s memory protection capabilities with some added effort for the exploit designers. It’s not that all of the techniques are necessarily new, but the browser appears to be particularly vulnerable to easy exploitation. </p>

<p>Surprising? Not exactly, when we take into account that the browser is suffering from the same disease as the general purpose operating system: bloat and compatibility. We expect the browser to do ever more, but everything we used it for before still needs to work as if it were yesterday. It feels a bit like people insisting on using a cardboard box as a safe, and wondering why their money keeps getting stolen.</p>

<p>It’s not like we haven’t been working on the browser’s cure, though. There have been some improvements in the browsers themselves, the operating systems have also implemented compensating controls, but most of all, there has been an enormous push for securing the web applications that deliver the data in the first place. Unfortunately, the latter two won’t help secure the browser in the long run.</p>

<p>The first issue is that not all content will come from ‘nice’ servers, the second that the server can only make an educated guess on how a browser will parse and render a given set of data, and the third that operating system controls have their own limitations, whether by design or implementation (for example needing to re-compile existing code to enable certain protections.) The browser, in the end, has to be mostly responsible for keeping itself safe; the operating system must assist it in doing so.</p>

<p>So we’re in a pickle. The browser is sick (and the operating system is too), but it’s hard to cure it without a redesign that will undoubtedly impact compatibility, the ever-so-desired multi-functionality, or its ease of use. We can layer defenses by using web filtering in the enterprise environment, but in the end – for the consumer market in particular – we need to fix the browser itself. I can think of a few things I think might help: </p>

<ul><li>Some kind of <a href="http://people.mozilla.com/~bsterne/site-security-policy/">site security policy</a>&nbsp; to restrict where the browser loads auxiliary content from, and which data it can ‘trust’, when loading a web page (I’d prefer mandatory enforcement, and adding an HTML tag to be able to indicate blocks of untrustworthy data.)</li>

<li>Restricted compartments for plug-ins to run in, ensuring that their bugs cannot easily affect the whole browser.</li>

<li>Better software development practices for the plug-ins and content parsers themselves, so that they’re less vulnerable, and compiled with the latest protection measures to begin with.</li></ul>

<p>All of this means more work, and some of it means a lot of unhappy reactions when things stop working. Even then we will of course still have to deal with additional vulnerabilities, such as those that may be present in hardware, but we will at least have taken prudent steps to ‘find a cure.’</p>

</div>
<img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityAndRiskManagementStrategiesBlog/~4/364862623" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Aug 2008 07:11:14 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/browser">browser</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web browser">web browser</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/browser appears">browser appears</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web">web</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cure">cure</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/browser security">browser security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/content">content</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/runs active content">runs active content</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/browsers cure">browsers cure</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityAndRiskManagementStrategiesBlog/~3/364862623/the-web-browser.html">The web browser is sick but wheres the cure?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The web browser is sick ??? but where???s the cure?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ed0b490e06092c5b7a4f3957bd361fa2</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ed0b490e06092c5b7a4f3957bd361fa2</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Blogger: Ramon Krikken
The web browser is one of those peculiar pieces of software, having to accept input from arbitrary sources and then parse and render the data that is sent to it. Part of this it...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Blogger: Ramon Krikken</p>

<p>The web browser is one of those peculiar pieces of software, having to accept input from arbitrary sources and then parse and render the data that is sent to it. Part of this it does by itself, and other parts are taken care of by handlers and plug-ins. In doing so, it displays hypertext, images, videos, and even runs active content like Flash, JavaScript, and ActiveX. </p>

<p>But however much we love the browser, we???ve also come to hate the myriad of vulnerabilities that affect it. Everything from cross-site scripting to remote code execution via maliciously formed animated cursor files and Flash content can make browsing a hazardous activity. The browser is sick, and that???s not desirable for a platform we use for important business and personal transactions.</p>

<p>Worsening the browser???s diagnosis is the <a href="http://taossa.com.nyud.net:8080/archive/bh08sotirovdowdslides.pdf">recent paper</a> from Mark Dowd and Alexander Sotirov, sub-titled ???Setting back browser security by 10 years,??? which discusses how to bypass Microsoft Vista???s memory protection capabilities with some added effort for the exploit designers. It???s not that all of the techniques are necessarily new, but the browser appears to be particularly vulnerable to easy exploitation. </p>

<p>Surprising? Not exactly, when we take into account that the browser is suffering from the same disease as the general purpose operating system: bloat and compatibility. We expect the browser to do ever more, but everything we used it for before still needs to work as if it were yesterday. It feels a bit like people insisting on using a cardboard box as a safe, and wondering why their money keeps getting stolen.</p>

<p>It???s not like we haven???t been working on the browser???s cure, though. There have been some improvements in the browsers themselves, the operating systems have also implemented compensating controls, but most of all, there has been an enormous push for securing the web applications that deliver the data in the first place. Unfortunately, the latter two won???t help secure the browser in the long run.</p>

<p>The first issue is that not all content will come from ???nice??? servers, the second that the server can only make an educated guess on how a browser will parse and render a given set of data, and the third that operating system controls have their own limitations, whether by design or implementation (for example needing to re-compile existing code to enable certain protections.) The browser, in the end, has to be mostly responsible for keeping itself safe; the operating system must assist it in doing so.</p>

<p>So we???re in a pickle. The browser is sick (and the operating system is too), but it???s hard to cure it without a redesign that will undoubtedly impact compatibility, the ever-so-desired multi-functionality, or its ease of use. We can layer defenses by using web filtering in the enterprise environment, but in the end ??? for the consumer market in particular ??? we need to fix the browser itself. I can think of a few things I think might help: </p>

<ul><li>Some kind of <a href="http://people.mozilla.com/~bsterne/site-security-policy/">site security policy</a>&nbsp; to restrict where the browser loads auxiliary content from, and which data it can ???trust???, when loading a web page (I???d prefer mandatory enforcement, and adding an HTML tag to be able to indicate blocks of untrustworthy data.)</li>

<li>Restricted compartments for plug-ins to run in, ensuring that their bugs cannot easily affect the whole browser.</li>

<li>Better software development practices for the plug-ins and content parsers themselves, so that they???re less vulnerable, and compiled with the latest protection measures to begin with.</li></ul>

<p>All of this means more work, and some of it means a lot of unhappy reactions when things stop working. Even then we will of course still have to deal with additional vulnerabilities, such as those that may be present in hardware, but we will at least have taken prudent steps to ???find a cure.???</p>

</div>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Aug 2008 07:11:14 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/browser">browser</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web browser">web browser</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/browser appears">browser appears</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/browser security">browser security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web">web</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/content">content</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/runs active content">runs active content</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web page">web page</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/system controls">system controls</category>
      <source url="http://srmsblog.burtongroup.com/2008/08/the-web-browser.html">The web browser is sick ??? but where???s the cure?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Mailing error at the University of Maryland exposes student information]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a51262d40f98a67474833c65ff29621e</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a51262d40f98a67474833c65ff29621e</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
7/17/08

Organization
University of Maryland

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
Department of Transportation Services

