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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: retention]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/retention</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Mon, 26 May 2008 10:48:06 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Data Retention and Privacy in Electronic Communications]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/8c25f32527ed66213f5716af1ebfb28b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/8c25f32527ed66213f5716af1ebfb28b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The retention of communication data by network providers, often mandated by legislation, raises social and technical security concerns. A generic model combining technical, procedural, and legal...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The retention of communication data by network providers, often mandated by legislation, raises social and technical security concerns. A generic model combining technical, procedural, and legal controls can help secure retained data and minimize privacy threats against users.<br style="clear: both;"/>
  <img alt="" style="border: 0; height:1px; width:1px;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?i=2decd6847ba49454704c462f5e3e7364" height="1" width="1"/>
<img src="http://www.pheedo.com/feeds/tracker.php?i=2decd6847ba49454704c462f5e3e7364" style="display: none;" border="0" height="1" width="1" alt=""/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 08 Oct 2008 00:42:06 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/technical">technical</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/technical security concerns">technical security concerns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/communication data">communication data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/legal controls">legal controls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/privacy threats">privacy threats</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network providers">network providers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/raises social">raises social</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/retention">retention</category>
      <source url="http://www.pheedo.com/click.phdo?i=2decd6847ba49454704c462f5e3e7364">Data Retention and Privacy in Electronic Communications</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[A World Becoming "Data Retentive"]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/c03cfaeb43f95ffff0ad3e55c000dcc9</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/c03cfaeb43f95ffff0ad3e55c000dcc9</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Ive recently been looking at the implications of the second phase of the EU Data Retention Directive which will shortly be coming into force: as well as requiring telcos to keep call logs of who we...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&rsquo;ve recently been looking at the implications of the second phase of the <a title="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_retention#Data_retention_in_the_European_Union" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_retention#Data_retention_in_the_European_Union">EU Data Retention Directive</a> which will shortly be coming into force: as well as requiring telcos to keep call logs of who we called and when, ISPs will also now be required to keep logs of when we logged on and from where. Let&rsquo;s leave the debate on whether all this logging is an invasion of our privacy or not &ndash; and whether that compromise of our personal freedom is justified in the global war on terror &ndash; for another time. <B>For now, let&rsquo;s just have a think about all that log data sitting around, waiting to be called upon...</b></p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/call logs">call logs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/logs">logs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data retention directive">data retention directive</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal freedom">personal freedom</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/log data">log data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/global war">global war</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/implications">implications</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/time">time</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/compromise">compromise</category>
      <source url="http://www.rsa.com/blog/blog_entry.aspx?id=1348">A World Becoming "Data Retentive"</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[EC praises Google's data-retention move, asks for more]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5d51c4a87e012a7d069ba77bb44a88df</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5d51c4a87e012a7d069ba77bb44a88df</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The European Commission welcomed Google's reduction in data retention times for people's search data but it urged the company and its rivals to go even further in order to safeguard European citizens'...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The European Commission welcomed Google's reduction in data retention times for people's search data but it urged the company and its rivals to go even further in order to safeguard European citizens' privacy, the regulator said Thursday.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data retention times">data retention times</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/safeguard european citizens">safeguard european citizens</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/google">google</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/european commission">european commission</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rivals">rivals</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/reduction">reduction</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/people">people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/regulator">regulator</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/091108-ec-praises-googles-data-retention.html?fsrc=rss-security">EC praises Google's data-retention move, asks for more</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Summarizing August's Threatscape]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/01c05fcd5f209b7515be2cee57a93c9b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/01c05fcd5f209b7515be2cee57a93c9b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Following the previous summaries of June's and July's threatscape based on all the research published during the month, it's time to summarize August's threatscape

August's threatscape was dominated...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SL_ZoXre4vI/AAAAAAAACJ0/LKtKpSt0igQ/s1600-h/ddanchev_august.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SL_ZoXre4vI/AAAAAAAACJ0/Phtgyl6rLXQ/s200-R/ddanchev_august.png" /></a>Following the previous summaries of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/summarizing-junes-threatscape.html">June's</a> and <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/summarizing-julys-threatscape.html">July's threatscape</a> based on all the research published during the month, it's time to summarize August's threatscape.<br />
<br />
