The latest Microsoft patch MS08-68 is a great example. It is a problem with NTLM authentication where the attacker can force a client to authenticate to him and the credentials, while not exposed in cleartext, can be relayed to another server or brute forced to obtain the cleartext. This is a very classic crypto protocol vulnerability. It’s not the crypto algorithms that are the problem, but the protocol implementation.

Microsoft recently fixed the problem, perhaps due to the availability of exploit code, the availability of an easy to use Metasploit implementation, or perhaps Microsoft’s changed tolerance for vulnerabilities. We can sum it up as a change in the threat space that made it worth fixing. But make no mistake, this is a very old problem.

News reports have been citing Sir Dystic’s SMBrelay tool, which was published in March, 2001, as the first knowledge of this vulnerability. Eric Shultze who worked at MSRC in 2001 just yesterday is quoted as saying, “I have been holding my breath since 2001 for this patch.” Obviously it is a long time coming. But this wasn’t the first publication of the problem. In 2000, one of my collegues on the research team at @stake, Christian Rioux (aka Dildog) published the telnet NTLM authentication vulnerability.

Rioux’s advisory has a great description of the credential relay and cracking weaknesses. I have talked to him and he says he discovered these problems independently, but he didn’t find them first. Dominique Brezinski published exactly these NTLM vulnerabilities in the SMB protocol in 1996 in a paper titled, “A Weakness in CIFS Authentication”. The earliest reference I can find on the paper on the net is here where it is included in another paper published in 1997. Such is the ad-hoc world of independent security research of 12 years ago which still continues today.

It seems ridiculous that a field like security research, which is so important to the running of modern society is so ad-hoc. Shouldn’t we know who discovered a vulnerability? Shouldn’t all researchers and engineers know about it? More importantly if someone implements a tool that takes advantage of a vulnerability shouldn’t they credit the discoverer? Don’t get me wrong. Implementation takes a lot of work and sometimes makes all the difference in makeing people aware of a security problem. After all when I was at the L0pht our slogan was, “Making the theoretical, practical”. I still think researchers should get credit when credit is due.

The security community has gotten better at documentating our research but I still see instances of independent discovery, misplaced credit, and tools giving no credit to researchers. I hate to say it but getting a bit more academic is in order. Credit is the currency of a researcher and placing it well will reward the right people and we will all benefit.

Warnings About Financial Institutions and Derivatives

Risks of Financial Institutions
The nature of a financial institution is that there are a lot of ways to go to hell in a bucket. You can push credit too far, do a dumb acquisition, leverage yourself excessively---its not just derivatives [that can bring about your downfall].

Maybe it's unique to us, but we're quite sensitive to financial risks. Financial institutions make us nervous when they're trying to do well.

We're exceptionally goosey of leveraged financial institutions. If they start talking about how good their risk management is, it makes us nervous.

We fret way earlier than other people. We've left a lot of money on the table through early fretting. It's the way we are -- you'll just have to live with it.

Derivatives
The system is almost insanely irresponsible. and what people think are fixes aren't realy fixes. It's so complicated I can't do it justice here - but you can't believe the trillions of dollars involved. You can't believe the complexity. You can't believe how difficult it is to do the accounting. You can't believe how big the incentives are to have wishful thinking about values and wishful thinking about ability to clear.

People don't think about the consequences of the consequences. People start by trying to hedge against interest rate changes, which is very difficult and complicated. Then, the hedges make the [reported profits] lumpy. So they use the new derivatives to smooth this. Well, now you've morphed into lying. This turns into a Mad Hatter's Tea Party. This happens to vast, sophisticated corporations.

Somebody has to step in and say, "We're not going to do it - it's just too hard."

I think a good litmus test of the mental and moral quality at any large institutions [with significant derivative exposure] would be to ask them, "Do you really understand your derivatives book?" Anyone who says yes is either crazy or lying.

It's easy to see [the dangers] when you talk about [what happened with] the energy derivatives - they went kerflooey. When [the companies] reached for the assets that were on their books, the money wasn't there. When it comes to financial assets, we haven't had any such denouement and the accountings hasn't changed so the denouement is ahead of us.

