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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: slow]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/slow</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Thu, 03 Jul 2008 18:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[What AntiVirus products do what?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/b7ef27f933cefa40ec6b0b71e62e2ae6</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/b7ef27f933cefa40ec6b0b71e62e2ae6</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[A really great article that should be required reading for every user online. Like a yearly requirement. ya know, to keep these facts fresh in your spongelike, thirsting for knowledge mind


clipped...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div > A really great article that should be required reading for every user online.<br/>Like a yearly requirement. ya know, to keep these facts fresh in your spongelike, thirsting for knowledge mind. </div>
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<td valign="top"><a href="http://clipmarks.com/clipmark/48F9302A-8447-4558-9BB7-9750C4963892/" title="go to this clipmark"><img src="http://content.clipmarks.com/blog_icon/381920b4-c929-414f-985d-feb6e958d47d/48F9302A-8447-4558-9BB7-9750C4963892/" alt="" width="19" height="19" border="0" style="vertical-align: middle; margin: 0px 4px; display: inline; border: none; float:none;" /></a>clipped from <a title="http://www.enterprise-security-today.com/story.xhtml?story_id=61428" href="http://www.enterprise-security-today.com/story.xhtml?story_id=61428" style="font-size: 11px;">www.enterprise-security-today.com</a></td>
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<td valign="top"><!-- CLIPPED FROM: http://www.enterprise-security-today.com/story.xhtml?story_id=61428 --><B>Not All Antivirus Programs Are Created Equal</B></td>
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<td valign="top"><!-- CLIPPED FROM: http://www.enterprise-security-today.com/story.xhtml?story_id=61428 --><SPAN class="storyCaption">Another issue with antivirus programs is the size of the processing footprint they exert. A number of common programs have very large footprints and will significantly slow down your computer &#8212; especially on startup. It is worthwhile asking about and understanding the effect the antivirus program will have on your particular computer.</SPAN></td>
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<td style="background:transparent;border-width:0px;padding:0px;">&nbsp;</td>
<td align="right" style="background:transparent;border-width:0px;padding:0px;width:107px" width="107"><a href="http://clipmarks.com/share/48F9302A-8447-4558-9BB7-9750C4963892/blog/" title="blog or email this clip"><img src="http://content8.clipmarks.com/images/c2b-foot.png" border="0" alt="blog it" width="107" height="17" style="border-width:0px;padding:0px;margin:0px;" /></a></td>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 21 Aug 2008 10:20:23 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/antivirus programs">antivirus programs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/antivirus program">antivirus program</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/common programs">common programs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/knowledge mind">knowledge mind</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/significantly slow">significantly slow</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/user online">user online</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/yearly requirement">yearly requirement</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer">computer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/exert">exert</category>
      <source url="http://spywarebiz.com/spywarebizblog/?p=567">What AntiVirus products do what?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[DNS Patches Slow Servers, but Fast Action Is Advised]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/bfc53c7349bb15056c18c167a303bffe</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/bfc53c7349bb15056c18c167a303bffe</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Some of the patches designed to protect against a cache-poisoning flaw in the DNS protocol are affecting server performance. But vendors are still urging IT admins to apply the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Some of the patches designed to protect against a cache-poisoning flaw in the DNS protocol are affecting server performance. But vendors are still urging IT admins to apply the fixes.
<p><a href="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~a/Computerworld/Security/News?a=RSHM32"><img src="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~a/Computerworld/Security/News?i=RSHM32" border="0"></img></a></p><img src="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~r/Computerworld/Security/News/~4/354967802" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 04 Aug 2008 00:28:59 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server performance">server performance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dns protocol">dns protocol</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/patches">patches</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vendors">vendors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fixes">fixes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/protect">protect</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/flaw">flaw</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/apply">apply</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/admins">admins</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~r/Computerworld/Security/News/~3/354967802/article.do">DNS Patches Slow Servers, but Fast Action Is Advised</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[When your hotel does funerals]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/7a31420cf206dd2cfc4b681fe0a369fc</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/7a31420cf206dd2cfc4b681fe0a369fc</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[So another week, another travel nightmare. This week I am in the DC area for a few days, than flying over to Ohio and then back home. Staying in the DC/Northern Va area I made hotel reservations...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>So another week, another travel nightmare.&nbsp; This week I am in the DC area for a few days, than flying over to Ohio and then back home.&nbsp; Staying in the DC/Northern Va area I made hotel reservations through our corporate Expedia account (which is now called Egencia BTW). Though it is fine for airline reservations, I regret it every time I make a hotel reservation on Expedia.&nbsp; This time I reserved a room at the <a href="http://www.google.com/aclk?sa=L&amp;ai=B953Ve6WGSLmnCIHceNvFuMMG-O_QGNDqiswB_LTwvwfgpxIIABABGAEoAjgBUOK2vZn8_____wFgyaaZjeykgBDIAQHIAtiqsgHZA9i4qLGuQL7D&amp;sig=AGiWqtw77p9SVu7mO_lOJ0ulJrBj4rf-rg&amp;q=http://www.virginiansuites.com/%3Fsrc%3Dppc_google_brand">Virginian Suites</a>. I had never heard of it, but it was only $158, which is really cheap for around here.&nbsp; It had 3 stars and sounded good, so I booked it.</p>

<p>I arrived tonight and as I pulled up I have to say that I thought I made a good choice. It is a converted apartment building and every room is actually a studio type of apartment. It has free parking and is located near where I have meetings in Arlington. I gave my name at the desk and they had my reservation, looking good!&nbsp; I was given keys to room 707 and headed on up.&nbsp; I got to room 707 and tried to open the door.&nbsp; No luck, the keys didn???t work. After a moment or two of trying to make the keys work, the door opens and the guy who is staying in the room wants to know what I am doing trying to get in. Well I was reminded of an old Robert Schimmel comedy routine and ran away from there as fast as I could.&nbsp; </p>

<p>I went back down to the desk and told them what happened.&nbsp; The woman at the desk apologized, she meant to write room 700, not 707.&nbsp; While I am waiting for her to correct this and issue new keys, I am looking at the schedule of events at the hotel today.&nbsp; That is when I notice that one of the main events of the day was a someone???s funeral!&nbsp; Thats right, it seems the hotel is used for funerals in the area.&nbsp; That just freaked me out.&nbsp; Now I am getting Six Feet Under deja vu here.&nbsp; I don???t know, call me squeamish, but I just don???t feel good about staying at a hotel that doubles as a funeral home. To top it off, the Internet access here sucks. It is so slow that I am watching the paint dry.&nbsp; Maybe I should go down and catch a funeral or two while I wait for a page to load.&nbsp; In any event, I think this will be the last time I stay here.&nbsp; I just can???t wait for what the rest of this week brings!</p></div>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 22 Jul 2008 19:41:36 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hotel">hotel</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hotel reservations">hotel reservations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hotel reservation">hotel reservation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/home">home</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/funeral home">funeral home</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/week brings">week brings</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/funeral">funeral</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/keys">keys</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/week">week</category>
      <source url="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/2008/07/when-your-hotel.html">When your hotel does funerals</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[When your hotel does funerals]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/cb3246b5c2e5a9f8d7ce414decd6efd3</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/cb3246b5c2e5a9f8d7ce414decd6efd3</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[So another week, another travel nightmare. This week I am in the DC area for a few days, than flying over to Ohio and then back home. Staying in the DC/Northern Va area I made hotel reservations...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>So another week, another travel nightmare.&nbsp; This week I am in the DC area for a few days, than flying over to Ohio and then back home.&nbsp; Staying in the DC/Northern Va area I made hotel reservations through our corporate Expedia account (which is now called Egencia BTW). Though it is fine for airline reservations, I regret it every time I make a hotel reservation on Expedia.&nbsp; This time I reserved a room at the <a href="http://www.google.com/aclk?sa=L&amp;ai=B953Ve6WGSLmnCIHceNvFuMMG-O_QGNDqiswB_LTwvwfgpxIIABABGAEoAjgBUOK2vZn8_____wFgyaaZjeykgBDIAQHIAtiqsgHZA9i4qLGuQL7D&amp;sig=AGiWqtw77p9SVu7mO_lOJ0ulJrBj4rf-rg&amp;q=http://www.virginiansuites.com/%3Fsrc%3Dppc_google_brand">Virginian Suites</a>. I had never heard of it, but it was only $158, which is really cheap for around here.&nbsp; It had 3 stars and sounded good, so I booked it.</p>

