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  <channel>
    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: simpler]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/simpler</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Thu, 26 Jun 2008 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[AlgoSec upgrades analysis platform to paint big picture of firewall protection ]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/34eb189192e927ac319c0c067dfb68d6</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/34eb189192e927ac319c0c067dfb68d6</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[AlgoSec is releasing new software that enables its Firewall Analyzer to simulate the effect multiple firewalls have on traffic, making simpler to determine the net effect of the firewalls and to...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[AlgoSec is releasing new software that enables its Firewall Analyzer to simulate the effect multiple firewalls have on traffic, making simpler to determine the net effect of the firewalls and to streamline their rule sets.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 23 Nov 2008 21:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/firewalls">firewalls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/effect multiple firewalls">effect multiple firewalls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rule sets">rule sets</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/net effect">net effect</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/algosec">algosec</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/firewall analyzer">firewall analyzer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/traffic">traffic</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/enables">enables</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/streamline">streamline</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/112408-algosec.html?fsrc=rss-security">AlgoSec upgrades analysis platform to paint big picture of firewall protection </source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Silent Break-Ins: How Technology Compromises Physical Security Too]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/037bb160455e2a7c95f039f67e29cad0</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/037bb160455e2a7c95f039f67e29cad0</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I could have used this technique last night I got home to my apartment in Oakland at 11:30, only to realize Id left my keys in Sacramento. Two hours later a locksmith finally came and charged me $100...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I could have used this technique last night &#8212; I got home to my apartment in Oakland at 11:30, only to realize I&#8217;d left my keys in Sacramento. Two hours later a locksmith finally came and charged me $100 to let me in my own apartment. Expensive? Maybe, but comparable to other services, and compared to the havoc that a lock-breaker could wreak if he was trying to use his talents for crime rather than service, it&#8217;s a small price.</p>
<p>It&#8217;s kind of frightening to see how quickly a skilled lock-picker can jimmy a lock and get in. But new technology makes it even simpler &#8212; apparently all you need is a good telephoto lens to break in to someone&#8217;s house &#8212; just wait till they leave their keys out on a table, snap a picture, and take it to an unethical key maker, and wha-la, a perfect replica:</p>
<blockquote><p><span id="intelliTXT"> &#8220;We built our key duplication <a rel="nofollow" class="iAs" style="border-bottom:0.075em solid darkgreen important;font-weight:normal;font-size:100%;text-decoration:underline;padding-bottom:1px;color:darkgreen important;background-color:transparent important;" target="_blank" href="http://www.physorg.com/news144519246.html#">software</a> system to show people that their keys are not inherently secret,&#8221; said Stefan Savage, the <a rel="nofollow" class="iAs" style="border-bottom:0.075em solid darkgreen important;font-weight:normal;font-size:100%;text-decoration:underline;padding-bottom:1px;color:darkgreen important;background-color:transparent important;" target="_blank" href="http://www.physorg.com/news144519246.html#">computer</a> science professor from UC San Diego&#8217;s Jacobs School of Engineering who led the student-run project. &#8220;Perhaps this was once a reasonable assumption, but advances in digital imaging and optics have made it easy to duplicate someone&#8217;s keys from a distance without them even noticing.&#8221;<br />
</span></p>
<p><span id="intelliTXT">Professor Savage presents this work on October 30 at ACM&#8217;s Conference on Communications and Computer Security (CCS) 2008, one of the premier academic computer security conferences. </span></p></blockquote>
<p><a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="http://www.secureconsulting.net/2008/11/remote_key_copying_eep.html">Read</a> the <a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="http://www.physorg.com/news144519246.html">full article</a> here.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Nov 2008 12:17:53 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/someones keys">someones keys</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/keys">keys</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lock">lock</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer science professor">computer science professor</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/unethical key maker">unethical key maker</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lock-picker">lock-picker</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lock-breaker">lock-breaker</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/apartment">apartment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/reasonable assumption">reasonable assumption</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/itsecurity/~3/450105958/">Silent Break-Ins: How Technology Compromises Physical Security Too</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[PasswordTextBox]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/4e1580792b56914339b6489792b99933</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/4e1580792b56914339b6489792b99933</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Chris Sells used to poke fun at me when we worked together in my former life . He used to call my security class, &quot;Essential Access Denied&quot;. His point was a good one: when they aren't applied...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.sellsbrothers.com/" target="_blank">Chris Sells</a> used to poke fun at me when we worked together in my <a href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/andyrs/240203382/" target="_blank">former life</a>. He used to call my security class, &quot;Essential Access Denied&quot;. His point was a good one: when they aren&#39;t applied carefully, security countermeasures often just get in the way of getting work done. I don&#39;t know about you, but password-mode text boxes in web forms have always been one of those annoyances.</p> <p>I&#39;m not complaining about the fact that I can&#39;t see what I&#39;m typing. I understand and laud that feature, because I don&#39;t want someone looking over my shoulder at the password I&#39;m typing, and this even applies when I&#39;m at home. I love my children, but I certainly don&#39;t want them knowing the password to my bank account!</p> <p>No, what I&#39;m bothered by is how a typical password text box behaves on a form that may incur multiple post-backs before it&#39;s finally submitted. If you use the built in ASP.NET TextBox control, it purposely does not repopulate the password text, which means if you press a button on the form that performs a post-back, or if you have a multi-page form that posts back on every step, that password disappears, and the user typically has to re-enter it. You could solve this with liberal use of ASP.NET Ajax UpdatePanels, but that adds its own complexities. I wanted a simpler solution.</p> <p>So I did a little research to see what others had discovered about this problem, and I ended up deriving my own custom control from TextBox to make a much more user-friendly (and developer-friendly) TextBox control. I called it PasswordTextBox, and it acts just like a TextBox in password mode, but it retains the password while still giving the user the same level of protection the standard TextBox supplies.</p> <p>My PasswordTextBox operates very simply: it stores the password in control state, and renders a series of fixed characters (with the same length as the actual password) into the text box so that it &quot;looks&quot; like the user&#39;s password has been rendered. Since control state is part of view state, and since view state is stored in a hidden field on the form, I encrypt the password before putting it into control state.</p> <p>The result is quite nice - the user can post your form back as many times as she needs to, perhaps moving back and forth across wizard steps or tabs, and when she finally presses the &quot;Finish&quot; button (or whatever you call the last step of your input form), your code will be able to read the password by simply accessing the Text property on the PasswordTextBox. The user will believe that her password is sitting there on the form while she&#39;s working, as the same number of obfuscated characters will show up in the field as she typed in originally (what she doesn&#39;t know is that those characters aren&#39;t her real password anymore, but what she doesn&#39;t know won&#39;t hurt her!)</p> <p>Note that to keep this simple, I used DPAPI to encrypt the password, which suited my purposes. But if you have a web farm, that won&#39;t work well at all if you don&#39;t know which machine the user&#39;s going to post back to, so you&#39;ll want to replace that with something more robust. I could see looking up the &lt;machineKey&gt; for entropy, as that tends to be sync&#39;d already across the farm, but I&#39;ve not yet spent the cycles to go down that road, since unfortunately all of the code for generating keys based on that config section are off limits in ASP.NET (most of the useful stuff is marked internal). I don&#39;t think it&#39;d be that hard to do though.</p> <p>Anyway, without further ado, here&#39;s the code, which you&#39;ll see is quite simple. I&#39;d love feedback, especially if you see any glaring problems with the idea or the implementation!</p><pre class="csharpcode"><span class="kwrd">public</span> <span class="kwrd">class</span> PasswordTextBox : TextBox
{
    <span class="rem">// unlikely that a string of these would be used for a password</span>
    <span class="kwrd">const</span> <span class="kwrd">char</span> PasswordPlaceholderChar = <span class="str">&#39;}&#39;</span>;

