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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: tapes]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/tapes</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 10 Jun 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Stampede Death at Wal-Mart]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a5436ad4dbabae1cfd63a3bda7bfbafd</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a5436ad4dbabae1cfd63a3bda7bfbafd</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The death of a Wal-Mart employee on Black Friday in New York should never have been allowed to happen

The Police are said to be reviewing tapes to see if they can identify who was responsible for...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The death of a Wal-Mart employee on Black Friday in New York should never have been allowed to happen.<br /><span id="fullpost"><br />The Police are said to be reviewing tapes to see if they can identify who was responsible for trampling the poor man to death.  What will that achieve?  Obviously it was not done on purpose.  The findings are bound to result in an "accidental death" determination. <br /></span><br />Getting back to; who is responsible?  I think that is quite clear.  Wal-Mart has to accept responsibility.  UNLESS...they really did hire an outside security company and the employees of that company did such a poor job organizing that mob of "door busters", that they lost control of the situation.<br /><br />One thing is a given.  The family of the employee who lost his life is bound to bring a civil law suit against Wal-Mart.  If I were them, the first thing I would look to find out would be who(if anyone)was providing security on Thanksgiving night outside of the front door?  <br /><br />Unfortunately, many clients do not take the function of security very seriously and they delegate the responsibility to those with no security training or experience.  We have consulted for clients at arenas and found that ordinary ushers will be given a fluorescent vest or jacket with "SECURITY" written on the back and asked to provide security.  This is a libility claim waiting to be filed.<br /><br />If Wal-Mart did in fact outsource their security to an outside company, was the company allowed to provide an adequate number of officers to ensure that shoppers lined up in an orderly fashion?  One security officer to a couple of hundred people is another liability suit waiting to be filed.<br /><br />Next, they should be looking at the training that the security officers (Wal-Mart better hope that shelve stockers were not given the task)receieved.  Because it was Thanksgiving night, there is the possibility that the company couldn't get anybody else to work and used untrained and inexperienced personnel.  If that turns out to be the case, hopefully the company was legal and had adequate insurance coverage.<br /><br />Whatever happens regarding a civil law suit, one thing will remain unchanged.  A man lost his life in an incident that should have been prevented.  It is obvious that not everything was done to ensure the safety of the shoppers who traditonally lined up to get the best bargains when the store opened on "Black Friday".<br /><br />Whether it was Wal-Mart or the security company who may have been hired to prevent this very incident from happening - somebody failed to do their job. Whichever one it was, they should step up to the plate and apologize to the grieving family for letting them down.<div class="blogger-post-footer">Visit Sexton Executive Security at www.sextonsecurity.com</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Dec 2008 01:12:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/provide">provide</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/provide security">provide security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security company">security company</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wal-mart">wal-mart</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/company">company</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security officers">security officers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wal-mart employee">wal-mart employee</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/death">death</category>
      <source url="http://www.thebulletproofblog.com/2008/11/stampede-death-at-walmart.html">Stampede Death at Wal-Mart</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[A New Way to Back Up Digital Files on paper]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f29b43ae964909cbeacf815e65f8018e</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f29b43ae964909cbeacf815e65f8018e</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[This is pretty funny a free open source application where you can backup your data by printing it, on paper, in a bar code format. A friend of mine says he tried it and that it even works
PaperBack is...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is pretty funny &#8212; a free open source application where you can backup your data by printing it, on paper, in a bar code format. A friend of mine says he tried it and that it even works &#8211;</p>
<blockquote><p>PaperBack is a free application that allows you to back up your precious files on the ordinary paper in the form of the oversized bitmaps. If you have a good laser printer with the 600 dpi resolution, you can save up to 500,000 bytes of uncompressed data on the single A4/Letter sheet. Integrated packer allows for much better data density - up to 3,000,000+ (three megabytes) of C code per page.</p>
<p>You may ask - why? Why, for heaven&#8217;s sake, do I need to make paper backups, if there are so many alternative possibilities like CD-R&#8217;s, DVD±R&#8217;s, memory sticks, flash cards, hard disks, streamer tapes, ZIP drives, network storages, magnetooptical cartridges, and even 8-inch double-sided floppy disks formatted for DEC PDP-11? (I still have some). The answer is simple: you don&#8217;t. However, by looking on CD or magnetic tape, you are not able to tell whether your data is readable or not. You must insert your medium into the drive (if you have one!) and try to read it.</p>
<p>Paper is different. Do you remember the punched cards? EBCDIC and all this stuff. For years, cards were the main storage medium for the source code. I agree that 100K+ programs were&#8230; unhandly, but hey, only real programmers dared to write applications of this size. And used cards were good as notepads, too. Punched tapes were also common. And even the most weird codings, like CDC or EBCDIC, were readable by humans (I mean, by real programmers).</p></blockquote>
<p>Read the <a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="http://www.ollydbg.de/Paperbak/index.html">whole thing here.<br />
</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 04 Sep 2008 04:28:19 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/paper">paper</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/code">code</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/source code">source code</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/paper backups">paper backups</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/real programmers dared">real programmers dared</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data density">data density</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/real programmers">real programmers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/flash cards">flash cards</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/itsecurity/~3/383345885/">A New Way to Back Up Digital Files on paper</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Again, On Laptops and US Borders]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2bd5c499e76fb2d415311b593b194e2f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2bd5c499e76fb2d415311b593b194e2f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers can confiscate and detain travelers' laptops at the U.S. border without suspicion of...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA["According to the <a href="http://www.dhs.gov/index.shtm" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">U.S. Department of Homeland Security</a> (DHS), Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers can confiscate and detain travelers' laptops at the U.S. border <span style="font-weight: bold;">without suspicion of wrongdoing. </span>Laptops can be taken to an off-site location for an undisclosed period of time, during which officials may examine the computer's contents and share copies of files with other agencies. This policy applies to any other form of digital or analog storage device, including iPods, cell phones, flash drives, hard drives, and tapes." (<a href="http://www.smartertravel.com/blogs/today-in-travel/your-laptop-may-be-detained-at-border.html?id=2644757&amp;source=rss_today-in-travel">source</a>)<br /><br />"The key to the above paragraph, of course, is "without suspicion of wrongdoing." Indeed, in the <a href="http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/travel/admissability/search_authority.ctt/search_authority.pdf" target="_blank">policy</a> (PDF), DHS says (emphasis mine), "In the course of a border search, and <em>absent individualized suspicion</em>, officers can review and analyze the information transported by any individual attempting to enter, reenter, depart, pass through, or reside in the United States."" (<a href="http://www.smartertravel.com/blogs/today-in-travel/your-laptop-may-be-detained-at-border.html?id=2644757&amp;source=rss_today-in-travel">source</a>)<br /><br />Fun question that was brought by someone on a security mailing list: <span style="font-style: italic;">if your employer-owned laptop is "captured" by DHS, TSA or Customs AND it has regulated information on it (CCs, SSNs, PHUI, etc), do you have to report it as "data loss"?</span>  The chances of that info being lost are definitely much, much higher now AND the control over such data is clearly not in your hands anymore... Niiiiice.<div class="blogger-post-footer">About me: http://www.chuvakin.org</div><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=HfDTPK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=HfDTPK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=0fuf5K"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=0fuf5K" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=RHgWqK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=RHgWqK" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~4/363162188" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2008 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/border protection">border protection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/laptops">laptops</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/border">border</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data loss">data loss</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/homeland security">homeland security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/analog storage device">analog storage device</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/policy applies">policy applies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/suspicion">suspicion</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/363162188/again-on-laptops-and-us-borders.html">Again, On Laptops and US Borders</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[U.S. Government Policy for Seizing Laptops at Borders]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/644821439b7605896de17d8ca6d3a3de</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/644821439b7605896de17d8ca6d3a3de</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Amazing. The U.S. government has published its policy : they can take you laptop anywhere they want, for as long as they want, and share the information with anyone they want
Here's the actual policy:...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Amazing.  The U.S. government has <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/01/AR2008080103030.html">published its policy</a>: they can take you laptop anywhere they want, for as long as they want, and share the information with anyone they want.</p>