August's threatscape was dominated by a huge increase of rogue security software domains made possible due to the easily obtainable templates for the sites, several malware campaigns targeting popular social networking sites, Russian's organized cyberattack against Georgia with evidence on who's behind it pointing to "everyone" and a few botnets dedicated to the attack making the whole process easy to outsource and turn responsibility into an "open topic", several new web based botnet management kits and tools found in the wild, evidence that the 76service may in fact be going mainstream since the concept of cybercrime as a service is already emerging, and, of course, a peek at India's CAPTCHA solving economy, where the best comment I've received so far is that every site should embrace reCAPTCHA, so that while solving CAPTCHAs and participating in the abuse of these services in question, they would be also digitizing books. As usual, August was a pretty dynamic month for the middle of summer, with everyone excelling in their own malicious field.<br />
<br />
<b>01.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/mcafees-site-advisor-blocking-nruns-ag.html">McAfee's Site Advisor Blocking n.runs AG - "for starters"</a><br />
False positives are rather common, especially when you're aiming to protect the end user from himself and not let him gain access to "hacking tools", but you're flagging security tools as badware and missing over half the SQL injected domains currently in the wild due to the fact that SiteAdvisor's community still haven't reviewed them - that's not good<br />
<br />
<b>02.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/twitter-malware-campaign-wants-to-bank.html">The Twitter Malware Campaign Wants to Bank With You</a><br />
Twitter, just like every Web 2.0 application, isn't and shouldn't be treated as a unique platform for dissemination of malware, since it's dissemination of malware "as usual". This particular malware campaign was not just executed by a lone gunman, but also, was taking advantage of a flaw allowing the author to add new followers potentially exposing them to the malicious links serving banker malware. For the the time being, MySpace, Facebook and Twitter accounts are the very last thing a malicious attacker is interesting in puchasing accounting data for, but how come? It's all due to the oversupply of automatically registered accounts at other popular services, whose ecosystem of Internet properties empower cybercriminals with the ability to launch, host and distribute malware in between abusing the very same company's services for the blackhat SEO campaign and redirection services. Theoretically, a distributed network build upon the services provided by a single company is faily easy to accomplish due to the single login authentication applied everywhere. A singly bogus Gmail account results in a blackhat SEO hosting blogspot account, flash based redirector hosted at Picasa, and a couple of thousands of spam emails sent automatically sent through Gmail in order to abuse it's trusted email reputation<br />
&nbsp; <br />
<b>03.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/compromised-web-servers-serving-fake.html">Compromised Web Servers Serving Fake Flash Players</a><br />
If aggressiveness matter, this campaign consisting of remotely injected redirection scripts at legitimate sites next to on purposely introduced malware oriented domains, was perhaps the most aggressive one during the month. Fake flash players, fake windows media players and fake youtube players are prone to increase as a social engineering tactic of choice due to the template-ization of malware serving sites for the sake of efficiency<br />
<br />
<b>04.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/pinch-vulnerable-to-remotely.html">Pinch Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw</a><br />
With Zeus vulnerable to a remotely exploitable flaw allowing cybercriminals to hijack other cybercriminal's Zeus botnet, private exploits targeting the still rather popular at least in respect to usefulness Pinch malware are leaking, allowing everyone including security researchers to take a peek at a particular campaign running unpatched Pinch gateway<br />
<br />
<b>05.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/phishers-backdooring-phishing-pages-to.html">Phishers Backdooring Phishing Pages to Scam One Another</a><br />
Backdooring phishing pages is perhaps the most minimalistic approach a cybercriminal wanting to scam another cybercriminal is going to take. The far more beneficial approach that I've encountered on a couple of occassions so far, would be to backdoor a proprietary web malware exploitation kit, release it in the wild, let them put the time and efforts into launching the campaigns, then hijack their botnet. In fact, the possibilities for backdooring copycat web malware exploitation kits in order to take advantage of the momentum while introducing a non-existent kit has always been there at the disposal of malicious attackers. One thing's for sure - there's no such thing as a free web malware exploitation kit, just like there isn't such thing as a free phishing page<br />
<br />
<b>06.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/email-hacking-going-commercial-part-two.html">Email Hacking Going Commercial - Part Two</a><br />
In between the scammers promising the Moon and asking for anything between $20 to $250 to hack into an email account, there are "legitimate" services taking advantage of web email hacking kits consisting of each and every known XSS vulnerability for a particular service in an attempt to increase the chances of the attacker. And given that the majority of these have been patched a long time ago, social engineering comes into play. Do these services have a future? Definitely as more and more people are in fact looking for and requesting such services, in fact, they're willing to pay a bonus considering how exotic it is for them to have any email that they provide hacked into and the accounting data sent back to them<br />
<br />
<b>07.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/russia-vs-georgia-cyber-attack.html">The Russia vs Georgia Cyber Attack</a><br />
Event of the month? Could be, but just like every "event of the moth" everyone seems to be once again restating their "selective retention" preferences. What is selective retention anyway? Selective retention is basically a situation where once Russian is attacking another country's infrastructure, you would automatically conclude that it's Russian FSB behind the attacks and consciously and subconsciously ignore all the research and articles telling you otherwise, namely that the FSB wouldn't even bother acknowledging Georgia's online presence, at least not directly. Moreover, talking about the FSB as the agency behind the cyberattacks indicates "selective retention", talking about FAPSI indicates better understanding of the subject.<br />
<br />
In times when cybercrime is getting ever easier to outsource, anyone following the news could basically orchestrate a large scale DDoS attack against a particular country in order to forward the responsibility to any country that they want to. In Russia vs Georgia, you have a combination of a collectivist society that's possessing the capabilities to launch DDoS attacks, knows where and how to order them, and that in times when your country is engaged in a war conflict drinking beer instead of DDoS-sing the major government sites of the adversary is not an option.<br />
<br />
Selective retention when combined with a typical mainstream media's mentality to "slice the threat on pieces" instead of turning the page as soon as possible, is perhaps the worst possible combination. Furthermore, coming up with <a href="http://intelfusion.net/wordpress/?p=398">Social Network analysis of the cyberattacks</a> would produce nothing more but a few fancy graphs of over enthusiastic Russian netizen's distributing the static list of the targets. The real conversations, as always, are <a href="http://blogs.nyu.edu/blogs/agc282/zia/2008/08/intelfusions_sna_of_russian_cy.html">happening in the "Dark Web" limiting the possibilities for open source intelligence</a> using a data mining software. Things changed, OPSEC is slowly emerging as a concept among malicious parties, whenever some of the "calls for action" in the DDoS attacks were posted at mainstream forums, they were immediately removed so that they don't show up in such academic initiatives<br />
