[SecurityRatty] tag: sessions

User Experience in the Identity Community

Tue, 02 Dec 2008 03:00:00 +0000

Eric Sachs & Ben Laurie, Google Security

One of the major conferences on Internet identity standards is the Internet Identity Workshop (IIW), a semiannual 'un-conference' where the sessions are not determined ahead of time. It is attended by a large set of people who work on Internet security and identity standards such as OAuth, OpenID, SAML, InfoCards, etc. A major theme within the identity community this year has been about improving the user experience and growing the adoption of these technologies. The OpenID community is making great progress on user experience, with Yahoo, AOL, and Google quickly improving the support they provide (read a summary from Joseph Smarr of Plaxo). Similarly, the InfoCard community has been working on simplifying the user experience of InfoCard technology, including the updated CardSpace selector from Microsoft.

Another hot topic at IIW centered around how to improve the user experience when testing alternatives and enhancements to passwords to make them less susceptible to phishing attacks. Many websites and enterprises have tried these password enhancements/alternatives, but they found that people complained that they were hard to use, or that they weren't portable enough for people who use multiple computers, including web cafes and smart phones. We have published an article summarizing some of the community's current ideas for how to deploy these new authentication mechanisms using a multi-layered approach that minimizes additional work required by users. We have also pulled together a set of videos showing how a number of these different approaches work with both web-based and desktop applications. We hope this information will be helpful to other websites and enterprises who are concerned about phishing.

BlueHat SDL Sessions Wrap-up

Mon, 01 Dec 2008 14:51:00 +0000

Hi everyone, Bryan here. The debut BlueHat SDL Sessions are over, and they were a resounding success: 96% of attendees completing evaluation surveys reported that they will be able to apply knowledge that they learned in the SDL sessions to make their products more secure. This is a great score and I’d like to thank all of our speakers and the BlueHat planning team for their hard work. As for the other 4% of attendees, we’ll just have to work that much harder next year to bring them actionable guidance for dealing with new vulnerabilities.

As promised, we recorded all of the day’s presentations and we’ve published them on TechNet:

Keynote Address by Scott Charney, Corporate VP, Microsoft Trustworthy Computing

Threat Modeling at EMC and Microsoft by Danny Dhillon of EMC and Adam Shostack of the Microsoft SDL team (of course)

Mitigations Unplugged by Matt Miller, Microsoft Security Science team

Concurrency Attacks on Web Applications by Scott Stender and Alex Vidergar of iSEC Partners

Fuzzed Enough? When it’s OK to Put the Shears Down by Jason Shirk, Dave Weinstein and Lars Opstad, Microsoft Security Science team

Real World Code Review – Using the Right Tools in the Right Place at the Right Time by Vinnie Liu of Stach & Liu

In addition to the presentations, we also recorded some short interviews (about 10 minutes long) with each of the speakers. If you’re just looking for a quick summary of a particular talk, these interviews are the place to start:

Threat Modeling at EMC, Danny Dhillon

Threat Modeling at Microsoft, Adam Shostack

Mitigations Unplugged, Matt Miller

Concurrency Attacks on Web Applications, Scott Stender and Alex Vidergar

Fuzzed Enough? Jason Shirk and Dave Weinstein

Real World Code Review, Vinnie Liu

I hope at least 96% of online readers will be able to directly apply this material to their products, just like the show attendees. Please post back and let us know, either way. And let us know what you’d like to see for next year. We have big plans to build on our success and make SDL Sessions 2.0 even bigger and better than the first.

The Economics of Finding and Fixing Vulnerabilities in Distributed Systems

Tue, 18 Nov 2008 19:47:55 +0000

The Economics of Finding and Fixing Vulnerabilities in Distributed Systems

Quality of Protection Keynote

Alexandria, VA

October 27. 2008

Gunnar Peterson

Managing Principal, Arctec Group

Blog: http://1raindrop.typepad.com

When Andy Ozment asked me over the summer to do this talk at QoP, I knew back in August that the topic I wanted to address was security and economics. So to that end I would like to start by thanking all of our friends on Wall Street and here in Washington DC for providing such a rich tapestry of recent events that I can speak to.

Like many people in this industry, my focus on security was fundamentally altered by Dan Geer's speech "Risk Management is Where the Money Is"[1], there are not many people who can call a ten year shot in the technology business, but Dan Geer did. The talk revolutionized the security industry. Since that speech, the security market, the vendors, consultants, and everyone else has realized that security is really about risk management.

Of course, saying that you are managing risk and actually managing risk are two different things. Warren Buffett started off his 2007 shareholder letter [2] talking about financial institutions' ability to deal with the subprime mess in the housing market saying, "You don't know who is swimming naked until the tide goes out." In our world, we don't know whose systems are running naked, with no controls, until they are attacked. Of course, by then it is too late.

So the security industry understands enough about risk management that the language of risk has permeated almost every product, presentation, and security project for the last ten years. However, a friend of mine who works at a bank recently attended a workshop on security metrics, and came away with the following observation - "All these people are talking about risk, but they don't have any assets." You can't do risk management if you don't know your assets.

Risk management requires that you know your assets, that on some level you understand the vulnerabilities surrounding your assets, the threats against those, and efficacy of the countermeasures you would like to use to separate the threat from the asset. But it starts with assets. Unfortunately, in the digital world these turn out to be devilishly hard to identify and value.

