[Q] I have been collecting accounts of your meeting with David Petraeus in Baghdad. And you had [inaudible] after he had made a really strong pitch [inaudible] for maximum flexibility. A lot of politicians at that moment would have said [inaudible] but from what I hear, you pushed back.

[BO] I did. I remember the conversation, pretty precisely. He made the case for maximum flexibility and I said you know what if I were in your shoes I would be making the exact same argument because your job right now is to succeed in Iraq on as favorable terms as we can get. My job as a potential commander in chief is to view your counsel and your interests through the prism of our overall national security which includes what is happening in Afghanistan, which includes the costs to our image in the middle east, to the continued occupation, which includes the financial costs of our occupation, which includes what it is doing to our military. So I said look, I described in my mind at list an analogous situation where I am sure he has to deal with situations where the commanding officer in [inaudible] says I need more troops here now because I really think I can make progress doing x y and z. That commanding officer is doing his job in Ramadi, but Petraeus's job is to step back and see how does it impact Iraq as a whole. My argument was I have got to do the same thing here. And based on my strong assessment particularly having just come from Afghanistan were going to have to make a different decision. But the point is that hopefully I communicated to the press my complete respect and gratitude to him and Proder who was in the meeting for their outstanding work. Our differences don't necessarily derive from differences in sort of, or my differences with him don't derive from tactical objections to his approach. But rather from a strategic framework that is trying to take into account the challenges to our national security and the fact that we've got finite resources.

I have made this general point again and again -- about airline security, about terrorism, about a lot of things -- that the person in charge of the security system can't be the person who decides what resources to devote to that security system. The analogy I like to use is a company: the VP of marketing wants all the money for marketing, the VP of engineering wants all the money for engineering, and so on; and the CEO has to balance all of those needs and do what's right for the company. So of course the TSA wants to spend all this money on new airplane security systems; that's their job. Someone above the TSA has to balance the risks to airlines with the other risks our country faces and allocate budget accordingly. Security is a trade-off, and that trade-off has to be made by someone with responsibility over all aspects of that trade-off.

I don't think I've ever heard a politician make this point so explicitly.

Conventional wisdom holds that terrorism is inherently political, and that people become terrorists for political reasons. This is the "strategic" model of terrorism, and it's basically an economic model. It posits that people resort to terrorism when they believe -- rightly or wrongly -- that terrorism is worth it; that is, when they believe the political gains of terrorism minus the political costs are greater than if they engaged in some other, more peaceful form of protest. It's assumed, for example, that people join Hamas to achieve a Palestinian state; that people join the PKK to attain a Kurdish national homeland; and that people join al-Qaida to, among other things, get the United States out of the Persian Gulf.

If you believe this model, the way to fight terrorism is to change that equation, and that's what most experts advocate. Governments tend to minimize the political gains of terrorism through a no-concessions policy; the international community tends to recommend reducing the political grievances of terrorists via appeasement, in hopes of getting them to renounce violence. Both advocate policies to provide effective nonviolent alternatives, like free elections.

Historically, none of these solutions has worked with any regularity. Max Abrahms, a predoctoral fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, has studied dozens of terrorist groups from all over the world. He argues that the model is wrong. In a paper published this year in International Security that -- sadly -- doesn't have the title "Seven Habits of Highly Ineffective Terrorists," he discusses, well, seven habits of highly ineffective terrorists. These seven tendencies are seen in terrorist organizations all over the world, and they directly contradict the theory that terrorists are political maximizers:

Terrorists, he writes, (1) attack civilians, a policy that has a lousy track record of convincing those civilians to give the terrorists what they want; (2) treat terrorism as a first resort, not a last resort, failing to embrace nonviolent alternatives like elections; (3) don't compromise with their target country, even when those compromises are in their best interest politically; (4) have protean political platforms, which regularly, and sometimes radically, change; (5) often engage in anonymous attacks, which precludes the target countries making political concessions to them; (6) regularly attack other terrorist groups with the same political platform; and (7) resist disbanding, even when they consistently fail to achieve their political objectives or when their stated political objectives have been achieved.

Abrahms has an alternative model to explain all this: People turn to terrorism for social solidarity. He theorizes that people join terrorist organizations worldwide in order to be part of a community, much like the reason inner-city youths join gangs in the United States.