<p><a href="http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/travel/admissability/search_authority.ctt/search_authority.pdf">Here's</a> the actual policy:</p>

<blockquote>Federal agents may take a traveler's laptop or other electronic device to an off-site location for an unspecified period of time without any suspicion of wrongdoing, as part of border search policies the Department of Homeland Security recently disclosed. Also, officials may share copies of the laptop's contents with other agencies and private entities for language translation, data decryption, or other reasons, according to the policies, dated July 16 and issued by two DHS agencies, US Customs and Border Protection and US Immigration and Customs Enforcement... DHS officials said that the newly disclosed policies — which apply to anyone entering the country, including US citizens — are reasonable and necessary to prevent terrorism... The policies cover 'any device capable of storing information in digital or analog form,' including hard drives, flash drives, cell phones, iPods, pagers, beepers, and video and audio tapes. They also cover 'all papers and other written documentation,' including books, pamphlets and 'written materials commonly referred to as "pocket trash..."</blockquote>

<p>It's not the policy that's amazing; it's the fact that the government has actually made it public.</p>

<p>Slashdot <a href="http://yro.slashdot.org/yro/08/08/01/0958242.shtml">thread</a>.  My previous <a href="http://www.schneier.com/essay-217.html">essay</a> on crossing borders with laptops, and how to protect yourself.</p>

