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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: theft]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/theft</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2008 02:47:19 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Assessing the Security Benefits of Cloud Computing]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/1e09e5c89f15d3a4df4ea921f9230c2d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/1e09e5c89f15d3a4df4ea921f9230c2d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[With all this talk and reporting about security concerns, lets change the channel for a moment and assess the potential security benefits of Cloud Computing
In my view, there are some strong technical...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a title="Is the glass half empty or half full?" href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/94094843@N00/2292559560/" target="_blank"><img class="alignright" style="border: 0; float: right; margin: 3px;" src="http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3004/2292559560_378f226531_m.jpg" border="0" alt="Is the glass half empty or half full?" /></a></p>
<p>With all this <a href="http://cloudsecurity.org">talk</a> and <a href="http://www.gartner.com/DisplayDocument?id=685308">reporting</a> about security concerns, lets change the channel for a moment and assess the <strong>potential security benefits</strong> of Cloud Computing.</p>
<p>In my view, there are some strong technical security arguments in favour of Cloud Computing - assuming we can find ways to manage the risks.</p>
<p>With this new paradigm come challenges <strong>and </strong>opportunities.  The challenges are getting plenty of attention - I&#8217;m regularly afforded the opportunity to <a href="http://www.gridtoday.com/grid/2422309.html">comment</a> on them, plus obviously I cover them on this blog.  However, lets not lose sight of the potential upside.</p>
<p>In this post, I walk through seven technical security benefits.  Some are immediate, others may arise over time and have conditions attached (some unstated for the sake of brevity).  However, I&#8217;m including the longer-range benefits now to raise awareness.  Some of the outcomes listed are available today without the Cloud, but they are either complex and slow to implement (and thus less likely to happen) or prohibitive for capital cost reasons.  I don&#8217;t claim this is a definitive list - it reflects where my thinking is today.</p>
<p>Some benefits depend on the Cloud service used and therefore do not apply across the board.  For example; I see no solid forensic benefits with SaaS.  Also, for space reasons, I&#8217;m purposely not including the &#8216;flip side&#8217; to these benefits, however if you read this blog regularly you should <a href="http://cloudsecurity.org/2008/04/24/cloud-stacks-please-mind-the-gap/">recognise some</a>.</p>
<p>On a sidenote, I believe the Cloud offers Small and Medium Businesses major potential security benefits.  Frequently SMBs struggle with limited or non-existent in-house INFOSEC resources and budgets.  The caveat is that the Cloud market is still very new - security offerings are somewhat foggy - making selection tricky.  Clearly, not all Cloud providers will offer the same security.</p>
<h4>Seven Technical Security Benefits of the Cloud</h4>
<h4>1. Centralised Data</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Reduced Data Leakage</strong>: this is the benefit I hear most from Cloud providers - and in my view they are right.  How many laptops do we need to lose before we get this?  How many backup tapes?  The data &#8220;landmines&#8221; of today could be greatly reduced by the Cloud as thin client technology becomes prevalent.  Small, temporary caches on handheld devices or Netbook computers pose less risk than transporting data buckets in the form of laptops.  Ask the CISO of any large company if all laptops have company &#8216;mandated&#8217; controls consistently applied; e.g. full disk encryption.  You&#8217;ll see the answer by looking at the whites of their eyes.  Despite best efforts around asset management and endpoint security we continue to see embarrassing and disturbing misses.  And what about SMBs?  How many use encryption for sensitive data, or even have a data classification policy in place?</li>
<li><strong>Monitoring benefits</strong>: central storage is easier to control and monitor.  The flipside is the nightmare scenario of <a href="http://www.gnucitizen.org/blog/most-attractive-targets-saas/">comprehensive data theft</a>.  However, I would rather spend my time as a security professional figuring out smart ways to protect and monitor access to data stored in one place (with the benefit of situational advantage) than trying to figure out all the places where the company data resides across a myriad of thick clients!  You can get the benefits of Thin Clients today but Cloud Storage provides a way to centralise the data faster and potentially cheaper.  The logistical challenge today is getting Terabytes of data to the Cloud in the first place.</li>
</ul>
<h4>2. Incident Response / Forensics</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Forensic readiness</strong>: with Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) providers, I can build a dedicated forensic server in the same Cloud as my company and place it offline, ready for use when needed.  I would only need pay for storage until an incident happens and I need to bring it online.  I don&#8217;t need to call someone to bring it online or install some kind of remote boot software - I just click a button in the Cloud Providers web interface.  If I have multiple incident responders, I can give them a copy of the VM so we can distribute the forensic workload based on the job at hand or as new sources of evidence arise and need analysis.  To fully realise this benefit, commercial forensic software vendors would need to move away from archaic, physical dongle based licensing schemes to a network licensing model.</li>
<li><strong>Decrease evidence acquisition time</strong>: if a server in the Cloud gets compromised (i.e. broken into), I can now clone that server at the click of a mouse and make the cloned disks instantly available to my Cloud Forensics server.  I didn&#8217;t need to &#8220;find&#8221; storage or have it &#8220;ready, waiting and unused&#8221; - its just there.</li>
<li><strong>Eliminate or reduce service downtime</strong>: Note that in the above scenario I didn&#8217;t have to go tell the COO that the system needs to be taken offline for hours whilst I dig around in the RAID Array hoping that my physical acqusition toolkit is compatible (and that the version of RAID firmware isn&#8217;t supported by my forensic software).  Abstracting the hardware removes a barrier to even doing forensics in some situations.</li>
<li><strong>Decrease evidence transfer time</strong>: In the same Cloud, bit fot bit copies are super fast - made faster by that replicated, distributed filesystem my Cloud provider engineered for me.  From a network traffic perspective, it may even be free to make the copy in the same Cloud.  Without the Cloud, <strong>I </strong>would have to a lot of time consuming and expensive provisioning of physical devices.  I only pay for the storage as long as I need the evidence.</li>