    <span class="kwrd">string</span> password; <span class="rem">// stored encrypted in control state</span>

    <span class="kwrd">protected</span> <span class="kwrd">override</span> <span class="kwrd">void</span> OnInit(EventArgs e)
    {
        <span class="kwrd">base</span>.OnInit(e);
        Page.RegisterRequiresControlState(<span class="kwrd">this</span>);
    }

    <span class="kwrd">protected</span> <span class="kwrd">override</span> <span class="kwrd">object</span> SaveControlState()
    {
        <span class="kwrd">byte</span>[] encryptedPassword = ProtectPassword(password);

        <span class="kwrd">object</span> baseControlState = <span class="kwrd">base</span>.SaveControlState();
        <span class="kwrd">if</span> (<span class="kwrd">null</span> == baseControlState)
            <span class="kwrd">return</span> encryptedPassword;
        <span class="kwrd">else</span> <span class="kwrd">return</span> <span class="kwrd">new</span> Pair(baseControlState, encryptedPassword);
    }

    <span class="kwrd">protected</span> <span class="kwrd">override</span> <span class="kwrd">void</span> LoadControlState(<span class="kwrd">object</span> savedState)
    {
        <span class="kwrd">byte</span>[] encryptedPassword;

        Pair pair = savedState <span class="kwrd">as</span> Pair;
        <span class="kwrd">if</span> (<span class="kwrd">null</span> != pair)
        {
            <span class="kwrd">base</span>.LoadControlState(pair.First);
            encryptedPassword = pair.Second <span class="kwrd">as</span> <span class="kwrd">byte</span>[];
        }
        <span class="kwrd">else</span> encryptedPassword = savedState <span class="kwrd">as</span> <span class="kwrd">byte</span>[];

        password = UnprotectPassword(encryptedPassword);
    }

    <span class="rem">/// &lt;summary&gt;</span>
    <span class="rem">/// This control always uses TextMode=Password</span>
    <span class="rem">/// &lt;/summary&gt;</span>
    <span class="kwrd">public</span> <span class="kwrd">override</span> TextBoxMode TextMode
    {
        get
        {
            <span class="kwrd">return</span> TextBoxMode.Password;
        }
        set { }
    }

    <span class="rem">/// &lt;summary&gt;</span>
    <span class="rem">/// TextBox doesn&#39;t render value attribute for TextMode=Password</span>
    <span class="rem">/// So we add code that renders a placeholder text instead</span>
    <span class="rem">/// &lt;/summary&gt;</span>
    <span class="rem">/// &lt;param name=&quot;writer&quot;&gt;&lt;/param&gt;</span>
    <span class="kwrd">protected</span> <span class="kwrd">override</span> <span class="kwrd">void</span> AddAttributesToRender(HtmlTextWriter writer)
    {
        <span class="kwrd">base</span>.AddAttributesToRender(writer);

        <span class="kwrd">string</span> text = Text;
        <span class="kwrd">if</span> (text.Length &gt; 0)
            writer.AddAttribute(HtmlTextWriterAttribute.Value,
                GetPlaceholderPassword(text));
    }

    <span class="rem">/// &lt;summary&gt;</span>
    <span class="rem">/// TextBox doesn&#39;t save the &quot;Text&quot; viewstate in</span>
    <span class="rem">/// TextMode=Password and we don&#39;t want our behavior to break</span>
    <span class="rem">/// if ViewState is turned off so we store the password in</span>
    <span class="rem">/// Control State, encrypted with MachineKey</span>
    <span class="rem">/// &lt;/summary&gt;</span>
    <span class="kwrd">public</span> <span class="kwrd">override</span> <span class="kwrd">string</span> Text
    {
        get
        {
            <span class="kwrd">return</span> password ?? <span class="kwrd">string</span>.Empty;
        }
        set
        {
            <span class="rem">// this prevents us overwriting the actual</span>
            <span class="rem">// password with a placeholder</span>
            <span class="kwrd">if</span> (!<span class="kwrd">string</span>.IsNullOrEmpty(password) &amp;&amp;
                <span class="kwrd">value</span>.Equals(GetPlaceholderPassword(password)))
                <span class="kwrd">return</span>;

            password = <span class="kwrd">value</span>;
        }
    }

    <span class="kwrd">private</span> <span class="kwrd">string</span> GetPlaceholderPassword(<span class="kwrd">string</span> realPassword)
    {
        <span class="kwrd">int</span> length = 12;
        <span class="kwrd">if</span> (!<span class="kwrd">string</span>.IsNullOrEmpty(realPassword))
            length = realPassword.Length;

        StringBuilder sb = <span class="kwrd">new</span> StringBuilder();
        sb.Append(PasswordPlaceholderChar, length);

