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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: sends]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/sends</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 30 Jul 2008 17:57:06 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[MSP Snapshot Monitoring with EM7]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5288692e82e0f23665e5086e43db9ed4</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5288692e82e0f23665e5086e43db9ed4</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Between the fifth anniversary for ScienceLogic and the Inc 500 milestone, weve become very nostalgic about the beginnings of the company and EM7. For instance, did you know that EM7 was originally...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Between the <a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/sciencelogics-5-year-anniversary/08/2008" target="_blank">fifth anniversary for ScienceLogic</a> and the Inc 500 milestone, we’ve become very nostalgic about the beginnings of the company and EM7. For instance, did you know that EM7 was originally designed with managed service providers in mind? Not so surprising when 5 of the first 6 employees (including all 3 founders) came from hosting and MSP backgrounds and had first-hand experience with the daily trials and tribulations of MSP operations – and the tools that didn’t quite work for them.
<p><a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/john-at-interop-vegas.jpg"><img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; margin: 0px 10px 10px 0px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" height="184" alt="John at Interop Vegas" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/john-at-interop-vegas-thumb.jpg" width="244" align="left" border="0"></a>Here we talk to John Proctor, who started out as one of our first customers (and the first MSP customer). And he believed in it so much, he eventually became part of the ScienceLogic team. (Remember &#8220;I&#8217;m not only the President, I&#8217;m also a client&#8221; from <a href="http://www.hairclub.com/inthenews_article1.php" target="_blank">the Hair Club for Men</a>?)
<p>John shares his perspectives about the service provider world and why he took a chance on a little-known product called EM7.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What is your background? How many years have you worked as a service provider and for what types of companies?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> I have been working with Service providers for over twelve years. I worked at a major regional service provider for six years and before that I designed and built national and international networks for ISP’s and Fortune 500 companies as a consultant for PriceWaterhouseCoopers and WorldComm.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> You were one of the first customers of EM7 – why did you choose it and how did you get over the hurdles associated with using a start-up company’s product?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> We were actually customer number five. Back in 2004 when we evaluated and purchased EM7 we could see that EM7 provided about 80% of what we were looking for in one integrated solution right out of the box. One of the things that sold us on EM7 was that the ScienceLogic founders had all previously worked for a service provider, so we knew they understood our business and our challenges. But in the end, it comes down to features. Once we compared EM7 functionality to the alternatives, it was clearly a “no brainer.”
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What other alternatives were being considered?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> Well, we had started with a few point solutions, but as our business and product offerings matured, this resulted in a growing number of point solutions. What started with 3 or 4 ended up as 14 separate tools. They all had strengths but what they didn’t have was integration and because of this they could not scale. And, if the tools could not scale, our business could not grow.
<p>So, naturally we started looking at framework solutions, but they are expensive to buy, expensive to implement, and expensive to maintain. At one point, we even considered some open source projects. There were several that showed promise, but we would still be stuck with tools that were not integrated. So then we considered hiring developers to cobble something together that would work for our business. The only problem with this alternative was that we felt it would take 6 to 8 months before we could have something viable to work with.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What products were you using before EM7? What were your goals?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> Before we purchased EM7 we used 14 different point solutions to deliver our products and services to the marketplace. Tools like NetCool, Openview, Argent, Heat, What’s Up Gold as well as several other point solutions, vendor specific applications and manually updated spreadsheets. And, as I mentioned before, this does not scale. This also adds a great deal of complexity when you begin to consider business continuity and disaster recovery. All these tools were vital to the delivery of our products and services. Any service provider will tell you it is all about uptime. So if the product is uptime, the tools used to deliver it have to be available 24&#215;7x365.
<p>Our goals were simple: scale and redundancy. As it turns out, the solution was simple as well. EM7 provided a tool that could replace the functionality of almost half of the existing point solutions and the applications that could not be replaced were integrated with EM7 to provide our staff with a “single pane of glass” to see the status and performance of each area of the business from one application. We had visibility into everything from facility systems to applications using EM7.
<p>ScienceLogic also delivers an extensible configuration that addressed uptime and redundancy. We deployed collectors throughout our network that reported back to a central pair of redundant database servers and with this configuration we were able to perform backups and add capacity without taking the system down.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> Why are service providers different from enterprises? How are their needs different?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> First and foremost, service providers face the same challenges that only the largest enterprises ever face and they also have many unique challenges that only service providers experience.
<p>One challenge we faced was that we had multiple datacenters in different states. They were all interconnected with plenty of bandwidth between each site, but the tools were not designed to be used across the WAN. Our staff in our remote data center did not have the same access as our staff in the corporate office. Since EM7 is web-based, it immediately eliminated this problem.
<p>Another challenge is that service providers must manage systems across multiple domains. Back in the early version of a specific tool we were using before EM7, the only way you could implement it across multiple domains was to put the same username and password on every computer that you monitored. Beyond the security concerns, maintenance was a nightmare. Anytime we had to change the password, we would get locked out of dozens upon dozens of systems. When the password was changed on the monitoring server, it would attempt to login to the remote machines and fail. Repeated attempts would result in the account getting locked. I think that vendor eventually addressed this issue, but service providers seldom find tools that were designed for their unique situations.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> How is EM7 geared to service providers?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> Enterprise IT is a trusted part of the business; they are one of the team. Service providers are outsiders that must earn trust by showing the customer exactly what they are doing.
<p>EM7 provides a multi-tenant environment that allows service providers to manage systems across many different customers while at the same time providing the customer access to see the same information but only what’s relevant to them.
<p>EM7 was built by service providers and even includes a few features just for them. Two of my favorites are bandwidth billing and the emergency notification system. Take bandwidth billing, for instance. EM7 provides a way to collect bandwidth utilization, store subscription information, and calculate a bill from any one of about 10 different methodologies. And at the end of the billing period, EM7 sends the completed report out to whomever you chose via email.
<p>Another unique service provider feature is the emergency notification system. EM7 allows the provider to track what customers used their unique infrastructure components. If they have to perform maintenance on the infrastructure component or have a problem they can send an email to all of the impacted customers in a matter of minutes.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What trends do you see for service providers? What about big trends such as virtualization and cloud computing – how will they impact service providers?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> Virtualization is really hot for service providers right now and for the same reasons as in the enterprise. Service providers run data centers and data centers must be powered and cooled. So, anytime they can use a virtual server instead of adding physical equipment it is a good thing. But then you add the complexity that multiple customers reside on the same host and you must track things like bandwidth utilizations by guest OS, and it all gets a little harder. Lucky for us this is not a problem for EM7.
<p>I still think it’s early days for cloud computing. Depending on who you talk to, much of what service providers (especially the big ones) have already been doing with SAAS offerings and hosted applications could be described as cloud computing already. In which case, service providers are ahead of the game. But whatever the “final” definition, cloud computing actually shares many similarities with virtualization – in that service providers (or enterprises) will need to be able to manage far more “devices” in real-time with “zero downtime” expectations by customers. What this really means is that you’re going to see much more automation in provisioning and IT monitoring tools to handle the scale and speed with which things can change in the data center given vm migration and the talked-about switching between “clouds” that can be used for high availability. </p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 08 Oct 2008 12:51:50 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/em7">em7</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service providers">service providers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service providers experience">service providers experience</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service providers seldom">service providers seldom</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/impact service providers">impact service providers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/em7 functionality">em7 functionality</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/em7 sends">em7 sends</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service provider">service provider</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service provider world">service provider world</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/msp-snapshot-monitoring-with-em7/10/2008">MSP Snapshot Monitoring with EM7</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Government sends auditors to investigate Postapay fraud]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/c0eda9efb0ee776398a1680c5609a96e</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/c0eda9efb0ee776398a1680c5609a96e</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Efforts by the Postal Corporation of Kenya to embrace technology have hit a snag, with the government sending forensic auditors to probe the integrity of its electronic money transfer service,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Efforts by the Postal Corporation of Kenya to embrace technology have hit a snag, with the government sending forensic auditors to probe the integrity of its electronic money transfer service, Postapay, following reports of millions of shillings lost to fraudsters.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Sep 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/government">government</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/shillings lost">shillings lost</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/forensic auditors">forensic auditors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/postapay">postapay</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/postal corporation">postal corporation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/embrace technology">embrace technology</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fraudsters">fraudsters</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kenya">kenya</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hit">hit</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/100108-government-sends-auditors-to-investigate.html?fsrc=rss-security">Government sends auditors to investigate Postapay fraud</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Enhanced Domain Protection Services Emerge]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/7acf5055cb56782b95c8c264468b8373</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/7acf5055cb56782b95c8c264468b8373</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Registrars are beginning to offer new services to protect against domain name loss. Are they worth it? Well, they're worth something, but maybe not all the money being charged. Yesterday, Domain Name...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Registrars are beginning to offer new services to protect against domain name loss. Are they worth it? Well, they're worth something, but maybe not all the money being charged.