<li><strong>Eliminate forensic image verification time</strong>: Some Cloud Storage implementations expose a cryptographic checksum or hash.  For example, Amazon S3 generates an MD5 hash <a href="http://docs.amazonwebservices.com/AmazonS3/2006-03-01/index.html?RESTObjectPUT.html">automagically</a> when you store an object.  In theory you no longer need to generate time-consuming MD5 checksums using external tools - its already there.</li>
<li><strong>Decrease time to access protected documents</strong>: Immense CPU power opens some doors.  Did the suspect password protect a document that is relevant to the investigation?  You can now test a wider range of candidate passwords in less time to speed investigations.</li>
</ul>
<h4>3. Password assurance testing (aka cracking)</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Decrease password cracking time</strong>: if your organisation regularly tests password strength by running password crackers you can use Cloud Compute to decrease crack time and you only pay for what you use.  Ironically, your cracking costs go up as people choose better passwords ;-).</li>
<li><strong>Keep cracking activities to dedicated machines</strong>: if today you use a distributed password cracker to spread the load across non-production machines, you can now put those agents in dedicated Compute instances - and thus stop mixing sensitive credentials with other workloads.</li>
</ul>
<h4>4. Logging</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>&#8220;Unlimited&#8221;, pay per drink storage</strong>: logging is often an afterthought, consequently insufficient disk space is allocated and logging is either non-existant or minimal.  Cloud Storage changes all this - no more &#8216;guessing&#8217; how much storage you need for standard logs.</li>
<li><strong>Improve log indexing and search</strong>: with your logs in the Cloud you can leverage Cloud Compute to index those logs in real-time and get the benefit of <a href="http://blogs.splunk.com/thewilde/2008/06/24/splunk-ninja-inside-the-cloud/">instant search results.</a> What is different here?  The Compute instances can be plumbed in and scale as needed based on the logging load - meaning a true real-time view.</li>
<li><strong>Getting compliant with Extended logging</strong>: most modern operating systems offer extended logging in the form of a C2 audit trail.  This is rarely enabled for fear of performance degradation and log size.  Now you can &#8216;opt-in&#8217; easily - if you are willing to pay for the enhanced logging, you can do so.  Granular logging makes compliance and investigations easier.</li>
</ul>
<h4>5. Improve the state of security software (performance)</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Drive vendors to create more efficient security software</strong>: Billable CPU cycles get noticed.  More attention will be paid to inefficient processes; e.g. poorly tuned security agents.  Process accounting will make a comeback as customers target &#8216;expensive&#8217; processes.  Security vendors that understand how to squeeze the most performance from their software will win.</li>
</ul>
<h4>6. Secure builds</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Pre-hardened, change control builds</strong>: this is primarily a benefit of virtualization based Cloud Computing.  Now you get a chance to start &#8217;secure&#8217; (by your own definition) - you create your Gold Image VM and clone away.  There are ways to do this today with bare-metal OS installs but frequently these require additional 3rd party tools, are time consuming to clone or add yet another agent to each endpoint.</li>
<li><strong>Reduce exposure through patching offline</strong>: Gold images can be kept up securely kept up to date.  Offline VMs can be conveniently patched &#8220;off&#8221; the network.</li>
<li><strong>Easier to test impact of security changes</strong>: this is a big one.  Spin up a copy of your production environment, implement a security change and test the impact at low cost, with minimal startup time.  This is a big deal and removes a major barrier to &#8216;doing&#8217; security in production environments.</li>
</ul>
<h4>7. Security Testing</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Reduce cost of testing security: </strong>a SaaS provider only passes on a portion of their security testing costs.  By sharing the same application as a service, you don&#8217;t foot the expensive security code review and/or penetration test.  Even with Platform as a Service (PaaS) where your developers get to write code, there are potential cost economies of scale (particularly around use of code scanning tools that sweep source code for security weaknesses).</li>
</ul>
<h4>Your Thoughts?</h4>
<p>What benefits do you see that I haven&#8217;t included in the above list?  Where do you agree/disagree and importantly, why?</p>
<img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/CloudSecurity/~4/341289594" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jul 2008 03:00:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/benefits">benefits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cloud">cloud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/technical security benefits">technical security benefits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/based">based</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization based cloud">virtualization based cloud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/efficient security software">efficient security software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security software">security software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cloud market">cloud market</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/CloudSecurity/~3/341289594/">Assessing the Security Benefits of Cloud Computing</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Funny Radio Skit on Identity Theft]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/414add53c5d2189160f6dbf2c77ba100</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/414add53c5d2189160f6dbf2c77ba100</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[By Mitchell &amp;...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[By <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CS9ptA3Ya9E">Mitchell & Webb</a>.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=Cz7HSJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=Cz7HSJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=gJTolJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=gJTolJ" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 18 Jul 2008 09:21:02 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/webb">webb</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mitchell">mitchell</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/07/funny_radio_ski.html">Funny Radio Skit on Identity Theft</source>
    </item>
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      <title><![CDATA[Backup tape is stolen from Bristol-Myers Squibb]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/911478f22f756b8e8513c59d7f720d18</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/911478f22f756b8e8513c59d7f720d18</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
7/17/08

