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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: reveal]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/reveal</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Sat, 11 Oct 2008 12:07:53 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Not Your Father's Data Breach]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6e6dd929bba96e08b0dee7eee16ea946</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6e6dd929bba96e08b0dee7eee16ea946</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I am surprised this doesn't happen more often, or become public when it does happen, and I suspect it will


Corporate custodians of confidential medical data should be closely monitoring events...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I am surprised <a href="http://www.stltoday.com/blogzone/the-platform/published-editorials/2008/11/express-scripts-data-breach-is-bitter-medicine/"><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">this</span></a><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "> doesn&#39;t happen more often, or become public when it does happen, and I suspect it will:</span></p><div><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></div><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; font-size: 16px; line-height: 17px; "><strong style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; "><span style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Corporate custodians</span></strong><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">&#0160;of confidential medical data should be closely monitoring events connected to a nightmarish computer security breach in the St. Louis region.</span></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Express Scripts is one of the nation’s largest pharmacy benefits managers. The company, with headquarters in St. Louis County, handles approximately 500 million prescriptions per year for 50 million workers at 1,600 American companies. Early in October, it received an extortion letter, the details of which it released on Nov. 6.</span><span style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 40px; border-top-style: none; border-right-style: none; border-bottom-style: none; border-left-style: none; border-width: initial; border-color: initial; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">The letter included personal information on about 75 Express Scripts clients — Social Security numbers, dates of birth and, in some cases, information about prescription medications. Whoever sent the letter demanded money from the company — the amount has not been disclosed — and threatened to use the Internet to reveal personal and medical information about millions of people if the demands were not met.</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">...</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; font-size: 16px; line-height: 17px; "><strong style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; "><span style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Beyond&#0160;</span></strong><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">the scale of the problem for Express Scripts — and the potential impact on the company is enormous — the issue extends well beyond the mounting concerns about identity theft, a phenomenon with which most people have become at least somewhat familiar.</span></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">The greater problem is the unique nature of personal medical records, the importance of moving to computerization of such records to improve health safety and reduce costs and the irreversibility of the damage people can suffer if confidential medical information becomes public. The stakes are so high that a federal law establishes strict standards for maintaining the privacy of medical information and stiff fines for failing to do so.</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Medical records of all kinds — paper and, especially, electronic — must be protected with the most sophisticated kinds of security systems available, including backup protections and automatic alerts of security violations. Yet Express Scripts learned of this breach in the “worst way,” as InformationWeek.com security correspondent George Hulme put it in an online report: “via an extortion letter.”</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; font-size: 16px; line-height: 17px; "><strong style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; "><span style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">The Express Scripts</span></strong><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">&#0160;breach raises many questions for all elements of the health industry: hospitals, clinics and doctors’ practices, benefits management firms, insurance companies, pharmacies, employers and government agencies:</span></span><span style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 40px; border-top-style: none; border-right-style: none; border-bottom-style: none; border-left-style: none; border-width: initial; border-color: initial; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Are they using the most advanced information security technology possible? Do they minimize the amount of data they collect and keep it only as long as necessary? Do they have strict protocols governing access to personal and medical data — and systems to enforce those protocols? If criminals were to hack into their systems, how would the companies know? How soon? And are the systems capable of instantly cutting off illegal access as soon as a breach is discovered?</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; font-size: 16px; line-height: 17px; "><strong style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; "><span style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Confronted</span></strong><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">&#0160;with a grave breach of electronic security, Express Scripts has responded by contacting law enforcement, establishing an informational website, offering a substantial reward and hiring a private consulting firm to help clients who have privacy concerns and investigate situations that “appear to be tied to identity theft” and provide “identity restoration services.” There is no question that the company is taking the situation extremely seriously.