Victims
All students registered for...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/umd.jpg" width="88" align="right" height="83"><font size="2"><b>Date Reported: </b><br>7/17/08<br><br><b>Organization: </b><br><a href="http://www.umd.edu/">University of Maryland</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br><a href="http://www.transportation.umd.edu/index.html">Department of Transportation Services</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>All students registered for Fall 2008 classes<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>23,727<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>Names, addresses, and Social Security numbers<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>On July 1st, 2008, the University of Maryland Department of Transportation Services mailed an </font><font size="2">on-campus parking </font><font size="2">brochure to all students </font><font size="2">registered for Fall 2008 classes</font><font size="2"> as of June 15, 2008.&nbsp; Recipient Social Security numbers were inadvertently exposed on the mailing labels.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://www.transportation.umd.edu/parkingmailer/">University of Maryland</a> <br><a href="http://www.wjla.com/news/stories/0708/536794.html">ABC Channel 7 News</a> <br><a href="http://www.wtop.com/?sid=1442585&amp;nid=25">WTOP FM 103.5 News</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>University of Maryland<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online sources cited above:<br><br>On July 1st, 2008, the University of Maryland’s Department of Transportation Services sent all students registered at the time, by U.S. mail, a brochure with on-campus parking information.<br><br>On July 8, 2008, the University discovered that the labels on that mailing included the addressees’ Social Security numbers.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Sheesh, a fraudster doesn't even have to tamper with the mail if the Social Security number is on the label.</span><br><br>The error was discovered on the morning of July 8 when calls were made to the University.<br><br>This parking mailer was sent to all individuals registered for Fall 2008 classes at the University of Maryland as of June 15, 2008.<br><br>The mailing list numbered 23,727 individuals.<br><br>In our annual effort to provide parking and transportation information to the University community, the names and addresses of all registered students was requested internally at the Department of Transportation Services for the purpose of creating mailing labels for a brochure.<br><br>This information was generated by a computer query and included names, addresses and what was believed to be University identification numbers (UIDs).<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] When writing and executing database queries, isn't it a good idea to check the results and see if the information displayed is the information you were looking for?&nbsp; I wonder if UIDs are also nine digits long like Social Security numbers are.</span><br><br>Our normal process is to remove the University ID numbers prior to mailing.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Is it safe to assume that "normal process" was not followed in this instance?&nbsp; If so, then why not?&nbsp; There is no mention in the school's response.</span><br><br>It was not apparent to departmental staff that these numbers not only still existed within the file, but were Social Security numbers, and not University ID numbers.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Not apparent?&nbsp; They were on the labels!</span><br><br>The numbers were not identified as Social Security numbers and did not show the normal spacing between digits.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] So it would be xxxxxxxxx instead of xxx-xx-xxxx.&nbsp; What percentage of people would recognize the first set of nine digits as a SSN?</span><br><br>This mailer was sent using third class, bulk mail delivery and may not have been delivered to you yet.<br><br>Currently, there is no evidence that anyone's Social Security number has been misused.<br><br>The University apologizes and deeply regrets this unfortunate mistake.<br><br>We are initiating immediate action to ensure that this error does not recur.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Like what?&nbsp; Maybe train people to review their query results and follow "normal process"?</span><br><br>The University of Maryland values the critical importance of your personal information.<br><br>We strongly recommend that you take appropriate precautions to mask, black out or destroy this document after use.<br><br>In unfortunate situations like this, it is possible that dishonest people may contact you asking for personal information in the guise of offering assistance from the University.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Equally unfortunate is the fact that there are a lot of dishonest people.</span><br><br>Please note that the University WILL NOT contact you by phone, e-mail or in any other way requesting personal information regarding this incident.<br><br>Please do not release any personal information in response to contacts claiming to be from the University.<br><br>In response to this incident, the University, and specifically the Department of Transportation Services, has moved to severely restrict access to sensitive student and faculty/staff information; we believe the fewer individuals who have access to this data will only increase our ability to protect sensitive information.<br><br>If individuals feel that they would like to take extra steps beyond the fraud alert, the University has arranged with Equifax to make available, at no cost to them, a 12-month service that includes credit monitoring, customer care, fraud expense reimbursement insurance and access to their credit report.<br><br>If you have not received this mailer and are unsure if you are included in the affected group, please call toll-free 1(877) 935-2428, Monday - Friday, 8:30 a.m. - 5 p.m. EST.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">You may contact us in one of the following ways:</span><br>By telephone: Toll-free 1(877) 935-2428, Monday-Friday, 8:30 a.m. - 5 p.m. EST<br>Via e-mail: parkingmailer@umd.edu<br>Mailing address: Regents Drive Garage, Building #202, College Park, MD 20742<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>The lack of attention to detail coupled with lack of control leads to an increase of risk of confidential information disclosure.&nbsp; Not all that uncommon. <br><br><b>Past Breaches:</b><br>Unknown<br></font><br>
<script src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/%7Es/breachblog?i=http://breachblog.com/2008/07/18/umd.aspx" type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8"></script>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 18 Jul 2008 05:18:07 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/university">university</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/maryland">maryland</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/university identification">university identification</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/university community">university community</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/social security">social security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/addressees social security">addressees social security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/recipient social security">recipient social security</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/07/18/umd.aspx">Mailing error at the University of Maryland exposes student information</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[ICANN's Announcement Of Anti-Domain Tasting Measures To Registrars]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/913d52903ceaedff758808be4b11d5bf</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/913d52903ceaedff758808be4b11d5bf</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The recent new that ICANN had taken measures to combat Domain Tasting came out in blogs, such as this one , based on second-hand news. ICANN had sent an e-mail to registrars announcing the policy...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The recent new that ICANN had taken measures to combat Domain Tasting came out in blogs, <a href="http://www.domainnamenews.com/miscellaneous/icann-board-resolution-kills-domain-tasting/1689">such as this one</a>, based on second-hand news. ICANN had sent an e-mail to registrars announcing the policy change. But there was confusion over exactly what the policy was; most people just assumed it followed the recommendations of the GNSO council from April.  The incomplete information caused some confused analysis such as <a href="http://www.cadna.org/en/newsroom/press-releases/icann-tasting-solution">this from CADNA (the Coalition Against Domain Name Abuse)</a>.

I asked ICANN and they sent me the actual e-mail that they sent out to registrars. It is published below. My analysis of it is in <a href="http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Yes-Domain-Tasting-Will-End/">a column on eWEEK</a>.

<blockquote>
Dear Registrar,

This message is intended to explain how certain decisions that were made by the ICANN Board of Directors at its meeting in Paris last week may affect your registrar.

Specifically, the Board adopted GNSO recommendations on domain tasting that included both budget and non-budget provisions designed to restrict the applicability of the Add Grace Period (AGP).  Please note that this message is a summary of changes that affect registrars.  You should refer to the adopted budget document and adopted motions for further information.


Summary of Important Timing Issues

After several months of discussion and public comment on both the budget and the GNSO recommendations, the Board has approved the proposed budget containing a provision for collecting transaction fees above a threshold during the AGP.  Effective 1 July 2008, the registrar-level transaction fee will be collected on transactions, including names added on or after 1 July
2008 and deleted during the Add Grace Period above a certain minimum threshold.  Each "transaction" will continue to be defined as a one-year domain registration increment caused by a successful add, renewal or transfer command, but this year any domain names deleted during the AGP (if
offered)
will be included as transactions if they exceed the maximum of (i) 10% of that registrar's net new registrations in that month (defined as total new registrations less domains deleted during AGP), or (ii) fifty (50) domain names, whichever is greater.  The budget assumes the transaction fee rate will remain at US ./send.20.