Recent events have taught us again, that in the financial world, Warren Buffett has few peers as a risk manager. I would like to take the first two parts of this talk looking at his career as a way to understand risk management and what we can infer for our digital assets.

Warren Buffett's evolution as an investor can be broken up into two parts. He began his career very much influenced by Ben Graham, who sought to buy "cheap stocks", comparing the price of the stock to value of the company's assets, and placing many, diversified bets on companies whose share price was below the total assets. Note that the businesses may have been of unremarkable quality, but when the price was right Graham would buy in, wait for it to rise and then sell. This was the dawn of value investing.

Buffett's later career departed from Graham's strict, statistical measures, where he sought to buy into companies that were selling at a fair price, but were also high quality businesses. We will examine high quality in Part 2 of this talk, but first we go to Part 1 which is asset value.

Why does a talk on finding and fixing vulnerabilities start with valuing assets? The reason is that vulnerabilities are everywhere, we are literally marinating in them. Interesting vulnerabilities are attached to high value assets. In a world that quite literally presents us with too much information, we need screens to sift out what is worth paying attention to. You can run your vulnerability assessment tool of choice on your system, and come back with hundreds or thousands of vulnerabilities, but which ones should you pay attention to and act on? The first part of answering this question is asset value.

When Warren Buffett was 19 years old studying at the University of Nebraska, he read Ben Graham's book "The Intelligent Investor", Buffett said he thought it was the best book on investing he has ever read and still feels that way today. In the Intelligent Investor Graham lays out the framework of value investing. Specifically, Graham talks about three concepts - Mr. Market, a stock is a piece of a business, and Margin of Safety.

Mr. Market is a fictional, teaching device invented by Graham. You imagine that you have a somewhat manic depressive business partner called Mr. Market. Every day, Mr. Market comes into the office and offers you quotes on companies, some days he is in a good mood and the prices are high, other days he is gloomy and prices are low. The market is a quote machine, for quoting prices, not a value assessment machine. Your job is to wait for the right price, and you are free to take as many passes and be as patient as you would like, Mr. Market will just show up the next day and throw out a new price.

Graham used Mr. Market to teach us the separation between a price of a stock, and the value of a company. The second big concept from Intelligent Investor is that buying a stock is buying a small piece of the underlying business. You are not buying a roulette chip, or a number that fluctuates in the newspaper every day, rather you are buying a piece of the company's existing and future cash flow. What the stock market says General Electric is worth yesterday, today or tomorrow is separate from GE's actual ability to generate cash flow.

The last big concept in "The Intelligent Investor" and the one seemingly most applicable to information security is the Margin of Safety. Graham's margin of safety involved calculating the intrinsic value of a business and then buying stock where the market cap of a company is less than its intrinsic value. So if a company has $100 million in assets and a market capitalization of $75 million, then an investor would get a 25% margin of safety. Ideally, Graham wanted to buy stocks that were selling for one half of their book value, i.e. with a 50% margin of safety. Graham said that buying stocks without a margin of safety, above their book value, speculation, not investing.

So price is readily available, but how do we calculate intrinsic value so that we can ascertain the margin of safety? Graham used quantitative statistical measures, relying heavily on the company's book value, like its hard assets. What would it take for a competitor to reproduce the company's assets - its factories, distribution system, and so on. The difference between the book value of the assets and market cap is the margin of safety.

What can we learn in information security from this quantitative approach? Where price and value are readily ascertainable we should build countermeasures and eliminate on vulnerabilities that give our assets a wide margin of safety. Since budgets are not unlimited we should prefer vulnerabilities that are cheap to find, cheap to fix.

First to the asset question, information security budgets like all IT budgets are crufty, they are not a reflection of today's top issues and priorities so much as an accumulating snowball of decisions, legacy contracts, and solution attempts to yesteryear's problems. Today the normal Information Security budget is just a legacy artifact from bygone years when the network was the purported greatest vulnerability. If you were around in 1995, you remember the great gnashing of gears as the enterprises opened up their networks, connected their back ends to the Web and began to transact business in the giant virtual space.

The security people huffed and puffed that it was dangerous but there was simply too much money to be made, so businesses went ahead. The security people would not go down without a fight and insisted on countermeasures. They got two - the network firewall and SSL. The firewall was used to separate the average Fortune 500s network of hundreds of thousands of machines, employees, consultants, and partners from the web at large. SSL was used to protect the network channel between the web server and the client browser. so the network firewall separated the network segments, and SSL in effect encrypted the last mile of many million complex transactions and computations.

In 1995, this seemed like a good security architecture. When we built out these security architectures, the eCommerce market was derided as a toy. Amazon famously lost money for years - losing a little on every transaction but making it up in volume. When the market is nascent, a quaint security architecture offers cost effective protection. But what about 2008? Those cute little eCommerce buggers have grown they even make profits now - market caps measured in the tens of billions, accumulating large cash hordes, no debt, and the largest ones are in better financial shape than the financial services players that kicked sand in their face in the dotcom era.

And its not just eCommerce, the "real" economy Fortune 500 types are all connected as well. Directly and indirectly the Web is seeping into all businesses. Major changes from when the security architecture of the web was built out. But has the security architecture changed to reflect these new business realities? Not a bit of it!

We can use the book value of the IT budget investments and the book value of the Information Security investments to see what kind of Margins of Safety Information Security groups are engineering.