</span></span><span style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 40px; border-top-style: none; border-right-style: none; border-bottom-style: none; border-left-style: none; border-width: initial; border-color: initial; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Given the ongoing criminal situation, information about how Express Scripts’ data systems were compromised — and whether it could have been avoided — has yet to be disclosed. But the American people have the right to expect that their sensitive personal and medical information is zealously protected and kept secure — not only by Express Scripts but also by every person or company entrusted with it.</span><span style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 40px; border-top-style: none; border-right-style: none; border-bottom-style: none; border-left-style: none; border-width: initial; border-color: initial; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><p><span style="color: #333333; font-size: 16px; line-height: 17px; "><div><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">The reason I am surprised this doesn&#39;t happen more often is that many Fortune 500 companies have oceans and oceans of personal data. Almost the only companies that have even tried to get to a medium level assurance are financial companies, yet many of the other companies have as much or even more data, with lower assurance. All that was lacking in the mix was an incentive and a bit of creativity and risk taking by the bad guys.</span></span></p><div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px;">I posted this to the security metrics list and Andy Jaquith quoted it in his great book S<a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2007/08/chicken-soup-fo.html">ecurity Metrics</a>:</span></div><div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px;"><br /></span></div><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; ">&quot;Customers and customer relationships...have tangible measurable value to businesses, and their value is much easier to communicate to those who fund projects. So in an enterprise risk management scenartio, their vlaue informs the risk management process...[For example, consider] a farmer deciding which crop to grow. A farmer interested in short term profits may grow the same high yield crop every year, but over time this would burn the fields out. The long term focused farmer would rotate the crops and invest in things that build the value of the farm and soil over time. Investing in security on behalf of your customers is like this. The investment made in securing your customer&#39;s data build current and future value for them. Measuring the value of the customer and relationships helps to target where to allocate security resources.&quot;</span></p></blockquote><div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px;">Of course this is the opposite of how most organizations do risk management and security architecture, and now, the fields have turned brown.<br /></span><div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">(Thanks to Chris for pointing me to this story)</span></div></div></div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 20 Nov 2008 06:37:59 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/medical information">medical information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal">personal</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal medical records">personal medical records</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/medical records">medical records</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/systems">systems</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security systems">security systems</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/11/not-your-fathers-data-breach.html">Not Your Father's Data Breach</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[OAuth for Secure Mashups]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f0ebee1b88f03cd2b1ad9ff61f4608ac</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f0ebee1b88f03cd2b1ad9ff61f4608ac</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Posted by Eric Sachs, Senior Product Manager, Google Security

A year ago, a number of large and small websites announced a new open standard called OAuth . This standard is designed to provide a...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<span class="byline-author">Posted by Eric Sachs, Senior Product Manager, Google Security</span><br /><br />A year ago, a number of large and small websites announced a new open standard called <a href="http://oauth.net/" id="hz33" title="OAuth">OAuth</a>. This standard is designed to provide a secure and privacy-preserving technique for enabling specific private data on one site to be accessed by another site.  One popular reason for that type of cross-site access is data portability in areas such as personal health records (such as Google Health or Microsoft Healthvault), as well as social networks (such as OpenSocial enabled sites). I originally became involved in this space in the summer of 2005, when Google started developing a feature called <a href="http://code.google.com/apis/accounts/docs/AuthSub.html" id="e3yh" title="AuthSub">AuthSub</a>, which was one of the pre-cursors of OAuth. That was a proprietary protocol, but one that has been used by hundreds of websites to provide add-on services to Google Account users by getting permission from users to access data in their Google Accounts.  In fact, that was the key feature that a few of us used to start the Google Health portability effort back when it was only a prototype project with a few dedicated Googlers.  <div id="zq.s" style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;"><br /></div>  <div id="zq.s1" style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;"> However, with the development of a common Internet standard in OAuth, we see much greater potential for data portability and secure mash-ups. Today we <a href="http://igoogledeveloper.blogspot.com/2008/11/sign-in-to-myspace-aol-mail-and-google.html">announced</a> that the gadget platform now supports OAuth, and the interoperability of this standard was demonstrated by new iGoogle gadgets that AOL and MySpace both built to enable users to see their respective AOL or MySpace mailboxes (and other information) while on iGoogle. However, to ensure the user's privacy, this only works after the user has authorized AOL or MySpace to make their data available to the gadget running on iGoogle.  We also previously <a href="http://googledataapis.blogspot.com/2008/10/whats-that-google-data-gadgets.html" id="w6.8" title="announced">announced</a> that third-party developers can build their own iGoogle gadgets that access the OAuth-enabled APIs for Google applications such as Calendar, Picasa, and Docs. In fact, since both the gadget platform and OAuth technology are open standards, we are working to help other companies who run services similar to iGoogle to enhance them with support for these standards. Once that is in place, these new OAuth-powered gadgets that are available on iGoogle will also work on those other sites, including many of the gadgets that Google offers for its own applications. This provides a platform for some interesting mash-ups.  For example, a third-party developer could create a single gadget that uses OAuth to access both Google OAuth-enabled APIs (such as a Gmail user's <a href="http://code.google.com/apis/contacts/" id="v05v" title="address book">address book</a>) and <a href="http://developer.myspace.com/community/myspace/dataavailability.aspx" id="lewp" title="MySpace OAuth enabled APIs">MySpace OAuth-enabled APIs</a> (such as a user's friend list) and display a mashup of the combination.  </div>  <div id="d23k" style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;"><br /></div>  <div id="ivuk" style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;"> While the combination of OAuth with gadgets is an exciting new use of the technology, most of the use of OAuth is between websites, such as to enable a user of Google Health to allow a clinical trial matching site to access his or her health profile.  I previously mentioned that one privacy control provided by OAuth is that it defines a standard way for users to authorize one website to make their data accessible to another website. In addition, OAuth provides a way to do this without the first site needing to reveal the identity of the user -- it simply provides a different opaque security token to each additional website the user wants to share his or her data with.  It would allow a mutual fund, for example, to provide an iGoogle gadget to their customers that would run on iGoogle and show the user the value of his or her mutual fund, but without giving Google any unique information about the user, such as a social security number or account number.  In the future, maybe we will even see industries like banks use standards such as OAuth to allow their customers to authorize utility companies to perform direct debit from the user's bank account without that person having to actually share his or her bank account number with the utility vendor. </div>  <div id="pvsw" style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;"><br /></div>  <div id="odub" style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;"> The OAuth community is continuing to enhance this standard and is very interested in having more companies engaged with its development. The <a href="http://oauth.net/" id="q6e4" title="OAuth">OAuth.net</a> website has more details about the current standard, and I maintain a <a href="http://sites.google.com/site/oauthgoog/" id="uw8z" title="website">website</a> with advanced information about Google's use of OAuth, including work on integrating OAuth with desktop apps, and integrating with federation standards such as OpenID and SAML.  If you're interested in engaging with the OAuth community, please get in touch with us. </div><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog?a=LcHtN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog?i=LcHtN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog?a=7jAKn"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog?i=7jAKn" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog/~4/458667878" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Nov 2008 14:41:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/oauth">oauth</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/oauth community">oauth community</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/google">google</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/google accounts">google accounts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/oauth technology">oauth technology</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/google security">google security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/account">account</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bank account">bank account</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/gadget">gadget</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog/~3/458667878/oauth-for-secure-mashups.html">OAuth for Secure Mashups</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[OAuth for Secure Mashups]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/dce22eb7ff2c1aceec169c6236231696</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/dce22eb7ff2c1aceec169c6236231696</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Posted by Eric Sachs, Senior Product Manager, Google Security

