The latest set of miscreants operates under the brand “goodeyeforlinks.com” and claim to “use white hat SEO techniques in order to get high quality, do-follow links to your website”. They also claim to be “professional” which in this case must mean you pay for their services, since sending out bulk unsolicited email is anything but professional.

Nevertheless, although their long term aim may indeed be to make money from legitimate, albeit foolish, businesses seeking a higher profile, the sites they have been promoting so far are anything but legitimate. In fact they’ve been fake sites covered with Google adverts (so-called “Made for AdSense” (MFA) sites).

They started by asking me to link to “entovation.net” which they claim is “page rank 3″. In fact it is page rank 3 (!) and a blatant copy of http://www.acentesolutions.com which appears entirely genuine (albeit only page rank 1). They have also been promoting “poland-translation-services.com“, which claims to be a site offering “A large team of 2,500 translators specializing in each sector, located in over 30 countries” …

However, this site is clearly fake as well. I haven’t tracked down where it all comes from, but much of this page comes from this Argentinian page, the text of which has been pushed through Google’s Spanish to English translation tools… which sadly (for example) renders

Comentarios: Se considera foja al equivalente a 500 palabras. Si el documento a traducir es menor a una foja, se lo considerará como una foja.

into

Comments: foja is considered the equivalent of 500 words. If the document is translated to a lesser foja, we will consider as a foja.

which makes the 2500 translators look more than a little bit foolish!

The fake websites are hosted by EuroAccess Enterprises Ltd. in The Netherlands (which is also where the email spam has been sent from). I’m not alone in receiving this type of email, further examples can be found here, and here, and here, and here, and here, and here, and even here (in Spanish).

EuroAccess have a fine ticketing system for abuse complaints… so I’m able to keep track of what they’re doing about my emails drawing their attention to the fraudsters they are hosting. I am therefore fully aware that they’ve so far marked my missives as “Priority: Low”, and nothing else is recorded to have been done… However, the tickets are still “Status: Open”, so perhaps a little publicity will encourage them to reassess their prioritisation.

He makes the argument that the Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999 is very much unconstitutional, in that its hefty fines for copyright infringement (misleadingly called "theft" in the title of the bill) show that the bill is effectively a criminal statute, yet for a civil crime. That's because it really focuses on punitive damages, rather than making private parties whole again. Even worse, it puts the act of enforcing the criminal statute in the hands of a private body (the RIAA) who uses it for profit motive in being able to get hefty fines.

Imagine a statute which, in the name of deterrence, provides for a $750 fine for each mile-per-hour that a driver exceeds the speed limit, with the fine escalating to $150,000 per mile over the limit if the driver knew he or she was speeding. Imagine that the fines are not publicized, and most drivers do not know they exist. Imagine that enforcement of the fines is put in the hands of a private, self-interested police force, that has no political accountability, that can pursue any defendant it chooses at its own whim, that can accept or reject payoffs in exchange for not prosecuting the tickets, and that pockets for itself all payoffs and fines. Imagine that a significant percentage of these fines were never contested, regardless of whether they had merit, because the individuals being fined have limited financial resources and little idea of whether they can prevail in front of an objective judicial body.

Another news story.

After Interop Las Vegas you may have seen our analysis of the data that we collected and delivered in our NOC view.  I thought I’d recreate the same data for NY and do a short comparison.

1) Like in Vegas, uptime for the network 100%.  This is no small feat considering that we introduced a new wrinkle in NY, taking down the primary NOC while the education portion of the show was still going on.  This was a forced failover to the backup systems, and it went flawlessly.  I’d like to give a little credit to EM7 on the 100% uptime as it caught a failover to battery power that allowed AC to be restored before a series of critical equipment would have gone down.

2) Again like Vegas, the average monitored device in the show network didn’t even hit 10% CPU utilization.  Still lots of computing overhead availabe in the show network.

3) The NY show network wasn’t nearly as busy as in Las Vegas, sustaining an average of only 27Mbps of usage (versus 56 Mbps) in Vegas.

4) Power consumption for the network and NOC in NY clocked in at 445kwh per day, about 25% less than the Las Vegas show.  This wasn’t because the equipment was any more power efficient, but instead because the show was smaller and therefore there was less network gear.

5) Finally, a stat we didn’t track too carefully in Las Vegas, but that I find interesting.  During show hours the wireless network average 1,100 users attached.  That’s a lot of people and a lot of wireless devices.

