<![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: sql-injection]]> http://securityratty.com/tag/sql-injection Thu, 07 Aug 2008 11:01:50 +0000 iRatty Engine http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss <![CDATA[How to create a SQL Server linked server to DB2]]> http://securityratty.com/article/cb9884d17975f25d375efbaabdc0ff95 http://securityratty.com/article/cb9884d17975f25d375efbaabdc0ff95 ]]> Thu, 21 Aug 2008 07:57:37 +0000 server sql server sql server environments db2 db2 driver db2 servers servers step-by-step process as400 version How to create a SQL Server linked server to DB2 <![CDATA[Tuning SQL Server performance via disk arrays and disk partitioning]]> http://securityratty.com/article/34670ae2c31e91241ed6ab725e042e2c http://securityratty.com/article/34670ae2c31e91241ed6ab725e042e2c ]]> Tue, 19 Aug 2008 07:21:45 +0000 sql server system sql server system hardware hardware performance peak performance tip discusses disk partitions top shape Tuning SQL Server performance via disk arrays and disk partitioning <![CDATA[Security is bigger than finding and fixing bugs]]> http://securityratty.com/article/9c8ebf47be004fc532a7e7de3eceed48 http://securityratty.com/article/9c8ebf47be004fc532a7e7de3eceed48 I’ve been catching up on various security-related articles that I’ve been meaning to read, and the following article was on the list http://www.itnews.com.au/News/73635,google-shares-its-security-secrets.aspx about Google’s “security secrets.”
 
Quoting from the article:

“In order to keep its products safe, Google has adopted a philosophy of 'security as a cultural value'. The programme includes mandatory security training for developers, a set of in-house security libraries, and code reviews both by Google developers and outside security researchers."

I think it is great that Google has a security program they are willing to talk about and I could not agree more with the ‘security as a cultural value’ philosophy. But isn’t there something really fundamental missing here? Design? There is a lot more to software engineering other than coding and testing.
 
The SDL has a very large set of implementation-related requirements, but there are many design-related requirements also.

Computer security experts have known since the early 1970s that you have to get the design right; and our experiences with the SDL over the last 5 years have taught us that you need to consider security and privacy (but remember, you have to ship too!) very early in the design phase and have a consistent end-to-end process if you truly hope to reduce vulnerabilities and create more secure software. This is how the SDL is helping to create ‘security as a cultural value’ at Microsoft.

We’ve seen a general trend downward in security vulnerabilities in Microsoft products, and the IBM X-Force 2008 mid-year report backs the assertion that we’re making progress; according to the report Microsoft’s share of total vulnerabilities decreased from 3.7% in 2007 (1st place) to 2.5% (that’s 2.5% for all Microsoft products; a more appropriate comparison might be Windows vs Linux vs Mac OSX, or SQL Server vs Oracle vs DB2) in the first 6 months of 2008 (3rd place.) This is an encouraging signal that the SDL is working on a large scale… of course, it might also show that vulnerability researchers are moving to easier targets, which, to me shows the SDL is working too.
 
What do you think?

]]> Thu, 14 Aug 2008 16:09:00 +0000 security security researchers security vulnerabilities computer security experts googles security secrets in-house security libraries security program microsoft products sdl Security is bigger than finding and fixing bugs <![CDATA[Should you upgrade to SQL Server 2005 or SQL Server 2008?]]> http://securityratty.com/article/e8d91351b302bdfefcce3a25859786bf http://securityratty.com/article/e8d91351b302bdfefcce3a25859786bf ]]> Thu, 14 Aug 2008 06:50:07 +0000 sql server upgrade skip sql server sequential upgrade path considerations include lack thereof follow benefits options Should you upgrade to SQL Server 2005 or SQL Server 2008? <![CDATA[Using the ORDER BY clause of the SELECT query in SQL]]> http://securityratty.com/article/d21f3e153ee7ea4053ffe296de842e24 http://securityratty.com/article/d21f3e153ee7ea4053ffe296de842e24 ]]> Wed, 13 Aug 2008 07:34:55 +0000 sql select query sql queries mere mortals properly sort data manipulation clause hands-on guide select statements Using the ORDER BY clause of the SELECT query in SQL <![CDATA[76Service - Cybercrime as a Service Going Mainstream]]> http://securityratty.com/article/35bdaf104e9aecf7703834d959f39050 http://securityratty.com/article/35bdaf104e9aecf7703834d959f39050
Disintermediating the intermediaries in the cybercrime ecosystem, ultimately results in more profitable operations. Controversial to the concept of outsourcing, some cybercriminals are in fact so self-sufficient, that the stereotype of a mysterious 76service server offered for rent could in fact easily cease to exist in an ecosystem so vibrant that literally everyone can partion their botnet and start offering access to it on a multi-user basis. Evil? Obviously. Extending the lifecycle of a proprietary malware tool? Definitely.