Yesterday, Domain Name Wire revealed that <a href="http://domainnamewire.com/2008/09/23/godaddy-files-patent-for-domain-name-hijack-protection/">GoDaddy has filed for a patent for "Domain Name Hijack Protection."</a> The basic idea of the service is that domain name transfer-out requests are automatically ignored. The customer gets a notice that the request was received and ignored. The user then has the option of turning off the service, and must supply photo ID in order to do it. Comments on the Domain Name Wire article say it's an intentionally cumbersome process, which certainly works out well for GoDaddy, but I'm not so sure I'd call this innovative.

This application may be related to <a href="https://www.godaddy.com/gdshop/protect/landing.asp?ci=9004">GoDaddy's Protected Registration service</a>, which similarly protects against casual transfers, a service they call Deadbolt Transfer Protection. In order to perform a transfer, more thorough verification procedures are required, probably involving genuine human beings.

GoDaddy also claims to protect the domain in case of billing problems, such as "credit card expiration, failed billing or outdated contact information." If your domain expires and cannot be renewed because the credit card expired or some other such reason the domain will be placed in "invalid, protected status" for up to one year. In other words, it will be taken off-line, but not made available for anyone else to register. If you've parked it you may not notice, but if you're using the domain you will, because it won't work anymore. At this point you can go back to GoDaddy and make things right. All this costs $24.99 a year, which is a lot of money compared to the base registration. You'd be much better off with a standard domain lock and just being responsible about your domains and reading the e-mail GoDaddy sends you.

And thanks to <a href="http://www.domainnamenews.com/registrars/moniker-launches-domainmaxlock/2452">DomainNameNews for reporting</a> that Moniker, a registrar aimed at higher-volume domain name owners, has launched <a href="http://www.moniker.com/maxlock/">their DomainMaxLock service</a>.

DomainMaxLock, like GoDaddy's Deadbolt, makes you provide more stringent identification for transfers. According to the company you must:
<UL>
<LI>Provide a government I.D. number for verification of your identity.
<LI>Set up custom security questions and answers, further safeguarding your domain assets.
<LI>Provide special verification instructions and artifacts to ensure that your unique business or ownership interests are protected.
<LI>When you request that your domains be unlocked, our security team works directly with you to verify all of the above off-line - further eliminating risks of doing business in an online world! </LI>
</UL>
It's essentially an admission of the failure of automated services with respect to security. The idea is we can trust humans in person, not software. The service costs $34.95 per domain per year for a limited time, but the cost will increase later to $59.99.

These verification services are similar in many ways to those performed by CAs (certificate authorities). Since GoDaddy is also one of those, it's likely they can get better utilization out of that staff by offering such services.
<p><a href="http://feedads.googleadservices.com/~a/FCZhqYUdUonhGhpMKWK6obfrCas/a"><img src="http://feedads.googleadservices.com/~a/FCZhqYUdUonhGhpMKWK6obfrCas/i" border="0" ismap="true"></img></a></p><img src="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~4/8Vacprz_ezY" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 24 Sep 2008 04:23:16 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/domain">domain</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/standard domain lock">standard domain lock</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/higher-volume domain">higher-volume domain</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/domain assets">domain assets</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/domain expires">domain expires</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service">service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/domainmaxlock service">domainmaxlock service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/godaddy">godaddy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/services">services</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.ziffdavisenterprise.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~3/8Vacprz_ezY/enhanced_domain_protection_services_emerge.html">Enhanced Domain Protection Services Emerge</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[More Details on McAfee's Artemis]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/3ef62fbfbd2bb374f1c20b9b41dc0c41</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/3ef62fbfbd2bb374f1c20b9b41dc0c41</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I spoke with McAfee recently, following my column about its Artemis technology . I learned a few things. Artemis kicks in when the local anti-virus scanner sees, through behavioral methods, if the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[I spoke with McAfee recently, following <a href="http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/McAfee-Putting-Malware-Signatures-in-the-Cloud/">my column about its Artemis technology</a>. I learned a few things.