<br />
<b>08.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/76service-cybercrime-as-service-going.html">76Service - Cybercrime as a Service Going Mainstream</a><br />
The reappearance of the 76Service allowing everyone to log into a web based interface and collect all the accounting and financial data coming from malware infected hosts across the globe for the period of time for which they've bought access, indicates that what used to be proprietary services which were supposedly no longer available, are now being operated in a do-it-yourself fashion. Goods and products mature into services, so from a cost-benefit analysis perspective, outsourcing is naturally most beneficial even when it comes to cybercrime <br />
<br />
<b>09.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/whos-behind-georgia-cyber-attacks.html">Who's Behind the Georgia Cyber Attacks?</a><br />
If it's the botnets used in the attacks, they are known, if it's about who's providing the hosting for the command and control, it's the "usual suspects", but just like previous discussion of the Russian Business Network, it remains questionable on whether or not they work on a revenue-sharing basis, are simply providing the anti-abuse hosting, or are the shady conspirators that every newly born RBN expert is positioning them to be.<br />
<br />
Cheap conversation regarding the RBN ultimately serves the RBN, and just for the record, there's a RBN alternative in every country, but the only thing that remains the same are the customers, tracking the customers means exposing the RBN and the international franchises of their services, making it harder to identify their international operations. And given that the "tip of the iceberg", namely RBN's U.S operations remain in tact, talking about taking actions against their international operations in countries where cybercrime law is still pending, is yet another quality research into the topic building up the pile of research into the very same segments of the very same ISPs.<br />
<br />
Just for the record - these "very same ISPs" are regular readers of my blog, and if you analyze their activities, they're definitely reading yours too, ironically, surfing through gateways residing within their netblock that are so heavily blacklisted due to the guestbook and forum spamming activities that their bad reputation usually ends up in another massive blackhat SEO campaign exposed.<br />
<br />
<b>10.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/guerilla-marketing-for-conspiracy-site.html">Guerilla Marketing for a Conspiracy Site</a><br />
Conspiracy theorists may in fact have a new wallpaper to show off with<br />
<br />
<b>11.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/banker-malware-targetting-brazilian.html">Banker Malware Targeting Brazilian Banks in the Wild</a><br />
When misinformed and not knowing anything about a particular underground segment, a potential cybercriminal would stick to using such primitive compared to the sophisticated banker malware kits currently in the wild. These sophisticated banker malware kits are often coming in a customer-tailored proposition, with their price increasing or decreasing based on the specific module to be included or excluded. For instance, a module targeting all the U.S banks that has been put in a "learning mode" long before it was made available to the customers can be requested and is often available with the business model build around the customer's wants&nbsp; <br />
<br />
<b>12.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/compromised-cpanel-accounts-for-sale.html">Compromised Cpanel Accounts For Sale</a><br />
Despite the massive SQL injection attacks, accounting data for Cpanel accounts coming from malware infected hosts seems to be once again coming into play, which isn't surprising given the filtering capabilities and log parsing tools today's botnet masters are empowered with. These very same compromised Cpanel accounts and the associated domains often end up so heavility abused that it's tactics like these that are driving the underground multitasking mentality, namely, abusing a single compromised account for each and every malicious online activity you can think of - even hosting banners for their blackhat SEO services <br />
<br />
<b>13.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two</a><br />
In August we saw a peek of fake security software, neatly typosquatted domains whose authors earn revenue each and every time someone installs the software. The vendors behind this software are forwarding the entire process of driving traffic to those excelling in aggregating traffic and abusing it. As anticipated, underground multitasking started taking place within the fake security software domains, with the people behind them introducing client-side exploits in order to improve the monetization of the traffic coming to the sites<br />
<br />
<b>14.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diy-botnet-kit-promising-eternal.html">DIY Botnet Kit Promising Eternal Updates</a><br />
There's no such thing as a (quality) free botnet kit. What's for free is often the leftovers from a single feature of a more sophisticated proprietary botnet kit. This one in particular is however trying to demonstrate that even a plain simple GUI botnet command and control software can achieve the results desired by an average script kiddie, and not necessarily satisfy the needs of the experienced botnet master<br />
<br />
<b>15.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_20.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three</a><br />
As far as trends and fads are concerned, the majority of the domains are currently parked at up to four different IPs, with most of them going into a stand by mode once they get detected and reappear back couple of weeks later<br />
<br />
<b>16.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/fake-celebrity-video-sites-serving.html">Fake Celebrity Video Sites Serving Malware - Part Two</a><br />
Due to the template-ization of fake celebrity video sites, and simple traffic management tools combined with blackhat SEO tactics, these sites are also prone to increase in the next couple of months<br />
<br />
<b>17.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/web-based-botnet-command-and-control.html">Web Based Botnet Command and Control Kit 2.0</a><br />
It's releases like these that remind us of the amount of time, efforts and personal touch that a malicious attacker would put into such a management kit, currently acting as a personal benchmark as far as complexity and features indicating the coder's experience with botnets is concerned. What's he's failing to anticipate is that this kit is sooner or later going to turn into the "MPack of botnet management"<br />
<br />
<b>18.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_25.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four</a><br />
Keep it coming, we'll keep it exposing until we end up getting down to the "fake software vendor" itself<br />
<br />
<b>19.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/automatic-email-harvesting-20.html">Automatic Email Harvesting 2.0</a><br />
Email harvesting is slowly maturing into a vertically integrated service provided by vendors of managed spamming services. This email harvesting module is aiming to close the page on text obfuscation in respect to fighting spam, and is successfully recognizing and collecting such publicly available emails. From a psychological perspective though, the end users who bothered to obfuscate their emails are less likely to fall victims into phishing scams, with the obfuscation speaking for a relatively decent situational awareness on how they emails end up in a spammer's campaign<br />
<br />
