It just so happens that I have been experimenting with Amazon Elastic Computing Services (EC2), documented in Computing in the Clouds with AWS over at The CEP Blog.  The server over at The UNIX and Linux Forums has been experiencing some very hardware-limited, high load averages recently. We thought we should take a look at moving the forum server up to the clouds.   

Then, a fellow system admin over at the forums suggested that maybe some rogue bots were causing high server loads; so I wrote a one-line command to do a bit of real-time spider hunting in the Apache2 logfiles.  Surprise!  I found there were a number of rogue, hungry spiders that would not follow our robots.txt directive not to crawl the site.   One of the bots was from Russia, one was from China, and another one was from Korea.  There were spiders from places I never heard of, all consuming precious  resources and denying our users!

So, I did what any Linux admin would do. I used iptables to block the networks of these rogue, hungry, spiders (sorry I was not very kind to these cyber creatures).  It probally comes to no surprise at this point in the story that four of the spiders were from the Amazon EC2 cloud.  Here is a sample of the output from iptables -L:

root@www:~# iptables -L
Chain INPUT (policy ACCEPT)
target prot opt source destination
DROP all — ec2-67-202-45-0.compute-1.amazonaws.com/24
DROP all — ec2-75-101-243-0.compute-1.amazonaws.com/24
DROP all — ec2-75-101-197-0.compute-1.amazonaws.com/24
DROP all — ec2-75-101-213-0.compute-1.amazonaws.com/24

Well, imagine a not-so-distant future dystopian world where criminals or terrorists want to launch a massive denial-of-service attack against some critical infrastructure, like the root DNS servers, or an attack against major financial institutions, military or e-commerce sites.   

First, the bad guys create an instance of powerful operating system with a malicious network application, they test it, and they place it the cloud (without invoking the instance, paying a very small storage fee, no computing time fee) and they wait.   Then, at the precise moment of their planned attack, they launch 128 instances each with the equivalence of whatever is the mega-platform at the time, and just blast away at their attack target(s).    Even more damaging, they do this from many cloud computing infrastructures.  (Note: The cost of the attack is minimal because the criminals are only charged a few pennies an hour for each running instance and the attack runs an hour or two.)

My experience with cloud computing, which is still maturing, is that cloud computing has great promise for both good and evil.  The very real example of the “spiders from the clouds” is a harmless enough story of folks using a cloud computing infrastructure for web crawling, perhaps hoping to be the next Google billionaires. 

One the other hand, cloud computing brings with it an emerging and growing danger for the misuse of the power of cloud computing infrastructures.   The misuse could be malicious, or accidental, but never-the-less, the danger is real.

What an interesting world we have created!  Would would have ever dreamed 10 years ago that we could be attacked by ……

#include <horror_movie_sounds.mp3>

…. Spiders from the Clouds.

Reprinted by permission from The Attack of the Spiders from the Clouds by Tim Bass, CISSP

Braving the Cold (Boot) – A Sneak Peek of My Presentation at Black Hat

by Patrick McGregor

Cold boot attacks aren’t theoretical academic exercises. Cold boot attacks are real. And they’re serious.

In the past few years, companies have poured hundreds of millions of dollars into full disk encryption technologies. Companies expect full disk encryption to reduce the risk of exposure of sensitive information such as intellectual property or customer data. Reality often deviates from what is expected, however. Researchers from Princeton shocked the industry earlier in 2008 when they released a research paper that showed that low-cost “Cold Boot” attacks could be used to defeat the security of most full disk encryption systems. They recently even published all the tools needed to do this at home!

Some have argued that Cold Boot attacks are not serious security threats. I disagree! First, an unskilled person can capitalize on the exploit using simple, automated steps and publicly available tools. In fact, Cold Boot attacks require nothing more than plugging a USB drive into a laptop. Second, the physical target of a Cold Boot attack, such as a laptop, is very easily obtainable (see the recent Ponemon report on laptops lost/stolen in airports – scary!). Third, although many laptops and desktops are stolen via random acts of theft, it is well known that some criminals profit from organized, calculated data theft. It is only a matter of time before we hear of a high-profile data breach that results from a simple Cold Boot attack.

I am excited to present at Black Hat several innovations for preventing Cold Boot attacks. In addition to summarizing how a Cold Boot attack works, I’ll describe four new software techniques for hardening full disk encryption against the attacks. The software technology was developed by myself, Tim Hollebeek, Alexander Volynkin, and Matt White. All of us work for BitArmor, an exciting security startup based in Pittsburgh. Here’s a sneak peek:

· Wash up: Wipe keys immediately before certain OS state transitions, such as before the computer shuts down or goes into hibernation mode – accessing the memory will yield nothing.