Organization
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (&quot;BMS

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
Unknown

Victims
Current and former employees and some dependants
...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/bms.jpg" width="198" align="right" height="160"><font size="2"><b>Date Reported: </b><br>7/17/08<br><br><b>Organization: </b><br><a href="http://www.bms.com/landing/data/index.html">Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. ("BMS")</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br>Unknown<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>Current and former employees and some dependants<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>Unknown*<br><br><font size="1">*Bristol-Myers Squibb had "about 42,000 employees as of Dec. 31, the last date for which work force figures were available in regulatory filings.", Source: <a href="http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articles/djf500/200807171514DOWJONESDJONLINE000844_FORTUNE5.htm">CNN Money</a></font> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>"name, address, date of birth, Social Security number, marital status, gender, salary, hire date, termination date, retirement date, and, in some instances bank account information"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"On June 4, 2008, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company ("BMS") learned that a back-up data tape containing BMS-related data was stolen while it was being transported for storage.&nbsp; Through subsequent forensic work, it was determined that the data tape included personal information of current and former BMS employees"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://www.pharmalot.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/bms_letter.pdf">Pharmalot (copy of notification letter)</a> <br><a href="http://www.pharmalot.com/2008/07/bristol-myers-security-breach-hits-untold-thousands/">Pharmalot</a> <br><a href="http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articles/djf500/200807171514DOWJONESDJONLINE000844_FORTUNE5.htm">CNNMoney</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>Ed Silverman, Pharmalot<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online sources cited above:<br><br>The drugmaker sent letters over the past week saying a data tape containing reams of personal information was stolen several weeks ago<br><br>On June 4, 2008, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company ("BMS") learned that a back-up data tape containing BMS-related data was stolen while it was being transported for storage. <br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] This statement prompted me to list the contractor as "unknown" instead of "none".&nbsp; I presume that the data tape was being transported by a third-party vendor when it was stolen.&nbsp; I am looking for more information on this.</span><br><br>Through subsequent forensic work, it was determined that the data tape included personal information of current and former BMS employees, such as name, address, date of birth, Social Security number, marital status, gender, salary, hire date, termination date, retirement date, and, in some instances, bank account information.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Ugh, this looks like very sensitive HR and benefits data.</span><br><br>The names, addresses, and Social Security numbers of some employee dependents also were included on the tape.<br><br>an untold number of current and former employees - and their dependents - could be affected<br><br>BMS has initiated an investigation of this incident.<br><br>To date, BMS has no reason to believe that any of your personal information has been inappropriately accessed from the data tape by an unauthorized party, or that any identity theft, fraud or misuse of your personal information has occurred.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I agree with most of this statement except for the "misuse" part.&nbsp; There may be no evidence of misuse post stolen tape, but there may be an argument for misuse by BMS themselves.&nbsp; BMS is the data custodian in this scenario, not the data owner.&nbsp; If a data custodian does not care for the owner's information in a manner that is expected or communicated, does it constitute misuse?</span><br><br>In addition, there is no evidence that the data tape or the information contained on it was the target of the theft.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I am interested in knowing more about who was transporting the tape and whether or not other items were taken.</span><br><br>As a precaution, to help you detect any possible misuse of your data, BMS has arranged for you to enroll in credit monitoring for one full year, at no cost to you.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] There is that "misuse" mention again.&nbsp; One year of free credit monitoring does nothing to protect a victim against fraud that occurs after one year, supposing the victim does not renew at his/her own expense.&nbsp; I wonder how many people renew on average.</span><br><br>If you have any questions, you may call the dedicated Privacy Help Line at 1-877-214-0689.&nbsp; Our representatives will be available to assist you Monday through Friday, between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m. ET.<br><br>the drugmaker is issuing this statement: "Bristol-Myers Squibb regrets that this incident occurred and is committed to providing appropriate assistance for affected individuals who had their personal information on the stolen data tape. We are committed to protecting the privacy and security of employee and dependent information. Maintaining the trust and confidence of our employees is paramount to Bristol-Myers Squibb."<br><br>Protecting the privacy and security of your information is extremely important to us.<br><br>In this regard, BMS wishes to reiterate that it does not have any evidence indicating that your personal information has been misused.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Another "misuse" mention.</span><br><br>the company is taking appropriate remedial steps, including enhancing security protocols regarding the handling of personal information and our back-up data tapes.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Like what? Encryption maybe?</span><br><br>On behalf of BMS, I apologize for any inconvenience or concern that this matter may cause for you.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>I couldn't find any mention about encryption or whether or not police were called.&nbsp; You would think that a large, well-repected company like Bristol-Myers Squibb encrypts confidential data on tape, right? <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>Unknown<br></font><br>
<script src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/%7Es/breachblog?i=http://breachblog.com/2008/07/18/bms.aspx" type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8"></script>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 18 Jul 2008 07:26:26 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tape">tape</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/back-up data tape">back-up data tape</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data tape">data tape</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/owner">owner</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data owner">data owner</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bristol-myers squibb">bristol-myers squibb</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/07/18/bms.aspx">Backup tape is stolen from Bristol-Myers Squibb</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Collaboration in the Cloud, Virtual Worlds and the Hacker Mindset]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/451246868f8b52e293c9ac433dce53dd</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/451246868f8b52e293c9ac433dce53dd</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Collaboration in the Cloud
Forward thinking companies use collaboration technologies to melt away the physical distance between disparate offices, remote workers and suppliers. Investments in R&amp;D...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><img src="http://blogs.cisco.com/images/uploads/johnchamberspost.jpg" alt="" width="450" height="246" /></h4>
<h4>Collaboration in the Cloud</h4>
<p>Forward thinking companies use collaboration technologies to melt away the physical distance between disparate offices, remote workers and suppliers.  Investments in R&amp;D projects to create the next generation of business collaboration technologies and starting to bear early fruits and are worth paying attention to - especially if you get paid to &#8220;do security&#8221;.  One major focus area is Virtual Worlds.</p>
<h4>Teleporting Virgins</h4>
<p>The <a href="http://blog.secondlife.com/2008/07/08/ibm-linden-lab-interoperability-announcement/">big news</a> in the <a href="http://www.secondlife.com/">Second Life</a> research community is that avatars (&#8221;virtual people&#8221;) have successfully teleported between <em><strong>distinct </strong></em>virtual worlds.  The virgin teleporters went from a Second Life Preview Grid - an experimental grid completely disconnected from the Main Grid - to a virtual world running IBM OpenSIM.</p>
<p>At this stage there is intentionally no asset transfer going on at all - in other words, you can&#8217;t take your &#8220;stuff&#8221; from one world to another - but that will come in time as the <a href="http://secondlifegrid.net.s3.amazonaws.com/docs/specs/SLGOGP-draft-1.html">Open Grid Protocol</a> is extended.  Today just login and teleport are supported.  No stealing those trade secret &#8220;assets&#8221; yet ;-).</p>
<p>Linden Labs speaks to this issue:</p>
<blockquote><p>Q: How will Linden Lab prevent property from being copied into other virtual worlds?<br />
We’re paying extremely close attention to that question. We will be designing this with the Second Life community to ensure their needs are met. We want to stress that when it does become possible to move avatars between worlds, we will take the utmost care to protect the rights of Second Life property owners and creators. Linden Lab will not design a system that lets people openly violate the permissions of SL goods and take them to other worlds. We recognize that intellectual property is the engine that drives Second Life, and we are completely committed to preserving the qualities that make Second Life the unique, innovative and dynamic place that it is today.</p></blockquote>
<p>With my &#8220;hacker-vision&#8221; &#8482; enabled I see *all kinds* of opportunities for mischief here.  I&#8217;m betting we&#8217;ll see imaginative attacks as the usual cat and mouse game of vulnerability research and vendor response plays out.  &#8220;Sorry boss, someone hijacked my avatar and now I&#8217;m stuck on this desert island for who knows how long!&#8221;.</p>
<h4>Threat Profiling Second Life</h4>
<p>Getting back to reality, people are already exploring Virtual World security.  <a href="http://www.ernw.de/">Michael Thumann of ERNW</a> in Germany is a pen-tester and security researcher and in this 10 minute video, Michael shares the result of his security research on Second Life.</p>
<p>He covers:</p>
<ul>
<li> In-game cheating</li>
<li> Identity theft</li>
<li> Attacking 3rd party servers using Linden Scripting Language (think about the liability issues and the providers ability to track abusers)</li>
</ul>
<p><object classid="clsid:d27cdb6e-ae6d-11cf-96b8-444553540000" width="425" height="344" codebase="http://download.macromedia.com/pub/shockwave/cabs/flash/swflash.cab#version=6,0,40,0"><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true" /><param name="src" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/6MoptnBsNGc&amp;hl=en&amp;fs=1" /><embed type="application/x-shockwave-flash" width="425" height="344" src="http://www.youtube.com/v/6MoptnBsNGc&amp;hl=en&amp;fs=1" allowfullscreen="true"></embed></object></p>
<p>For those interested in more detail, the full presentation he gave at BlackHat Europe 2008 in Amsterdam is <a href="https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-europe-08/Thumann/Whitepaper/bh-eu-08-thumann-WP.pdf">here </a>(pdf).</p>
<p>Of particular note, Michael applied a formal threat model approach to the research - <a href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms954176.aspx">STRIDE </a>from Microsoft.</p>
<p>In a future post I&#8217;ll talk more about threat profiling in the context of Cloud Computing vulnerability research and specific API security vulnerability classes we can expect to see exploited.</p>
<img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/CloudSecurity/~4/338174255" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Jul 2008 11:51:24 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtual worlds">virtual worlds</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/worlds">worlds</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/research">research</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vulnerability research">vulnerability research</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security research">security research</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/life">life</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/life property owners">life property owners</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/life research community">life research community</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/collaboration">collaboration</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/CloudSecurity/~3/338174255/">Collaboration in the Cloud, Virtual Worlds and the Hacker Mindset</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[Houston law firm threw confidential client information in the trash]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f6684ed1c67a7acb138958de524dcb1a</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f6684ed1c67a7acb138958de524dcb1a</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
7/15/08