Artemis kicks in when the local anti-virus scanner sees, through behavioral methods, if the file is suspicious. Then it sends a fingerprint of the file up to the Artemis servers for further analysis.

I had assumed that this fingerprint was a hash of some kind, but that was a simplistic assumption. The fingerprint includes characteristics of the file, including the ones that the scanner used to determine that the file was suspicious: Is it packed? Using certain packers in particular? Is it compressed (not the same thing)? Is it a certain size? In case I was unclear before, none of this involves signatures in the conventional sense.

It occurs to me that this could lower false-positives, compared with conventional behavioral analysis, because it subjects suspicious threats to more extensive analysis in the cloud. It all depends on how aggressive McAfee is at that stage.

Another thought I had is that since Artemis kicks in as a result of behavioral analysis, the threat has already hit the system by the time Artemis is invoked. Presumably the process is asynchronous and Artemis could return its analysis some time after the submission. If this is the case, it could be awhile during which malware is running rampant on your system.
<p><a href="http://feedads.googleadservices.com/~a/gTm8XhZRINn6ceS8NEYjhBg8ZZo/a"><img src="http://feedads.googleadservices.com/~a/gTm8XhZRINn6ceS8NEYjhBg8ZZo/i" border="0" ismap="true"></img></a></p><img src="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~4/VyuqqR5FRAs" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 19 Sep 2008 07:25:41 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/artemis">artemis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/analysis">analysis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/conventional behavioral analysis">conventional behavioral analysis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/artemis servers">artemis servers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/artemis kicks">artemis kicks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/extensive analysis">extensive analysis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/behavioral analysis">behavioral analysis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/artemis technology">artemis technology</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fingerprint">fingerprint</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.ziffdavisenterprise.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~3/VyuqqR5FRAs/more_details_on_mcafees_artemis.html">More Details on McAfee's Artemis</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Scams from Fake Compliance Companies]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f28d3480048e65001749f8279c858338</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f28d3480048e65001749f8279c858338</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[As more and more standards and regulations get passed to help protect consumers and guide businesses in proper procedures, managers also come to expect that they will come up against new compliance...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As more and more standards and regulations get passed to help protect consumers and guide businesses in proper procedures, managers also come to expect that they will come up against new compliance standards all the time&#8211;even some they haven&#8217;t heard of.</p>
<p>This makes the compliance area rife for scammers, who send letters or emails claiming that businesses owe them penalties or haven&#8217;t filed the right forms.</p>
<p>Tony Mancuso at Nolo, the publisher of books about corporate forms and law, writes about how to recognize some of these scams.</p>
<blockquote><p>One official-looking legal letter came into the controller&#8217;s office recently. It was from an &#8220;agency&#8221; calling itself the Corporate Minutes Compliance Counsel, or somesuch, and it strongly advised (warned, really) that Nolo send the Board a payment of $125 to prepare its state-mandated domestic corporation statement. Failure to do so could result in dire consequences, the letter advised, including a loss of corporate status with the Secretary of State.<br />
Nolo&#8217;s controller, who has years of experience with real and bogus corporate service solicitations, shredded this letter immediately.</p></blockquote>
<p>This scam also seems particularly nasty because not only can the scammers steal money from you, they will get valuable information and insight into your private business!</p>
<p>One smart way to avoid these scams is to check anything suspicious&#8211;call your secretary of state office or look up the organization who sends you that nasty letter. Or learn more by reading <a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="http://www.llccorporationblog.com/2008/06/corporate-compliance-scams-and.html">the full article</a> here.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 04 Sep 2008 04:28:27 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/compliance">compliance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nasty letter">nasty letter</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nasty">nasty</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/letter">letter</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/standards">standards</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/compliance standards">compliance standards</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/letter immediately">letter immediately</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/controllers office recently">controllers office recently</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/minutes compliance counsel">minutes compliance counsel</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/itsecurity/~3/383345884/">Scams from Fake Compliance Companies</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[SDL and the XSS Filter]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ce479edf032699e552a4cb52750d1f63</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ce479edf032699e552a4cb52750d1f63</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Steve Lipner here. When the Internet Explorer team posted the announcement about the XSS Filter feature in IE8 I asked some other members of the SDL blog team why arent we talking about the new XSS...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>Steve Lipner here.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>When the Internet Explorer team posted the announcement about the </FONT><A href="http://blogs.msdn.com/ie/archive/2008/07/02/ie8-security-part-iv-the-xss-filter.aspx"><FONT face=Calibri color=#0000ff size=3>XSS Filter feature in IE8</FONT></A><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri> <SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp;</SPAN>I asked some other members of the SDL blog team “why aren’t we talking about the new XSS Filter feature on the SDL blog?” &nbsp;Bryan and Jeremy said something like “that’s a mitigation that only applies to specific clients and a subset of attacks”.&nbsp; So we didn’t cross-reference IE’s XSS Filter post on the SDL blog at the time.&nbsp; Instead, I agreed to write a subsequent post about the relationship of XSS Filter to the SDL and to the ways that our SDL and security science teams think about improving product security.<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" /><o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><o:p><FONT face=Calibri size=3>&nbsp;</FONT></o:p></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>For those of you who aren’t familiar with XSS Filter, a brief summary is that it is a client-side defense against reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks.&nbsp; It works by recognizing that reflected XSS attacks inject script into the string that the browser sends to the targeted web server.&nbsp; If the server doesn’t neuter or strip out the injected script, it gets sent back to the browser and executed in the context of the target web page.&nbsp; Bad things then happen.&nbsp; At a high level, XSS Filter remembers the string that the browser sent to the server, and looks at the server’s response to see if any of the script was actually in that string.&nbsp; If it was, then XSS Filter decides that it got there because it was injected by an XSS attack and blocks the script from executing.&nbsp; The rest of the web page renders as usual.&nbsp; This is a vastly oversimplified sketch of XSS Filter – for details, see the post by David Ross, inventor of XSS Filter on the </FONT><A href="http://blogs.technet.com/swi/archive/2008/08/19/ie-8-xss-filter-architecture-implementation.aspx"><FONT face=Calibri color=#0000ff size=3>Security Vulnerability Research and Defense blog</FONT></A><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>.<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><o:p><FONT face=Calibri size=3>&nbsp;</FONT></o:p></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>So what does XSS Filter have to do with the SDL?&nbsp; Well, for almost nine years, since XSS was first discovered at Microsoft, we’ve been trying to figure out effective ways to reduce vulnerability to XSS attacks.&nbsp; Our focus has been on improving the ways that web page developers code their pages, and we’ve developed a lot of tools and techniques for making web content safer from XSS attacks and for detecting XSS vulnerabilities in live pages.&nbsp; The SDL requires the use of many of these tools and techniques, and we’re sure we’ve prevented a lot of XSS vulnerabilities from being introduced into Microsoft web pages as a result.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><o:p><FONT face=Calibri size=3>&nbsp;</FONT></o:p></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>But while we identify (and the SDL requires) measures that allow developers to avoid classes of vulnerabilities, we also look to identify more sweeping solutions that can either 1) eliminate classes of vulnerabilities, 2) reduce their severity, or 3) reduce the likelihood of attacks being successful.&nbsp; The process usually starts from deep understanding of a class of vulnerabilities and attacks, and then we broaden defenses from there.&nbsp; In the case of XSS Filter, David’s years of work researching XSS led him to come up with an approach that blocks many of the most common vulnerabilities to reflected attacks found on the web today.&nbsp; The solution is compatible with existing web pages (doesn’t “break the web”) and thus we were able to enable it by default for users of Internet Explorer 8.&nbsp; Because it’s a client-side mitigation, it will help protect users from attacks even though the sites they visit may be vulnerable to XSS.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><o:p><FONT face=Calibri size=3>&nbsp;</FONT></o:p></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>Our work on buffer overrun defenses follows a somewhat similar pattern – we started by prescribing coding techniques, banning the use of some APIs, and building tools that detect coding constructs that look like buffer overruns.&nbsp; As we gained a deeper understanding of how buffer overruns can be exploited, we enhanced the </FONT><A href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/8dbf701c(VS.80).aspx"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>/GS compiler flag</FONT></A><FONT face=Calibri size=3> and added </FONT><A href="http://blogs.msdn.com/michael_howard/archive/2006/05/26/address-space-layout-randomization-in-windows-vista.aspx"><FONT face=Calibri color=#0000ff size=3>ASLR</FONT></A><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri> in a quest to cause classes of exploits to fail even if a buffer overrun remains.&nbsp; We’re not yet close to eliminating the SDL requirements for use of tools and coding techniques, but the SDL also requires the use of the mitigations to reduce the severity of vulnerabilities that slip past.&nbsp; Will we ever get to the point where the mitigating technologies are so strong that we can relax the coding requirements?&nbsp; Maybe not, but we will continue to introduce technologies that reduce the chances of a successful attack.