Derivatives are full of clauses that say if one party's credit gets downgraded then it has to put up collateral. It's like margin - you can go broke [just putting up more margin]. In an attempt to protect themselves, they've introduced instability. Nobody seems to recognize what a disaster of a system they've created. It's a demented system. 

In engineering people have a big margin of safety. But in the financial world, people don't give a damn about safety. They let it balloon and balloon and balloon. It's aided by false accounting. I'm more pessimistic about this than Warren is.

Accounting for Derivatives
I hate with a passion GAAP [Generally Accepted Accounting Principles] as applied to derivatives and swaps. JP Morgan sold out to this type of accounting to front-end revenues. I think it's a disgrace.

It's bonkers, and the accountants sold out. Everyone caved, adopted loose [accounting] standards, and created exotic derivatives linked to theoretical models. As a result, all kinds of earnings, blessed by accountants, are not really being earned. When you reach for the money, it melts away. It was never there.

It [accounting for derivatives] is just disgusting. It is a sewer, and if I'm right, there will be hell to pay in due course. All of you will have to prepare to deal with a blowup of derivative books.

Likelihood of a Derivatives Blowup
We tried to sell Gen Re's derivatives operations and couldn't, so we started liquidating it. We had to take big markdowns. I would confidently predict that most of the derivatives books of [this country's] major banks cannot be liquidated for anything like what they're carried on the books at. When the denouement will happen and how severe it will be, I don't know. But I fear the consequences could be fearsome. I think there are major problems, worse than in the energy field, and look at the destruction there.

I'll be amazed if we don't have some kind of significant [derivatives-related] blowup in the next five to ten years.

I think we're he only big corporation in America to be running off its derivative book.

It's a crazy idea for people who are already rich -  like Berkshire - to be in this business. It's a crazy business for big banks to be in.

Yo would be disgusted if you had a fair mind and spent a month really delving into a big derivative operation. You would think it was Lewis Carroll. You would think it was the Mad Hatter's Tea Party. And the false precision of these people is just unbelievable. They make the worst economics professors look like gods. Moreover, there is depravity augmenting the folly. Read the book F.I.A.S.C.O., by law professor and former derivative trader Frank Partnoy, an insider account of the depravity of derivative trading at one of the biggest and best-regarded Wall Street firms. This book will turn your stomach.

Lots being written about the Cloud, most of it quite dark and gloomy.  In fact I’m surprised, that Hoff hasn’t got a preso spooled up called “The Toxic Cloud” or something similarly ominous for his next speaking tour.
That said, the Economist does a great job distilling the issue into a simple statement -

Cloud computing is a trade-off between sovereignty and efficiency.

Let me ask you -  if you had to put your money on one of those horses, considering your average profit-preoccupied business, which would it be?  I’d put my bottom dollar on the thoroughbred named “Cost Center Reduction”, to place.

WHO ARE WE TO STAND IN THE WAY OF “PROGRESS”?

I’m always fond of Jack’s rule that the role of information risk management boils down to three deceptively simple premises:

• Reduce Risk.
• Reduce Loss.
• Create Operational Efficiencies.

So it would seem antithetical to the charter of the Chief Security Officer to stand in the way of progress as embodied by “cloud computing” (not to mention dangerous to long-term job security).  And I think that this presents opportunities to discuss strategies for managing risk, strategies that aren’t too theoretical and have practical application (though actual “cloud” use by enterprises may be rare at this point).

ON RISK REDUCTION IN THE CLOUD (or, How To Learn From the Shortcomings of PCI DSS)

The good news is, there’s already a well-established model for managing the risk around outsourcing the processing of “confidential” information.  The bad news is, that model kinda sucks it.

The Payment Card Industry, known as the “PCI” or “meal ticket” to many in the industry, faced a similar problem with the introduction of GLBA.  As I see it (and I’m not at all close to the PCI, at all, so this is all just abstract soliloquy) the PCI had one of two choices when faced with the prospect of other people managing their sensitive information:

1. Accept the *massive* amount of GLBA risk their business creates and spend a TON of money to build out the infrastructure (both process and IT) to manage the consumer data themselves (in conjunction with the banks, of course) and never have it grace the computing systems of the retailer.  Or,
2. Transfer the GLBA risk down to the retailer and have them bear the majority of the risk (and cost of reducing risk to a level that might be tolerable to the US Government).