<b>20.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/fake-porn-sites-serving-malware-part.html">Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Three</a><br />
As a firm believer in sampling in order to draw conclusions on the big picture, an approach that has proven highly accurate in modeling historical and upcoming tactics and behavior, a single fake porn site serving malware campaign usually exposes a dozen of misconfigured redirectors, which thanks to their misconfiguration despite the evasive features available within the kits, expose another dozen of malware campaigns<br />
<br />
<b>21.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/facebook-malware-campaigns-rotating.html">Facebook Malware Campaigns Rotating Tactics</a><br />
With no particular flaw exploited other than the social engineering tactic of using already compromised Facebook accounts who would automatically spam all their friends with links to flash files hosted at legitimate services, the more persistent the campaign is, the higher the chance that it will scale enough. This campaign in particular is mainly relying on rotation of tactics, namely different messages, different services and file extensions used in order to trick someone's friend into visiting the URL. With the number of users increasing, the most popular social networking sites are naturally going to be permanently under attacks from cybercriminals<br />
<br />
<b>22.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/fake-security-software-domains-serving.html">Fake Security Software Domains Serving Exploits</a><br />
Despite that it's a single brand, namely the International Virus Research Lab that's introducing client-side exploits within it's portfolio of domains, the opportunity for abuse may be noticed by the rest of the brands pretty fast<br />
<br />
<b>23.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/exposing-indias-captcha-solving-economy.html">Exposing India’s CAPTCHA Solving Economy</a><br />
Taking into consideration the mentality surrounding a particular country's cybercriminals, how they think, how they operate, what do they define as an opportunity, and how much personal efforts are they willing to put into their campaigns, I wouldn't be surpised if a Russian vendor offering 100,000 bogus Gmail accounts for sale has in fact outsourcing the account registration process to Indian workers, paid them pocket change and is then reselling them ten to twenty times higher than the price he originally paid for them. <br />
<br />
The text based CAPTCHAs used at the major Internet portals and services, are so efficiently abused by this approach that continuing to use is directly undermining the trust these email providers and services often come with as granted<div class="feedflare">
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      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 02:57:32 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/facebook malware campaigns">facebook malware campaigns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/usefulness pinch malware">usefulness pinch malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/banker malware kits">banker malware kits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware campaigns">malware campaigns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/botnet">botnet</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/diy botnet kit">diy botnet kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/distribute malware">distribute malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/banker malware">banker malware</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/388609194/summarizing-augusts-threatscape.html">Summarizing August's Threatscape</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Do You Speak E-Discovery? You Should, Even in Europe]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/83b90f1f212111ff6dbba328b609d249</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/83b90f1f212111ff6dbba328b609d249</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[How often have you watched the news on television and seen people carrying boxes full of electronic media and digital files out of some well-known company's headquarters? It's a familiar scene in the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[How often have you watched the news on television and seen people carrying boxes full of electronic media and digital files out of some well-known company's headquarters? It's a familiar scene in the United States, because of the number of companies subject to e-discovery actions. But even though this subject is disturbing the sleep of CIOs in companies large and small in the U.S. - and even though vendors of tools supporting e-discovery are all looking for the next "killer app" - most Europeans just look on and say, "What on earth is this 'e-discovery'?"<br />
<br />
The concept of legal discovery (called "e-discovery" when electronic information is involved) is unique to the "common law" countries - notably the U.S., the U.K., Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Discovery in common-law civil litigation is a form of interrogatory in which both parties agree to the pretrial exchange of information, so that the plaintiff can prosecute a cause for action and the defendant can build a defense. By contrast, in countries with legal systems based on the Roman or Napoleonic traditions - which is to say, most of continental Europe - the obligation to produce information that is relevant to the cause for action is nowhere as comprehensive as the obligation attached to discovery in common law.<br />
<br />
There is an important difference between criminal and civil litigation, irrespective of a country's legal system. In a criminal case, if the authorities have a warrant or an indictment, the subject is obligated to produce relevant information, and this is true both in common-law countries and in continental Europe. In civil litigation, however, only common law requires the pretrial production of information and its exchange between affected parties. In non-common-law civil litigation, the relevant information is produced before the judge for consideration and evaluation.<br />
<br />
Despite these differences, there are some important lessons for all Europeans about e-discovery and about legal discovery in general. The first is that if an external party demands information, whether during civil or criminal proceedings, it pays to deliver that information quickly. Gartner has seen many cases where enterprises simply didn't know how to find the requested information or couldn't produce it for several days - just long enough to generate some damaging media coverage.<br />
<br />
The second lesson: It also pays to be able to deliver precisely the information requested. Law enforcement officers may seize folders and binders, disks and tapes, files and e-mails, reports and logs - anything they can get their hands on, really. This may include information that is not relevant to the case, and it may include information that is highly sensitive. This information will be reviewed, processed and analyzed, and some of this sensitive information might leak to the public or to competitors. It's much better to be prepared to hand over just the requested and required information.<br />
<br />
The e-discovery landscape is made even more confusing by international jurisdictional differences. In the global economy, a business relationship with an entity in the U.S. is becoming more the rule than the exception. But a company's duty to release information following a U.S. legal discovery claim - for example, for a European subsidiary - and how that would be seen in relation with European privacy legislation remain unclear at best. E-discovery rules require quick delivery of information that has not been tampered with, but privacy protection requires that personal data be removed first.<br />