The evidence supports this. Individual terrorists often have no prior involvement with a group's political agenda, and often join multiple terrorist groups with incompatible platforms. Individuals who join terrorist groups are frequently not oppressed in any way, and often can't describe the political goals of their organizations. People who join terrorist groups most often have friends or relatives who are members of the group, and the great majority of terrorist are socially isolated: unmarried young men or widowed women who weren't working prior to joining. These things are true for members of terrorist groups as diverse as the IRA and al-Qaida.

For example, several of the 9/11 hijackers planned to fight in Chechnya, but they didn't have the right paperwork so they attacked America instead. The mujahedeen had no idea whom they would attack after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, so they sat around until they came up with a new enemy: America. Pakistani terrorists regularly defect to another terrorist group with a totally different political platform. Many new al-Qaida members say, unconvincingly, that they decided to become a jihadist after reading an extreme, anti-American blog, or after converting to Islam, sometimes just a few weeks before. These people know little about politics or Islam, and they frankly don't even seem to care much about learning more. The blogs they turn to don't have a lot of substance in these areas, even though more informative blogs do exist.

All of this explains the seven habits. It's not that they're ineffective; it's that they have a different goal. They might not be effective politically, but they are effective socially: They all help preserve the group's existence and cohesion.

This kind of analysis isn't just theoretical; it has practical implications for counterterrorism. Not only can we now better understand who is likely to become a terrorist, we can engage in strategies specifically designed to weaken the social bonds within terrorist organizations. Driving a wedge between group members -- commuting prison sentences in exchange for actionable intelligence, planting more double agents within terrorist groups -- will go a long way to weakening the social bonds within those groups.

We also need to pay more attention to the socially marginalized than to the politically downtrodden, like unassimilated communities in Western countries. We need to support vibrant, benign communities and organizations as alternative ways for potential terrorists to get the social cohesion they need. And finally, we need to minimize collateral damage in our counterterrorism operations, as well as clamping down on bigotry and hate crimes, which just creates more dislocation and social isolation, and the inevitable calls for revenge.

This essay previously appeared on Wired.com.

Conventional wisdom holds that terrorism is inherently political, and that people become terrorists for political reasons. This is the "strategic" model of terrorism, and it's basically an economic model. It posits that people resort to terrorism when they believe -- rightly or wrongly -- that terrorism is worth it; that is, when they believe the political gains of terrorism minus the political costs are greater than if they engaged in some other, more peaceful form of protest. It's assumed, for example, that people join Hamas to achieve a Palestinian state; that people join the PKK to attain a Kurdish national homeland; and that people join al-Qaida to, among other things, get the United States out of the Persian Gulf.

If you believe this model, the way to fight terrorism is to change that equation, and that's what most experts advocate. Governments tend to minimize the political gains of terrorism through a no-concessions policy; the international community tends to recommend reducing the political grievances of terrorists via appeasement, in hopes of getting them to renounce violence. Both advocate policies to provide effective nonviolent alternatives, like free elections.

Historically, none of these solutions has worked with any regularity. Max Abrahms, a predoctoral fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, has studied dozens of terrorist groups from all over the world. He argues that the model is wrong. In a paper (.pdf) published this year in International Security that -- sadly -- doesn't have the title "Seven Habits of Highly Ineffective Terrorists," he discusses, well, seven habits of highly ineffective terrorists. These seven tendencies are seen in terrorist organizations all over the world, and they directly contradict the theory that terrorists are political maximizers:

Terrorists, he writes, (1) attack civilians, a policy that has a lousy track record of convincing those civilians to give the terrorists what they want; (2) treat terrorism as a first resort, not a last resort, failing to embrace nonviolent alternatives like elections; (3) don't compromise with their target country, even when those compromises are in their best interest politically; (4) have protean political platforms, which regularly, and sometimes radically, change; (5) often engage in anonymous attacks, which precludes the target countries making political concessions to them; (6) regularly attack other terrorist groups with the same political platform; and (7) resist disbanding, even when they consistently fail to achieve their political objectives or when their stated political objectives have been achieved.

Abrahms has an alternative model to explain all this: People turn to terrorism for social solidarity. He theorizes that people join terrorist organizations worldwide in order to be part of a community, much like the reason inner-city youths join gangs in the United States.