A year ago, a number of large and small websites announced a new open standard called OAuth . This standard is designed to provide a...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<span class="byline-author">Posted by Eric Sachs, Senior Product Manager, Google Security</span><br /><br />A year ago, a number of large and small websites announced a new open standard called <a href="http://oauth.net/" id="hz33" title="OAuth">OAuth</a>. This standard is designed to provide a secure and privacy-preserving technique for enabling specific private data on one site to be accessed by another site.  One popular reason for that type of cross-site access is data portability in areas such as personal health records (such as Google Health or Microsoft Healthvault), as well as social networks (such as OpenSocial enabled sites). I originally became involved in this space in the summer of 2005, when Google started developing a feature called <a href="http://code.google.com/apis/accounts/docs/AuthSub.html" id="e3yh" title="AuthSub">AuthSub</a>, which was one of the pre-cursors of OAuth. That was a proprietary protocol, but one that has been used by hundreds of websites to provide add-on services to Google Account users by getting permission from users to access data in their Google Accounts.  In fact, that was the key feature that a few of us used to start the Google Health portability effort back when it was only a prototype project with a few dedicated Googlers.  <div id="zq.s" style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;"><br /></div>  <div id="zq.s1" style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;"> However, with the development of a common Internet standard in OAuth, we see much greater potential for data portability and secure mash-ups. Today we <a href="http://igoogledeveloper.blogspot.com/2008/11/sign-in-to-myspace-aol-mail-and-google.html">announced</a> that the gadget platform now supports OAuth, and the interoperability of this standard was demonstrated by new iGoogle gadgets that AOL and MySpace both built to enable users to see their respective AOL or MySpace mailboxes (and other information) while on iGoogle. However, to ensure the user's privacy, this only works after the user has authorized AOL or MySpace to make their data available to the gadget running on iGoogle.  We also previously <a href="http://googledataapis.blogspot.com/2008/10/whats-that-google-data-gadgets.html" id="w6.8" title="announced">announced</a> that third-party developers can build their own iGoogle gadgets that access the OAuth-enabled APIs for Google applications such as Calendar, Picasa, and Docs. In fact, since both the gadget platform and OAuth technology are open standards, we are working to help other companies who run services similar to iGoogle to enhance them with support for these standards. Once that is in place, these new OAuth-powered gadgets that are available on iGoogle will also work on those other sites, including many of the gadgets that Google offers for its own applications. This provides a platform for some interesting mash-ups.  For example, a third-party developer could create a single gadget that uses OAuth to access both Google OAuth-enabled APIs (such as a Gmail user's <a href="http://code.google.com/apis/contacts/" id="v05v" title="address book">address book</a>) and <a href="http://developer.myspace.com/community/myspace/dataavailability.aspx" id="lewp" title="MySpace OAuth enabled APIs">MySpace OAuth-enabled APIs</a> (such as a user's friend list) and display a mashup of the combination.  </div>  <div id="d23k" style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;"><br /></div>  <div id="ivuk" style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;"> While the combination of OAuth with gadgets is an exciting new use of the technology, most of the use of OAuth is between websites, such as to enable a user of Google Health to allow a clinical trial matching site to access his or her health profile.  I previously mentioned that one privacy control provided by OAuth is that it defines a standard way for users to authorize one website to make their data accessible to another website. In addition, OAuth provides a way to do this without the first site needing to reveal the identity of the user -- it simply provides a different opaque security token to each additional website the user wants to share his or her data with.  It would allow a mutual fund, for example, to provide an iGoogle gadget to their customers that would run on iGoogle and show the user the value of his or her mutual fund, but without giving Google any unique information about the user, such as a social security number or account number.  In the future, maybe we will even see industries like banks use standards such as OAuth to allow their customers to authorize utility companies to perform direct debit from the user's bank account without that person having to actually share his or her bank account number with the utility vendor. </div>  <div id="pvsw" style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;"><br /></div>  <div id="odub" style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;"> The OAuth community is continuing to enhance this standard and is very interested in having more companies engaged with its development. The <a href="http://oauth.net/" id="q6e4" title="OAuth">OAuth.net</a> website has more details about the current standard, and I maintain a <a href="http://sites.google.com/site/oauthgoog/" id="uw8z" title="website">website</a> with advanced information about Google's use of OAuth, including work on integrating OAuth with desktop apps, and integrating with federation standards such as OpenID and SAML.  