The second change prohibits registries from issuing refunds above a similar threshold for names registered and deleted during the AGP (although some registries have made plans to charge for such transactions independent of this motion).  The implementation timing of this change has not been set, but should be expected to take place over a period of some months.  ICANN staff will solicit public comments and post a registrar advisory prior to implementation of this aspect of the GNSO recommendation.


Budget - Registrar Fees Effective 1 July 2008

The Operating Plan and Budget details for 2008-2009 fiscal year can be found at:

http://www.icann.org/en/financials/proposed-opplan-budget-v3-fy09-25jun0
8-en.pdf

Relevant section from the approved budget:

* Registrar-Level Transaction Fees

In FY08 the per transaction-year rate was ./send.20 (or a 5 cent discount from the established ./send.25 rate).  The draft FY09 budget assumes that the ./send.20 rate will continue for registrar transaction fees.  As in past years, each transaction will be defined as one-year domain registration increment caused by a successful add renewal or transfer command.  FY09 revenue is estimated to be .4 million for registrar-level transaction fees.  Each "transaction"
will continue to be defined as a one-year domain registration increment caused by a successful add, renewal or transfer command, but this year any domain names deleted during the AGP (if offered) will be included as transactions if they exceed the maximum of (i) 10% of that registrar's net new registrations in that month (defined as total new registrations less domains deleted during AGP), or (ii) fifty (50) domain names, whichever is greater.  Therefore per-transaction fee will continue to be charged for each one-year increment of every transaction (e.g.  at a ./send.20 fee level, the fee for a three-year renewal will be US ./send.60), and registrars will continue to have the option to "defer" payment of the fees for the years beyond one for each transaction.  n

Note, as in previous years, ICANN can collect such fees directly from the registrars only if they are "expressly approved by registrars who account, in the aggregate, for payment of two-thirds of all registrar-level fees collected by ICANN." ICANN will shortly undertake the process of requesting such approval for the 2008-09 fiscal year.  While ICANN is grateful for consistent approval by registrars of fee levels in prior years, and is optimistic about such approval this year, if for some reason the necessary approval is not achieved, the fees will be collected by ICANN, as permitted under the registry agreements through the registries.  (Note that the amount of such fees varies by registry, but in no case exceeds US ./send.25.) Registries will then be able to collect those payments from registrars to the extent permitted under the relevant contracts.  It is expected that the same transaction increments (including AGP) will be covered, whether collected directly by ICANN or in! directly by the registries, so registrars should anticipate this liability under either scenario.


ICANN Board Resolution

Whereas, ICANN community stakeholders are increasingly concerned about domain tasting, which is the practice of using the add grace period (AGP) to register domain names in bulk in order to test their profitability.

Whereas, on 17 April 2008, the GNSO Council approved, by a Supermajority vote, a motion to prohibit any gTLD operator that has implemented an AGP from offering a refund for any domain name deleted during the AGP that exceeds 10% of its net new registrations in that month, or fifty domain names, whichever is greater.  <http://gnso.icann.org/meetings/minutes-gnso-17apr08.shtml>

Whereas, on 25 April 2008, the GNSO Council forwarded its formal "Report to the ICANN Board - Recommendation for Domain Tasting"
<http://gnso.icann.org/issues/domain-tasting/domain-tasting-board-report
-gnso-council-25apr08.pdf>,
which outlines the full text of the motion and the full context and procedural history of this proceeding.

Whereas, the Board is also considering the Proposed FY 09 Operating Plan and Budget <http://www.icann.org/financials/fiscal-30jun09.htm>, which includes (at the encouragement of the GNSO Council) a proposal similar to the GNSO policy recommendation to expand the applicability of the ICANN transaction fee in order to limit domain tasting.

Resolved (2008.06.26.06), the Board adopts the GNSO policy recommendation on domain tasting, and directs staff to implement the policy following appropriate comment and notice periods on the implementation documents.


Domain tasting motion approved by the GNSO Council 17 April 2008

<http://gnso.icann.org/issues/domain-tasting/domain-tasting-board-report
-gnso-council-25apr08.pdf>

Whereas, the GNSO Council has discussed the Issues Report on Domain Tasting and the Final Outcomes Report of the ad hoc group on Domain Tasting;

Whereas, the GNSO Council resolved on 31 October 2007 to launch a PDP on Domain Tasting;

Whereas, the GNSO Council authorized on 17 January 2008 the formation of a small design team to develop a plan for the deliberations on the Domain Tasting PDP (the "Design Team"), the principal volunteers to which had been members of the Ad Hoc Group on Domain Tasting and were well-informed of both the Final Outcomes Report of the Ad Hoc Group on Domain Tasting and the GNSO Initial Report on Domain Tasting (collectively with the Issues Report, the "Reports on Domain Tasting");

Whereas, the GNSO Council has received the Draft Final Report on Domain Tasting;

Whereas, PIR, the .org registry operator, has amended its Registry Agreement to charge an Excess Deletion Fee; and both NeuStar, the .biz registry operator, and Afilias, the .info registry operator, are seeking amendments to their respective Registry Agreements to modify the existing AGP;

The GNSO Council recommends to the ICANN Board of Directors that:

1.  The applicability of the Add Grace Period shall be restricted for any gTLD which has implemented an AGP ("Applicable gTLD Operator").
Specifically, for each Applicable gTLD Operator:

  a.  During any given month, an Applicable gTLD Operator may not offer any
  refund to a registrar for any domain names deleted during the AGP that
  exceed (i) 10% of that registrar's net new registrations in that month
  (defined as total new registrations less domains deleted during AGP), or
  (ii) fifty (50) domain names, whichever is greater.

  b.  A Registrar may seek an exemption from the application of such
  restriction in a specific month, upon the documented showing of
  extraordinary circumstances.  For any Registrar requesting such an
  exemption, the Registrar must confirm in writing to the Registry Operator
  how, at the time the names were deleted, these extraordinary circumstances
  were not known, reasonably could not have been known, and were outside of
  the Registrar's control.  Acceptance of any exemption will be at the sole
  reasonable discretion of the Registry Operator, however "extraordinary
  circumstances" which reoccur regularly will not be deemed extraordinary.

  c.  In addition to all other reporting requirements to ICANN, each
  Applicable gTLD Operator shall identify each Registrar that has sought an
  exemption, along with a brief descriptive identification of the type of
  extraordinary circumstance and the action (if any) that was taken by the
  Applicable gTLD Operator.

2.  Implementation and execution of these recommendations shall be monitored by the GNSO.  Specifically;

  a.  ICANN Staff shall analyze and report to the GNSO at six month intervals
  for two years after implementation, until such time as the GNSO resolves
  otherwise, with the goal of determining;

    i.  How effectively and to what extent the policies have been implemented
    and followed by Registries and Registrars, and

    ii.  Whether or not modifications to these policies should be considered
    by the GNSO as a result of the experiences gained during the
    implementation and monitoring stages,

  b.  The purpose of these monitoring and reporting requirements are to allow
  the GNSO to determine when, if ever, these recommendations and any ensuing
  policy require additional clarification or attention based on the results
  of the reports prepared by ICANN Staff.

