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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: shortage]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/shortage</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 17 Jun 2008 17:22:09 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Thirteen]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f98a08c6e830a559db2ccd85e32f048e</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f98a08c6e830a559db2ccd85e32f048e</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[What is the difference between a reactive and proactive threat intell? A reactive threat intell is assessing a campaign, individual, a group of individuals, how are they related to one another, and...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SRri0cTxwTI/AAAAAAAACb0/G9gmDkGawOk/s1600-h/fake_security_software_powerfull.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SRri0cTxwTI/AAAAAAAACb0/G9gmDkGawOk/s200/fake_security_software_powerfull.png" /></a>What is the difference between a reactive and proactive threat intell? A reactive threat intell is assessing a campaign, individual, a group of individuals, how are they related to one another, and what have they been doing in the past, based exclusively on a lead that's been found within the past couple of hours.<br />
<br />
Try the very latest rogue security domains courtesy of three domainers (<b>Fedor Ibragimov cndomainz@yahoo.com, Anton Golovayk gpdomains@yahoo.com</b> and <b>Ivan Durov idomains.admin@gmail.com</b> ) whose portfolios can always keep you updated about the latest releases of such popular software as The Best Antivirus Cleaner 2008.<br />
<br />
<b>powerfullantivirusscan .com</b> (78.159.118.217; 89.149.253.215; 208.72.168.185)<br />
<b>protection-update .com</b><br />
<b>updatepcprotection .com</b><br />
<b>updateyourprotection .com</b><br />
<b>mac-imunizator .net</b> (67.205.75.10)<br />
<b>avproinstall .com</b> (78.157.141.26)<br />
<b>winavpro .com</b> (92.241.163.30)<br />
<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SRtYLfJhw0I/AAAAAAAACcM/NIA5Cb8GMjI/s1600-h/fake_security_software_november_.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SRtYLfJhw0I/AAAAAAAACcM/NIA5Cb8GMjI/s200/fake_security_software_november_.png" /></a>As far as proactive threat intell is concerned, try the following "upcoming fake security software domains" :<br />
<br />
<b>spywaredefender2009 .com<br />
spywaredestroyer2009 .com<br />
spywareeliminator2009 .com<br />
spywareprotector2009 .com</b><br />
<br />
It would be interesting to monitor whether or not the well known non-existent security software brands we've monitoring throughout 2008, will be basically typosquatted in a 2009 like fashion, or would they simply introduce new brands. With their business model under pressure, I'm starting to see evidence of schemes involving the illegal advertisement of affiliate links to legitimate security software, where the cybercriminals are actual resellers of it. There's also no shortage of surreal situations, where a fake security software is taking advantage of blackhat SEO practices promising the removal of competing fake security software brands.<br />
<br />
Last week, the <b>noadware .net </b>(69.20.71.82; 69.20.104.139) software was persistently advertised in such a way, mostly by generating Wordpress accounts promising to remove competing software :<br />
<br />
<b>antiviruspro2009.wordpress .com<br />
ultraantivirus2009.wordpress .com<br />
smartantivirus.wordpress .com<br />
antiviruslab2009.wordpress .com<br />
antivirusvip.wordpress .com<br />
personaldefender2009.wordpress .com<br />
malwareremoval.wordpress .com</b><br />
<br />
Naturally, it didn't take long before blackhat SEO farms were created for the purpose, like these very latest ones :<br />
<br />
<b>removal-tool.blogspot .com<br />
cgidoctor .com<br />
spywareremoval .net<br />
spyware-adware-remover .com<br />
spywarestop .com<br />
zero-adware .net<br />
adware-remove .com<br />
antispywaresecrets .com<br />
protectyourcomputerfromspyware .info<br />
cleanpcfree .net<br />
spyware-bot&nbsp; .com<br />
spywarezapper.co .uk<br />
thepcsecurity .com<br />
noadware-official-site .com<br />
spywaredoctorfavor .cn<br />
removespywareedge .cn<br />
thespywareremover .com<br />
virusremovalguru .com<br />
virusremovalguide .org</b> <br />
<br />
The day when fake security software sites start attracting traffic by promising to remove other fake security software, is the day when we have clear evidence that an ecosystem has emerged.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/11/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Twelve</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/10/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_28.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Eleven</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/10/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_22.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Ten</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/10/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_16.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Nine</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/10/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Eight</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/09/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_30.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Seven</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/09/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_24.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Six</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/09/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">A  Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Five</a> <br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_25.html">A  Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_20.html">A  Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three</a><b> </b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">A  Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">Diverse  Portfolio of Fake Security Software</a><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=AqTIN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=AqTIN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=GqbtN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=GqbtN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=AwMMn"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=AwMMn" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=wYg3n"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=wYg3n" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=xmYvN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=xmYvN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=lK1GN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=lK1GN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=uEj3n"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=uEj3n" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/451194751" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 12 Nov 2008 13:57:26 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security software">security software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software">software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fake security software">fake security software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/popular software">popular software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/diverse portfolio">diverse portfolio</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wordpress">wordpress</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wordpress accounts">wordpress accounts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/proactive threat intell">proactive threat intell</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/net">net</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/451194751/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_12.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Thirteen</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Identifying the Gpcode Ransomware Author]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/7fcd166cea35b581caf45eb753d96890</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/7fcd166cea35b581caf45eb753d96890</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Interesting article, but it implies that there has been a shortage of quality OSINT regarding the campaigners behind the recent Gpcode targeted cryptoviral extortion attacks

The individual is...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SOKf-AHSSyI/AAAAAAAACNA/2DxahyQID7E/s1600-h/gpcode_decryptor.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SOKf-AHSSyI/AAAAAAAACNA/xl-jNWBubqU/s200-R/gpcode_decryptor.jpg" /></a>Interesting article, but it implies that <a href="http://www.techworld.com/security/news/index.cfm?newsid=105043">there has been a shortage of quality OSINT</a> regarding the campaigners behind the recent <a href="http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=08/09/30/1446211">Gpcode targeted cryptoviral extortion attacks</a> :<br />
