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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: university]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/university</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 18 Jun 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[A Blast from the Past: CEP at Stanford,1998-2003]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ecd27eebd62b2df7d9e99b1fcf7ac96f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ecd27eebd62b2df7d9e99b1fcf7ac96f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Courtesy of Complex Event Processing at Stanford
Complex event processing (CEP) is a new technology. It can be applied to extracting and analyzing information from any kind of distributed...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Courtesy of <a href="http://pavg.stanford.edu/cep/" target="_blank">Complex Event Processing at Stanford</a></p>
<p>Complex event processing (CEP) is a new technology. It can be applied to extracting and analyzing information from any kind of distributed message-based system. It is developed from the Rapide concepts of (1) causal event modeling, (2) event patterns and pattern matching, and (3) event pattern maps and constraints. Complex event processing can be applied to a wide variety of Enterprise monitoring and management problems, from low level network management to high level enterprise intelligence gathering.</p>
<h2>Applications of Complex Event Processing:</h2>
<ul>
<li><strong><a href="http://pavg.stanford.edu/cep/enterprise-viewing.html">Instant Insight</a></strong>  - hierarchical event viewing applied to the Enterprise IT layer. (coming soon)
<ul>
<li><a href="http://pavg.stanford.edu/cep/instantinsightpaper.pdf">Analysing business processes</a> (paper in pdf format)</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="http://pavg.stanford.edu/cep/netviewer-presentation.ppt">Network Level Monitoring and Management (Powerpoint presentation)</a></li>
<li><a href="http://pavg.stanford.edu/ID/">Cyber Security: Network Intrusion Detection</a></li>
<li>Enterprise Monitoring and Management (coming soon)</li>
<li><a href="http://pavg.stanford.edu/cep/final-version-131102.pdf">Modeling and Simulation of Collaborative Business Processes </a></li>
<li>Business Policy Monitoring. (coming soon)</li>
<li>Analysis and Debugging of Distributed Systems (coming soon)</li>
</ul>
<h2>Presentations:</h2>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://pavg.stanford.edu/cep/ee380abstract.html">&#8220;Complex Event Processing: An Essential Technology for Instant Insight into the Operation of Enterprise Information Systems,&#8221; </a>lecture at the Stanford University Computer Systems Laborary EE380 Colloquium series. <a href="http://stanford-online.stanford.edu/courses/ee380/030115-ee380-100.asx">Video of the lecture (duration: 60 minutes). </a></li>
</ul>
<h2>Publications:</h2>
<ul>
<li><em><a href="http://pavg.stanford.edu/cep/fabline.ps">Complex Event Processing in Distributed Systems.</a></em> David C. Luckham and Brian Frasca, Stanford University Technical Report CSL-TR-98-754, March 1998, 28 pages.<em>Abstract:</em> Complex event processing is a new technology for extracting information from distributed message-based systems. This technology allows users of a system to specify the information that is of interest to them. It can be low level network processing data or high level enterprise management intelligence, depending upon the role and viewpoint of individual users. And it can be changed from moment to moment while the target system is in operation. This paper presents an overview of Complex Event Processing applied to a particular example of a distributed message-based system, a fabrication process management system. The concepts of causal event histories, event patterns, event filtering, and event aggregation are introduced and their application to the process management system is illustrated by simple examples. This paper gives the reader an overview of Complex Event Processing concepts and illustrates how they can be applied using the Rapide toolset to one specific kind of system.<br />
 </li>
<li><em><a href="http://pavg.stanford.edu/cep/99pakdd.ps">Event Mining with Event Processing Networks.</a></em> Louis Perrochon and Walter Mann and Stephane Kasriel and David C. Luckham, The Third Pacific-Asia Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. April 26-28, 1999. Beijing, China, 5 pages.<em>Abstract:</em> Event Mining discovers and delivers information and knowledge in a real-time stream of data, or events. We show that the process of delivering knowledge by searching patterns in data and subsequent abstraction of found patterns can be applied in real-time to a complex, asynchronous system. Our event processing engine consists of a network of event processing agents (EPAs) running in parallel that interact using a dedicated event processing infrastructure. The agents can be configured at run-time using a formal pattern language. The underlying infrastructure (1) provides an abstract communication mechanism and thus allows dynamic reconfiguration of the communication topology between agents at run-time and (2) provides transparent, location-independent access to all data. These features allow dynamic allocation of EPAs to different threads and processes on different machines at run time.<br />