<br />
E-discovery simply does not exist in most European legal systems, but European companies would be well-advised to familiarize themselves with the concept, in case an e-discovery claim originates elsewhere. Companies that have processes and automation for information archiving and retrieval, document and records management, and a retention policy (including disposal when information is no longer needed) will be well-prepared for any e-discovery claims that arise.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 24 Jul 2008 08:05:25 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/e-discovery">e-discovery</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/e-discovery simply">e-discovery simply</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/e-discovery actions">e-discovery actions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sensitive information">sensitive information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/include information">include information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/discovery">discovery</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/produce relevant information">produce relevant information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/e-discovery claims">e-discovery claims</category>
      <source url="http://blog.gartner.com/blog/security.php?x=0&amp;itemid=3732">Do You Speak E-Discovery? You Should, Even in Europe</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA["many of Colt's clients" affected by breach, CNET included]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/3313abd868212bd3a9ed98811169e851</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/3313abd868212bd3a9ed98811169e851</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
6/13/08

Organization
CNET Networks, Inc. (&quot;CNET

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
Colt Express Outsourcing Services, Inc. (&quot;Colt

Victims
current and former...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/colt.jpg" width="78" align="right" height="69"><font size="2"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Date Reported: </span><br>6/13/08<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Organization: </span><br><a href="http://www.cnetnetworks.com/">CNET Networks, Inc. ("CNET")</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br><a href="http://www.colthr.com/">Colt Express Outsourcing Services, Inc. ("Colt")</a><br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>"current and former employees and their dependants"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>"around 6,500"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>"first names, last names, date of birth, Social Security numbers, address, employer, hire date, benefits group numbers, and relationship to the policy holder"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"Colt informed our client by this letter that on Memorial Day, Monday, May 26, 2008, Colt's offices in Walnut Creek, California were burglarized.&nbsp; Certain computer equipment was taken which contains the human resources data of several of their clients, including CNET.&nbsp; The theft of this equipment may have compromised the personal information of our client's current and former employees and their dependants, and our client is working to understand the extent of any exposure for its employees."<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://www.oag.state.md.us/idtheft/Breach%20Notices/ITU-153493.pdf">Maryland State Attorney General breach notification</a><br><a href="http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/147460/cnet_employees_notified_after_data_breach.html">PCWorld</a> <br><a href="http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2008/06/24/cnet-affected-by-security-breach">WebProNews</a> <br><a href="http://www.pogowasright.org/article.php?story=20080619103835325">PogoWasRight</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>The Maryland State Attorney General<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online sources cited above:<br><br>On June 6, 2008, CNET received the attached letter from Colt Express Outsourcing Services, Inc., ("Colt") who has provided our client with employee benefit plan administrative services for the past 8 years.<br><br>Colt informed our client by this letter that on Memorial Day, Monday, May 26, 2008, Colt's offices in Walnut Creek, California were burglarized.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Uh Oh!, this is starting to read like and smell like the </span><a style="font-style: italic;" href="http://breachblog.com/2008/02/11/asi.aspx">ASI breach</a><span style="font-style: italic;"> reported in February.</span><br><br>The breach occurred on Memorial Day, Monday, May 26, 2008, between approximately 4:30 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. PST, when someone broke into Colt Express's office at 2125 Oak Grove Road, Suite 210, Walnut Creek, California, 94598<br><br>Certain computer equipment was taken which contains the human resources data of several of their clients, including CNET. <br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] According to a CNET spokesperson, via PogoWasRight.org, the "computer equipment" did not employ encryption to protect the information.&nbsp; Encryption could have been a prudent control in a defense-in-depth approach, a mitigating control to protect information against a physical break-in and theft.</span><br><br>The theft of this equipment may have compromised the personal information of our client's current and former employees and their dependants, and our client is working to understand the extent of any exposure for its employees.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Not "may have", but did.&nbsp; Information security and control can no longer be reasonably assured, which in my book constitutes a compromise.</span><br><br>Colt has also informed us that they reported the break-in to Walnut Creek police and to REACT High Tech Crimes Task Force in Silicon Valley when they discovered the burglary and that there is an ongoing criminal investigation.<br><br>report number 08-12367<br><br>In speaking directly with the Walnut Creek Police on June 12, 2008, Officer Greg Leonard, the primary investigator for the incident informed us that they are not aware of any misuse of personal information as a result of this theft at this time.<br><br>The information included first names, last names, Social Security numbers, address, employer, hire date, benefits group numbers, and relationship to the policy holder for around 6,500 of our client's current and former employees, and their dependants.<br><br><img src="http://images.quickblogcast.com/95781-88451/cnetnumbers.jpg" width="435" border="0"><br><br>some of your current and former employees and their dependants during the time period of 01-Aug-00 to present.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] August 1st, 2000 through May 26th, 2008 is almost eight years of information!&nbsp; I wonder what the data retention policy states at Colt, supposing one exists.</span><br><br>We do not have any understanding that the computers stored personal health information.<br><br>Our client is providing written notification to all affected individuals at the last home address we have on record<br><br>Although there is no evidence of misuse of the data to date, our client's notification will also inform affected individuals that it has contracted with Equifax to provide Equifax Credit Watch Gold with 3 in 1 Monitoring service, including identity theft insurance, for one full year at no cost.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I have said it before, and I will say it again.&nbsp; One year of semi-effective protection should not be considered adequate for information that has a usable life that far exceeds this time frame.