<br />
"<i>The individual is believed to be a Russian national, and has been in contact with at least one anti-malware company, Kaspersky Lab, in an attempt to sell a tool that could be used to decrypt victims' files. Kaspersky Lab set about locating the man by resolving the proxied IP addresses used to communicate with the world to their real addresses. The proxied addresses turned out to be zombie PCs in countries such as the US, which pointed to the fact that GPcode's author had almost certainly used compromised PCs from a single botnet to get Gpcode on to victim's machines.</i>"<br />
<br />
In reality, there hasn't been a shortage of timely OSINT aiming to to identify the authors - "<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1259">Who’s behind the GPcode ransomware?</a>" :<br />
<br />
"<i>So, the ultimate question - who’s behind the GPcode ransomware? It’s Russian  teens with pimples, using E-gold and Liberty Reserve accounts, running three  different GPcode campaigns, two of which request either $100 or $200 for the  decryptor, and communicating from Chinese IPs. Here are all the details  regarding the emails they use, the email responses they sent back, the currency  accounts, as well their most recent IPs used in the communication (<b>58.38.8.211; </b><b>221.201.2.227</b>) :</i><br />
<br />
<i><b>Emails used by the GPcode authors where the infected victims are  supposed to contact them :</b><br />
content715@yahoo .com<br />
saveinfo89@yahoo  .com<br />
cipher4000@yahoo .com<br />
decrypt482@yahoo .com</i><br />
<br />
<i><b>Virtual currency accounts used by the malware authors  :</b><br />
Liberty Reserve - account U6890784<br />
E-Gold - account -  5431725<br />
E-Gold - account - 5437838</i>"<br />
<br />
The bottom line - out of the four unique emails used by the GPcode campaigners, only two were actively corresponding with the victims, each of them requesting a different amount of money, but both, taking advantage of U.S based web services to accomplish their attack.<i></i><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=bQZsL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=bQZsL" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=q8qRL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=q8qRL" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=UNhel"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=UNhel" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=SUDkl"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=SUDkl" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=d50OL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=d50OL" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=RaaqL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=RaaqL" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=YsUgl"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=YsUgl" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/407661528" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Sep 2008 13:23:32 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/gpcode">gpcode</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/gpcode campaigns">gpcode campaigns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/recent gpcode">recent gpcode</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/gpcode ransomware">gpcode ransomware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/gpcode campaigners">gpcode campaigners</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/gpcode authors">gpcode authors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kaspersky lab">kaspersky lab</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtual currency accounts">virtual currency accounts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/liberty reserve accounts">liberty reserve accounts</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/407661528/identifying-gpcode-ransomware-author.html">Identifying the Gpcode Ransomware Author</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Network skill level gap is growing, but growth opportunities abound!]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a4929ca88458feb902376bc7bd38e824</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a4929ca88458feb902376bc7bd38e824</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[A recent IDC report sponsored by the Cisco Learning Institute reveals a huge networking skills gap is emerging in North America, which spells trouble for enterprises. Listen to this: 600,000 IT...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; margin: 0px 10px 10px 0px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/exam.jpg" border="0" alt="Test Quiz" width="240" height="160" align="left" /> A recent IDC report sponsored by the Cisco Learning Institute reveals <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/newsletters/itlead/2008/080408itlead1.html" target="_blank">a huge networking skills gap</a> is emerging in North America, which spells trouble for enterprises. Listen to this: “600,000 IT workers were needed to install, configure, manage and secure networks in North America in 2007, 14% of the total IT workforce.” However, IDC reports that another 180,000 engineers with wireless as well as traditional network engineering experience will need to be added by 2011 to keep pace with advances in technology that is transforming the role of the network.</p>
<p>The convergence of voice and video traffic are quickly transforming the growing complexity of networks at a torrid pace. IDC estimates that the skills gap in VOIP should grow to 19% by 2011.</p>
<p>This changing profile in the role of the network plays a key role in the skills shortage. Network enabled collaboration tools such as social networking apps and the Webex conferencing/collaboration solutions we use in our business each and every day are demanding a new set of IT skills to deliver business value.</p>
<p>My perspective is two-fold on this issue; the first is what I have seen in the resources we have attempted to hire! We give a very straightforward quick written/oral test to all new technical hires. This requires basic networking knowledge and some Unix commands. On average, (after filters from reputable recruiting firms, some with 5-10 years experience) less than 10% pass muster for the first filter we use in our hiring process. This is a troubling fact, which has cost us considerable time and effort to secure the right resources with competent skills. So I can say from our market assessment in a very strong technological job skills market, core Unix and networking foundation skills are slipping.</p>
<p>The second is that we as an IT Operations Management (ITOM) industry need to keep pushing hard to build better proactive and intuitive solutions to aggregate instrumentation from all Data Center tools, including more work around VOIP, video streaming, and collaboration so that we can ease this transition. If ITOM solutions become more proactive across the typical Cisco infrastructure that is commonly installed in the Data Center, we can free up some additional time for advanced “emerging technologies” training where existing IT workers can enhance their core skills and re-invigorate their careers. We have to do a much better job of getting our existing IT professionals trained on emerging technologies!</p>
<p>While there’s less that ScienceLogic can do around <a href="http://www.cisco.com/web/learning/le3/learning_career_certifications_and_learning_paths_home.html" target="_blank">training</a>, we certainly strive to do our part to enhance a day in the life of the networking engineers who use our solutions to simplify monitoring of increasingly complex networking, <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/080608-p-g.html" target="_blank">Wireless, VOIP, and collaboration needs</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 25 Aug 2008 17:06:07 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/skills">skills</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/foundation skills">foundation skills</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network">network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/skills gap">skills gap</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/skills shortage">skills shortage</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/intuitive solutions">intuitive solutions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/solutions">solutions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/traditional network">traditional network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/recent idc report">recent idc report</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/network-skill-level-gap-is-growing-but-growth-opportunities-abound/08/2008">Network skill level gap is growing, but growth opportunities abound!</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[This Generations ApathyThe Age of Specialization and ADD]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/de3980adf7c1fb760b23b64836636412</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/de3980adf7c1fb760b23b64836636412</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Robert Scoble has some interesting commentary this morning about the number of photojournalists with expensive gear covering the Olympics