 </li>
<li><em><a href="http://pavg.stanford.edu/people/santoro/distrib/ejava.ps">eJava - Extending Java with Causality</a></em>. Alexandre Santoro and Walter Mann and Neel Madhav and David Luckham, Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Software Engineering and Knowledge Engineering, June 1998, 10 pages.<em>Abstract:</em> Programming languages like Java provide designers with a variety of classes that simplify the process of program development. Some of these classes allow one to easily build multithreaded programs. Though useful, especially in the creation of reactive systems, multithreaded programs present challenging problems such as race conditions and synchronization issues. Validating these programs against a specification is not trivial since Java does not clearly indicate thread interaction. These problems can be solved by modifying Java so that it produces computations, collections of events with both causal and temporal ordering relations defined for them. Specifically, the causal ordering is ideal for identifying thread interaction. This paper presents eJava, an extension to Java that is both event based and causally aware, and shows how it simplifies the process of understanding and debugging multithreaded programs.<br />
 </li>
<li><a href="http://pavg.stanford.edu/cep/99wicsa1.ps.gz">Event-Based Execution Architectures for Dynamic Software Systems</a>. James Vera, Louis Perrochon, David C. Luckham.<br />
Proceedings of the First Working IFIP Conf. on Software Architecture. 1999. San Antonio, Texas.<em>Abstract:</em> Distributed systems&#8217; runtime behavior can be difficult to understand. Concurrent, distributed activity make notions of global state difficult to grasp. We focus on the runtime structure of a system, its execution architecture, and propose representing its evolution as a partially ordered set of predefined architectural event types. This representation allows a system&#8217;s topology to be visualized, analyzed and con-strained. The use of a predefined event types allows the execution architectures of different systems to be readily compared.<br />
 </li>
<li><em><a href="http://pavg.stanford.edu/cep/cidf.ps.gz">Using Context-Based Correlation in Network Operations and Management</a></em>. Louis Perrochon (work in progress, mail author for newest version)<em>Abstract:</em> Network operation consists to a large degree of reaction to activities happening in the network. Better knowledge of the network at any time allows more appropriate reactions. On the example of intrusion detection, we show how context-based correlation of such activities can provide a more detailed view of the network in shorter time. We first present how we model context and then describe the architecture of the Stanford University CEP context-based correlator. Correlation is specified as event patterns in a declarative language that allows us to specify what needs to be detected, instead of specifying how it should be detected. CEP introduces the concept of causal context to intrusion detection. The correlator is able to process events on-line, as they are generated and it can be reconfigured at dynamically. We then show how it increases detection rate, reduce false alarms, and detect large-scale attack patterns at an early stage.</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 07 Jul 2008 15:20:21 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/architectural event types">architectural event types</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/event">event</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/event pattern maps">event pattern maps</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/event types">event types</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/event aggregation">event aggregation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/event patterns">event patterns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/complex event">complex event</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/event based">event based</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hierarchical event">hierarchical event</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/07/07/a-blast-from-the-past-cep-at-stanford1998-2003/">A Blast from the Past: CEP at Stanford,1998-2003</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[U.S. Arms Dealer Tests Legal Bounds in Middle East Arms Bazaar]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a494b708fadf3d4f453c6495d8064dc2</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a494b708fadf3d4f453c6495d8064dc2</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Former congressman Curt Weldon is helping broker deals between Russian and Ukranian weapons suppliers and the Iraqi and Libyan governments as part of his new job with a private American defense...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>
Former congressman Curt Weldon is helping broker deals between Russian and Ukranian weapons suppliers and the Iraqi and Libyan governments as part of his new job with a private American defense consulting firm, Wired.com has learned. 
</p>