<p>I arrived tonight and as I pulled up I have to say that I thought I made a good choice. It is a converted apartment building and every room is actually a studio type of apartment. It has free parking and is located near where I have meetings in Arlington. I gave my name at the desk and they had my reservation, looking good!&nbsp; I was given keys to room 707 and headed on up.&nbsp; I got to room 707 and tried to open the door.&nbsp; No luck, the keys didn’t work. After a moment or two of trying to make the keys work, the door opens and the guy who is staying in the room wants to know what I am doing trying to get in. Well I was reminded of an old Robert Schimmel comedy routine and ran away from there as fast as I could.&nbsp; </p>

<p>I went back down to the desk and told them what happened.&nbsp; The woman at the desk apologized, she meant to write room 700, not 707.&nbsp; While I am waiting for her to correct this and issue new keys, I am looking at the schedule of events at the hotel today.&nbsp; That is when I notice that one of the main events of the day was a someone’s funeral!&nbsp; Thats right, it seems the hotel is used for funerals in the area.&nbsp; That just freaked me out.&nbsp; Now I am getting Six Feet Under deja vu here.&nbsp; I don’t know, call me squeamish, but I just don’t feel good about staying at a hotel that doubles as a funeral home. To top it off, the Internet access here sucks. It is so slow that I am watching the paint dry.&nbsp; Maybe I should go down and catch a funeral or two while I wait for a page to load.&nbsp; In any event, I think this will be the last time I stay here.&nbsp; I just can’t wait for what the rest of this week brings!</p></div>