The evidence supports this. Individual terrorists often have no prior involvement with a group's political agenda, and often join multiple terrorist groups with incompatible platforms. Individuals who join terrorist groups are frequently not oppressed in any way, and often can't describe the political goals of their organizations. People who join terrorist groups most often have friends or relatives who are members of the group, and the great majority of terrorist are socially isolated: unmarried young men or widowed women who weren't working prior to joining. These things are true for members of terrorist groups as diverse as the IRA and al-Qaida.

For example, several of the 9/11 hijackers planned to fight in Chechnya, but they didn't have the right paperwork so they attacked America instead. The mujahedeen had no idea whom they would attack after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, so they sat around until they came up with a new enemy: America. Pakistani terrorists regularly defect to another terrorist group with a totally different political platform. Many new al-Qaida members say, unconvincingly, that they decided to become a jihadist after reading an extreme, anti-American blog, or after converting to Islam, sometimes just a few weeks before. These people know little about politics or Islam, and they frankly don't even seem to care much about learning more. The blogs they turn to don't have a lot of substance in these areas, even though more informative blogs do exist.

All of this explains the seven habits. It's not that they're ineffective; it's that they have a different goal. They might not be effective politically, but they are effective socially: They all help preserve the group's existence and cohesion.

This kind of analysis isn't just theoretical; it has practical implications for counterterrorism. Not only can we now better understand who is likely to become a terrorist, we can engage in strategies specifically designed to weaken the social bonds within terrorist organizations. Driving a wedge between group members -- commuting prison sentences in exchange for actionable intelligence, planting more double agents within terrorist groups -- will go a long way to weakening the social bonds within those groups.

We also need to pay more attention to the socially marginalized than to the politically downtrodden, like unassimilated communities in Western countries. We need to support vibrant, benign communities and organizations as alternative ways for potential terrorists to get the social cohesion they need. And finally, we need to minimize collateral damage in our counterterrorism operations, as well as clamping down on bigotry and hate crimes, which just creates more dislocation and social isolation, and the inevitable calls for revenge.

---

Bruce Schneier is Chief Security Technology Officer of BT, and author of Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World.

I say today is a good day for two reasons:  1.)  BT’s CSO Jill Knesek wrote an article called “Keys to establishing an end-to-end security strategy” which begs some discussion within context, and 2.)  Sara Peters on Twitter last night wanted to know why I thought “risk management” requires more than what most “best practices” around the subject suggest the effort requires.

WHAT SHOULD WE BE REFLECTING ABOUT?

Jill Knesek’s article gives us a rough outline of how to develop a security strategy.  It’s fairly high-level, Pragmatic CSO-ish type stuff.  It gives us a nice outline of

• Get a seat at the table
• Process
• People
• Technology

Nothing earth-shattering there.  But it is a very nice broad CISO-level taxonomy about what we have to reflect on.  The need to reflect is driven by something Jack told me long ago,

“The amount of risk we have is a function of the decisions we made and our ability to execute on them from some point in the past”.

As an Aside:  So Sarah if you’re reading, this quote does much to explain why I said I disagree with much of what our industry calls “risk management”.  We tend to define the process of risk management as essentially a tactical “issue whack-a-mole” exercise. Find the issue.  Analyze the “risk” around the issue.  Fix the issue.  Repeat. This hamster-wheel-of-pain, while sometimes an effective tool for the CISO, is incongruous with addressing root causes (the ability to match a tactical issue to the strategic shortcoming that created the issue is up to the expertise of the analyst or consultant).  It is only Kaizen without (good) Hansei, if you will.

Back to what Jill is writing - the sorts of things we should be reflecting about can be thought of in context of her outline.  Namely:

1. Once you have a seat at the table, what is the nature of that relationship?  Who are you reporting to and what are their concerns? What and how are you reporting and how might that be addressing their concerns?
2. What processes are in place?, How do you know that those are the processes that should be in place? If they are, what kind of job am I doing at those processes?
3. What is the quality of the skills and resources I have from a people perspective, and how do I know if they are adequate?  How do I know that the training they petition me for will effectively reduce organizational risk?
4. Are the Technology solutions I have in place effective, are we managing them effectively, and what sort of States of Knowledge could they provide me with (to make good decisions and execute upon them, from above)?