· Take advantage of BIOS memory smashing: By strategically placing keys in certain regions of memory, we can rely on the BIOS boot process to overwrite keys before any operating system can dump the contents of memory.

· Is it chilly in here?: Using built-in temperature sensors, we can lock down the system in reaction to temperature drops that may indicate a Cold Boot attack is in progress.

· Create a virtual enclave for keys: We can implement special cryptographic, OS and processor architecture techniques to provide robust protection for keys against the most aggressive cold boot attacks. By creating a “virtual secure enclave” for encryption keys in software, an attacker cannot extract critical keys from memory – even if the RAM is super-cooled.

Hope you can join us at Black Hat as we take an in-depth look at the future of full disk encryption technology.

I was reading Tim Greene's column this morning about Symantec's new on demand web log in for guests as part of their SNAC appliance offering. I have to admit that even I who follows the NAC market and competition pretty closely, get pretty confused with all of the different offerings Symantec has come out with around NAC. Symantec seems to be following a fling stuff on the wall and see what sticks strategy when it comes to NAC.  The problem is separating the keepers from the rest of it when evaluating their offering.

This latest offering appears to sure up a hole that was called out in the recent CRN review of their product in a bake off against Sophos and StillSecure's Safe Access. In that review Symantec's drop off in functionality between agent and agentless was called out.  So within just a few days comes this announcement addressing the issue.  Very timely indeed.  This comes on the heels of Symantec's peer-to-peer approach to NAC, which came on the heels of their Endpoint Security product version 11 which had NAC included (and which I understand has already been patched/upgraded several times since its release). 

At this point you have Symantec NAC with their endpoint suite which is a throw in but has no guest access option on its own. Than you have the Symantec NAC appliance which can do enforcement of managed devices beyond what just endpoint suite gives you.  Now you also have on demand/dissolvable agents available with the Symantec NAC server (but I guess not with the endpoint suite). You also have the Symantec peer-to-peer stuff, which I think also requires the SNAC server.  Starting to get confusing? I guess this is what happens when your NAC offering is made up of an amalgamation of several different products lumped together.

Not to worry though, I am sure Big Yellow will still sell plenty of all flavors of their NAC offering. At the end of the day some of this stuff is bound to stick.

I was reading Tim Greene's column this morning about Symantec's new on demand web log in for guests as part of their SNAC appliance offering. I have to admit that even I who follows the NAC market and competition pretty closely, get pretty confused with all of the different offerings Symantec has come out with around NAC. Symantec seems to be following a fling stuff on the wall and see what sticks strategy when it comes to NAC.  The problem is separating the keepers from the rest of it when evaluating their offering.

This latest offering appears to sure up a hole that was called out in the recent CRN review of their product in a bake off against Sophos and StillSecure's Safe Access. In that review Symantec's drop off in functionality between agent and agentless was called out.  So within just a few days comes this announcement addressing the issue.  Very timely indeed.  This comes on the heels of Symantec's peer-to-peer approach to NAC, which came on the heels of their Endpoint Security product version 11 which had NAC included (and which I understand has already been patched/upgraded several times since its release). 

At this point you have Symantec NAC with their endpoint suite which is a throw in but has no guest access option on its own. Than you have the Symantec NAC appliance which can do enforcement of managed devices beyond what just endpoint suite gives you.  Now you also have on demand/dissolvable agents available with the Symantec NAC server (but I guess not with the endpoint suite). You also have the Symantec peer-to-peer stuff, which I think also requires the SNAC server.  Starting to get confusing? I guess this is what happens when your NAC offering is made up of an amalgamation of several different products lumped together.

Not to worry though, I am sure Big Yellow will still sell plenty of all flavors of their NAC offering. At the end of the day some of this stuff is bound to stick.

Recently several NAC customers have been stepping up and talking about how they use NAC and why. Last week there was a good article on Estee Lauder using NAC first for guest access control and most recently an expansion of their NAC deployment to help with PCI compliance.  This week in an article with the usual left-handed compliments, Tim Greene in between quotes by the so called analyst experts, talks about several NAC companies rolling out NAC.  One is American Bancard, another StillSecure customer who uses NAC to help with PCI and keep their network secure. The article talks about several other companies using NAC solutions from other vendors as well, which is also very encouraging.  Of course the companies I have spoken about I know for a fact are using NAC.  With some of the competition, you cannot always be sure as I have written about in the past.

In any event, I think it is important that we are starting to see some real public references for NAC deployments.  Nothing proves the point of a products value than real live customers stepping up and talking about it!