The good news is there was nothing too unexpected in the data, overall the smaller show led to a smaller number of tickets and smaller consumption of resources across the board.  We hope to have the opportunity to work with the InteropNet team again next year and take a look at this data year-over-year for each show.

Unfortunately, there's not really anything to his response. It's obvious he doesn't want to admit that they've been checking ID's all this time to no purpose whatsoever, so he just emits vague generalities like a frightened squid filling the water with ink. Yes, some of the stunts in article are silly (who cares if people fly with Hezbollah T-shirts?) so that gives him an opportunity to minimize the real issues.

Watch-lists and identity checks are important and effective security measures. We identify dozens of terrorist-related individuals a week and stop No-Flys regularly with our watch-list process.

It is simply impossible that the TSA catches dozens of terrorists every week. If it were true, the administration would be trumpeting this all over the press -- it would be an amazing success story in their war on terrorism. But note that Hawley doesn't exactly say that; he calls them "terrorist-related individuals." Which means exactly what? People so dangerous they can't be allowed to fly for any reason, yet so innocent they can't be arrested -- even under the provisions of the Patriot Act.

And if Secretary Chertoff is telling the truth when he says that there are only 2,500 people on the no-fly list and fewer than 16,000 people on the selectee list -- they're the ones that get extra screening -- and that most of them live outside the U.S., then it is statistically impossible that the TSA identifies "dozens" of these people every week. The math just doesn't make sense.

And I also don't believe this:

Behavior detection works and we have 2,000 trained officers at airports today. They alert us to people who may pose a threat but who may also have items that could elude other layers of physical security.

It does work, but I don't see the TSA doing it properly. (Fly El Al if you want to see it done properly.) But what I think Hawley is doing is engaging in a little bit of psychological manipulation. Like sky marshals, the real benefit of behavior detection isn't whether or not you do it but whether or not the bad guys believe you're doing it. If they think you are doing behavior detection at security checkpoints, or have sky marshals on every airplane, then you don't actually have to do it. It's the threat that's the deterrent, not the actual security system.

This doesn't impress me, either:

Items carried on the person, be they a 'beer belly' or concealed objects in very private areas, are why we are buying over 100 whole body imagers in upcoming months and will deploy more over time. In the meantime, we use hand-held devices that detect hydrogen peroxide and other explosives compounds as well as targeted pat-downs that require private screening.

Optional security measures don't work, because the bad guys will opt not to use them. It's like those air-puff machines at some airports now. They're probably great at detecting explosive residue off clothing, but every time I have seen the machines in operation, the passengers have the option whether to go through the lane with them or another lane. What possible good is that?

The closest thing to a real response from Hawley is that the terrorists might get caught stealing credit cards.

Using stolen credit cards and false documents as a way to get around watch-lists makes the point that forcing terrorists to use increasingly risky tactics has its own security value.

He's right about that. And, truth be told, that was my sloppiest answer during the original intervied. Thinking about it afterwards, it's far more likely is that someone with a clean record and a legal credit card will buy the various plane tickets.

This is new:

Boarding pass scanners and encryption are being tested in eight airports now and more will be coming.

Ignoring for a moment that "eight airports" nonsense -- unless you do it at every airport, the bad guys will choose the airport where you don't do it to launch their attack -- this is an excellent idea. The reason my attack works, the reason I can get through TSA checkpoints with a fake boarding pass, is that the TSA never confirms that the information on the boarding pass matches a legitimate reservation. If all TSA checkpoints had boarding pass scanners that connected to the airlines' computers, this attack would not work. (Interestingly enough, I noticed exactly this system at the Dublin airport earlier this month.)

Stopping the ‘James Bond’ terrorist is truly a team effort and I whole-heartedly agree that the best way to stop those attacks is with intelligence and law enforcement working together.

This isn't about "Stopping the 'James Bond' terrorist," it's about stopping terrorism. And if all this focus on airports, even assuming it starts working, shifts the terrorists to other targets, we haven't gotten a whole lot of security for our money.

FYI: I did a long interview with Kip Hawley last year. If you haven't read it, I strongly recommend you do. I pressed him on these and many other points, and didn't get very good answers then, either.

One of the most interesting operations was the laundry mat [sic]. Having lost many troops and civilians to bombings, the Brits decided they needed to determine who was making the bombs and where they were being manufactured. One bright fellow recommended they operate a laundry and when asked "what the hell he was talking about," he explained the plan and it was incorporated -- to much success.

The plan was simple: Build a laundry and staff it with locals and a few of their own. The laundry would then send out "color coded" special discount tickets, to the effect of "get two loads for the price of one," etc. The color coding was matched to specific streets and thus when someone brought in their laundry, it was easy to determine the general location from which a city map was coded.