This, for the CISO, is Hansei.  The continuous management of it is Kaizen.  Not to particularly pick on Jill’s article, but creating a “risk register expressed in ALE” might be fine if you’re trying to explain to the board what your “first 100 days in office” will be like - but these sorts of lists are usually not very strategic in nature, and as such, depending on the outcome of that risk register (and the models used to create it) it might not actually be useful.

WHAT IS NEEDED FOR REFLECTION?

So what is needed for this sort of CISO-level Hansei?

The CISO must understand the

• Current State of Nature

turn that into a

• State of Knowledge

and use that to create a

• State of Wisdom.

CREATING A STATE OF NATURE FOR THE IRM PROGRAM

This Current State of Nature determination be done by applying analytical methods to a program audit.  We must understand questions like,  “What is in that program and how is it structured?”  before we can answer questions about “how (good/bad) are we at managing risk?”

There are many ways to structure an IRM program, but as an example - below is a graphic shared with me by Adrian Seccombe.  For those who know Adrian and the Trust Model - this is classified as “white” so it’s OK for public display and consumption.  But here’s what Adrian is trying to build at a high level:

So regarding Adrian’s program diagram:

1. Is a governance framework.  Think ITIL.
2. Is a risk framework.  Think ISO 27002 using FAIR as an analytical engine.  To be fair (pun) I believe this is really issue management, and it’s a process, but that’s OK.
3. Reg compliance should be self explanatory.  That’s essentially what GRC products do for you.
4. With architecture, I think Adrian is inclined towards TOGAF.
5. Security is the ISMS in place (27001, ISM^3, PCI, whatever…)
6. Are the processes that drive execution
7. Monitor (audit) is creating a State of Nature and Evaluate is creating a State of Knowledge from that State of Nature around items 1-6.

EVALUATE - CREATING A STATE OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE IRM PROGRAM

That evaluate is Hansei/Kaizen.  Evaluation, done effectively, will drive actual organizational risk exposure.  Evaluate will even answer those four questions we raised in the “What Should We Be Reflecting About” section above:

1. Once you have a seat at the table, what is the nature of that relationship?  Who are you reporting to and what are their concerns? What and how are you reporting and how might that be addressing their concerns?
2. What processes are in place?, How do you know that those are the processes that should be in place? If they are, what kind of job am I doing at those processes?
3. What is the quality of the skills and resources I have from a people perspective, and how do I know if they are adequate?
4. Are the Technology solutions I have in place effective, are we managing them effectively, and what sort of States of Wisdom do they provide me with (to make good decisions and execute upon them, from above)?

If we could have a nice metric (or set of metrics) that answers these questions, we might call it something like “My Ability To Manage Risk” or MATMR for short.

GETTING TO A STATE OF WISDOM

What’s then missing is how you create a State of Wisdom around the State of Knowledge developed - your “MATMR” metric.  That is, given the current State of Knowledge - how can I be most effective?  This State of Wisdom requires proper models for what risk is, and what you can do to manage it applied in a probabilistic manner (because we can’t intrinsically *know* the future, we can only say with some degree of certainty what the desired course should be).

So the outcome of Hansei/Kaizen should be to create a State of Wisdom about Risk Management.  This is why reflection must be relentless - because your wisdom must be similarly abundant.

This is no small part of the reason RMI exists, why we build software and help organizations understand the things they do.

ScienceLogic: Can you share any of the strategies/advice that you give to companies embarking on their BSM journeys?

Doug McClure: Well, first they’ve got to have a BSM strategy. Nearly all the clients I talk to or hear about wanting to do BSM do not have a BSM strategy. I talk a lot about this on my blog and with clients and it is relevant whether you’re going to think about “BSM Lite” or “BSM Heavy” approaches.

Once we have a BSM strategy, we need to establish a BSM roadmap that guides us in how we’ll implement the BSM strategy in a more tactical manner, focusing on short term iterative quick wins and 30-60-90 day projects. For more of my thoughts on BSM strategy and roadmapping, see the following blog posts.

• Elements of Business Service Management Part 3: Getting Business Service Management on the Radar Screen

• Elements of Business Service Management Part 4: What’s your Business Service Management Strategy?

As I’ve alluded to previously, a client first must define and understand what “BSM Lite” may mean to them. Don’t take what the analysts or the vendors pitch for what you should do to achieve BSM or what value you should get from it.