Organization
Weber Law Firm

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
his wife

Victims
Clients

Number Affected
hundreds

Types of Data
personal financial...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/weber.jpg" width="200" align="right" height="60"><font size="2"><b>Date Reported: </b><br>7/15/08<br><br><b>Organization: </b><br><a href="http://weberlaw.com/">Weber Law Firm</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br>"his wife"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>Clients<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>"hundreds"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>"personal financial records, documents with Social Security numbers, people's medical files and more"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"HOUSTON -- Harris County Sheriff's deputies uncovered hundreds of people's personal financial files that had been discarded in a dumpster in northwest Houston on Monday."<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://www.khou.com/business/stories/khou080711_tj_recordsfound.57f842ba.html">KHOU-TV News (original)</a> <br><a href="http://www.khou.com/business/stories/khou080716_tj_filesdumped.6221053b.html">KHOU-TV News (follow-up)</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>Jeremy Desel, KHOU-TV<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online sources cited above:<br><br>Harris County Sheriff's deputies uncovered hundreds of people's personal financial files that had been discarded in a dumpster in northwest Houston on Monday.<br><br>The records were mostly bankruptcy case files from a Houston attorney's office that found their way into a dumpster belonging to a Houston day care.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] There is little doubt about the sensitivity of the information found in a person's bankruptcy files.&nbsp; Don't you think that an attorney should know better?</span><br><br>The discovery came in a trash bin in the 9100 block of Jones Road, with box after box of records including personal financial records, documents with Social Security numbers, people's medical files and more.<br><br>When the sheriff's office first arrived, the responding deputies had no idea what to do with the records. <br><br>So, they called the law office from where the records had come from. 11 News called the law offices of William Weber as well.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Mr. Weber's </span><a style="font-style: italic;" href="http://weberlaw.com/attorneys-staff.htm">bio</a><span style="font-style: italic;"> is pretty extensive.</span><br><br>Weber, who eventually arrived to pick up the discarded records, told both 11 News and the sheriff's office that it was "no big deal"<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Obviously, this answer probably doesn't go over very well.&nbsp; In hindsight, I am guessing that Mr. Weber wishes he could take these words back.</span><br><br>Still, at the insistence of the sheriff's office, Weber did arrive to pick the boxes up.<br><br>Weber had a different answer for 11 News when he showed up to retrieve the 32 boxes.<br><br>"It's a mistake," he said. "We regret it. We regret it. They weren't intended to be put here. I didn't put them here. It was a misunderstanding between me and my wife."<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Ugh.&nbsp; Blaming the wife would not be a good idea in my house, even if it were my her fault.</span><br><br>He added it was a one-time problem.<br><br>But he also said his firm does not have a policy for disposing of sensitive documents. <br>"No, I do not. I don't think there is a formal disposal policy. Legally," he answered. <br><br>Don't tell that to Radio Shack or Select Medical Corporation. Both settled lawsuits with the Texas Attorney General's Office this week for violating the Texas ID Theft Law that was passed in 2005.<br><br>It requires businesses to destroy any documents that contain sensitive information. Select Medical dumped 4,000 documents in its own dumpster, but did not destroy them first.<br><br>Both companies settled this week with the state for hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Don't forget about </span><a style="font-style: italic;" href="http://www.oag.state.tx.us/oagNews/release.php?id=2519">EZMONEY, L.P. and EZPAWN L.P.</a><span style="font-style: italic;">&nbsp; They agreed to pay $660,000 to the Texas Attorney General.&nbsp; Don't mess with Texas!</span><br><br>However, it's not just a civil law question. It is also an ethics question. <br><br>"If a customer of Radio Shack had an interest in privacy and an interest to have their identity protected (and) not just tossed to the wind, I can assure you that a medical provider or a lawyer has a higher duty," said 11 News legal expert Gerald Treece.<br><br>The sheriff's office is looking into the possibility laws were broken by throwing away the records in that dumpster, but were unsure if anything illegal happened.<br><br>As a matter of fact, there's a good possibility no laws were broken.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Not criminal.&nbsp; This case may be ripe for a civil proceeding, however.</span><br><br>Weber spent several minutes loading the boxes into his car, but he also spent a lot of time avoiding the 11 News cameras as he picked up the discarded records.<br><br>Eventually, he left the scene, leaving a few boxes behind when he was confronted by 11 News cameras.<br><br>In his rush to get away, a box was left on the trunk lid of his vehicle and some of the papers inside flew out as he sped off.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Embarrassed?</span><br><br>Weber told 11 News that all the documents were shredded on Wednesday morning.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Any thought given to notifying the affected individuals?&nbsp; If not, it is probably too late now.</span><br><br>Weber also said he has talked with an attorney at the attorney general's office and told them he would cooperate fully. <br><br>11 News also spoke with one of the clients whose file was found in the dumpster on Monday. She said she's angry and feels betrayed.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>We have read about organizations dumping sensitive confidential information in dumpsters before, but this is the first time I have read about a lawyer being responsible (or his wife).&nbsp; Mistakes do happen, but I question how much of a mistake this actually was due to Mr. Weber's initial "no big deal" reaction. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>Unknown<br></font><br>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Jul 2008 10:59:25 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/houston">houston</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/weber">weber</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/weber wishes">weber wishes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/houston attorney">houston attorney</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bankruptcy">bankruptcy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/khou-tv news">khou-tv news</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/news">news</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bankruptcy files">bankruptcy files</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/william weber">william weber</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/07/17/weber.aspx">Houston law firm threw confidential client information in the trash</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Indiana State University professor's laptop is stolen]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ac01a165449e657f832374db2c405cad</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ac01a165449e657f832374db2c405cad</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
7/15/08