Hes a bit indignant that so much energy goes to sporting...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Robert Scoble has some interesting <a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="http://scobleizer.com/">commentary</a> this morning about the number of photojournalists with expensive gear covering the Olympics.</p>
<p>He&#8217;s a bit indignant that so much energy goes to sporting events like the Olympics rather than more important news that isn&#8217;t getting reported around the world.</p>
<blockquote><p>This is in a year when tons of journalists are getting laid off.</p>
<p>This is in a year when there are tons of stories around the world that aren’t getting reported on.</p>
<p>Could we take half of those photographers and send them to Russia, for instance</p></blockquote>
<p>Reminds me of a feeling I had back in college as an undergrad student studying social sciences and humanities, about the way my friends who were physicists interacted with the world. They were so awed by the stars, Mars, astrophysics, and it seemed to me interesting but altogether unimportant. They argued they may find something outside our planet that could help solve Earth-bound problems like disease, or find the origins of earth and humanity &#8212; but really they were doing it because they loved it. One of my friends had a good argument, though &#8212; there are enough people right now that we can specialize in what we care about, and there will still be others covering other topics. He could be a physicist and look into the universe&#8217;s origin, while I studied social interaction and writing, and our other friends looked into solving cancer or eradicating invasive plants in the native wetlands. We have to specialize, and there are enough of us to do it too.</p>
<p>I think it&#8217;s the same way in journalism &#8212; whether it&#8217;s sports, celebrity journalism, or coverage of politics and war, there are a lot of opportunities right now for journalists. Of course the business model is changing, and some old-schoolers won&#8217;t know how to roll with that, but generations change slowly; we&#8217;re learning.</p>
<p>Also, the Olympics is seen as more than a sporting event, it&#8217;s also a symbol of world competition and cooperation too &#8212; a way for countries to come together and share entertainment globally. I think that&#8217;s worth covering.</p>
<p>In the second post, Robert Scoble says there are plenty of great journalists but the public doesn&#8217;t care. In some ways I have to agree with that, but I don&#8217;t think it&#8217;s negative, necessarily. I had a conversation with someone the other day about world news reportage. He says, &#8220;I was just reading this story, but what does it matter to me if there&#8217;s a flood in some city in another country I&#8217;ll never visit and some farmer lost his sheep?&#8221; World news is only important when it&#8217;s relevant, so it&#8217;s no wonder that many people don&#8217;t care &#8212; if they don&#8217;t know much about the area, and it doesn&#8217;t affect them, they have no incentive to give it full attention. You can call that apathy, but I think it&#8217;s an important selectivity skill that humans have. We have to choose what to give priority to, so if nothing stands out as being particularly important, we just ignore it or gloss over it. Human nature&#8230;</p>
<p>Also I think the common person today just gets desensitized and doesn&#8217;t know where to turn their energy, when surrounded by so many crises. Either you focus on one specialty and do your best to work toward one cause in your life &#8212; and maybe that&#8217;s just in the course of your daily work &#8212; or you become a complete Attention-Deficit-Disorder case and bounce from one problem to the next, without knowing how to solve anything. That just causes a sense of bewilderment, despair, and either that bogs you down or eventually you get desensitized.</p>
<p>There&#8217;s a commenter on Scoble&#8217;s blog, Spencer, who talks about this generation&#8217;s apathy. There are so many people who want to blame today&#8217;s generation or the young generation for this &#8220;apathy&#8221; that they sense. But I see it as a survival mechanism that arises from the way information flows these days. We&#8217;re surrounded by crises, everyone wants us to know about them &#8212; the water shortage, global warming, death in Iraq, the national deficit. Okay, crisis, I get it. But no one gives a real clear idea on what any individual is really supposed to do to solve the problem. You can&#8217;t get involved with one global cause, without ignoring all the others, and if you do get involved it&#8217;s likely to become your life&#8217;s purpose. Most people are concerned with other things &#8212; their families, their work, personal development, their homes and futures, and really that&#8217;s enough to take up all their time.</p>
<p>I&#8217;m always amazed when I read about the early unionists. Emma Goldman for example, the activist who pushed for the 8-hr workday, and campaigned for free love in the early 1900s when women were still wearing corsets, used to work 16 hour factory days as a seamstress, then lead meetings late into the night. Today we lead cushy lives comparatively&#8211;8 hour days, plus commute and lunch, family time, dinner time, gym maybe, sleep&#8230; but it still doesn&#8217;t seem like we ever have enough energy and time.</p>
<p>What Emma had that most people today don&#8217;t, is a community living in the same conditions as herself, with clear goals about what they were campaigning for, and a cause that affected their own daily lives. Today, unionism and local activism is in much shorter supply, in part due to the many people who work fairly comfy desk jobs, and the problem that everyone has his own specialization, works in a cubicle, does his or her own thing. The problems we&#8217;re facing today in terms of global warming, global water shortage, aren&#8217;t the same kinds of problems that activists have fought for in the past, and there&#8217;s no clear road map for how to solve them. Our leaders sure aren&#8217;t leading the way.</p>
<p>What we do have, at least, is the Olympics, which is an age old symbol of international cooperation, play and competition&#8230;so, uh, go sports! As for full disclosure, I don&#8217;t actually have a TV and haven&#8217;t watched the Olympics in many years, but I do try taking short showers&#8211;does that help?</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Aug 2008 09:46:26 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/world news reportage">world news reportage</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/world">world</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/world competition">world competition</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/world news">world news</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/global water shortage">global water shortage</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/global">global</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/time">time</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/news">news</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/solve earth-bound">solve earth-bound</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/itsecurity/~3/369359733/">This Generations ApathyThe Age of Specialization and ADD</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Growing Security Skills Shortage]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6f0a31fa5334384c34fb7f51cba96b5b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6f0a31fa5334384c34fb7f51cba96b5b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[We are regularly hearing from our security clients about their difficulties finding people with the right skills or when they do finally find them, these people are too costly to employ because their...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img title="Jonathan Penn" alt="Jonathan Penn" src="http://www.forrester.com/role_based/images/author/imported/forresterDotCom/Analyst_Photos/Silhouette/Color/Jonathan-Penn.gif" border="0" style="FLOAT: left; MARGIN: 0px 5px 5px 0px" /></p>

