For those of you who aren’t familiar with XSS Filter, a brief summary is that it is a client-side defense against reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks.  It works by recognizing that reflected XSS attacks inject script into the string that the browser sends to the targeted web server.  If the server doesn’t neuter or strip out the injected script, it gets sent back to the browser and executed in the context of the target web page.  Bad things then happen.  At a high level, XSS Filter remembers the string that the browser sent to the server, and looks at the server’s response to see if any of the script was actually in that string.  If it was, then XSS Filter decides that it got there because it was injected by an XSS attack and blocks the script from executing.  The rest of the web page renders as usual.  This is a vastly oversimplified sketch of XSS Filter – for details, see the post by David Ross, inventor of XSS Filter on the Security Vulnerability Research and Defense blog.

So what does XSS Filter have to do with the SDL?  Well, for almost nine years, since XSS was first discovered at Microsoft, we’ve been trying to figure out effective ways to reduce vulnerability to XSS attacks.  Our focus has been on improving the ways that web page developers code their pages, and we’ve developed a lot of tools and techniques for making web content safer from XSS attacks and for detecting XSS vulnerabilities in live pages.  The SDL requires the use of many of these tools and techniques, and we’re sure we’ve prevented a lot of XSS vulnerabilities from being introduced into Microsoft web pages as a result. 

But while we identify (and the SDL requires) measures that allow developers to avoid classes of vulnerabilities, we also look to identify more sweeping solutions that can either 1) eliminate classes of vulnerabilities, 2) reduce their severity, or 3) reduce the likelihood of attacks being successful.  The process usually starts from deep understanding of a class of vulnerabilities and attacks, and then we broaden defenses from there.  In the case of XSS Filter, David’s years of work researching XSS led him to come up with an approach that blocks many of the most common vulnerabilities to reflected attacks found on the web today.  The solution is compatible with existing web pages (doesn’t “break the web”) and thus we were able to enable it by default for users of Internet Explorer 8.  Because it’s a client-side mitigation, it will help protect users from attacks even though the sites they visit may be vulnerable to XSS. 

Our work on buffer overrun defenses follows a somewhat similar pattern – we started by prescribing coding techniques, banning the use of some APIs, and building tools that detect coding constructs that look like buffer overruns.  As we gained a deeper understanding of how buffer overruns can be exploited, we enhanced the /GS compiler flag and added ASLR in a quest to cause classes of exploits to fail even if a buffer overrun remains.  We’re not yet close to eliminating the SDL requirements for use of tools and coding techniques, but the SDL also requires the use of the mitigations to reduce the severity of vulnerabilities that slip past.  Will we ever get to the point where the mitigating technologies are so strong that we can relax the coding requirements?  Maybe not, but we will continue to introduce technologies that reduce the chances of a successful attack.

Similarly, in the case of XSS, even after IE8 ships, the SDL will continue to require the use of safe web site coding practices and tools such as the Anti-XSS library both to protect users of browsers other than IE8 and to provide protection in recognition of the fact that XSS Filter is a mitigation or defense in depth rather than a complete solution.  But we’ll also be keeping our eyes open (and doing active research) in the quest for an even more effective defense – whether client or server side – that eliminates XSS for good.

This post is a little far afield from the normal content of the SDL blog, but I thought it was important to provide a picture of the role of security science and security research in defining SDL requirements and in making major improvements in software security.  You can read more about our work in security science in the Security Vulnerability Research and Defense blog.

Can HP-EDS put its money where its mouth is? EDS profit margin, pre-acquisition, was under 6%. The former EDS CEO, now heading the combined outsourcing unit, expects to leverage HP automation tools to cut costs and improve that margin.

But Rod Bourgeois, an analyst at Sanford Bernstein says, “It’s not like HP has automation tools that weren’t at EDS’s disposal before.”

But this brings up a good point. EDS and 140,000 new bodies notwithstanding, HP seems to be positioning itself to do a big automation push in the marketplace.

Of course this makes sense – we’ve talked before about what a critical role automation is going to have in managing the rapidly evolving “dynamic” data center. Technologies like virtualization and cloud computing needs are pushing out the limits of real-time resources management in the data center; management tools must perform faster, integrate with more solutions across the spectrum of IT infrastructure and be smart enough to do much of this on their own.