<p>Although honestly, the best thing is probably to keep your encrypted archives on some network drive somewhere, and download what you need after you cross the border.</p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=xpja3K"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=xpja3K" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=vWPUNK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=vWPUNK" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Aug 2008 08:21:25 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/policy">policy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cover">cover</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/policies cover">policies cover</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/policies">policies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/actual policy">actual policy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/government">government</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/border protection">border protection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/border">border</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/laptop">laptop</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/08/us_government_p.html">U.S. Government Policy for Seizing Laptops at Borders</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Do You Speak E-Discovery? You Should, Even in Europe]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/83b90f1f212111ff6dbba328b609d249</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/83b90f1f212111ff6dbba328b609d249</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[How often have you watched the news on television and seen people carrying boxes full of electronic media and digital files out of some well-known company's headquarters? It's a familiar scene in the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[How often have you watched the news on television and seen people carrying boxes full of electronic media and digital files out of some well-known company's headquarters? It's a familiar scene in the United States, because of the number of companies subject to e-discovery actions. But even though this subject is disturbing the sleep of CIOs in companies large and small in the U.S. - and even though vendors of tools supporting e-discovery are all looking for the next "killer app" - most Europeans just look on and say, "What on earth is this 'e-discovery'?"<br />
<br />
The concept of legal discovery (called "e-discovery" when electronic information is involved) is unique to the "common law" countries - notably the U.S., the U.K., Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Discovery in common-law civil litigation is a form of interrogatory in which both parties agree to the pretrial exchange of information, so that the plaintiff can prosecute a cause for action and the defendant can build a defense. By contrast, in countries with legal systems based on the Roman or Napoleonic traditions - which is to say, most of continental Europe - the obligation to produce information that is relevant to the cause for action is nowhere as comprehensive as the obligation attached to discovery in common law.<br />
<br />
There is an important difference between criminal and civil litigation, irrespective of a country's legal system. In a criminal case, if the authorities have a warrant or an indictment, the subject is obligated to produce relevant information, and this is true both in common-law countries and in continental Europe. In civil litigation, however, only common law requires the pretrial production of information and its exchange between affected parties. In non-common-law civil litigation, the relevant information is produced before the judge for consideration and evaluation.<br />
<br />
Despite these differences, there are some important lessons for all Europeans about e-discovery and about legal discovery in general. The first is that if an external party demands information, whether during civil or criminal proceedings, it pays to deliver that information quickly. Gartner has seen many cases where enterprises simply didn't know how to find the requested information or couldn't produce it for several days - just long enough to generate some damaging media coverage.<br />
<br />
The second lesson: It also pays to be able to deliver precisely the information requested. Law enforcement officers may seize folders and binders, disks and tapes, files and e-mails, reports and logs - anything they can get their hands on, really. This may include information that is not relevant to the case, and it may include information that is highly sensitive. This information will be reviewed, processed and analyzed, and some of this sensitive information might leak to the public or to competitors. It's much better to be prepared to hand over just the requested and required information.<br />
<br />
The e-discovery landscape is made even more confusing by international jurisdictional differences. In the global economy, a business relationship with an entity in the U.S. is becoming more the rule than the exception. But a company's duty to release information following a U.S. legal discovery claim - for example, for a European subsidiary - and how that would be seen in relation with European privacy legislation remain unclear at best. E-discovery rules require quick delivery of information that has not been tampered with, but privacy protection requires that personal data be removed first.<br />
<br />
E-discovery simply does not exist in most European legal systems, but European companies would be well-advised to familiarize themselves with the concept, in case an e-discovery claim originates elsewhere. Companies that have processes and automation for information archiving and retrieval, document and records management, and a retention policy (including disposal when information is no longer needed) will be well-prepared for any e-discovery claims that arise.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 24 Jul 2008 08:05:25 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/e-discovery">e-discovery</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/e-discovery simply">e-discovery simply</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/e-discovery actions">e-discovery actions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sensitive information">sensitive information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/include information">include information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/discovery">discovery</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/produce relevant information">produce relevant information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/e-discovery claims">e-discovery claims</category>