</blockquote>

<br style="clear: both;"/>
  <img alt="" style="border: 0; height:1px; width:1px;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?i=152f487f101abbcdd9c900fc3eb46268" height="1" width="1"/>
<img src="http://www.pheedo.com/feeds/tracker.php?i=152f487f101abbcdd9c900fc3eb46268" style="display: none;" border="0" height="1" width="1" alt=""/><img src="http://feeds.ziffdavisenterprise.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~4/330098895" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Jul 2008 11:42:32 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/icann">icann</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/directly">directly</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fees directly">fees directly</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fees">fees</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/registrar fees effective">registrar fees effective</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/effective">effective</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/registrar-level fees">registrar-level fees</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fee">fee</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/per-transaction fee">per-transaction fee</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.ziffdavisenterprise.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~3/330098895/ch_icanns_announcement_of_antidomain_tasting_measures_to_registrars.html">ICANN's Announcement Of Anti-Domain Tasting Measures To Registrars</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[ICANN's Announcement Of Anti-Domain Tasting Measures To Registrars]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/1438af7a2605c2bbe5326444d5bd9d27</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/1438af7a2605c2bbe5326444d5bd9d27</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The recent new that ICANN had taken measures to combat Domain Tasting came out in blogs, such as this one , based on second-hand news. ICANN had sent an e-mail to registrars announcing the policy...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The recent new that ICANN had taken measures to combat Domain Tasting came out in blogs, <a href="http://www.domainnamenews.com/miscellaneous/icann-board-resolution-kills-domain-tasting/1689">such as this one</a>, based on second-hand news. ICANN had sent an e-mail to registrars announcing the policy change. But there was confusion over exactly what the policy was; most people just assumed it followed the recommendations of the GNSO council from April.  The incomplete information caused some confused analysis such as <a href="http://www.cadna.org/en/newsroom/press-releases/icann-tasting-solution">this from CADNA (the Coalition Against Domain Name Abuse)</a>.

I asked ICANN and they sent me the actual e-mail that they sent out to registrars. It is published below. My analysis of it is in <a href="http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Yes-Domain-Tasting-Will-End/">a column on eWEEK</a>.

<blockquote>
Dear Registrar,

This message is intended to explain how certain decisions that were made by the ICANN Board of Directors at its meeting in Paris last week may affect your registrar.

Specifically, the Board adopted GNSO recommendations on domain tasting that included both budget and non-budget provisions designed to restrict the applicability of the Add Grace Period (AGP).  Please note that this message is a summary of changes that affect registrars.  You should refer to the adopted budget document and adopted motions for further information.


Summary of Important Timing Issues

After several months of discussion and public comment on both the budget and the GNSO recommendations, the Board has approved the proposed budget containing a provision for collecting transaction fees above a threshold during the AGP.  Effective 1 July 2008, the registrar-level transaction fee will be collected on transactions, including names added on or after 1 July
2008 and deleted during the Add Grace Period above a certain minimum threshold.  Each "transaction" will continue to be defined as a one-year domain registration increment caused by a successful add, renewal or transfer command, but this year any domain names deleted during the AGP (if
offered)
will be included as transactions if they exceed the maximum of (i) 10% of that registrar's net new registrations in that month (defined as total new registrations less domains deleted during AGP), or (ii) fifty (50) domain names, whichever is greater.  The budget assumes the transaction fee rate will remain at US ./send.20.

The second change prohibits registries from issuing refunds above a similar threshold for names registered and deleted during the AGP (although some registries have made plans to charge for such transactions independent of this motion).  The implementation timing of this change has not been set, but should be expected to take place over a period of some months.  ICANN staff will solicit public comments and post a registrar advisory prior to implementation of this aspect of the GNSO recommendation.


Budget - Registrar Fees Effective 1 July 2008

The Operating Plan and Budget details for 2008-2009 fiscal year can be found at:

http://www.icann.org/en/financials/proposed-opplan-budget-v3-fy09-25jun0
8-en.pdf

Relevant section from the approved budget:

* Registrar-Level Transaction Fees

In FY08 the per transaction-year rate was ./send.20 (or a 5 cent discount from the established ./send.25 rate).  The draft FY09 budget assumes that the ./send.20 rate will continue for registrar transaction fees.  As in past years, each transaction will be defined as one-year domain registration increment caused by a successful add renewal or transfer command.  FY09 revenue is estimated to be .4 million for registrar-level transaction fees.  Each "transaction"
will continue to be defined as a one-year domain registration increment caused by a successful add, renewal or transfer command, but this year any domain names deleted during the AGP (if offered) will be included as transactions if they exceed the maximum of (i) 10% of that registrar's net new registrations in that month (defined as total new registrations less domains deleted during AGP), or (ii) fifty (50) domain names, whichever is greater.  Therefore per-transaction fee will continue to be charged for each one-year increment of every transaction (e.g.  at a ./send.20 fee level, the fee for a three-year renewal will be US ./send.60), and registrars will continue to have the option to "defer" payment of the fees for the years beyond one for each transaction.  n

Note, as in previous years, ICANN can collect such fees directly from the registrars only if they are "expressly approved by registrars who account, in the aggregate, for payment of two-thirds of all registrar-level fees collected by ICANN." ICANN will shortly undertake the process of requesting such approval for the 2008-09 fiscal year.  While ICANN is grateful for consistent approval by registrars of fee levels in prior years, and is optimistic about such approval this year, if for some reason the necessary approval is not achieved, the fees will be collected by ICANN, as permitted under the registry agreements through the registries.  (Note that the amount of such fees varies by registry, but in no case exceeds US ./send.25.) Registries will then be able to collect those payments from registrars to the extent permitted under the relevant contracts.  It is expected that the same transaction increments (including AGP) will be covered, whether collected directly by ICANN or in! directly by the registries, so registrars should anticipate this liability under either scenario.


ICANN Board Resolution

Whereas, ICANN community stakeholders are increasingly concerned about domain tasting, which is the practice of using the add grace period (AGP) to register domain names in bulk in order to test their profitability.

Whereas, on 17 April 2008, the GNSO Council approved, by a Supermajority vote, a motion to prohibit any gTLD operator that has implemented an AGP from offering a refund for any domain name deleted during the AGP that exceeds 10% of its net new registrations in that month, or fifty domain names, whichever is greater.  <http://gnso.icann.org/meetings/minutes-gnso-17apr08.shtml>

Whereas, on 25 April 2008, the GNSO Council forwarded its formal "Report to the ICANN Board - Recommendation for Domain Tasting"
<http://gnso.icann.org/issues/domain-tasting/domain-tasting-board-report
-gnso-council-25apr08.pdf>,
which outlines the full text of the motion and the full context and procedural history of this proceeding.

Whereas, the Board is also considering the Proposed FY 09 Operating Plan and Budget <http://www.icann.org/financials/fiscal-30jun09.htm>, which includes (at the encouragement of the GNSO Council) a proposal similar to the GNSO policy recommendation to expand the applicability of the ICANN transaction fee in order to limit domain tasting.