While the laundry was indeed being washed, pressed and dry cleaned, it had one additional cycle -- every garment, sheet, glove, pair of pants, was first sent through an analyzer, located in the basement, that checked for bomb-making residue. The analyzer was disguised as just another piece of the laundry equipment; good OPSEC [operational security]. Within a few weeks, multiple positives had shown up, indicating the ingredients of bomb residue, and intelligence had determined which areas of the city were involved. To narrow their target list, [the laundry] simply sent out more specific coupons [numbered] to all houses in the area, and before long they had good addresses. After confirming addresses, authorities with the SAS teams swooped down on the multiple homes and arrested multiple personnel and confiscated numerous assembled bombs, weapons and ingredients. During the entire operation, no one was injured or killed.

Interop NY 2008 was up considerably in size from the show in 2007.  According to Lenny Heymann, the GM of Interop, this is a trend that they expect to continue.  My personal experience was that the size of the vendors was also up this year.  I think there were so few startups that “Startup City” was pulled from the show completely.  In any case, the show floor was full and there was plenty of attendee traffic to go around.

Definitely helping out from a traffic and draw perspective was the addition of the Web 2.0 Expo - Interop was co-located with both Mobile Business Expo and the Web 2.0 show. It seems like that buzzword still hasn’t lost most of its luster.

From the InteropNet perspective, the main feeling was one of being rushed.  With the show only lasting two days, and the InteropNet team only having a couple of days of ramp up time, everything was compressed into a much shorter period than in Las Vegas.  While this would normally be a challenge, it’s an even bigger challenge at the Javits where the InteropNet team was allowed to do almost nothing ourselves because of union rules.  You’d be surprised how frustrated you can make a network guy who’s told that he has to stand there and watch the electrician plug things in, rather than just doing it himself.  The only thing faster than the InteropNet team getting the Interop NY network up, was my pedicab ride to the InteropNet Booze Cruise.

In any case, everything came off without a hitch, and EM7 performed flawlessly catching a couple of power outages that last day and alerting everyone before the batteries on the UPSes had a chance to run down.

Over the next couple of weeks I’ll analyze the data from the show to see how many tickets were handled, amount of bandwidth consumed, etc and we’ll do a comparison to Interop Las Vegas.

We’re (both ScienceLogic and me personally) looking forward to Interop 2009.

The TSA's useless photo ID rules

No-fly lists and photo IDs are supposed to help protect the flying public from terrorists. Except that they don't work.

By Bruce Schneier

August 28, 2008

The TSA is tightening its photo ID rules at airport security. Previously, people with expired IDs or who claimed to have lost their IDs were subjected to secondary screening. Then the Transportation Security Administration realized that meant someone on the government's no-fly list -- the list that is supposed to keep our planes safe from terrorists -- could just fly with no ID.

Now, people without ID must also answer personal questions from their credit history to ascertain their identity. The TSA will keep records of who those ID-less people are, too, in case they're trying to probe the system.

This may seem like an improvement, except that the photo ID requirement is a joke. Anyone on the no-fly list can easily fly whenever he wants. Even worse, the whole concept of matching passenger names against a list of bad guys has negligible security value.

How to fly, even if you are on the no-fly list: Buy a ticket in some innocent person's name. At home, before your flight, check in online and print out your boarding pass. Then, save that web page as a PDF and use Adobe Acrobat to change the name on the boarding pass to your own. Print it again. At the airport, use the fake boarding pass and your valid ID to get through security. At the gate, use the real boarding pass in the fake name to board your flight.

The problem is that it is unverified passenger names that get checked against the no-fly list. At security checkpoints, the TSA just matches IDs to whatever is printed on the boarding passes. The airline checks boarding passes against tickets when people board the plane. But because no one checks ticketed names against IDs, the security breaks down.

This vulnerability isn't new. It isn't even subtle. I first wrote about it in 2006. I asked Kip Hawley, who runs the TSA, about it in 2007. Today, any terrorist smart enough to Google "print your own boarding pass" can bypass the no-fly list.

This gaping security hole would bother me more if the very idea of a no-fly list weren't so ineffective. The system is based on the faulty notion that the feds have this master list of terrorists, and all we have to do is keep the people on the list off the planes.

That's just not true. The no-fly list -- a list of people so dangerous they are not allowed to fly yet so innocent we can't arrest them -- and the less dangerous "watch list" contain a combined 1 million names representing the identities and aliases of an estimated 400,000 people. There aren't that many terrorists out there; if there were, we would be feeling their effects.