(Martin, you may recall our Twittering about PCI a while back.  This is the crux of my view on the subj.)

Now fortunately, the CSO’s of the world are going to be a little more “invested” in protecting the information they are stewards over, and unlike the PCI, will remain primarily responsible for the C, I, & A of the data in the Cloud.  The cool thing is, this actually presents a great opportunity to start building a meaningful model for co-management of risk!  In fact, we can take the PCI model of contractual risk transference but modify where it goes all wrong, and start working to create something better.  And we can start by euthanizing some faulty assumptions.

JUST HOW INFORMATIVE IS PCI DSS?

What might be the.greatest.mistake of the standards compliance mentality is the assumption of value for the past-state measurement.  That is, I believe that the CSO needs more than some “past-state” assurance in order to understand their risk.    If you look at the concept of “PCI compliance” it really is an examination of a past state of nature that is assumed to be relevant to current and future states.   Many people (myself included) are not at all convinced that this past-state is nearly as informative as those who mandate it’s measurement believe it to be.

That’s not to condemn past-state measurements as completely non-informative,  they most certainly are useful.  It’s just that no self-respecting CSO sleeps well because they were deemed “PCI compliant” 10 months ago.  They sleep well because they have good visibility into current-state information and confidence in their strategy concerning future-state (based on that visibility and the outcomes of sound IRM models).

MOVING PAST THE VULNERABILITY SCANNER INTO INTELLIGENCE AND WISDOM

So realizing this new importance (to me, at least) concerning visibility and IRM models, I’m lead to the conclusion that if we are to manage risk in the Cloud, we’ll have to move beyond “PCI Compliance” or the concept that some regular “audit” of controls in place at the host is all we need to understand our ability to manage risk.  No, the CSO must have good information concerning current and probable future states.   This is that “visibility” I spoke of above.  In fact, we’ll need significant amounts of piercing, transparent visibility.  And in order to gain that visibility, our insight into Cloud Risk Management must include significant provisions for understanding a joint ability to Prevent/Detect/Respond as well as provisions for managing the risk that one of the participants won’t provide that visibility or ability via SLA’s and penalties . These SLA’s must be expressed in measurable terms (more visibility), and those metrics must have their roots in the things that help understand how we manage risk (those aforementioned IRM models).

THE CLOUD COMPUTING SECURITY SILVER LINING (sorry couldn’t resist)

As I mentioned earlier, I do see an opportunity to create insight.  The need for visibility and IRM models would allow us to create a “guidance” if you’ll allow me to use the term.  Not a standard or a “best practice” to audit by, but simply a reference document that says “if you’re going to put information on somebody else’s systems and still hold some significant responsibility for that information, here’s the considerations, why they are considerations, and how you might go about collaborating on the management of risk”.

And I think that if we undertake this journey, there is going to be a lot of growth and risk management innovation along the way.  But keen insights into what it means to manage risk will be necessary, and secure and forthright collaboration will be of absolute importance.

I say that last bit because, if these pundits are right about the utility of a hosted computing model - the Cloud will happen regardless of the CSO’s ability or desire to manage it.

Conventional wisdom holds that terrorism is inherently political, and that people become terrorists for political reasons. This is the "strategic" model of terrorism, and it's basically an economic model. It posits that people resort to terrorism when they believe -- rightly or wrongly -- that terrorism is worth it; that is, when they believe the political gains of terrorism minus the political costs are greater than if they engaged in some other, more peaceful form of protest. It's assumed, for example, that people join Hamas to achieve a Palestinian state; that people join the PKK to attain a Kurdish national homeland; and that people join al-Qaida to, among other things, get the United States out of the Persian Gulf.

If you believe this model, the way to fight terrorism is to change that equation, and that's what most experts advocate. Governments tend to minimize the political gains of terrorism through a no-concessions policy; the international community tends to recommend reducing the political grievances of terrorists via appeasement, in hopes of getting them to renounce violence. Both advocate policies to provide effective nonviolent alternatives, like free elections.