Resolved (2008.06.26.06), the Board adopts the GNSO policy recommendation on domain tasting, and directs staff to implement the policy following appropriate comment and notice periods on the implementation documents.


Domain tasting motion approved by the GNSO Council 17 April 2008

<http://gnso.icann.org/issues/domain-tasting/domain-tasting-board-report
-gnso-council-25apr08.pdf>

Whereas, the GNSO Council has discussed the Issues Report on Domain Tasting and the Final Outcomes Report of the ad hoc group on Domain Tasting;

Whereas, the GNSO Council resolved on 31 October 2007 to launch a PDP on Domain Tasting;

Whereas, the GNSO Council authorized on 17 January 2008 the formation of a small design team to develop a plan for the deliberations on the Domain Tasting PDP (the "Design Team"), the principal volunteers to which had been members of the Ad Hoc Group on Domain Tasting and were well-informed of both the Final Outcomes Report of the Ad Hoc Group on Domain Tasting and the GNSO Initial Report on Domain Tasting (collectively with the Issues Report, the "Reports on Domain Tasting");

Whereas, the GNSO Council has received the Draft Final Report on Domain Tasting;

Whereas, PIR, the .org registry operator, has amended its Registry Agreement to charge an Excess Deletion Fee; and both NeuStar, the .biz registry operator, and Afilias, the .info registry operator, are seeking amendments to their respective Registry Agreements to modify the existing AGP;

The GNSO Council recommends to the ICANN Board of Directors that:

1.  The applicability of the Add Grace Period shall be restricted for any gTLD which has implemented an AGP ("Applicable gTLD Operator").
Specifically, for each Applicable gTLD Operator:

  a.  During any given month, an Applicable gTLD Operator may not offer any
  refund to a registrar for any domain names deleted during the AGP that
  exceed (i) 10% of that registrar's net new registrations in that month
  (defined as total new registrations less domains deleted during AGP), or
  (ii) fifty (50) domain names, whichever is greater.

  b.  A Registrar may seek an exemption from the application of such
  restriction in a specific month, upon the documented showing of
  extraordinary circumstances.  For any Registrar requesting such an
  exemption, the Registrar must confirm in writing to the Registry Operator
  how, at the time the names were deleted, these extraordinary circumstances
  were not known, reasonably could not have been known, and were outside of
  the Registrar's control.  Acceptance of any exemption will be at the sole
  reasonable discretion of the Registry Operator, however "extraordinary
  circumstances" which reoccur regularly will not be deemed extraordinary.

  c.  In addition to all other reporting requirements to ICANN, each
  Applicable gTLD Operator shall identify each Registrar that has sought an
  exemption, along with a brief descriptive identification of the type of
  extraordinary circumstance and the action (if any) that was taken by the
  Applicable gTLD Operator.

2.  Implementation and execution of these recommendations shall be monitored by the GNSO.  Specifically;

  a.  ICANN Staff shall analyze and report to the GNSO at six month intervals
  for two years after implementation, until such time as the GNSO resolves
  otherwise, with the goal of determining;

    i.  How effectively and to what extent the policies have been implemented
    and followed by Registries and Registrars, and

    ii.  Whether or not modifications to these policies should be considered
    by the GNSO as a result of the experiences gained during the
    implementation and monitoring stages,

  b.  The purpose of these monitoring and reporting requirements are to allow
  the GNSO to determine when, if ever, these recommendations and any ensuing
  policy require additional clarification or attention based on the results
  of the reports prepared by ICANN Staff.

</blockquote>

<br style="clear: both;"/>
      <a href="http://www.pheedo.com/click.phdo?s=8eea0eb864e902bc67c9b814b1af0256"><img alt="" style="border: 0;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?s=8eea0eb864e902bc67c9b814b1af0256"/></a>
  <img src="http://www.pheedo.com/feeds/tracker.php?i=8eea0eb864e902bc67c9b814b1af0256" style="display: none;" border="0" height="1" width="1" alt=""/><img src="http://feeds.ziffdavisenterprise.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~4/338277687" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Jul 2008 11:42:32 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/icann">icann</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/directly">directly</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fees directly">fees directly</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fees">fees</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/registrar fees effective">registrar fees effective</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/effective">effective</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/registrar-level fees">registrar-level fees</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fee">fee</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/per-transaction fee">per-transaction fee</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.ziffdavisenterprise.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~3/338277687/ch_icanns_announcement_of_antidomain_tasting_measures_to_registrars.html">ICANN's Announcement Of Anti-Domain Tasting Measures To Registrars</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[ICANN's Announcement Of Anti-Domain Tasting Measures To Registrars]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/266456c2c42bc5e4cf836f3ca19af1c2</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/266456c2c42bc5e4cf836f3ca19af1c2</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The recent new that ICANN had taken measures to combat Domain Tasting came out in blogs, such as this one , based on second-hand news. ICANN had sent an e-mail to registrars announcing the policy...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The recent new that ICANN had taken measures to combat Domain Tasting came out in blogs, <a href="http://www.domainnamenews.com/miscellaneous/icann-board-resolution-kills-domain-tasting/1689">such as this one</a>, based on second-hand news. ICANN had sent an e-mail to registrars announcing the policy change. But there was confusion over exactly what the policy was; most people just assumed it followed the recommendations of the GNSO council from April.  The incomplete information caused some confused analysis such as <a href="http://www.cadna.org/en/newsroom/press-releases/icann-tasting-solution">this from CADNA (the Coalition Against Domain Name Abuse)</a>.

I asked ICANN and they sent me the actual e-mail that they sent out to registrars. It is published below. My analysis of it is in <a href="http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Yes-Domain-Tasting-Will-End/">a column on eWEEK</a>.

<blockquote>
Dear Registrar,

This message is intended to explain how certain decisions that were made by the ICANN Board of Directors at its meeting in Paris last week may affect your registrar.

Specifically, the Board adopted GNSO recommendations on domain tasting that included both budget and non-budget provisions designed to restrict the applicability of the Add Grace Period (AGP).  Please note that this message is a summary of changes that affect registrars.  You should refer to the adopted budget document and adopted motions for further information.


Summary of Important Timing Issues

After several months of discussion and public comment on both the budget and the GNSO recommendations, the Board has approved the proposed budget containing a provision for collecting transaction fees above a threshold during the AGP.  Effective 1 July 2008, the registrar-level transaction fee will be collected on transactions, including names added on or after 1 July
2008 and deleted during the Add Grace Period above a certain minimum threshold.  Each "transaction" will continue to be defined as a one-year domain registration increment caused by a successful add, renewal or transfer command, but this year any domain names deleted during the AGP (if
offered)
will be included as transactions if they exceed the maximum of (i) 10% of that registrar's net new registrations in that month (defined as total new registrations less domains deleted during AGP), or (ii) fifty (50) domain names, whichever is greater.  The budget assumes the transaction fee rate will remain at US ./send.20.

The second change prohibits registries from issuing refunds above a similar threshold for names registered and deleted during the AGP (although some registries have made plans to charge for such transactions independent of this motion).  The implementation timing of this change has not been set, but should be expected to take place over a period of some months.  ICANN staff will solicit public comments and post a registrar advisory prior to implementation of this aspect of the GNSO recommendation.