<p>We are regularly hearing from our security clients about their difficulties finding people with the right skills – or when they do finally find them, these people are too costly to employ because their skills are in such demand.</p>



<p>Indeed, the “unavailability of people with the right skills” was cited as a top challenge for security groups in both our <a href="http://www.forrester.com/go?docid=44366">enterprise</a> and <a href="http://www.forrester.com/go?docid=44692">SMB</a> surveys.</p>



<p>In comparing need for talent across 25 different IT roles, Forrester analysts came to the conclusion that information security experts are among <a href="http://www.forrester.com/go?docid=46400">the hottest roles in IT</a>, sharing the top spot with information/data architects.</p>



<p>The skills shortage is likely to get worse before it gets better. We’re unlikely to see a significant spike in security experts’ salaries to attract those we need to hire: large changes in compensation for senior security personnel would run against the current of economic belt-tightening. Another typical approach to offsetting the shortage would be to train up: foster the career development and advancement of existing security personnel on our payroll. However, with all the outsourcing that is going on – and which will increasingly occur – there is a shrinking pool from which to find people with “the right stuff” worth championing their advancement.</p>



<p>We could look outside of security to others in IT, or even to co-workers in other departments or business groups. But given how poor a job IT Security does of marketing its value proposition, I don’t hold much hope for attracting non-security people.</p>



<p>What do you think? Are we about to hit a very big wall when it comes to skills and staffing? Are you presently feeling the pain of a skills shortage? Do you see such a shortage looming? What measures are you taking to acquire and nurture talent? Which ones are successful and why?</p>



<p>I welcome your thoughts on the topic.</p>

]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Aug 2008 05:02:06 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/senior security personnel">senior security personnel</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security clients">security clients</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security experts salaries">security experts salaries</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/skills shortage">skills shortage</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/shortage">shortage</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security experts">information security experts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/skills">skills</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security personnel">security personnel</category>
      <source url="http://blogs.forrester.com/srm/2008/08/the-growing-sec.html">The Growing Security Skills Shortage</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Summarizing July's Threatscape]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2860027a1eaa69350d814429c3bf6070</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2860027a1eaa69350d814429c3bf6070</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[July's threatscape -- consider going through June's summary as well -- once again demonstrated that nothing is impossible, the impossible just takes a little longer where the incentive would be the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJLdSTaizDI/AAAAAAAAB_E/WogqT88LBdc/s1600-h/ddanchev_july.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJLdSTaizDI/AAAAAAAAB_E/Bb9z-K3ib7c/s200-R/ddanchev_july.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>July's threatscape -- consider going through <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/summarizing-junes-threatscape.html">June's summary</a> as well -- once again demonstrated that nothing is impossible, the impossible just takes a little longer where the incentive would be the ultimate monetization of the process.<br />
<br />
Russian hacktivists attacking Lithuania and Georgia, several Storm Worm campaigns, a couple of new malware tools, Neosploit team abandoning support for their web malware exploitation kit, CAPTCHA for several of the most popular free email providers getting efficiently attacked in order to resell the bogus accounts registered in the process, several copycat SQL injects next to the evasion techniques applied by the copycats, botnets continuing to commit click fraud and generate revenue for those who own or have rented them, an infamous money mule recruitment service taking advantage of the fast-fluxed network provided by the ASProx botnet - pretty interesting month indeed.<br />
<br />
<b>01.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/decrypting-and-restoring-gpcode.html">Decrypting and Restoring GPcode Encrypted Files</a> -<br />
The GPcode authors read the news too, and are catching up with the major weaknesses pointed out in their previous release in order to come with a virtually unbreakable algorithm. And since more evidence of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/whos-behind-gpcode-ransomware.html">who's behind the GPcode ransomware</a> was gathered, vendors and independent researchers realized that the latest release is also susceptible to a plain simple flaw, namely the encrypted files were basically getting deleting and not securely erased making them fairly easy to recover.<br />
<br />
<b>02.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/chinese-bloggers-bypassing-censorship.html">Chinese Bloggers Bypassing Censorship by Blogging Backward</a> -<br />
When you know how it works, you can either improve, abuse or destroy it in that very particular order. Chinese bloggers are always very adaptive in respect to spreading their message by obfuscating their messages in a way that common keywords filtering software wouldn't be able to pick them.<br />
<br />
<b>03.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/gmail-yahoo-and-hotmails-captcha-broken.html">Gmail, Yahoo and Hotmail’s CAPTCHA Broken</a> -<br />
This has been an urban legend for a while, but with more services starting to offer hundreds of thousands of pre-registered accounts at these providers, it's surprising that <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1514">spam and phishing emails coming from legitimate email providers is increasing</a>. The "vendors" behind these propositions are naturally starting to "vertically integrate" by offering value-added services for extra payments, namely, scripts to automatically abuse the pre-registered accounts for automatic registration of splogs and anything else malicious or blackhat SEO related.<br />
<br />
<b>04.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/antivirus-industry-in-2008.html">The Antivirus Industry in 2008</a> -<br />
If it were anyone else but a security vendor to come up with such a realistic cartoon aiming to stimulate innovation by emphasizing on how prolific and sophisticated malware groups have become, it would have been a biased cartoon. However, this one is courtesy of a security vendor, and it's pretty objective.<br />
<br />
<b>05.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lithuania-attacked-by-russian.html">Lithuania Attacked by Russian Hacktivists, 300 Sites Defaced</a> -<br />
This attack is a good example of a decent PSYOPS operation. Of course they have already build the capabilities to deface and even execute DDoS attacks against Lithuania, so why not put them in a "stay tuned" mode, by speculating on the upcoming attack and then executing it making it look like they delived what they've promised? This a lone gunman mass defacement given that the sites were all hosted on a single ISP, with no indication of any kind of coordination whatsoever. The same for the <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1533">Georgia President’s web site which was under DDoS attack from Russian hackers</a> later this month. Despite that the hacktivists behind it dedicated a separate C&amp;C for the attack, one that hasn't been used in any type of previous attacks so far, they did a minor mistake by using a secondary command and control location that's known to have been connected with a particular "botnet on demand" service in the past. The second attack once again proves that you don't need to build capacity when you can basically outsource the process to someone else.<br />
<br />
<b>06.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/icann-responds-to-dns-hijacking-its.html">The ICANN Responds to the DNS Hijacking, Its Blog Under Attack</a> -<br />