      <source url="http://blog.gartner.com/blog/security.php?x=0&amp;itemid=3732">Do You Speak E-Discovery? You Should, Even in Europe</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Assessing the Security Benefits of Cloud Computing]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/1e09e5c89f15d3a4df4ea921f9230c2d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/1e09e5c89f15d3a4df4ea921f9230c2d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[With all this talk and reporting about security concerns, lets change the channel for a moment and assess the potential security benefits of Cloud Computing
In my view, there are some strong technical...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a title="Is the glass half empty or half full?" href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/94094843@N00/2292559560/" target="_blank"><img class="alignright" style="border: 0; float: right; margin: 3px;" src="http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3004/2292559560_378f226531_m.jpg" border="0" alt="Is the glass half empty or half full?" /></a></p>
<p>With all this <a href="http://cloudsecurity.org">talk</a> and <a href="http://www.gartner.com/DisplayDocument?id=685308">reporting</a> about security concerns, lets change the channel for a moment and assess the <strong>potential security benefits</strong> of Cloud Computing.</p>
<p>In my view, there are some strong technical security arguments in favour of Cloud Computing - assuming we can find ways to manage the risks.</p>
<p>With this new paradigm come challenges <strong>and </strong>opportunities.  The challenges are getting plenty of attention - I&#8217;m regularly afforded the opportunity to <a href="http://www.gridtoday.com/grid/2422309.html">comment</a> on them, plus obviously I cover them on this blog.  However, lets not lose sight of the potential upside.</p>
<p>In this post, I walk through seven technical security benefits.  Some are immediate, others may arise over time and have conditions attached (some unstated for the sake of brevity).  However, I&#8217;m including the longer-range benefits now to raise awareness.  Some of the outcomes listed are available today without the Cloud, but they are either complex and slow to implement (and thus less likely to happen) or prohibitive for capital cost reasons.  I don&#8217;t claim this is a definitive list - it reflects where my thinking is today.</p>
<p>Some benefits depend on the Cloud service used and therefore do not apply across the board.  For example; I see no solid forensic benefits with SaaS.  Also, for space reasons, I&#8217;m purposely not including the &#8216;flip side&#8217; to these benefits, however if you read this blog regularly you should <a href="http://cloudsecurity.org/2008/04/24/cloud-stacks-please-mind-the-gap/">recognise some</a>.</p>
<p>On a sidenote, I believe the Cloud offers Small and Medium Businesses major potential security benefits.  Frequently SMBs struggle with limited or non-existent in-house INFOSEC resources and budgets.  The caveat is that the Cloud market is still very new - security offerings are somewhat foggy - making selection tricky.  Clearly, not all Cloud providers will offer the same security.</p>
<h4>Seven Technical Security Benefits of the Cloud</h4>
<h4>1. Centralised Data</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Reduced Data Leakage</strong>: this is the benefit I hear most from Cloud providers - and in my view they are right.  How many laptops do we need to lose before we get this?  How many backup tapes?  The data &#8220;landmines&#8221; of today could be greatly reduced by the Cloud as thin client technology becomes prevalent.  Small, temporary caches on handheld devices or Netbook computers pose less risk than transporting data buckets in the form of laptops.  Ask the CISO of any large company if all laptops have company &#8216;mandated&#8217; controls consistently applied; e.g. full disk encryption.  You&#8217;ll see the answer by looking at the whites of their eyes.  Despite best efforts around asset management and endpoint security we continue to see embarrassing and disturbing misses.  And what about SMBs?  How many use encryption for sensitive data, or even have a data classification policy in place?</li>
<li><strong>Monitoring benefits</strong>: central storage is easier to control and monitor.  The flipside is the nightmare scenario of <a href="http://www.gnucitizen.org/blog/most-attractive-targets-saas/">comprehensive data theft</a>.  However, I would rather spend my time as a security professional figuring out smart ways to protect and monitor access to data stored in one place (with the benefit of situational advantage) than trying to figure out all the places where the company data resides across a myriad of thick clients!  You can get the benefits of Thin Clients today but Cloud Storage provides a way to centralise the data faster and potentially cheaper.  The logistical challenge today is getting Terabytes of data to the Cloud in the first place.</li>
</ul>
<h4>2. Incident Response / Forensics</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Forensic readiness</strong>: with Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) providers, I can build a dedicated forensic server in the same Cloud as my company and place it offline, ready for use when needed.  I would only need pay for storage until an incident happens and I need to bring it online.  I don&#8217;t need to call someone to bring it online or install some kind of remote boot software - I just click a button in the Cloud Providers web interface.  If I have multiple incident responders, I can give them a copy of the VM so we can distribute the forensic workload based on the job at hand or as new sources of evidence arise and need analysis.  To fully realise this benefit, commercial forensic software vendors would need to move away from archaic, physical dongle based licensing schemes to a network licensing model.</li>
<li><strong>Decrease evidence acquisition time</strong>: if a server in the Cloud gets compromised (i.e. broken into), I can now clone that server at the click of a mouse and make the cloned disks instantly available to my Cloud Forensics server.  I didn&#8217;t need to &#8220;find&#8221; storage or have it &#8220;ready, waiting and unused&#8221; - its just there.</li>
<li><strong>Eliminate or reduce service downtime</strong>: Note that in the above scenario I didn&#8217;t have to go tell the COO that the system needs to be taken offline for hours whilst I dig around in the RAID Array hoping that my physical acqusition toolkit is compatible (and that the version of RAID firmware isn&#8217;t supported by my forensic software).  Abstracting the hardware removes a barrier to even doing forensics in some situations.</li>