<p><a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=bAF3vT"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=bAF3vT" border="0"></img></a></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=TtFnXJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=TtFnXJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=FF9XkJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=FF9XkJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=CgaObJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=CgaObJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=kuNdRJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=kuNdRJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=KCgbwj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=KCgbwj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=BQjQzj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=BQjQzj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~4/343165828" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 22 Jul 2008 18:45:08 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hotel">hotel</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hotel reservations">hotel reservations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hotel reservation">hotel reservation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/home">home</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/funeral home">funeral home</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/funeral">funeral</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/week brings">week brings</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/keys">keys</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/week">week</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~3/343165828/when-your-hotel.html">When your hotel does funerals</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Assessing the Security Benefits of Cloud Computing]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/1e09e5c89f15d3a4df4ea921f9230c2d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/1e09e5c89f15d3a4df4ea921f9230c2d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[With all this talk and reporting about security concerns, lets change the channel for a moment and assess the potential security benefits of Cloud Computing
In my view, there are some strong technical...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a title="Is the glass half empty or half full?" href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/94094843@N00/2292559560/" target="_blank"><img class="alignright" style="border: 0; float: right; margin: 3px;" src="http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3004/2292559560_378f226531_m.jpg" border="0" alt="Is the glass half empty or half full?" /></a></p>
<p>With all this <a href="http://cloudsecurity.org">talk</a> and <a href="http://www.gartner.com/DisplayDocument?id=685308">reporting</a> about security concerns, lets change the channel for a moment and assess the <strong>potential security benefits</strong> of Cloud Computing.</p>
<p>In my view, there are some strong technical security arguments in favour of Cloud Computing - assuming we can find ways to manage the risks.</p>
<p>With this new paradigm come challenges <strong>and </strong>opportunities.  The challenges are getting plenty of attention - I&#8217;m regularly afforded the opportunity to <a href="http://www.gridtoday.com/grid/2422309.html">comment</a> on them, plus obviously I cover them on this blog.  However, lets not lose sight of the potential upside.</p>
<p>In this post, I walk through seven technical security benefits.  Some are immediate, others may arise over time and have conditions attached (some unstated for the sake of brevity).  However, I&#8217;m including the longer-range benefits now to raise awareness.  Some of the outcomes listed are available today without the Cloud, but they are either complex and slow to implement (and thus less likely to happen) or prohibitive for capital cost reasons.  I don&#8217;t claim this is a definitive list - it reflects where my thinking is today.</p>
<p>Some benefits depend on the Cloud service used and therefore do not apply across the board.  For example; I see no solid forensic benefits with SaaS.  Also, for space reasons, I&#8217;m purposely not including the &#8216;flip side&#8217; to these benefits, however if you read this blog regularly you should <a href="http://cloudsecurity.org/2008/04/24/cloud-stacks-please-mind-the-gap/">recognise some</a>.</p>
<p>On a sidenote, I believe the Cloud offers Small and Medium Businesses major potential security benefits.  Frequently SMBs struggle with limited or non-existent in-house INFOSEC resources and budgets.  The caveat is that the Cloud market is still very new - security offerings are somewhat foggy - making selection tricky.  Clearly, not all Cloud providers will offer the same security.</p>
<h4>Seven Technical Security Benefits of the Cloud</h4>
<h4>1. Centralised Data</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Reduced Data Leakage</strong>: this is the benefit I hear most from Cloud providers - and in my view they are right.  How many laptops do we need to lose before we get this?  How many backup tapes?  The data &#8220;landmines&#8221; of today could be greatly reduced by the Cloud as thin client technology becomes prevalent.  Small, temporary caches on handheld devices or Netbook computers pose less risk than transporting data buckets in the form of laptops.  Ask the CISO of any large company if all laptops have company &#8216;mandated&#8217; controls consistently applied; e.g. full disk encryption.  You&#8217;ll see the answer by looking at the whites of their eyes.  Despite best efforts around asset management and endpoint security we continue to see embarrassing and disturbing misses.  And what about SMBs?  How many use encryption for sensitive data, or even have a data classification policy in place?</li>
<li><strong>Monitoring benefits</strong>: central storage is easier to control and monitor.  The flipside is the nightmare scenario of <a href="http://www.gnucitizen.org/blog/most-attractive-targets-saas/">comprehensive data theft</a>.  However, I would rather spend my time as a security professional figuring out smart ways to protect and monitor access to data stored in one place (with the benefit of situational advantage) than trying to figure out all the places where the company data resides across a myriad of thick clients!  You can get the benefits of Thin Clients today but Cloud Storage provides a way to centralise the data faster and potentially cheaper.  The logistical challenge today is getting Terabytes of data to the Cloud in the first place.</li>
</ul>
<h4>2. Incident Response / Forensics</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Forensic readiness</strong>: with Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) providers, I can build a dedicated forensic server in the same Cloud as my company and place it offline, ready for use when needed.  I would only need pay for storage until an incident happens and I need to bring it online.  I don&#8217;t need to call someone to bring it online or install some kind of remote boot software - I just click a button in the Cloud Providers web interface.  If I have multiple incident responders, I can give them a copy of the VM so we can distribute the forensic workload based on the job at hand or as new sources of evidence arise and need analysis.  To fully realise this benefit, commercial forensic software vendors would need to move away from archaic, physical dongle based licensing schemes to a network licensing model.</li>
<li><strong>Decrease evidence acquisition time</strong>: if a server in the Cloud gets compromised (i.e. broken into), I can now clone that server at the click of a mouse and make the cloned disks instantly available to my Cloud Forensics server.  I didn&#8217;t need to &#8220;find&#8221; storage or have it &#8220;ready, waiting and unused&#8221; - its just there.</li>
<li><strong>Eliminate or reduce service downtime</strong>: Note that in the above scenario I didn&#8217;t have to go tell the COO that the system needs to be taken offline for hours whilst I dig around in the RAID Array hoping that my physical acqusition toolkit is compatible (and that the version of RAID firmware isn&#8217;t supported by my forensic software).  Abstracting the hardware removes a barrier to even doing forensics in some situations.</li>
<li><strong>Decrease evidence transfer time</strong>: In the same Cloud, bit fot bit copies are super fast - made faster by that replicated, distributed filesystem my Cloud provider engineered for me.  From a network traffic perspective, it may even be free to make the copy in the same Cloud.  Without the Cloud, <strong>I </strong>would have to a lot of time consuming and expensive provisioning of physical devices.  I only pay for the storage as long as I need the evidence.</li>
<li><strong>Eliminate forensic image verification time</strong>: Some Cloud Storage implementations expose a cryptographic checksum or hash.  For example, Amazon S3 generates an MD5 hash <a href="http://docs.amazonwebservices.com/AmazonS3/2006-03-01/index.html?RESTObjectPUT.html">automagically</a> when you store an object.  In theory you no longer need to generate time-consuming MD5 checksums using external tools - its already there.</li>
<li><strong>Decrease time to access protected documents</strong>: Immense CPU power opens some doors.  Did the suspect password protect a document that is relevant to the investigation?  You can now test a wider range of candidate passwords in less time to speed investigations.</li>
</ul>
<h4>3. Password assurance testing (aka cracking)</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Decrease password cracking time</strong>: if your organisation regularly tests password strength by running password crackers you can use Cloud Compute to decrease crack time and you only pay for what you use.  Ironically, your cracking costs go up as people choose better passwords ;-).</li>
<li><strong>Keep cracking activities to dedicated machines</strong>: if today you use a distributed password cracker to spread the load across non-production machines, you can now put those agents in dedicated Compute instances - and thus stop mixing sensitive credentials with other workloads.</li>
</ul>
<h4>4. Logging</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>&#8220;Unlimited&#8221;, pay per drink storage</strong>: logging is often an afterthought, consequently insufficient disk space is allocated and logging is either non-existant or minimal.  Cloud Storage changes all this - no more &#8216;guessing&#8217; how much storage you need for standard logs.</li>
<li><strong>Improve log indexing and search</strong>: with your logs in the Cloud you can leverage Cloud Compute to index those logs in real-time and get the benefit of <a href="http://blogs.splunk.com/thewilde/2008/06/24/splunk-ninja-inside-the-cloud/">instant search results.</a> What is different here?  The Compute instances can be plumbed in and scale as needed based on the logging load - meaning a true real-time view.</li>
<li><strong>Getting compliant with Extended logging</strong>: most modern operating systems offer extended logging in the form of a C2 audit trail.  This is rarely enabled for fear of performance degradation and log size.  Now you can &#8216;opt-in&#8217; easily - if you are willing to pay for the enhanced logging, you can do so.  Granular logging makes compliance and investigations easier.</li>
</ul>
<h4>5. Improve the state of security software (performance)</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Drive vendors to create more efficient security software</strong>: Billable CPU cycles get noticed.  More attention will be paid to inefficient processes; e.g. poorly tuned security agents.  Process accounting will make a comeback as customers target &#8216;expensive&#8217; processes.  Security vendors that understand how to squeeze the most performance from their software will win.</li>
</ul>
<h4>6. Secure builds</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Pre-hardened, change control builds</strong>: this is primarily a benefit of virtualization based Cloud Computing.  Now you get a chance to start &#8217;secure&#8217; (by your own definition) - you create your Gold Image VM and clone away.  There are ways to do this today with bare-metal OS installs but frequently these require additional 3rd party tools, are time consuming to clone or add yet another agent to each endpoint.</li>
<li><strong>Reduce exposure through patching offline</strong>: Gold images can be kept up securely kept up to date.  Offline VMs can be conveniently patched &#8220;off&#8221; the network.</li>
<li><strong>Easier to test impact of security changes</strong>: this is a big one.  Spin up a copy of your production environment, implement a security change and test the impact at low cost, with minimal startup time.  This is a big deal and removes a major barrier to &#8216;doing&#8217; security in production environments.</li>
</ul>
<h4>7. Security Testing</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Reduce cost of testing security: </strong>a SaaS provider only passes on a portion of their security testing costs.  By sharing the same application as a service, you don&#8217;t foot the expensive security code review and/or penetration test.  Even with Platform as a Service (PaaS) where your developers get to write code, there are potential cost economies of scale (particularly around use of code scanning tools that sweep source code for security weaknesses).</li>
</ul>
<h4>Your Thoughts?</h4>
<p>What benefits do you see that I haven&#8217;t included in the above list?  Where do you agree/disagree and importantly, why?</p>
<img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/CloudSecurity/~4/341289594" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jul 2008 03:00:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/benefits">benefits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cloud">cloud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/technical security benefits">technical security benefits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/based">based</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization based cloud">virtualization based cloud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/efficient security software">efficient security software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security software">security software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cloud market">cloud market</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/CloudSecurity/~3/341289594/">Assessing the Security Benefits of Cloud Computing</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Are you using the latest web browser?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f99696393f35efc81b36eae37200a248</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f99696393f35efc81b36eae37200a248</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Written by Thomas Duebendorfer