The ICANN finally issued a statement concerning the DNS hijacking of some of their domains, which is in fact what Comcast.net and Photobucket.com should have done as well, next to stating it was a "glitch". The ICANN also took advantage of the moment and also pointed out that their blog has also been under attack during the month. There's no better example of how the combination of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/icann-and-ianas-domain-names-hijacked.html"> tactics can result in the hijacking of the domains</a> of the organizations implementing procedures aiming to protect against these very same attacks. And while Photobucket.com remained silent during the entire incident, the hosting provider that was used by the Netdevilz team in the two attacks, since they were also responsible for the ICANN and IANA DNS hijackings, <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/update-to-photobuckets-dns-hijacking.html">technological and social engineeringissued a statement</a>.<br />
<br />
<b>07.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/risks-of-outdated-situational-awareness.html">The Risks of Outdated Situational Awareness</a> -<br />
Security vendors are often in a "catch-up mode" and if I were an average Internet user not knowing that real-time situational awareness speaks for the degree to which my vendor knows what going on online, I'd be pretty excited. However, I'm not. <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1085">Prevx were catching up with a service which I covered approximately two months ago</a>, I even had the chance to constructively confront with one of the affected sites on how despite their security measures in place, this attack was still possible. Recently <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/07/18/limbo_trojan/">Prevx have once again demonstrated an outdated situational awareness</a> by coming across a banking malware in July 2008, whereas the malware has been around since July 2007, and earlier depending on which version you're referring to.<br />
<br />
<b>08.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/fake-porn-sites-serving-malware-part.html">Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Two</a> -<br />
Yet another domain portfolio of fake porn sites serving rogue codecs and live exploit URLs, just the tip of the iceberg as usual, however their centralization is greatly assisting in tracking them down.<br />
<br />
<b>09.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/storm-worms-us-invasion-of-iran.html">Storm Worm's U.S Invasion of Iran Campaign</a> -<br />
Stormy Wormy is once again making the headlines with their ability to actually make up the headlines on their own.<br />
<br />
<b>10.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/mobile-malware-scam-isexplayer-wants.html">Mobile Malware Scam iSexPlayer Wants Your Money</a> -<br />
The best scams are the ones to which you've personally agreed to be scammed with without even knowing it. Like this one, which was tracked down and analyzed a couple of hours once a uset tipped on it.<br />
<br />
<b>11.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/template-ization-of-malware-serving.html">The Template-ization of Malware Serving Sites</a> -<br />
The increase of fake porn and celebrity sites is due to the overall template-ization of these, with the people behind them basically implementing several malicious doorways to ensure that the domains get rotated on the fly. Despite that they all look the same, they all sever different type of malware, and zero porn of celebrity content at all except the thumbnails.<br />
<br />
<b>12.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/violating-opsec-for-increasing.html">Violating OPSEC for Increasing the Probability of Malware Infection</a> -<br />
No better way to expose your affiliations and several unknown bad netblocks so far, by adding the netblocks and the malicious domains as trusted sites upon infecting a PC with the malware. Of course, the usual suspects lead the "trusted netblocks".<br />
<br />
<b>13.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/monetizing-compromised-web-sites.html">Monetizing Compromised Web Sites</a> -<br />
Several years ago, a script kiddie would install Apache on a mail server, they claim that they defaced it. Today, these amusing situations are replaced by monetization of the compromised sites, by reselling the access to them to blackhat SEO-ers, malware authors, phishers, or personally starting to manage a scammy infrastructure on them, by earning money on an affiliate based model, like this particular attack.<br />
<br />
<b>14.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/malware-and-office-documents-joining.html">Malware and Office Documents Joining Forces</a> -<br />
A recent DIY malware kit, sold as a proprietary tool basically crunching out malware infected office documents, whose built-in obfuscation makes them harder to detect. It will sooner or later leak out, turning into a commodity tool, a process that's been pretty evident for web malware exploitation kits as well.<br />
<br />
<b>15.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/are-stolen-credit-card-details-getting.html">Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?</a> -<br />
Depends on who you're buying them from, and whether or not they offer discounts on a volume basis, namely the more you buy the cheaper the price of a card is supposed to get. With the current oversupply of stolen credit card details, what used to be an exclusive good once where they could enjoy a higher profit-margin, is today's commodity good.<br />
<br />
<b>16.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-malware-kit-updated-with.html">The Neosploit Malware Kit Updated with Snapshot ActiveX Exploit</a> -<br />
Since alll the web malware exploitation kits are open source, and leaked in the wild at large, their modularity allows everyone to easily embed any type of exploit that they want to, resulting in Neosploit's single most beneficial feature, the fact that certain versions include all the publicly available exploits targeting Internet Explorer, Firefox and Opera. Moreover, the open source nature of the kit is resulting in a countless number of modified versions yet to be detected and analyzed, therefore keeping track of the exploits included in a malware kit can only be realistic if you take into considered the exploits that come with the default installation.<br />
<br />
<b>17.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/obfuscating-fast-fluxed-sql-injected.html">Obfuscating Fast-fluxed SQL Injected Domains</a> -<br />
Now that's a very good example of different tactics combined to attack, ensure survivability, and apply a certain degree of evasion in between.<br />
<br />
<b>18.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/unbreakable-captcha.html">The Unbreakable CAPTCHA</a> -<br />
There's never been a shortage of ideas, there's always been an issue of usability.<br />
<br />
<b>19.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/ayyildiz-turkish-hacking-group-vs.html">The Ayyildiz Turkish Hacking Group VS Everyone</a> -<br />
That's a pretty inspiring mission if you are to ensure your future in the next couple of years, by targeting everyone, everywhere that has ever publicly stated their disagreement with the Turkish foreign policy.<br />
<br />
<b>20.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/money-mule-recruiters-use-asproxs-fast.html">Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services</a> -<br />
A true multitasking in action with a botnet that's been crunching out phishing emails, SQL injecting and now hosting a well known money mule recruitment service. <br />
<br />
<b>21.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/sql-injecting-malicious-doorways-to.html">SQL Injecting Malicious Doorways to Serve Malware</a> -<br />
Constantly switching tactics and combining different ones to achive an objective that used to be accomplished by plain simple techniques, is only starting to take place. In this case, instead of a hard coded SQL injected domain, we have the typical malicious doorways the result of the converging traffic management tools with web malware exploitation kits.<br />
<br />
<b>22.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/impersonating-stopbadwareorg-to-serve.html">Impersonating StopBadware.org to Serve Fake Security Warnings</a> -<br />
Typosquatting popular security vendors and services is nothing new, by having HostFresh providing the hosting for the parked domains promoting the rogue security software, is a privilege and flattery for the success of the Stopbadware initiative.<br />
<br />
<b>23.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire</a> -<br />
Customerization -- not customization -- has been taking place for a while, that's the process of tailoring your upcoming products to the needs of your future customers, compared to the product concept myopia where the malware coder would code something that he believes would be valuable to the potential customers. End user agreements, issuing licenses for the malware tool, as well as forbidding the reverse engineering of the malware so that no remotely exploitable flaws could be, are among the requirements the coder assists on.<br />
