<![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: substitute]]> http://securityratty.com/tag/substitute Mon, 26 May 2008 20:00:00 +0000 iRatty Engine http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss <![CDATA[How spyware nearly sent a teacher to prison]]> http://securityratty.com/article/3d0c32672b920aeb16aeb695492cf5e7 http://securityratty.com/article/3d0c32672b920aeb16aeb695492cf5e7 Add to digg Add to StumbleUpon Add to Twitter Add to Slashdot
]]> Sun, 30 Nov 2008 02:00:00 +0000 spyware felony charges poster child julie amero substitute teacher classroom computer content pop-ups dangers How spyware nearly sent a teacher to prison <![CDATA[Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability - Pick Any Two]]> http://securityratty.com/article/c60f46f9f63d51e4a5a9e84ddb44cfe9 http://securityratty.com/article/c60f46f9f63d51e4a5a9e84ddb44cfe9 Under Worm Assault, Military Bans Disks, USB Drives


The Defense Department's geeks are spooked by a rapidly spreading worm crawling across their networks. So they've suspended the use of so-called thumb drives, CDs, flash media cards, and all other removable data storage devices from their nets, to try to keep the worm from multiplying any further.


The ban comes from the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, according to an internal Army e-mail. It applies to both the secret SIPR and unclassified NIPR nets. The suspension, which includes everything from external hard drives to "floppy disks," is supposed to take effect "immediately." Similar notices went out to the other military services.

In some organizations, the ban would be only a minor inconvenience. But the military relies heavily on such drives to store information. Bandwidth is often scarce out in the field. Networks are often considered unreliable. Takeaway storage is used constantly as a substitute.


Its almost like we built out a bunch of systems and then connected them to huge networks without building security into the software or something.
]]> Fri, 21 Nov 2008 06:50:19 +0000 networks worm assault huge networks worm flash media cards military bans disks internal army e-mail nipr nets military relies heavily Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability - Pick Any Two <![CDATA[On Security & Risk Management Innovation]]> http://securityratty.com/article/044cbc91b90e3bcf8694d48ef0276511 http://securityratty.com/article/044cbc91b90e3bcf8694d48ef0276511 Pre-Script - It should be noted that the outcome of this discussion - in the last paragraph - is one smart way you can approach the “We need to reduce your budget” discussion (if that discussion hasn’t come already).

I’ve often read people who say that we (security, risk management) need to “think like the attacker”.  And when you read this sort of article, that usually alludes to trying to anticipate the tactics an attacker might use to mess with your C, I, or A.  Smart stuff, that, and very useful when architecting security solutions.  But as I was training some folks Monday, I was thinking in the back of my head about Threat Capability (TCap) in FAIR.  As you might know, we like to estimate the capability of a threat to apply some level of “force” against our assets.  This ability to apply force is a byproduct of the attacker’s skills and resources.  And thinking of how an attacker applies skills and resources, I came across another way we might “think” like an attacker.

Traditionally, I’ve thought of “skills” as being a byproduct of the toolset an attacker has.  This mindset probably stems from my time with Penetration Testing teams, where in the process of scoping the  PenTest I would ask our clients to select the level of effort that they wanted us to throw at them.  If a client chose “high” we’d throw every ‘spoit we had at them.  If they chose “low” we’d limit ourselves to a more commonly available toolset.

But while the resources part of TCap is time & materials (money) - the skills are really more than just the toolset.  Skills would include the ability of the attacker to be creative and innovative.    As an example of that innovation from those PenTesting days - when we got a “high” effort request, we would always try to couple that with some “social engineering”-type of attack, or some unique means of delivering an existing exploit.  Our creativity was not necessarily a byproduct of a unique exploit or tool we had, but the process by which we might deliver pre-existing or commonly available exploits.  I remember when we first got ahold of a handful of 32mb thumb drives (hey, 32mb was huge back then) and “dropped” a few in the lobby of a client’s retail space.  The keystroke loggers and phone-home script weren’t new, but using the thumb drive as delivery vehicle certainly was.

So I’ve started to really think about this concept of innovation, and how if “thinking like an attacker” means to be innovative, we ought to do the same.  I’ve been thinking of two main categories of innovation this morning.

INNOVATION

The first I’ll call Technology Innovation.  And by Technology Innovation, I mean some new, unique, “ahead of the curve” technology that an attacker can use against us.  The obvious example of which is a zero-day.  It’s that “high” tool set our PenTesters would use against the clients.  For security departments, this might be the latest security product designed to enhance our ability to P, D, and/or R.

Alternately, we can be creative in the way we deliver (manage) existing technology.  I think of this as Process Innovation.  It’s doing more with what we already have, just like the PenTest team would be creative in the delivery of an existing exploit.

Unfortunately for us - attackers have traditionally had quite a leg up on us in terms of Process Innovation.  It is much easier fro them to be creative, as they are free of political constraints and bureaucracy.  In contrast, when the security industry tries Process Innovation, the results are checklists and “standards”.  It’s committees and consensus.  An extreme example of which might be something like SABSA - a great work if you want to understand some very smart people’s comprehensive understanding of organizational security  - but the “adoption”of which will do very little to help you be innovative in P/D/R.

It’s worth noting that ultimately, this is one reason I don’t like regulatory compliance efforts - they simply serve to prove how mundane your security department is,  wasting valuable resources that could be spent on creating ways to be more effective.