For any type of BSM to be successful, each client must define what BSM means to them and state what they expect to get from BSM. They must make it personal, make it a part of their company culture and elevate it to be as an important initiative as compliance, risk management, SOA, ITIL, or other initiatives may be within the company.

Please don’t get scared off from this strategy thing. Please don’t blow this off as something that the secret enterprise architecture council should be doing. If you’re unable to get an audience in these areas within your company, start within your own sphere of influence.

Your strategy could be as simple as enabling the local operations center to more efficiently classify, triage and resolve problems based on a simple business service or application contextual understanding. Focus on how this changes the game within your environment. Come up with your own metrics and measures to assess the value this has to this organizational use. Trust me, you’ll need to justify your investment some time in the future.

Another trait of successful BSM implementations is that of the formal monitoring and management tools group has established some sort of database or knowledge repository that enables them to “manage the business of IT management and monitoring” if you will. In my opinion, the vendor community has let their clients down significantly in this area. The CMDB may be the correct answer, but most companies just don’t value monitoring enough to demand that this be included in their formal CMDB initiatives.

In my last job, we developed an application that I referred to as the “Service Management Database” or “SMDB”. Others may call it something else, but in essence, it was the database that captured what was monitored, how it was monitored, who owned it, what business services and applications it supported, the impact an outage or event from it had on the business services or applications, etc.

One key component of this “SMDB” was establishing the relationships of real and synthetic user and transaction monitoring steps to associated servers and applications. This is a significant gap area in many tools and vendor CMDBs.

Clients who have instituted something formal such as this generally have a very good handle on management and monitoring within their environment. Far too many clients do not have adequate monitoring (read visibility) in place to begin their BSM journey.

I’d strongly recommend a good hard look at how well the client’s monitoring and management practices are implemented and managed. Simply put, if they don’t have adequate visibility into how well those business services and applications are performing, you can’t expect to manage what you can’t “see” that may be impacting the business, clients, revenue, etc.

Just ask yourself this – can you explicitly state what monitoring is in place for a given business service or application? Can you quantify the impact of a simple event to a business service or application? Can you explain why something is red, yellow, purple or green and what causes it to change from one color to another? If you can’t, your BSM journey will be challenging.

Those with formal CMDB initiatives have their hands full with high risk, long time to value projects to just get a handle with traditional configuration management models. Taking these low level configuration items (CI’s) and establishing application and service dependencies comes after a lot of work getting through the organizational challenges of getting systems access to populate the CMDB.

I strongly recommend that the formal monitoring and management tools group create an authoritative database that enables them to establish end-to-end visibility into the service and application delivery chain and the impacts it has on the business, customer, etc. This ultimately becomes part of a more realistic federated CMDB within the business.

ScienceLogic: Can you provide an example of a successful implementation of BSM? Were there specific factors that especially contributed to its success?

Doug McClure: I’ve touched on the highlights of the most successful BSM implementations throughout my previous answers. Clients that have rallied around an organizational change or transformation focusing every team member’s efforts and energy towards ensuring that the business goals and objectives are being met through the delivery of highly available business services and applications.

Far too often the “change” never happens and it’s the “talking heads” that are preaching to the choir about what should be done. Every person on the front line, in the support teams, at the help desk, etc. must understand how they support or impact the business in business terms. Try putting this simple phrase after job titles “Hi, my name is Doug. I’m a Systems Administrator, Supporting the Business”.

That was a mouthful, but simply put, these clients have an impressively instrumented business and IT environment with the right amount of visibility into each area, joined together with an organization that thinks, operates and responds based on their understanding of the business goals and objectives and how these business services and applications enable business success.

The operational model for an organization fully adopting BSM identifies ways to establish a service management mentality across the entire business service and application delivery and support chain. The delivery, operations and support organizations must be incented to manage the services and applications being delivered with this end-to-end context.

A leading, outside the box “service management organization” may include the traditional IT silos but within a matrixed fashion focused on one or more key business services and applications. The “service management organization” is then incented to work together, as a team, for the end-to-end delivery and support of these services or applications.

It’s no longer one’s job to just be the systems administrator, database administrator or network engineer, their job is now to support specific business services and applications. They provide the subject matter expertise needed to support the services and applications together, as a team, eliminating the finger pointing or “not my problem” attitudes that exist in the majority of IT organizations today.