<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><o:p><FONT face=Calibri size=3>&nbsp;</FONT></o:p></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>Similarly, in the case of XSS, even after IE8 ships, the SDL will continue to require the use of safe web site coding practices and tools such as the </FONT><A href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa973813.aspx"><FONT face=Calibri color=#0000ff size=3>Anti-XSS library</FONT></A><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri> both to protect users of browsers other than IE8 and to provide protection in recognition of the fact that XSS Filter is a mitigation or defense in depth rather than a complete solution.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>But we’ll also be keeping our eyes open (and doing active research) in the quest for an even more effective defense – whether client or server side – that eliminates XSS for good.<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><o:p><FONT face=Calibri size=3>&nbsp;</FONT></o:p></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>This post is a little far afield from the normal content of the SDL blog, but I thought it was important to provide a picture of the role of security science and security research in defining SDL requirements and in making major improvements in software security.&nbsp; You can read more about our work in security science in the </FONT><A href="http://blogs.technet.com/swi/default.aspx"><FONT face=Calibri color=#0000ff size=3>Security Vulnerability Research and Defense blog</FONT></A><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>.</FONT></FONT></P><img src="http://blogs.msdn.com/aggbug.aspx?PostID=8900490" width="1" height="1">]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 27 Aug 2008 11:35:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/xss">xss</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/xss filter">xss filter</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/xss vulnerabilities">xss vulnerabilities</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/xss led">xss led</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/anti-xss library">anti-xss library</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/xss attack">xss attack</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/xss attacks">xss attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attacks">attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/xss filter remembers">xss filter remembers</category>
      <source url="http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/archive/2008/08/27/sdl-and-the-xss-filter.aspx">SDL and the XSS Filter</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[How to turn a software pirate into a paying customer]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/0ec1dd6179210779e4441852fcd479d2</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/0ec1dd6179210779e4441852fcd479d2</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[V.i. Laboratories' CodeArmor Intelligence product collects data on how and where pirated software is used, and then stealthily sends it back to the software's...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[V.i. Laboratories' CodeArmor Intelligence product collects data on how and where pirated software is used, and then stealthily sends it back to the software's maker
<p><a href="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~a/Computerworld/Security/News?a=pzdWcP"><img src="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~a/Computerworld/Security/News?i=pzdWcP" border="0"></img></a></p><img src="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~r/Computerworld/Security/News/~4/370441524" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 20 Aug 2008 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software">software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/stealthily sends">stealthily sends</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/maker">maker</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/laboratories">laboratories</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~r/Computerworld/Security/News/~3/370441524/article.do">How to turn a software pirate into a paying customer</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Automated Spim on Microblogging Site Via MSN Messenger]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/e5a1fb1ee8285e5dda0e9ae590ea20f2</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/e5a1fb1ee8285e5dda0e9ae590ea20f2</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[There's been a fair amount of Twitter coverage recently, but it's worth noting that other countries have their own versions of Twittering and some of them have seem to be a little easier to use in...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
        There's been a fair amount of <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1640">Twitter coverage</a> recently, but it's worth noting that other countries have their own versions of Twittering and some of them have seem to be a little easier to use in conjunction with Instant Messaging, whereas Twitter still seems to have a need for <a href="http://www.twittermsn.com/">third party services</a>, <a href="http://kunal.kundaje.net/twessenger/">add-ins</a> and <a href="http://www.theyagar.com/2008/01/30/twitter-bot-for-yahoo/">other tools</a> to get the job done if the service used is something other than Google Talk, Livejournal Chat or Jabber (if it's now more straightforward for other clients too, please let me know!)<br /><br />Either way, the below illustrates why adding Instant Messaging features to services such as Twitter can cause problems in the long run and needs to be considered carefully.<br /><br />We were alerted to the fact that a large amount of Spam seemed to be coming out of China in the last day or two (indeed, one contact mentioned to me that this particular message had been sent to their Honeypot around 29,000+ times, which is a lot of spamming for one URL however you look at it). The spam in question seemed to have been sent via a Spambot, and the only mentions of this URL so far in search engines seems to be related to China - shall we take a look?<br /><br />The URL in question (with part of it redacted) is<br /><br />http: //5834******/ ;)<br /><br />You'll notice the spam is short, snappy and also includes a little smiley-face thing at the end. In fact, it looks a little bit like the kind of link people send to their contacts on Twitter, doesn't it?<br /><br />Well, let's see - a quick search and we find this:<br /><br /><div align="center"><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf1.html" onclick="window.open('http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf1.html','popup','width=780,height=584,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf1-thumb-380x284.jpg" alt="fanf1.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="284" width="380" /></a></span>
<br /><br />Click to Enlarge<br /></div><br />A page from Fanfou.com, which I believe is a Chinese site "<a href="http://www.twittown.com/fanfou">inspired</a>" by Twitter with much of the same features and functionality. In fact, it has one feature working straight off the bat that Twitter users previously had to rely on <a href="http://kunal.kundaje.net/twessenger/">plugins</a> for - the ability to send messages to their page via MSN Messenger updates.<br /><br />http: //5834****** doesn't actually resolve anywhere - however, a quick Ping to that address and we have an IP:<br /><br /><div align="center"><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf3.html" onclick="window.open('http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf3.html','popup','width=452,height=212,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf3-thumb-352x165.jpg" alt="fanf3.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="165" width="352" /></a></span>
<br /><br />Click to Enlarge<br /></div><br />Type the IP address into the browser, and via some geolocational technology, you'll see a region specific version of the following dating website:<br /><br /><div align="center"><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf4.html" onclick="window.open('http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf4.html','popup','width=780,height=564,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf4-thumb-380x274.jpg" alt="fanf4.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="274" width="380" /></a></span>
<br /><br />Click to Enlarge<br /></div><br />Go back to the page on Fanfou.com, scroll down and select any of the clickable links and surprise - the same page appears. This particular account on Fanfou has something like 30+ pages devoted to endless Spim links via MSN. They link to placeholder pages, sites that look as though they've been suspended and / or deleted with no way to determine what content was there previously - all interspersed with "Twitter" style messages throughout such as this:<br /><br /><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><img alt="fanf5.jpg" src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf5.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="27" width="208" /></span>
<br /><br />Again, note everything is coming via MSN. By this point, you're probably wondering exactly how they allow you to send messages to their Twitter-style pages. Well, the solution is quite clever - check out the <a href="http://help.fanfou.com/im.html">IM page</a>. You enter your MSN address, and when you login to your MSN account, you'll suddenly find you have a new IM buddy who wants to be a contact:<br /><br /><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><img alt="fanf6.jpg" src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf6.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="189" width="475" /></span>
<br /><br />Add it, and whenever you want to put a message on your page, send it an <a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/image/fanf7.jpg">instant message</a> and, lo and behold, your Tweet-style message has appeared on your page:<br /><br /><div align="center"><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf8.html" onclick="window.open('http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf8.html','popup','width=541,height=241,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/fanf8-thumb-341x151.jpg" alt="fanf8.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="151" width="341" /></a></span><br /><br />Click to Enlarge<br /></div><br />In conclusion, the steps here appear to be<br /><br /><b>1)</b> Create a Spambot that infects users via MSN Messenger<br /><b>2)</b> Tailor the messages it sends to be short and sweet, just like a Twitter-style message<br /><b>3)</b> Set up an account on a service such as Fanfou.com that makes it easy to send messages to your page via MSN Messenger (or other IM services affected by your bot)<br /><b>4)</b> Infect the PC running your MSN Messenger account then watch as it spams the userpage with whatever messages you want it to send.<br /><br />Of course, the links can be anything from dating sites and ringtone adverts to infection files and exploits - all made so much more easier (and far less time consuming than manually typing in URLs to your userpage) by the functionality built into the site you happen to be using. It's also worth noting that the accounts sending the Spim don't <i>have</i> to be set up by the spammer - they could be compromised accounts that had been hijacked when clicking a rogue IM link, which is a great way of filling out the spamming ranks very quickly.<br /><br />This is definitely something Twitter - and any other site out there involved in <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Micro-blogging">microblogging</a> - need to keep an eye out for, and consider carefully when thinking of adding integration with popular Instant Messaging clients.<br /><br />We detect the file sending the weblinks via MSN as <a href="http://www.spywareguide.com/product_show.php?id=32320">Foubot</a>.<br /><br />Research and Writeup: Christopher Boyd, Director of Malware Research<br />Additional Research: Chris Mannon, Senior Threat Researcher<br /><div><br /></div>
        