PROCESS INNOVATION AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION

As we come to the close of 2009, some surveys suggest that security spending isn’t horribly impacted yet by the economy (the latest from E&Y points to only 5% of their respondents getting budget cuts).  But if this is a protracted downturn, and because InfoSec is an operational expense, I would expect cash to become more and more difficult to keep.  And regardless if technology spends do slow, I believe it makes sense to think about Process Innovation because I see Process Innovation as a means to increase effectiveness without significant capital expenditures (effectiveness increases because our ability to manage risk has a direct correlation to the amount of risk we have).

The bad news is, of course, that great innovation is hard.  It is R & D.  Failure is usually a pre-requisite to success.

The good news is, our current state is so bad that many of us don’t need to come up with a whizbang new way of reducing software defects in the SDLC as innovation.  Simply inserting a risk analyst into the PMO’s processes might count as a big enough victory. Be cautioned, though,  that if we’re substituting the risk reductions provided by technology acquisition - Process Innovation might actually be even more “expensive” as it requires us to expend political capital.   But there are (forgive the term) innovative ways to spend this political capital.

For example, by taking a second now and figuring out the 3 things that the rest of the organization can do to make your life easier, when that “I need to reduce your budget” talk comes, you can be prepared to negotiate.  Get a political capital “loan” or “investment” from the C-Suite reducing your budget.  Something to the effect of: “I expected this, and am happy to give up my budget.  But if our tolerance for risk hasn’t changed, what I’d like to do is get you to personally back my office on three projects I’ve identified that can reduce our risk without requiring significant capital expenditure.”

]]> Wed, 12 Nov 2008 11:23:30 +0000 innovation process process innovation call technology innovation technology innovation security risk risk management attackers skills On Security & Risk Management Innovation <![CDATA[Wee-Fi: Mumbai Blast Leads to Open Network; NullRiver's App Nullified; Copper Substitute]]> http://securityratty.com/article/321165af2aaf7769bf8ef8224af4125c http://securityratty.com/article/321165af2aaf7769bf8ef8224af4125c Mumbai man's open wireless network used to send bomb claim: An American expatriate, Kenneth Haywood, left his Wi-Fi network open in Mumbai, and police allege it was used to send email claiming responsibility for a bomb blast that killed 42 people. The Guardian reports that Haywood says his email account was also hacked. Police say that someone would need to be within two floors of the 15th-floor apartment Haywood and others occupy, but they may be disregarding high-gain antennas. Haywood's installer demanded he not change his network password.

iPhone tethering application up, down, up, down: The NetShare connection-sharing application from NullRiver has made a couple of appearances on Apple's App Store, the only authorized place from which owners of iPod touch and iPhone devices can purchase software for uncracked equipment. NetShare appears to violate the terms of service for AT&T, although this wouldn't be the case with all carriers worldwide, by bridging 2.5G and 3G network traffic via the Wi-Fi connection on the iPhone. A laptop or desktop needs special configuration to connect to the iPhone, but various reports show it works fine. AT&T offers tethering with other smartphones - but not the iPhone - for typically about $20 more per month, comparable to a national hotspot aggregated subscription.

Speaking of AT&T, they like WiMax as a wire alternative: AT&T is bullish on WiMax, but the fixed kind used to replace wires in places they have no cable.

]]> Mon, 04 Aug 2008 05:56:36 +0000 haywood kenneth haywood iphone iphone devices att 15th-floor apartment haywood att offers mumbai police Wee-Fi: Mumbai Blast Leads to Open Network; NullRiver's App Nullified; Copper Substitute <![CDATA[Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire]]> http://securityratty.com/article/1dbd4bddd9e4248009d0273ad7cae5dd http://securityratty.com/article/1dbd4bddd9e4248009d0273ad7cae5dd What type of antivirus evasion do you want today? For the past several years, we have been witnessing the emerging customerization applied in malware and spyware for hire services. What used to be a situation where the malware authors would code and then start promoting a piece of malware including features that he thinks his potential customers would want by generalizing a cybercriminal's needs, is today's "listening to the customer" win-win situation that they've reached already.

The whole maturity from a product concept to customerization is in fact so prevalent these days, that malware authors wanting to preserve their intellectual property are forbidding their customers from reverse engineering their malware modules, presumably fearing that remotely exploitable flaws like this one in one of the most popular Ebanker malwares for the last two yers Zeus, could be discovered due to the malware author's insecure coding practices. Moreover, limiting the distribution of a single license they are given to more than three people will result in the malware author ignoring any future business relationships with the party that ruined the exclusiveness of the malware, thereby leaking it to the public, something that's been happening and will continue happening with web malware exploitation kits.