Organization
Indiana State University

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
None

Victims
students who took economics classes from 1997 through the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/indianastate.jpg" width="137" align="right" height="48"><font size="2"><b>Date Reported: </b><br>7/15/08<br><br><b>Organization: </b><br><a href="http://www.indstate.edu/home.htm">Indiana State University</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br>None<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>"students who took economics classes from 1997 through the spring semester 2008"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>"more than 2,500"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>"names, grades, e-mail addresses and student identification numbers"*<br><br><font size="1">*Until 2003, student identification numbers were the equivalent of each student’s Social Security number.</font><br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"A password-protected laptop computer containing personal information for current and former Indiana State University students was stolen during the weekend, the university reported Tuesday."<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://www1.indstate.edu/laptopsecurity/">Indiana State University</a> <br><a href="http://www.wthitv.com/Global/story.asp?S=8684098&amp;nav=menu593_1">Associated Press via WTHI Channel 10 News</a> <br><a href="%20http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-ap-in-isu-stolenlaptop,0,1255776.story">Associated Press via Chicago Tribune</a><br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>Indiana State University<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online sources cited above:<br><br>A password-protected laptop computer containing personal information for current and former Indiana State University students was stolen during the weekend, the university reported Tuesday.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] What do you suppose the purpose of the "password-protected" mention is?&nbsp; I hope it is not meant to reassure anyone that the information is safe.&nbsp; For those of you that do not know, password-protection is easily bypassed and in the opinion of many information security professionals (this one included), does NOT provide adequate protection for confidential information.</span><br><br>While there is no evidence to suggest that password security was breached, the university is taking the precaution of notifying all affected students for whom it has current contact information.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] If someone were to breach the "password security", what evidence would the school see?&nbsp; None.&nbsp; There would be no evidence (except locally on the laptop) if the local password store had been compromised.&nbsp; The school no longer has possession of the laptop, so the school would have no evidence.</span><br><br>The laptop contained data for students who took economics classes from 1997 through the spring semester 2008, estimated at more than 2,500 individuals.<br><br>If you took an economics class during this time period, but did not receive a letter, please call the Registrar’s Office to verify that you were on the list, and to update your address so that we may send you a letter.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Contact information for the Registrar's Office, click </span><a style="font-style: italic;" href="http://www1.indstate.edu/registrar/">here</a><span style="font-style: italic;">.</span><br><br>The information includes names, grades, e-mail addresses and student identification numbers.<br><br>Beginning in 2003, use of social security numbers as student ID numbers was discontinued in favor of university-specific identification numbers.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] A sound security decision by the university would have been to follow up with a project to identify and remove Social Security numbers already held as student IDs.&nbsp; Maybe it was, but the information on this laptop was missed.</span><br><br>The theft occurred Saturday while the professor was traveling in southern Indiana<br><br>the professor was traveling with his family and briefly left the computer unattended<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] A laptop can grow legs in a flash.&nbsp; A person doesn't need to leave a laptop unattended for very long for it to disappear.</span><br><br>The incident occurred on July 12, 2008 and was reported to university officials on July 14, 2008.<br><br>The incident was reported immediately to the appropriate law enforcement agency and early Monday to university officials.<br><br>The extent of the information contained on the computer was not determined until Monday night.<br><br>Faculty and staff are being reminded that university policy prohibits the storage of private, sensitive data on portable computers.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Excellent policy provision.&nbsp; Policy does little if it is not communicated, enforced, audited against, and improved.&nbsp; Where was the failure in the breach?&nbsp; Was the policy not communicated to this professor, and thus he/she was not aware?</span><br><br>In addition, laptops provided to faculty are equipped with several security measures including encryption and a bio-metric fingerprint reader to prevent access by anyone other than the assigned user.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] An excellent standard (or procedure).</span><br><br>Approximately 500 ISU faculty members have laptop computers.<br><br>The university is reviewing its procedures to ensure compliance with existing policies, said Interim President C. Jack Maynard, the university’s provost and vice president for academic affairs<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">From the FAQs:</span><br><br>Q: What can someone do with a stolen SSN?<br>A: "With just a SSN there is little anyone can do in the way of setting up a false identity or securing credit. Generally an identity thief would need more information and documentation to set up false credit.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] A SSN needs to be held in strict confidentiality in today's financial, employment, health, and other systems.&nbsp; It is often used for identification and authentication.&nbsp; Once an identity thief has a SSN, the owner of that SSN is now a prime target because the thief has the most confidential piece of information (ingredient) in the identity theft recipe.&nbsp; The rest of the information is typically easier to come by, i.e. name, address, employer, etc.&nbsp; It is true that an SSN alone is not enough information to commit identity theft, but it is an EXCELLENT start.</span><br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>We can assume that the school knows the risks involved in storing confidential information on a poorly protected laptop.&nbsp; Otherwise, they probably wouldn't have policy and procedure against it.&nbsp; The school's statements that are meant to minimize the risk, seemingly without fact, are disappointing. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>Unknown<br></font><br>
<script src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/%7Es/breachblog?i=http://breachblog.com/2008/07/17/indianastate.aspx" type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8"></script>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Jul 2008 05:29:35 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/university">university</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information includes names">information includes names</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/university students">university students</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/confidential information">confidential information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/laptop">laptop</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/evan contact information">evan contact information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/university policy prohibits">university policy prohibits</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/07/17/indianastate.aspx">Indiana State University professor's laptop is stolen</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Perfect Storm]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/32f71212618ca9738aa75adab4f5a3b5</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/32f71212618ca9738aa75adab4f5a3b5</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Its time to get your raincoats and lifeboats - the perfect storm is finished brewing - it is about to rain down upon us