    ]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 07 Aug 2008 17:12:09 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/msn messenger">msn messenger</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/msn">msn</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/message">message</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/msn messenger account">msn messenger account</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/twitter-style message">twitter-style message</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/account">account</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/msn account">msn account</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/twitter-style pages">twitter-style pages</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pages">pages</category>
      <source url="http://blog.spywareguide.com/2008/08/automated-spim-on-microbloggin.html">Automated Spim on Microblogging Site Via MSN Messenger</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Security Through Visibility - Montego, Lancope and NetFlow]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/03c1f11d6787944e11b9ab1baec0352e</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/03c1f11d6787944e11b9ab1baec0352e</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[We've probably all heard that you can't secure what you can't see and that statement is even more profound when it comes to virtual environments. This is because it is extremely challenging to see...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We've probably all heard that you can't secure what you can't see and that statement is even more profound when it comes to virtual environments.&nbsp; This is because it is extremely challenging to see what is going on at a micro vs. macro level within a virtual environments network.&nbsp; The virtualization vendors such as VMWare and Citrix have provided embedded tools into their management consoles that show a macro level of visibility but its not enough to identify security events in the environment.&nbsp; Take a look at the attached picture.&nbsp; It simply shows VMWare's ability to monitor virtual network performance statistics from a bits per second perspective.</p>