&nbsp; It should be pointed out howevere that it is better than nothing and the company is not required to offer it.</span><br><br>Although we are not aware of the exact number of individuals affected by the Colt breach, we do know that we were among many of Colt's clients whose data were stored on the stolen computers.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] The word that catches my attention almost immediately is "many".&nbsp; How many clients will be affected in the end?&nbsp; PogoWasRight is already following up on another company that may be affected.</span><br><br>Colt Express takes the protection of its customer and personal information very seriously.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Making a statement like this and the demonstration by action are two entirely different matters.&nbsp; An organization such as Colt Express creates, collects, stores and transfers very sensitive information as an integral part of their business.&nbsp; This being said, I wonder why this information was not protected better.</span><br><br>Colt Express is taking steps to ensure that a potential data security breach does not occur in the future.<br><br>We installed an alarm system on Friday, May 30th.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Are we to assume that there was none prior to May 30th?&nbsp; I hope not!</span><br><br>Colt Express is looking into what additional steps may be taken to provide enhanced security.<br><br>By this letter and enclosures, we are providing you with all the information we believe you need, and that we are able to give you.&nbsp; We do not have the resources, financial and otherwise, to assist you further.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Say huh?</span><br><br>Towards the end of last year, our customer base was reduced to an unsustainable level.<br><br>Colt has been in the process of going out of business, while at the same time providing time for remaining customers to find alternative solutions.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] This is a twist.&nbsp; How long has the company been in the process of going out of business and was CNET (and the "many" other clients) aware of it?&nbsp; If so, this could have been a sign that could have spurred some action.&nbsp; Then again, maybe not.</span><br><br><img src="http://images.quickblogcast.com/95781-88451/cnetcolthomepage.jpg" width="241" border="0"><br><font size="1">http://www.colthr.com/</font><br><br><br><br>Those decisions are now final.<br><br>We are firmly committed to protecting all of the information that is entrusted to us both before and after we close down.<br><br>We sincerely apologize for the inconvenience and concern this incident will cause.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>As I stated earlier in the post, I am a little fearful that this breach could end up as significant or more significant (in terms of number of people and organizations affected) than the <a href="http://breachblog.com/2008/02/11/asi.aspx">ASI breach</a> reported in February.&nbsp; The ASI breach was the 2nd most popular posting in The Breach Blog's history at the time, based on number of online page reads and comments posted.<br><br>This breach has got me thinking.&nbsp; Some of the key risks that we address with the organizations we work with are those involving the management of vendor and third-party relationships.&nbsp; Ideally, information security personnel are involved throughout the relationship, including the initial vendor feasibility assessment.&nbsp; Vendors and "trusted" third-parties need to be held to the same high security standards that we set for the organization.&nbsp; The methods in which this can be accomplished vary from organization to organization, but typically include risk assessments (initial and ongoing), information security requirements built into contractual language, and enforcement actions if necessary.&nbsp; If a vendor is not encrypting confidential information or employing burglar alarms, it is known (and hopefully addressed). <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>Unknown</font><br><br>
<script src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/%7Es/breachblog?i=http://breachblog.com/2008/06/25/colt.aspx" type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8"></script>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 25 Jun 2008 07:25:20 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/confidential information">confidential information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/protect information">protect information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/breach">breach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sensitive information">sensitive information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security requirements">information security requirements</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/colt">colt</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/06/25/colt.aspx">"many of Colt's clients" affected by breach, CNET included</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Petroleum Wholesale charged with exposing customers]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/1e0eee4c18853dda51b902995e1d952a</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/1e0eee4c18853dda51b902995e1d952a</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
6/19/08

Organization
Petroleum Wholesale, L. P

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
None

Victims
Customers

Number Affected
Unknown

Types of Data
sensitive...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/pw.jpg" width="200" align="right" height="93"><font size="2"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Date Reported: </span><br>6/19/08<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Organization: </span><br><a href="http://www.petroleumwholesale.com/sunmart.web/homepage.html">Petroleum Wholesale, L. P.</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br>None<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>Customers<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>Unknown<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>"sensitive personal information, including Social Security numbers, bank account numbers, and credit or debit card information"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>”HOUSTON -- Petroleum Wholesale, which operated Sunmart Travel Centers and Convenience Stores in 10 states, was charged by the Texas Attorney General of improperly disposing of customer records"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://www.hcnonline.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=19788139&amp;BRD=1574&amp;PAG=461&amp;dept_id=532238&amp;rfi=6">The Pasadena Citizen</a> <br><a href="http://www.khou.com/news/local/crime/stories/khou080619_jj_storeid.1c30dcf3.html">KHOU-TV Channel 11 News</a> <br><a href="http://www.csnews.com/csn/news/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1003819492">Convenience Store News</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>The Pasadena Citizen<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online sources cited above:<br><br>HOUSTON - Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott today charged Houston-based Petroleum Wholesale, L.P., which operates Sunmart Travel Centers &amp; Convenience Stores in 10 states, for exposing its customers to identity theft.<br><br>According to the state's enforcement action, Petroleum Wholesale improperly discarded customer records containing sensitive personal information, including Social Security numbers, bank account numbers, and credit or debit card information.<br><br>"This defendant is charged with failing to protect its customers' sensitive information," Attorney General Abbott said.