<![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: takes]]> http://securityratty.com/tag/takes Sun, 16 Nov 2008 21:00:00 +0000 iRatty Engine http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss <![CDATA[Stolen Credit Cards account for 59% of online criminal activity]]> http://securityratty.com/article/cffc479a20281b84d90e501e93ee3e5d http://securityratty.com/article/cffc479a20281b84d90e501e93ee3e5d Please dont become a statistic in this area.
Be careful online, make sure the site is safe and make sure your computer security products are up to date and functioning properly.
clipped from www.crime-research.org
Symantec takes cybercrime snapshot with ‘Underground Economy’ report

The “Underground Economy” report contains a snapshot of online criminal activity observed from July 2007 to June 2008 by a Symantec team monitoring activities in Internet Relay Chat (IRC) and Web-based forums where stolen goods are advertised. Symantec estimates the total value of the goods advertised on what it calls “underground servers” was about $276 million, with credit-card information accounting for 59% of the total.
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]]> Fri, 28 Nov 2008 13:09:24 +0000 online criminal activity underground economy report symantec symantec team computer security products calls underground servers internet relay chat credit-card information total Stolen Credit Cards account for 59% of online criminal activity <![CDATA[Forensic genomics]]> http://securityratty.com/article/db4fa79fc51e6d9290abb3a8fd263e3f http://securityratty.com/article/db4fa79fc51e6d9290abb3a8fd263e3f I recently presented a paper on Forensic genomics: kin privacy, driftnets and other open questions (co-authored with Lucia Bianchi, Pietro Liò and Douwe Korff) at WPES 2008, the Workshop for Privacy in the Electronic Society of ACM CCS, the ACM Computer and Communication Security conference. Pietro and I also gave a related talk here at the Computer Laboratory in Cambridge.

While genetics is concerned with the observation of specific sections of DNA, genomics is about studying the entire genome of an organism, something that has only become practically possible in recent years. In forensic genetics, which is the technology behind the large national DNA databases being built in several countries including notably UK and USA (Wallace’s outstanding article lucidly exposes many significant issues), investigators compare scene-of-crime samples with database samples by checking if they match, but only on a very small number of specific locations in the genome (e.g. 13 locations according to the CODIS rules). In our paper we explore what might change when forensic analysis moves from genetics to genomics over the next few decades. This is a problem that can only be meaningfully approached from a multi-disciplinary viewpoint and indeed our combined backgrounds cover computer security, bioinformatics and law.

CODIS markers
(Image from Wikimedia commons, in turn from NIST.)

Sequencing the first human genome (2003) cost 2.7 billion dollars and took 13 years. The US’s National Human Genome Research Institute has offered over 20 M$ worth of grants towards the goal of driving the cost of whole-genome sequencing down to a thousand dollars. This will enable personalized genomic medicine (e.g. predicting genetic risk of contracting specific diseases) but will also open up a number of ethical and privacy-related problems. Eugenetic abortions, genomic pre-screening as precondition for healthcare (or even just dating…), (mis)use of genomic data for purposes other than that for which it was collected and so forth. In various jurisdictions there exists legislation (such as the recent GINA in the US) that attempts to protect citizens from some of the possible abuses; but how strongly is it enforced? And is it enough? In the forensic context, is the DNA analysis procedure as infallible as we are led to believe? There are many subtleties associated with the interpretation of statistical results; when even professional statisticians disagree, how are the poor jurors expected to reach a fair verdict? Another subtle issue is kin privacy: if the scene-of-crime sample, compared with everyone in the database, partially matches Alice, this may be used as a hint to investigate all her relatives, who aren’t even in the database; indeed, some 1980s murders were recently solved in this way. “This raises compelling policy questions about the balance between collective security and individual privacy” [Bieber, Brenner, Lazer, 2006]. Should a democracy allow such a “driftnet” approach of suspecting and investigating all the innocents in order to catch the guilty?

This is a paper of questions rather than one of solutions. We believe an informed public debate is needed before the expected transition from genetics to genomics takes place. We want to stimulate discussion and therefore we invite you to read the paper, make up your mind and support what you believe are the right answers.