<p><a href="http://vmwaresecurity.typepad.com/.shared/image.html?/photos/uncategorized/2008/07/30/performancescreen.jpg" onclick="window.open(this.href, '_blank', 'width=800,height=500,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img height="187" width="300" border="0" alt="Performancescreen" title="Performancescreen" src="http://vmwaresecurity.typepad.com/security_in_the_virtual_w/images/2008/07/30/performancescreen.jpg" style="margin: 0px 5px 5px 0px; float: left;" /></a>
<br />&lt;-Click To Enlarge</p>

<p>With only this level of detail how can one determine which network applications are causing spikes.&nbsp; Is it FTP traffic that is occuring at a high volume at an unuseal time of day?&nbsp; If that were occuring, could that be indicative of either a breach or some sort of problem? What if FTP isn't even an authorized service in the virtual environment but there is a high volume of it?&nbsp; Did someone install a rouge FTP service so they could steal information from the server at will? </p>

<p>These types of questions can't really be answered without a micro level of detail into the packets flowing in, out and within the virtual environment.&nbsp; Now, what I am highlighting is not security in the traditional sense of prevention but using visibility as a means to first identify, then pin point the source of an issue so that it can properly be mitigated.&nbsp; Having constant visibility can also ensure that other security products in the environment are performing as expected.&nbsp; What if a Montego HyperSwitch with firewalling enabled is configured with many policies but someone forgot to create an FTP block policy.&nbsp; One could think they are protected from rouge FTP services transmiting data out of the network, but without constant visibility monitoring, can you be certain?</p>

<p>Some vendors, namely Reflex Security will get you to believe that their IPS / IDS solution that is inline and running in the virtual environment is the right and only approach.&nbsp; Or they will tell you to hang a virtual IDS off a span port in the virtual environment and you will at least have visibility into the attacks that are taking place.&nbsp; Well, sure... You now have attack visibility but at the performance cost of your virtual environment.&nbsp; Signature matching technologies are great, I'm a huge believer; however they don't scale very well in shared computing environments such as virtual ones.&nbsp; IDS systems also don't typically track protocol and network service (FTP, HTTP, etc.) utilizations; which is another important part of visibility.</p>

<p>So, what do we do to gain visibility without the performance headache?&nbsp; Well, for starters its probably best to put your IDS/IPS solutions in the physical environment where performance will be less of a concern.&nbsp; In fact, you can span a virtual switch's traffic out to a physical NIC as easy as you can to a virtual one.&nbsp; So why do it virtual and have to pay a 60% CPU utilization tax?&nbsp; Another solution is to IDS inspect only the things you care about.&nbsp; Why IDS inspect SSL traffic if you know your solution can't unencrypt SSL.&nbsp; Its just a waste of compute cycles isnt it?&nbsp; Policy based switching helps you with directing only the things you care about to an IDS (attack visualization product).&nbsp; Montego's HyperSwitch also can help you with the traffic redirection of only the things you care about. </p>

<p>Another method of visibility which I tend to be a fan of is one of packet analysis (aka NetFlow).&nbsp; NetFlow was invented by Cisco some time ago and has gained popularity in the physical world and definately has a use in the virtual world.&nbsp; NetFlow is lightweight.&nbsp; Let me say that again, its light weight!&nbsp; It only sends a summation of packet detail to an analytical engine which can do some number crunching, packet comparison, etc. etc. to make some sense out of whats going on.&nbsp; <a href="http://www.lancope.com">Lancope</a>, an Atlanta based visibility company that provides Network Visibility, Security Visibility and User Visibility has this tool on their website that is a Netflow Bandwidth calculator.&nbsp; You'll see from playing with this ( <a href="http://www.lancope.com/netflowcalculator.aspx">http://www.lancope.com/netflowcalculator.aspx</a> ) calculator that it doesn't consume a lot of network bandwidth to transmit these network accounting records.&nbsp; It also doesn't cause a lot of CPU overhead to send these records to an analytical engine sitting somewhere in the network.</p>

<p>Lancope's analytical engines have the ability to do the following for you within your virtual environment:</p><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /><meta name="ProgId" content="PowerPoint.Slide" /><meta name="Generator" content="Microsoft PowerPoint 11" /><title><p>&lt;p&gt;Slide 3&lt;/p&gt;</p></title><meta name="Description" content="7/30/2008" /><style>
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</style><o:shapelayout v:ext="edit"></o:shapelayout><o:idmap v:ext="edit" data="1"></o:idmap><p:colorscheme colors="#ffffff,#000000,#e9e5dc,#696464,#d34817,#9b2d1f,#cc9900,#96a9a9">&nbsp;</p:colorscheme><p:colorscheme colors="#ffffff,#000000,#e9e5dc,#696464,#d34817,#9b2d1f,#cc9900,#96a9a9"><div v:shape="_x0000_s1026" class="O">

<ol><li><span style="font-size: 56%;"><span style="position: absolute; left: -0.85%;">•</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt;">Monitor and Alert network behavior of VMs
</span></li>

<li><span style="font-size: 56%;"><span style="position: absolute; left: -0.85%;">•</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt;">Track Vmotion movement of VMs accross physical servers</span></li>

<li><span style="font-size: 56%;"><span style="position: absolute; left: -0.85%;">•</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt;">Monitor and Alert on communication between VMs
</span></li>

<li><span style="font-size: 56%;"><span style="position: absolute; left: -0.85%;">•</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt;">Identify users accessing VMs
</span></li>

<li><span style="font-size: 56%;"><span style="position: absolute; left: -0.85%;">•</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt;">Identify unauthorized or rouge VMs
</span></li>

<li><span style="font-size: 56%;"><span style="position: absolute; left: -0.85%;">•</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt;">Monitor and Alert when VM’s go online or offline
</span></li>

<li><span style="font-size: 56%;"><span style="position: absolute; left: -0.85%;">•</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt;">Identify network services running on VMs
</span></li>

<li><span style="font-size: 56%;"><span style="position: absolute; left: -0.85%;">•</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt;">Monitor Network / Application performance of VMs<br />Display active hosts accessing VMs</span></li></ol>