        <span class="kwrd">return</span> sb.ToString();
    }

    <span class="kwrd">public</span> <span class="kwrd">byte</span>[] ProtectPassword(<span class="kwrd">string</span> password)
    {
        <span class="kwrd">if</span> (<span class="kwrd">string</span>.IsNullOrEmpty(password))
            <span class="kwrd">return</span> <span class="kwrd">null</span>;
        <span class="kwrd">byte</span>[] cleartext = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(password);
        <span class="kwrd">return</span> ProtectedData.Protect(cleartext, <span class="kwrd">null</span>,
            DataProtectionScope.LocalMachine);
    }

    <span class="kwrd">public</span> <span class="kwrd">string</span> UnprotectPassword(<span class="kwrd">byte</span>[] ciphertext)
    {
        <span class="kwrd">if</span> (<span class="kwrd">null</span> == ciphertext)
            <span class="kwrd">return</span> <span class="kwrd">null</span>;
        <span class="kwrd">byte</span>[] cleartext = ProtectedData.Unprotect(ciphertext, <span class="kwrd">null</span>,
            DataProtectionScope.LocalMachine);
        <span class="kwrd">return</span> Encoding.UTF8.GetString(cleartext);
    }
}
</pre><div style="clear:both;"></div><img src="http://www.pluralsight.com/community/aggbug.aspx?PostID=54154" width="1" height="1">]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2008 16:49:54 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/password-mode text boxes">password-mode text boxes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/text">text</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/return null">return null</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/return">return</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/net">net</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/net ajax updatepanels">net ajax updatepanels</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/net textbox control">net textbox control</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/password">password</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/textbox control">textbox control</category>
      <source url="http://www.pluralsight.com/community/blogs/keith/archive/2008/10/29/passwordtextbox.aspx">PasswordTextBox</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Data Mining for Terrorists Doesn't Work]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/205a9261660e694f495f2a2726701cd2</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/205a9261660e694f495f2a2726701cd2</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[According to a massive report from the National Research Council, data mining for terrorists doesn't work. Here's a good summary: The report was written by a committee whose members include William...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>According to a <a href="http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12452">massive report</a> from the National Research Council, data mining for terrorists doesn't work.  <a href="http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10059987-38.html?part=rss&subj=news&tag=2547-1_3-0-20">Here's</a> a good summary:</p>

<blockquote>The report was written by a committee whose members include William Perry, a professor at Stanford University; Charles Vest, the former president of MIT; W. Earl Boebert, a retired senior scientist at Sandia National Laboratories; Cynthia Dwork of Microsoft Research; R. Gil Kerlikowske, Seattle's police chief; and Daryl Pregibon, a research scientist at Google.

<p>They admit that far more Americans live their lives online, using everything from VoIP phones to Facebook to RFID tags in automobiles, than a decade ago, and the databases created by those activities are tempting targets for federal agencies. And they draw a distinction between subject-based data mining (starting with one individual and looking for connections) compared with pattern-based data mining (looking for anomalous activities that could show illegal activities).</p>

<p>But the authors conclude the type of data mining that government bureaucrats would like to do--perhaps inspired by watching too many episodes of the Fox series 24--can't work. "If it were possible to automatically find the digital tracks of terrorists and automatically monitor only the communications of terrorists, public policy choices in this domain would be much simpler. But it is not possible to do so."</p>

<p>A summary of the recommendations:</p>

<ul><li>U.S. government agencies should be required to follow a systematic process to evaluate the effectiveness, lawfulness, and consistency with U.S. values of every information-based program, whether classified or unclassified, for detecting and countering terrorists before it can be deployed, and periodically thereafter.

<p><li>Periodically after a program has been operationally deployed, and in particular before a program enters a new phase in its life cycle, policy makers should (carefully review) the program before allowing it to continue operations or to proceed to the next phase.</p>

<p><li>To protect the privacy of innocent people, the research and development of any information-based counterterrorism program should be conducted with synthetic population data... At all stages of a phased deployment, data about individuals should be rigorously subjected to the full safeguards of the framework.</p>

<p><li>Any information-based counterterrorism program of the U.S. government should be subjected to robust, independent oversight of the operations of that program, a part of which would entail a practice of using the same data mining technologies to "mine the miners and track the trackers."</p>

<p><li>Counterterrorism programs should provide meaningful redress to any individuals inappropriately harmed by their operation.</p>

<p><li>The U.S. government should periodically review the nation's laws, policies, and procedures that protect individuals' private information for relevance and effectiveness in light of changing technologies and circumstances. In particular, Congress should re-examine existing law to consider how privacy should be protected in the context of information-based programs (e.g., data mining) for counterterrorism.</ul></blockquote></p>