In view of mass defacements of hundreds of thousand of web pages - with the intent to misuse them to launch drive-by download attacks - security researchers from ETH...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<span class="byline-author">Written by Thomas Duebendorfer</span><br /><br />In view of mass defacements of hundreds of thousand of web pages - with the intent to misuse them to launch drive-by download attacks - security researchers from ETH Zurich, Google, and IBM Internet Security Systems were interested in looking at the other side of the attack: the web browser. By analyzing the web browser versions seen in visits to Google websites, they have shown that more than 600 million Internet users don't use the latest version of their browser.<br /><br /><b>Slow migration to latest browser version</b><br />The researchers' paper, entitled <a href="http://www.techzoom.net/insecurity-iceberg">"Understanding the Web Browser Threat"</a>, shows that as of June 2008, only 59.1% percent of Internet users worldwide use the latest major version of their preferred web browser. Firefox users are the most attentive: 92.2% of them surfed with Firefox 2, the latest major version before the recently released 3.0. Only 52.5% of Microsoft Internet Explorer users have updated to version 7, which is the most secure according to multiple publicly-cited Microsoft experts (among them Sandi Hardmeier). The study revealed that 637 million Internet users worldwide who use web browsers are either not running the latest version of their preferred browser or have not installed the latest patches. These users are vulnerable to exploitation due to their web browser's "built-in" vulnerabilities and the lack of more recent security mechanisms such as improved phishing protection.<br /><br /><b>Neglected security patches</b><br />Over the past 18 months, the study also shows, a maximum of 83.3% of Firefox users were using the latest major version of the web browser and also had all current patches installed (i.e. latest minor version). Only 56.1% and 47.6% of Opera and Internet Explorer users, respectively, were similarly utilizing fully-patched web browsers. Apple users are no better: since the public release of Safari 3, only 65.3% of users operate the latest Safari version.<br /><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://bp1.blogger.com/_LMSk7hTEaIE/SH5ZvdukCtI/AAAAAAAAd10/-yGf2De4l8I/s1600-h/share.png"><img style="cursor: pointer;" src="http://bp1.blogger.com/_LMSk7hTEaIE/SH5ZvdukCtI/AAAAAAAAd10/-yGf2De4l8I/s400/share.png" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5223711289765006034" border="0" /></a><br /><div><em>Maximum measured share of users surfing the web with the most secure versions of Firefox, Safari, Opera and Internet Explorer in June 2008 as seen on Google websites.</em></div><br /><br /><b>Obsolete browser warning</b><br />The study's most important finding is that technical measures now in place do not sufficiently guarantee browser security, and that users' security awareness must be further developed. The problem is that most users are unaware that they are not using their browser's latest version. It must be made clear to web browser users that outdated software is associated with significantly higher risk. The researchers therefore suggest that, as a critical component of web software, a visible warning be instituted that warns the user of missing security patches in a way analogous to the 'best before' date in the perishable food industry. Software updates must also be made easier to find. The resulting transparency would go far in contributing to end user awareness of software weaknesses, and allow users to better evaluate risks.<br /><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://bp0.blogger.com/_LMSk7hTEaIE/SH5aAEVMy0I/AAAAAAAAd18/nXMAqQdWXno/s1600-h/expired.png"><img style="cursor: pointer;" src="http://bp0.blogger.com/_LMSk7hTEaIE/SH5aAEVMy0I/AAAAAAAAd18/nXMAqQdWXno/s400/expired.png" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5223711575005514562" border="0" /></a><br /><div><em>Example "best before" implementation on a Web browser</em></div><br /><br />As a side effect, having users migrate faster to the latest browser version would not only increase security but also make the lives of webmasters easier, as they would need to test and optimize websites for fewer older versions of web browsers.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog?a=JC3YMJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog?i=JC3YMJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog?a=Tt44Ej"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog?i=Tt44Ej" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog/~4/337403441" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 16 Jul 2008 09:24:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/browser">browser</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web browser">web browser</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/browser version">browser version</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/versions">versions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/secure versions">secure versions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/obsolete browser">obsolete browser</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web browser versions">web browser versions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web browser users">web browser users</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web">web</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/GoogleOnlineSecurityBlog/~3/337403441/are-you-using-latest-web-browser.html">Are you using the latest web browser?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[You want the truth, you can't handle the truth!]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5e8ee0a0eb7aec0d6393e17e6cc64b3d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5e8ee0a0eb7aec0d6393e17e6cc64b3d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I am not sure what it is with Richard Stiennon. Maybe his mom beat him with a NAC stick when he was young. Hence his Jack Nicholson looks (more like the Joker in Batman , than Col Jessep in A Few Good...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><a href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/fewgoodmen.jpg"><img title="fewgoodmen" height="183" alt="fewgoodmen" src="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/fewgoodmen_thumb.jpg" width="179" align="left" border="0" style="BORDER-RIGHT: 0px; BORDER-TOP: 0px; MARGIN: 0px 10px 5px 0px; BORDER-LEFT: 0px; BORDER-BOTTOM: 0px" /></a> I am not sure what it is with Richard Stiennon.&nbsp; Maybe his mom beat him with a NAC stick when he was young.&nbsp; Hence his Jack Nicholson looks (more like the Joker in <a class="zem_slink" title="Batman" href="http://www.dccomics.com/sites/batman/" rel="homepage">Batman</a>, than Col Jessep in <a class="zem_slink" title="A Few Good Men" href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0104257" rel="imdb">A Few Good Men</a>) and his total disdain for NAC.&nbsp; In any event Richard never seems to miss a chance to take a pot shot at NAC.&nbsp; I have fired back and debated him many times on this.&nbsp; In fact I am convinced that Richard's problem with NAC is that like Uncle Joe, he is just moving a little slow.&nbsp; Richard still thinks of NAC as Cisco???s network admission control, circa Dec ???03.&nbsp; He has not gotten up to speed on anything happening with NAC since.&nbsp; Richard is going to debate NAC with Joel Snyder according to <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/newsletters/vpn/2008/070708nac2.html">this article</a> by Tim Greene today. My prediction is Snyder by a knockout in 3 rounds or less.</p>

<p>Richard???s latest NAC knock comes on a comment to an <a href="http://rationalsecurity.typepad.com/blog/2008/07/security-analys.html?cid=121871540#comment-121871540">excellent article by the Hoff</a>.&nbsp; Chris takes a bold stand for someone working for a vendor and calls BS on the whole analyst thing (I will write more about that later in this article). Richard being an ex-analyst himself (lets face it, with Richard you can take the man out of the analyst job, but you can???t take the analyst out of the man), takes exception to Hoff???s ???whining??? (Richards words, not mine) and tries to tell Hoff that giving up is not the answer and the way to show up analysts, is to prove them wrong.&nbsp; Great Richard you try to prove them wrong, when because of what they report you don???t have a market, can???t get any capital and have no visibility.&nbsp; I guess that is when it is time to move on to the next gig, right? Then Richard has a bad NAC deja vu and feels it necessary to write this: </p><blockquote><p><em>???Look how easy it is to one up the analyst firms, who as near as I can tell support Network Admission Control universally. Everyone except the folks at Updata Ventures know how seriously flawed NAC is with only one viable market, edu.???</em></p></blockquote><p>I assume Richard is referring to Updata recently leading the Bradford Networks VC round. But more importantly Richard it is time to call a code red on you and give you the cold hard truth.&nbsp; Richard the fact is that the edu market is not the only viable market for NAC.&nbsp; In fact, one of the biggest customers of NAC is the DoD.&nbsp; That is right Richard at least 3 of the 4 armed forces use NAC in helping to secure their networks. To paraphrase my friend Col Jessep - Richard, you want the truth, you can???t handle the truth!&nbsp; You sleep securely under the blanket of protection that NAC provides.&nbsp; If it is good enough to help ???clean the sand??? out of laptops coming home from SWA (that is SouthWest Asia, like in Iraq and Afghanistan, in case you don???t know Richard), it should be good enough for you. Think about that next time you are about to bad mouth NAC.</p>

<p>Let me give you some other truths you may not like Richard.&nbsp; Why do you think every switch vendor (of which we partner with many of them) is lining up and bringing out NAC solutions?&nbsp; Why has Microsoft put such a big push on NAP?&nbsp; Why despite the Luddites like you does NAC still draw crowds at conferences like Interop (ask Joel about that).&nbsp; Richard we are still signing new major OEM partners.&nbsp; I am afraid you are the one sadly out of touch on this one Richard.&nbsp; Just as you are out of touch in missing Hoff???s point in his article.</p>

<p>As to Hoff???s article, as I said I give Chris credit for speaking his mind. I spend an ungodly amount of my time speaking with analysts and trying to ???learn??? from them while at the same time trying to educate them.&nbsp; I am constantly amazed that so many analysts (and press for that matter) just take a vendors word as gospel. I have seen research reports from analysts big and small, that I am sure did not have any more research done than calling a handful of vendors and listening to their spiel. Too many of these vendors if they do speak to customers, base their findings on such a small sample that it is impossible to have an accurate picture.</p>