Let's look at some market data, Gary McGraw reviewed the numbers [2] in software security for 2007, breaking down software security sectors like tools and services. Here is a summary of his findings on software security tools:

"One of the most important developments in the software security market can be seen in the tools space which, combined, almost doubled to $150-180 million. Top of list are two major acquisitions that closed in 2007: Watchfire's purchase by IBM (somewhere in the range of $120-150 million on 2006 revenue of $26 million) and SPI Dynamics's purchase by HP (for around $100 million on 2006 revenue of $21.2 million).

...

The black box space was flat in 2007, with IBM/Watchfire checking in at $24.1 million and HP/SPI Dynamics earning $22.3 million. Smaller companies in the space, including Cenzic, Codenomicon, WhiteHat and the like had combined revenues around $12.5 million (a growth of 25%, though Cenzic grew 16% and WhiteHat 52%). Most of the growth "hiccup" in the black box market can be attributed to the serious challenges posed by any acquisition. So far 2008 looks to be back on track from a growth perspective in the black box testing space. The global reach that IBM and HP offer are already making a big difference.

On a more positive note, static analysis tools for code review grew at a healthy clip in 2007 into a $91.9 million dollar market. Fortify was up 83% to $29.2 million. Klocwork grew over 60% to $26 million. Coverity grew over 50% to $27.2 million. Ounce Labs tripled their revenue to $9.5 million."

These are very nice growth numbers, what company doesn't want 83% growth? However, the let's look at the total picture and compare the software security countermeasures against other security mechanisms. Gary McGraw's estimate shows the software security space coming in at $150 Million total, yet we see a company like Checkpoint that won the network security war in 1995 with earnings of around $900 Million! One single network security vendor is 6 times bigger than the entire software security space, in what alternate universe does this make sense?

This is where we begin to see that decisions in the People's Republic of Information Security have no real risk management thinking, they truly are swimming naked and hoping the tide doesn't go out.

Let's look at network assets. Obviously Cisco is the biggest, they earned $39.5 Billion last year. Pretty stellar. So spending $900 Million (Checkpoint) to defined $39.5 Billion seems like a pretty good deal.

Except, let's compare software security spending - last year Microsoft earned $60 Billion, SAP $16 billion, and Oracle $22 Billion. So that is about $98 Billion in just three vendors and you are going to "defend" that with allocating $150 Million worth of software security tools?

On the network side we are buying $900 million of security countermeasures (Checkpoint firewalls) to protect $39.5 billion worth of Cisco gear, about 2.3% of the network investment goes to security.

On the software side, we are buying $150 million of security countermeasures (like static analysis and black box scanners) to protect $98 billion of software (you know the stuff that runs the whole business), roughly coming to about 0.2% of the software budget goes to security.

This is very disturbing. From a prioritization standpoint The People's Republic of Information Security is misaligned by an order of magnitude at least. Next time you read about a data breach, or see an auditor's report with thousands of findings you won't have to wonder how it happened. It happened because Information Security doesn't have its eye on the ball, it invests in network security not because those controls have greater efficacy (the whole point of networks is they are dumb), no, they invest in network firewalls because they bought a bunch in 1995, some more in 1998, and heck they just kept buying them, the Checkpoint rep kept showing up and taking CISOs out to play golf, contracts got renewed, and poof - there goes the security budget.

Consider that software security tools could grow 50% a year for five years and still be half of where Checkpoint is today.

The optimistic way of looking at all this data is that there is major room for growth for software security, if you take network security as a target for a mature industry and assume that 2.3% is a reasonable margin of safety, then the software security space should evolve to around 2% of the software space meaning that it should evolve into a $2 billion space around fifteen times larger than it is today. Unprotected assets will either be protected or will cease to be assets, VCs get your check books ready.

My friend Brian Chess has a nice way of looking at this he says 2007 was the turning point - "the first year there was a bigger market for products that help you get code right than there was for products that help you demonstrate a problem exists."

Now I am not suggesting that Information Security budgets have to be aligned with IT budget one for one, but I do think that looking at the overall IT budget is the starting point. If Information Security has a more cost effective security mechanism they should deploy it, but the starting point should be aligned to the business. Businesses spend most of their money on software, and there are very good reasons - competitive advantage, increased revenues and lower costs. Information Security spends most of its money on network security, and there is no good reason why, except that it was a seemingly good idea in 1995. You really don't have to go beyond the book value of IT investment as a whole versus Information Security to see a stunning disparity. Information Security's job is to deliver a Margin of Safety to the business, but they are not.

To deliver a real Margin of Safety to the business, I propose the following based on a defense in depth mindset. Break the IT budget into the following categories:

- Network: all the resources invested in Cisco, network admins, etc.

- Host: all the resources invested in Unix, Windows, sys admins, etc.

- Applications: all the resources invested in developers, CRM, ERP, etc.

- Data: all the resources invested in databases, DBAs, etc.

Tally up each layer. If you are like most business you will probably find that you spend most on Applications, then Data, then Host, then Network.

Then do the same exercise for the Information Security budget:

- Network: all the resources invested in network firewalls, firewall admins, etc.

- Host: all the resources invested in Vulnerability management, patching, etc.

- Applications: all the resources invested in static analysis, black box scanning etc.

- Data: all the resources invested in database encryption, database monitoring, etc.

Again, tally each up layer. If you are like most business you will find that you spend most on Network, then Host, then Applications, then Data. Congratulations, Information Security, you are diametrically opposed to the business!

Its not just about alignment for alignment's sake, its about applying controls as a way to have a Margin of Safety properly placed so that when not if there is a failure on a higher value asset you are relatively better positioned to deal with it.

