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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: servers]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/servers</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Mon, 30 Jun 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Massive Coordinated Patch Effort To DNS System Flaw]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/7589fc80aa1552bfeb0b5819d4d86cda</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/7589fc80aa1552bfeb0b5819d4d86cda</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The DNS client and server patch in today's Microsoft monthly patches wasn't just a Microsoft problem. It was part of a coordinated effort to patch numerous DNS servers for a series of problems that...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The DNS client and server patch in <a href="http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Security-Pros-Rating-of-Microsofts-July-Security-Patches-Could-be-Deceiving/">today's Microsoft monthly patches</a> wasn't just a Microsoft problem. It was part of a coordinated effort to patch numerous DNS servers for a series of problems that are common to DNS implementations.

<a href="http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/800113">The US-Cert advisory on the problem</a> describes three problems which, research has shown, can be combined into effective spoofing attacks:
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/484649">VU#484649</a> - Microsoft Windows DNS Server vulnerable to cache poisoning
</li><li><a href="http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/252735">VU#252735</a> - ISC BIND generates cryptographically weak DNS query IDs
</li><li><a href="http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/927905">VU#927905</a> - BIND version 8 generates cryptographically weak DNS query identifiers</li></ul>
The advisory lists 101 DNS servers, their status and the date of their last update. For the large majority of the servers the status is "Unknown," but several important ones are listed as Vulnerable and all of these were patched either today or late last week. Among the vulnerable systems, in addition to Microsoft, are Cisco, ISC, Juniper, Red Hat and Sun. Many of the servers whose status is "Unknown" were also patched quite recently, and it's a safe guess that it was for this reason.

The advisory credits Dan Kaminsky of <a href="http://www.ioactive.com/">IOActive</a>, Paul Vixie of <a href="http://www.isc.org/">Internet Systems Consortium</a> (ISC) and Daniel J. Bernstein for the research. It also earlier mentions Amit Klein for work he did on one of the constituent attacks.

According to CircleID, <a href="http://www.circleid.com/posts/largest_synchronized_dns_bug_patch/">Kaminsky will reveal details of the attack in 30 days</a> after users and vendors have had a fair shot at patching it.<br style="clear: both;"/>
  <img alt="" style="border: 0; height:1px; width:1px;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?i=4b41d4126e1d061661557a16fd4ec510" height="1" width="1"/>
<img src="http://www.pheedo.com/feeds/tracker.php?i=4b41d4126e1d061661557a16fd4ec510" style="display: none;" border="0" height="1" width="1" alt=""/><img src="http://feeds.ziffdavisenterprise.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~4/330210899" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Jul 2008 13:56:25 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/microsoft monthly patches">microsoft monthly patches</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/microsoft">microsoft</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dns servers">dns servers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/isc bind">isc bind</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/isc">isc</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/servers">servers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attacks">attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/internet systems consortium">internet systems consortium</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/status">status</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.ziffdavisenterprise.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~3/330210899/massive_coordinated_patch_effort_to_dns_system_flaw.html">Massive Coordinated Patch Effort To DNS System Flaw</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Have you googled, HR security breaches lately?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/891bb72b417d85643a8bd1df738baf4f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/891bb72b417d85643a8bd1df738baf4f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Blogger: Randall Gamby
As briefly mentioned in a Burton Group IdPS blog and a ZDNet Australia published article on July 3, 2008, HR data from Google was stolen from one of their previous HR outsource...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Blogger: Randall Gamby</p>

<p>As briefly mentioned in a Burton Group <a href="http://bgidps.typepad.com/bgidps/2008/07/physician-heal.html">IdPS blog</a> and a ZDNet Australia published <a href="http://www.zdnet.com.au/news/security/soa/Stolen-Google-s-employee-records-/0,130061744,339290305,00.htm">article</a> on July 3, 2008, HR data from Google was stolen from one of their previous HR outsource partners.&nbsp; It seems that the partner, Colt Express Outsource Partners, had equipment stolen that contained HR data from some of its clients, including Google.&nbsp; The data was unencrypted and stored on systems that were apparently portable.</p>

<p>So what does this mean for all of us?&nbsp; </p>

<p>First, it shows that even large SaaS companies like Google can be bitten by a lack of security at their partners, just like many of us can.&nbsp; Burton Group has been warning clients for a long time about the dangers of sending confidential information to outsource partners without proper security and audit processes in place. Of course this should also be backed by strong contractual language.&nbsp; </p>