<p>Personally, like Hoff says, who watches the watchers is the truth. I would like to see a code of conduct among analysts. I would start by dictating that vendors cannot pay analysts.&nbsp; Take the payola out of the equation the way they did to the DJ/Radio business in the late 50s. Next analyst reports have to come with metrics to back up the findings. I want to know how many customers they spoke to, how big they were, how they were found, etc.&nbsp; A vendor giving an analyst a real live???pet??? customer is not real research. I want to know if the customer pays the analyst. It is a dirty business. </p>

<p>Hey let me be clear, I play the game as well as the next guy.&nbsp; But I agree with Hoff we need to clean up the rules to make the whole analyst thing more fair, viable and valuable.</p>

<div class="zemanta-pixie" style="MARGIN-TOP: 10px; HEIGHT: 15px"><a class="zemanta-pixie-a" title="Zemified by Zemanta" href="http://reblog.zemanta.com/zemified/e6165b9b-253e-4392-a8dd-ef9917b5dc2e/"><img class="zemanta-pixie-img" alt="Zemanta Pixie" src="http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_e.png?x-id=e6165b9b-253e-4392-a8dd-ef9917b5dc2e" style="BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; BORDER-TOP: medium none; FLOAT: right; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none" /></a></div></div>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Jul 2008 18:50:16 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac">nac</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac stick">nac stick</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/richard">richard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/richard stiennon">richard stiennon</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bad mouth nac">bad mouth nac</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/importantly richard">importantly richard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac knock">nac knock</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/assume richard">assume richard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/event richard">event richard</category>
      <source url="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/2008/07/you-want-the-tr.html">You want the truth, you can't handle the truth!</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[You want the truth, you can't handle the truth!]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/8ffe83b77278161ca4798e9097d5d497</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/8ffe83b77278161ca4798e9097d5d497</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I am not sure what it is with Richard Stiennon. Maybe his mom beat him with a NAC stick when he was young. Hence his Jack Nicholson looks (more like the Joker in Batman , than Col Jessep in A Few Good...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><a href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/fewgoodmen.jpg"><img title="fewgoodmen" height="183" alt="fewgoodmen" src="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/fewgoodmen_thumb.jpg" width="179" align="left" border="0" style="BORDER-RIGHT: 0px; BORDER-TOP: 0px; MARGIN: 0px 10px 5px 0px; BORDER-LEFT: 0px; BORDER-BOTTOM: 0px" /></a> I am not sure what it is with Richard Stiennon.&nbsp; Maybe his mom beat him with a NAC stick when he was young.&nbsp; Hence his Jack Nicholson looks (more like the Joker in <a class="zem_slink" title="Batman" href="http://www.dccomics.com/sites/batman/" rel="homepage">Batman</a>, than Col Jessep in <a class="zem_slink" title="A Few Good Men" href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0104257" rel="imdb">A Few Good Men</a>) and his total disdain for NAC.&nbsp; In any event Richard never seems to miss a chance to take a pot shot at NAC.&nbsp; I have fired back and debated him many times on this.&nbsp; In fact I am convinced that Richard's problem with NAC is that like Uncle Joe, he is just moving a little slow.&nbsp; Richard still thinks of NAC as Cisco’s network admission control, circa Dec ‘03.&nbsp; He has not gotten up to speed on anything happening with NAC since.&nbsp; Richard is going to debate NAC with Joel Snyder according to <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/newsletters/vpn/2008/070708nac2.html">this article</a> by Tim Greene today. My prediction is Snyder by a knockout in 3 rounds or less.</p>

<p>Richard’s latest NAC knock comes on a comment to an <a href="http://rationalsecurity.typepad.com/blog/2008/07/security-analys.html?cid=121871540#comment-121871540">excellent article by the Hoff</a>.&nbsp; Chris takes a bold stand for someone working for a vendor and calls BS on the whole analyst thing (I will write more about that later in this article). Richard being an ex-analyst himself (lets face it, with Richard you can take the man out of the analyst job, but you can’t take the analyst out of the man), takes exception to Hoff’s “whining” (Richards words, not mine) and tries to tell Hoff that giving up is not the answer and the way to show up analysts, is to prove them wrong.&nbsp; Great Richard you try to prove them wrong, when because of what they report you don’t have a market, can’t get any capital and have no visibility.&nbsp; I guess that is when it is time to move on to the next gig, right? Then Richard has a bad NAC deja vu and feels it necessary to write this: </p><blockquote><p><em>“Look how easy it is to one up the analyst firms, who as near as I can tell support Network Admission Control universally. Everyone except the folks at Updata Ventures know how seriously flawed NAC is with only one viable market, edu.”</em></p></blockquote><p>I assume Richard is referring to Updata recently leading the Bradford Networks VC round. But more importantly Richard it is time to call a code red on you and give you the cold hard truth.&nbsp; Richard the fact is that the edu market is not the only viable market for NAC.&nbsp; In fact, one of the biggest customers of NAC is the DoD.&nbsp; That is right Richard at least 3 of the 4 armed forces use NAC in helping to secure their networks. To paraphrase my friend Col Jessep - Richard, you want the truth, you can’t handle the truth!&nbsp; You sleep securely under the blanket of protection that NAC provides.&nbsp; If it is good enough to help “clean the sand” out of laptops coming home from SWA (that is SouthWest Asia, like in Iraq and Afghanistan, in case you don’t know Richard), it should be good enough for you. Think about that next time you are about to bad mouth NAC.</p>

<p>Let me give you some other truths you may not like Richard.&nbsp; Why do you think every switch vendor (of which we partner with many of them) is lining up and bringing out NAC solutions?&nbsp; Why has Microsoft put such a big push on NAP?&nbsp; Why despite the Luddites like you does NAC still draw crowds at conferences like Interop (ask Joel about that).&nbsp; Richard we are still signing new major OEM partners.&nbsp; I am afraid you are the one sadly out of touch on this one Richard.&nbsp; Just as you are out of touch in missing Hoff’s point in his article.</p>

<p>As to Hoff’s article, as I said I give Chris credit for speaking his mind. I spend an ungodly amount of my time speaking with analysts and trying to “learn” from them while at the same time trying to educate them.&nbsp; I am constantly amazed that so many analysts (and press for that matter) just take a vendors word as gospel. I have seen research reports from analysts big and small, that I am sure did not have any more research done than calling a handful of vendors and listening to their spiel. Too many of these vendors if they do speak to customers, base their findings on such a small sample that it is impossible to have an accurate picture.</p>

<p>Personally, like Hoff says, who watches the watchers is the truth. I would like to see a code of conduct among analysts. I would start by dictating that vendors cannot pay analysts.&nbsp; Take the payola out of the equation the way they did to the DJ/Radio business in the late 50s. Next analyst reports have to come with metrics to back up the findings. I want to know how many customers they spoke to, how big they were, how they were found, etc.&nbsp; A vendor giving an analyst a real live“pet” customer is not real research. I want to know if the customer pays the analyst. It is a dirty business. </p>

<p>Hey let me be clear, I play the game as well as the next guy.&nbsp; But I agree with Hoff we need to clean up the rules to make the whole analyst thing more fair, viable and valuable.</p>

<div class="zemanta-pixie" style="MARGIN-TOP: 10px; HEIGHT: 15px"><a class="zemanta-pixie-a" title="Zemified by Zemanta" href="http://reblog.zemanta.com/zemified/e6165b9b-253e-4392-a8dd-ef9917b5dc2e/"><img class="zemanta-pixie-img" alt="Zemanta Pixie" src="http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_e.png?x-id=e6165b9b-253e-4392-a8dd-ef9917b5dc2e" style="BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; BORDER-TOP: medium none; FLOAT: right; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none" /></a></div></div>