Almost all of the people stopped by the no-fly list are false positives. It catches innocents such as Ted Kennedy, whose name is similar to someone's on the list, and Islam Yusuf (formerly Cat Stevens), who was on the list but no one knew why.

The no-fly list is a Kafkaesque nightmare for the thousands of innocent Americans who are harassed and detained every time they fly. Put on the list by unidentified government officials, they can't get off. They can't challenge the TSA about their status or prove their innocence. (The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals decided this month that no-fly passengers can sue the FBI, but that strategy hasn't been tried yet.)

But even if these lists were complete and accurate, they wouldn't work. Timothy McVeigh, the Unabomber, the D.C. snipers, the London subway bombers and most of the 9/11 terrorists weren't on any list before they committed their terrorist acts. And if a terrorist wants to know if he's on a list, the TSA has approved a convenient, $100 service that allows him to figure it out: the Clear program, which issues IDs to "trusted travelers" to speed them through security lines. Just apply for a Clear card; if you get one, you're not on the list.

In the end, the photo ID requirement is based on the myth that we can somehow correlate identity with intent. We can't. And instead of wasting money trying, we would be far safer as a nation if we invested in intelligence, investigation and emergency response -- security measures that aren't based on a guess about a terrorist target or tactic.

That's the TSA: Not doing the right things. Not even doing right the things it does.

"The rigorous studies clearly show red-light cameras don't work," said lead author Barbara Langland-Orban, professor and chair of health policy and management at the USF College of Public Health. "Instead, they increase crashes and injuries as drivers attempt to abruptly stop at camera intersections."

Comprehensive studies from North Carolina, Virginia, and Ontario have all reported cameras are associated with increases in crashes. The study by the Virginia Transportation Research Council also found that cameras were linked to increased crash costs. The only studies that conclude cameras reduced crashes or injuries contained "major research design flaws," such as incomplete data or inadequate analyses, and were always conducted by researchers with links to the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. The IIHS, funded by automobile insurance companies, is the leading advocate for red-light cameras since insurance companies can profit from red-light cameras by way of higher premiums due to increased crashes and citations.

And, of course, the agenda of the government is to increase revenue due to fines:

A 2001 paper by the Office of the Majority Leader of the U.S. House of Representatives reported that red-light cameras are "a hidden tax levied on motorists." The report came to the same conclusions that all of the other valid studies have, that red-light cameras are associated with increased crashes and that the timings at yellow lights are often set too short to increase tickets for red-light running. That's right, the state actually tampers with the yellow light settings to make them shorter, and more likely to turn red as you're driving through them.

In fact, six U.S. cities have been found guilty of shortening the yellow light cycles below what is allowed by law on intersections equipped with cameras meant to catch red-light runners. Those local governments have completely ignored the safety benefit of increasing the yellow light time and decided to install red-light cameras, shorten the yellow light duration, and collect the profits instead.

The cities in question include Union City, CA, Dallas and Lubbock, TX, Nashville and Chattanooga, TN, and Springfield, MO, according to Motorists.org, which collected information from reports from around the country.

From the Confidential Memo Prepared for the MBTA which was publicly disclosed by the MBTA is court filing:

This seems to break all the rules of integrity of sensitive data storage. How could someone store money on a magnetic stripe in 2008 and not store an identifier that references the account in a central database?

The tickets do have a unique identifier generated when the card is initially purchased so a fraud detection system could be in place or is planned. But this would require tracking the value on the ticket or the usage of the ticket centrally so it isn’t clear why the value is stored on the card in the first place.

There are so many question about the security of this public system.  Fraud costs the Massachusetts taxpayer money and refitting an insecure, ill-designed system costs the Massachusetts taxpayer money. [Disclosure: I am a Massachusetts taxpayer.]

It should be a requirement that the current system or the (hopefully) upgraded system be tested by an independent organization that specializes in cryptosystems.  If the independent testing uncovers vulnerabilities, they need to be fixed before the system is fielded. Then the system should be retested to verify the fixes.  Once the system is deemed secure by an independent organization, a summary of the test document should be published for public inspection.  It should include the types of testing conducted and the results.

The public trust requires inspection of taxpayer funded projects to make sure they meet acceptible standards and vendors held responsible for deficiencies.  Projects that use computers and software should not get a free pass. It will be interesting to see if the CharlieTicket system is ever held up to public scrutiny.