<p>Second, be prepared to pay.&nbsp; Even if Google had breach mitigation terms in their contract, Colt Express announced that it was in financial difficulty. So Google has had to pay for financial reporting and other compensation to its own employees, even though Google did nothing wrong.&nbsp; </p>

<p>Third, a Google representative stated &quot;We take the security of our employees very seriously and require outside vendors to meet appropriate security standards. We review and update these standards on an on-going basis.”&nbsp; Does this mean that Google doesn’t require encryption of its confidential information since encryption of the data was not deployed at Colt Express?&nbsp; When working with third parties, whether it’s financial data or confidential personal data, this information needs to be protected from unauthorized access. One of the simplest ways is encrypting the data while at rest, regardless of where it’s located.&nbsp; </p>

<p>Final, the Colt Express breach brings to mind a question Burton Group is always asking: “What is your exit strategy if the contract is terminated with your outsourcing partner?”&nbsp; A lot of effort is expended in creating an outsourcing agreement around use and protection of data, but what happens when the contract is ended?&nbsp; Do you obtain and retain the information the outsource partner maintained?&nbsp; Do you have the outsource partner destroy the information and any archives of it (and verify this was done)?&nbsp; Do you create a custodial contract with the outsourcing partner for them to maintain the information and archives on your behalf (ensuring the data is properly protected)?&nbsp; As was found in this incident, after their contract with Google was terminated the outsourcing partner apparently retained the employee data unencrypted on their servers. This was the fatal mistake that allowed the breach to occur.</p>

<p>So as you work with your outsourcing and SaaS vendors, you should not only consider how day-to-day operations should be secured to maintain the confidentiality of your data. You should also think about how that data is being maintained over time, and what are your procedures should the unthinkable happen if your partner allows your data to be compromised.</p></div>
<img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityAndRiskManagementStrategiesBlog/~4/329819020" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Jul 2008 05:38:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/employee data">employee data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/outsource partner destroy">outsource partner destroy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/outsource partner">outsource partner</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/confidential personal data">confidential personal data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/financial data">financial data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/partner">partner</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/partner apparently">partner apparently</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityAndRiskManagementStrategiesBlog/~3/329819020/have-you-google.html">Have you googled, HR security breaches lately?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Swedes Massively Protest Wiretap Law]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/83ff246ffcb04684af06c532c75da1ca</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/83ff246ffcb04684af06c532c75da1ca</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[In June the Swedish parliament passed a controversial surveillance law that gives authorities a mandate to read all email and listen in on all phone calls without warrant or court order. In response...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[In June the Swedish parliament passed a controversial surveillance law that gives authorities a mandate to read all email and listen in on all phone calls without warrant or court order. In response to the law, The Pirate Party organized rallies, bloggers and journalists turned into activists, and even Google decided to relocate their servers.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 07 Jul 2008 17:50:03 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/law">law</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/controversial surveillance law">controversial surveillance law</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/swedish parliament">swedish parliament</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/phone calls">phone calls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/google">google</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/journalists">journalists</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/court">court</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bloggers">bloggers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email">email</category>
      <source url="http://digg.com/security/Swedes_Massively_Protest_Wiretap_Law_2">Swedes Massively Protest Wiretap Law</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Firewalls On Your Windows Servers]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/0d3a5ed02686a6d75aef94ae06705f87</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/0d3a5ed02686a6d75aef94ae06705f87</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[A survey last year by David Litchfield of NGS Software showed &quot; ...there are approximately 368,000 Microsoft SQL Servers directly accessible on the Internet and around 124,000 Oracle database servers...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<A href="http://regmedia.co.uk/2007/11/15/thedatabaseexposuresurvey2007.pdf">A survey last year by David Litchfield of NGS Software</A> showed "<i>...there are approximately 368,000 Microsoft SQL Servers directly accessible on the Internet and around 124,000 Oracle database servers directly accessible on the Internet.</i>" Egad! That's almost certainly not a good thing. Many of them are accessible by accident and many of them are run by just plain incompetent people; 4% of the SQL servers were so old they were still vulnerable to the Slammer worm from many years ago.

One point it raises, even if you don't in intend for your server to be accessible directly on the Internet, is defense in-depth. There should be a firewall on the server so that at least the attack surface is somewhat restricted. Out of this philosophy, starting with Windows Server 2008, the Windows Firewall is turned on by default.

Many users will notice this change in the form of connectivity failures, but that's a good thing because it forces you to think about what's open and closed on your server and make a decision about it. <a href="http://blogs.msdn.com/sqlsecurity/archive/2008/07/01/sql-server-and-the-windows-server-2008-firewall.aspx">An entry on the SQL Server Security Blog</a> discusses these changes and how you can approach them to make your Windows Server 2008-hosted SQL Servers secure.