Overall, the KISS approach is what will enable BSM of any type (lite, heavy) to be the most successful. If it just feels natural, doesn’t take any additional effort, clicks or tasks to do then it’s going to work. BSM should be transparent and not just another buzz word. It’s not a form that gets filled out or a special process to follow in the run book. It’s doing the right thing for the business, no matter what the situation, crisis, buzz word or technology initiative of the day is.

ScienceLogic: How did you get involved in BSM?

Doug McClure: I think the foundations of my service management background and passion were initially established during my service in the US Navy. Today, I relate that experience to what I call BSM for the Military or Mission Services Management (MSM).

We had been taught over and over that extreme attention to the details of the mission at hand (aka “the business”) was the number one priority and that all of our technology, services, and applications existed for those Sailors and Marines on the other end (the “customer”). I can recall countless instances where mission critical communications services (telephony, orderwires, teletypes, command and control systems, etc.) were impacted in one way or another. It was extremely critical that we understood who was impacted and to what degree so that contingency plans could be activated. We weren’t just talking about lost revenue, poor sales or customer experience; we were talking about human lives and the security of the United States.

It is that military bearing, attention to detail and real world experience that drives me with many of my modern day BSM endeavors. That migration from “Mission Services Management” to BSM was honed working for over 10 years working in the Internet Service Provider (ISP) and datacenter, hosting and colocation business.

In those rapid growth businesses during the Internet boom, service differentiation was what “made you millions” or paved your way to bankruptcy. The companies I worked for had an extreme passion and focus on ensuring that their services, applications and Internet access products were of the highest quality, highly reliable and just plain better than the competition.

Again, the IT infrastructure, service quality and customer experience relationship was ingrained in all of our heads. It was all hands on deck when Webmail, Internet access, DNS, or the network experienced problems. We were measured in terms of how many customers experienced a busy signal or dropped connection or if you couldn’t log in fast enough to read your email. Companies like Keynote Systems and LionBridge/Veritest/Inverse tested the quality of our networks, services and applications and publicly ranked us against our competition. We thought in terms of customer experience and impact every minute of the day, 24×7.

It was in my last job managing a traditional enterprise management and monitoring development group for a nationwide ISP where I was able to work with emerging technology to help get a handle on the complexities of these rapidly growing IT environments filled with emerging technologies and products. Applying this early technology to complex service problems in our environment proved to me that the technology, coupled with the right emphasis on how the technology was implemented and an emphasis on the people and processes within the organization could bring BSM to life.

Where I felt left out in the cold was with my vendor relationship. While their technology gave me the potential, they didn’t teach me how to work through the organizational and technological problems to successfully implement the BSM strategy. My very first end-to-end BSM pilot was extremely successful and provided visibility into the IT environment and business service impact that have never been available before.

And here I am today, working at a software vendor for the first time. Welcome to the “dark side” as they say. The approach and methodology we followed for BSM has become the basis of the core BSM Methodology that I teach IBMers and our clients around the world today.

My personal mission and drive here at IBM Tivoli is to ensure that BSM is something that the typical monitoring tools administrator can actually implement and that our BSM story is something that any of our clients can be successful with. The sales and marketing slicks must be backed up by something like this whomever you are these days. Clients shouldn’t put up for “marketecture”, me too and gee whiz buzz words.

BSM takes a partnership and commitment to every client’s success, and I want to be involved in those BSM efforts in every industry or market worldwide. We need more thought leaders collaborating together in an open and public forum to change legacy attitudes about BSM and do what we can to enable client’s to be as successful as they can be.

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ScienceLogic: What is “BSM Lite” and how is it different from “heavy” BSM?

Doug McClure: I think the concepts that Peter Sevcik from Net Forecast initially outlined in his blog post sum up what “BSM Lite” is all about: a simpler, less expensive, more responsive way of achieving the goals and objectives of Business Service Management (BSM).  He’s contrasted this nicely against what he termed “BSM Heavy” being the larger investments in time and resources to deploy domain specific tools and solutions each providing a view into the business service delivery with some aggregation and consolidation to tie up all of the disparate tool’s information into a concise end-to-end business service management story.