<p>
Weldon, who is currently being investigated by the FBI over alleged corruption during his time in office, visited Libya in March to discuss a possible military deal, according to a letter describing the trip from Weldon to <a href="http://www.ds-pa.com/">Defense Solutions</a> CEO Timothy Ringgold. In May, Weldon, together with Ringgold and another company representative, traveled to Moscow to discuss working with Russia's weapons-export agency on arms sales to the Middle East.
</p>

<p>
Both trips were part of the company's effort to tap into the growing -- and often legally murky -- market for selling weapons from former Eastern Bloc countries to the Middle East and Afghanistan.
</p>



<div id="embed" style="margin: 0px 0px 15px 15px; float: right; width: 250px; height: auto;">

<img src="http://www.wired.com/images/article/full/2008/07/weldon_350px.jpg" width="250px" alt="Curt Weldon">

<div id="caption">

Ex-Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Penn., is helping broker deals between Russian weapons suppliers and the Iraqi and Libyan governments through his company, Defense Solutions.<br />
<em>Photo: H. Rumph Jr/AP</em>

</div> 

</div>

<p>
The Russians want to sell weapons to Iraq directly, but "must go slow on Iraq because of political reasons" and want to work with an "intermediary" like Defense Solutions, CEO Ringgold subsequently wrote to colleagues. "They have not spoken with any American company that can offer the quid pro quo that we can or that has the connections in Russia that we have," he boasted.
</p>



<p>
A few years ago, an American company proposing to sell weapons to Libya might have triggered a congressional hearing. So, too, would have a proposal to conduct arms deals with Russia, which the United States has accused of selling high-tech weapons to Syria and Iran. 
</p>

<p>However, U.S. government efforts to rapidly equip countries like Afghanistan and Iraq -- which have largely Soviet-origin weapons -- have created legal ambiguities and loopholes in export controls that didn't exist in years past and given rise to a new class of arms trade middlemen. So, even though both Libya and the Russian arms export agency are on official U.S. blacklists, government officials and analysts involved in weapons sales say the rules have become unclear as the push to equip allies in the global war on terror has blazed new but uncertain legal ground. 
</p>




<p>
Eagerly stepping into that virgin territory is <a href="http://www.ds-pa.com/">Defense Solutions</a>, a Pennsylvania-based company that is carving out a small but lucrative niche in a new international arms bazaar. The firm boasts as its advisors a number of influential Washington insiders, such as retired General Barry McCaffrey, the former White House drug czar.
</p>

<p>
Helping the firm make key connections is Curt Weldon, a former Republican congressman from Pennsylvania at the center of an FBI investigation into alleged conflicts of interest during his time in office.  Weldon, now a key executive at Defense Solutions, is working with the company to set up these weapons deals.
</p>

<div id="embed" style="margin: 0px 0px 15px 15px; float: right; width: 350px; height: auto;">

<img src="http://www.wired.com/images/article/full/2008/07/btr_60_350px.jpg" alt="">

<div id="caption">

Defense Solutions has also proposed refurbishing Libya's BTR-60 armored personnel carriers, according to a sales proposal seen by Wired.com. Defense Solutions denies drafting a sales proposal to Libya.

</div> 

</div>

<p>
It's an unusual, if not an entirely unexpected chapter for Weldon, whose time in office included frequent trips to Russia. As an influential member of the House Armed Services Committee, Weldon pushed for multibillion-dollar defense programs, like ballistic missile defense, and earned a reputation as a foreign policy gadfly, boasting of his contacts with officials in nations labeled by the administration as "rogue states" such as Libya and North Korea. Weldon's wild claims about a 9/11 cover-up and his sensationalist book warning of an Iranian terror plot, sometimes earned him official scorn and public ridicule, but it was accusations that he steered contracts to Eastern European businesses linked to his daughter's lobbying firm that drew the government's attention.
</p>


<!--pagebreak-->
<p>
Weldon was voted out of office in 2006 just weeks after the FBI raided his daughter's home, and that of one of her associates.
</p>

<p>
Weldon did not respond to e-mails and phone requests to be interviewed or comment for this article. But in a 2006 interview, before the FBI probe was public, Weldon spoke enthusiastically about setting up a "front company" to work with the Russian arms agency, Rosoboronexport. Weldon hoped this company could sell weapons to the Middle East, and other regions, particularly to countries where the U.S. has strained relations. He claimed the director of Rosoboronexport approached him to work with "an American company that would act as a front for weapons these nations want to buy."
</p>

<p>
Weldon called the proposal an "unbelievable offer."
</p>

<p>
The administration, he acknowledged at the time, did not welcome the idea of an American company selling Russian weapons to potentially unfriendly countries. But two years later, Weldon, now a private citizen and chief strategic officer for Defense Solutions, appears to be working on precisely that sort of deal. And whether illegal or not, Defense Solutions' business represents a new phenomenon in the international arms trade business.
</p>

<p>
In years past arms brokers -- firms or individuals who serve as middlemen to facilitate weapons sales between countries -- were largely the stuff of spy thrillers. Unlike traditional American defense companies, like Lockheed Martin or Boeing, which typically sell weapons directly to NATO countries or other governments regarded as friendly to the United States, brokers are often small outfits run by people with sometimes questionable experience and reputations they will sell to anyone. One of the most infamous arms brokers, a Russian named <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victor_Bout">Viktor Bout</a>, is charged by the United States, United Nations, Interpol and others of funneling arms to terrorists and rebels around the world. He was recently arrested in Thailand. The United States is requesting his extradition on charges of supplying arms to a terrorist organization.
</p>

<div id="embed" style="margin: 0px 0px 15px 15px; float: right; width: 350px; height: auto;">

<img src="http://www.wired.com/images/article/full/2008/07/bmp_1_350px.jpg" alt="" />

<div id="caption">

Two Marines lower the trim vane on the front of an Iraqi BMP-1 mechanized infantry combat vehicle that was captured during Operation Desert Storm. The American defense consulting firm Defense Solutions has proposed refurbishing Libya's aging fleet of BMP-1s. Defense Solutions denies drafting a sales proposal to Libya.