Historically, none of these solutions has worked with any regularity. Max Abrahms, a predoctoral fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, has studied dozens of terrorist groups from all over the world. He argues that the model is wrong. In a paper published this year in International Security that -- sadly -- doesn't have the title "Seven Habits of Highly Ineffective Terrorists," he discusses, well, seven habits of highly ineffective terrorists. These seven tendencies are seen in terrorist organizations all over the world, and they directly contradict the theory that terrorists are political maximizers:

Terrorists, he writes, (1) attack civilians, a policy that has a lousy track record of convincing those civilians to give the terrorists what they want; (2) treat terrorism as a first resort, not a last resort, failing to embrace nonviolent alternatives like elections; (3) don't compromise with their target country, even when those compromises are in their best interest politically; (4) have protean political platforms, which regularly, and sometimes radically, change; (5) often engage in anonymous attacks, which precludes the target countries making political concessions to them; (6) regularly attack other terrorist groups with the same political platform; and (7) resist disbanding, even when they consistently fail to achieve their political objectives or when their stated political objectives have been achieved.

Abrahms has an alternative model to explain all this: People turn to terrorism for social solidarity. He theorizes that people join terrorist organizations worldwide in order to be part of a community, much like the reason inner-city youths join gangs in the United States.

The evidence supports this. Individual terrorists often have no prior involvement with a group's political agenda, and often join multiple terrorist groups with incompatible platforms. Individuals who join terrorist groups are frequently not oppressed in any way, and often can't describe the political goals of their organizations. People who join terrorist groups most often have friends or relatives who are members of the group, and the great majority of terrorist are socially isolated: unmarried young men or widowed women who weren't working prior to joining. These things are true for members of terrorist groups as diverse as the IRA and al-Qaida.

For example, several of the 9/11 hijackers planned to fight in Chechnya, but they didn't have the right paperwork so they attacked America instead. The mujahedeen had no idea whom they would attack after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, so they sat around until they came up with a new enemy: America. Pakistani terrorists regularly defect to another terrorist group with a totally different political platform. Many new al-Qaida members say, unconvincingly, that they decided to become a jihadist after reading an extreme, anti-American blog, or after converting to Islam, sometimes just a few weeks before. These people know little about politics or Islam, and they frankly don't even seem to care much about learning more. The blogs they turn to don't have a lot of substance in these areas, even though more informative blogs do exist.

All of this explains the seven habits. It's not that they're ineffective; it's that they have a different goal. They might not be effective politically, but they are effective socially: They all help preserve the group's existence and cohesion.

This kind of analysis isn't just theoretical; it has practical implications for counterterrorism. Not only can we now better understand who is likely to become a terrorist, we can engage in strategies specifically designed to weaken the social bonds within terrorist organizations. Driving a wedge between group members -- commuting prison sentences in exchange for actionable intelligence, planting more double agents within terrorist groups -- will go a long way to weakening the social bonds within those groups.

We also need to pay more attention to the socially marginalized than to the politically downtrodden, like unassimilated communities in Western countries. We need to support vibrant, benign communities and organizations as alternative ways for potential terrorists to get the social cohesion they need. And finally, we need to minimize collateral damage in our counterterrorism operations, as well as clamping down on bigotry and hate crimes, which just creates more dislocation and social isolation, and the inevitable calls for revenge.

This essay previously appeared on Wired.com.

Conventional wisdom holds that terrorism is inherently political, and that people become terrorists for political reasons. This is the "strategic" model of terrorism, and it's basically an economic model. It posits that people resort to terrorism when they believe -- rightly or wrongly -- that terrorism is worth it; that is, when they believe the political gains of terrorism minus the political costs are greater than if they engaged in some other, more peaceful form of protest. It's assumed, for example, that people join Hamas to achieve a Palestinian state; that people join the PKK to attain a Kurdish national homeland; and that people join al-Qaida to, among other things, get the United States out of the Persian Gulf.

If you believe this model, the way to fight terrorism is to change that equation, and that's what most experts advocate. Governments tend to minimize the political gains of terrorism through a no-concessions policy; the international community tends to recommend reducing the political grievances of terrorists via appeasement, in hopes of getting them to renounce violence. Both advocate policies to provide effective nonviolent alternatives, like free elections.