<p><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/08/washington/08data.html">Here</a> <a href="http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/10/data-mining-for.html">are</a> <a href="http://techdirt.com/articles/20081007/1242002479.shtml">more</a> news articles on the report.  I <a href="http://www.schneier.com/essay-108.html">explained</a> why data mining wouldn't find terrorists back in 2005.</p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=w2YwM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=w2YwM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=sK5kM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=sK5kM" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 10 Oct 2008 02:35:43 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/synthetic population data">synthetic population data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/terrorists">terrorists</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/program">program</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/program enters">program enters</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/research scientist">research scientist</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/research">research</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/protect">protect</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/microsoft research">microsoft research</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/10/data_mining_for_1.html">Data Mining for Terrorists Doesn't Work</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[What to watch for - the Rest of the Fortune 500 Gets Their Software Security]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d0a9a1ce70c7eb39399e6f52665bcf05</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d0a9a1ce70c7eb39399e6f52665bcf05</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The financial industry drives a lot of what happens in security. They have had a lot of money, and lots of people try to steal from them their customers. They did drive some good stuff, but only from...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The financial industry drives a lot of what happens in security. They <strike>have</strike> had a lot of money, and lots of people try to steal from <strike>them</strike> their customers. They did drive some good stuff, but only from one vertical&#39;s perspective. I have advocated for awhile that software security look to other verticals to understand their security needs. Now that we&#39;re watching these behemoth financial firms vanish before our eyes, we will see the needs of insurance, manufacturing, healthcare and other verticals take on more precedence. If you want some ideas on what is important, start <a href="http://duckdown.blogspot.com/">here</a>. FWIW, here are some key themes that i think will emerge.</p><br />
<div><span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Standard Support</span></div>
<div><a href="http://xmlnetworking.blogspot.com/">Mark O&#39;Neill</a> posted this comment to an earlier <a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/09/software-security-may-live-in-interesting-times.html">blog</a> and it bears repeating</div><br />
<blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="PADDING-RIGHT: 0px; PADDING-LEFT: 0px; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 40px; BORDER-TOP-STYLE: none; PADDING-TOP: 0px; BORDER-RIGHT-STYLE: none; BORDER-LEFT-STYLE: none; BORDER-BOTTOM-STYLE: none">
<p><span style="COLOR: #333333; LINE-HEIGHT: 19px">Take a difference I&#39;ve noticed between financial services and government. I have encountered situations where a financial services customer may say &quot;what if we just forget about using all those standards and make all these messages simpler&quot;, as they have optimization hard-wired as a goal. A government customer is (in my experience) more likely to focus on standards support for interoperability, and also to support directives that certain standards are used (e.g. XACML, let&#39;s say).</span></p></blockquote>
<blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="PADDING-RIGHT: 0px; PADDING-LEFT: 0px; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 40px; BORDER-TOP-STYLE: none; PADDING-TOP: 0px; BORDER-RIGHT-STYLE: none; BORDER-LEFT-STYLE: none; BORDER-BOTTOM-STYLE: none">
<p><span style="COLOR: #333333; LINE-HEIGHT: 19px"><br /></span><span style="COLOR: #333333; LINE-HEIGHT: 19px">If the vendor was to build their product based solely on either customers needs, they would assume, as you say, that &quot;the client just doesn&#39;t get it&quot;. It would be either &quot;These government people are crazy, the people back at the bank told us those standards were not important&quot;, or else &quot;these financial services people are crazy, we show them all the complex support for standards we have and they do not seem to care at all, they just want us to strip all that out&quot;.</span><br /><span style="COLOR: #333333; LINE-HEIGHT: 19px">In that case, the trick would be to build something down the middle, with the standards support and the optimization. But, just focusing on one sector is bad.</span></p></blockquote><br />
<div>The financial people have been optimizing for so long and they had so much money they didn&#39;t need to worry about standards, they were the standard. But you don&#39;t need standards for standards&#39; sake, you need...</div><br />
<div><span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Interoperability</span></div>
<div>The financial people didn&#39;t worry about this, the pot of gold was so big people would pay to play and build their own adapters. Architects at other companies need to figure out how to cost effectively knit things together and get authN, authZ, and audit too.</div><br />
<div><span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Fuzzy Edges</span></div>
<div>Take something hideous like the FIX protocol. Everyone knows its broken but they just built stuff all around in terms of accountability and other controls. they could do this because there was a living breathing audit log of transactions - a hard edge. So the financial industry drove lots of poor plumbing and compensated with hard edges. It worked well enough I suppose, but as any protocol plumber knows, you need to fix the pipes eventually. Especially if you want to...</div><br />
<div><span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Scale</span></div>
<div>Need to scale across domains, locations, geographies. Its not one little closed trading floor loop. Its wheels within wheels. You might say its <span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">federated</span> autonomous nodes.&#160;</div><br />
<div>its not just technical run time scale. Its people scale. You can&#39;t assume that your tool is supported by several security people per project. The tools have to scale for one security person and a hundred developer type ratios. Better automation, better reporting, faster integration. Raise the floor one inch, but raise the <span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">whole</span> floor.</div>
<div>&#160;</div>
<div><strong>Smaller Overall Security Budget</strong></div>
<div>I saved the best for last. When the financial people wanted software security, they kept spending on network security and they added dollars to support software security tools and processes. The rest of the F500 can&#39;t or wont be able to, this means that for the software security vendors, they will need to <strong>take market share</strong>. Its not just competing against each other, its making the business case for software security over other types of security that have <a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/08/golf-driven-security.html">ossified technically</a> but still command a rosy price, like *cough* network firewalls.</div>
<div>&#160;</div>
<div>Side note, I know three financial firms that did excellent work in software security. really dug and invested time and money to make sure they are world class in that space. Strangely enough with all these firms melting down, the three I am thinking of that took a conservative approach, addressing software security in a root and branch mode,have not been named as a target for the next meltdown. Coincidence? We report, you decide.</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Sep 2008 11:06:51 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software security">software security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/government customer">government customer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/government">government</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/government people">government people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/people">people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/financial people">financial people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software security vendors">software security vendors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/financial services people">financial services people</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/09/what-to-watch-for---the-rest-of-the-fortune-500-gets-their-software-security.html">What to watch for - the Rest of the Fortune 500 Gets Their Software Security</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[A tip on using ASP.NET validation controls]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/20fc43ecdf7ca60d64f9285d0e374a62</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/20fc43ecdf7ca60d64f9285d0e374a62</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Executive summary
ValidationSummary controls look at the ErrorMessage field to figure out what to display, so always use ErrorMessage in a verbose enough way that it will be helpful from a...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Executive summary:</p> <ul> <li>ValidationSummary controls look at the ErrorMessage field to figure out what to display, so always use ErrorMessage in a verbose enough way that it will be helpful from a ValidationSummary control.</li> <li>If you need a shorter message to display inline (i.e., where the validation control is on the form, as opposed to the ValidationSummary) use the body of the control to define it.</li></ul> <p>In the past, I&#39;ve used RequiredFieldValidator controls on my web forms to remind users that certain fields are required. I would set the ErrorMessage to something vanilla like, &quot;This field is required&quot;, or even something simpler like &quot;*&quot; (an asterisk) if I didn&#39;t have much room on the form to display more prose for an error.</p> <p>A friend was recently testing a new feature that I&#39;d built for our sales team and she had a hard time seeing the little red asterisks that were showing up next to required fields. It felt to her as though she was pushing the submit button on the form but nothing was happening. It was clear that a ValidationSummary control would be helpful, especially if placed close to the submit button for the form.</p> <p>I&#39;ve been a bit lazy in the past about using ValidationSummary controls, partially because most of my forms are simple enough that they feel a bit redundant. But on a more complicated form, they can be very helpful to guide users back to the places on the form where there&#39;s problems.</p> <p>So I threw one of those puppies on the form and immediately saw that there was a problem - my error message was set to &quot;*&quot;, which meant that my validation summary was pretty useless - it just displayed a bunch of red asterisks! And in places where I&#39;d used the prose, &quot;This field is required&quot;, well that was pretty useless as an error message in the summary.</p> <p>After a bit of research and experimentation, I discovered that the ValidationSummary control looks at the ErrorMessage property on each validation control in order to figure out what to display in the summary. So it&#39;s important to use ErrorMessage with a summary in mind! Don&#39;t use text like &quot;*&quot; or &quot;This field is required&quot;. Be more specific so the user can find her way up to the problem field, as in, &quot;PostalCode is required&quot;.</p> <p>But if you make ErrorMessage verbose so that it&#39;s helpful in a summary, it may make your form really ugly when displayed inline next to the control being validated. The trick is to use the body of the validation control element to specify the inline error message. Then you end up with two messages: a verbose one that&#39;s used in your summary, and a more localized, brief message that shows up right next to the control being validated. Note the asterisk that&#39;s in the body of the RequiredFieldValidator below:</p><pre class="csharpcode"><span class="kwrd">&lt;</span><span class="html">asp:RequiredFieldValidator</span>
      <span class="attr">ErrorMessage</span><span class="kwrd">=&quot;Zip/postal code is required&quot;</span>
      <span class="attr">ControlToValidate</span><span class="kwrd">=&#39;txtPostalCode&#39;</span>
      <span class="attr">ValidationGroup</span><span class="kwrd">=&#39;BasicInfo&#39;</span>
      <span class="attr">Display</span><span class="kwrd">=&quot;Dynamic&quot;</span>
      <span class="attr">runat</span><span class="kwrd">=&#39;server&#39;</span><span class="kwrd">&gt;</span>*<span class="kwrd">&lt;/</span><span class="html">asp:RequiredFieldValidator</span><span class="kwrd">&gt;</span></pre>
<p>I&#39;ve learned a lesson from all of this. In the future when I use validation controls I&#39;ll always provide a summary-friendly message in the ErrorMessage field, and if I need something different (typically shorter) to display inline, I&#39;ll put it in the body of the validation control element.</p>
<p>Hope this helps!</p><div style="clear:both;"></div><img src="http://www.pluralsight.com/community/aggbug.aspx?PostID=52816" width="1" height="1">]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 03 Sep 2008 13:16:35 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/shorter message">shorter message</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/message">message</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/inline error message">inline error message</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/validation control element">validation control element</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/control">control</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/inline">inline</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/display inline">display inline</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/errormessage">errormessage</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/errormessage property">errormessage property</category>
      <source url="http://www.pluralsight.com/community/blogs/keith/archive/2008/09/03/a-tip-on-using-asp-net-validation-controls.aspx">A tip on using ASP.NET validation controls</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Q&A with Doug McClure: Is BSM Lite the Answer?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/183e734958786a07b2c4d4b988eb60cc</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/183e734958786a07b2c4d4b988eb60cc</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[We had the opportunity to chat with Doug McClure , who is currently the Senior Managing Consultant for Business Service Management (BSM) and IT Service Management (ITSM) for the IBM Software Services...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; margin: 0px 10px 10px 0px; border-right-width: 0px" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/dougmcclurefeb2008-web.jpg" border="0" alt="dougmcclureFeb2008-web" width="105" height="156" align="left" /> We had the opportunity to chat with <a href="http://dougmcclure.net/blog/" target="_blank">Doug McClure</a>, who is currently the Senior Managing Consultant for Business Service Management (BSM) and IT Service Management (ITSM) for the IBM Software Services for Tivoli (ISST) team at IBM Tivoli (part of Software Group (SWG)). He currently leads the Virtual BSM Practice within IBM Software Services for Tivoli.</p>
<p><em><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong></em> What is “BSM Lite” and how is it different from “heavy” BSM?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> I think the concepts that <a href="http://netforecast.com/" target="_blank">Peter Sevcik from Net Forecast</a> initially <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/27818" target="_blank">outlined in his blog post</a> sum up what &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; is all about: a simpler, less expensive, more responsive way of achieving the goals and objectives of Business Service Management (BSM).  He&#8217;s contrasted this nicely against what he termed &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; being the larger investments in time and resources to deploy domain specific tools and solutions each providing a view into the business service delivery with some aggregation and consolidation to tie up all of the disparate tool&#8217;s information into a concise end-to-end business service management story.</p>