Budget - Registrar Fees Effective 1 July 2008

The Operating Plan and Budget details for 2008-2009 fiscal year can be found at:

http://www.icann.org/en/financials/proposed-opplan-budget-v3-fy09-25jun0
8-en.pdf

Relevant section from the approved budget:

* Registrar-Level Transaction Fees

In FY08 the per transaction-year rate was ./send.20 (or a 5 cent discount from the established ./send.25 rate).  The draft FY09 budget assumes that the ./send.20 rate will continue for registrar transaction fees.  As in past years, each transaction will be defined as one-year domain registration increment caused by a successful add renewal or transfer command.  FY09 revenue is estimated to be .4 million for registrar-level transaction fees.  Each "transaction"
will continue to be defined as a one-year domain registration increment caused by a successful add, renewal or transfer command, but this year any domain names deleted during the AGP (if offered) will be included as transactions if they exceed the maximum of (i) 10% of that registrar's net new registrations in that month (defined as total new registrations less domains deleted during AGP), or (ii) fifty (50) domain names, whichever is greater.  Therefore per-transaction fee will continue to be charged for each one-year increment of every transaction (e.g.  at a ./send.20 fee level, the fee for a three-year renewal will be US ./send.60), and registrars will continue to have the option to "defer" payment of the fees for the years beyond one for each transaction.  n

Note, as in previous years, ICANN can collect such fees directly from the registrars only if they are "expressly approved by registrars who account, in the aggregate, for payment of two-thirds of all registrar-level fees collected by ICANN." ICANN will shortly undertake the process of requesting such approval for the 2008-09 fiscal year.  While ICANN is grateful for consistent approval by registrars of fee levels in prior years, and is optimistic about such approval this year, if for some reason the necessary approval is not achieved, the fees will be collected by ICANN, as permitted under the registry agreements through the registries.  (Note that the amount of such fees varies by registry, but in no case exceeds US ./send.25.) Registries will then be able to collect those payments from registrars to the extent permitted under the relevant contracts.  It is expected that the same transaction increments (including AGP) will be covered, whether collected directly by ICANN or in! directly by the registries, so registrars should anticipate this liability under either scenario.


ICANN Board Resolution

Whereas, ICANN community stakeholders are increasingly concerned about domain tasting, which is the practice of using the add grace period (AGP) to register domain names in bulk in order to test their profitability.

Whereas, on 17 April 2008, the GNSO Council approved, by a Supermajority vote, a motion to prohibit any gTLD operator that has implemented an AGP from offering a refund for any domain name deleted during the AGP that exceeds 10% of its net new registrations in that month, or fifty domain names, whichever is greater.  <http://gnso.icann.org/meetings/minutes-gnso-17apr08.shtml>

Whereas, on 25 April 2008, the GNSO Council forwarded its formal "Report to the ICANN Board - Recommendation for Domain Tasting"
<http://gnso.icann.org/issues/domain-tasting/domain-tasting-board-report
-gnso-council-25apr08.pdf>,
which outlines the full text of the motion and the full context and procedural history of this proceeding.

Whereas, the Board is also considering the Proposed FY 09 Operating Plan and Budget <http://www.icann.org/financials/fiscal-30jun09.htm>, which includes (at the encouragement of the GNSO Council) a proposal similar to the GNSO policy recommendation to expand the applicability of the ICANN transaction fee in order to limit domain tasting.

Resolved (2008.06.26.06), the Board adopts the GNSO policy recommendation on domain tasting, and directs staff to implement the policy following appropriate comment and notice periods on the implementation documents.


Domain tasting motion approved by the GNSO Council 17 April 2008

<http://gnso.icann.org/issues/domain-tasting/domain-tasting-board-report
-gnso-council-25apr08.pdf>

Whereas, the GNSO Council has discussed the Issues Report on Domain Tasting and the Final Outcomes Report of the ad hoc group on Domain Tasting;

Whereas, the GNSO Council resolved on 31 October 2007 to launch a PDP on Domain Tasting;

Whereas, the GNSO Council authorized on 17 January 2008 the formation of a small design team to develop a plan for the deliberations on the Domain Tasting PDP (the "Design Team"), the principal volunteers to which had been members of the Ad Hoc Group on Domain Tasting and were well-informed of both the Final Outcomes Report of the Ad Hoc Group on Domain Tasting and the GNSO Initial Report on Domain Tasting (collectively with the Issues Report, the "Reports on Domain Tasting");

Whereas, the GNSO Council has received the Draft Final Report on Domain Tasting;

Whereas, PIR, the .org registry operator, has amended its Registry Agreement to charge an Excess Deletion Fee; and both NeuStar, the .biz registry operator, and Afilias, the .info registry operator, are seeking amendments to their respective Registry Agreements to modify the existing AGP;

The GNSO Council recommends to the ICANN Board of Directors that:

1.  The applicability of the Add Grace Period shall be restricted for any gTLD which has implemented an AGP ("Applicable gTLD Operator").
Specifically, for each Applicable gTLD Operator:

  a.  During any given month, an Applicable gTLD Operator may not offer any
  refund to a registrar for any domain names deleted during the AGP that
  exceed (i) 10% of that registrar's net new registrations in that month
  (defined as total new registrations less domains deleted during AGP), or
  (ii) fifty (50) domain names, whichever is greater.

  b.  A Registrar may seek an exemption from the application of such
  restriction in a specific month, upon the documented showing of
  extraordinary circumstances.  For any Registrar requesting such an
  exemption, the Registrar must confirm in writing to the Registry Operator
  how, at the time the names were deleted, these extraordinary circumstances
  were not known, reasonably could not have been known, and were outside of
  the Registrar's control.  Acceptance of any exemption will be at the sole
  reasonable discretion of the Registry Operator, however "extraordinary
  circumstances" which reoccur regularly will not be deemed extraordinary.

  c.  In addition to all other reporting requirements to ICANN, each
  Applicable gTLD Operator shall identify each Registrar that has sought an
  exemption, along with a brief descriptive identification of the type of
  extraordinary circumstance and the action (if any) that was taken by the
  Applicable gTLD Operator.

2.  Implementation and execution of these recommendations shall be monitored by the GNSO.  Specifically;

  a.  ICANN Staff shall analyze and report to the GNSO at six month intervals
  for two years after implementation, until such time as the GNSO resolves
  otherwise, with the goal of determining;

    i.  How effectively and to what extent the policies have been implemented
    and followed by Registries and Registrars, and

    ii.  Whether or not modifications to these policies should be considered
    by the GNSO as a result of the experiences gained during the
    implementation and monitoring stages,

  b.  The purpose of these monitoring and reporting requirements are to allow
  the GNSO to determine when, if ever, these recommendations and any ensuing
  policy require additional clarification or attention based on the results
  of the reports prepared by ICANN Staff.