</div> 

</div>

<p>
But ironically, Iraq has fueled a new market for these professional middlemen; the United States is funneling billions of dollars into modernizing Iraq's army so that the country's government can fend for itself after coalition troops withdraw. And Iraq's largely Soviet-equipped military is a natural market for Eastern European countries brimming with old or out-of-date equipment they would like to unload. The middlemen, in these cases, serve a key role by allowing the U.S. government to do business with an American company, which in turn buys equipment from Eastern Bloc countries in deals worth hundreds of millions of dollars, much of it financed with U.S. taxpayer dollars.
</p>

<p>
One of Defense Solutions' sales -- a deal to sell Hungarian-owed T-72 tanks to Iraq in 2005 -- was typical of these new foreign military sales. But on the more questionable side is the company's plans to work with Rosoboronexport, which is barred from doing business with the U.S. government, and Libya, which is still on the State Department's arms embargo list. 
</p>

<p>
The Eastern European-Middle East arms-brokering business, while in some cases sanctioned by the U.S. government, has run into problems, including outright corruption and quality. Defense contractor Dale Stoffel, the president of Wye Oak Technology, and another American were gunned down in Iraq in December 2004 after Stoffel alleged that the Iraqi Ministry of Defense was involved in a kickback scheme. Like Defense Solutions, the company Stoffel worked for was refurbishing the Iraq's army Eastern Bloc equipment.
</p>

<p>
Another problem is quality. Weapons from the former Soviet Bloc, which the U.S. military euphemistically calls "nonstandard equipment," have been flagged as substandard, acknowledges Brigadier General Charles Luckey, who is in charge of security assistance at <a href="http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/">Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq</a>. In an interview from Iraq, Brigadier General Luckey said: "One of the frustrating things about buying nonstandard [weapons], is that I'm the guy who has to deal with the fact that some broker I've never heard of allowed weapons to get to Iraq before they were inspected."
</p>

<div id="embed" style="margin: 0px 0px 15px 15px; float: right; width: 350px; height: auto;">

<img src="http://www.wired.com/images/article/full/2008/07/tank_350px.jpg" alt="" />

<div id="caption">

Defense Solutions is carving a new niche in the arms trade, selling Soviet-made weapons to Middle Eastern countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. Defense Solutions sold Hungarian-owed T-72 tanks to Iraq in 2005.

</div> 

</div>


<p>
In one high-profile case, Iraqi officials alleged that a corrupt firm sold them $400 million in shoddy helicopters from Poland. More recently, a company led by a 21-year-old and a former masseur was offered a U.S. government contract worth nearly $300 million to sell ammunition to Afghanistan. The ammunition turned out to be outdated and of dubious origin and several people connected with the company have been indicted. A congressional investigation concluded that the company, which was on a State Department watch list, was able to take advantage of regulatory loopholes by using middlemen.
</p>

<p>
For those concerned about illicit arms trade, this new wave of weapons deals is rife with the potential for corruption and abuse, but for companies eager to pursue markets once regarded as dubious, it represents a lucrative business opportunity.  The problem in these cases, according to those familiar with arms sales, is that it's no longer clear what's legal and what's not.
</p>
<!--pagebreak-->
<p>
Rachel Stohl, an expert on international arms trade and a senior analyst at Center for Defense Information, says that in many ways, the rush to equip Iraq has led the United States to throw caution to the wind. She points to a report by the Government Accountability Office last year that found that some 190,000 weapons sold to Iraq have gone missing. "I think the reality is we won't know, until way after the fact, about all of these irregularities with the Iraq weapons provision program," she said. "We were providing them all these assault rifles that have gone missing. Why? They were not following the standard procedures that were in place."
</p>

<p>
But Iraq and Afghanistan aren't the only markets available to arms brokers like Defense Solutions. The gradual normalization of relations with Libya opens another door into a quasi-legal area of sales. 
</p>