<br />
<b>24. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lazy-summer-days-at-ukrtelegroup-ltds.html">Lazy Summer Days at UkrTeleGroup Ltd</a><b> -</b><br />
Taking a random snapshot of the current malicious activity at a well known provider of hosting services for rogue security applications, live exploit URLs and botnet command&amp;control locations, always provides an insight into what are their customers up to. In this case, centralization of their scammy ecosystem, and parking a countless number of rogue domains on the same server.<br />
<br />
<b>25. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/email-hacking-going-commercial.html">Email Hacking Going Commercial</a> -<br />
Cybercrime is in fact getting easier to outsource, and while the number of scammers trying to offer non-existent services, or at least services where they cannot deliver the goods, the business model of this service that is that you only pay once they show you a proof that they've managed to hack the email address you game them. How are they doing it? Social engineering and enticing the user to click on live exploit URL from where they'll infect the PC and obtain the email password, of course, next to definitely abusing it for many other purposes in the process.<br />
<br />
<b>26.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/vulnerabilities-in-antivirus-software.html">Vulnerabilities in Antivirus Software - Conflict of Interest</a> -<br />
You can easily twist the number of vulnerabilities found in your antivirus solution, but not recognizing them as vulnerabilities at the first place. It's all a matter of what you define as a vulnerability, or perhaps what you admit as a serious vulnerability - remote code execution through a security software, or a flaw that's allowing malware to bypass the security solution itself.<br />
<br />
<b>27. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/counting-bullets-on-malware-front.html">Counting the Bullets on the (Malware) Front</a> -<br />
Emphasizing on the number of malware/threats/viruses/worms/slugs your solution detects may be marketable in the short-term, but is damaging the end user's understanding of the threatscape in the long-term. So, by the time he catches up with what exactly is going on, he'll recall the moment in time where he was using the number of threats his solution was detecting as the main benchmark for its usefulness. In reality through, the number is irrelevant from a pro-active point of view, with zero day malware like the one coded for hire undermining the signatures based scanning model.<br />
<br />
<b>28. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/smells-like-copycat-sql-injection-in.html">Smells Like a Copycat SQL Injection In the Wild</a> -<br />
It was pretty obvious that copycats seeing the success of SQL injections the the huge number of sites susceptible to exploitation, would also starting taking advantage of the practice. Some are, however, targeting local communities and trying to avoid detection by using targeted SQL injections.<br />
<br />
<b>29. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/click-fraud-botnets-and-parked-domains.html">Click Fraud, Botnets and Parked Domains - All Inclusive</a> -<br />
The scheme is nothing new, what's new is that the botnet masters are trying to limit the revenues that used to go out to affiliate networks they were participating in, and are trying to own or rent the entire infrastructure on their own.<br />
<br />
<b>30. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/over-80-percent-of-storm-worm-spam-sent.html">Over 80 percent of Storm Worm Spam Sent by Pharmaceutical Spam Kings</a><b> -</b><br />
With access to Storm Worm sold and resold, and new malware introduced on Storm Worm infected hosts used as foundation for the propagation of the new malware in this case, it's questionable whether or not the Storm Worm-ers themselves are sending out the junk emails, or are they people who've rented access to the botnet doing it. <br />
<br />
<b>31. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-team-leaving-it-underground.html">Neosploit Team Leaving the IT Underground</a> -<br />
Pretty surprising at the first place, but in reality it clearly demonstrates that when you cannot enforce the end user agreement on your crimeware kit, but continue seeing it used in a very profitable malware operations, you basically shut down the support for the public version. The team is not going to stop innovating for their own purposes, and in the long-term they may in fact re-appear with an updated malware kit that's converging different services next to the product itself.<br />
<br />
<b>32. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/dissecting-managed-spamming-service.html">Dissecting a Managed Spamming Service</a> - <br />
Managed spamming services using botnets as the foundation for the campaigns are starting to introduce improved metrics for the delivery, as well as experienced customer support ensuring the spam messages make it through spam filters, or at least increase the probability of making the happen. This is an example of a random service emphasizing on the improved metrics they're capable of delivering.<br />
<br />
<b>33. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/storm-worms-lazy-summer-campaigns.html">Storm Worm's Lazy Summer Campaigns</a> -<br />
Looks like a "cybercrime intern" launched this campaign, lacking any of the usual Storm Worm evasive practices, no exploitation of client side vulnerabilities, as well as no survivability offered by their usual fast-flux nodes.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=dMjxcK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=dMjxcK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=IC3AVK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=IC3AVK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=d2XWZk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=d2XWZk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=vRFZyk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=vRFZyk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=6ZdeKK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=6ZdeKK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=jVlXIK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=jVlXIK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=W4mAWk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=W4mAWk" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/352993637" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Aug 2008 12:08:24 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/profitable malware operations">profitable malware operations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware authors">malware authors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware tools">malware tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware coder">malware coder</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware kit">malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware infection">malware infection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/neosploit malware kit">neosploit malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam">spam</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/352993637/summarizing-julys-threatscape.html">Summarizing July's Threatscape</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a67e13e215d163e122340bffab059502</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a67e13e215d163e122340bffab059502</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[What is shaping the prices of stolen credit card details? The investments the cybercriminals or real life scammers ( through credit card cloning or ATM skimming ) put into the process of obtaining the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div>
<div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div>
<a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHzyYjwnXTI/AAAAAAAAB6c/9rHV8A0Ggz4/s1600-h/ccz.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHzyYjwnXTI/AAAAAAAAB6c/WQG5_Cal0xY/s200-R/ccz.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>What is shaping the prices of stolen credit card details? The investments the cybercriminals or real life scammers ( through <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/02/credit-card-data-cloning-tactic.html">credit card cloning</a> or <a href="http://www.snopes.com/fraud/atm/atmcamera.asp">ATM skimming</a>) put into the process of obtaining the details, or can we even talk about investments being made where an experienced scammer has just purchased 1GB of raw credit cards data from a novice botnet master who isn't really aware of the actual value of his "botnet output"?<br />
<br />