This may sound dramatic but I think that I may not be conveying the amount of...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Its time to get your raincoats and lifeboats - the perfect storm is finished brewing - it is about to rain down upon us.<br /><br />This may sound dramatic but I think that I may not be conveying the amount of pain that Information Security is about to receive. We will certainly have to step up our game.<br /><br /><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_0">Symantec</span> and Verizon have done some interesting research into the underground hacker community and their findings are rather interesting. A bit scary too.<br /><br />There is an entire community of totally different players that all work together to get from the point where a nerdy kid finds a vulnerability to where a hacker uses that to get into a PC, steal personal information and credit card details, sell them or use them and move on.<br /><br />So far, it seems, that the community has been quite lazy and have just <span class="blsp-spelling-corrected" id="SPELLING_ERROR_1">discarded</span> company information to get to the credit card information and personal information (ID numbers, social security numbers, addresses etc).<br /><br />This has provided us in Information Security with a perfect <span class="blsp-spelling-corrected" id="SPELLING_ERROR_2">opportunity</span>. We have been able to observe how hackers work while they have been taking information that is not our own. Companies that have credit card information have been the ones that were most under attack but those that don't handle credit card information have largely been ignored by hackers except for some members of staff who have been caught out but then they have only lost their own personal information.<br /><br />There just really isn't a (black/underground) market for information that is not credit card or personal finance related.<br /><br />However, it was always my feeling that the credit card/personal finance market would become saturated at some stage and the <span class="blsp-spelling-corrected" id="SPELLING_ERROR_3">loosely</span>-bound-but-still-very-organised-and-co-ordinated <span class="blsp-spelling-corrected" id="SPELLING_ERROR_4">underground</span> market would start to look elsewhere.<br /><br />Essentially, the infrastructure is there for wide-scale information theft but the will wasn't there. I have thought this for a while my question was always - when will the will be there? When will Jack-the-hacker decide that credit card theft is no longer worth his time and start to deal in company information ?<br /><br /><a href="http://securosis.com/2008/07/16/the-data-supply/">Adrian Lane from <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_5">Securosis</span> </a>thinks that the falling prices in the underground economy is <span class="blsp-spelling-corrected" id="SPELLING_ERROR_6">humorous</span>. I disagree. I look at it as very scary and the final puzzle-piece.<br /><br />I think that the perfect storm is about to be unleashed.<img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityThoughts/~4/337832309" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Jul 2008 03:15:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card details">credit card details</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card">credit card</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/company information">company information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card theft">credit card theft</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wide-scale information theft">wide-scale information theft</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card information">credit card information</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityThoughts/~3/337832309/perfect-storm.html">The Perfect Storm</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[A backup tape is stolen from Greensboro Gynecology Associates]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/50667ca11f139e2009a7776a17ed3db5</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/50667ca11f139e2009a7776a17ed3db5</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
7/15/08