The infamous 76service, a cybercrime as a service web interface where customers basically collect the final output out of the banking malware botnet during the specific period of time for which they've purchases access to the service, is going mainstream, with 76Service's Spring Edition apparently leaking out, and cybercriminals enjoying its interoperability potential by introducing different banking trojans in their campaigns.

In this post, I'll discuss the 76service's spring.edition that has been combined with a Metaphisher banking malware, an a popular web malware exploitation kit, with two campaigns currently hosting 5.51GB of stolen banking data based on over 1 million compromised hosts 59% of which are based in Russia. Screenshots courtesy of an egocentric underground show-off.

Some general info on the 76service :

"Subscribers could log in with their assigned user name and password any time during the 30-day project. They’d be met with a screen that told them which of their bots was currently active, and a side bar of management options. For example, they could pull down the latest drops—data deposits that the Gozi-infected machines they subscribed to sent to the servers, like the 3.3 GB one Jackson had found. A project was like an investment portfolio. Individual Gozi-infected machines were like stocks and subscribers bought a group of them, betting they could gain enough personal information from their portfolio of infected machines to make a profit, mostly by turning around and selling credentials on the black market. (In some cases, subscribers would use a few of the credentials themselves). Some machines, like some stocks, would under perform and provide little private information. But others would land the subscriber a windfall of private data. The point was to subscribe to several infected machines to balance that risk, the way Wall Street fund managers invest in many stocks to offset losses in one company with gains in another."

The 76service empowers everyone who is either not willing to spend time and resources for building and maintaining a botnet, launching campaigns, and SQL injecting hundreds of thousands of sites in order to take advantage of the long tail of malware infected sites that theoretically can outpace the traffic that could come from a SQL injected high-profile site.

Next to the spring.edition, the winter edition's price starts from $1000 and goes to $2000, which is all a matter of who you're buying it from, unless of course you haven't come across leaked copies :

"Assuming that the dealer offering what he claimed was the 76service kit was correct, the profit is not only in the kit, but in selling value added services like exploitation, compromised servers/accounts, database configuration, and customization of the interface. Prices start between $1000 to $2000 and go up based on added services. The underground payment methods generally involve hard-to-track virtual currencies, whose central authority is in a jurisdiction where regulation is liberal to non-existent, and feature non-reversible transactions. The individual or group called "76service" was easy to track down on the Web, but not in person."

It's interesting to monitor how services aiming to provide specific malicious services are vertically integrating by expanding their portfolio of related services -- taka a spamming vendor that will offer the segmented email databases, the advanced metrics, and the localization of the spam messages to different languages -- or letting the buyer have full control of anything that comes out of a particular botnet for a specific period of time in which he has bought access to it. For instance, DDoS for hire matured into botnet for hire, which evolved into today's "What type of stolen data do you want?" for hire mentality I'm starting to see emerging, next to the usual interest in improving the metrics and thereby the probability for a more succesful campaign.

Ironically, this cybercrime model is so efficient that the people behind it cannot seem to be able to process all of the stolen data, which like a great deal of underground assets loses its value if not sold as fast as possible. The result of this oversupply of stolen data are the increasing number of services selling raw logs segmented based on a particular country for a specific period of time.

Time for a remotely exploitable vulnerability in yet another malware kit about to go mainstream? Definitely, unless of course backdooring it and releasing it doesn't achieve the obvious results of controlling someone else's cybercrime ecosystem.