If you're interested in engaging with the OAuth community, please get in touch with us. </div><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~f/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog?a=RbYKY1QI"><img src="http://feedproxy.google.com/~f/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog?d=41" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~f/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog?a=livMlZFo"><img src="http://feedproxy.google.com/~f/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog?i=livMlZFo" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog/~4/bEpTg1dntxU" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Nov 2008 14:41:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/oauth">oauth</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/oauth community">oauth community</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/google">google</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/google accounts">google accounts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/oauth technology">oauth technology</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/google security">google security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/account">account</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bank account">bank account</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/gadget">gadget</category>
      <source url="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog/~3/bEpTg1dntxU/oauth-for-secure-mashups.html">OAuth for Secure Mashups</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Managing the Social-Networking Data Sieve]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/02b60c5bbe44d7996733cad53a20d22f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/02b60c5bbe44d7996733cad53a20d22f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn and other social networking sites practically beg you to reveal even more information about yourself. Log on and you're asked: What are you doing? What are you doing right...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn and other social networking sites practically beg you to reveal even more information about yourself. Log on and you're asked: What are you doing? What are you doing right now? What are you working on?]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 04 Nov 2008 21:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/social">social</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/beg">beg</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sites">sites</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/linkedin">linkedin</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/twitter">twitter</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/reveal">reveal</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/facebook">facebook</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/log">log</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/110508-managing-the-social-networking-data.html?fsrc=rss-security">Managing the Social-Networking Data Sieve</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Rubber-Hose Cryptanalysis]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/00c7dde63c0c5ce2a87b55f27f14c41d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/00c7dde63c0c5ce2a87b55f27f14c41d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Cryptographers have long joked about rubber-hose cryptanalysis : basically, beating the keys out of someone. Seems that this might have actually happened in Turkey: According to comments allegedly...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Cryptographers have long joked about <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubber_hose_cryptanalysis">rubber-hose cryptanalysis</a>: basically, beating the keys out of someone.  Seems that this <a href="http://news.cnet.com/8301-13739_3-10069776-46.html">might have actually happened</a> in Turkey:</p>

<blockquote>According to comments allegedly made by Howard Cox, a US Department of Justice official in a closed-door meeting last week, after being frustrated with the disk encryption employed by Yastremskiy, Turkish law enforcement may have resorted to physical violence to force the password out of the Ukrainian suspect.

<p>Mr Cox's revelation came in the context of a joke made during his speech. While the exact words were not recorded, multiple sources have verified that Cox quipped about leaving a stubborn suspect alone with Turkish police for a week as a way to get them to voluntarily reveal their password. The specifics of the interrogation techniques were not revealed, but all four people I spoke to stated that it was clear that physical coercion was the implied method.</blockquote></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=PBtwM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=PBtwM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=KfqWM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=KfqWM" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 27 Oct 2008 09:45:46 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/howard cox">howard cox</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cox">cox</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rubber-hose cryptanalysis">rubber-hose cryptanalysis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/turkish law enforcement">turkish law enforcement</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/physical coercion">physical coercion</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/disk encryption">disk encryption</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/password">password</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/multiple sources">multiple sources</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/comments allegedly">comments allegedly</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/10/rubber_hose_cry.html">Rubber-Hose Cryptanalysis</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Critical Flaws Patched In Opera 9.61, New Zero-day Vulnerability Remains Unpatched]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/08b28c8efcd3e5bd944c65c603c869da</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/08b28c8efcd3e5bd944c65c603c869da</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[New Opera 9.61 makers correct an issue where History Search could be used to reveal browser history (rated extremely severe). Also fixed: a Fast Forward bug that allows cross-site scripting (highly...