Organization
Greensboro Gynecology Associates

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
None

Victims
Physicians, staff members, and patients

Number...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/gga.jpg" width="70" align="right" height="70"><font size="2"><b>Date Reported: </b><br>7/15/08<br><br><b>Organization: </b><br><a href="http://www.greensborogynassoc.medem.com/">Greensboro Gynecology Associates</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br>None<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>Physicians, staff members, and patients<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>Unknown<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>"names, addresses, Social Security numbers, employers, insurance companies, policy numbers and family members"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"GREENSBORO - Patients at a Greensboro doctors’ office have been notified that their personal information - including Social Security numbers and addresses - was stolen in May."<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://www.news-record.com/content/2008/07/15/article/security_breach_puts_patients_of_greensboro_gynecology_at_risk">News &amp; Record</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>Ryan Seals, News &amp; Record<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online source cited above:<br><br>In a letter mailed to patients, Greensboro Gynecology Associates said a backup tape of their computer database was stolen.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Does "their computer database" include billing information and other confidential information other than personally identifiable information?</span><br style="font-style: italic;"><br>The letter was dated June 16, but some letters weren't postmarked until July 9.<br><br>The medical practice said a backup tape of patient information was stolen on May 29 from an employee who was taking the tape to an off-site storage facility for safekeeping.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I wonder what type of off-site storage facility.&nbsp; Some of the small businesses that I have encountered consider an employee's home to be an "off-site" storage facility.</span><br style="font-style: italic;"><br>The stolen information included patients' name, address, Social Security number, employer, insurance company, policy numbers and family members.<br><br>The tape did not include treatment or specific medical data.<br><br>"We are very concerned about this theft, as we too are victims," Pat Higgins, the practice's administrator, wrote in an e-mail Tuesday. "We are notifying our present and former patients. ..."<br><br>The practice at 719 Green Valley Road Suite 305 said personal information for its physicians and other staff members also was on the stolen tape.<br><br>the case is under investigation<br><br>did not respond to inquiries about how many patients were affected, how the theft occurred and whether anything else was taken<br><br>The practice's letter said the theft had been reported to police. However, officials with the Greensboro Police Department and the Guilford County Sheriff's Office said they had no such report on file.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] This is interesting news.</span><br><br>The data was not encrypted, but Greensboro Gynecology Associates said the stolen data isn't likely to be accessed.<br><br>"We have consulted with several computer security experts, and they have advised it is highly unlikely the tapes can be accessed because of the program used and the language (the information) is written in," according to a recording on a hotline set up to address patients' concerns.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Who are these several computer security "experts'?&nbsp; I hate to disagree, but...&nbsp; The assessment is based on "the program used and the language" that the archived information is written in.&nbsp; Really?&nbsp; How hard is it to obtain the necessary hardware and software to access the information?&nbsp; Someone interested in accessing the tape could conceivably flip the data protection tab on the tape (to prevent data corruption through inadvertent writes), download some of the more popular backup software programs, buy a compatible drive (stolen or on eBay), and go to town.&nbsp; Couldn't they?&nbsp; Backup Exec is a very popular backup program.&nbsp; Anyone can download a 60-day trial for free.&nbsp; More talented professionals have even more sophisticated methods of accessing data on tape. </span><br style="font-style: italic;"><br>Greensboro Gynecology Associates said they are consulting with computer security experts to prevent similar thefts in the future.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I kind of hope that they are not consulting with the same computer security "experts" referenced above.</span><br style="font-style: italic;"><br>"We sincerely regret and apologize that this incident occurred," the letter said<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>Many backup software solutions include the option to encrypt the written data built-in.&nbsp; Why not use it?<br><br>Greensboro Gynecology Associates has established a hotline for concerned patients.&nbsp; The phone number is (336) 544-4590.&nbsp;&nbsp; The hotline asks patients to leave their name and telephone number for a staff member to return their call. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>Unknown<br></font><br>
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      <pubDate>Wed, 16 Jul 2008 12:16:26 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/greensboro gynecology">greensboro gynecology</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/greensboro">greensboro</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tape">tape</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/backup tape">backup tape</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/specific medical data">specific medical data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer security">computer security</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/07/16/gga.aspx">A backup tape is stolen from Greensboro Gynecology Associates</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA["Metro" employee information mistakenly posted to Web]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/cd2d242bebb5e31e3d326420f3f89e22</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/cd2d242bebb5e31e3d326420f3f89e22</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
7/14/08

Organization
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (&quot;Metro

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
None

Victims
past and present employees
...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/metro.jpg" width="45" align="right" height="54"><font size="2"><b>Date Reported: </b><br>7/14/08<br><br><b>Organization: </b><br><a href="http://www.wmata.com/default.cfm">Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("Metro")</a> <br><br><b>Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</b><br>None<br><br><b>Victims:</b><br>"past and present employees"<br><br><b>Number Affected:</b><br>4,675<br><br><b>Types of Data:</b><br>Names and Social Security numbers<br><br><b>Breach Description:</b><br>"Metro has advised nearly 4,700 past and present employees that their social security numbers were published accidentally on the transit agency’s Web site last month."<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://www.wmata.com/about/MET_NEWS/PressReleaseDetail.cfm?ReleaseID=2194">Metro Press Release</a> <br><a href="http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2008/07/14/ap5213364.html">Associated Press via Forbes.com</a> <br><a href="http://www.nbc4.com/news/16881050/detail.html">NBC Channel 4 News</a> <br><a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/14/AR2008071402245.html">The Washington Post</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online sources cited above:<br><br>Metro has advised nearly 4,700 past and present employees that their social security numbers were published accidentally on the transit agency’s Web site last month.<br><br>The information was posted between June 9 and 25 as part of a solicitation from Metro to companies interested in providing worker’s compensation and risk management services.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Rather than post this information to a public web site, why wasn't a more secure method of tranmission used such as VPN or secure FTP?</span><br><br>The document mistakenly included the social security numbers of 4,675 employees.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] According to Metro spokeswoman Candace Smith the sensitive information was supposed to be redacted.&nbsp; I wonder how well this mandate was communicated to the employee(s) responsible for compiling and posting the information.</span><br><br>A smaller group of employees had their names and social security numbers posted in the lengthy document. Metro officials continue to analyze the information for any other data breaches.<br><br>Three Metro employees have been disciplined<br><br>The three disciplined employees, including a manager, have been suspended for up to a month without pay, officials said.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] This implies that the employees responsible for the mistake should have known better.&nbsp; We can probably assume that they were informed of the proper procedure, but did not follow it.</span><br><br>Letters warning of the breach were sent out to the affected employees.<br><br>The letter urges employees to watch their credit reports for signs of identity theft.<br><br>Last week, the agency set up a separate Web site where employees can determine whether their numbers were among those posted. <br><br>The agency is offering the 4,700 employees one year of free credit report monitoring, $25,000 in identity theft insurance and counseling services.<br><br>"We deeply regret this incident, and believe the likelihood of misuse of the information is low," said Metro Chief Safety Officer Ronald Keele.<br><br>"However, we have taken additional steps to protect employee information by bolstering Internet security and requiring more checks and balances of materials before they are being released publicly."<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Checks and balances are typically lacking in these types of breaches, so I think it’s a good sign that Metro is addressing these.</span><br><br>Metro officials say they are not alone in this type of data breach.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] So what?</span><br><br>According to the Identity Theft Resource Center, data breaches at businesses, governments and universities were up 69 percent in the first half of 2008 compared with a similar period in 2007.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>The end result of this oversight is three disciplined employees (with no pay for a month) and nearly 4,700 people with an increased risk of identity theft.&nbsp; Forethought is there for a reason, whether or not you use it is your choice. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>Unknown<br></font><br>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2008 06:39:14 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/metro officials continue">metro officials continue</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/metro officials">metro officials</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/metro">metro</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/officials">officials</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/employees">employees</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/letter urges employees">letter urges employees</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/metro employees">metro employees</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/employees responsible">employees responsible</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/07/15/metro.aspx">"Metro" employee information mistakenly posted to Web</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[Man-in-the-Middle Attacks]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/4886f7013362b82e729992218c60dc53</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/4886f7013362b82e729992218c60dc53</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Last week's dramatic rescue of 15 hostages held by the guerrilla organization FARC was the result of months of intricate deception on the part of the Colombian government. At the center was a classic...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Last week's dramatic rescue of 15 hostages held by the guerrilla organization FARC was the result of months of intricate deception on the part of the Colombian government. At the center was a classic man-in-the-middle attack.