</blockquote><img src="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~4/xJKws7q3qKE" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Jul 2008 11:42:32 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/icann">icann</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/directly">directly</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fees directly">fees directly</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fees">fees</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/registrar fees effective">registrar fees effective</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/effective">effective</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/registrar-level fees">registrar-level fees</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fee">fee</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/per-transaction fee">per-transaction fee</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.ziffdavisenterprise.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~3/xJKws7q3qKE/ch_icanns_announcement_of_antidomain_tasting_measures_to_registrars.html">ICANN's Announcement Of Anti-Domain Tasting Measures To Registrars</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Latest 802.11 Standard Boosts Wi-Fi Power in New Band]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/8a175684170e876da287683bcc08e2a3</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/8a175684170e876da287683bcc08e2a3</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The nearly finished IEEE 802.11y could make Wi-Fi more practical over longer distances : Wi-Fi is a compromise. In the unlicensed bands in which it operates, it has to deal with interference from...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.warpspeed.com/wordpress/?p=2406"><strong>The nearly finished IEEE 802.11y could make Wi-Fi more practical over longer distances</strong></a>: Wi-Fi is a compromise. In the unlicensed bands in which it operates, it has to deal with interference from noise sources and other networks, while using very low power, and trying not to make a pest of itself. It's done very well. In the 2.4 GHz band and parts of 5 GHz, the maximum power from the radio is 1 watt (W), and the effective power (EIRP) is 4 W on an omnidirectional antenna. (You can push far more power if you narrow the antenna's beam. And parts of the 5 GHz band restrict radio power below 1 W. I wrote <a href="http://wifinetnews.com/archives/007336.html"><strong>a long rundown of 5 GHz issues</strong></a> back in Jan-2007.)</p>

<p>But there's this lovely new segment of lightly licensed spectrum in the U.S., the 3.65 GHz band. It's a non-exclusive licensed band available only in parts of the country that don't have pre-existing ground-to-satellite or radar uses that overlap. This omits most of the eastern seaboard and most major cities; Seattle is one exception.</p>

<p>The licensing mechanism allows any number of operators to obtain inexpensive licenses, and register the base stations they use by location. If interference arises among base stations, operators are required to work out the problems themselves. I wrote extensively about this band and its rules on 9-May-2008 in <a href="http://wifinetnews.com/archives/008313.html"><strong>profiling Azulstar</strong></a>, formerly a metro-scale Wi-Fi firm, but now a big proponent of WiMax in 3.65 GHz. I also <a href="http://wimaxnetnews.com/archives/2007/06/fcc_affirms_365.html"><strong>went over the rules</strong></a> for the band on 11-June-2007 when the FCC announced the arrangement. </p>

<p>Several firms offer base station and customer premises equipment for this band now, so close to the 3.5 GHz band more commonly exclusively licensed in Europe and elsewhere. WiMax equipment is available because the 3.65 GHz band can be used with WiMax without any modifications to that protocol, although limited to just 25 MHz of the 50 MHz that the FCC set aside.</p>

<p>Equipment that conforms to a more stringent set of rules about contention and other factors can use the whole 50 MHz, and that's where 802.11y comes in. It's an extension of Wi-Fi to cope with the specific needs--and to open Wi-Fi technology up to 20 W EIRP, a vastly higher power output. This could allow connections over 5 km, the group says.</p>

<p>The <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IEEE_802.11y"><strong>Wikipedia entry on 802.11y</strong></a>, clearly written by someone involved with the specification, notes that three specific additions are needed: a tweak to support the way in which the FCC wants contention among competing devices to work; a method for an access point to tell a station (a connecting radio) that it's about to switch its channel or its channel's bandwidth, and the station should do likewise; and a mechanism to handle a base station allowing or revoking permission to use the spectrum without uniquely identifying the user's system or broadcasting its precise GPS-based location.</p>

<p>The standard is near completion and initial approval. I don't have any knowledge about whether any mainstream Wi-Fi equipment makers or metro-scale equipment makers are looking into building 802.11y into their gear. </p>

<p>The fact is that this could be a great technology for the mostly sub-metropolitan markets that 3.65 GHz is available in, although it has the same pain as WiMax: all new gear on the towers and all new adapters for customers.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 25 Jun 2008 10:01:44 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/band">band</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/power">power</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wi-fi">wi-fi</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ghz band">ghz band</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ghz">ghz</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/equipment">equipment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wimax equipment">wimax equipment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/metro-scale wi-fi firm">metro-scale wi-fi firm</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/power output">power output</category>
      <source url="http://wifinetnews.com/archives/008379.html">Latest 802.11 Standard Boosts Wi-Fi Power in New Band</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Laptop stolen from the home of a BearingPoint employee]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/cdacc39a32caa98a264d6e52be4b661f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/cdacc39a32caa98a264d6e52be4b661f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
6/5/08

