Blogger: Dan Blum

It is no surprise for us to hear loose lips flapping in India about a capability to decrypt Blackberry and other carrier traffic.

After all, we’ve done basic threat analysis for years and it was only months ago that I was brought into a company-wide CISO meeting at a U.S. defense contractor to help them hash out their travel policy for mobile devices. Going into the meeting, I knew their policy restricted taking devices to a list of countries considered dangerous – but there was an exemption for BlackBerries.

Our research uncovered that BlackBerry is pretty secure in most respects. It has transport encryption along with optional password protection, remote kill, disk encryption, and S/MIME encryption. Viruses have not flourished on this functionally limited and closed platform. Few if any third party add on programs are required for additional protection. Nonetheless, I went into the meeting prepared to talk with the CISOs about the risks and security limitations of life on BlackBerry.

Was the BlackBerry exemption reasonable? At the time, BlackBerry transport encryption was not known to have been broken (to be fair, the article listed above still qualifies as rumor, not certainty of breakage). However, I pointed out that it is dangerous to assume well-equipped attackers like military or intelligence organizations can’t crack transport encryption. And even if they haven’t cracked the BlackBerry network and whole disk encryption features, sophisticated adversaries have other attack paths. Check out Neal Stephenson’s excellent book Cryptonomicon for a description of how a talented adversary might “see” your keystrokes and screen images through a motel room wall, for example.

If one of your employees – such as a key scientist, project manager, or executive – is targeted for surveillance and is carrying sensitive data through certain countries, one could argue that he or she had better undergo serious counter-intelligence training.  Learn to spot and shake tails, sneak into dark alleys for that BlackBerry fix. Learn to paper the closet with layers of aluminum foil and send messages in the dark. Defend that BlackBerry with encryption, long passphrases, and kung fu. But unless James Bond is running your company, I doubt this is what your executives have in mind for the next business trip!

Assuming your organization’s lower level employees are like needles in a haystack and won’t be bothered could be an exercise in wishful thinking. It is always possible that nation states are monitoring some or all of the airwaves. Not so long ago the NSA had a massive a covert surveillance program in place. Years before the government was reportedly snarfing up terabytes of emails and crunching them through a program called Carnivore. And of course, selective monitoring of people on watch lists continues on a large scale. This is just the surveillance we know about in the U.S. We suspect there’s more behind the scenes and especially in countries such as China. Even if you train your non-specifically-targeted low level employees to write and speak in search-keyword-free code, the carnivore programs of the world are pretty good at sniffing out those interesting needles – such as descriptions of your business plans, manufacturing processes, and trade secrets.

Sound paranoid? I admit that I don’t know what the probabilities of being targeted or monitored are – just that it can happen. It’s the height of arrogance to believe that a nation state can’t get your information if they’ve targeted it and you’re within their borders. And it’s dangerous to rely on security by obscurity when medium or high consequence information must be protected.

What can be done? If key personnel can't dispense with the BlackBerry (or any other email device) during international travel to those countries where information may be most at risk, they (the users) should limit communications to what they’d feel comfortable uttering over a potentially-monitored telephone call. Controlling incoming communications – messages sent by others – is a harder problem. Until data loss prevention (DLP) products become more contextually sensitive about the travel issues, it may be best not to synchronize the BlackBerry with the overseas user’s home mailbox. Instead, have the user give out a temporary address for the BlackBerry and warn senders to be discreet.

From: Question It [mailto:question_it@fanboxapps.com]
Sent: Monday, January 07, 2008 2:34
To: Steve Riley
Subject: Ratul has asked you a question on FanBox

<http://ai.hitbox.com/ai?hb=DM550726CGWB&ai=EMC-FBX_Questionit_sync>

Ratul asked you a question. View the question <http://www.sms.ac/WidgetAPI/Service.ashx?version=1&Method=GoToMyWidget&FROMeUid=4ZIFG1mO1m6PfQKo06SrHw==&eWid=KO7kd3aLplJrKkBpaarhhg==&AssocData=+kt0NC6UaHnnVtU7bTsqPw==&source=ViralWidgetEmail&encemail=mygm7I2EtPGYgkjfT5Bu/3oQesFPnbnqWXKIA33YOI0=&mlid=590803540> and answer it.

FanBox.com is the web-based desktop that instantly turns every computer into your computer. It includes over 10,000 web applications and games to choose from, including the Question It application.

This email was sent by Ratul while using the Question It application on FanBox. Go here <http://profile.fanbox.com/preferences/EmailBlock.aspx> to learn more or stop receiving emails from friends using Question It. FanBox: 255 G Street #723, San Diego, CA 92101, USA

<http://www.sms.ac/WidgetAPI/Service.ashx?method=OpenEmail&FROMeUid=4ZIFG1mO1m6PfQKo06SrHw==&eWid=KO7kd3aLplJrKkBpaarhhg==&encemail=mygm7I2EtPGYgkjfT5Bu/3oQesFPnbnqWXKIA33YOI0=&mlid=590803540>

For most of the well-known marketing profiling--oops, I mean social networking--sites, I've enrolled my email addresses in their opt-out mechanisms (I simply don't care about LinkedIn, Plaxo, Facebook, MySpace, and so on). But this one seemed suspicious. I don't know anyone named Ratul, and everyone who wants to ask me questions certainly knows my email address. It raised my bullshit detector.

So after a bit of foraging I found this: http://spamhuntress.com/2007/12/15/smsac-turns-into-fanbox/. Seems like the company running FaxBox got in trouble for doing this crap once before. Funny, isn't it, how you can just change your name and suddenly all your past sins evaporate! Well, not on the Internet, apparently. Your past sins can and do come back to haunt you.

When you sign up for FaxBox, they ask for your permission to email everyone in your address book (FanBox knows how to talk to most webmail systems). To do this, of course, FanBox needs your password. Most people, sigh, willingly supply their passwords to any seemingly innocuous service. We all know that these services really are vile disgusting filth, the very embodiment of whatever nefarious supreme being you now strongly wish would unleash itself on FaxBox and their ilk.

So in this case, I'm certainly not going to click on the link to stop receiving more emails. Rather, I'll put fanbox.com, fanboxapps.com, and while I'm at it, sms.ac in my blocked senders list. I recommend you do the same, and get the word out to your friends, too. FanBox--and anyone else who asks for your password--is evil, eeeeeevil I say.