<li><strong>Decrease evidence transfer time</strong>: In the same Cloud, bit fot bit copies are super fast - made faster by that replicated, distributed filesystem my Cloud provider engineered for me.  From a network traffic perspective, it may even be free to make the copy in the same Cloud.  Without the Cloud, <strong>I </strong>would have to a lot of time consuming and expensive provisioning of physical devices.  I only pay for the storage as long as I need the evidence.</li>
<li><strong>Eliminate forensic image verification time</strong>: Some Cloud Storage implementations expose a cryptographic checksum or hash.  For example, Amazon S3 generates an MD5 hash <a href="http://docs.amazonwebservices.com/AmazonS3/2006-03-01/index.html?RESTObjectPUT.html">automagically</a> when you store an object.  In theory you no longer need to generate time-consuming MD5 checksums using external tools - its already there.</li>
<li><strong>Decrease time to access protected documents</strong>: Immense CPU power opens some doors.  Did the suspect password protect a document that is relevant to the investigation?  You can now test a wider range of candidate passwords in less time to speed investigations.</li>
</ul>
<h4>3. Password assurance testing (aka cracking)</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Decrease password cracking time</strong>: if your organisation regularly tests password strength by running password crackers you can use Cloud Compute to decrease crack time and you only pay for what you use.  Ironically, your cracking costs go up as people choose better passwords ;-).</li>
<li><strong>Keep cracking activities to dedicated machines</strong>: if today you use a distributed password cracker to spread the load across non-production machines, you can now put those agents in dedicated Compute instances - and thus stop mixing sensitive credentials with other workloads.</li>
</ul>
<h4>4. Logging</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>&#8220;Unlimited&#8221;, pay per drink storage</strong>: logging is often an afterthought, consequently insufficient disk space is allocated and logging is either non-existant or minimal.  Cloud Storage changes all this - no more &#8216;guessing&#8217; how much storage you need for standard logs.</li>
<li><strong>Improve log indexing and search</strong>: with your logs in the Cloud you can leverage Cloud Compute to index those logs in real-time and get the benefit of <a href="http://blogs.splunk.com/thewilde/2008/06/24/splunk-ninja-inside-the-cloud/">instant search results.</a> What is different here?  The Compute instances can be plumbed in and scale as needed based on the logging load - meaning a true real-time view.</li>
<li><strong>Getting compliant with Extended logging</strong>: most modern operating systems offer extended logging in the form of a C2 audit trail.  This is rarely enabled for fear of performance degradation and log size.  Now you can &#8216;opt-in&#8217; easily - if you are willing to pay for the enhanced logging, you can do so.  Granular logging makes compliance and investigations easier.</li>
</ul>
<h4>5. Improve the state of security software (performance)</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Drive vendors to create more efficient security software</strong>: Billable CPU cycles get noticed.  More attention will be paid to inefficient processes; e.g. poorly tuned security agents.  Process accounting will make a comeback as customers target &#8216;expensive&#8217; processes.  Security vendors that understand how to squeeze the most performance from their software will win.</li>
</ul>
<h4>6. Secure builds</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Pre-hardened, change control builds</strong>: this is primarily a benefit of virtualization based Cloud Computing.  Now you get a chance to start &#8217;secure&#8217; (by your own definition) - you create your Gold Image VM and clone away.  There are ways to do this today with bare-metal OS installs but frequently these require additional 3rd party tools, are time consuming to clone or add yet another agent to each endpoint.</li>
<li><strong>Reduce exposure through patching offline</strong>: Gold images can be kept up securely kept up to date.  Offline VMs can be conveniently patched &#8220;off&#8221; the network.</li>
<li><strong>Easier to test impact of security changes</strong>: this is a big one.  Spin up a copy of your production environment, implement a security change and test the impact at low cost, with minimal startup time.  This is a big deal and removes a major barrier to &#8216;doing&#8217; security in production environments.</li>
</ul>
<h4>7. Security Testing</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Reduce cost of testing security: </strong>a SaaS provider only passes on a portion of their security testing costs.  By sharing the same application as a service, you don&#8217;t foot the expensive security code review and/or penetration test.  Even with Platform as a Service (PaaS) where your developers get to write code, there are potential cost economies of scale (particularly around use of code scanning tools that sweep source code for security weaknesses).</li>
</ul>
<h4>Your Thoughts?</h4>
<p>What benefits do you see that I haven&#8217;t included in the above list?  Where do you agree/disagree and importantly, why?</p>
<img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/CloudSecurity/~4/341289594" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jul 2008 03:00:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/benefits">benefits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cloud">cloud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/technical security benefits">technical security benefits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/based">based</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization based cloud">virtualization based cloud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/efficient security software">efficient security software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security software">security software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cloud market">cloud market</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/CloudSecurity/~3/341289594/">Assessing the Security Benefits of Cloud Computing</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Backup tape is stolen from Bristol-Myers Squibb]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/911478f22f756b8e8513c59d7f720d18</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/911478f22f756b8e8513c59d7f720d18</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
7/17/08