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[New Opera 9.61 makers correct an issue where History Search could be used to reveal browser history (rated extremely severe). Also fixed: a Fast Forward bug that allows cross-site scripting (highly severe) and an information disclosure flaw in news feeds (also highly severe). On the same day Opera shipped a browser update with patches for [...]]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 23 Oct 2008 07:24:30 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/opera">opera</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/browser">browser</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/reveal browser history">reveal browser history</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/history">history</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/highly severe">highly severe</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/day opera">day opera</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast forward bug">fast forward bug</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information disclosure flaw">information disclosure flaw</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/news feeds">news feeds</category>
      <source url="http://cyberinsecure.com/critical-flaws-patched-in-opera-961-new-zero-day-vulnerability-remains-unpatched/">Critical Flaws Patched In Opera 9.61, New Zero-day Vulnerability Remains Unpatched</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Cybercrime Supersite 'DarkMarket' Was FBI Sting, Documents Confirm]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/b7864d4ca779ac5079e34205130d1314</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/b7864d4ca779ac5079e34205130d1314</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[For two years a site that provided one-stop shopping for credit card swindlers, hackers and identity thieves around the world was run by an FBI agent in Pittsburgh, FBI documents reveal. Let the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[For two years a site that provided one-stop shopping for credit card swindlers, hackers and identity thieves around the world was run by an FBI agent in Pittsburgh, FBI documents reveal. Let the arrests begin.<br style="clear: both;"/>
  <img alt="" style="border: 0; height:1px; width:1px;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?i=52b18d580cc6ebffb885015646dfacc9" height="1" width="1"/>
<img src="http://www.pheedo.com/feeds/tracker.php?i=52b18d580cc6ebffb885015646dfacc9" style="display: none;" border="0" height="1" width="1" alt=""/><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=qErNM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=qErNM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=frj6m"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=frj6m" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=VZsSm"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=VZsSm" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=Qrr0M"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=Qrr0M" border="0"></img></a>
 <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=0FN5M"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=0FN5M" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=5gwxm"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=5gwxm" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=6S1em"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=6S1em" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=iHUmM"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=iHUmM" border="0"></img></a> </div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/wired/politics/privacy/~4/419881492" height="1" width="1"/><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~r/wired/politics/security/~4/419881517" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 13 Oct 2008 16:20:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fbi documents reveal">fbi documents reveal</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card swindlers">credit card swindlers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fbi agent">fbi agent</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/identity thieves">identity thieves</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/arrests">arrests</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/world">world</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/site">site</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/one-stop">one-stop</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pittsburgh">pittsburgh</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.wired.com/~r/wired/politics/security/~3/419881517/darkmarket-post.html">Cybercrime Supersite 'DarkMarket' Was FBI Sting, Documents Confirm</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Rohyt Belani - "State of the Hack" from Louisville Infosec 2008]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/e5277ac5e1a5a18f9a7df67fee4f8cfa</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/e5277ac5e1a5a18f9a7df67fee4f8cfa</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Rohyt Belani - &quot;State of the Hack&quot; from Louisville Infosec 2008 Rohyt Belani gave this presentation for the Kentuckiana ISSA at the Louisville Infosec 2008 conference. Rohyt shows new ways to think...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a href="http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/rohyt-belani-state-of-the-hack-from-louisville-infosec-2008">Rohyt Belani - "State of the Hack" from Louisville Infosec 2008</a><br/>Rohyt Belani gave this presentation for the <a href="http://www.issa-kentuckiana.org/">Kentuckiana ISSA</a> at the Louisville Infosec 2008 conference. Rohyt shows new ways to think about hacking, going into how and why simple things work on the people element. Why hack a system when a quick Google search can reveal so much? Rohyt's talk was humorous and informative, and I'd like to thank him for letting me record his it.