<p>I&#8217;m pleased that he leveraged some of my thinking around a better working definition of what BSM really is from the <a href="http://dougmcclure.net/blog/business-service-management-bsm-defined/" target="_blank">BSM Defined page on my blog</a>. Of course, these definitions are going to vary depending on whom you talk with and how they see the overall BSM Maturity Model.  I&#8217;ve created a BSM Maturity Model that aligns with the famous Gartner IT maturity model.  I&#8217;d like to think that a &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; solution is one attacking the low hanging fruit, enabling one to achieve value quicker, and in a more tactical manner.  The &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; solutions are capable of the same, but span all along the BSM Maturity Model by adding additional point solutions, products and technologies from their broader portfolio. </p>
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> Does “BSM Lite” just refer to the tools, or can it refer to the process and methodology as well?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> I think that BSM is as much a philosophy as it is technology, process, people and methodology.  If we can get people to think, operate and respond differently than they do today with a focus on the business, customers, quality, revenue, or whatever else is most important to their business goals and objectives, than that is Business Service Management and could be &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; if you will. </p>
<p>Being that I work for IBM Tivoli, one of my personal objectives is to identify ways to use our key BSM enabling products in a more efficient, effective and BSM centric way. This was a huge driver for trying to hold DevCampTivoli focused on &#8220;Collaborative Development of End-to-End BSM Solutions&#8221;. </p>
<p>In my opinion, we don’t make things very easy for our clients and the answer can’t be to “buy this product, module or widget” to fill in the gaps.  In my opinion, we must establish a BSM overlay within IBM Tivoli’s development and product management organization that ensures that we have clearly thought about how to enable BSM with the hundreds or products that we sell.  In my opinion, every product release must incorporate the fundamentals of enabling BSM in addition to the core domain specific functionality intended. I hope to keep this spirit alive and get our smartest IBMers and clients thinking about the best way to take a &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; solution and make it &#8220;lighter&#8221;. I hope to share more about my plans here and guidance for the industry in general soon.</p>
<p>That said, I am always interested in consulting with clients and collaborate with peers in the industry to figure out how to get the focus on the people, process and technology as key components of their BSM strategies.  I am absolutely convinced that without a documented BSM strategy, roadmap and top level sponsorship within the business and IT, the chances of BSM success greatly diminish.</p>
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> Given the complexities involved in implementing a BSM strategy and dealing with the people and processes components of any business, how does “BSM Lite” really work? Should the expectations and outcomes be “lite” as well?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> Time will tell if &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; will work.  I&#8217;m seeing emerging companies that are already breaking down some of the barriers to BSM success.  I do not expect that those choosing to begin with a &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; approach should expect &#8220;lite&#8221; outcomes. </p>
<p>The outcomes are the same regardless of the approach IF you&#8217;ve got a documented BSM strategy, roadmap and top level sponsorship in place before you begin. New features, capabilities and technologies will be needed as the needs of the business change and companies mature in BSM and fundamental IT management. This will likely force companies to move in more &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; directions to fill those gaps. </p>
<p>In my opinion, this is the ideal scenario now as it gives &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; vendors opportunities to grow their products and solutions. It also GREATLY improves the chances for success with a &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; solution because the organization would have already had matured enough to approach a &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; solution than if they hadn&#8217;t done a &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; solution in the past.</p>
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> Is “BSM Lite” more appropriate for a small or midsized organization, or does it apply equally to large companies? Is there an ideal profile for a company that can successfully implement a BSM strategy? Is there a different profile for “BSM Lite”?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> From an economic perspective, the concepts of &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; are appropriate for all companies.  Remember, with &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; we&#8217;re focused on identifying ways to make the goals and objectives of BSM easier to implement and in a more cost effective way.  Any company concerned about their IT cost overhead should care about this, especially when the risks of starting out with a &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; type deployment are much greater and the time to value generally much longer.</p>
<p>The &#8220;ideal&#8221; profile for any company is one where the BSM initiative begins by establishing top level buy in through creation of a formal BSM strategy for the company. This BSM strategy personalizes how the company defines what BSM is, what value the company expects from it, and how it will use BSM as a competitive differentiator for delivery of its business and IT services, products, etc.</p>
<p>The organizational &#8220;profile&#8221; I&#8217;ve seen most successful is when implementing a BSM strategy originates from within or actively includes a group that many companies have now that serves as a liaison or relationship management role between the various lines of business and IT. Sometimes this group is often seen as the gatekeeper to filter (and hinder) business driven requirements into the IT organization. In the ideal scenario, this group works very closely with the business and IT (usually staffed by business people and not IT people) to understand both the business side and IT side of complex business services and applications. </p>
<p>Apart from the traditional IT components, what this group can do is help IT really understand the business perspective.  Analysis of the impact on the business in business terms is only possible by collaborating with a group such as this.  True value oriented BSM becomes attainable when we get to this level of IT and business alignment, cooperation, collaboration and communication.</p>
<p>If BSM is an IT only initiative, this will likely result in an IT centric perspective severely lacking in the necessary business perspective.  In these cases where IT doesn&#8217;t invest their BSM efforts with the business as an equal partner, the implementation ultimately becomes a &#8220;CYA&#8221; tool for IT and not achieve the desired value oriented expected.</p>
<p>To some degree &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; may have an entirely different profile. If we see the price points, complexity and time to value change significantly we may see these types of deployments originate exclusively within the Line of Business. The possibility may exist where large enterprises operating in a shared IT services or IT outsourcing type model that the Line of Business brings in a &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; solution to gain the visibility, checks and balances needed to ensure that the LoB’s needs are being met from the internal/external provider. I&#8217;d envision that &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; may even be capable of operating within a &#8220;SaaS&#8221; model or other managed service type offering where the price points are below the signing levels triggering broader IT involvement and review.</p>
<p><em>To Be Continued&#8230;</em></p>
<p><a href="http://sharethis.com/item?&wp=abc&amp;publisher=ea11358c-69de-4e80-9804-e964a8930b70&amp;title=Q%26amp%3BA+with+Doug+McClure%3A+Is+BSM+Lite+the+Answer%3F&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fblog.sciencelogic.com%2Fqa-with-doug-mcclure-is-bsm-lite-the-answer%2F07%2F2008">ShareThis</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 14 Jul 2008 20:02:59 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lite">lite</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bsm heavy">bsm heavy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bsm heavy directions">bsm heavy directions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bsm">bsm</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/outcomes">outcomes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/expect lite outcomes">expect lite outcomes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bsm lite approach">bsm lite approach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/approach">approach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bsm heavy solution">bsm heavy solution</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/qa-with-doug-mcclure-is-bsm-lite-the-answer/07/2008">Q&amp;A with Doug McClure: Is BSM Lite the Answer?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Introducing Microsoft Code Name Zermatt]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/732b3e6ffabbf1bdf556615c13244f16</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/732b3e6ffabbf1bdf556615c13244f16</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[For a couple of years now, I've been giving talks about &quot;claims-based identity&quot;, and &quot;claims-aware applications&quot;. The most concrete example of a claims-based identity architecture that I've been able...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For a couple of years now, I&#39;ve been giving talks about &quot;claims-based identity&quot;, and &quot;claims-aware applications&quot;. The most concrete example of a claims-based identity architecture that I&#39;ve been able to show so far is Active Directory Federation Services v1 (ADFS) and Windows CardSpace. And the claims programming model I&#39;ve been using is the one that shipped with WCF in the System.IdentityModel assembly.<br /><br />But today I&#39;m happy to announce that there&#39;s a new path forward in the claims world. <a href="https://connect.microsoft.com/Downloads/DownloadDetails.aspx?SiteID=642&amp;DownloadID=12937">Zermatt</a> is the &quot;identity framework&quot; that I&#39;ve been itching to talk about, but until today, hasn&#39;t been announced publicly.<br /><br />Well, <a href="http://blogs.msdn.com/vbertocci/">Vittorio</a> just made the <a href="http://blogs.msdn.com/vbertocci/archive/2008/07/09/announcing-the-beta-release-of-zermatt-developer-identity-framework.aspx">announcement</a> just a moment ago, and now you can get your hands on this new framework. With it, you can build web applications and services that rely on claims to discover identity details about users. And you can easily build a security token service (STS) that supplies those claims. Zermatt makes this possible by supplying all of the plumbing that implements WS-Trust (for web services) and WS-Federation (for browser-based web applications). All you have to do is figure out what claims you want to issue based on what you know about the user and what you know about the application (aka relying party).<br /><br />I was fortunate to be asked by the team to write the <a href="https://connect.microsoft.com/Downloads/DownloadDetails.aspx?SiteID=642&amp;DownloadID=12901">white paper</a> introducing Zermatt to developers. You can download it here. The paper introduces the ideas behind claims-based identity, and talks about how you can use Zermatt to centralize authentication (and to some degree, authorization) in an STS, thus making it easy to achieve single sign on in your applications, and even be ready to federate with other organizations or platforms should that need arise.<br /><br />Here are some highlights of what you&#39;ll find in Zermatt:<br /><br />Zermatt includes a new claims programming model, with IClaimsPrincipal and IClaimsIdentity, two new interfaces that extend the existing IPrincipal and IIdentity that you already know and love from the .NET Framework. IClaimsIdentity adds a collection of claims. Zermatt&#39;s claims programming model is in many ways simpler than that in WCF - the Claim class exposes the value of claims as strings (always) and calls the value of a claim &quot;Value&quot;, instead of &quot;Resource&quot; as WCF did. But the model is also more sophisticated - multi-hop delegation is supported, so one user can &quot;Act As&quot; another user, and the relying party will see the entire chain of delegation as a linked list of IClaimsIdentity objects.<br /><br />Zermatt includes an HttpModule that you can wire into your ASP.NET application that will implement WS-Federation for you. This module (called the FAM) is a lot like the &quot;Web Agent&quot; from ADFS, and it makes it quite easy to build a web application that relies on claims.<br /><br />Zermatt includes plumbing that sits on top of WCF and simplifies building claims-based web services and clients.<br /><br />Zermatt also includes a couple of ASP.NET controls for adding SignIn functionality to websites. The first is a passive sign-in control which simply redirects the browser to an STS to get claims. The second is the highly anticipated InformationCard control that pops the user&#39;s identity selector and lets her choose which identity she wants to use.<br /><br />Zermatt comes with a bunch of sample code to help you get started.<br /><br />All you need to test-drive Zermatt is Visual Studio 2008 and your curiosity. Download the beta now, read the whitepaper, experiment with the samples, and see what claims-based identity is all about!<br /><br />For more on Zermatt, you&#39;ll want to watch <a href="http://blogs.msdn.com/vbertocci/">Vittorio&#39;s blog</a>. I&#39;ll also be talking more about it in the future!</p><div style="clear:both;"></div><img src="http://www.pluralsight.com/community/aggbug.aspx?PostID=51689" width="1" height="1">]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 09 Jul 2008 16:27:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/zermatt">zermatt</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/claims world">claims world</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/claims">claims</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/zermatt includes">zermatt includes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/includes">includes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/claims-aware applications">claims-aware applications</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/framework">framework</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/identity framework">identity framework</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/identity">identity</category>
      <source url="http://www.pluralsight.com/community/blogs/keith/archive/2008/07/09/introducing-microsoft-code-name-zermatt.aspx">Introducing Microsoft Code Name Zermatt</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Kill Switches and Remote Control]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6faff6d8aced2811984a7463136f6b3a</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6faff6d8aced2811984a7463136f6b3a</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[It used to be that just the entertainment industries wanted to control your computers -- and televisions and iPods and everything else -- to ensure that you didn't violate any copyright rules. But now...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[It used to be that just the entertainment industries wanted to control your computers -- and televisions and iPods and everything else -- to ensure that you didn't violate any copyright rules. But now everyone else wants to get their hooks into your gear.