Historically, none of these solutions has worked with any regularity. Max Abrahms, a predoctoral fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, has studied dozens of terrorist groups from all over the world. He argues that the model is wrong. In a paper (.pdf) published this year in International Security that -- sadly -- doesn't have the title "Seven Habits of Highly Ineffective Terrorists," he discusses, well, seven habits of highly ineffective terrorists. These seven tendencies are seen in terrorist organizations all over the world, and they directly contradict the theory that terrorists are political maximizers:

Terrorists, he writes, (1) attack civilians, a policy that has a lousy track record of convincing those civilians to give the terrorists what they want; (2) treat terrorism as a first resort, not a last resort, failing to embrace nonviolent alternatives like elections; (3) don't compromise with their target country, even when those compromises are in their best interest politically; (4) have protean political platforms, which regularly, and sometimes radically, change; (5) often engage in anonymous attacks, which precludes the target countries making political concessions to them; (6) regularly attack other terrorist groups with the same political platform; and (7) resist disbanding, even when they consistently fail to achieve their political objectives or when their stated political objectives have been achieved.

Abrahms has an alternative model to explain all this: People turn to terrorism for social solidarity. He theorizes that people join terrorist organizations worldwide in order to be part of a community, much like the reason inner-city youths join gangs in the United States.

The evidence supports this. Individual terrorists often have no prior involvement with a group's political agenda, and often join multiple terrorist groups with incompatible platforms. Individuals who join terrorist groups are frequently not oppressed in any way, and often can't describe the political goals of their organizations. People who join terrorist groups most often have friends or relatives who are members of the group, and the great majority of terrorist are socially isolated: unmarried young men or widowed women who weren't working prior to joining. These things are true for members of terrorist groups as diverse as the IRA and al-Qaida.

For example, several of the 9/11 hijackers planned to fight in Chechnya, but they didn't have the right paperwork so they attacked America instead. The mujahedeen had no idea whom they would attack after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, so they sat around until they came up with a new enemy: America. Pakistani terrorists regularly defect to another terrorist group with a totally different political platform. Many new al-Qaida members say, unconvincingly, that they decided to become a jihadist after reading an extreme, anti-American blog, or after converting to Islam, sometimes just a few weeks before. These people know little about politics or Islam, and they frankly don't even seem to care much about learning more. The blogs they turn to don't have a lot of substance in these areas, even though more informative blogs do exist.

All of this explains the seven habits. It's not that they're ineffective; it's that they have a different goal. They might not be effective politically, but they are effective socially: They all help preserve the group's existence and cohesion.

This kind of analysis isn't just theoretical; it has practical implications for counterterrorism. Not only can we now better understand who is likely to become a terrorist, we can engage in strategies specifically designed to weaken the social bonds within terrorist organizations. Driving a wedge between group members -- commuting prison sentences in exchange for actionable intelligence, planting more double agents within terrorist groups -- will go a long way to weakening the social bonds within those groups.

We also need to pay more attention to the socially marginalized than to the politically downtrodden, like unassimilated communities in Western countries. We need to support vibrant, benign communities and organizations as alternative ways for potential terrorists to get the social cohesion they need. And finally, we need to minimize collateral damage in our counterterrorism operations, as well as clamping down on bigotry and hate crimes, which just creates more dislocation and social isolation, and the inevitable calls for revenge.

---

Bruce Schneier is Chief Security Technology Officer of BT, and author of Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World.

The "Oyster card" used on the London Tube was at issue in the Dutch case, and a similar fare card used on the Boston "T" was the center of the U.S. case. The Dutch court got it right, and the American court, in Boston, got it wrong from the start -- despite facing an open-and-shut case of First Amendment prior restraint.

The U.S. court has since seen the error of its ways -- but the damage is done. The MIT security researchers who were prepared to discuss their Boston findings at the DefCon security conference were prevented from giving their talk.

The ethics of full disclosure are intimately familiar to those of us in the computer-security field. Before full disclosure became the norm, researchers would quietly disclose vulnerabilities to the vendors -- who would routinely ignore them. Sometimes vendors would even threaten researchers with legal action if they disclosed the vulnerabilities.