<p><a href="http://feedads.googleadservices.com/~a/QCKRlHuD_6FZIJcotGcFNPbuXIU/a"><img src="http://feedads.googleadservices.com/~a/QCKRlHuD_6FZIJcotGcFNPbuXIU/i" border="0" ismap="true"></img></a></p><img src="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/IrongeeksSecuritySite/~4/pLhOoQXQhNc" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 11 Oct 2008 12:07:53 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rohyt belani">rohyt belani</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rohyt">rohyt</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/louisville infosec">louisville infosec</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hack">hack</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/quick google">quick google</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/people element">people element</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kentuckiana issa">kentuckiana issa</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/system">system</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/humorous">humorous</category>
      <source url="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/IrongeeksSecuritySite/~3/pLhOoQXQhNc/i.php">Rohyt Belani - "State of the Hack" from Louisville Infosec 2008</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Rohyt Belani - "State of the Hack" from Louisville Infosec 2008]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2d0756915d0cb0f272bec324e8d39c7b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2d0756915d0cb0f272bec324e8d39c7b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Rohyt Belani - &quot;State of the Hack&quot; from Louisville Infosec 2008 Rohyt Belani gave this presentation for the Kentuckiana ISSA at the Louisville Infosec 2008 conference. Rohyt shows new ways to think...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a href="http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/rohyt-belani-state-of-the-hack-from-louisville-infosec-2008">Rohyt Belani - "State of the Hack" from Louisville Infosec 2008</a><br/>Rohyt Belani gave this presentation for the <a href="http://www.issa-kentuckiana.org/">Kentuckiana ISSA</a> at the Louisville Infosec 2008 conference. Rohyt shows new ways to think about hacking, going into how and why simple things work on the people element. Why hack a system when a quick Google search can reveal so much? Rohyt's talk was humorous and informative, and I'd like to thank him for letting me record his it.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 11 Oct 2008 12:07:53 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rohyt belani">rohyt belani</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rohyt">rohyt</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/louisville infosec">louisville infosec</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hack">hack</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/quick google">quick google</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/people element">people element</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kentuckiana issa">kentuckiana issa</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/system">system</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/humorous">humorous</category>
      <source url="http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/rohyt-belani-state-of-the-hack-from-louisville-infosec-2008">Rohyt Belani - "State of the Hack" from Louisville Infosec 2008</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Rohyt Belani - "State of the Hack" from Louisville Infosec 2008]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/1dc2e90d408b6210ed977fe261dc9469</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/1dc2e90d408b6210ed977fe261dc9469</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Rohyt Belani - &quot;State of the Hack&quot; from Louisville Infosec 2008 Rohyt Belani gave this presentation for the Kentuckiana ISSA at the Louisville Infosec 2008 conference. Rohyt shows new ways to think...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a href="http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/rohyt-belani-state-of-the-hack-from-louisville-infosec-2008">Rohyt Belani - "State of the Hack" from Louisville Infosec 2008</a><br/>Rohyt Belani gave this presentation for the <a href="http://www.issa-kentuckiana.org/">Kentuckiana ISSA</a> at the Louisville Infosec 2008 conference. Rohyt shows new ways to think about hacking, going into how and why simple things work on the people element. Why hack a system when a quick Google search can reveal so much? Rohyt's talk was humorous and informative, and I'd like to thank him for letting me record his it.
<p><a href="http://feedads.googleadservices.com/~a/QCKRlHuD_6FZIJcotGcFNPbuXIU/a"><img src="http://feedads.googleadservices.com/~a/QCKRlHuD_6FZIJcotGcFNPbuXIU/i" border="0" ismap="true"></img></a></p><img src="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/IrongeeksSecuritySite/~4/h3IM_rrzhMo" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 11 Oct 2008 12:07:53 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rohyt belani">rohyt belani</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rohyt">rohyt</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/louisville infosec">louisville infosec</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hack">hack</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/quick google">quick google</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/people element">people element</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kentuckiana issa">kentuckiana issa</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/system">system</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/humorous">humorous</category>
      <source url="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/IrongeeksSecuritySite/~3/h3IM_rrzhMo/i.php">Rohyt Belani - "State of the Hack" from Louisville Infosec 2008</source>
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