Organization
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (&quot;BMS

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
Unknown

Victims
Current and former employees and some dependants
...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/bms.jpg" width="198" align="right" height="160"><font size="2"><b>Date Reported: </b><br>7/17/08<br><br><b>Organization: </b><br><a href="http://www.bms.com/landing/data/index.html">Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. ("BMS")</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br>Unknown<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>Current and former employees and some dependants<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>Unknown*<br><br><font size="1">*Bristol-Myers Squibb had "about 42,000 employees as of Dec. 31, the last date for which work force figures were available in regulatory filings.", Source: <a href="http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articles/djf500/200807171514DOWJONESDJONLINE000844_FORTUNE5.htm">CNN Money</a></font> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>"name, address, date of birth, Social Security number, marital status, gender, salary, hire date, termination date, retirement date, and, in some instances bank account information"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"On June 4, 2008, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company ("BMS") learned that a back-up data tape containing BMS-related data was stolen while it was being transported for storage.&nbsp; Through subsequent forensic work, it was determined that the data tape included personal information of current and former BMS employees"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://www.pharmalot.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/bms_letter.pdf">Pharmalot (copy of notification letter)</a> <br><a href="http://www.pharmalot.com/2008/07/bristol-myers-security-breach-hits-untold-thousands/">Pharmalot</a> <br><a href="http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articles/djf500/200807171514DOWJONESDJONLINE000844_FORTUNE5.htm">CNNMoney</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>Ed Silverman, Pharmalot<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online sources cited above:<br><br>The drugmaker sent letters over the past week saying a data tape containing reams of personal information was stolen several weeks ago<br><br>On June 4, 2008, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company ("BMS") learned that a back-up data tape containing BMS-related data was stolen while it was being transported for storage. <br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] This statement prompted me to list the contractor as "unknown" instead of "none".&nbsp; I presume that the data tape was being transported by a third-party vendor when it was stolen.&nbsp; I am looking for more information on this.</span><br><br>Through subsequent forensic work, it was determined that the data tape included personal information of current and former BMS employees, such as name, address, date of birth, Social Security number, marital status, gender, salary, hire date, termination date, retirement date, and, in some instances, bank account information.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Ugh, this looks like very sensitive HR and benefits data.</span><br><br>The names, addresses, and Social Security numbers of some employee dependents also were included on the tape.<br><br>an untold number of current and former employees - and their dependents - could be affected<br><br>BMS has initiated an investigation of this incident.<br><br>To date, BMS has no reason to believe that any of your personal information has been inappropriately accessed from the data tape by an unauthorized party, or that any identity theft, fraud or misuse of your personal information has occurred.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I agree with most of this statement except for the "misuse" part.&nbsp; There may be no evidence of misuse post stolen tape, but there may be an argument for misuse by BMS themselves.&nbsp; BMS is the data custodian in this scenario, not the data owner.&nbsp; If a data custodian does not care for the owner's information in a manner that is expected or communicated, does it constitute misuse?</span><br><br>In addition, there is no evidence that the data tape or the information contained on it was the target of the theft.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I am interested in knowing more about who was transporting the tape and whether or not other items were taken.</span><br><br>As a precaution, to help you detect any possible misuse of your data, BMS has arranged for you to enroll in credit monitoring for one full year, at no cost to you.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] There is that "misuse" mention again.&nbsp; One year of free credit monitoring does nothing to protect a victim against fraud that occurs after one year, supposing the victim does not renew at his/her own expense.&nbsp; I wonder how many people renew on average.</span><br><br>If you have any questions, you may call the dedicated Privacy Help Line at 1-877-214-0689.&nbsp; Our representatives will be available to assist you Monday through Friday, between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m. ET.<br><br>the drugmaker is issuing this statement: "Bristol-Myers Squibb regrets that this incident occurred and is committed to providing appropriate assistance for affected individuals who had their personal information on the stolen data tape. We are committed to protecting the privacy and security of employee and dependent information. Maintaining the trust and confidence of our employees is paramount to Bristol-Myers Squibb."<br><br>Protecting the privacy and security of your information is extremely important to us.<br><br>In this regard, BMS wishes to reiterate that it does not have any evidence indicating that your personal information has been misused.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Another "misuse" mention.</span><br><br>the company is taking appropriate remedial steps, including enhancing security protocols regarding the handling of personal information and our back-up data tapes.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Like what? Encryption maybe?</span><br><br>On behalf of BMS, I apologize for any inconvenience or concern that this matter may cause for you.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>I couldn't find any mention about encryption or whether or not police were called.&nbsp; You would think that a large, well-repected company like Bristol-Myers Squibb encrypts confidential data on tape, right? <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>Unknown<br></font><br>
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      <pubDate>Fri, 18 Jul 2008 07:26:26 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tape">tape</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/back-up data tape">back-up data tape</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data tape">data tape</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/owner">owner</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data owner">data owner</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bristol-myers squibb">bristol-myers squibb</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/07/18/bms.aspx">Backup tape is stolen from Bristol-Myers Squibb</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[A backup tape is stolen from Greensboro Gynecology Associates]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/50667ca11f139e2009a7776a17ed3db5</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/50667ca11f139e2009a7776a17ed3db5</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
7/15/08