<p>
Like Iraq, Libya has a substantial arsenal of Soviet-origin military weapons, offering a potential market for brokers working with Russia and other former Soviet states. But even when there's not an outright ban, sales to the Middle East are often fraught with controversy, particularly to countries like Libya, which was under international sanction for more than a decade. Even as sanctions against it have been lifted, European companies proposing to sell arms to Libya have faced steep criticism, particularly since the country is still ruled by dictator Muammar Gaddafi, who took power in a military coup in 1969. 
</p>

<p>
While the United States lifted Libya's "state sponsor of terrorism" designation in 2006, other restrictions, such as on the sale of arms, remain in place. A State Department spokesperson confirmed that exports of "lethal munitions" to Libya, such as tanks or related equipment, are still banned, although sales of nonlethal equipment are now allowed on a case-by-case basis.
</p>

<p>
In late March, Weldon traveled to Libya for a weeklong trip at the invitation of the <a href="http://gdf.org.ly/index.php?lang=ar&Page=101&lang=en">Gaddafi Foundation</a>, a group run by the son of Libya's leader, and the chairman of Libya's foreign affairs committee, according to <a href="http://blog.wired.com/defense/files/libya_trip_report.doc">the report he sent to Defense Solutions</a> (.pdf), a copy of which was obtained by Wired.com. The trip reports states: "Agreement reached for Weldon to quickly return to Libya for meetings with son [of Libyan leader Gaddafi] Morti regarding defense and security cooperation."
</p>

<p>
A document dated April 16, just two weeks after Weldon's trip, outlines Defense Solutions' proposal to Libya to refurbish the country's fleet of armored vehicles, including its T-72 tanks, BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, and BTR-60 armored personnel carriers. A copy of the sales proposal, also provided to Wired.com, is on Defense Solutions' letterhead, appears to bear the signature of company CEO Timothy Ringgold, and is addressed to Libya's defense procurement council. "Defense Solutions is committed to delivering a full end-to-end solution to its clients," the proposal states. "Besides refurbishing these vehicles, we are capable of providing a full logistics support package, including a two year supply of spare parts, maintenance and repair services, and operator, maintenance, and repair training."
</p>

<p>
In an interview with Wired.com, Ringgold admitted that he's interested in doing business in Libya and confirms receiving Weldon's trip report from Libya, but denies drafting or signing an arms-sale proposal. "I've never made such a document to Libya," Ringgold insisted, after being read the proposal, and told that his signature is on it.
</p>

<p>
In addition to the Libyan arms-deal document, Wired.com has also reviewed copies of e-mails from Ringgold discussing the Libyan deal.
</p>

<p>
While Ringgold denies proposing an arms sale to Libya, he is open about speaking with Rosoboronexport, which has been on a U.S. government sanctions list since 2006, after the Russian state agency allegedly violated the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act. An April e-mail provided to Wired.com describes Ringgold, Weldon and Stephan Minikes, a senior advisor to Defense Solutions and a former ambassador, meeting with Rosoboronexport. The conversations included a number of potential deals, including supplying Mi-17 helicopters to Afghanistan and spare parts for Iraq's infantry fighting vehicles. Ringgold wrote to colleagues following the visit, describing the meetings as a "spectacular success," saying the Russian agency "has the ability to undercut all cost proposals from brokers."
</p>

<p>
Ringgold confirmed those discussions and said that his company has sought to do business with Rosoboronexport. Asked whether Ringgold considers his dealings with Russia to be legal, he argued that U.S. companies could work with Rosoboronexport on a "case-by-case" basis. "The particular purpose of the meeting we had -- and I want to be crystal clear -- was in response to a U.S. government requirement," he said.
</p>

<p>
A number of officials at the State Department and in the Pentagon, when contacted for this article, could not say whether working with Rosoboronexport is legal or not. A Pentagon spokeswoman said she was familiar with the issue, but deferred the question to the State Department. When asked about Rosoboronexport's status on the blacklist, John Herzberg, a State Department spokesman replied: "What's on there is on there."
</p>

<p>
Asked whether, given the ban, there was any way a company could legally work with Rosoboronexport, as Ringgold suggested, Herzberg provided an equivocal answer. "At the stage of the process we're at, I'm unable to give you an answer," he said. "You can try elsewhere in government, and maybe they'll be braver than me."
</p>

<p>
In an interview from Iraq, General Luckey conceded it was a murky area, but said, "My understanding is they are currently on our no-go list." 
</p>