What would be the price of a custom malware module coded on demand? How much does it cost to have a built in email harvester that would sniff all the incoming and outgoing email addresses from the infected host to later on include them in upcoming spam and malware campaigns? Would the malware author also provide a managed hosting service for the command and control and the actual binaries on a revenue sharing

Here's an automatically translated, and fairly easy to understand random proposition for coding spyware and malware for hire, aiming to answer many of these questions, clearly demonstrating that today's malware is coded in exactly the same way the customer wants it to :

"As you can see in the history of its development turned directly into the combine, while almost no raspuh in weight, full-size pack аж 18 kb and minialno 5 kb, for all nampomnyu again, all descriptions below can be done as otdelnym bot, and any combination of cross except for a few restrictions. This product is targeted at mass-user and will not be all prodavatsya row. So, you can choose from:

Actually loader - is able to load a file from adminki, by country and other characteristics, such as the number of animals on board with a specific bot, a country group of countries, the availability of certain authors or Fire, sredenemu time online, etc. etc.. You can adjust the speed of shipping limits for each file, can load 1 as well as how files simultaneously
300 €

FTP and not only Graber
Analyzes user traffic and collects from the ftp acclamation, that is ftp acclamation would you regardless of how the customer uses ftp user, thus can be obtained most valuable ftp aka (even those to which the password is not saved), you can also grab other in a way not only acclamation acclamation and other tasty things more)
150 € 

Assembler spam bases
Analyzes user traffic and collects from all email, snifit http pop3 smtp protocols, keeps records unikallnosti locally on each boat to reduce the burden on the server as well as globally on a server has 2 mode of operation - ie passive with only collects user to please and active - the very beginning to download the entire inet) in search of soap
220 €

Socks 4 / 5
Normal soks with competently implemented multithreading, is activated only if the user real Ip, otherwise not. And also optional, depending on the connection type and speed ineta.
70 €

Indicates
The primitive method, contamination fleshek avtoranom gives 2-3% increase in the first week and up to 7% in the next, a pleasant trifle)
35 €

Scripts
Loader supports internal scripting language - jscript, to carry out arbitrary actions on the victim machine, whether recording data in the register, setting authentic hon-Pago, opening URL in your browser (it was done so to please with 90% punching)), apload arbitrary files on a server, even theoretically possible to form and grabing inzhekty in IE) has only to write the script zaebetes, vobschem lyuboye actions soul who wish)
70 € basic functionality

Assembler passwords
Collects data such as passwords pstorage IE, MSN, etc., will be added at the request of other sources of passwords
70 €

Mini-AV
When installing loadera wheelbarrows to remove BHO shaped three, zevso-shaped, the majority of shit from all avtoranov, render most keylogerov until all) forward proposals to improve
70 €

File-default
In exe loadera program URL (in adminke) to the file which once progruzit 1 and run at first start loadera on wheelbarrows, while simultaneously helping progruzke Trojan for example, in its entire botnet that does not paired with challenges in adminke, the module operates in 20 seconds after the mini - av which excludes the removal of your Trojan bot, after progruza this exe bot continues to normal activities.
35 €

Form Graber
While in beta version, robbed IE. Sends logs in adminku, folding country. Logs are like logs agent. It consists of:

Graber certificats
On the idea is part formgrabera but could work and of itself, actually there is nothing to describe)

Injections
Literacy sold inzhekty, did not begin work after full progruza pages (as in bolshistve three) and immediately supported injection yavaskript code, which allows avtozalivy and DC inzhekty for data collection. For example not to yuzat acclamation at all is not yet introduce the necessary number of Britain, after which inzhekt ceases to operate. Вобщем mdelat can be anything and in any form) rather than the meager request field pin) And also inzhektov subspecies - a substitute for the issuance of search enginee.

Graber balances
Makes loot aka balances at the entrance to the user acclamation, detail added to the logs.

Screen
Universal method to grab information from absolutely any species and varieties klaiviatur screens, in particular html, flash, in one picture, with a drop-down fields after choosing your encrypted, as well as information such as "enter 3 yu secret letter word" etc. as well as any information which is visible a user but not seen in the logs. Screen settings of adminki, set URL where do screen as well as the type of screen: for virtual keyboard (done several small images of areas around the clique) or to "enter 3 yu secret letter words" (makes 1 full shot). With the withdrawal screen recorded in the log entry with the name of the file to the screen this position.

Antiabuznost for botneta
Feachem adminki, keep botnet enables fast, normal, bezglyuchnyh NEabuzoustoychivyh hosting, with features that you forget what abuzy, nohistory week saporta "abuzoustoychivogo" hosting inaccessibility host to half ineta etc., etc., also with the help of the supplement will be able to keep huge botnety (over SL) at 1 dedike with 512 Lake) and well on the price of hosting a savings, not $ 500 a month and 150. It may use this feature to stroronnim development, Trojans, bots, etc., actually is a separate product. And incidentally, if you do not understand the theory that nenado ask "and how does it work?" imagine that it works and point and neubivaemo in pritsnipe.
600 € +
 
All prices are in euros, the calculation is made at the rate of CB on the day of purchase. ps I will not disappear as most authors after months of sales, I DONT how to please you get to the assembly ftp, I DONT how many soap collects soap-graber, I DONT what otstuk from loadera, I DONT soksov how many will be from 1 to downloads, and how best To work load a file is not dead quickly, if you are confused my ignorance - that my loader so you do not need more tries)

Rules / Licence
-- Customer has no right to transfer any of his three 3 persons except options for harmonizing with me
-- Customer does not have the right to make any decompile, research, malicious modification of any three parts
-- Customer has no right where either rasprostanyat information about three and a public discussion with the exception of three entries.
-- For violating the rules - without any license denial manibekov and further conversations"

This malware coder seems to be participating in an affiliate program with a malicious ISP that is offering hosting services for the entire campaign, not just the malware binaries, so you have a rather good example that incentives and revenue-sharing models result in value-added services, a all-in-one shop for a customer to take advantage of without bothering to approach a third-party.