Depends on which economic theory you believe in, or whether or not you'll take the "bottom-up approach" or the "top-down" one. And since I'm not aware of the existence of "the invisible hand of the underground market" and centralized power to increase the supply or decrease it to boost prices for the stolen credit card details, also indicating the existence of underground cartels putting everyone in a "price taker" position.<br />
<br />
The basics of demand and supply for anything underground will always apply unless of course, The more they want, the cheaper it gets, the less they want, the higher the price on per credit card basis gets, since the investment on behalf of the malicious party that originally stolen them is virtually the same, and he can theoretically break-even in every single case since the credit card details were obtained efficiently. It's up to the seller to follow or entirely ignore economic behavior, and do what they feel like doing with this good which must on the other hand reach its market liquidity as soon as possible, else it becomes obsolete. The current market model can be further explained as a good example of competitive equilibrium :<br />
<br />
"<i>Competitive market equilibrium is the traditional concept of economic equilibrium, appropriate for the analysis of commodity markets with flexible prices and many traders, and serving as the benchmark of efficiency in economic analysis. <b>It relies crucially on the assumption of a competitive environment where each trader decides upon a quantity that is so small compared to the total quantity traded in the market that their individual transactions have no influence on the prices.</b></i>"<br />
<br />
This can be easily explained in a single sentence - it's a mess and every participant is doing whatever they want to, so generalizing on the prices charged for stolen credit card numbers would be unrealistic, since it's the price a single seller with no real impact on the "average" market price for the same good. As for the average market price itself, it would be hard to measure it depending on the quality of the sample you want to rely on, since this is a type of market where sellers don't have to report price changes in their goods for the purpose of statistical research.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.finjan.com/Content.aspx?id=827#SecurityTrendsReport">A recently released report by Finjan</a>, with whom I've been on the same page of several high profile incidents so far, <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20080715/wr_nm/cybercrime_finjan_dc">touches this very same topic</a> :<br />
<br />
"<i>Prices charged by cybercriminals selling hacked bank and credit card details have fallen sharply as the volume of data on offer has soared, forcing them to look elsewhere to boost profit margins, a new report says. Researchers for Finjan, a Web security firm, said the high volumes traded had led to bank and credit card information becoming "commoditized" - account details with PIN codes that once fetched $100 or more each might now go for $10 or $20. In its latest quarterly survey of Web trends, the California-based company said cybercrime had evolved into "a major shadow economy ruled by business rules and logic that closely mimics the legitimate business world.</i>"<br />
<br />
Excluding the presence of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/price-discrimination-in-market-for.html">price discrimination</a> for a while, as well as open topic offers in the lines of "how much for X amount of Y?" answered as "how much are you willing to pay?", it's all a matter of the seller in a particular situation.<br />
<br />
Furthermore, in real-life market there's always the scarcity problem, however, in the underground market there's no shortage of resources despite the ever growing wants of the buyers. Generalizing even more, take for instance the butterfly effect of a price change in petrol, and result of which is inevitable increase of prices in every single aspect of your life, but in the underground market mostly due to the malicious economies of scale achieved, a price increase in renting a botnet would have no effect in the prices charged for the stolen credit card details obtained through the infected hosts. How come? Basically, the price and resources for malware infection are prone to decrease, if we take a malware infected host as a static foundation for the basis of any upcoming cybercrime activities using it.<br />
<br />
Perhaps the most disturbing part is that the market for stolen credit card details is so mature, and its entry barriers so low these days, that the confidential data that cannot be efficiently obtained through real-life means like credit card cloning or ATM skimming on a large scale, is now purchased online for the purpose of abusing it in real-life by<a href="http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/06/citibank-atm-se.html"> embedding the valid information into plastic cards</a>.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=c5gmVJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=c5gmVJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=yABcqJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=yABcqJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=iuXpaj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=iuXpaj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=Ctkd2j"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=Ctkd2j" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=KJLEOJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=KJLEOJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=6teEcJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=6teEcJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=XpeGzj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=XpeGzj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/336435935" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2008 11:36:12 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/price">price</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/average market price">average market price</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/market price">market price</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card">credit card</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card details">credit card details</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/details">details</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/market">market</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/competitive market equilibrium">competitive market equilibrium</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card basis">credit card basis</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/336435935/are-stolen-credit-card-details-getting.html">Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[A Niche to a Niche is Still Hard to Staff]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/928e4ced778e9e246c51637aebd03d84</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/928e4ced778e9e246c51637aebd03d84</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Ive touched on this about a bazillion times, let me start today with a very simple statement: due to the scale of the US Government, we cannot find enough skilled security people
Part of the problem...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;ve touched on this about a bazillion times, let me start today with a very simple statement:  due to the scale of the US Government, we cannot find enough skilled security people.</p>
<p>Part of the problem is that good security people need to know the following skills:</p>
<ul>
<li>IT technology: since the data more often than not is in a computer, you need to understand them</li>
<li>People technology: policies and procedures for managing people</li>
<li>Business sense:  understanding that you&#8217;re supporting business goals</li>
<li>And for Government:  politics</li>
</ul>
<p>Back when I was PFC Rybolov, my battalion commander told me something along the lines of &#8220;The intelligence world is a hard job, you have to be able to out-infantry the infantry, out-mechanic the mechanics, out-radio the radio guys, and you need to know a language.&#8221;  Security is pretty much the same thing&#8211;you have to out-techie the techies, out-business the MBAs, and out-jerkify the auditors.  =)</p>
<p>Sound complicated?  Yes, it is, and it&#8217;s hard to find people who can do all this.  IT is an employment niche, IT security is a niche to a niche.  And there isn&#8217;t enough people who have the experience to do it.</p>
<p>So how do we mitigate the staffing shortage?  Here is what we are doing today in the Government:</p>
<ul>
<li>CyberCorps scholarship program for undergrads and graduate students with a minimum government service obligation.</li>
<li>Using other career fields in &#8220;crossover roles&#8221;&#8211;yes, accountants can be used for some light security tasks.  Some things that we think of as security are really Quality Assurance and Change Control jobs that we have a vested interest in making work.</li>