The pure statistical approach can only take us so far. Buffett said he would be a lot poorer if all he did was listen to Ben Graham. Book value is great to see the diametric opposition mentioned above, but it doesn't really tell us much about the efficacy of the security mechanisms.

What we do get out of this statistical approach is a screen. The asset value screen filters out subjective opinion and narrows the field for where we need to dig in to do the high value, time consuming analytical work.

The second part of Warren Buffett's career and the second part of this talk leave behind pure statistical measures. In Warren Buffett's case he was joined by a guy named Charlie Munger who talked him out of the pure Ben Graham approach. Charlie Munger has a saying - "a great business at a fair price beats a fair business at a great price." Where Graham was focused on price and margin of safety, Munger wants a fair price but also a high quality business. This lead to Warren Buffett's company Berkshire Hathaway investing in companies like Coca Cola, Wells Fargo, and American Express, where the prices were far from dirt cheap (as Graham would have wanted), but the long term returns were outstanding.

In our world of Information Security, we start by aligning our priorities with the business using the thumbnail defense in depth approach, but then we would like to invest in high quality, effective controls.

To get at the notion of control quality and effectiveness, I am going to start part 2 of this talk with a brief history of software. The first web software was just static HTML, but web software really got interesting when developers started creating dynamic websites using CGI an PERL.

Once websites were hooked up to company databases and were not just serving static content, the security people realized they needed a security architecture, and they sprung into action. What they came up was was model that divided the world into "good stuff" which was comprised of all their networks, systems, and data; and then there was everything else the "bad stuff" on the Internet. So job one of the early days Internet security architecture was to separate all your good stuff (i.e. your network) for the bad stuff (the Internet). To do this the security people used a sophisticated tool called Visio to draw a flaming brick wall on the network diagram, and this flaming brick wall was supposed to keep the good stuff and the bad stuff separate.

The security people also realized that the data and session tokens that they served up from their Web server would have to traverse the "bad" neighborhood called the Internet, so they added one more security mechanism to secure the last mile of the transaction - SSL between the browser and the Web server.

And this was the state of the art security architecture used circa 1995 to protect the earliest dynamic web applications.

What happened next was that the dotcom boom started to happen and businesses realized they could make some real money on the Web, the web apps started to get more sophisticated, more personalization, richer session experiences and so on. This led the Java people to create JSP and the Microsoft people to create ASP, and of course the PERL people to create even greasier PERL scripts, all of this in the effort to pooling resources and sessions on the Web server. The security people defended this new application programming model with network firewall and SSL.

Around 1998, developers began building out more distributed N tier or 3 tier applications that separated the business logic layer, the presentation layer and the data access layer. Among other things, your web application could seamlessly integrate data from multiple back ends systems. Let's say you have pricing data in Oracle, order data in SAP, and customer data in a Mainframe. You write separate data access objects, apply business logic in the middle tier and then you tie it all together in a friendly user interface. At this point the web applications are beginning to integrate across departments and geographic boundaries, huge critical chunks of the business are now connected to the web. How did the security people defend this part of the business? They applied the same 1995 security architecture - network firewall and SSL.

Around 1999-2000 timeframe businesses relied on web applications for major parts of the revenue, and the apps were built in different technologies like Java and Microsoft technologies, but the customer didn't care (still doesn't), the customer wanted (and still wants) data access and functionality. So to integrate the disparate technologies, SOAP and XML were deployed so that Microsoft could talk to Java and so Websphere could talk to Weblogic and so on. And, oh yes, SOAP and XML were used to connect B2B networks so partners in a supply chain and business process can exchange data and interoperate. SOAP and XML present a fundamentally new programming model based on a message document style integration, where XML is used to mesh together data and functionality across platforms. SOAP and XML have no security model by default for authentication, authorization, and confidentiality. How did the security people deal with this? They kept the security architecture the same as they had in 1995 - network firewalls and SSL.

The software world did not stop innovating in 2000 of course, in the last few years we have seen Web services and XML form the basis of baroque and powerful SOAs and simple REST applications. We have seen Web 2.0 come on the scene, and entirely new networked applications built on top of that.

What we have not seen, is a single meaningful change in security architecture in 13 years. Developers have evolved, businesses have increasingly bet their entire business models on the web and they have increased security budgets. But what has the security architecture as its deployed in the field got to show for all of this? More firewalls and more SSL connections.

Since Information Security has proven incapable of evolving, it is time to learn from a discipline that has mastered innovation - software development, and yes, I will step back in case the lightning bolts hits.

What does software development focus on these days? Well, let's look at Service Oriented Architecture (SOA), all hype aside I look at SOA as a set of technologies that delivers three things:

Virtualization: we want Beijing, Bangalore and Boston to communicate.

Interoperability: we want our .Net stuff to talk to our java stuff.

Reusability: how many order/claim/pricing/customer systems does one company need?

To build out their SOA, developers separated the application interface from its implementation. So you can host the interface in a variety of locations, but its separate from the application logic and data.

This is also a useful trick for putting services like SOAP through the firewall. SOAP was designed as a firewall friendly protocol. When SOAP first came out, Bruce Schneier said calling SOAP a firewall friendly protocol is like having a skull friendly bullet. Which is a great line and explains why his books fly off the shelves, it does not explain, why security people think an architecture designed in 1995 is the one we should be using today. Maybe the problem is not that the developers figured out how to go through the firewall to get the data their customers want, maybe the problem is that the firewall is the sum total of the security architecture, and it never adapted.