<p><a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=dcwJi7"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=dcwJi7" border="0"></img></a></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=Tb6DcJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=Tb6DcJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=MtzjiJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=MtzjiJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=BbZUEJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=BbZUEJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=zXRM7J"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=zXRM7J" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=9dGsDj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=9dGsDj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=IUwOmj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=IUwOmj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~4/332294950" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Jul 2008 18:35:46 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac">nac</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac stick">nac stick</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/richard">richard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bad mouth nac">bad mouth nac</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/richard stiennon">richard stiennon</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/importantly richard">importantly richard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac knock">nac knock</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/assume richard">assume richard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac solutions">nac solutions</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~3/332294950/you-want-the-tr.html">You want the truth, you can't handle the truth!</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Taming of the Information Security]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d22f10755f4bc01c24a23a86362200d0</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d22f10755f4bc01c24a23a86362200d0</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[In many mid-size to large organizations, information security grows up to become an unmanageable complex beast. In some cases, this happens consciously where information security goes out of control,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><FONT face="Times New Roman,Times,serif"><FONT size=3><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">In many mid-size to large organizations, information security grows up to become an unmanageable complex beast.&nbsp; </SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">In some cases, this happens consciously where information security goes out of control, but in other cases this&nbsp;</SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">happens unconsciously where there is a slow but incremental increase in the complexity of information security </SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">which leads to chaos. </SPAN></FONT></FONT></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond"><?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" /><o:p><FONT face="Times New Roman,Times,serif" size=3>&nbsp;</FONT></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><FONT face="Times New Roman,Times,serif"><FONT size=3><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">The information security field is not yet fully mature; there is a lack of cohesive interoperable framework.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </SPAN></SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">The rapidly evolving landscape adds to the existing problem. There are several examples: Intrusion Detection System </SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">(IDS) was quickly overtaken by Intrusion Prevention System (IPS).<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>On the Firewall arena: the focus has moved </SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">from perimeter security to end point security.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>There are some security visionaries who are preaching inside-out </SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">security approach i.e. building products with information security in mind from the beginning. </SPAN></FONT></FONT></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt">&nbsp;</P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><FONT face="Times New Roman,Times,serif"><FONT size=3><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">Threats are </SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">moving higher up in the OSI stack making it harder to detect. Hackers are becoming more sophisticated – there </SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">are powerful free open source hacking tools available at their disposal. </SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">Security managers driving security initiatives without co-ordination can result in pieces of puzzle that don't </SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">fit well. Agency problem i.e. security managers thinking more about their personal advancement rather than security </SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">of the company is bad for the company’s security initiative. Security leaders who do not have a clear vision of </SPAN></FONT></FONT></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><FONT face="Times New Roman,Times,serif"><FONT size=3><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">security at the component level, the administration level and the strategy level can only make information </SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">security even more convoluted. The CISO and acting CIO of US Dept of Veteran affairs resigned after the breach</SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond"><SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp;</SPAN>in May, 2006 where personal data of 26 million veterans and more than 2 million service members was stolen. </SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">This clearly demonstrates the accountability and visibility of security leadership.</SPAN></FONT></FONT></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond"><o:p><FONT face="Times New Roman,Times,serif" size=3>&nbsp;</FONT></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><FONT face="Times New Roman,Times,serif"><FONT size=3><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">The attitude of IT security leaders and security team members has a significant impact on security.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;Reckless buying of information security technology can result in wasteful expenditure&nbsp;and very little gain in efficiency</SPAN></SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">. Not understanding </SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">the business perspective of security issues or security perspective of business issues can lead to poor security </SPAN></FONT></FONT><FONT face="Times New Roman,Times,serif"><FONT size=3><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">decisions. Using security as a mechanism to gain control rather than using it as a tool to reduce risk can only&nbsp;</SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">diminish the perceived value of security initiative. Implementing security as an afterthought rather than building </SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">it into the framework not only result in poor architectural decision. Security investment is more like buying insurance.&nbsp;</SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">Thinking security as a vehicle providing an ROI can result in wrong expectation and lead poor decision. The business i</SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">n which a company operates contributes largely to the perceived importance to security. Financial institutions </SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">usually have a higher bar on security because of the very nature of their business and their exposure legal liability. </SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">It is a good idea for many technology companies to emulate&nbsp;financial institutions to raise their information security bar</SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">.</SPAN></FONT></FONT></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond"><o:p><FONT face="Times New Roman,Times,serif" size=3>&nbsp;</FONT></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><FONT face="Times New Roman,Times,serif"><FONT size=3><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">It could be a pipedream to accomplish complete<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>information security but accomplishing a well managed information </SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt; FONT-FAMILY: Garamond">security program is an attainable possibility.</SPAN></FONT></FONT></P><PRE>&nbsp;</PRE>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 09 Jul 2008 02:33:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security field">information security field</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security bar">information security bar</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security program">information security program</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security technology">information security technology</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/poor security decisions">poor security decisions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security grows">information security grows</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/companys security initiative">companys security initiative</category>
      <source url="http://ravichar.blogharbor.com/blog/_archives/2008/7/9/3785025.html">Taming of the Information Security</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[U.S. Arms Dealer Tests Legal Bounds in Middle East Arms Bazaar]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a494b708fadf3d4f453c6495d8064dc2</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a494b708fadf3d4f453c6495d8064dc2</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Former congressman Curt Weldon is helping broker deals between Russian and Ukranian weapons suppliers and the Iraqi and Libyan governments as part of his new job with a private American defense...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>
Former congressman Curt Weldon is helping broker deals between Russian and Ukranian weapons suppliers and the Iraqi and Libyan governments as part of his new job with a private American defense consulting firm, Wired.com has learned. 
</p>

<p>
Weldon, who is currently being investigated by the FBI over alleged corruption during his time in office, visited Libya in March to discuss a possible military deal, according to a letter describing the trip from Weldon to <a href="http://www.ds-pa.com/">Defense Solutions</a> CEO Timothy Ringgold. In May, Weldon, together with Ringgold and another company representative, traveled to Moscow to discuss working with Russia's weapons-export agency on arms sales to the Middle East.
</p>

<p>
Both trips were part of the company's effort to tap into the growing -- and often legally murky -- market for selling weapons from former Eastern Bloc countries to the Middle East and Afghanistan.
</p>



<div id="embed" style="margin: 0px 0px 15px 15px; float: right; width: 250px; height: auto;">

<img src="http://www.wired.com/images/article/full/2008/07/weldon_350px.jpg" width="250px" alt="Curt Weldon">

<div id="caption">

Ex-Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Penn., is helping broker deals between Russian weapons suppliers and the Iraqi and Libyan governments through his company, Defense Solutions.<br />
<em>Photo: H. Rumph Jr/AP</em>

</div> 

</div>

<p>
The Russians want to sell weapons to Iraq directly, but "must go slow on Iraq because of political reasons" and want to work with an "intermediary" like Defense Solutions, CEO Ringgold subsequently wrote to colleagues. "They have not spoken with any American company that can offer the quid pro quo that we can or that has the connections in Russia that we have," he boasted.
</p>



<p>
A few years ago, an American company proposing to sell weapons to Libya might have triggered a congressional hearing. So, too, would have a proposal to conduct arms deals with Russia, which the United States has accused of selling high-tech weapons to Syria and Iran. 
</p>

<p>However, U.S. government efforts to rapidly equip countries like Afghanistan and Iraq -- which have largely Soviet-origin weapons -- have created legal ambiguities and loopholes in export controls that didn't exist in years past and given rise to a new class of arms trade middlemen. So, even though both Libya and the Russian arms export agency are on official U.S. blacklists, government officials and analysts involved in weapons sales say the rules have become unclear as the push to equip allies in the global war on terror has blazed new but uncertain legal ground. 
</p>