First you have to locate your servers; it's a good bet that quite a few owners of those Internet-facing servers that Litchfield found don't even know the servers are up. You need to review the host security implementations on those servers to make sure that they conform to your policy. You also need to review your <i>network</i> firewall policies to make sure that the two are compatible. Verify that it's all working as expected; in other words, test the configuration. Then remedy the problems.

Read the blog for more details. On your Windows Server 2003 servers you might even want to turn the firewall on as a defensive measure. Or you might want to turn it off on 2008. But it should be you making a conscious decision.<br style="clear: both;"/>
  <img alt="" style="border: 0; height:1px; width:1px;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?i=35d3a5c73bd4a65ab2f70def6ff10c2c" height="1" width="1"/>
<img src="http://www.pheedo.com/feeds/tracker.php?i=35d3a5c73bd4a65ab2f70def6ff10c2c" style="display: none;" border="0" height="1" width="1" alt=""/><img src="http://feeds.ziffdavisenterprise.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~4/328040439" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 06 Jul 2008 04:37:16 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/servers">servers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql servers">sql servers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql servers secure">sql servers secure</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server">server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/windows server">windows server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/firewall">firewall</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network firewall policies">network firewall policies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/windows firewall">windows firewall</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/litchfield">litchfield</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.ziffdavisenterprise.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~3/328040439/firewalls_on_your_windows_servers.html">Firewalls On Your Windows Servers</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Hidden endpoints: Mitigating the threat of non-traditional network devices]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/56a16c8a42e6624c687451869bc74922</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/56a16c8a42e6624c687451869bc74922</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Organizations have many safeguards in place for network-enabled devices like PCs and servers, but few realize the threat posed by non-traditional devices like printers, physical access devices and...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Organizations have many safeguards in place for network-enabled devices like PCs and servers, but few realize the threat posed by non-traditional devices like printers, physical access devices and even vending machines. Endpoint security expert Mark Kadrich offers up some worst-case scenarios and explains how these and other endpoints can be protected.<img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/WhatisEnterpriseItTipsAndExpertAdvice/~4/326057949" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 03 Jul 2008 11:40:22 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/devices">devices</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/physical access devices">physical access devices</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/non-traditional devices">non-traditional devices</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/worst-case scenarios">worst-case scenarios</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/endpoints">endpoints</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/threat posed">threat posed</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/safeguards">safeguards</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/explains">explains</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/printers">printers</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/WhatisEnterpriseItTipsAndExpertAdvice/~3/326057949/0,289483,sid14_gci1319144,00.html">Hidden endpoints: Mitigating the threat of non-traditional network devices</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Upcoming Talks and Training]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d68ebfdb5917f37e9c36ff618bc2fbcb</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d68ebfdb5917f37e9c36ff618bc2fbcb</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Here is my current list of talks and training