Cybercrime is getting even more easier to outsource these days, and with the malicious parties improving their communication and incentives model, the resulting transparency in the underground market

Related posts:
The Underground Economy's Supply of Goods and Services
The Dynamics of the Malware Industry - Proprietary Malware Tools
Using Market Forces to Disrupt Botnets
Multiple Firewalls Bypassing Verification on Demand
Managed Spamming Appliances - The Future of Spam
Localizing Cybercrime - Cultural Diversity on Demand
E-crime and Socioeconomic Factors
Russia's FSB vs Cybercrime
Malware as a Web Service
Localizing Open Source Malware
Quality and Assurance in Malware Attacks
Benchmarking and Optimising Malware
]]> Mon, 21 Jul 2008 23:52:14 +0000 malware malware author malware authors malware binaries malware attacks ftp ftp user collects malware industry Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire <![CDATA[Fundamentalism in Risk & Security]]> http://securityratty.com/article/a6485e6738241f3f746b13f7ed6ec366 http://securityratty.com/article/a6485e6738241f3f746b13f7ed6ec366 FEAR AND LOATHING IN DAYTON, OHIO

Had a great time Sunday with Rob Newby. We solved the world’s problems over deep fried whitefish and french fries (fish & chips to him).  It was a very good time, even if my driving did make him a bit uneasy.  If I may quote myself (said in an attempt to soothe Rob’s uneasyness about being lost in the car of a complete stranger in a strange country):

If your life doesn’t imitate the surreal aspects of a Douglas Adams book at least once a day, you’re just not living right.

Aside:  Bruce Scheier already has too many awards and too much recognition, so go vote for Rob instead :)   :  http://robnewby.blogspot.com/2008/07/award-up-for-grabs.html

SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND (CURRENT) STATE

Rob and I spent some time discussing risk and security,  and our conversation circled around the (now) recurring blogo-topic concerning the State of the Practice.  It’s a favorite topic of mine, so I’ve been delighted that it has reappeared in blogodom.

Rob writes about it some here in PCI the Priest.  LonerVamp’s and Richard Bejtlich’s blogs talk about Galileo, his confrontation with his church, and lessons we can learn from history (there’s nothing wrong with them recycling the meme, IMHO - because I, for one, never got closure the first time). Jon added a nice quote from Feynman today that’s also inline with the meme.

I’m not going to belabor the analogy, the “art vs. science” misnomer, nor discuss the problems with our various canon (PCI, ISO, CoBTI, COSO, blah, blah, blah).  Rather I’d like to talk about some essential things I think our industry needs to “sort out”  before it can move on towards a more scientific view of the world.  And by “sort out” of course, I mean agree with me on :)

CAN’T WE ALL JUST GET ALONG?

1 - Can we agree that risk is a probability issue?
Now obviously, you can retreat in probability theory a century or so and claim that risk is a Knightian uncertainty and that we just can’t “know” it.  Have fun.  But you should know that there’s the catch - “security” is also a probability issue.  So I’m betting that you can’t know “secure” for much of the same reasons Frank Knight would argue we can’t know “risky”.

But if risk (and security) is a probability issue, however, then we’re going to have to do better than “A’s in three college courses in statistics” to address the problem.  We will have to do as Curphey (and others) suggest and bring elements of other disciplines to bear on our problem space.  Let me suggest probability theory and economics as fine, fine places to start.

2 - Can we agree to stop measuring stupidly?
We have to agree that Ordinal Scales are not measurements, and Interval Scales are not useful measurements?

I had a post titled “More Ways To Confuse Your Auditor/Assessor” but it turned out to be a pretty cruel discussion about how we tend to try to act like our calculations based on ordinal or interval scales are useful (hint:  insist that your auditor/assessor/consultant replace the label “one” with the label “zero”).

Note that if risk is a probability issue, then we’re going to have to throw out the concepts of measuring in any scale other than a ratio anyhow.

3 - Can we agree on a (good) taxonomy?
We’re going to have to do (much) better than ISO 27005 (nudge, nudge).

4 - Can we agree we need to do a better job with our data?
We’re going to have to do better with measurements, metrics, models and testing.

It’s a shame that honeypots tend to be under appreciated.

5 - Can we agree to test that data and share it with each other?
We may not need to share specific data, but we will need to share when a model falls down.

I’d like to be as idealistic as some of my fellow ‘New Schoolers’ and suggest we’ll someday all be sharing data together, but I’m skeptical.  But that doesn’t mean we can’t demonstrate where results from the models we use are not repeatable, consistent or logical.   One thing Rob and I talked about at length yesterday was the ability to disprove a model using realistic but “substitute” or sanitized data.  There’s gonna be a TON of work to be done here, and that work will take not years but careers.  Which begs a great question:

Is it the sharing of data that we need, or the sharing of models?

HELP ME OUT, HERE
That’s my list of 5 fundamental concepts I wish we could move past.  Let me ask you - what else am I missing?  What’s it going to take to get past our current malaise?  How does the New School reach critical mass?  Who is going to help us agree in a centralized manner?