Organization
Greensboro Gynecology Associates

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
None

Victims
Physicians, staff members, and patients

Number...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/gga.jpg" width="70" align="right" height="70"><font size="2"><b>Date Reported: </b><br>7/15/08<br><br><b>Organization: </b><br><a href="http://www.greensborogynassoc.medem.com/">Greensboro Gynecology Associates</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br>None<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>Physicians, staff members, and patients<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>Unknown<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>"names, addresses, Social Security numbers, employers, insurance companies, policy numbers and family members"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"GREENSBORO - Patients at a Greensboro doctors’ office have been notified that their personal information - including Social Security numbers and addresses - was stolen in May."<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://www.news-record.com/content/2008/07/15/article/security_breach_puts_patients_of_greensboro_gynecology_at_risk">News &amp; Record</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>Ryan Seals, News &amp; Record<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online source cited above:<br><br>In a letter mailed to patients, Greensboro Gynecology Associates said a backup tape of their computer database was stolen.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Does "their computer database" include billing information and other confidential information other than personally identifiable information?</span><br style="font-style: italic;"><br>The letter was dated June 16, but some letters weren't postmarked until July 9.<br><br>The medical practice said a backup tape of patient information was stolen on May 29 from an employee who was taking the tape to an off-site storage facility for safekeeping.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I wonder what type of off-site storage facility.&nbsp; Some of the small businesses that I have encountered consider an employee's home to be an "off-site" storage facility.</span><br style="font-style: italic;"><br>The stolen information included patients' name, address, Social Security number, employer, insurance company, policy numbers and family members.<br><br>The tape did not include treatment or specific medical data.<br><br>"We are very concerned about this theft, as we too are victims," Pat Higgins, the practice's administrator, wrote in an e-mail Tuesday. "We are notifying our present and former patients. ..."<br><br>The practice at 719 Green Valley Road Suite 305 said personal information for its physicians and other staff members also was on the stolen tape.<br><br>the case is under investigation<br><br>did not respond to inquiries about how many patients were affected, how the theft occurred and whether anything else was taken<br><br>The practice's letter said the theft had been reported to police. However, officials with the Greensboro Police Department and the Guilford County Sheriff's Office said they had no such report on file.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] This is interesting news.</span><br><br>The data was not encrypted, but Greensboro Gynecology Associates said the stolen data isn't likely to be accessed.<br><br>"We have consulted with several computer security experts, and they have advised it is highly unlikely the tapes can be accessed because of the program used and the language (the information) is written in," according to a recording on a hotline set up to address patients' concerns.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Who are these several computer security "experts'?&nbsp; I hate to disagree, but...&nbsp; The assessment is based on "the program used and the language" that the archived information is written in.&nbsp; Really?&nbsp; How hard is it to obtain the necessary hardware and software to access the information?&nbsp; Someone interested in accessing the tape could conceivably flip the data protection tab on the tape (to prevent data corruption through inadvertent writes), download some of the more popular backup software programs, buy a compatible drive (stolen or on eBay), and go to town.&nbsp; Couldn't they?&nbsp; Backup Exec is a very popular backup program.&nbsp; Anyone can download a 60-day trial for free.&nbsp; More talented professionals have even more sophisticated methods of accessing data on tape. </span><br style="font-style: italic;"><br>Greensboro Gynecology Associates said they are consulting with computer security experts to prevent similar thefts in the future.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I kind of hope that they are not consulting with the same computer security "experts" referenced above.</span><br style="font-style: italic;"><br>"We sincerely regret and apologize that this incident occurred," the letter said<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>Many backup software solutions include the option to encrypt the written data built-in.&nbsp; Why not use it?<br><br>Greensboro Gynecology Associates has established a hotline for concerned patients.&nbsp; The phone number is (336) 544-4590.&nbsp;&nbsp; The hotline asks patients to leave their name and telephone number for a staff member to return their call. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>Unknown<br></font><br>
<script src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/%7Es/breachblog?i=http://breachblog.com/2008/07/16/gga.aspx" type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8"></script>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 16 Jul 2008 12:16:26 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/greensboro gynecology">greensboro gynecology</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/greensboro">greensboro</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tape">tape</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/backup tape">backup tape</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/specific medical data">specific medical data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer security">computer security</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/07/16/gga.aspx">A backup tape is stolen from Greensboro Gynecology Associates</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[2.2 million billing records missing on stolen backup tape]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5c8436d56efb6533033af7a1ca7f75d9</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5c8436d56efb6533033af7a1ca7f75d9</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
6/10/08

Organization
University of Utah

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
University of Utah Hospitals &amp; Clinics
Perpetual Storage, Inc