OnStar will soon include the <a href="http://www.informationweek.com/news/mobility/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=202400922">ability</a> for the police to shut off your engine remotely. Buses are getting the <a href="http://www.nypost.com/seven/06082008/news/regionalnews/busting_terror_114567.htm">same capability</a>, in case terrorists want to re-enact the movie <cite>Speed</cite>. The Pentagon wants a kill switch <a href="http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/06/the-pentagons-n.html">installed</a> on airplanes, and is worried about potential enemies <a href="http://spectrum.ieee.org/may08/6171">installing</a> kill switches on their own equipment. 

Microsoft is doing some of the most creative thinking along these lines, with something it's calling "<a href="http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080611-microsoft-patent-brings-miss-manners-into-the-digital-age.html">Digital Manners Policies</a>." According to its <a href="http://appft1.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PG01&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.html&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=%2220080125102%22.PGNR.&OS=DN/20080125102&RS=DN/20080125102">patent application</a>, DMP-enabled devices would accept broadcast "orders" limiting capabilities. Cellphones could be remotely set to vibrate mode in restaurants and concert halls, and be turned off on airplanes and in hospitals. Cameras could be prohibited from taking pictures in locker rooms and museums, and recording equipment could be disabled in theaters. Professors finally could prevent students from texting one another during class. 