<p>
Eagerly stepping into that virgin territory is <a href="http://www.ds-pa.com/">Defense Solutions</a>, a Pennsylvania-based company that is carving out a small but lucrative niche in a new international arms bazaar. The firm boasts as its advisors a number of influential Washington insiders, such as retired General Barry McCaffrey, the former White House drug czar.
</p>

<p>
Helping the firm make key connections is Curt Weldon, a former Republican congressman from Pennsylvania at the center of an FBI investigation into alleged conflicts of interest during his time in office.  Weldon, now a key executive at Defense Solutions, is working with the company to set up these weapons deals.
</p>

<div id="embed" style="margin: 0px 0px 15px 15px; float: right; width: 350px; height: auto;">

<img src="http://www.wired.com/images/article/full/2008/07/btr_60_350px.jpg" alt="">

<div id="caption">

Defense Solutions has also proposed refurbishing Libya's BTR-60 armored personnel carriers, according to a sales proposal seen by Wired.com. Defense Solutions denies drafting a sales proposal to Libya.

</div> 

</div>

<p>
It's an unusual, if not an entirely unexpected chapter for Weldon, whose time in office included frequent trips to Russia. As an influential member of the House Armed Services Committee, Weldon pushed for multibillion-dollar defense programs, like ballistic missile defense, and earned a reputation as a foreign policy gadfly, boasting of his contacts with officials in nations labeled by the administration as "rogue states" such as Libya and North Korea. Weldon's wild claims about a 9/11 cover-up and his sensationalist book warning of an Iranian terror plot, sometimes earned him official scorn and public ridicule, but it was accusations that he steered contracts to Eastern European businesses linked to his daughter's lobbying firm that drew the government's attention.
</p>


<!--pagebreak-->
<p>
Weldon was voted out of office in 2006 just weeks after the FBI raided his daughter's home, and that of one of her associates.
</p>

<p>
Weldon did not respond to e-mails and phone requests to be interviewed or comment for this article. But in a 2006 interview, before the FBI probe was public, Weldon spoke enthusiastically about setting up a "front company" to work with the Russian arms agency, Rosoboronexport. Weldon hoped this company could sell weapons to the Middle East, and other regions, particularly to countries where the U.S. has strained relations. He claimed the director of Rosoboronexport approached him to work with "an American company that would act as a front for weapons these nations want to buy."
</p>

<p>
Weldon called the proposal an "unbelievable offer."
</p>

<p>
The administration, he acknowledged at the time, did not welcome the idea of an American company selling Russian weapons to potentially unfriendly countries. But two years later, Weldon, now a private citizen and chief strategic officer for Defense Solutions, appears to be working on precisely that sort of deal. And whether illegal or not, Defense Solutions' business represents a new phenomenon in the international arms trade business.
</p>

<p>
In years past arms brokers -- firms or individuals who serve as middlemen to facilitate weapons sales between countries -- were largely the stuff of spy thrillers. Unlike traditional American defense companies, like Lockheed Martin or Boeing, which typically sell weapons directly to NATO countries or other governments regarded as friendly to the United States, brokers are often small outfits run by people with sometimes questionable experience and reputations they will sell to anyone. One of the most infamous arms brokers, a Russian named <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victor_Bout">Viktor Bout</a>, is charged by the United States, United Nations, Interpol and others of funneling arms to terrorists and rebels around the world. He was recently arrested in Thailand. The United States is requesting his extradition on charges of supplying arms to a terrorist organization.
</p>

<div id="embed" style="margin: 0px 0px 15px 15px; float: right; width: 350px; height: auto;">

<img src="http://www.wired.com/images/article/full/2008/07/bmp_1_350px.jpg" alt="" />

<div id="caption">

Two Marines lower the trim vane on the front of an Iraqi BMP-1 mechanized infantry combat vehicle that was captured during Operation Desert Storm. The American defense consulting firm Defense Solutions has proposed refurbishing Libya's aging fleet of BMP-1s. Defense Solutions denies drafting a sales proposal to Libya.

</div> 

</div>

<p>
But ironically, Iraq has fueled a new market for these professional middlemen; the United States is funneling billions of dollars into modernizing Iraq's army so that the country's government can fend for itself after coalition troops withdraw. And Iraq's largely Soviet-equipped military is a natural market for Eastern European countries brimming with old or out-of-date equipment they would like to unload. The middlemen, in these cases, serve a key role by allowing the U.S. government to do business with an American company, which in turn buys equipment from Eastern Bloc countries in deals worth hundreds of millions of dollars, much of it financed with U.S. taxpayer dollars.
</p>

<p>
One of Defense Solutions' sales -- a deal to sell Hungarian-owed T-72 tanks to Iraq in 2005 -- was typical of these new foreign military sales. But on the more questionable side is the company's plans to work with Rosoboronexport, which is barred from doing business with the U.S. government, and Libya, which is still on the State Department's arms embargo list. 
</p>

<p>
The Eastern European-Middle East arms-brokering business, while in some cases sanctioned by the U.S. government, has run into problems, including outright corruption and quality. Defense contractor Dale Stoffel, the president of Wye Oak Technology, and another American were gunned down in Iraq in December 2004 after Stoffel alleged that the Iraqi Ministry of Defense was involved in a kickback scheme. Like Defense Solutions, the company Stoffel worked for was refurbishing the Iraq's army Eastern Bloc equipment.
</p>

<p>
Another problem is quality. Weapons from the former Soviet Bloc, which the U.S. military euphemistically calls "nonstandard equipment," have been flagged as substandard, acknowledges Brigadier General Charles Luckey, who is in charge of security assistance at <a href="http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/">Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq</a>. In an interview from Iraq, Brigadier General Luckey said: "One of the frustrating things about buying nonstandard [weapons], is that I'm the guy who has to deal with the fact that some broker I've never heard of allowed weapons to get to Iraq before they were inspected."
</p>

<div id="embed" style="margin: 0px 0px 15px 15px; float: right; width: 350px; height: auto;">

<img src="http://www.wired.com/images/article/full/2008/07/tank_350px.jpg" alt="" />

<div id="caption">

Defense Solutions is carving a new niche in the arms trade, selling Soviet-made weapons to Middle Eastern countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. Defense Solutions sold Hungarian-owed T-72 tanks to Iraq in 2005.

</div> 

</div>


<p>
In one high-profile case, Iraqi officials alleged that a corrupt firm sold them $400 million in shoddy helicopters from Poland. More recently, a company led by a 21-year-old and a former masseur was offered a U.S. government contract worth nearly $300 million to sell ammunition to Afghanistan. The ammunition turned out to be outdated and of dubious origin and several people connected with the company have been indicted. A congressional investigation concluded that the company, which was on a State Department watch list, was able to take advantage of regulatory loopholes by using middlemen.
</p>

<p>
For those concerned about illicit arms trade, this new wave of weapons deals is rife with the potential for corruption and abuse, but for companies eager to pursue markets once regarded as dubious, it represents a lucrative business opportunity.  The problem in these cases, according to those familiar with arms sales, is that it's no longer clear what's legal and what's not.
</p>
<!--pagebreak-->
<p>
Rachel Stohl, an expert on international arms trade and a senior analyst at Center for Defense Information, says that in many ways, the rush to equip Iraq has led the United States to throw caution to the wind. She points to a report by the Government Accountability Office last year that found that some 190,000 weapons sold to Iraq have gone missing. "I think the reality is we won't know, until way after the fact, about all of these irregularities with the Iraq weapons provision program," she said. "We were providing them all these assault rifles that have gone missing. Why? They were not following the standard procedures that were in place."
</p>