I’m pleased that he leveraged some of my thinking around a better working definition of what BSM really is from the BSM Defined page on my blog. Of course, these definitions are going to vary depending on whom you talk with and how they see the overall BSM Maturity Model.  I’ve created a BSM Maturity Model that aligns with the famous Gartner IT maturity model.  I’d like to think that a “BSM Lite” solution is one attacking the low hanging fruit, enabling one to achieve value quicker, and in a more tactical manner.  The “BSM Heavy” solutions are capable of the same, but span all along the BSM Maturity Model by adding additional point solutions, products and technologies from their broader portfolio. 

ScienceLogic: Does “BSM Lite” just refer to the tools, or can it refer to the process and methodology as well?

Doug McClure: I think that BSM is as much a philosophy as it is technology, process, people and methodology.  If we can get people to think, operate and respond differently than they do today with a focus on the business, customers, quality, revenue, or whatever else is most important to their business goals and objectives, than that is Business Service Management and could be “BSM Lite” if you will. 

Being that I work for IBM Tivoli, one of my personal objectives is to identify ways to use our key BSM enabling products in a more efficient, effective and BSM centric way. This was a huge driver for trying to hold DevCampTivoli focused on “Collaborative Development of End-to-End BSM Solutions”. 

In my opinion, we don’t make things very easy for our clients and the answer can’t be to “buy this product, module or widget” to fill in the gaps.  In my opinion, we must establish a BSM overlay within IBM Tivoli’s development and product management organization that ensures that we have clearly thought about how to enable BSM with the hundreds or products that we sell.  In my opinion, every product release must incorporate the fundamentals of enabling BSM in addition to the core domain specific functionality intended. I hope to keep this spirit alive and get our smartest IBMers and clients thinking about the best way to take a “BSM Heavy” solution and make it “lighter”. I hope to share more about my plans here and guidance for the industry in general soon.

That said, I am always interested in consulting with clients and collaborate with peers in the industry to figure out how to get the focus on the people, process and technology as key components of their BSM strategies.  I am absolutely convinced that without a documented BSM strategy, roadmap and top level sponsorship within the business and IT, the chances of BSM success greatly diminish.

ScienceLogic: Given the complexities involved in implementing a BSM strategy and dealing with the people and processes components of any business, how does “BSM Lite” really work? Should the expectations and outcomes be “lite” as well?

Doug McClure: Time will tell if “BSM Lite” will work.  I’m seeing emerging companies that are already breaking down some of the barriers to BSM success.  I do not expect that those choosing to begin with a “BSM Lite” approach should expect “lite” outcomes. 

The outcomes are the same regardless of the approach IF you’ve got a documented BSM strategy, roadmap and top level sponsorship in place before you begin. New features, capabilities and technologies will be needed as the needs of the business change and companies mature in BSM and fundamental IT management. This will likely force companies to move in more “BSM Heavy” directions to fill those gaps. 

In my opinion, this is the ideal scenario now as it gives “BSM Lite” vendors opportunities to grow their products and solutions. It also GREATLY improves the chances for success with a “BSM Heavy” solution because the organization would have already had matured enough to approach a “BSM Heavy” solution than if they hadn’t done a “BSM Lite” solution in the past.

ScienceLogic: Is “BSM Lite” more appropriate for a small or midsized organization, or does it apply equally to large companies? Is there an ideal profile for a company that can successfully implement a BSM strategy? Is there a different profile for “BSM Lite”?

Doug McClure: From an economic perspective, the concepts of “BSM Lite” are appropriate for all companies.  Remember, with “BSM Lite” we’re focused on identifying ways to make the goals and objectives of BSM easier to implement and in a more cost effective way.  Any company concerned about their IT cost overhead should care about this, especially when the risks of starting out with a “BSM Heavy” type deployment are much greater and the time to value generally much longer.

The “ideal” profile for any company is one where the BSM initiative begins by establishing top level buy in through creation of a formal BSM strategy for the company. This BSM strategy personalizes how the company defines what BSM is, what value the company expects from it, and how it will use BSM as a competitive differentiator for delivery of its business and IT services, products, etc.

The organizational “profile” I’ve seen most successful is when implementing a BSM strategy originates from within or actively includes a group that many companies have now that serves as a liaison or relationship management role between the various lines of business and IT. Sometimes this group is often seen as the gatekeeper to filter (and hinder) business driven requirements into the IT organization. In the ideal scenario, this group works very closely with the business and IT (usually staffed by business people and not IT people) to understand both the business side and IT side of complex business services and applications. 