The possibilities are endless, and very dangerous. Making this work involves building a nearly flawless hierarchical system of authority. That's a difficult security problem even in its simplest form. Distributing that system among a variety of different devices -- computers, phones, PDAs, cameras, recorders -- with different firmware and manufacturers, is even more difficult. Not to mention delegating different levels of authority to various agencies, enterprises, industries and individuals, and then enforcing the necessary safeguards.

Once we go down this path -- giving one device authority over other devices -- the security problems start piling up. Who has the authority to limit functionality of my devices, and how do they get that authority? What prevents them from abusing that power? Do I get the ability to override their limitations? In what circumstances, and how? Can they override my override?

How do we prevent this from being abused? Can a burglar, for example, enforce a "no photography" rule and prevent security cameras from working? Can the police enforce the same rule to avoid another Rodney King incident? Do the police get "superuser" devices that cannot be limited, and do they get "supercontroller" devices that can limit anything? How do we ensure that only they get them, and what do we do when the devices inevitably fall into the wrong hands?

It's comparatively easy to make this work in closed specialized systems -- OnStar, airplane avionics, military hardware -- but much more difficult in open-ended systems. If you think Microsoft's vision could possibly be securely designed, all you have to do is look at the dismal effectiveness of the various copy-protection and digital-rights-management systems we've seen over the years. That's a similar capabilities-enforcement mechanism, albeit simpler than these more general systems.