A big part of this problem is that we have left Newton's world behind and entered Einstein's universe. Mainframes are Newton’s world, we have THE computer, THE price, THE record and so on.

As Pat Helland explained [4,5], Mainframes are Newron's world, but Distributed computing is Einstein’s world. More specifically in the Einstein world of distributed computing - "Computers don’t make decisions, computers try to make decisions." Our computers don't really make a decision, they say you can buy this book from Amazon at this price, we have it in stock and will deliver on such and such a date. But the warehouse runs out, the pallet gets dropped in the warehouse, your boo is crushed, and the package is stolen off your front step. The computer confirmed your transaction, but the real world intervened.

So we don't have iron clad decisions, instead its all about Memories (last time I checked your book was in stock), Guesses (we should be able to ship on this date) and Apologies (sorry the forklift ran over your book)

Translating this into security, security mechanisms don’t make policy-based decisions, security mechanisms try to make policy-based decisions

Some examples of memories, guesses and apologies in security

Memories

Security Policies - for example Triple A policy

Triple A policies can memorize a map of subjects, objects, and roles. They can even replicate these memories and play them back at runtime to try to make policy enforcement decisions.

Guesses

Security Policy Enforcement Decision

Unfortunately, while the policy enforcement decisions can be based on memorized logic, the decision itself is still a guess, even in the case of Triple A. Any guesses why? Because, the authentication process itself is a guess. It happens to be a guess that you then bind to a principal so it looks very official once you bind your guess to a Kerberos ticket or SAML assertion, but it still a guess.

Apologies

Giant Global Bank is sorry your account was compromised!

And this leads to lots and lots of apologies by companies with poor access control models.

Some additional examples of information security memories, guesses and apologies.

Example Memories - Triple A Security Policies, Audit logs, User account information , Authorization Logic - concrete mapping Subject, Resource, Condition, Action

Example Guesses - Security Policy Enforcement Decision Points, Authentication Logic, Monitoring, detection, fraud response

Example Apologies - Identity Management tools - provisioning, deprovisioning, Reimburse customer for fraud losses, Compensating Transaction - Giant Global Bank is still sorry your account was compromised!

The point of this is that security memories, guesses and apologies utilize different processes, different people, and different capabilities to be effective.

What trends can we identify to lead us toward better qualitative analysis based on the best practices of virtualization, interoperability and reusability.

Virtualization

Finding Vulnerabilities in a Virtualized World is a problem because applications are more configured than coded. Runtime behavior and structure not apparent due to weak typing and inversion of control.

Result - finding bugs becomes harder. Action - use screens to target finding time and resources

Fixing Vulnerabilities in a Virtualized World is a problem because how do I locate the controls when interfaces run in Beijing, Bangalore and Boston?

Result - synchronization and/or replication of security policy is problematic. Action - decentralized policy enforcement points and policy decision points.

Interoperability

Finding interoperable vulnerabilities

XSS - Javascript is an equal opportunity offender - interoperability for developers and attackers alike.

Fixing interoperable vulnerabilities

App servers, ESBs, and services are the attacker’s red carpet to your enterprise, right into your book of business. Interoperable access control can be leveraged across the enterprise.

Use XML signature for authentication and integrity

…

Use XML encryption to protect sensitive data, don't pass sensitive data in the clear

My Credit Card Number

Encrypt the data

…

XNQ0a4legiie5mWFxO6CQkk2hhldYNnKroObue/LXS/VYtvaTgMbCujhGExDi+vlkU//Qc2/T6mx0WVTmBMT3z8rogha8jD+nS9Zr2Bc3CwoTh2lh8wL3D0DEu91iwJT9JByLGXvt7v9lyuxK0ooDOYEClsH974CPmTs3tBC+GQ=

To ensure that these controls are applied use automated tools like static analysis to scan for security mechanism use and coverage.

In terms of reusability findings and fixes consider two bug findings

Session management bug: session state is passed around to every component, service and user. Makes for many high priority findings in audit report, also the fix is required on virtually every program

Data validation bug: Data access object (DAO) has a SQL injection hole. One major high priority finding in report. DAO used by many business logic classes, one fix location serves many classes

To bring these factors together, I generally use a scorecard index [6], so you can measure such things as transport security, message security, threat protection and so on. The hard work in developing the index is developing a useful scale. A scale for XML tokens could use the following

0: no token

1: hashed token

2: hashed and signed token

3: hashed and signed token from standard authoritative source

An example scale for XML validation could use:

0: no validation

1: schema validation

2: schema validation against hardened schema

3: schema validation against standard, hardened schema

These indexed scales are used to show maturity across the factors in the scorecard. The first part of the talk described value, the value assessment is used to focus time and effort on high value assets. The value assessment can be determined quantitatively. There is hard analytical work to qualitatively determine the scorecard, index, and scales, the quantitative value assessment is used to screen out high value targets for these endeavors. The scoring index is used to track progress and improve quality over time. In the best case scenario, automated tools are used to perform the checks described in the index, and once security is automated just like software developers we may see security innovation make progress in years not decades.

Thank you for your time.