Breaking Web Services,&quot; Monday July 7: OWASP Twin Cities - &quot; SOA and Web services promise wonderful interoperability, but distributed systems create...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Here is my current list of talks and training</p><br><div><ul>
<li>"Breaking Web Services," Monday July 7: <a href="https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Minneapolis_St_Paul">OWASP Twin Cities</a>  - "<span style="font-family: -webkit-sans-serif; line-height: 19px; ">SOA and Web services promise wonderful interoperability, but distributed systems create lots of room for fantastic failures. This session will explore the gory details of unique vulnerabilities at each layer of the SOA stack - from the WSDL interfaces to XML processing (XSD, XPath and XQuery), to the implementation languages liike Java and C#, to new security standards like WS-Security and SAML.<p style="margin-top: 0.4em; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0.5em; margin-left: 0px; line-height: 1.5em; ">I gave a version of  this talk with Brian Chess at the <a href="https://cm.rsaconference.com/US08/catalog/controller/catalog" class="external text" title="https://cm.rsaconference.com/US08/catalog/controller/catalog" rel="nofollow" style="text-decoration: none; background-image: none; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; -webkit-background-clip: initial; -webkit-background-origin: initial; background-color: initial; color: #3366bb; background-position: initial initial; ">2008 RSA Conference</a>.</p></span></li>
<li><span> "Web Services and SSO: There and Back Again" at Ping's <a href="http://www.ssosummit.com/program/Agenda-at-a-Glance.cfm">SSO Summit</a>. July 25, Keystone, CO - "<span style="font-family: Arial; font-size: 14px; line-height: normal; "><font size="2">What happens to your identity information and business data after you press "SUBMIT" on a website? These bits have a journey as dangerous as Frodo Baggins' travels through Mordor. This talk traces the path from the website through the perils that lurk in the enterprise and legacy systems. We will explore what threats are encountered along the way, and how to design a cost effective security architecture with Security Token Servers using open standards</font><em><font size="2">."</font></em></span> <span> </span> </span></li>
<li><span> "SOA, web services, and XML Security" 1 day training at <a href="http://www.usenix.org/events/sec08/training/tutonefile.html#t3">Usenix Security</a></span> July 29. This is a public 1 day version of my <a href="http://arctecgroup.net/training.htm">training</a> see the link for details</li>
</ul>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 03 Jul 2008 10:32:26 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/usenix security july">usenix security july</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ws-security">ws-security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/xml security">xml security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/july">july</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web services">web services</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/day version">day version</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security standards">security standards</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/soa">soa</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/07/upcoming-talks-and-training.html">Upcoming Talks and Training</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Protecting exposed servers from Google hacks (and Google 'dorks')]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/46304470b79510a462523053ad50a383</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/46304470b79510a462523053ad50a383</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Search engines are now routinely used to find ways of gaining unauthorized access to servers. Michael Cobb explains how to avoid exposing your important data to 'Google...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Search engines are now routinely used to find ways of gaining unauthorized access to servers. Michael Cobb explains how to avoid exposing your important data to 'Google dorks.'<img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/WhatisEnterpriseItTipsAndExpertAdvice/~4/325144194" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 02 Jul 2008 11:32:18 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/michael cobb explains">michael cobb explains</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/servers">servers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/google dorks">google dorks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/engines">engines</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/avoid">avoid</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/access">access</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/routinely">routinely</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/WhatisEnterpriseItTipsAndExpertAdvice/~3/325144194/0,289625,sid14_gci1317952,00.html">Protecting exposed servers from Google hacks (and Google 'dorks')</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Tip: Does Your Server Really Need a Recycle Bin?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/04796b4fcb53857b83413b80c6262f34</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/04796b4fcb53857b83413b80c6262f34</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[This is obvious when you think about it. What might you do, operating on the server itself, for which you need a recycle bin? In fact, for some, like Terminal Servers, you might need then, but not on...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This is obvious when you think about it. What might you do, operating on the server itself, for which you need a recycle bin? In fact, for some, like Terminal Servers, you might need then, but not on others like a web server. In the meantime, it turns out to be a potential liability there.

Thanks to <a href="http://www.theeldergeek.com/enable_disable_recycle_bin.htm">The Elder Geek</a>, by way of <a href="http://msmvps.com/blogs/bradley/archive/2008/07/01/does-your-server-really-need-a-recycle-bin.aspx">the SBS Diva blog (read this one for better details)</a>, for pointing this out.

Susan, the SBS Diva, <a href="http://msmvps.com/blogs/bradley/archive/2008/06/24/so-how-did-they-break-in.aspx">recently had a server compromise</a>, and it turns out that the attackers used her web server's recycle bin as a video repository. Why? Because it's hidden.

Removing the recycle bin won't stop someone from compromising your server, but it will take away one place they can hide once they get in there, so you might discover the breach sooner.