<li>Using contractors in some roles such as ISSO, ISSM, etc.</li>
<li>Automation as much as possible.  Technical is easier, the policy and procedures side takes longer.  What you&#8217;ll find out eventually is that good IT management is good security management.</li>
<li>Hanging on methodologies to &#8220;automate&#8221; the process side of security.</li>
</ul>
<p>Now this is cool and all, but it&#8217;s hard to sustain and really hard to justify as a long-term solution.  In order to support the Government, we need to create more people.  Cybercorps is a start, but the need is so much larger than the supply that we have to consider better ways to create Government security dweebs.</p>
<p>Do we need Security Awareness and Training?  Yes we do, but much more than what is being provided (think system administrator training and procurement specialist training, not end-user training), and as an internal recruiting pipeline.  Still, I don&#8217;t think that we can recruit enough people to &#8220;the dark side&#8221; and that we need to look outside the Beltway for people.  Problem is that DC is such an insular community and we don&#8217;t speak the same language as the rest of the world.</p>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Jul 2008 08:59:36 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/light security tasks">light security tasks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/management">management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security management">security management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/government security dweebs">government security dweebs</category>
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      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security awareness">security awareness</category>
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      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/TheGuerillaCiso/~3/331709034/420">A Niche to a Niche is Still Hard to Staff</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Darpa Brain Drain Costs Agency $32 Million]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/0da13ddc612a50891083f5dffe6f2e7f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/0da13ddc612a50891083f5dffe6f2e7f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Due to Darpa's shortage of qualified staff, the Pentagon says that the premiere research agency &quot;continues to underexecute&quot; and reassigns $32 million of its funding to other defense...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Due to Darpa's shortage of qualified staff, the Pentagon says that the premiere research agency "continues to underexecute" and reassigns $32 million of its funding to other defense projects.<br style="clear: both;"/>
      <a href="http://www.pheedo.com/click.phdo?s=823a602088409b922491ef4eabd0771c"><img alt="" style="border: 0;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?s=823a602088409b922491ef4eabd0771c"/></a>
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      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Jun 2008 15:32:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[NISTS FISMA Pase IIWho Certifies Those who Certify the Certifiers?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/271d22495a76ce6a3ee6919616e42509</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/271d22495a76ce6a3ee6919616e42509</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Check out this slideshow and this workshop paper from 2006 on some ideas that NIST and a fairly large advisory panel have put together about certification of C&amp;A service providers. Ive heard about...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Check <a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fisma/documents/PPT/FISMA-Phase-II.pdf" target="_blank">out this slideshow</a> and this <a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fisma/documents/Workshop-April26-2006/NIST-FISMA-PhaseII-Workshop-Notes.pdf" target="_blank">workshop paper </a>from 2006 on some ideas that NIST and a fairly large advisory panel have put together about certification of C&amp;A service providers.  I&#8217;ve heard about this for several years now, and it&#8217;s been fairly much on a hiatus since 2006, but it&#8217;s starting to get some eartime lately.</p>
<p>The interesting thing to me is the big question of certifying companies v/s individuals.  I think the endgame will involve doing both because you certify companies for methodology and you certify people for skills.</p>
<p>This is the problem with certification and accreditation services as I see it today:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Security staffing shortage means lower priority:</strong>  If you are an agency CISO and have 2 skilled people, where are you going to put them?  Odds are, architecture, engineering, or some other high-payoff activity, meaning that C&amp;A services are candidates for entry-level security staff.</li>
<li><strong>Centralized v/s project-specific funding:</strong>  Some agencies have a &#8220;stable&#8221; of C&amp;A staff, if it&#8217;s done wrong, you end up with standardization and complete compliance but not real risk management.  The opposite of this is where all the C&amp;A activities are done on a per-project basis and huge repetition of effort ensues.  Basic management technique is to blend the 2 approaches.</li>
<li><strong>Crossover of personnel from &#8220;risk-avoidance&#8221; cultures:</strong>  Taking people from compliance-centric roles such as legal and accounting and putting them into a risk-based culture is a sure recipe for failure, overspending, and frustration.</li>
<li><strong>Accreditation is somewhat broken:</strong>  Not a new concept&#8211;teaching business owners about IT security risk is always hard to do, even more so when they have to sign off on the risk.</li>
<li><strong>C&amp;A services are a commodity market:</strong>  I <a href="http://www.guerilla-ciso.com/archives/412">covered this last week</a>.  This is pivotal, remember it for later.</li>
<li><strong>Misinformation abounds:</strong>  Because the NIST Risk Management Framework evolves so rapidly, what&#8217;s valid today is not the same that will be valid in 2 years.</li>
</ul>
<p>So what we&#8217;re looking at with this blog post is how would a program to certify the C&amp;A service providers look like.  NIST has 3 viable options:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Use Existing Certs:</strong> Require basic certification levels for role descriptions.  DoD 8570.1M follows this approach.  Individual-level certification would be CAP, CISSP, CG.*, CISA, etc.  The company-level certification would be something like ITIL or CMMI.</li>
<li><strong>Second-Party Credentialing:</strong>  The industry creates a new certification program to satisfy NIST&#8217;s need without any input from NIST.  Part of this has already happened with some of the certifications like CAP.</li>
<li><strong>NIST-Sponsored Certification:</strong>  NIST becomes the &#8220;owner&#8221; of the certification and commissions organizations to test each other.</li>
</ul>
<p>Now just like DoD 8570.1M, I&#8217;m torn on this issue.  On one hand, it means that you&#8217;ll get a higher caliber of person performing services because they have to meet some kind of minimum standard.  On the other hand, introducing scarcity means that there will be even less people available to do the job.  But the big problem that I have is that if you introduce higher requirements on commodity services, you&#8217;re squeezing the market severely:  costs as a customer go up for basic services, vendors get even less of a margin on services, more charlatans show up because you&#8217;ve tipped over into higher-priced boutique services, and mayhem ensues.</p>
<p>Guys, I&#8217;m not really a rocket scientist on this, but really after all this effort, it seems to me that the #1 problem that the Government has is a lack of skilled people.  Yes, certifying people is a good thing because it helps weed out the dirtballs with a very rough sieve, but I get the feeling that maybe what we should be doing instead is trying to create more people with the skills we need.  Alas, that&#8217;s a future blog post&#8230;.</p>
<p>However, the last thing that I want to see happen is a meta-game of what&#8217;s going on with certifications right now&#8211;who certifies those who certify?  I think it&#8217;s a vicious cycle of cross-certification that will end up with the entire Government security industry becoming one huge self-licking ice cream cone.  =)</p>
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      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/TheGuerillaCiso/~3/314090909/419">NISTS FISMA Pase IIWho Certifies Those who Certify the Certifiers?</source>
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