The convergence of voice and video traffic are quickly transforming the growing complexity of networks at a torrid pace. IDC estimates that the skills gap in VOIP should grow to 19% by 2011.

This changing profile in the role of the network plays a key role in the skills shortage. Network enabled collaboration tools such as social networking apps and the Webex conferencing/collaboration solutions we use in our business each and every day are demanding a new set of IT skills to deliver business value.

My perspective is two-fold on this issue; the first is what I have seen in the resources we have attempted to hire! We give a very straightforward quick written/oral test to all new technical hires. This requires basic networking knowledge and some Unix commands. On average, (after filters from reputable recruiting firms, some with 5-10 years experience) less than 10% pass muster for the first filter we use in our hiring process. This is a troubling fact, which has cost us considerable time and effort to secure the right resources with competent skills. So I can say from our market assessment in a very strong technological job skills market, core Unix and networking foundation skills are slipping.

The second is that we as an IT Operations Management (ITOM) industry need to keep pushing hard to build better proactive and intuitive solutions to aggregate instrumentation from all Data Center tools, including more work around VOIP, video streaming, and collaboration so that we can ease this transition. If ITOM solutions become more proactive across the typical Cisco infrastructure that is commonly installed in the Data Center, we can free up some additional time for advanced “emerging technologies” training where existing IT workers can enhance their core skills and re-invigorate their careers. We have to do a much better job of getting our existing IT professionals trained on emerging technologies!

While there’s less that ScienceLogic can do around training, we certainly strive to do our part to enhance a day in the life of the networking engineers who use our solutions to simplify monitoring of increasingly complex networking, Wireless, VOIP, and collaboration needs.

Recently, Thinking Problem Management wrote on the concept of Hansei-Kaizen.  That started me thinking about Information Risk Management, Information Security, the role of the security group and the analytical function. The following isn’t necessarily a revelation, but as I’ve a friend interviewing for a CISO-type job at a Fortune 20 this week and they are focused on a not dissimilar business management philosophy, I thought I’d write a little about the subject.

Hansei-Kaizen is the process of relentless reflection (Hansei) and continuous improvement (Kaizen).  It might be thought of as part of the Deming Plan, Do, Check, Act cycle.  In fact, Taiichi Ohno, father of Toyota’s production system (Lean Manufacturing) is quoted as saying:   “Check (in PDCA) is Hansei”.

image from the awesome Panta Rei weblog

Now those who have had exposure to Six Sigma and management theory are already probably very well acquainted with the concept of Kaizen.  I think anyone who has held a security management position would argue that continuous improvement is a very admirable goal.  And I don’t think we need to talk necessarily about what improvement is and why it needs to be continuous.

But what is usually not given a great deal of consideration in  our profession is this concept of “relentless reflection”, the “Hansei” bit. And a lack of Hansei can be a source of frustration to those we work with and report to.  In fact, there’s a great presentation by Dr. Hwang Chi Hong available via search engines that explains:

Hansei (reflection) alone only generates staff unhappiness.  Kaizen (continuous improvement) alone only wastes creativity.

Cool huh?

So what’s this got to do with Risk Analysis?

If we can agree that continuous improvement is an admirable goal for security management, security departments, and even security vendors, then in light of the quote above we have some questions to ask ourselves;

• what is this relentless reflection (Hansei),
• what should we be relentlessly reflecting about, and
• how much work is being put into, and how good are we at, Hansei?

I’d like to focus on that for the next few blog posts this week, because I think that adding structure around this concept may be a “pragmatic” (Hi Mike!) compliment to many of the CISO  “self-help” books I’ve been seeing.

MI5 has concluded that there is no easy way to identify those who become involved in terrorism in Britain, according to a classified internal research document on radicalisation seen by the Guardian.

[...]

The main findings include:

• The majority are British nationals and the remainder, with a few exceptions, are here legally. Around half were born in the UK, with others migrating here later in life. Some of these fled traumatic experiences and oppressive regimes and claimed UK asylum, but more came to Britain to study or for family or economic reasons and became radicalised many years after arriving.