Later on, researchers started disclosing the existence of a vulnerability but not the details. Vendors responded by denying the security holes' existence, or calling them just theoretical. It wasn't until full disclosure became the norm that vendors began consistently fixing vulnerabilities quickly. Now that vendors routinely patch vulnerabilities, researchers generally give them advance notice to allow them to patch their systems before the vulnerability is published. But even with this "responsible disclosure" protocol, it's the threat of disclosure that motivates them to patch their systems. Full disclosure is the mechanism (.pdf) by which computer security improves.

Outside of computer security, secrecy is much more the norm. Some security communities, like locksmiths, behave much like medieval guilds, divulging the secrets of their profession only to those within it. These communities hate open research, and have responded with surprising vitriol to researchers who have found serious vulnerabilities in bicycle locks, combination safes (.pdf), master-key systems and many other security devices.

Researchers have received a similar reaction from other communities more used to secrecy than openness. Researchers -- sometimes young students -- who discovered and published flaws in copyright-protection schemes, voting-machine security and now wireless access cards have all suffered recriminations and sometimes lawsuits for not keeping the vulnerabilities secret. When Christopher Soghoian created a website allowing people to print fake airline boarding passes, he got several unpleasant visits from the FBI.

This preference for secrecy comes from confusing a vulnerability with information about that vulnerability. Using secrecy as a security measure is fundamentally fragile. It assumes that the bad guys don't do their own security research. It assumes that no one else will find the same vulnerability. It assumes that information won't leak out even if the research results are suppressed. These assumptions are all incorrect.

The problem isn't the researchers; it's the products themselves. Companies will only design security as good as what their customers know to ask for. Full disclosure helps customers evaluate the security of the products they buy, and educates them in how to ask for better security. The Dutch court got it exactly right when it wrote: "Damage to NXP is not the result of the publication of the article but of the production and sale of a chip that appears to have shortcomings."

In a world of forced secrecy, vendors make inflated claims about their products, vulnerabilities don't get fixed, and customers are no wiser. Security research is stifled, and security technology doesn't improve. The only beneficiaries are the bad guys.

If you'll forgive the analogy, the ethics of full disclosure parallel the ethics of not paying kidnapping ransoms. We all know why we don't pay kidnappers: It encourages more kidnappings. Yet in every kidnapping case, there's someone -- a spouse, a parent, an employer -- with a good reason why, in this one case, we should make an exception.

The reason we want researchers to publish vulnerabilities is because that's how security improves. But in every case there's someone -- the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority, the locksmiths, an election machine manufacturer -- who argues that, in this one case, we should make an exception.

We shouldn't. The benefits of responsibly publishing attacks greatly outweigh the potential harm. Disclosure encourages companies to build security properly rather than relying on shoddy design and secrecy, and discourages them from promising security based on their ability to threaten researchers. It's how we learn about security, and how we improve future security.

This essay previously appeared on Wired.com.

EDITED TO ADD (8/26): Matt Blaze has a good essay on the topic.

Hackers getting a free T pass may be the least of our worries — local hackers-turned-security experts suggest RFID keycards, wireless networks and medical devices implanted in the body are also vulnerable to hacks.

At last week’s Defcon hacker convention in Las Vegas, a team of researchers showed it was possible to get information such as Social Security numbers and medical diagnoses, and change the settings on an implantable defibrillator by impersonating the computer it communicates with wirelessly. By doing so, a hacker could send a fatal shock to a patient’s heart, said William Maisel of the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center.

It is almost like things haven’t changed since the 90’s when the L0pht worked to change the mindset of security:

1. Don’t trust vendor claims around security
2. Attacks aren’t “theoretical”
3. Security by obscurity is no security

The L0pht worked as an independent security research think tank.  For us it was non-profit side job researching and publishing vulnerabilities in software and hardware.  We did it for our love of technology and published what we found out because purchasers and users of the vulnerable systems deserve to know.