1 "Risk Management is where the Money Is" by Dan Geer, http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/20.06.html

2 Berkshire Hathaway 2007 Shareholder Letter by Warren Buffett, http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2007ltr.pdf

3 "Software [In]security: Software Security Demand Rising, by Gary McGraw

http://www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=1237978

4 "SOA and Newton's Universe" by Pat Helland, http://blogs.msdn.com/pathelland/archive/2007/05/20/soa-and-newton-s-universe.aspx

5 "Memories, Guesses and Apologies" by Pat Helland, http://blogs.msdn.com/pathelland/archive/2007/05/15/memories-guesses-and-apologies.aspx

6 "Web Servicres Security Checklist" by Gunnar Peterson, http://arctecgroup.net/pdf/WebServicesSecurityChecklist.pdf

Combating Cyber Threats Around the Globe -- A More Collaborative Approach?

Tue, 11 Nov 2008 21:00:00 +0000

Governments and law enforcement agencies from North America and Europe continue to increase cooperation and coordination to combat the growing threats of cyber-crime and e-espionage. That was quite evident at the recent RSA Conference Europe that was held in London as a significant number of representatives from governments participated in panels and other events. I moderated one of those sessions, which was titled “Tackling Cyber-crime and Protecting Critical Information Infrastructure – Public Sector Approaches&rdquo...

SDL Announcements at TechEd EMEA

Mon, 10 Nov 2008 19:25:00 +0000

Hello all, Dave here…

I am in Barcelona, Spain with Michael Howard and Adam Shostack at the TechEd EMEA: Developers Conference.

In addition to teaching and attending security sessions, we are in Barcelona to formally announce the launch of the SDL Optimization Model, SDL Pro Network and the Microsoft SDL Threat Modeling Tool Beta! For those of you who are unaware of these initiatives here’s a description of each…

SDL Optimization Model: The SDL Optimization Model was created to facilitate gradual, consistent and cost-effective implementation of the SDL in development organizations outside of Microsoft. It allows development managers and IT policy-makers to assess the state of the security in development and create a vision and road map for reducing customer risk.

Specific objectives of the model include the following:

· Enable organizations outside of Microsoft to create more secure and privacy-enhanced software by successfully implementing the SDL

· Allow organizations to self-assess current software development security practices and create a strategy for gradual improvement

· Provide SDL Pro Network service providers with a consistent and effective framework for providing SDL services

SDL Pro Network: The SDL Pro Network is a group of security service providers that specialize in application security and have substantial experience and expertise with the methodology and technologies of the Microsoft SDL. SDL Pro Network service providers will guide and support organizations in implementing the SDL into their environments.

The primary focus area for all members, both now and in the future, will be to deliver on the program’s commitment to make the SDL available outside Microsoft, specifically focusing on these issues:

· Protecting the customer - Helping customers adopt the SDL or general secure coding practices.

· Improving the SDL - Leveraging member knowledge to understand how the SDL is used by customers, what needs to be modified and what customer needs must be met in the future.

SDL Threat Modeling Tool Beta: The Microsoft SDL Threat Modeling Tool Beta allows for structured analysis, proactive mitigation and tracking of potential security and privacy issues in new and existing applications. Microsoft developed the tool and we use it internally on many of our products. This tool offers a threat modeling methodology that any software architect can lead effectively — in contrast with other processes, which are more expert-dependent. A few quick notes about the features:

· Automated guidance and feedback in drawing threat diagrams

· Guided analysis of threats and mitigations based on the STRIDE taxonomy

· Integration with bug-and issue-tracking systems like Visual Studio Team Foundation Server

To learn more about these, visit the SDL portal, http://www.microsoft.com/sdl.

By the way, if you are in Barcelona and want to stop by and chat, the session list is below:

SDL Theater Sessions:

· Getting started with the new SDL Threat Modeling Tool

Adam Shostack, Theater 1, Tuesday, Nov. 11, 15:20 – 15:40

· You could do that but it would be wrong – a discussion of pros/cons of threat mitigations

Michael Howard & Adam Shostack, Theater 1, Thursday, Nov. 13, 10:20 – 10:40

General Sessions:

· DVP308 How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Threat Modeling Nov. 12, 10:45 – 12:00

· DVP309 How to Review Your Code and Test for Security Bugs Nov. 13, 3:15 – 4:30

· DVP312 Top Ten Strategies to Security Your Code Nov. 14, 10:45 – 12:00

OWASP European Summit - Portugal

Wed, 15 Oct 2008 14:27:22 +0000

Portugal/Algarve - 4th - 7th November 2008

Setting the Web Application Security Agenda for 2009: OWASP Invites You to Join Our Summit in Portugal

http://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_EU_Summit_2008

With the theme ‘Setting the AppSec agenda for 2009′, the OWASP Summit will be a worldwide gathering of OWASP leaders and key industry players to present and discuss the latest OWASP tools, documentation projects, and web application security trends. Join us in Portugal in just a few short weeks! This venue hosts a diverse selection of training courses along with technical and business tracks, making it THE place to learn about web application security and the resources OWASP has available for use today.

OWASP is a not-for-profit organization with the purpose of supporting the Web Application Security community around the world, and has granted $250,000 USD for web application security research. In addition to over 40 presentations from the OWASP Leaders and grant recipients, the OWASP Summit will host multiple Working Sessions designed to improve collaboration, achieve specific objectives and identify roadmaps for OWASP projects, chapters, and the OWASP community itself.

To facilitate this event, OWASP is investing $150,000 USD which will be used to cover air travel and accommodation expenses for OWASP leaders, active contributors, and select key industry leaders. With their confirmed presence, the OWASP Summit will provide a relaxed but professional environment to meet, discuss, influence and contribute to OWASP projects.