And if you don't delete it, at least cut it down in size from the default 10% of space, which is far too big for a server, and probably for most client desktop.<br style="clear: both;"/>
      <a href="http://www.pheedo.com/click.phdo?s=bf8001d25bd1e2fcb926bd05347b2116"><img alt="" style="border: 0;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?s=bf8001d25bd1e2fcb926bd05347b2116"/></a>
  <img src="http://www.pheedo.com/feeds/tracker.php?i=bf8001d25bd1e2fcb926bd05347b2116" style="display: none;" border="0" height="1" width="1" alt=""/><img src="http://feeds.ziffdavisenterprise.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~4/324872146" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 02 Jul 2008 04:54:44 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server">server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/recycle bin">recycle bin</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web server">web server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server compromise">server compromise</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sbs diva">sbs diva</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sbs diva blog">sbs diva blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/potential liability">potential liability</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/breach sooner">breach sooner</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/elder geek">elder geek</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.ziffdavisenterprise.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~3/324872146/tip_does_your_server_really_need_a_recycle_bin.html">Tip: Does Your Server Really Need a Recycle Bin?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Virtualization Needs vs. Cool Features]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5e61ca489a9bbf96b3334c272f8306de</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5e61ca489a9bbf96b3334c272f8306de</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Regardless of the size of your virtualization project you will probably ask two of the most common questions before you even start
What product(s) &amp; version(s) should I use
How much should I plan to...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Regardless of the size of your virtualization project you will probably ask two of the most common questions before you even start:</p>
<ol>
<li>What product(s) &amp; version(s) should I use?</li>
<li>How much should I plan to spend?</li>
</ol>
<p>The simplest answer of course is “it depends”. I’ve seen implementations range from a thousand bucks to over several million. Ideally, your virtualization project needs &amp; goals should drive your product selection. The bells &amp; whistles you chose will determine your spending.</p>
<p><strong>10 Basic questions that will help you determine product &amp; cost:</strong></p>
<ol>
<li>Will your Virtual Infrastructure (VI) host production Virtual Machines (VM)?</li>
<li>What servers do you already have that can be used as hosts (32bit, 64bit, Mem, Disk, Network)?</li>
<li>Do you have a need for High Availability (HA)?</li>
<li>Do you have the need to manage SLA’s on your VMs?</li>
<li>What will a typical VM in your VI look like (OS, Disk, Mem, Network, CPU)?</li>
<li>What other IT resources do you have that can be used (SAN, NAS, Switches, etc…)?</li>
<li>What level of comfort does your existing staff have with the various IT resources?</li>
<li>Do you have existing hardware/software support agreements with Vendors you could leverage?</li>
<li>What tools do you already own that are “virtualization aware” and what new tools will you need?</li>
<li>How many VM’s do you plan to scale to?</li>
</ol>
<p>Please, please, please, don’t make the mistake of implementing features that you don’t need and over-engineering just because the product lets you do so.</p>
<p>If you plan it right your product &amp; cost, questions will be answered with no unpleasant surprises.</p>
<p><a href="http://sharethis.com/item?&wp=2.5.1&amp;publisher=ea11358c-69de-4e80-9804-e964a8930b70&amp;title=Virtualization+Needs+vs.+Cool+Features&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fblog.sciencelogic.com%2Fvirtualization-needs-vs-cool-features%2F07%2F2008" onclick="javascript:pageTracker._trackPageview('/outbound/article/sharethis.com');">ShareThis</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jul 2008 17:00:08 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/determine product">determine product</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/product">product</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/product selection">product selection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/questions">questions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/basic questions">basic questions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization project">virtualization project</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/plan">plan</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/determine">determine</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/common questions">common questions</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/virtualization-needs-vs-cool-features/07/2008">Virtualization Needs vs. Cool Features</source>
    </item>
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      <title><![CDATA[Links for 2008-06-30 [del.icio.us]]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/426d1daa7056db5cfc6a9644b602cad7</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/426d1daa7056db5cfc6a9644b602cad7</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[SIEM tools come up short
Are SIEM and log management the same thing? - Network World
Log Management IT@SmallBiz Another issue we faced in dealing with our SAS 70 audit was log management. Every system...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.networkworld.com/cgi-bin/mailto/x.cgi?pagetosend=/export/home/httpd/htdocs/reviews/2008/063008-test-siem.html&pagename=/reviews/2008/063008-test-siem.html&pageurl=http://www.networkworld.com/reviews/2008/063008-test-siem.html&site=security">SIEM tools come up short</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.networkworld.com/reviews/2008/063008-test-siem-log-integration.html">Are SIEM and log management the same thing? - Network World</a></li>
<li><a href="http://itatsmallbiz.wordpress.com/2008/06/30/log-management/">Log Management &laquo; IT@SmallBiz</a><br/>
Another issue we faced in dealing with our SAS 70 audit was log management.  Every system admin deals with this issue, we just ignore it most times.  You have all sorts of information stored in log files on all your various servers.  If you were going to</li>
<li><a href="http://anand.typepad.com/datawocky/2008/06/searching-for-a-needle-or-exploring-the-haystack.html">Datawocky: Searching for a Needle or Exploring the Haystack?</a><br/>
&quot;Searching for a Needle or Exploring the Haystack?&quot; 

Search engines are great at finding the needle in a haystack. And that's perfect when you are looking for a needle. Often though, the main objective is not so much to find a specific needle as to exp</li>
</ul><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~4/323776452" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 30 Jun 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/log management">log management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/log management itsmallbiz">log management itsmallbiz</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/needle">needle</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/specific needle">specific needle</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/siem tools">siem tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/siem">siem</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/system admin deals">system admin deals</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/haystack">haystack</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/log files">log files</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/323776452/anton18">Links for 2008-06-30 [del.icio.us]</source>
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