It’s 10 years later and the situation hasn’t improved much.  Mudge talks about the vulnerabilities the L0pht found in highway transponder systems that are still in systems being fielded today.  But more important than the vulnerabilities themselves is the nature of how these vulnerabilities are coming to light.  They are being found by hobbyists, students, and IT people working in their spare time.  How can something as important as the security of public fare collection systems and medical equipment not have a standard process for security acceptance testing? 

As we become more reliant on digital systems, with some even keeping us alive, it is high time for security testing to move beyond student papers and part time IT work.  Security testing needs to become a formal part of the process of purchasing and fielding digital systems.  Our lives are starting to depend on it.

The "Oyster card" used on the London Tube was at issue in the Dutch case, and a similar fare card used on the Boston "T" was the center of the U.S. case. The Dutch court got it right, and the American court, in Boston, got it wrong from the start -- despite facing an open-and-shut case of First Amendment prior restraint.

The U.S. court has since seen the error of its ways -- but the damage is done. The MIT security researchers who were prepared to discuss their Boston findings at the DefCon security conference were prevented from giving their talk.

The ethics of full disclosure are intimately familiar to those of us in the computer-security field. Before full disclosure became the norm, researchers would quietly disclose vulnerabilities to the vendors -- who would routinely ignore them. Sometimes vendors would even threaten researchers with legal action if they disclosed the vulnerabilities.

Later on, researchers started disclosing the existence of a vulnerability but not the details. Vendors responded by denying the security holes' existence, or calling them just theoretical. It wasn't until full disclosure became the norm that vendors began consistently fixing vulnerabilities quickly. Now that vendors routinely patch vulnerabilities, researchers generally give them advance notice to allow them to patch their systems before the vulnerability is published. But even with this "responsible disclosure" protocol, it's the threat of disclosure that motivates them to patch their systems. Full disclosure is the mechanism (.pdf) by which computer security improves.

Outside of computer security, secrecy is much more the norm. Some security communities, like locksmiths, behave much like medieval guilds, divulging the secrets of their profession only to those within it. These communities hate open research, and have responded with surprising vitriol to researchers who have found serious vulnerabilities in bicycle locks, combination safes (.pdf), master-key systems and many other security devices.

Researchers have received a similar reaction from other communities more used to secrecy than openness. Researchers -- sometimes young students -- who discovered and published flaws in copyright-protection schemes, voting-machine security and now wireless access cards have all suffered recriminations and sometimes lawsuits for not keeping the vulnerabilities secret. When Christopher Soghoian created a website allowing people to print fake airline boarding passes, he got several unpleasant visits from the FBI.

This preference for secrecy comes from confusing a vulnerability with information about that vulnerability. Using secrecy as a security measure is fundamentally fragile. It assumes that the bad guys don't do their own security research. It assumes that no one else will find the same vulnerability. It assumes that information won't leak out even if the research results are suppressed. These assumptions are all incorrect.

The problem isn't the researchers; it's the products themselves. Companies will only design security as good as what their customers know to ask for. Full disclosure helps customers evaluate the security of the products they buy, and educates them in how to ask for better security. The Dutch court got it exactly right when it wrote: "Damage to NXP is not the result of the publication of the article but of the production and sale of a chip that appears to have shortcomings."

In a world of forced secrecy, vendors make inflated claims about their products, vulnerabilities don't get fixed, and customers are no wiser. Security research is stifled, and security technology doesn't improve. The only beneficiaries are the bad guys.

If you'll forgive the analogy, the ethics of full disclosure parallel the ethics of not paying kidnapping ransoms. We all know why we don't pay kidnappers: It encourages more kidnappings. Yet in every kidnapping case, there's someone -- a spouse, a parent, an employer -- with a good reason why, in this one case, we should make an exception.

The reason we want researchers to publish vulnerabilities is because that's how security improves. But in every case there's someone -- the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority, the locksmiths, an election machine manufacturer -- who argues that, in this one case, we should make an exception.

We shouldn't. The benefits of responsibly publishing attacks greatly outweigh the potential harm. Disclosure encourages companies to build security properly rather than relying on shoddy design and secrecy, and discourages them from promising security based on their ability to threaten researchers. It's how we learn about security, and how we improve future security.

---

Bruce Schneier is Chief Security Technology Officer of BT Global Services and author of Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World. You can read more of his writings on his website.