And that's the key to understanding this system. Don't be fooled by the scare stories of wireless devices on airplanes and in hospitals, or visions of a world where no one is yammering loudly on their cellphones in posh restaurants. This is really about media companies wanting to exert their control further over your electronics. They not only want to prevent you from surreptitiously recording movies and concerts, they want your new television to enforce good "manners" on your computer, and not allow it to record any programs. They want your iPod to politely refuse to copy music to a computer other than your own. They want to enforce <em>their</em> legislated definition of manners: to control what you do and when you do it, and to charge you repeatedly for the privilege whenever possible. 

"Digital Manners Policies" is a marketing term. Let's call this what it really is: Selective Device Jamming. It's not polite, it's dangerous. It won't make anyone more secure -- or more polite.

This essay <a href="http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2008/06/securitymatters_0626">originally appeared</a> in Wired.com.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=JiKwGJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=JiKwGJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=aXm5MJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=aXm5MJ" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jul 2008 02:48:37 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wireless devices">wireless devices</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/devices">devices</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/devices inevitably">devices inevitably</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/digital manners policies">digital manners policies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/prevent">prevent</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/prevent security cameras">prevent security cameras</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/difficult security">difficult security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cameras">cameras</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/prevent students">prevent students</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/07/kill_switches_a.html">Kill Switches and Remote Control</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Security Matters: I've Seen the Future, and It Has a Kill Switch]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/b9aa8529e116abf92778a4755495e63d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/b9aa8529e116abf92778a4755495e63d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[It used to be that just the entertainment industries wanted to control your computers -- and televisions and iPods and everything else -- to ensure that you didn't violate any copyright rules. But now...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It used to be that just the entertainment industries wanted to control your computers -- and televisions and iPods and everything else -- to ensure that you didn't violate any copyright rules. But now everyone else wants to get their hooks into your gear.
</p><p>
OnStar will soon include the <a href="http://www.informationweek.com/news/mobility/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=202400922">ability</a> for the police to shut off your engine remotely. Buses are getting the <a href="http://www.nypost.com/seven/06082008/news/regionalnews/busting_terror_114567.htm">same capability</a>, in case terrorists want to re-enact the movie <cite>Speed</cite>. The Pentagon wants a kill switch <a href="http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/06/the-pentagons-n.html">installed</a> on airplanes, and is worried about potential enemies <a href="http://spectrum.ieee.org/may08/6171">installing</a> kill switches on their own equipment. 
</p><p>
Microsoft is doing some of the most creative thinking along these lines, with something it's calling "<a href="http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080611-microsoft-patent-brings-miss-manners-into-the-digital-age.html">Digital Manners Policies</a>." According to its <a href="http://appft1.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PG01&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.html&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=%2220080125102%22.PGNR.&OS=DN/20080125102&RS=DN/20080125102">patent application</a>, DMP-enabled devices would accept broadcast "orders" limiting capabilities. Cellphones could be remotely set to vibrate mode in restaurants and concert halls, and be turned off on airplanes and in hospitals. Cameras could be prohibited from taking pictures in locker rooms and museums, and recording equipment could be disabled in theaters. Professors finally could prevent students from texting one another during class. 
</p><p>
The possibilities are endless, and very dangerous. Making this work involves building a nearly flawless hierarchical system of authority. That's a difficult security problem even in its simplest form. Distributing that system among a variety of different devices -- computers, phones, PDAs, cameras, recorders -- with different firmware and manufacturers, is even more difficult. Not to mention delegating different levels of authority to various agencies, enterprises, industries and individuals, and then enforcing the necessary safeguards.
</p><p>
Once we go down this path -- giving one device authority over other devices -- the security problems start piling up. Who has the authority to limit functionality of my devices, and how do they get that authority? What prevents them from abusing that power? Do I get the ability to override their limitations? In what circumstances, and how? Can they override my override?
</p><p>
How do we prevent this from being abused? Can a burglar, for example, enforce a "no photography" rule and prevent security cameras from working? Can the police enforce the same rule to avoid another Rodney King incident? Do the police get "superuser" devices that cannot be limited, and do they get "supercontroller" devices that can limit anything? How do we ensure that only they get them, and what do we do when the devices inevitably fall into the wrong hands?
</p><p>
It's comparatively easy to make this work in closed specialized systems -- OnStar, airplane avionics, military hardware -- but much more difficult in open-ended systems. If you think Microsoft's vision could possibly be securely designed, all you have to do is look at the dismal effectiveness of the various copy-protection and digital-rights-management systems we've seen over the years. That's a similar capabilities-enforcement mechanism, albeit simpler than these more general systems.
</p><p>
And that's the key to understanding this system. Don't be fooled by the scare stories of wireless devices on airplanes and in hospitals, or visions of a world where no one is yammering loudly on their cellphones in posh restaurants. This is really about media companies wanting to exert their control further over your electronics. They not only want to prevent you from surreptitiously recording movies and concerts, they want your new television to enforce good "manners" on your computer, and not allow it to record any programs. They want your iPod to politely refuse to copy music a computer other than your own. They want to enforce <em>their</em> legislated definition of manners: to control what you do and when you do it, and to charge you repeatedly for the privilege whenever possible. 
</p><p>
"Digital Manners Policies" is a marketing term. Let's call this what it really is: Selective Device Jamming. It's not polite, it's dangerous. It won't make anyone more secure -- or more polite.
</p>
<p>
---
</p>
<p><em>Bruce Schneier is chief security technology officer of BT, and author of</em> Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World<em>.</em>
</p><br style="clear: both;"/>
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 <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=rAla0I"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=rAla0I" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=DKXIgi"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=DKXIgi" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=IE7M8i"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=IE7M8i" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=swX5hI"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=swX5hI" border="0"></img></a> </div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/wired/politics/privacy/~4/320220918" height="1" width="1"/><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~r/wired/politics/security/~4/320220920" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 26 Jun 2008 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wireless devices">wireless devices</category>
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      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/prevent students">prevent students</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/difficult">difficult</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.wired.com/~r/wired/politics/security/~3/320220920/securitymatters_0626">Security Matters: I've Seen the Future, and It Has a Kill Switch</source>
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