“Linux is a movement, a philosophy, where programmers and technical people take control of their own destiny.”  — Tim Bass

Ref:  Email signature, Re: Future of 2.0.36, G.W. Wettstein (greg@wind.enjellic.com), Sat, 24 Oct 1998 10:09:27 -0500

AEP had been a victim of the NAC fallout.  They made a bad bet on an OEM partner to provide them with NAC technology.  When that NAC vendor went belly up, so did AEPs NAC product as a result.  Now Tim Greene reports that AEP has come out with a new device that while not strictly a NAC product, does more identity access control and does not seem to do any admission control.

AEP which makes a SSL VPN type of appliance has a new appliance that delivers an agent to an endpoint and authenticates the user.  It than according to the article inserts an identifier in the payload of every packet that shows where and who that packet is from which then allows it to either pass or not pass through, only to its allowed base.  I don’t know that seems a bit of a chokepoint/bottleneck to me, but I don’t know enough about it, only what I read in the article.

The appliance is not cheap with a price tag of over 50k for just 99 users.  It seems like an awful lot of money for what it does.  An important lesson I think on picking the right OEM partner.  Pick the wrong one and your product goes down as collateral damage to the OEM partners demise.

I am not sure what it is with Richard Stiennon.  Maybe his mom beat him with a NAC stick when he was young.  Hence his Jack Nicholson looks (more like the Joker in Batman, than Col Jessep in A Few Good Men) and his total disdain for NAC.  In any event Richard never seems to miss a chance to take a pot shot at NAC.  I have fired back and debated him many times on this.  In fact I am convinced that Richard's problem with NAC is that like Uncle Joe, he is just moving a little slow.  Richard still thinks of NAC as Cisco???s network admission control, circa Dec ???03.  He has not gotten up to speed on anything happening with NAC since.  Richard is going to debate NAC with Joel Snyder according to this article by Tim Greene today. My prediction is Snyder by a knockout in 3 rounds or less.

Richard???s latest NAC knock comes on a comment to an excellent article by the Hoff.  Chris takes a bold stand for someone working for a vendor and calls BS on the whole analyst thing (I will write more about that later in this article). Richard being an ex-analyst himself (lets face it, with Richard you can take the man out of the analyst job, but you can???t take the analyst out of the man), takes exception to Hoff???s ???whining??? (Richards words, not mine) and tries to tell Hoff that giving up is not the answer and the way to show up analysts, is to prove them wrong.  Great Richard you try to prove them wrong, when because of what they report you don???t have a market, can???t get any capital and have no visibility.  I guess that is when it is time to move on to the next gig, right? Then Richard has a bad NAC deja vu and feels it necessary to write this:

???Look how easy it is to one up the analyst firms, who as near as I can tell support Network Admission Control universally. Everyone except the folks at Updata Ventures know how seriously flawed NAC is with only one viable market, edu.???

I assume Richard is referring to Updata recently leading the Bradford Networks VC round. But more importantly Richard it is time to call a code red on you and give you the cold hard truth.  Richard the fact is that the edu market is not the only viable market for NAC.  In fact, one of the biggest customers of NAC is the DoD.  That is right Richard at least 3 of the 4 armed forces use NAC in helping to secure their networks. To paraphrase my friend Col Jessep - Richard, you want the truth, you can???t handle the truth!  You sleep securely under the blanket of protection that NAC provides.  If it is good enough to help ???clean the sand??? out of laptops coming home from SWA (that is SouthWest Asia, like in Iraq and Afghanistan, in case you don???t know Richard), it should be good enough for you. Think about that next time you are about to bad mouth NAC.

Let me give you some other truths you may not like Richard.  Why do you think every switch vendor (of which we partner with many of them) is lining up and bringing out NAC solutions?  Why has Microsoft put such a big push on NAP?  Why despite the Luddites like you does NAC still draw crowds at conferences like Interop (ask Joel about that).  Richard we are still signing new major OEM partners.  I am afraid you are the one sadly out of touch on this one Richard.  Just as you are out of touch in missing Hoff???s point in his article.

As to Hoff???s article, as I said I give Chris credit for speaking his mind. I spend an ungodly amount of my time speaking with analysts and trying to ???learn??? from them while at the same time trying to educate them.  I am constantly amazed that so many analysts (and press for that matter) just take a vendors word as gospel. I have seen research reports from analysts big and small, that I am sure did not have any more research done than calling a handful of vendors and listening to their spiel. Too many of these vendors if they do speak to customers, base their findings on such a small sample that it is impossible to have an accurate picture.