<br><br>"With more than 20,000 Texas victims each year, identity theft remains one of the nation's fastest-growing crimes. The Office of the Attorney General will continue working to protect Texans from identity theft."<br><br>Investigators with the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) discovered that the company improperly discarded hundreds of customer records in a publicly-accessible trash container outside its former headquarters.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] According to information posted on the Petroleum Wholesale web site, "Petroleum Wholesale services more than 350 retail locations throughout ten states."&nbsp; This breach has the potential to affect many, many people.</span><br><br>According to investigators, the records included sales receipts with customers' names and full credit or debit card numbers with expiration dates.<br><br>The records also included returned checks, along with forms listing customers' names, banking routing numbers, driver's license and Social Security numbers.<br><br>The defendant is charged with violating the 2005 Identity Theft Enforcement and Protection Act, which requires the safeguarding and proper destruction of clients' sensitive personal information.<br><br>State law establishes penalties of up to $50,000 per violation of the Act.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] This could add up quick.&nbsp; What's a better business decision, a few hundred bucks for a cross-cut shredder and accompanying procedures, or fifty grand per incident?&nbsp; Although, I am not sure that a shredder and procedures are not all that is needed in Petroleum Wholesale's information security program (assuming one exists).</span><br><br>The OAG also charged the company with violating Chapter 35 of the Business and Commerce Code, which requires businesses to develop retention and disposal procedures for their clients' personal information.<br><br>The law provides for civil penalties of up to $500 for each abandoned record.<br><br>For more information about preventing identity theft, contact the Office of the Attorney General at (800) 252-8011 or visit the agency's Web site at <a href="http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov.<br><br><span">www.texasattorneygeneral.gov.<br><br><span</a> style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>One question that isn't clear from the news reports is whether or not this was a common practice at Petroleum Wholesale.&nbsp; Organizations should take heed of this case.&nbsp; I think actions taken by Mr. Abbott and other State Attorney Generals will only become more frequent.<br><br>I look forward to more information in the future about this case. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>Unknown</font><br><br>
<script src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/%7Es/breachblog?i=http://breachblog.com/2008/06/22/pw.aspx" type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8"></script>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 22 Jun 2008 17:58:23 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sensitive personal information">sensitive personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/petroleum wholesale">petroleum wholesale</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/company">company</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/company improperly">company improperly</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/improperly">improperly</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/debit card information">debit card information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/debit card">debit card</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/06/22/pw.aspx">Petroleum Wholesale charged with exposing customers</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Discovering Tricks of E-discovery]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d299aaa997a34e930c4023e328bccd73</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d299aaa997a34e930c4023e328bccd73</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Federal rules governing retention of electronic documents pull info security into the legal...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Federal rules governing retention of electronic documents pull info security into the legal domain.
<p><a href="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~a/Computerworld/Security/News?a=Mv9itv"><img src="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~a/Computerworld/Security/News?i=Mv9itv" border="0"></img></a></p><img src="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~r/Computerworld/Security/News/~4/312756044" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Jun 2008 02:26:56 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/legal domain">legal domain</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/federal rules">federal rules</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/retention">retention</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~r/Computerworld/Security/News/~3/312756044/article.do">Discovering Tricks of E-discovery</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[CISSP's - Be Prepared for Audit]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/410312330d8927e04bc44cadca6affee</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/410312330d8927e04bc44cadca6affee</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Just a quick note to all CISSPs, or other certification-holders from (ISC)2
ISC)2 is taking a hard stand on CPE submissions and coming down heavy-handed on audits. If you attend an event, even if the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Just a quick note to all CISSPs, or other certification-holders from <a class="offsite-link-inline" href="http://www.isc2.org/" target="_blank">(ISC)2</a></p><p>(ISC)2 is taking a hard stand on CPE submissions and coming down heavy-handed on audits. If you attend an event, even if the event host is an (ISC)2 CPE-Submitter, you need to retain your &#8216;proof of attendance&#8217; and keep those documents on file. Generally an event host will provide a CPE audit retention sheet at the time of the event, or post-event. </p><p>I recently received an audit for my attendance at the<a class="offsite-link-inline" href="http://rsaconference.com/" target="_blank"> RSA Conference </a>in February. While they don&#8217;t specify a specific date or time frame you have to respond, I would recommend responding to an audit within 30 days. </p><p>Here are some quick tips&#8230;</p><ul><li><div>Provide your CISSP number to event hosts that are CPE-Submitters</div></li><li><div>Keep and file any documentation, programs&nbsp;and&nbsp;badges from the event</div></li><li><div>If provided, keep the &#8216;Proof of Attendance&#8217; sheet&nbsp;from the event host</div></li><li><div>Keep supporting docs for 12 months past the 3-year certification cycle you claimed the CPEs in</div></li></ul><p>For more information, visit the official <a class="offsite-link-inline" href="http://www.isc2.org/" target="_blank">(ISC)2 site</a>. </p><p># # #</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Jun 2008 10:14:42 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/event">event</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/event hosts">event hosts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/event host">event host</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/post-event">post-event</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/audit">audit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attendance">attendance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/isc">isc</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attendance sheet">attendance sheet</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/time frame">time frame</category>