There are still funds available! If you are interested in attending and you meet the profile of the current OWASP supported attendees (see list here: http://spreadsheets.google.com/pub?key=pAX6n7m2zaTVLrPtR07riBA) contact Paulo Coimbra (paulo.coimbra@owasp.org). Please note that you should do so only if you meet the paid attendance criteria (see herehttps://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_EU_Summit_2008_paid_participation_rules) and are unable to get corporate support to attend this event (for other corporate sponsorship opportunities see http://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_EU_Summit_2008_Sponsors).

The OWASP Summit will also host a large and diverse selection of training courses, covering multiple OWASP specific and Web Application Security Topics.

The remarkable impact of OWASP is made possible only by the collaboration of many dedicated people and organizations worldwide. In that spirit of cooperation, OWASP invites all its members (who have 20% discount + 1 VIP Ticket) and interested individuals and companies to attend this thrilling event. Please join us and help to set the Web Application Security Agenda for 2009!

Please see below for additional details about the OWASP Summit or visit the OWASP Summit website: http://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_EU_Summit_2008.

Projects

OWASP projects selected for Summit presentation include new documentation and innovative tools to help developers, architects, and security specialists ensure that applications are secure:

Application Security Verification Standard,
Code review guide, V1.1,
Ruby on Rails Security Guide v2,
Securing WebGoat using ModSecurity,
Testing Guide v3,
GTK+ GUI for w3af project,
Access Control Rules Tester,
AntiSamy .NET,
Live CD & DVD Project,
OpenPGP Extensions for HTTP,
Orizon Project,
Python Static Analysis,
WebScarab-NG,
And many, many others.

Working Sessions

Expecting the presence of the application security industry key players, the Working Sessions will cover a wide range of issues such as:

OWASP Top 10 2009,
Browser Security,
Web Application Framework Security,
Enterprise Security API Project,
Best Practices for OWASP Chapter Leaders,
OWASP Documentation Projects,
OWASP Tools Projects,
OWASP Education Project,
OWASP Strategic Planning for 2009,
OWASP Certification,
OWASP Winter of Code 2009
Two-way Internationalization of OWASP Content
And many more.

Training

These 2-day, 1-day or 1/2-day training courses cover a wide range of OWASP specific and Web Application Security Topics:

OWASP Top 10 - What Developers Should Know on Web Application Security
Uncovering WebScarab’s Secret Treasures
Securing WebGoat with ModSecurity
Secure Programming with Java
Advanced Web Application Security Testing
Building Secure Web 2.0 Applications
Building Secure Web Services
Building Secure Web Applications with OWASP’s Enterprise Security API (ESAPI)
Classic ASP Security using OWASP tools
Web Application Assessments
Hacking Owasp Orizon Project v1.0
Ajax Security
Practical Penetration Testing: Think Like an Attacker to Stop Attacks
Linux Software Exploitation
Web server/services hardening using SELinux

Main Contact:

Kate Hartmann
OWASP Operations Director
9175 Guilford Road, Suite 300
Columbia, MD 21046, USA
Phone: +1-301-575-0189
Facsimile: +1-301-604-8033
Email: kate.hartmann@owasp.org

Proxy Caches are a Challenging Threat to Internet Security

Sun, 05 Oct 2008 06:41:52 +0000

Proxy caches, combined with poorly written session management code, can easily leads to serious security flaws similar to what we highlighted in A New Security Breach in Google Docs Revealed.

Web developers have no control over proxy caches in the Internet. However, developers do have control of the code they write and their admin teams have configuration control of their web servers. Developers must assume the worst case Internet scenario with aggressive Internet cache management policies that serve cached data for economic and performance reasons.

As a consequence, this fact-of-life on the Internet sometimes results in multiple web clients being sent the same Set-Cookie HTTP headers, for example. Caching proxy servers should obtain a fresh cookie for the each new client request. Ideally, proxy caches should not cache session management cookies and distribute cached cookies to multiple clients. However, application developers cannot assume that proxy caches are well behaved, especially for applications where security and privacy are required.

Web developers cannot know whether their content is consumed directly or via a proxy cache. Developers also cannot assume that the HTTP responses will be delivered to the intended browser. Moreover, developers cannot be sure that the intended browser even receives the intended content. For example, a session ID issued to a client gets used while it is valid or until abandoned and expired. If it is served and delivered in response to an unencrypted HTTP GET request, there’s no guarantee it will be consumed by the intended web browser.

Ideally, SSL should be used on all web transactions that require confidentiality and privacy, including our recent Google Docs breach. On the other hand, even SSL is not foolproof. For example, many web developers do not correctly set the “Encrypted Sessions Only” cookie property. These incorrectly configured “secure” servers will send HTTPS cookies in the open, unencrypted.

There be dragons …

Note: Reposted from the (ISC)2 blog.

Monetizing Infected Hosts by Hijacking Search Results

Thu, 02 Oct 2008 03:33:00 +0000

When logs with accounting data are no longer of interest due to low liquidity on the underground market, monetization of the infected hosts comes into play.

This web based malware seems like an early BETA aiming to scale, however it's only unique features are its ability to hijack the infected user's searches and server relevant ads courtesy of the affiliate networks the administrator participates in, and also, an integrated DDoS module that the author simply stole from another kit. Strangely, it's 2008 yet the author also included the ability to turn on the telnet service on an infected host.