Related posts:
The Underground Economy's Supply of Goods and Services
The Dynamics of the Malware Industry - Proprietary Malware Tools
Using Market Forces to Disrupt Botnets
Multiple Firewalls Bypassing Verification on Demand
Managed Spamming Appliances - The Future of Spam
Localizing Cybercrime - Cultural Diversity on Demand
E-crime and Socioeconomic Factors 
Malware as a Web Service 
Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire
Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?
Neosploit Team Leaving the IT Underground
The Zeus Crimeware Kit Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw
Pinch Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw
Dissecting a Managed Spamming Service
Managed "Spamming Appliances" - The Future of Spam

]]> Wed, 13 Aug 2008 04:08:43 +0000 76service service malware malware kit cybercrime malware botnet botnet mysterious 76service server web service 76Service - Cybercrime as a Service Going Mainstream <![CDATA[SQL Server data conversions from date/time values to character types]]> http://securityratty.com/article/70c12029c0be7b3af3f71c36f5657c3a http://securityratty.com/article/70c12029c0be7b3af3f71c36f5657c3a ]]> Tue, 12 Aug 2008 07:18:17 +0000 step-by-step process convert functions steps include explicit conversions t-sql supports vice versa datetime values handy cast character data SQL Server data conversions from date/time values to character types <![CDATA[The Russia vs Georgia Cyber Attack]]> http://securityratty.com/article/8a00d5d19f0f12447cb8a837ccb009d4 http://securityratty.com/article/8a00d5d19f0f12447cb8a837ccb009d4
Last month's lone gunman DDoS attack against Georgia President's web site seemed like a signal shot for the cyber siege to come a week later. Here's the complete coverage of the coordination phrase, the execution and the actual impact of the cyber attack so far - "Coordinated Russia vs Georgia cyber attack in progress" :

"Who’s behind it? The infamous Russian Business Network, or literally every Russian supporting Russia’s actions? How coordinated and planned the cyber attack is, and do we actually have a relatively decent example of cyber warfare combining PSYOPs (psychological operations), and self-mobilization of the local Internet users by spreading “For our motherland, brothers!” or “Your country is calling you!” hacktivist messages across web forums. Let’s find out, in-depth. With the attacks originally starting to take place several weeks before the actual “intervention” with Georgia President’s web site coming under DDoS attack from Russian hackers in July, followed by active discussions across the Russian web on whether or not DDoS attacks and web site defacements should in fact be taking place, which would inevitably come as a handy tool to be used against Russian from Western or Pro-Western journalists, the peak of DDoS attack and the actual defacements started taking place as of Friday."

Some of the tactics used :
distributing a static list of targets, eliminate centralized coordination of the attack, engaging the average internet users, empower them with DoS tools; distributing lists of remotely SQL injectable Georgian sites; abusing public lists of email addresses of Georgian politicians for spamming and targeted attacks; destroy the adversary’s ability to communicate using the usual channels -- Georgia's most popular hacking portal is under DDoS attack from Russian hackers.

Some of the parked domains acting as command and control servers for one of the botnets at 79.135.167.22 :
emultrix .org
yandexshit .com
ad.yandexshit .com
a-nahui-vse-zaebalo-v-pizdu .com
killgay .com
ns1.guagaga .net
ns2.guagaga .net
ohueli .net
pizdos .net
googlecomaolcomyahoocomaboutcom.net

Actual command and control locations :
a-nahui-vse-zaebalo-v-pizdu .com/a/nahui/vse/zaebalo/v/pizdu/
prosto.pizdos .net/_lol/

Consider going through the complete coverage of what's been happening during the weeked. Considering the combination of tactics used, unless the conflict gets solved, more attacks will definitely take place during the week.
]]> Mon, 11 Aug 2008 15:35:55 +0000 georgia cyber attack cyber attack attack georgia georgia president russian russian web ddos attack russian hackers The Russia vs Georgia Cyber Attack <![CDATA[Summarizing Zero Day's Posts for July]]> http://securityratty.com/article/8dcef74e51c669037abd743dd3beb89d http://securityratty.com/article/8dcef74e51c669037abd743dd3beb89d
Different audience provokes different approach for communicating a particular event. In case you aren't reading ZDNet's Zero Day, where I blog next to Ryan Naraine and Nathan McFeters - join us.