<p>
The confusion over debarred parties has even led the U.S. government into its own legal tangles, according to Jim McAleese, a Washington attorney who specializes in government contracting and foreign military sales. Because the Russian government violated U.S. nonproliferation laws, even NASA had to go to Congress to ensure it could work with Russia on Soyuz flights to the international space station. "What I'm warning you about is, don't be surprised by the confusion," McAleese said. "There are a whole bunch of different statutes that were adopted piecemeal and were never intended to be reconciled."
</p>

<p>
But it's the very ambiguity of the law that troubles those who monitor export control. "It's highly unusual to do anything with the Russians, particularly Rosoboronexport," said Scott Jones, director of Export Control Programs at the <a href="http://www.uga.edu/cits/">Center for International Trade and Security</a> at the University of Georgia. 
</p>

<p>
Legal or not, reputable American companies simply don't want to work with banned entities, Jones said, for fear of risking their reputations and business. "Even if it's not an outright prohibition, most companies don't want to put themselves in a liability situation that has really bad PR … and they stay away from it," Jones said. "But if that's your business, pimping out arms from the U.S. or Russia, that's the way it works, and you push as much as possible."
</p>

<p>
Finding any U.S. defense company working with the Russian government at this point would be "remarkable," Jones added.
</p>

<p>
In the meantime, the future for Weldon is unclear. The FBI investigation continues and Weldon's former chief of staff recently pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge and is cooperating with the government, notes Melanie Sloan, the executive director of <a href="http://www.citizensforethics.org/">Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington</a>, which filed a complaint against Weldon in 2004. Sloan speculated that Weldon may be charged with "honest service fraud" for misusing his office for personal gain. "It's an easier standard than bribery," she said. "I wouldn't be surprised [if he's charged] with bribery, but I think it will be honest services fraud."
</p>

<p>
Ringgold insists that he and Weldon are on the right side of the law. "Everything we do is in strict compliance with international and U.S. law and we operate only in the best interests of the U.S. government," he said. "I didn't serve 30 years in the United States Army to throw that away on a whim."
</p>

<p>
Asked if Weldon is still working for the company, Ringgold replied: "Absolutely, proudly so." 
</p><br style="clear: both;"/>
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 <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=OTsesJ"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=OTsesJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=wFj1Jj"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=wFj1Jj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=OExjrj"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=OExjrj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=DKk6TJ"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=DKk6TJ" border="0"></img></a> </div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/wired/politics/privacy/~4/326164069" height="1" width="1"/><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~r/wired/politics/security/~4/326164070" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 03 Jul 2008 18:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/arms brokers">arms brokers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/brokers">brokers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/infamous arms brokers">infamous arms brokers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/defense">defense</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/firm defense solutions">firm defense solutions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/arms">arms</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/arms trade">arms trade</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/international arms trade">international arms trade</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/russian weapons suppliers">russian weapons suppliers</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.wired.com/~r/wired/politics/security/~3/326164070/defense_solutions">U.S. Arms Dealer Tests Legal Bounds in Middle East Arms Bazaar</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Mashup of the Titans]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6289294023616c0d4219941919c976a5</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6289294023616c0d4219941919c976a5</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Information Security - an Oxymoron for the information age

Always the beautiful answer who asks a more beautiful question. e. e. cummings
or why i am with Gelernter