Your comments or own blog posts are most welcome (please include a trackback or post here)

]]> Tue, 08 Jul 2008 09:16:04 +0000 risk share share specific data data agree probability issue rob writes rob security Fundamentalism in Risk & Security <![CDATA[Mashup of the Titans]]> http://securityratty.com/article/6289294023616c0d4219941919c976a5 http://securityratty.com/article/6289294023616c0d4219941919c976a5 Information Security - an Oxymoron for the information age
“Always the beautiful answer who asks a more beautiful question.” e. e. cummings
...or why i am with Gelernter

This is a mashup of Saltzer & Schroeder's famous information security principles with David Gelernter's Manifesto.

The premise of this mashup is to examine the paper by Saltzer and Schroeder which was written in 1975 and serves as the basis for most information security programs against the Gelernter's manifesto as to where computing is actually going. Each of the eight principles in Saltzer and Schroeder's paper is listed in order, and followed by select excerpts of Gelernter's manifesto. This comparison is to examine theoretical information security principles vis a vis the actual utility of modern information systems. I will not make an attempt to reconcile theory and practice, but will point out where the two schools of thought agree. In fairness, Saltzer and Schroeder's paper was written 25 years before Gelernter's, however Saltzer and Schroeder's principles dominate the thinking about information security to this day and so its important to view them side by side with Gelernter's thinking on the direction of computing.

Saltzer and Schroeder:
"a) Economy of mechanism: Keep the design as simple and small as possible. This well-known principle applies to any aspect of a system, but it deserves emphasis for protection mechanisms for this reason: design and implementation errors that result in unwanted access paths will not be noticed during normal use (since normal use usually does not include attempts to exercise improper access paths). As a result, techniques such as line-by-line inspection of software and physical examination of hardware that implements protection mechanisms are necessary. For such techniques to be successful, a small and simple design is essential."

Gelernter:
"9. The computing future is based on "cyberbodies" — self-contained, neatly-ordered, beautifully-laid-out collections of information, like immaculate giant gardens."

Conclusion(gp): So far, so good

**

Saltzer and Schroeder:
"b) Fail-safe defaults: Base access decisions on permission rather than exclusion. This principle, suggested by E. Glaser in 1965,8 means that the default situation is lack of access, and the protection scheme identifies conditions under which access is permitted. The alternative, in which mechanisms attempt to identify conditions under which access should be refused, presents the wrong psychological base for secure system design. A conservative design must be based on arguments why objects should be accessible, rather than why they should not. In a large system some objects will be inadequately considered, so a default of lack of permission is safer. A design or implementation mistake in a mechanism that gives explicit permission tends to fail by refusing permission, a safe situation, since it will be quickly detected. On the other hand, a design or implementation mistake in a mechanism that explicitly excludes access tends to fail by allowing access, a failure which may go unnoticed in normal use. This principle applies both to the outward appearance of the protection mechanism and to its underlying implementation."

Conclusion(gp): A conservative design principle that puts the object's owner in control of permissions. This makes a lot of sense from the object point of view, but does little to address the use case in which it executes.

**

Saltzer and Schroeder:
"c) Complete mediation: Every access to every object must be checked for authority. This principle, when systematically applied, is the primary underpinning of the protection system. It forces a system-wide view of access control, which in addition to normal operation includes initialization, recovery, shutdown, and maintenance. It implies that a foolproof method of identifying the source of every request must be devised. It also requires that proposals to gain performance by remembering the result of an authority check be examined skeptically. If a change in authority occurs, such remembered results must be systematically updated."

Gelernter:
"8. The software systems we depend on most today are operating systems (Unix, the Macintosh OS, Windows et. al.) and browsers (Internet Explorer, Netscape Communicator...). Operating systems are connectors that fasten users to computers; they attach to the computer at one end, the user at the other. Browsers fasten users to remote computers, to "servers" on the internet.

Today's operating systems and browsers are obsolete because people no longer want to be connected to computers — near ones OR remote ones. (They probably never did). They want to be connected to information. In the future, people are connected to cyberbodies; cyberbodies drift in the computational cosmos — also known as the Swarm, the Cybersphere.

13. Any well-designed next-generation electronic gadget will come with a ``Disable Omniscience'' button.

17. A cyberbody can be replicated or distributed over many computers; can inhabit many computers at the same time. If the Cybersphere's computers are tiles in a paved courtyard, a cyberbody is a cloud's drifting shadow covering many tiles simultaneously.

20. If a million people use a Web site simultaneously, doesn't that mean that we must have a heavy-duty remote server to keep them all happy? No; we could move the site onto a million desktops and use the internet for coordination. The "site" is like a military unit in the field, the general moving with his troops (or like a hockey team in constant swarming motion). (We used essentially this technique to build the first tuple space implementations. They seemed to depend on a shared server, but the server was an illusion; there was no server, just a swarm of clients.) Could Amazon.com be an itinerant horde instead of a fixed Central Command Post? Yes."

Conclusion(gp): Complete mediation provides the underpinning for Saltzer and Schroeder's system, but does not appear to scale to the desired itinerant horde at least in common interpretation.

**

Saltzer and Schroeder:
"d) Open design: The design should not be secret. The mechanisms should not depend on the ignorance of potential attackers, but rather on the possession of specific, more easily protected, keys or passwords. This decoupling of protection mechanisms from protection keys permits the mechanisms to be examined by many reviewers without concern that the review may itself compromise the safeguards. In addition, any skeptical user may be allowed to convince himself that the system he is about to use is adequate for his purpose. Finally, it is simply not realistic to attempt to maintain secrecy for any system which receives wide distribution."