<p>
But Iraq and Afghanistan aren't the only markets available to arms brokers like Defense Solutions. The gradual normalization of relations with Libya opens another door into a quasi-legal area of sales. 
</p>

<p>
Like Iraq, Libya has a substantial arsenal of Soviet-origin military weapons, offering a potential market for brokers working with Russia and other former Soviet states. But even when there's not an outright ban, sales to the Middle East are often fraught with controversy, particularly to countries like Libya, which was under international sanction for more than a decade. Even as sanctions against it have been lifted, European companies proposing to sell arms to Libya have faced steep criticism, particularly since the country is still ruled by dictator Muammar Gaddafi, who took power in a military coup in 1969. 
</p>

<p>
While the United States lifted Libya's "state sponsor of terrorism" designation in 2006, other restrictions, such as on the sale of arms, remain in place. A State Department spokesperson confirmed that exports of "lethal munitions" to Libya, such as tanks or related equipment, are still banned, although sales of nonlethal equipment are now allowed on a case-by-case basis.
</p>

<p>
In late March, Weldon traveled to Libya for a weeklong trip at the invitation of the <a href="http://gdf.org.ly/index.php?lang=ar&Page=101&lang=en">Gaddafi Foundation</a>, a group run by the son of Libya's leader, and the chairman of Libya's foreign affairs committee, according to <a href="http://blog.wired.com/defense/files/libya_trip_report.doc">the report he sent to Defense Solutions</a> (.pdf), a copy of which was obtained by Wired.com. The trip reports states: "Agreement reached for Weldon to quickly return to Libya for meetings with son [of Libyan leader Gaddafi] Morti regarding defense and security cooperation."
</p>

<p>
A document dated April 16, just two weeks after Weldon's trip, outlines Defense Solutions' proposal to Libya to refurbish the country's fleet of armored vehicles, including its T-72 tanks, BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, and BTR-60 armored personnel carriers. A copy of the sales proposal, also provided to Wired.com, is on Defense Solutions' letterhead, appears to bear the signature of company CEO Timothy Ringgold, and is addressed to Libya's defense procurement council. "Defense Solutions is committed to delivering a full end-to-end solution to its clients," the proposal states. "Besides refurbishing these vehicles, we are capable of providing a full logistics support package, including a two year supply of spare parts, maintenance and repair services, and operator, maintenance, and repair training."
</p>

<p>
In an interview with Wired.com, Ringgold admitted that he's interested in doing business in Libya and confirms receiving Weldon's trip report from Libya, but denies drafting or signing an arms-sale proposal. "I've never made such a document to Libya," Ringgold insisted, after being read the proposal, and told that his signature is on it.
</p>

<p>
In addition to the Libyan arms-deal document, Wired.com has also reviewed copies of e-mails from Ringgold discussing the Libyan deal.
</p>

<p>
While Ringgold denies proposing an arms sale to Libya, he is open about speaking with Rosoboronexport, which has been on a U.S. government sanctions list since 2006, after the Russian state agency allegedly violated the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act. An April e-mail provided to Wired.com describes Ringgold, Weldon and Stephan Minikes, a senior advisor to Defense Solutions and a former ambassador, meeting with Rosoboronexport. The conversations included a number of potential deals, including supplying Mi-17 helicopters to Afghanistan and spare parts for Iraq's infantry fighting vehicles. Ringgold wrote to colleagues following the visit, describing the meetings as a "spectacular success," saying the Russian agency "has the ability to undercut all cost proposals from brokers."
</p>

<p>
Ringgold confirmed those discussions and said that his company has sought to do business with Rosoboronexport. Asked whether Ringgold considers his dealings with Russia to be legal, he argued that U.S. companies could work with Rosoboronexport on a "case-by-case" basis. "The particular purpose of the meeting we had -- and I want to be crystal clear -- was in response to a U.S. government requirement," he said.
</p>

<p>
A number of officials at the State Department and in the Pentagon, when contacted for this article, could not say whether working with Rosoboronexport is legal or not. A Pentagon spokeswoman said she was familiar with the issue, but deferred the question to the State Department. When asked about Rosoboronexport's status on the blacklist, John Herzberg, a State Department spokesman replied: "What's on there is on there."
</p>

<p>
Asked whether, given the ban, there was any way a company could legally work with Rosoboronexport, as Ringgold suggested, Herzberg provided an equivocal answer. "At the stage of the process we're at, I'm unable to give you an answer," he said. "You can try elsewhere in government, and maybe they'll be braver than me."
</p>

<p>
In an interview from Iraq, General Luckey conceded it was a murky area, but said, "My understanding is they are currently on our no-go list." 
</p>

<p>
The confusion over debarred parties has even led the U.S. government into its own legal tangles, according to Jim McAleese, a Washington attorney who specializes in government contracting and foreign military sales. Because the Russian government violated U.S. nonproliferation laws, even NASA had to go to Congress to ensure it could work with Russia on Soyuz flights to the international space station. "What I'm warning you about is, don't be surprised by the confusion," McAleese said. "There are a whole bunch of different statutes that were adopted piecemeal and were never intended to be reconciled."
</p>

<p>
But it's the very ambiguity of the law that troubles those who monitor export control. "It's highly unusual to do anything with the Russians, particularly Rosoboronexport," said Scott Jones, director of Export Control Programs at the <a href="http://www.uga.edu/cits/">Center for International Trade and Security</a> at the University of Georgia. 
</p>

<p>
Legal or not, reputable American companies simply don't want to work with banned entities, Jones said, for fear of risking their reputations and business. "Even if it's not an outright prohibition, most companies don't want to put themselves in a liability situation that has really bad PR … and they stay away from it," Jones said. "But if that's your business, pimping out arms from the U.S. or Russia, that's the way it works, and you push as much as possible."
</p>

<p>
Finding any U.S. defense company working with the Russian government at this point would be "remarkable," Jones added.
</p>

<p>
In the meantime, the future for Weldon is unclear. The FBI investigation continues and Weldon's former chief of staff recently pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge and is cooperating with the government, notes Melanie Sloan, the executive director of <a href="http://www.citizensforethics.org/">Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington</a>, which filed a complaint against Weldon in 2004. Sloan speculated that Weldon may be charged with "honest service fraud" for misusing his office for personal gain. "It's an easier standard than bribery," she said. "I wouldn't be surprised [if he's charged] with bribery, but I think it will be honest services fraud."
</p>

<p>
Ringgold insists that he and Weldon are on the right side of the law. "Everything we do is in strict compliance with international and U.S. law and we operate only in the best interests of the U.S. government," he said. "I didn't serve 30 years in the United States Army to throw that away on a whim."
</p>

<p>
Asked if Weldon is still working for the company, Ringgold replied: "Absolutely, proudly so." 
</p><br style="clear: both;"/>
  <img alt="" style="border: 0; height:1px; width:1px;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?i=3c1b81ed8ecb441b359b5fd6e6dec750" height="1" width="1"/>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 03 Jul 2008 18:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/arms brokers">arms brokers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/brokers">brokers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/infamous arms brokers">infamous arms brokers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/defense">defense</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/firm defense solutions">firm defense solutions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/arms">arms</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/arms trade">arms trade</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/international arms trade">international arms trade</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/russian weapons suppliers">russian weapons suppliers</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.wired.com/~r/wired/politics/security/~3/326164070/defense_solutions">U.S. Arms Dealer Tests Legal Bounds in Middle East Arms Bazaar</source>
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