Personally, like Hoff says, who watches the watchers is the truth. I would like to see a code of conduct among analysts. I would start by dictating that vendors cannot pay analysts.  Take the payola out of the equation the way they did to the DJ/Radio business in the late 50s. Next analyst reports have to come with metrics to back up the findings. I want to know how many customers they spoke to, how big they were, how they were found, etc.  A vendor giving an analyst a real live???pet??? customer is not real research. I want to know if the customer pays the analyst. It is a dirty business.

Hey let me be clear, I play the game as well as the next guy.  But I agree with Hoff we need to clean up the rules to make the whole analyst thing more fair, viable and valuable.

I am not sure what it is with Richard Stiennon.  Maybe his mom beat him with a NAC stick when he was young.  Hence his Jack Nicholson looks (more like the Joker in Batman, than Col Jessep in A Few Good Men) and his total disdain for NAC.  In any event Richard never seems to miss a chance to take a pot shot at NAC.  I have fired back and debated him many times on this.  In fact I am convinced that Richard's problem with NAC is that like Uncle Joe, he is just moving a little slow.  Richard still thinks of NAC as Cisco’s network admission control, circa Dec ‘03.  He has not gotten up to speed on anything happening with NAC since.  Richard is going to debate NAC with Joel Snyder according to this article by Tim Greene today. My prediction is Snyder by a knockout in 3 rounds or less.

Richard’s latest NAC knock comes on a comment to an excellent article by the Hoff.  Chris takes a bold stand for someone working for a vendor and calls BS on the whole analyst thing (I will write more about that later in this article). Richard being an ex-analyst himself (lets face it, with Richard you can take the man out of the analyst job, but you can’t take the analyst out of the man), takes exception to Hoff’s “whining” (Richards words, not mine) and tries to tell Hoff that giving up is not the answer and the way to show up analysts, is to prove them wrong.  Great Richard you try to prove them wrong, when because of what they report you don’t have a market, can’t get any capital and have no visibility.  I guess that is when it is time to move on to the next gig, right? Then Richard has a bad NAC deja vu and feels it necessary to write this:

“Look how easy it is to one up the analyst firms, who as near as I can tell support Network Admission Control universally. Everyone except the folks at Updata Ventures know how seriously flawed NAC is with only one viable market, edu.”

I assume Richard is referring to Updata recently leading the Bradford Networks VC round. But more importantly Richard it is time to call a code red on you and give you the cold hard truth.  Richard the fact is that the edu market is not the only viable market for NAC.  In fact, one of the biggest customers of NAC is the DoD.  That is right Richard at least 3 of the 4 armed forces use NAC in helping to secure their networks. To paraphrase my friend Col Jessep - Richard, you want the truth, you can’t handle the truth!  You sleep securely under the blanket of protection that NAC provides.  If it is good enough to help “clean the sand” out of laptops coming home from SWA (that is SouthWest Asia, like in Iraq and Afghanistan, in case you don’t know Richard), it should be good enough for you. Think about that next time you are about to bad mouth NAC.

Let me give you some other truths you may not like Richard.  Why do you think every switch vendor (of which we partner with many of them) is lining up and bringing out NAC solutions?  Why has Microsoft put such a big push on NAP?  Why despite the Luddites like you does NAC still draw crowds at conferences like Interop (ask Joel about that).  Richard we are still signing new major OEM partners.  I am afraid you are the one sadly out of touch on this one Richard.  Just as you are out of touch in missing Hoff’s point in his article.

As to Hoff’s article, as I said I give Chris credit for speaking his mind. I spend an ungodly amount of my time speaking with analysts and trying to “learn” from them while at the same time trying to educate them.  I am constantly amazed that so many analysts (and press for that matter) just take a vendors word as gospel. I have seen research reports from analysts big and small, that I am sure did not have any more research done than calling a handful of vendors and listening to their spiel. Too many of these vendors if they do speak to customers, base their findings on such a small sample that it is impossible to have an accurate picture.

Personally, like Hoff says, who watches the watchers is the truth. I would like to see a code of conduct among analysts. I would start by dictating that vendors cannot pay analysts.  Take the payola out of the equation the way they did to the DJ/Radio business in the late 50s. Next analyst reports have to come with metrics to back up the findings. I want to know how many customers they spoke to, how big they were, how they were found, etc.  A vendor giving an analyst a real live“pet” customer is not real research. I want to know if the customer pays the analyst. It is a dirty business.

Hey let me be clear, I play the game as well as the next guy.  But I agree with Hoff we need to clean up the rules to make the whole analyst thing more fair, viable and valuable.