<div></div>

</div>

</p:colorscheme><p>...and probably a slew of other things I'm not aware of.&nbsp; A screen shot of their product is bellow:</p>

<p><a href="http://vmwaresecurity.typepad.com/.shared/image.html?/photos/uncategorized/2008/07/30/lancopescreen.jpg" onclick="window.open(this.href, '_blank', 'width=800,height=500,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img height="187" width="300" border="0" alt="Lancopescreen" title="Lancopescreen" src="http://vmwaresecurity.typepad.com/security_in_the_virtual_w/images/2008/07/30/lancopescreen.jpg" style="margin: 0px 5px 5px 0px; float: left;" /></a> &lt;- Click to enlarge</p>

<p>You'll notice from the screenshot that you are able to visualize who is talking to who, how much traffic they have sent and received and something called a concern index (not seen on this screenshot).</p>

<p>Now, a concern index is a number that increases as Lancopes analytical engines monitor suspicious activity on a session.&nbsp; A high counter can be indicative of a security problem.&nbsp; Its another way of identifying (visualizing) compromised hosts (virtual machines) without having to do signature matching like a heavy weight IPS engine.&nbsp; Example:&nbsp; Lets say you have a VM that has a BOT on it and is &quot;owned&quot;.&nbsp; The Lancope product is monitoring this long life session.&nbsp; Let's say that session is established for several hours or maybe even days or months.&nbsp; Lets also say that the conversation appears to be mostly unidirectional from a public ip address not belonging to your enterprise.&nbsp; Lancope would increase a the concern index on this since this server hasn't typically had this type of behavior.&nbsp; Once the concern index reached a certain level it could then fire off an email, send you a text message or something saying:&nbsp; <strong>Warning, Warning, Danger, Danger Will Robinson!!! You're virtual server may be infected with a BOT, please investigate immediately!!!</strong></p>

<p>This example is VISIBILITY which helps you with SECURITY.&nbsp; There are a number of other things you can do with NetFlow and Lancope products that have less to do with security and more to do with operational efficiencies.&nbsp; Things like, helping you answer questions of:&nbsp; How do I know what network applications are taking up the most bandwidth?&nbsp; When should I move those applications over to a server with more horsepower?&nbsp; When did these VM's vmotion over here and was there a traffic condition / CPU condition that caused that to occur?&nbsp; I could go on and on but thats a topic for another blog entry.</p>

<p>So, my suggestion is to take a look at what NetFlow has to offer.&nbsp; Montego Networks supports NetFlow transmission and Lancope supports NetFlow analytics and with both you can regain what was lost visibility.</p>

<p>I hope this was helpful to you all!</p>

<p>-John Peterson</p></div>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 30 Jul 2008 17:57:06 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network">network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network visibility">network visibility</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/visibility">visibility</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/environments">environments</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtual environments network">virtual environments network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network bandwidth">network bandwidth</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bandwidth">bandwidth</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtual">virtual</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityInTheVirtualWorld/~3/350982407/security-throug.html">Security Through Visibility - Montego, Lancope and NetFlow</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Security Through Visibility - Montego, Lancope and NetFlow]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5b6ed1101dc183f8ebcfa1e481566982</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5b6ed1101dc183f8ebcfa1e481566982</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[We've probably all heard that you can't secure what you can't see and that statement is even more profound when it comes to virtual environments. This is because it is extremely challenging to see...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We've probably all heard that you can't secure what you can't see and that statement is even more profound when it comes to virtual environments.&nbsp; This is because it is extremely challenging to see what is going on at a micro vs. macro level within a virtual environments network.&nbsp; The virtualization vendors such as VMWare and Citrix have provided embedded tools into their management consoles that show a macro level of visibility but its not enough to identify security events in the environment.&nbsp; Take a look at the attached picture.&nbsp; It simply shows VMWare's ability to monitor virtual network performance statistics from a bits per second perspective.</p>

<p><a href="http://vmwaresecurity.typepad.com/.shared/image.html?/photos/uncategorized/2008/07/30/performancescreen.jpg" onclick="window.open(this.href, '_blank', 'width=800,height=500,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img height="187" width="300" border="0" alt="Performancescreen" title="Performancescreen" src="http://vmwaresecurity.typepad.com/security_in_the_virtual_w/images/2008/07/30/performancescreen.jpg" style="margin: 0px 5px 5px 0px; float: left;" /></a>
<br />&lt;-Click To Enlarge</p>

<p>With only this level of detail how can one determine which network applications are causing spikes.&nbsp; Is it FTP traffic that is occuring at a high volume at an unuseal time of day?&nbsp; If that were occuring, could that be indicative of either a breach or some sort of problem? What if FTP isn't even an authorized service in the virtual environment but there is a high volume of it?&nbsp; Did someone install a rouge FTP service so they could steal information from the server at will? </p>

<p>These types of questions can't really be answered without a micro level of detail into the packets flowing in, out and within the virtual environment.&nbsp; Now, what I am highlighting is not security in the traditional sense of prevention but using visibility as a means to first identify, then pin point the source of an issue so that it can properly be mitigated.&nbsp; Having constant visibility can also ensure that other security products in the environment are performing as expected.&nbsp; What if a Montego HyperSwitch with firewalling enabled is configured with many policies but someone forgot to create an FTP block policy.&nbsp; One could think they are protected from rouge FTP services transmiting data out of the network, but without constant visibility monitoring, can you be certain?</p>

<p>Some vendors, namely Reflex Security will get you to believe that their IPS / IDS solution that is inline and running in the virtual environment is the right and only approach.&nbsp; Or they will tell you to hang a virtual IDS off a span port in the virtual environment and you will at least have visibility into the attacks that are taking place.&nbsp; Well, sure... You now have attack visibility but at the performance cost of your virtual environment.&nbsp; Signature matching technologies are great, I'm a huge believer; however they don't scale very well in shared computing environments such as virtual ones.&nbsp; IDS systems also don't typically track protocol and network service (FTP, HTTP, etc.) utilizations; which is another important part of visibility.</p>