Conclusion(gp): both seem to agree, hard to get the itinerant horde moving in a swarm without open standards.

**

Saltzer and Schroeder:
"e) Separation of privilege: Where feasible, a protection mechanism that requires two keys to unlock it is more robust and flexible than one that allows access to the presenter of only a single key. The relevance of this observation to computer systems was pointed out by R. Needham in 1973. The reason is that, once the mechanism is locked, the two keys can be physically separated and distinct programs, organizations, or individuals made responsible for them. From then on, no single accident, deception, or breach of trust is sufficient to compromise the protected information. This principle is often used in bank safe-deposit boxes. It is also at work in the defense system that fires a nuclear weapon only if two different people both give the correct command. In a computer system, separated keys apply to any situation in which two or more conditions must be met before access should be permitted. For example, systems providing user-extendible protected data types usually depend on separation of privilege for their implementation."

Gelernter:
"37. Elements stored in a mind do not have names and are not organized into folders; are retrieved not by name or folder but by contents. (Hear a voice, think of a face: you've retrieved a memory that contains the voice as one component.) You can see everything in your memory from the standpoint of past, present and future. Using a file cabinet, you classify information when you put it in; minds classify information when it is taken out. (Yesterday afternoon at four you stood with Natasha on Fifth Avenue in the rain — as you might recall when you are thinking about "Fifth Avenue," "rain," "Natasha" or many other things. But you attached no such labels to the memory when you acquired it. The classification happened retrospectively.)"

Conclusion(gp): Information Security models tend to look at things statically through information classification lenses, but its how information is used that makes it valuable. In practice this is how information security theory breaks down in the face of reality - what does an access control matrix look like for a mashup? What does it look like for a data mining app?

**

Saltzer and Schroeder:
"f) Least privilege: Every program and every user of the system should operate using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the job. Primarily, this principle limits the damage that can result from an accident or error. It also reduces the number of potential interactions among privileged programs to the minimum for correct operation, so that unintentional, unwanted, or improper uses of privilege are less likely to occur. Thus, if a question arises related to misuse of a privilege, the number of programs that must be audited is minimized. Put another way, if a mechanism can provide "firewalls," the principle of least privilege provides a rationale for where to install the firewalls. The military security rule of "need-to-know" is an example of this principle."

Gelernter:
"28. Metaphors have a profound effect on computing: the file-cabinet metaphor traps us in a "passive" instead of "active" view of information management that is fundamentally wrong for computers.

29. The rigid file and directory system you are stuck with on your Mac or PC was designed by programmers for programmers — and is still a good system for programmers. It is no good for non-programmers. It never was, and was never intended to be.

30. If you have three pet dogs, give them names. If you have 10,000 head of cattle, don't bother. Nowadays the idea of giving a name to every file on your computer is ridiculous."

Conclusion(gp): Least Privilege is the point where the practical matter of applying Saltzer and Schroeder's principles breaks down in modern systems. Its a deployment issue, and a matter of insufficient models and modes.

**

Saltzer and Schroeder:
"g) Least common mechanism: Minimize the amount of mechanism common to more than one user and depended on by all users [28]. Every shared mechanism (especially one involving shared variables) represents a potential information path between users and must be designed with great care to be sure it does not unintentionally compromise security. Further, any mechanism serving all users must be certified to the satisfaction of every user, a job presumably harder than satisfying only one or a few users. For example, given the choice of implementing a new function as a supervisor procedure shared by all users or as a library procedure that can be handled as though it were the user's own, choose the latter course. Then, if one or a few users are not satisfied with the level of certification of the function, they can provide a substitute or not use it at all. Either way, they can avoid being harmed by a mistake in it."

Gelernter:
"6. Miniaturization was the big theme in the first age of computers: rising power, falling prices, computers for everybody. Theme of the Second Age now approaching: computing transcends computers. Information travels through a sea of anonymous, interchangeable computers like a breeze through tall grass. A dekstop computer is a scooped-out hole in the beach where information from the Cybersphere wells up like seawater.

16. The future is dense with computers. They will hang around everywhere in lush growths like Spanish moss. They will swarm like locusts. But a swarm is not merely a big crowd. The individuals in the swarm lose their identities. The computers that make up this global swarm will blend together into the seamless substance of the Cybersphere. Within the swarm, individual computers will be as anonymous as molecules of air.

55. Software can solve hard problems in two ways: by algorithm or by making connections — by delivering the problem to exactly the right human problem-solver. The second technique is just as powerful as the first, but so far we have ignored it.

56. Lifestreams and microcosms are the two most important cyberbody types; they relate to each other as a single musical line relates to a single chord. The stream is a "moment in space," the microcosm a moment in time."

**

Saltzer and Schroeder:
"h) Psychological acceptability: It is essential that the human interface be designed for ease of use, so that users routinely and automatically apply the protection mechanisms correctly. Also, to the extent that the user's mental image of his protection goals matches the mechanisms he must use, mistakes will be minimized. If he must translate his image of his protection needs into a radically different specification language, he will make errors."