Victims
Patients
...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/uhc.jpg" align="right" height="49" width="201"><font size="2"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Date Reported: </span><br>6/10/08<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Organization: </span><br><a href="http://www.utah.edu/portal/site/uuhome/">University of Utah</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br><a href="http://healthcare.utah.edu/index.cfm">University of Utah Hospitals &amp; Clinics</a> <br><a href="http://www.perpetualstorage.com/index_home.htm">Perpetual Storage, Inc.</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>Patients<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>"approximately 2.2 million"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>"names, related demographic information and diagnostic codes" additionally, "Records for a subset of 1.3 million patients also contained Social Security numbers"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"SALT LAKE CITY (AP) - Billing records of 2.2 million patients at the University of Utah Hospitals and Clinics were stolen from a vehicle after a courier failed to immediately take them to a storage center"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://healthcare.utah.edu/publicaffairs/news/current/billing_theft.html">University of Utah Hospitals &amp; Clinics</a> <br><a href="http://www.sltrib.com/ci_9540210">The Salt Lake Tribune</a> <br><a href="http://www.kutv.com/content/news/local/story.aspx?content_id=76de0817-3ffe-4f8e-9764-506795954fa1">Associated Press via KUTV Channel 2 News</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>University of Utah Hospitals &amp; Clinics<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online sources cited above:<br><br>SALT LAKE CITY (AP) - Billing records of 2.2 million patients at the University of Utah Hospitals and Clinics were stolen from a vehicle after a courier failed to immediately take them to a storage center<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] There is no mention of encryption in any of the news reports I have read regarding this breach, so I am going to go ahead and assume that it was not used.&nbsp; As you read through the publicly available details of this breach below, you will probably agree that the courier driver made an idiotic mistake that he almost certainly regrets, but the University of Utah Hospitals &amp; Clinics is the custodian of this information that should have identified the risks involved with transporting confidential patient records off-site.&nbsp; One of those risks is the possibility that a backup tape may become lost of stolen, which is obviously the case in this breach.&nbsp; Where were preventative controls to account for this unacceptable (in most cases) risk, like encryption?</span><br><br>The records, described only as backup information tapes, contained Social Security numbers of 1.3 million people treated at the university over the last 16 years<br><br>people would be notified by a letter at a cost of $500,000 just for stamps and envelopes<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] How much would it have cost to encrypt the information on the tapes?&nbsp; The State of Utah has an exemption in their breach notification law for encrypted information.</span><br><br>The hospital also pledged free credit monitoring<br><br>The records were in a gray metal box<br><br>The courier, whose name was not released, picked them up in his Ford Explorer on June 1<br><br>instead of driving directly to a storage center, he worked a second job and then went home<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] This is the idiotic mistake I was writing about earlier.</span><br><br>The next day, he discovered that someone had broken into his Ford Explorer outside his Kearns home and taken the box<br><br>The driver worked for Perpetual Storage Inc. for 18 years and was fired.<br><br>Authorities declined to say how easy or difficult it would be to read the records.<br><br>The sheriff believes the thief probably thought the box contained money.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] What it contains could probably be turned into a helluva lot of money!</span><br><br>"The investigation indicates that the theft was probably a random car burglary, and there is no evidence that the information on the tapes has been accessed or used for identity theft," said Salt Lake County Sheriff Jim Winder.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Eight days (June 2nd - June 10th) is probably a little too soon for evidence to appear of identity theft.</span><br><br>There's no evidence any of the information on the tapes has been accessed; besides, anyone trying to use the tapes would need specialized equipment to view the contents, Winder said.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Specialized equipment like a tape drive?</span><br><br>Eighty percent of the 2.2 million people live in Utah or Idaho, Betz said. The hospital is offering a $1,000 reward for the records. (Lorris Betz, M.D., Ph.D, Senior Vice President for Health Sciences)<br><br>The University of Utah Hospitals &amp; Clinics is offering a $1,000 reward for the return of the tapes, no questions asked.&nbsp; Those wishing to claim the reward may call the Sheriff’s Department at (801) 743-7000.<br>[Evan] To think of this in pure financial terms.&nbsp; A person could return the tape for $1,000 or could access the tape, sell the information and make maybe $5,000.000+.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Maybe a good preventative control for organizations is to assume that criminals are stupid as part of your risk management program (seriously though, it's not).</font><br><font size="2"><br>"We understand this is unwelcome news to our patients," said Betz.<br><br>The university had worked with Perpetual Storage for 12 years before the theft<br><br>The University of Utah Hospitals &amp; Clinics has suspended deliveries of backup tapes to Perpetual Storage pending the review of all procedures and protocols for transporting and storing backup data.<br><br>Additionally, the health-care system is taking the following steps on behalf of its 2.2 million patients.<br></font><ul><li><font size="2">Mailing notification letters to all 2.2 million patients and guarantors;</font></li><li>Providing free credit monitoring and restoration service to patients whose records included Social Security numbers;</li><li>Providing a toll-free information line at 1-866-581-3599 to respond to questions; and</li><li>Establishing a website at <a href="http://healthcare.utah.edu/billingrecordstheft">healthcare.utah.edu/billingrecordstheft</a> that provides information and resources.<br></li></ul><font size="2"><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victim Reaction:</span><br>Tuesday's news was especially unsettling for people like Will Taylor, of West Valley City, whose premature daughter is a patient at University Hospital. Taylor has already been the victim of identity theft once, when thieves racked up credit card charges in his name. <br><br>"I will ask [the hospital] what precautions I can take and what they are doing about it," he said.<br><br>"If our information isn't safe, then what is?" patient Dan Christenson, of Salt Lake City, said Tuesday after learning of the theft. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>I would be more understanding if this were the first breach ever reported where a backup was stolen that contained personal information, but it's not.&nbsp; Employing backup tapes without encryption is a very well documented risk, so why do large organizations still accept it? <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>March, 2008 - <a href="http://breachblog.com/2008/03/14/uhc.aspx">Stolen University Health Care laptop requires notification of 4800</a> </font><br><br>
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      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Jun 2008 08:33:06 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tape">tape</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/backup tape">backup tape</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/backup">backup</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/backup information tapes">backup information tapes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/million">million</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/utah">utah</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/million people live">million people live</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/06/11/uhc.aspx">2.2 million billing records missing on stolen backup tape</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Thieves steal tapes holding 2.2M billing records]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/1c25fa2ae1fefe4f1ef18ea3eba16bea</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/1c25fa2ae1fefe4f1ef18ea3eba16bea</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[University of Utah officials this week acknowledged that a metal box of backup tapes containing billing records of some 2.2 million patients was stolen early this month from the car of a courier who...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[University of Utah officials this week acknowledged that a metal box of backup tapes containing billing records of some 2.2 million patients was stolen early this month from the car of a courier who left it in a parked car overnight outside his home.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Jun 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/car">car</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/car overnight">car overnight</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/utah officials">utah officials</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/records">records</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/million patients">million patients</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/backup tapes">backup tapes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/metal box">metal box</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/university">university</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/month">month</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/061108-thieves-steal-tapes-holding-22m.html?fsrc=rss-security">Thieves steal tapes holding 2.2M billing records</source>
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