<p>So, what do we do to gain visibility without the performance headache?&nbsp; Well, for starters its probably best to put your IDS/IPS solutions in the physical environment where performance will be less of a concern.&nbsp; In fact, you can span a virtual switch's traffic out to a physical NIC as easy as you can to a virtual one.&nbsp; So why do it virtual and have to pay a 60% CPU utilization tax?&nbsp; Another solution is to IDS inspect only the things you care about.&nbsp; Why IDS inspect SSL traffic if you know your solution can't unencrypt SSL.&nbsp; Its just a waste of compute cycles isnt it?&nbsp; Policy based switching helps you with directing only the things you care about to an IDS (attack visualization product).&nbsp; Montego's HyperSwitch also can help you with the traffic redirection of only the things you care about. </p>

<p>Another method of visibility which I tend to be a fan of is one of packet analysis (aka NetFlow).&nbsp; NetFlow was invented by Cisco some time ago and has gained popularity in the physical world and definately has a use in the virtual world.&nbsp; NetFlow is lightweight.&nbsp; Let me say that again, its light weight!&nbsp; It only sends a summation of packet detail to an analytical engine which can do some number crunching, packet comparison, etc. etc. to make some sense out of whats going on.&nbsp; <a href="http://www.lancope.com">Lancope</a>, an Atlanta based visibility company that provides Network Visibility, Security Visibility and User Visibility has this tool on their website that is a Netflow Bandwidth calculator.&nbsp; You'll see from playing with this ( <a href="http://www.lancope.com/netflowcalculator.aspx">http://www.lancope.com/netflowcalculator.aspx</a> ) calculator that it doesn't consume a lot of network bandwidth to transmit these network accounting records.&nbsp; It also doesn't cause a lot of CPU overhead to send these records to an analytical engine sitting somewhere in the network.</p>

<p>Lancope's analytical engines have the ability to do the following for you within your virtual environment:</p><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /><meta name="ProgId" content="PowerPoint.Slide" /><meta name="Generator" content="Microsoft PowerPoint 11" /><title><p>&lt;p&gt;Slide 3&lt;/p&gt;</p></title><meta name="Description" content="7/30/2008" /><style>
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<ol><li><span style="font-size: 56%;"><span style="position: absolute; left: -0.85%;">???</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt;">Monitor and Alert network behavior of VMs
</span></li>

<li><span style="font-size: 56%;"><span style="position: absolute; left: -0.85%;">???</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt;">Track Vmotion movement of VMs accross physical servers</span></li>

<li><span style="font-size: 56%;"><span style="position: absolute; left: -0.85%;">???</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt;">Monitor and Alert on communication between VMs
</span></li>

<li><span style="font-size: 56%;"><span style="position: absolute; left: -0.85%;">???</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt;">Identify users accessing VMs
</span></li>

<li><span style="font-size: 56%;"><span style="position: absolute; left: -0.85%;">???</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt;">Identify unauthorized or rouge VMs
</span></li>

<li><span style="font-size: 56%;"><span style="position: absolute; left: -0.85%;">???</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt;">Monitor and Alert when VM???s go online or offline
</span></li>

<li><span style="font-size: 56%;"><span style="position: absolute; left: -0.85%;">???</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt;">Identify network services running on VMs
</span></li>

<li><span style="font-size: 56%;"><span style="position: absolute; left: -0.85%;">???</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt;">Monitor Network / Application performance of VMs<br />Display active hosts accessing VMs</span></li></ol>















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</p:colorscheme><p>...and probably a slew of other things I'm not aware of.&nbsp; A screen shot of their product is bellow:</p>

<p><a href="http://vmwaresecurity.typepad.com/.shared/image.html?/photos/uncategorized/2008/07/30/lancopescreen.jpg" onclick="window.open(this.href, '_blank', 'width=800,height=500,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img height="187" width="300" border="0" alt="Lancopescreen" title="Lancopescreen" src="http://vmwaresecurity.typepad.com/security_in_the_virtual_w/images/2008/07/30/lancopescreen.jpg" style="margin: 0px 5px 5px 0px; float: left;" /></a> &lt;- Click to enlarge</p>

<p>You'll notice from the screenshot that you are able to visualize who is talking to who, how much traffic they have sent and received and something called a concern index (not seen on this screenshot).</p>

<p>Now, a concern index is a number that increases as Lancopes analytical engines monitor suspicious activity on a session.&nbsp; A high counter can be indicative of a security problem.&nbsp; Its another way of identifying (visualizing) compromised hosts (virtual machines) without having to do signature matching like a heavy weight IPS engine.&nbsp; Example:&nbsp; Lets say you have a VM that has a BOT on it and is &quot;owned&quot;.&nbsp; The Lancope product is monitoring this long life session.&nbsp; Let's say that session is established for several hours or maybe even days or months.&nbsp; Lets also say that the conversation appears to be mostly unidirectional from a public ip address not belonging to your enterprise.&nbsp; Lancope would increase a the concern index on this since this server hasn't typically had this type of behavior.&nbsp; Once the concern index reached a certain level it could then fire off an email, send you a text message or something saying:&nbsp; <strong>Warning, Warning, Danger, Danger Will Robinson!!! You're virtual server may be infected with a BOT, please investigate immediately!!!</strong></p>

<p>This example is VISIBILITY which helps you with SECURITY.&nbsp; There are a number of other things you can do with NetFlow and Lancope products that have less to do with security and more to do with operational efficiencies.&nbsp; Things like, helping you answer questions of:&nbsp; How do I know what network applications are taking up the most bandwidth?&nbsp; When should I move those applications over to a server with more horsepower?&nbsp; When did these VM's vmotion over here and was there a traffic condition / CPU condition that caused that to occur?&nbsp; I could go on and on but thats a topic for another blog entry.</p>

<p>So, my suggestion is to take a look at what NetFlow has to offer.&nbsp; Montego Networks supports NetFlow transmission and Lancope supports NetFlow analytics and with both you can regain what was lost visibility.</p>

<p>I hope this was helpful to you all!</p>

<p>-John Peterson</p></div>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 30 Jul 2008 17:57:06 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network">network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network visibility">network visibility</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/visibility">visibility</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/environments">environments</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtual environments network">virtual environments network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network bandwidth">network bandwidth</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bandwidth">bandwidth</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtual">virtual</category>
      <source url="http://vmwaresecurity.typepad.com/security_in_the_virtual_w/2008/07/security-throug.html">Security Through Visibility - Montego, Lancope and NetFlow</source>
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