This is a mashup of Saltzer &amp;...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div>Information Security - an Oxymoron for the information age</div><br /><div>“Always the beautiful answer who asks a more beautiful question.” e. e. cummings</div><div>...or why i am with Gelernter</div><br /><div>This is a mashup of Saltzer &amp; Schroeder&#39;s famous <a href="http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~evans/cs551/saltzer/">information security principles</a> with David Gelernter&#39;s <a href="http://www.edge.org/documents/archive/edge70.html">Manifesto</a>.</div><br /><div>The premise of this mashup is to examine the paper by Saltzer and Schroeder which was written in 1975 and serves as the basis for most information security programs against the Gelernter&#39;s manifesto as to where computing is actually going. Each of the eight principles in Saltzer and Schroeder&#39;s paper is listed in order, and followed by select excerpts of Gelernter&#39;s manifesto. This comparison is to examine theoretical information security principles vis a vis the actual utility of modern information systems. I will not make an attempt to reconcile theory and practice, but will point out where the two schools of thought agree. In fairness, Saltzer and Schroeder&#39;s paper was written 25 years before Gelernter&#39;s, however Saltzer and Schroeder&#39;s principles dominate the thinking about information security to this day and so its important to view them side by side with Gelernter&#39;s thinking on the direction of computing.</div><br /><div style="color: #bf5f00; ">Saltzer and Schroeder:</div><div>&quot;a) Economy of mechanism: Keep the design as simple and small as possible. This well-known principle applies to any aspect of a system, but it deserves emphasis for protection mechanisms for this reason: design and implementation errors that result in unwanted access paths will not be noticed during normal use (since normal use usually does not include attempts to exercise improper access paths). As a result, techniques such as line-by-line inspection of software and physical examination of hardware that implements protection mechanisms are necessary. For such techniques to be successful, a small and simple design is essential.&quot;</div><br /><div style="color: #0060bf; ">Gelernter:</div><div>&quot;9. The computing future is based on &quot;cyberbodies&quot; — self-contained, neatly-ordered, beautifully-laid-out collections of information, like immaculate giant gardens.&quot;</div><br /><div><span style="color: #00bf00; ">Conclusion(gp):</span>&#0160;So far, so good</div><br /><div>**</div><br /><div><span style="color: #bf5f00; ">Saltzer and Schroeder:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;b) Fail-safe defaults: Base access decisions on permission rather than exclusion. This principle, suggested by E. Glaser in 1965,8 means that the default situation is lack of access, and the protection scheme identifies conditions under which access is permitted. The alternative, in which mechanisms attempt to identify conditions under which access should be refused, presents the wrong psychological base for secure system design. A conservative design must be based on arguments why objects should be accessible, rather than why they should not. In a large system some objects will be inadequately considered, so a default of lack of permission is safer. A design or implementation mistake in a mechanism that gives explicit permission tends to fail by refusing permission, a safe situation, since it will be quickly detected. On the other hand, a design or implementation mistake in a mechanism that explicitly excludes access tends to fail by allowing access, a failure which may go unnoticed in normal use. This principle applies both to the outward appearance of the protection mechanism and to its underlying implementation.&quot;</div><br /><div><span style="color: #00bf00; ">Conclusion(gp):</span>&#0160;A conservative design principle that puts the object&#39;s owner in control of permissions. This makes a lot of sense from the object point of view, but does little to address the use case in which it executes.</div><br /><div>**</div><br /><div><span style="color: #bf5f00; ">Saltzer and Schroeder:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;c) Complete mediation: Every access to every object must be checked for authority. This principle, when systematically applied, is the primary underpinning of the protection system. It forces a system-wide view of access control, which in addition to normal operation includes initialization, recovery, shutdown, and maintenance. It implies that a foolproof method of identifying the source of every request must be devised. It also requires that proposals to gain performance by remembering the result of an authority check be examined skeptically. If a change in authority occurs, such remembered results must be systematically updated.&quot;</div><br /><div><span style="color: #0060bf; ">Gelernter:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;8. The software systems we depend on most today are operating systems (Unix, the Macintosh OS, Windows et. al.) and browsers (Internet Explorer, Netscape Communicator...). Operating systems are connectors that fasten users to computers; they attach to the computer at one end, the user at the other. Browsers fasten users to remote computers, to &quot;servers&quot; on the internet.</div><br /><div>Today&#39;s operating systems and browsers are obsolete because people no longer want to be connected to computers — near ones OR remote ones. (They probably never did). They want to be connected to information. In the future, people are connected to cyberbodies; cyberbodies drift in the computational cosmos — also known as the Swarm, the Cybersphere.</div><br /><div>13. Any well-designed next-generation electronic gadget will come with a ``Disable Omniscience&#39;&#39; button.</div><br /><div>17. A cyberbody can be replicated or distributed over many computers; can inhabit many computers at the same time. If the Cybersphere&#39;s computers are tiles in a paved courtyard, a cyberbody is a cloud&#39;s drifting shadow covering many tiles simultaneously.</div><br /><div>20. If a million people use a Web site simultaneously, doesn&#39;t that mean that we must have a heavy-duty remote server to keep them all happy? No; we could move the site onto a million desktops and use the internet for coordination. The &quot;site&quot; is like a military unit in the field, the general moving with his troops (or like a hockey team in constant swarming motion). (We used essentially this technique to build the first tuple space implementations. They seemed to depend on a shared server, but the server was an illusion; there was no server, just a swarm of clients.) Could Amazon.com be an itinerant horde instead of a fixed Central Command Post? Yes.