Gelernter:
"7. "The network is the computer" — yes; but we're less interested in computers all the time. The real topic in astronomy is the cosmos, not telescopes. The real topic in computing is the Cybersphere and the cyberstructures in it, not the computers we use as telescopes and tuners.

27. Modern computing is based on an analogy between computers and file cabinets that is fundamentally wrong and affects nearly every move we make. (We store "files" on disks, write "records," organize files into "folders" — file-cabinet language.) Computers are fundamentally unlike file cabinets because they can take action.

31. Our standard policy on file names has far-reaching consequences: doesn't merely force us to make up names where no name is called for; also imposes strong limits on our handling of an important class of documents — ones that arrive from the outside world. A newly-arrived email message (for example) can't stand on its own as a separate document — can't show up alongside other files in searches, sit by itself on the desktop, be opened or printed independently; it has no name, so it must be buried on arrival inside some existing file (the mail file) that does have a name. The same holds for incoming photos and faxes, Web bookmarks, scanned images...

32. You shouldn't have to put files in directories. The directories should reach out and take them. If a file belongs in six directories, all six should reach out and grab it automatically, simultaneously.

33. A file should be allowed to have no name, one name or many names. Many files should be allowed to share one name. A file should be allowed to be in no directory, one directory, or many directories. Many files should be allowed to share one directory. Of these eight possibilities, only three are legal and the other five are banned — for no good reason.

53. Your car, your school, your company and yourself are all one-track vehicles moving forward through time, and they will each leave a stream-shaped cyberbody (like an aircraft's contrail) behind them as they go. These vapor-trails of crystallized experience will represent our first concrete answer to a hard question: what is a company, a university, any sort of ongoing organization or institution, if its staff and customers and owners can all change, its buildings be bulldozed, its site relocated — what's left? What is it? The answer: a lifestream in cyberspace."


**
Conclusion(gp):

The Saltzer and Schroeder principles of Open Design and Economy of Mechanism hold up well in the face of modern computing realities, and to a certain extent Fail Safe Defaults does as well; however if we information security people are to be effective we need to re-think the other principles.

**

Last word: Gelernter:
We'll know the system is working when a butterfly wanders into the in-box and (a few wingbeats later) flutters out — and in that brief interval the system has transcribed the creature's appearance and analyzed its way of moving, and the real butterfly leaves a shadow-butterfly behind. Some time soon afterward you'll be examining some tedious electronic document and a cyber-butterfly will appear at the bottom left corner of your screen (maybe a Hamearis lucina) and pause there, briefly hiding the text (and showing its neatly-folded rusty-chocolate wings like Victorian paisley, with orange eyespots) — and moments later will have crossed the screen and be gone.
]]> Wed, 25 Jun 2008 13:29:25 +0000 protection mechanisms protection mechanisms correctly information security information implements protection mechanisms information travels information security people protection potential information path Mashup of the Titans <![CDATA[The used car salesmen of NAC and the BNBB]]> http://securityratty.com/article/cd36c880e9816f61480c0090b87f3fc4 http://securityratty.com/article/cd36c880e9816f61480c0090b87f3fc4

slimy_salesguyFew occupations have such a low reputation as used car salespeople.  Well OK maybe lawyers ;-).  For the most part though used car sales people are not really as bad as they are made out to be or perhaps as bad as they used to be. Yes, there is the "what do I have to do to put you in this car today" attitude, but by and large - lemon laws, consumer protection rules and truth in advertising regs have taken some of the snake oil out of the fast and loose way of doing business which earned them their reputation.  Who doesn't hear or read an ad today for cars without the "fine print" being mentioned.

In the world of NAC though we have no such protections built in it seems. It is very much "caveat emptor" - buyer beware.  NAC companies can pretty much say what they want, claim what they will.  How is a prospective customer supposed to know the truth?  Some say you can check references, but even then much like someone applying for a job, do they ever give a reference who is not going say something nice about them? The easy answer of course is try it for yourself. There is no substitute for actually kicking the tires.

Here is another idea I was thinking about, I call it the Better NAC Business Bureau (BNBB).  Its mission is to shine a spotlight on some of the dark alleys and rat holes that some NAC vendors do business in.  The same way the used car salesmen of the world have been rehabilitated, lets do the same with NAC marketing! 

bnbb With that in mind, the first investigation of the BNBB is in regard to some recent press releases from two NAC vendors.  The first press release is from StillSecure and is in regard to Lehigh Valley Hospital and Health Center.  It claims that LVHHC is and has been a NAC customer of StillSecure for the past two years and continues to be a customer.  The press release has quotes from the CIO of LVHHC.  The second press release and case study is from NAC vendor X .  It also claims that LVHHC uses this companies product product for NAC throughout the entire organization.  They also have a quote from someone at the organization (OK, not the CIO, but someone).  Who to believe?  Does LVHHC have two NAC solutions?  I doubt it.  What to do? 

Well we can look at a little history.  For instance which of these two NAC companies claimed they did not use Nessus in their NAC product and than it turned out they did.  What company took the infamous TCP reset and tried to peddle it as a "virtual firewall".  Of course there was the time they took out Google ad words on my name. Yes my friends, it seems that playing fast and loose with marketing claims has earned this company a bit of a used car salesman reputation. But like gas mileage, past performance is not controlling and your performance may vary.