Apart from the traditional IT components, what this group can do is help IT really understand the business perspective.  Analysis of the impact on the business in business terms is only possible by collaborating with a group such as this.  True value oriented BSM becomes attainable when we get to this level of IT and business alignment, cooperation, collaboration and communication.

If BSM is an IT only initiative, this will likely result in an IT centric perspective severely lacking in the necessary business perspective.  In these cases where IT doesn’t invest their BSM efforts with the business as an equal partner, the implementation ultimately becomes a “CYA” tool for IT and not achieve the desired value oriented expected.

To some degree “BSM Lite” may have an entirely different profile. If we see the price points, complexity and time to value change significantly we may see these types of deployments originate exclusively within the Line of Business. The possibility may exist where large enterprises operating in a shared IT services or IT outsourcing type model that the Line of Business brings in a “BSM Lite” solution to gain the visibility, checks and balances needed to ensure that the LoB’s needs are being met from the internal/external provider. I’d envision that “BSM Lite” may even be capable of operating within a “SaaS” model or other managed service type offering where the price points are below the signing levels triggering broader IT involvement and review.

To Be Continued…

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Research Director Patricia Adams and VP and Distinguished Analyst Ronnie Colville presented this thought provoking session. It seemed to echo what ScienceLogic has been talking about regarding our thinking around the practical ways to efficiently accomplish key tactical gains against your Configuration Management Data Base (CMDB) initiatives.

They started out with, what are the prerequisites to a successful CMDB implementation?

Garbage in = Garbage out

There is no miracle occurring in all of these new fancy framework tools; these complex databases are only as good as the trusted source of information inserted. You have to put a bunch of elbow grease into figuring out what to actually put in the CMDB.

So how do you define the metrics?

First you need to know where you are starting from – you will need to baseline the environment. Then baseline what your state is 3, 6, and 12 months after installing CMDB.

Next: break metrics down to 2 strategic areas:

1. Strategic
   1. Operational Costs
   2. Application performance
   3. Compliance - internal auditors doing analysis – keep track of their findings and incorporate into your elements for data gathering
2. Operational Metrics
   1. Changes unplanned (typically 80% unplanned or emergency)
   2. Changes withdrawn (how many changes were withdrawn / roll back)
   3. Application downtime (what did it cost from app being down)
   4. Server downtime (before and after)
   5. Tickets generated (before and after)

Having the data to show how you are performing makes it much easier to show why you need more budget to improve performance in specific areas. Having metrics allows IT managers to do marketing back to the business units about the value you are delivering.

Gartner said that from their Enterprise customers they often hear “I haven’t quantified the value yet”…That is not the right answer.

During the session, Gartner did a real-time wireless poll of the audience with some interesting questions:

What are the tools to build and populate your CMDB with IT services?

Focus of CMDB?

• Inventory 20%
• IT service relationships 68%
• Other 6%
• Don’t know 6%

Interesting to note, a very consistent set of information from year to year polling which equals a mature understanding of the CMDB’s role for analysis and decision process.

Have you heard of ITIL V.2 & V.3 and considered how it impacts this discussion?

ITIL is a process framework, it is not a technology automation framework. Just because something is pink ITIL certified does not mean that it will help at all with the automation of the process framework.

Gartner quantified the market as being about 2 years old this month. So the point here is we are in early days of this technology. The way they see it, the Large Enterprise/Framework vendors selling you is like a lock-in, but the interesting thing about CMDB is that the tools that you need to integrate and federate were only recently acquired, so the entire framework vendor integration and alignment story is mostly incomplete.

Gartner’s Evolution of the CMDB deployment

On average it takes 12 – 18 months to get up and running.

Through 2011 enterprise should recognize that any of the CMDB tools bought today may require significant upgrades to offer near real time service views to support decision support analytics.

Several items from this presentation jump out at me:

1. IT Organizations need to deploy tools that will help to automate the continuous collection of IT asset inventory, configuration and business impact analysis. That is a big gap that exists in the marketplace today… the speed at which information is collected and updated into the CMDB.
2. Investing too much into this immature market before the official standards are set and then adopted by the industry (estimated 18 months after final adoption) is quite risky.

The conclusion that I made from this presentation is that you are better off with our 80 – 20 rule around CMDB’s. Use a tool that will collect 80% of what you need to operate the business in 20% of the time it takes to deploy these heavy, less than automated framework tools!

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