• Far from being religious zealots, a large number of those involved in terrorism do not practise their faith regularly. Many lack religious literacy and could actually be regarded as religious novices. Very few have been brought up in strongly religious households, and there is a higher than average proportion of converts. Some are involved in drug-taking, drinking alcohol and visiting prostitutes. MI5 says there is evidence that a well-established religious identity actually protects against violent radicalisation.

• The "mad and bad" theory to explain why people turn to terrorism does not stand up, with no more evidence of mental illness or pathological personality traits found among British terrorists than is found in the general population.

• British-based terrorists are as ethnically diverse as the UK Muslim population, with individuals from Pakistani, Middle Eastern and Caucasian backgrounds. MI5 says assumptions cannot be made about suspects based on skin colour, ethnic heritage or nationality.

• Most UK terrorists are male, but women also play an important role. Sometimes they are aware of their husbands', brothers' or sons' activities, but do not object or try to stop them.

• While the majority are in their early to mid-20s when they become radicalised, a small but not insignificant minority first become involved in violent extremism at over the age of 30.

• Far from being lone individuals with no ties, the majority of those over 30 have steady relationships, and most have children. MI5 says this challenges the idea that terrorists are young men driven by sexual frustration and lured to "martyrdom" by the promise of beautiful virgins waiting for them in paradise. It is wrong to assume that someone with a wife and children is less likely to commit acts of terrorism.

• Those involved in British terrorism are not unintelligent or gullible, and nor are they more likely to be well-educated; their educational achievement ranges from total lack of qualifications to degree-level education. However, they are almost all employed in low-grade jobs.

The first UEPS transaction was performed on Sunday, August 3, 2008, in Baghdad, Iraq, during the official launch of the UEPS smart card technology with the two state banks namely, Rafidain Bank and Rasheed Bank.

The official launch, attended by invitees from Rafidain Bank, Rasheed Bank, the Iraqi Government, War Victim Ministry and Martyrdom Ministry, demonstrated smart card registration, biometric enrolment and issuing of UEPS cards, offline loading of wage payments and government grants to the UEPS cards and dispensing of cash.

The pilot project involving 100,000 beneficiaries is now ready for implementation across selected bank branches and will enable the distribution and payment of government grants to war victims and martyrdom beneficiaries, as well as salary and wage distribution and payment to employees of the two state banks.

Brenda Stewart, Net1 Senior Vice President Sales and Marketing, said, "From the entire team at Net1, we congratulate the Iraqi consortium on this historic achievement and look forward to the successful implementation of the various projects already identified for implementation, as well as the projects currently in business development. Net1 is proud that the development of its core technology, from which it creates end-user products that satisfy the requirements of its customers, can change the way business is conducted leading to the improvement of people's lives. We share the belief of our Iraqi partners that our technology can play a fundamental role in the upliftment of the economy. The success of any technology should be measured, not only by the profits it generates for its inventors, suppliers and users, but also by the difference that it makes to the lives of people," Stewart concluded.

Since its birth 12 years ago after a fatal kidnapping in Texas, Amber Alert has quickly become one of the best-known tools in the national law enforcement arsenal. The warnings are familiar to anyone who watches cable TV news, especially during the summer, when the drumbeat of abduction stories seems to increase. Last year, 227 alerts were issued nationwide, each galvanizing interest in the local community and flooding police with tips. While the particulars of the state systems differ, the goal is the same: to disperse news of a kidnapping as widely and quickly as possible, in the hope that someone will spot the kidnapper before a child is harmed.

The program's champions say that its successes have been dramatic. According to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, more than 400 children have been saved by Amber Alerts. Of the 17 children Massachusetts has issued alerts on since it created its system in 2003, all have been safely returned.

These are encouraging statistics -- but also deeply misleading, according to some of the only outside scholars to examine the system in depth. In the first independent study of whether Amber Alerts work, a team led by University of Nevada criminologist Timothy Griffin looked at hundreds of abduction cases between 2003 and 2006 and found that Amber Alerts -- for all their urgency and drama -- actually accomplish little. In most cases where they were issued, Griffin found, Amber Alerts played no role in the eventual return of abducted children. Their successes were generally in child custody fights that didn't pose a risk to the child. And in those rare instances where kidnappers did intend to rape or kill the child, Amber Alerts usually failed to save lives.