]]> Thu, 27 Nov 2008 12:58:58 +0000 genomics forensic genomics privacy individual privacy dna national dna databases genome whole-genome kin privacy Forensic genomics <![CDATA[Zermatt is now Geneva Framework]]> http://securityratty.com/article/ffdbf806596ce2b9eecd4ab50a7394dc http://securityratty.com/article/ffdbf806596ce2b9eecd4ab50a7394dc For those who didn't attend PDC, the Zermatt identity framework has been re-code-named Geneva Framework so that it fits in with the Geneva family of products:

Geneva Framework: a .NET class library called Microsoft.IdentityModel (basically it's an updated Zermatt)

Geneva Server: This is essentially ADFS v2, built on top of the Geneva Framework

Geneva CardSpace: This is CardSpace v2.

This link takes you to the "Geneva" landing page at Microsoft, where you'll find links to all of the bits, as well as the whitepaper v2. The new version of the whitepaper was co-authored by myself and a PM on the Geneva Framework team, Sesha Mani, who added a bunch of new details based on the PDC version of the framework.

]]> Wed, 26 Nov 2008 11:41:00 +0000 geneva geneva framework zermatt framework geneva family zermatt identity framework geneva cardspace cardspace geneva framework team Zermatt is now Geneva Framework <![CDATA[Localizing Cybercrime - Cultural Diversity on Demand Part Two]]> http://securityratty.com/article/6fa5c311a11504a21120c6a907e03041 http://securityratty.com/article/6fa5c311a11504a21120c6a907e03041
It's where you advertise your services, and how you position yourself that speak for your intentions, of course, "between the lines". There's a common misunderstanding that in order for a malware campaigner or scammer to launch a localized attack speaking the native language of their potential victims, they need to speak the local language. This misconception is largely based on the fact that a huge number of people remain unaware on how core strategic business practices have been in operation across the cybercrime underground for the last couple of years.

Outsourcing the localization process (translation services for spam/phishing/malware campaigns) has been happening for a while, courtsy of DIY servics ensuring complete anonymity of their customers. Interestingly, the translators may in fact be unaware that the advertising channels the service is using is directly attracting everyone from the bottom to the top of the cybercriminal food chain as a customer. Sometimes, it's services like this that open a new market segment covering an untapped opportunity, with this particular service already pointing out that it's charging cheaper than their competitors.

"We offer our services in translation. We are only competent translators profile higher education. Service is working with all types of texts. Languages available at this time of Russian, English, German. Average translation of the text takes up to 10 hours (usually much faster) through the full automation of the order and payment. Just want to note that we do not keep any logs on IP and does not require registration. In addition you can remove your order from the database after his execution. In addition to running more than 1000 translations already, we can use all the lessons learned to be more effective in our services. Prices vary depending on the complexity of the topic covered.

Prices and deadlines:
* Standard - the deadline is not more than 24 hours. Prices depend on the direction and guidance from the 'Order'. 
* Term - work on your translation begins precedence. The price of the 50% more than the standard translation. Prices also depend on the direction and guidance from the 'Order'.

The cost of the transfer depends on the amount of work. The workload is measured in symbols. In calculating the characters are shown letters and numbers. Punctuation do not count. Minimum order 100 characters."

I'm particularly curious how is a contractor(translator) going to react to a situation when a large scale malware campaign speaking several different languages tell a fake story that the contractor might have recently translated for them. With the employer positioning itself as a fully legitimate company, whereas its customers requesting localized version of texts for the spam/phishing/malware campaigns are the "usual suspects", the contractors would continue allowing cybercriminals the opportunity to build more authenticity within their campaigns.

Related posts:
E-crime and Socioeconomic Factors
MPack and IcePack Localized to Chinese
The Icepack Exploitation Kit Localized to French
The FirePack Exploitation Kit Localized to Chinese
Localizing Open Source Malware
Localized Fake Security Software
A Localized Bankers Malware Campaign
Lonely Polina's Secret (Localized malware campaign)
]]> Tue, 25 Nov 2008 05:55:21 +0000 translation standard translation average translation translation services malware campaign bankers malware campaign prices services prices vary Localizing Cybercrime - Cultural Diversity on Demand Part Two <![CDATA[Symantec takes cybercrime snapshot with 'Underground Economy' report]]> http://securityratty.com/article/1372806ad60aee438b9a56d4c8eebbfb http://securityratty.com/article/1372806ad60aee438b9a56d4c8eebbfb Sun, 23 Nov 2008 21:00:00 +0000 criminal market online credit cards financial accounts symantec report software information monday Symantec takes cybercrime snapshot with 'Underground Economy' report <![CDATA[Opinion: Obama's Blackberry Is No Security Threat]]> http://securityratty.com/article/e87ac9b85b1440c70317a2e3c99bc69a http://securityratty.com/article/e87ac9b85b1440c70317a2e3c99bc69a Add to digg Add to StumbleUpon Add to Twitter Add to Slashdot
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]]> Thu, 20 Nov 2008 02:00:00 +0000 national geographic channel takes office jan plain dumb continues tonight blackberry intrepid explorers expedition week discovery ancient pyramids Opinion: Obama's Blackberry Is No Security Threat <![CDATA[CISSPs Lend me your ears]]> http://securityratty.com/article/2f51be6dbed18127b772146d8ca86adc http://securityratty.com/article/2f51be6dbed18127b772146d8ca86adc Art of Information Security endorses Dan Houser for (ISC)² Board of Directors