In a man-in-the-middle attack, the attacker inserts himself between two communicating parties. Both believe they're talking to each other, and the attacker can delete or modify the communications at will. </p><p><cite>The Wall Street Journal</cite> reported how this <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121518490923829025.html">gambit played out in Colombia</a>: 

<blockquote>"The plan had a chance of working because, for months, in an operation one army officer likened to a 'broken telephone,' military intelligence had been able to convince Ms. Betancourt's captor, Gerardo Aguilar, a guerrilla known as 'Cesar,' that he was communicating with his top bosses in the guerrillas' seven-man secretariat. Army intelligence convinced top guerrilla leaders that they were talking to Cesar. In reality, both were talking to army intelligence."</blockquote>

This ploy worked because Cesar and his guerrilla bosses didn't know one another well. They didn't recognize one anothers' voices, and didn't have a friendship or shared history that could have tipped them off about the ruse. Man-in-the-middle is defeated by context, and the FARC guerrillas didn't have any.

And that's why man-in-the-middle, abbreviated MITM in the computer-security community, is such a problem online: Internet communication is often <a href="http://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/">stripped of any context</a>. There's no way to <a href="http://www.oxid.it/">recognize someone's face</a>. There's no way to <a href="http://ettercap.sourceforge.net/">recognize someone's voice</a>. When you receive an e-mail purporting to come from a person or organization, you have no idea who actually sent it. When you visit a website, you have no idea if you're really visiting that website. We all like to pretend that we know who we're communicating with -- and for the most part, of course, there isn't any attacker inserting himself into our communications -- but in reality, we don't. And there are lots of <a href="http://sourceforge.net/projects/airjack/">hacker tools</a> that exploit this <a href="http://www.wsniff.com/">unjustified trust</a>, and <a href="http://www.theta44.org/karma/">implement MITM attacks</a>.

Even with context, it's still possible for MITM to fool both sides -- because electronic communications are often intermittent. Imagine that one of the FARC guerrillas became suspicious about who he was talking to. So he asks a question about their shared history as a test: "What did we have for dinner that time last year?" or something like that. On the telephone, the attacker wouldn't be able to answer quickly, so his ruse would be discovered.  But e-mail conversation isn't synchronous. The attacker could simply pass that question through to the other end of the communications, and when he got the answer back, he would be able to reply.

This is the way MITM attacks work against web-based financial systems. A bank demands authentication from the user: a password, a one-time code from a token or whatever. The attacker sitting in the middle receives the request from the bank and passes it to the user.  The user responds to the attacker, who passes that response to the bank. Now the bank assumes it is talking to the legitimate user, and the attacker is free to send transactions directly to the bank. This kind of attack completely bypasses any <a href="http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0503.html#2">two-factor authentication mechanisms</a>, and is becoming a more popular identity-theft tactic.

There are cryptographic solutions to MITM attacks, and there are secure web protocols that implement them. Many of them require shared secrets, though, making them useful only in situations where people already know and trust one another.

The NSA-designed <a href="http://www.fas.org/irp/program/security/_work/stu3.html">STU-III and STE</a> secure telephones solve the MITM problem by embedding the identity of each phone together with its key. (The NSA creates all keys and is trusted by everyone, so this works.) When two phones talk to each other securely, they exchange keys and display the other phone's identity on a screen. Because the phone is in a secure location, the user now knows who he is talking to, and if the phone displays another organization -- as it would if there were a MITM attack in progress -- he should hang up.

Zfone, a <a href="http://zfoneproject.com/faq.html#mitm">secure VoIP system</a>, protects against MITM attacks with a short authentication string. After two Zfone terminals exchange keys, both computers display a four-character string. The users are supposed to manually verify that both strings are the same -- "my screen says 5C19; what does yours say?" -- to ensure that the phones are communicating directly with each other and not with an MITM. The <a href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/21746901@N08/2275723713/">AT&T TSD-3600</a> worked similarly.

This sort of protection is embedded in SSL, although no one uses it. As it is normally used, SSL provides an encrypted communications link to whoever is at the other end: bank and phishing site alike. And the better phishing sites create valid SSL connections, so as to more effectively fool users. But if the user wanted to, he could manually <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/protect/yourself/phishing/spoof.mspx">check the SSL certificate</a> to see if it was issued to "National Bank of Trustworthiness" or "Two Guys With a Computer in Nigeria."  
 
No one does, though, because you have to both remember and be willing to do the work. (The browsers could make this easier if they wanted to, but they don’t seem to want to.) In the real world, you can easily tell a branch of your bank from a money changer on a street corner. But on the internet, a phishing site can be easily made to look like your bank's legitimate website. Any method of telling the two apart takes work. And that's the first step to fooling you with a MITM attack.
 
Man-in-the-middle isn't new, and it doesn't have to be technological. But the internet makes the attacks easier and more powerful, and that's not going to change anytime soon.

This essay <a href="http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2008/07/securitymatters_0710">originally appeared</a> on Wired.com.<div class="feedflare">
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      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2008 02:47:19 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/implement mitm attacks">implement mitm attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/implement">implement</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mitm attacks">mitm attacks</category>
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      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bank">bank</category>
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      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bank assumes">bank assumes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attacker inserts">attacker inserts</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/07/maninthemiddle_1.html">Man-in-the-Middle Attacks</source>
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