Organization
BearingPoint, Inc

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
None

Victims
Independent BearingPoint contractors

Number Affected
Unknown

Types...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/bearingpoint.jpg" width="166" align="right" height="81"><font size="2"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Date Reported: </span><br>6/5/08<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Organization: </span><br><a href="http://www.bearingpoint.com/portal/site/bearingpoint">BearingPoint, Inc.</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br>None<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>Independent BearingPoint contractors<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>Unknown<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>"first and last name and Social Security Number"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>On May 14, 2008 a BearingPoint company-issued laptop was stolen from the residence of an employee.&nbsp; The laptop contained sensitive personal information belonging to a number of BearingPoint independent contractors.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://www.oag.state.md.us/idtheft/Breach%20Notices/ITU-153117.pdf">The Maryland State Attorney General breach notification</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>The Maryland State Attorney General<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online source cited above:<br><br>BearingPoint recognizes the importance of safeguarding the personal information it handles in the course of conducting business.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] As demonstrated on their web site.&nbsp; The number "8" followed by "The number of years in a row that identity theft has been the #1 internet crime"</span><br><br><img src="http://images.quickblogcast.com/95781-88451/8.jpg" width="576" border="0"><br><br><br><img src="http://images.quickblogcast.com/95781-88451/8y.jpg" width="576" border="0"><br><br>To that end, we have implemented safeguards for the information.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] OK, I am following so far.</span><br><br>Even the most rigorous safeguards, however, can not guarantee protection against criminal conduct.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Well, I think "rigorous safeguards" needs to be quantified somewhat.&nbsp; What are "rigorous safeguards" and how do they apply to this breach?</span><br><br>The Company was recently victimized by such conduct and we are writing to inform you that this criminal conduct might have a direct impact on you.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Uh oh, here it comes.&nbsp; Not only was "The Company" recently victimized, but just as importantly, the owners of the personal information were victimized as well.</span><br><br>On May 14, 2008, the residence of one of our employees was burglarized and the company-issued laptop computer was taken amongst other personal property.<br><br>The employee promptly reported the theft to the Atlanta Police Department, which is investigating the break in.<br><br>The investigation into the burglary is on-going and BearingPoint is cooperating fully.<br><br>BearingPoint worked diligently to reconstruct the information stored on the stolen laptop.<br><br>BearingPoint has been able to determine that the computer contains the name and social security number of independent contractors.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Recognizing the importance of safeguarding personal information, is storing personal information on a laptop (presumably without encryption due to the fact that there is no mention of it) a prudent practice?</span><br><br>The stolen laptop did not contain credit or debit card numbers, or financial account numbers.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] So a criminal would have to open his/her own accounts using the other information that WAS on the laptop.</span><br><br>We have no reason to believe that the information stored on the stolen laptop was the target of the burglary or that the information has been misused.<br><br>The personal information on the laptop can be accessed only with two passwords and two forms of authentication.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] The "passwords" are the authentication.&nbsp; I am guessing that BearingPoint meant two forms of identification (probably usernames).&nbsp; Again, I am guessing that one of the username/passwords is for the operating system itself which takes less than 10 minutes to bypass in most instances and I am guessing that the other username/password combination is file access for which there are known workarounds in many common applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, etc.).&nbsp; Either way, I think that this excerpt is meant to minimize the situation with a strong bias towards saving face.</span><br><br>In addition, the personal information was not stored in a single file or spreadsheet but dispersed among numerous files.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Information security personnel know better than to argue the security through obscurity defense.</span><br><br>To date, we have received no report indicating that the information stored on the laptops has been accessed or misused.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I think "laptops" in the breach notification is a typo</span><br><br>BearingPoint recognizes this development, and any related inconvenience, might be upsetting.<br><br>We regret this incident has occurred and we apologize for any inconvenience it may cause you.<br><br>As a result of this incident, we have taken immediate steps to review our current policies and procedures to further enhance security for personal data we handle and to reduce the risk of recurrence.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Restrict ability to store confidential information on mobile devices?&nbsp; Encryption?&nbsp; Two-factor authentication?</span><br><br>To lessen the potential inconvenience to you and reduce the risk that you might be subjected to attempts to steal your identity, we have engaged ConsumerInfo.com Inc., and Experian company, to provide you with one year of credit monitoring, at no cost to you.<br><br>Please contact BPt-FMGOICPrivacy@bearingpoint.com should you have additional questions regarding the cirumstance of the incident.<br><br>BearingPoint currently anticipates notifying affected individuals on or before June 6, 2008, of this incident.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>Marketing on the BearingPoint web site boasts "BearingPoint has demonstrated some of the biggest advancements in risk consulting services among the large number of providers in this market" - Forrester Wave: Risk Consulting Services, Q2, June 2007 Report.&nbsp; <br><br>It is disappointing to read about a well-respected company losing control of confidential information, but what makes this worse is the fact that it happened through the actions of a leading information security and risk consulting company.&nbsp; It is important to point out that one incident <span style="font-weight: bold;">DOES NOT</span> define a company. <br><br>No encryption or mention of it as a matter of policy, and the attempts to minimize the possible impact by mentioning ineffective controls (passwords and obscurity) is troubling. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>Unknown</font><br><br>
<script src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/%7Es/breachblog?i=http://breachblog.com/2008/06/19/bearingpoint.aspx" type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8"></script>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Jun 2008 11:38:38 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sensitive personal information">sensitive personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bearingpoint">bearingpoint</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/store confidential information">store confidential information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/confidential information">confidential information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/laptop">laptop</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/independent contractors">independent contractors</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/06/19/bearingpoint.aspx">Laptop stolen from the home of a BearingPoint employee</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Another brick in the wall to limit blogging]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/938d64252078beb3e8e96d82052b0dc3</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/938d64252078beb3e8e96d82052b0dc3</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[First it was the EU looking at passing a law that would require bloggers to disclose their identity and affiliation. Now the AP is looking to enforce a new license that would require payments when a...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><a onclick="window.open(this.href, '_blank', 'width=300,height=300,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false" href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/.shared/image.html?/photos/uncategorized/2008/06/17/brick_in_the_wall.jpg"><img title="Brick_in_the_wall" height="200" alt="Brick_in_the_wall" src="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/images/2008/06/17/brick_in_the_wall.jpg" width="200" border="0" style="FLOAT: left; MARGIN: 0px 5px 5px 0px" /></a> First it was the <a href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/2008/06/eu-bloggers-und.html">EU looking at passing a law</a> that would require bloggers to disclose their identity and affiliation. Now the <a class="zem_slink" title="Associated Press" href="http://ap.org/" rel="homepage">AP</a> is looking to enforce a new license that would require payments when a blogger puts an excerpt from an AP article in their blog.&nbsp; My friend <a href="http://www.crn.com/software/208700252">Kevin McLaughlin blogged on this over at Channel Web blog</a> today. Basically the AP says that if you excerpt more than 5 words you need to start paying them fees.&nbsp; Kevin reached out to me and I gave him my views on this one.</p>

<p>I think that it is a really short sighted move by the AP.&nbsp; First of all it shows they really don't understand blogging.&nbsp; Blogging is about taking an idea which often comes from another source and putting the bloggers own spin and ideas behind it. In this way topics are built on one blog at a time with each blogger adding a bit more to the conversation. Each additional blog on topic enriches those blogs and articles that preceded it.&nbsp; As I said in the Channel Web article, it is like a jazz musician playing a riff on top of a line already laid down.</p>

<p>In real terms blogging on the AP content will only generate more views and interest in the AP content.&nbsp; AP is just a dinosaur with this type of view and will soon go the way of dinosaurs if they try to enforce this. In the meantime bloggers can talk about an AP article, but don't link to it and don't excerpt from it. I suspect that the next thing is we will have a replay of the inbound links litigation we had 8 years ago.&nbsp; In the meantime blogging will continue to march on with AP or not. </p>

<fieldset class="zemanta-related"><legend>Related articles</legend><ul class="zemanta-article-ul"><li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a title="Open in new window" href="http://www.marketingvox.com/ap-blogging-group-to-create-unified-guidelines-039294/?camp=rssfeed&amp;src=mv&amp;type=textlink">AP, Blogging Group to Create Unified Guidelines</a> [via Zemanta] </li>

<li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a title="Open in new window" href="http://www.socialmediatoday.com/SMC/37470">AP to Restrict Content Use on Blogs</a> [via Zemanta] </li>

<li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a title="Open in new window" href="http://billhobbs.com/2008/06/bet_on_the_bloggers.html">Bet on the Bloggers</a> [via Zemanta] </li>

<li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a title="Open in new window" href="http://www.paidcontent.org/entry/419-ap-wants-change-in-blog-excerpting-just-not-sure-what/">AP Wants Change In Blog Excerpting, Just Not Sure What</a> [via Zemanta] </li>

<li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a title="Open in new window" href="http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2008/6/16/145135/241">AP's clash with bloggers, fair use</a> [via Zemanta] </li>

<li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a title="Open in new window" href="http://techdirt.com/articles/20080616/0635571413.shtml">Associated Press Digs Its Own Grave Deeper; Wants To Create Its Own Fair Use Rules</a> [via Zemanta]</li></ul></fieldset> <div class="zemanta-pixie" style="MARGIN-TOP: 10px; HEIGHT: 15px"><a class="zemanta-pixie-a" title="Zemified by Zemanta" href="http://reblog.zemanta.com/zemified/41559f22-3b30-4fc0-8281-96493f59c454/"><img class="zemanta-pixie-img" alt="Zemanta Pixie" src="http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_a.png?x-id=41559f22-3b30-4fc0-8281-96493f59c454" style="BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; BORDER-TOP: medium none; FLOAT: right; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none" /></a></div></div>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Jun 2008 20:36:22 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/meantime">meantime</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/channel web blog">channel web blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/meantime bloggers">meantime bloggers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blog">blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bloggers">bloggers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/zemanta">zemanta</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/additional blog">additional blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/channel web article">channel web article</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/require bloggers">require bloggers</category>
      <source url="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/2008/06/another-brick-i.html">Another brick in the wall to limit blogging</source>
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  </channel>
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