So lets give this company the benefit of the doubt. Maybe in their burning desire to show reference customers they were a little to quick to pull the trigger here.  Lets give them a chance to go back and check with their sources and see if they have the facts the straight.  If they find out that perhaps they were mistaken about this customer using their product for NAC for over 20,000 users at LVHHC, lets give them a chance to retract or correct the press release and case study.  At that the BNBB would close this file without any prejudice.  Case closed, the BNBB does its job again. What do you think would be a reasonable time to do this?  Two weeks? Three weeks? I'll tell you what, the BNBB is founded on fairness.  Lets give them a month. 

If after a month though they have not updated the case study and press release we will have a podcast here and we will delve into this further.  We are going to find out what the NAC solution there is.  Of course Forescout is invited to participate in the podcast and can even bring their own guests if they like.  But at the end of the day, there is only one solution being used for NAC at LVHHC and we all are going to find out what that is.  That hospital ain't big enough for the both of us!

If you would like to be involved in this podcast or the BNBB drop me a line at podcast@stillsecure.com

]]> Mon, 16 Jun 2008 17:03:36 +0000 nac nac solution nac solutions nac vendor nac companies car prospective customer customer companies product product The used car salesmen of NAC and the BNBB <![CDATA[The used car salesmen of NAC and the BNBB]]> http://securityratty.com/article/936d718e5f37edc62b63f2e074ad307e http://securityratty.com/article/936d718e5f37edc62b63f2e074ad307e

slimy_salesguyFew occupations have such a low reputation as used car salespeople.  Well OK maybe lawyers ;-).  For the most part though used car sales people are not really as bad as they are made out to be or perhaps as bad as they used to be. Yes, there is the "what do I have to do to put you in this car today" attitude, but by and large - lemon laws, consumer protection rules and truth in advertising regs have taken some of the snake oil out of the fast and loose way of doing business which earned them their reputation.  Who doesn't hear or read an ad today for cars without the "fine print" being mentioned.

In the world of NAC though we have no such protections built in it seems. It is very much "caveat emptor" - buyer beware.  NAC companies can pretty much say what they want, claim what they will.  How is a prospective customer supposed to know the truth?  Some say you can check references, but even then much like someone applying for a job, do they ever give a reference who is not going say something nice about them? The easy answer of course is try it for yourself. There is no substitute for actually kicking the tires.

Here is another idea I was thinking about, I call it the Better NAC Business Bureau (BNBB).  Its mission is to shine a spotlight on some of the dark alleys and rat holes that some NAC vendors do business in.  The same way the used car salesmen of the world have been rehabilitated, lets do the same with NAC marketing! 

bnbb With that in mind, the first investigation of the BNBB is in regard to some recent press releases from two NAC vendors.  The first press release is from StillSecure and is in regard to Lehigh Valley Hospital and Health Center.  It claims that LVHHC is and has been a NAC customer of StillSecure for the past two years and continues to be a customer.  The press release has quotes from the CIO of LVHHC.  The second press release and case study is from NAC vendor X .  It also claims that LVHHC uses this companies product product for NAC throughout the entire organization.  They also have a quote from someone at the organization (OK, not the CIO, but someone).  Who to believe?  Does LVHHC have two NAC solutions?  I doubt it.  What to do? 

Well we can look at a little history.  For instance which of these two NAC companies claimed they did not use Nessus in their NAC product and than it turned out they did.  What company took the infamous TCP reset and tried to peddle it as a "virtual firewall".  Of course there was the time they took out Google ad words on my name. Yes my friends, it seems that playing fast and loose with marketing claims has earned this company a bit of a used car salesman reputation. But like gas mileage, past performance is not controlling and your performance may vary.

So lets give this company the benefit of the doubt. Maybe in their burning desire to show reference customers they were a little to quick to pull the trigger here.  Lets give them a chance to go back and check with their sources and see if they have the facts the straight.  If they find out that perhaps they were mistaken about this customer using their product for NAC for over 20,000 users at LVHHC, lets give them a chance to retract or correct the press release and case study.  At that the BNBB would close this file without any prejudice.  Case closed, the BNBB does its job again. What do you think would be a reasonable time to do this?  Two weeks? Three weeks? I'll tell you what, the BNBB is founded on fairness.  Lets give them a month. 

If after a month though they have not updated the case study and press release we will have a podcast here and we will delve into this further.  We are going to find out what the NAC solution there is.  Of course Forescout is invited to participate in the podcast and can even bring their own guests if they like.  But at the end of the day, there is only one solution being used for NAC at LVHHC and we all are going to find out what that is.  That hospital ain't big enough for the both of us!

If you would like to be involved in this podcast or the BNBB drop me a line at podcast@stillsecure.com

]]> Mon, 16 Jun 2008 16:20:50 +0000 nac nac solution nac solutions nac vendor nac companies car prospective customer customer companies product product The used car salesmen of NAC and the BNBB <![CDATA[Password Expiration: Like Margarine and Water?]]> http://securityratty.com/article/f3cb96874ec6ffbc70f6693b2432ae26 http://securityratty.com/article/f3cb96874ec6ffbc70f6693b2432ae26 password expiration as a prime candidate. ]]> Mon, 26 May 2008 20:00:00 +0000 water margarine password expiration 8x8 water doctrine cardiovascular health advice substitute margarine similar dogma applies health Password Expiration: Like Margarine and Water?