With the search queries feature easy to duplicate by other kits, this web based malware is a great example of how the time-to-market mentality lacking any kind of personal experience -- the malware cannot intercept SSL sessions compared to the majority of crimeware kits that can -- ends up in a weird hybrid of random features.

Customerization will inevitably prevail over the product concept mentality.

A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Seven

Tue, 30 Sep 2008 12:35:15 +0000

In case you haven't heard - Microsoft and the Washington state are suing a U.S based -- naturally -- "scareware" vendor Branch Software :

"We won't tolerate the use of alarmist warnings or deceptive 'free scans' to trick consumers into buying software to fix a problem that doesn't even exist," Washington Attorney General Rob McKenna said. "We've repeatedly proven that Internet companies that prey on consumers' anxieties are within our reach."

Sadly, Branch Software is the tip of the iceberg on the top of the affiliates participating in different affiliation based programs, which similar to IBSOFTWARE CYPRUS and Interactivebrands, which I've been tracking down for a while, are the aggregators of scareware that popped up on the radars due to their extensive portfolios. These three companies offering software bundles or plain simple fake software, are somewhere in between the food chain of this ecosystem, with the real vendors paying out the commissions on a per installation basis slowly starting to issue invitation codes that they've distributed only across invite-only forums/sections of particular forums.

Behind these brands is everyone that is participating in the franchise and is putting personal efforts into monetizing the high payout rates that the fake security software vendor is paying for successful installation. These high payout rates -- with the financing naturally coming straight from other criminal activities online -- are in fact so high, that I can easily say that the last two quarters we've witnesses the largest increase of such domains ever, and they're only heating up since the typosquatting possibilities are countless and they seem to know that as well.

It's important to point out that their business model of acquiring traffic is outsourced to all the affiliates that do the blackhat SEO, SQL injections, web sessions hijacking of malware infected hosts in order to monetize, so basically, you have an affiliates network whose actions are directly driving the growth into all these areas. Throwing money into the underground marketplace as a "financial injection", is proving itself as a growth factor, and incentive for innovation on behalf of all the participants.

Here are some of the most recent fake security software domains, a "deja vu" moment with a known RBN domain from a "previous life" that is also parked at one of the servers, and evidence that typosquatting for fraudulent purposes is still pretty active with a dozen of Norton Antivirus related domains, some of which have already started issuing "fake security notices" by brandjacking the vendor for traffic acquisition purposes.

Antivirus-Alert .com (203.117.111.47) where pepato .org a domain that was used in the Wired.com and History.com IFRAME injections, which back in March was also hosted at Hostfresh (58.65.238.59).

softload2008name .com (78.157.143.250)
softload2008nm .com
softload2008n .com
softload2008jq .com

microantivir-2009 .com (91.208.0.223)
scanner.microantivir-2009 .com
microantivir2009 .com
microantivirus-2009 .com
microantivirus2009 .com

ms-scan .com (91.208.0.228)
msscanner .com
ms-scanner .com

Personalantispy .com (93.190.139.197)
freepcsecure .com
quickinstallpack .com
quickdownloadpro .com
advancedcleaner .com
performanceoptimizer .com
internetanonymizer .com

ieprogramming .com (92.62.101.83)
uptodatepage .com
fileliveupdate .com
qwertypages .com
sharedupdates .com
ierenewals .com

norton-antivirus-alert .com
norton-anti-virus-2007 .com
norton-antivirus-2007 .com
norton-antivirus2007 .com
nortonantivirus2007 .com
norton-antivirus-2008 .com
nortonantivirus2008 .com
nortonantivirus2008freedownload .com
norton-antivirus-2009 .com
nortonantivirus2009 .com
norton-antivirus-2010 .com
nortonantivirus2010 .com
nortonantivirus360 .com
nortonantivirus8 .com
nortonantivirusa .com
nortonantivirusactivation .com
norton-antivirus-alert .com
nortonantivirusalerts .com
norton--anti-virus .com
norton-anti-virus .com
norton-antivirus .com
nortonanti-virus .com
nortonantivirus.com
nortonantiviruscom .com
nortonantiviruscorporate .com
nortonantiviruscorporateedition .com
nortonantiviruscoupon .com
nortonantivirusdefinition .com
nortonantivirusdefinitions .com
nortonantivirusdirect .com

Fake Antivirus Inc. is not going away as long as the affiliate based model remains active. If the real vendors were greedy enough not to share the revenues with others, they would have been the one popping up on the radar, compared to the situation where it's the affiliate network's participations greed that's increasing their visibility online.

Related posts:
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Six
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Five
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two
Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software
Cybersquatting Symantec's Norton AntiVirus
Cybersquatting Security Vendors for Fraudulent Purposes
Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Three
Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Two
Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware
EstDomains and Intercage VS Cybercrime
Fake Security Software Domains Serving Exploits
Localized Fake Security Software
Got Your XPShield Up and Running?
Fake PestPatrol Security Software
RBN's Fake Security Software
Lazy Summer Days at UkrTeleGroup Ltd
Geolocating Malicious ISPs
The Malicious ISPs You Rarely See in Any Report

Oracle OpenWorld

Tue, 30 Sep 2008 03:18:05 +0000

Well, Oracle OpenWorld came and went. As usual, I hardly had any time to attend sessions. The one really cool session I attended ( besides my own ) was by Tanel Poder talking about troubleshooting Oracle when the Oracle instrumentation does not work. See his blog for details. I really loved his straight forward [...]