      <source url="http://www.securityuncorked.com/security-uncorked/2008/6/5/cissps-be-prepared-for-audit.html">CISSP's - Be Prepared for Audit</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Hard drives purchased at Oklahoma auction contained personal information]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/077a7836ac972db81a40645143ce4ecf</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/077a7836ac972db81a40645143ce4ecf</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
5/19/08

Organization
State of Oklahoma

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
Oklahoma Tax Commission
Oklahoma Corporation Commission

Victims
Residents

Number...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/occ.jpg" align="right" height="73" width="200"><font size="2"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Date Reported: </span><br>5/19/08<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Organization: </span><br><a href="http://www.ok.gov/">State of Oklahoma</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br><a href="http://www.oktax.state.ok.us/">Oklahoma Tax Commission</a> <br><a href="http://www.occ.state.ok.us/">Oklahoma Corporation Commission</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>Residents<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>More than 5,000<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>Names, addresses, and Social Security numbers<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"OKLAHOMA CITY -- The Oklahoma Corporation Commission is removing hard drives from all surplus computer equipment after a server containing the names and Social Security numbers of thousands of residents was sold at an auction recently."<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://www.koco.com/news/16333215/detail.html">KOCO Channel 5 News</a> <br><a href="http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?articleID=20080521_12_OKLAH32253">Associated Press via Tulsa World</a> <br><a href="http://www.kten.com/Global/story.asp?S=8357581">KTEN Channel 10 News</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>KOCO Channel 5 News<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online sources cited above:<br><br>An Oklahoma City man discovered the names, addresses and Social Security numbers of thousands of Oklahomans on a computer he bought at a government auction.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] There are people who buy computer equipment at auctions online and in-person specifically for the information they find on the hard drives.&nbsp; This was not the case here, but criminals can (and do) find a plethora of personal information, intellectual property and other confidential information on used computer equipment.</span><br><br>Joe Sill bought 50 computers last month to refurbish and resell as part of his business.<br><br>When he found the confidential information from 2003 he said he wanted the public to know.<br><br>"I was stunned that the government actually left all this information on the computer."<br><br>"People's identities are at risk," he said.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Absolutely.&nbsp; Purchasing used hard drives and other data storage devices is one of the easiest methods for crooks to get their hands on confidential information.</span><br><br>The computer was a server labeled for the Oklahoma Tax Commission.<br><br>A representative from the commission said in 2005 some computers were transferred to the Corporation Commission where the computer came from.<br><br>Corporation Commission spokesman Matt Skinner said the commission is investigating why the computer's hard drive was not cleaned before the auction.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Does the commission have the necessary policy and procedures in effect to dictate how the information on hard drives is destroyed when no longer needed?&nbsp; I doubt it.</span><br><br>The Social Security numbers are likely tied to trucking industry data kept on the server by both agencies, Corporation Commission spokesman Matt Skinner said.<br><br>"We're backtracking through the inventory sheet and we're working with DCS and tax commission to bring all the paperwork together on this machine."<br><br>The Corporation Commission does not usually hold confidential information so it left hard drives in the computers after they are decommissioned, though they are supposed to be erased.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] No hard drives should ever leave an organization without being processed according to information security policy and procedures (supposing they exist and address data destruction).</span><br><br>Commission representatives say now they will not allow computers to leave their building with hard drives still in them.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Then what becomes of the hard drives?&nbsp; Are they destroyed, stored securely, or just discarded?&nbsp; I don't see any problem with leaving hard drives in the computers as long as they are securely wiped.&nbsp; Using a free program like <a href="http://dban.sourceforge.net/">Darik's Boot and Nuke</a> works fine for many applications but can be time consuming.</span><br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>If information is no longer needed by an organization, destroy it.&nbsp; If encryption had been employed by the commission, this would have provided an additional layer in a defense-in-depth approach to information security.<br><br>My suggested policy statements state something like (at a minimum):<br><br>Confidential Data:<br></font><ul><li><font size="2">When stored on mobile devices and media, protections and encryption measures provided through mechanisms approved by Management must be employed.</font></li><li>Must be encrypted with strong encryption when transferred electronically to any entity outside of XYZ.</li><li>Must be destroyed when no longer needed subject to the XYZ Data Retention Policy.&nbsp;&nbsp; Destruction may be accomplished by:</li><ul><li>“Hard Copy” materials must be destroyed by shredding or another approved process that destroys the data beyond either recognition or reconstruction as per the XYZ Data Destruction and Re-Use Standard.</li><li>Electronic storage media that will be re-used must be overwritten according to the XYZ Data Destruction and Re-Use Standard.</li><li>Electronic storage media that will not be re-used must be physically destroyed according to the XYZ Data Destruction and Re-Use Standard.</li><li>Deleting files or formatting the media is NOT an acceptable method of destroying Confidential Data<br></li></ul></ul><font size="2">If management has decided that it is necessary to collect and store confidential information, it must also be decided that they are willing to take the necessary steps to protect it.&nbsp; The two decisions go hand-in-hand.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>April, 2008 - <a href="http://breachblog.com/2008/04/21/oklahomadoc.aspx">Oklahoma Department of Corrections SQL exposure</a></font><br><br>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 26 May 2008 10:48:06 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/oklahoma">oklahoma</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/oklahoma tax commission">oklahoma tax commission</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/store confidential information">store confidential information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/oklahoma corporation commission">oklahoma corporation commission</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/corporation commission">corporation commission</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tax commission">tax commission</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/05/26/occ.aspx">Hard drives purchased at Oklahoma auction contained personal information</source>
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