The CISSP is undoubtably one of the most, if not the most, important professional certifications in Information Security. Many organizations and practitioners rely on it as evidence of a solid foundation and track record in Information Security. But the CISSP is only one of the many ways that the (ISC)² attempts to fulfill its mission of developing the Information Security profession.

Board membership is a role of governance, guidance, and passion. Let’s briefly explore how Dan’s track record and past contributions demonstrate his qualification for this post, and possibly your vote.

Passion

Dan is someone who has a passion for promoting and developing the talent needed to continue to grow and mature our profession. Anyone who has seen Dan speak at conferences, local chapter meetings, or in one of his classes knows how passionate Dan is! But anyone who takes the time to approach him knows that he is no ideologue or zealot; Dan is always interested in improving his own understanding, and then sharing that knowledge with others.

Dan has a long track record as a contributor - as a “giver” - to the profession. In addition to teaching over a dozen CISSP review courses, he has also served on multiple (ISC)² committees, is one of the authors of the ISSAP Body of Knowledge (cryptography), and has published primary research on professional certifications. He is also the founder of the monthly Columbus, Ohio Information Security MBA (Masters of Beer Appreciation) meeting - a professional roundtable that attracts practitioners from across the state.

Governance and Guidance 

In addition to past experience serving on (ISC)² committees, which I assume led to the current board’s nomination, Dan has served on numerous Boards of Directors including local and regional community organizations, ISSA chapters,and several Toastmasters clubs. 

Personal Experiences

I have known Dan for almost three yeas. Dan and I have collaborated on a number or projects, including a half-day Cryptographic Controls Seminar and a full-day Identity Management Architecture class. It is my feeling that when you collaborate, work closely, and travel with someone, you really get to know them. You get to do more than hear about their College Sweethearts (which, for Dan, is Rebecca, his wife of 21 years), but you also get to understand their ethics, how they really conduct themselves, how they deal with stress, etc.

Given the entire picture, the understanding that I have of Dan Houser, I can think of no one better suited to representing, guiding and developing the (ISC)². I have voted for Dan, and I hope that you will consider doing the same.

Here is the voting link for (ISC)²: https://webportal.isc2.org/custom/votenow.aspx

Cheers, Erik

CISSPs… Lend me your ears…

]]> Tue, 18 Nov 2008 01:15:31 +0000 dan dan houser dan foralmostthree yeas dans track record information security track record information security profession isc profession CISSPs Lend me your ears <![CDATA[It's all about getting the job done, unfortunately]]> http://securityratty.com/article/6028d5bb121d67465c28c3635c2c899d http://securityratty.com/article/6028d5bb121d67465c28c3635c2c899d Mon, 17 Nov 2008 10:09:00 +0000 users managers expect users bad behavior performance levels human expectations provide takes alternative It's all about getting the job done, unfortunately <![CDATA[Attacks On Banks]]> http://securityratty.com/article/788a3c9a82e042e1d445b41303e5e129 http://securityratty.com/article/788a3c9a82e042e1d445b41303e5e129 Mon, 17 Nov 2008 03:15:09 +0000 attack financial institutions malicious programs banks cyber criminals reviews overview trends takes article Attacks On Banks <![CDATA[Events per Second the difference between a target and an assurance]]> http://securityratty.com/article/f9815504814bde06b74afe918ec8d827 http://securityratty.com/article/f9815504814bde06b74afe918ec8d827 We’ve been getting a good few questions recently about how many Events Per Second a SIEM product support. Well, that depends on a few factors:

  • The transport – processing Syslog events takes up a heck of a lot less processing power than collecting from a Windows box. Same with collecting data over an ODBC connection.
]]> Sun, 16 Nov 2008 21:00:00 +0000 events syslog events takes siem product support windows box questions recently odbc connection lot transport data Events per Second the difference between a target and an assurance