Also, consider subscribing yourself to my personal RSS feed, or Zero Day's main feed in order to read all the posts. Here's a quick summary of my posts for last month :

01. Blizzard introducing two-factor authentication for WoW gamers
02. Sony PlayStation's site SQL injected, redirecting to rogue security software
03. 300 Lithuanian sites hacked by Russian hackers
04. Antivirus vendor introducing virtual keyboard for secure Ebanking
05. Gmail, Yahoo and Hotmail's CAPTCHA broken by spammers
06. Storm Worm's Independence Day campaign
07. Approximately 800 vulnerabilities discovered in antivirus products
08. $1 Million prize offered for cracking an encryption algorithm
09. U.K's most spammed person receives 44,000 spam emails daily
10. Storm Worm says the U.S have invaded Iran
11. Gmail, PayPal and Ebay embrace DomainKeys to fight phishing emails
12. Verizon, Telecom Italia, and Brasil Telecom top the botnet charts in Q2 of 2008
13. XSS worm at Justin.tv infects 2,525 profiles
14. Remote code execution through Intel CPU bugs
15. Ringleader of cybercrime group to be offered a job as cybercrime fighter
16. Spam coming from free email providers increasing
17. Kaspersky's Malaysian site hacked by Turkish hacker
18. Georgia President's web site under DDoS attack from Russian hackers
19. 75% of online banking sites found vulnerable to security design flaws
20. McAfee debunks recent vulnerabilities in AV software research, n.runs restates its position
21. Click fraud in 2nd quarter of 2008 more sophisticated, botnets to blame
22. How OpenDNS, PowerDNS and MaraDNS remained unaffected by the DNS cache poisoning vulnerability
23. DNS cache poisoning attacks exploited in the wild
24. The Neosploit cybercrime group abandons its web malware exploitation kit
25. OS fingerprinting Apple's iPhone 2.0 software - a "trivial joke"
26. HD Moore pwned with his own DNS exploit, vulnerable AT&T DNS servers to blame
]]> Fri, 08 Aug 2008 10:35:52 +0000 day software rogue security software spam emails daily cybercrime cybercrime fighter independence day campaign emails posts Summarizing Zero Day's Posts for July <![CDATA[Phishers Backdooring Phishing Pages to Scam One Another]]> http://securityratty.com/article/6ccaae3434fe8c6502ba9a6fc0cfb3e0 http://securityratty.com/article/6ccaae3434fe8c6502ba9a6fc0cfb3e0
There seems to be no such thing as a free phishing page these days, with phishers scamming one another at an alarming rate according to a recently published research entitled "There is No Free Phish:An Analysis of “Free” and Live Phishing Kits".

Cybercriminals attempting to scam other cybercriminals has been happening for years, with old school cases where backdoored malware tools such as crypters and binders are offered for free, or a newly released RAT whose client is in fact infected with a third-party malware. Realizing and definitely not enjoying the fact that the lowered entry barriers into cybercrime are empowering yesterday's script kiddies will malware kits that used to be utilized by a set of people who invested time and money into the process several years ago, this unethical competitive practice is only going to get more common. Backdooring phishing pages is one thing, backdooring entire web malware exploitation kits, next to the possibility to remotely exploit a competitor's command and control server is entirely another :

"Taking a more strategic approach, a cybercriminal wanting to scam another cybercriminal would backdoor a highly expensive web malware exploitation kit, then start distributing it for free, and in fact, there have been numerous cases when such kits have been distributed in such a fraudulent manner. The result is a total outsourcing of the process of coming up with ways to infect hundreds of thousands of users though client side exploits embedded or SQL injected at legitimate sites, and basically collecting the final output - the stolen E-banking data and the botnet itself."

What's to come in the long term? Why just backdoor the phishing page, when you can embedd it with a live exploit URL in an attempt to both, infect the cybercriminal about to use and obtain all of the already stolen virtual assets has has already stolen, and also, have a third-party maintain a blended attack campaign without even knowing it.

Related posts:
Phishing Campaign Spreading Across Facebook
Phishing Pages for Every Bank are a Commodity
RBN's Phishing Activities
Inside a Botnet's Phishing Activities
Large Scale MySpace Phishing Attack
Update on the MySpace Phishing Campaign
MySpace Phishers Now Targeting Facebook
MySpace Hosting MySpace Phishing Profiles
DIY Phishing Kits
DIY Phishing Kit Goes 2.0
PayPal and Ebay Phishing Domains
Average Online Time for Phishing Sites
The Phishing Ecosystem
Assessing a Rock Phish Campaign
Taking Down Phishing Sites - A Business Model?
Take this Malicious Site Down - Processing Order..
209 Host Locked
209.1 Host Locked
66.1 Host Locked
Confirm Your Gullibility
Phishers, Spammers and Malware Authors Clearly Consolidating
The Economics of Phishing
]]> Thu, 07 Aug 2008 11:01:50 +0000 phishers myspace phishers campaign myspace rock phish campaign free phish free kits attack Phishers Backdooring Phishing Pages to Scam One Another