&quot;</div><br /><div><span style="color: #00bf00; ">Conclusion(gp):</span>&#0160;Complete mediation provides the underpinning for Saltzer and Schroeder&#39;s system, but does not appear to scale to the desired itinerant horde at least in common interpretation.</div><br /><div>**</div><br /><div><span style="color: #bf5f00; ">Saltzer and Schroeder:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;d) Open design: The design should not be secret. The mechanisms should not depend on the ignorance of potential attackers, but rather on the possession of specific, more easily protected, keys or passwords. This decoupling of protection mechanisms from protection keys permits the mechanisms to be examined by many reviewers without concern that the review may itself compromise the safeguards. In addition, any skeptical user may be allowed to convince himself that the system he is about to use is adequate for his purpose. Finally, it is simply not realistic to attempt to maintain secrecy for any system which receives wide distribution.&quot;</div><br /><div><span style="color: #00bf00; ">Conclusion(gp):</span>&#0160;both seem to agree, hard to get the itinerant horde moving in a swarm without open standards.</div><br /><div>**</div><br /><div><span style="color: #bf5f00; ">Saltzer and Schroeder:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;e) Separation of privilege: Where feasible, a protection mechanism that requires two keys to unlock it is more robust and flexible than one that allows access to the presenter of only a single key. The relevance of this observation to computer systems was pointed out by R. Needham in 1973. The reason is that, once the mechanism is locked, the two keys can be physically separated and distinct programs, organizations, or individuals made responsible for them. From then on, no single accident, deception, or breach of trust is sufficient to compromise the protected information. This principle is often used in bank safe-deposit boxes. It is also at work in the defense system that fires a nuclear weapon only if two different people both give the correct command. In a computer system, separated keys apply to any situation in which two or more conditions must be met before access should be permitted. For example, systems providing user-extendible protected data types usually depend on separation of privilege for their implementation.&quot;</div><br /><div><span style="color: #0060bf; ">Gelernter:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;37. Elements stored in a mind do not have names and are not organized into folders; are retrieved not by name or folder but by contents. (Hear a voice, think of a face: you&#39;ve retrieved a memory that contains the voice as one component.) You can see everything in your memory from the standpoint of past, present and future. Using a file cabinet, you classify information when you put it in; minds classify information when it is taken out. (Yesterday afternoon at four you stood with Natasha on Fifth Avenue in the rain — as you might recall when you are thinking about &quot;Fifth Avenue,&quot; &quot;rain,&quot; &quot;Natasha&quot; or many other things. But you attached no such labels to the memory when you acquired it. The classification happened retrospectively.)&quot;</div><br /><div><span style="color: #00bf00; ">Conclusion(gp):</span>&#0160;Information Security models tend to look at things statically through information classification lenses, but its how information is used that makes it valuable. In practice this is how information security theory breaks down in the face of reality - what does an access control matrix look like for a mashup? What does it look like for a data mining app?</div><br /><div>**</div><br /><div><span style="color: #bf5f00; ">Saltzer and Schroeder:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;f) Least privilege: Every program and every user of the system should operate using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the job. Primarily, this principle limits the damage that can result from an accident or error. It also reduces the number of potential interactions among privileged programs to the minimum for correct operation, so that unintentional, unwanted, or improper uses of privilege are less likely to occur. Thus, if a question arises related to misuse of a privilege, the number of programs that must be audited is minimized. Put another way, if a mechanism can provide &quot;firewalls,&quot; the principle of least privilege provides a rationale for where to install the firewalls. The military security rule of &quot;need-to-know&quot; is an example of this principle.&quot;</div><br /><div><span style="color: #0060bf; ">Gelernter:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;28. Metaphors have a profound effect on computing: the file-cabinet metaphor traps us in a &quot;passive&quot; instead of &quot;active&quot; view of information management that is fundamentally wrong for computers.</div><br /><div>29. The rigid file and directory system you are stuck with on your Mac or PC was designed by programmers for programmers — and is still a good system for programmers. It is no good for non-programmers. It never was, and was never intended to be.</div><br /><div>30. If you have three pet dogs, give them names. If you have 10,000 head of cattle, don&#39;t bother. Nowadays the idea of giving a name to every file on your computer is ridiculous.&quot;</div><br /><div><span style="color: #00bf00; ">Conclusion(gp):</span>&#0160;Least Privilege is the point where the practical matter of applying Saltzer and Schroeder&#39;s principles breaks down in modern systems. Its a deployment issue, and a matter of insufficient models and modes.</div><br /><div>**</div><br /><div><span style="color: #bf5f00; ">Saltzer and Schroeder:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;g) Least common mechanism: Minimize the amount of mechanism common to more than one user and depended on by all users [28]. Every shared mechanism (especially one involving shared variables) represents a potential information path between users and must be designed with great care to be sure it does not unintentionally compromise security. Further, any mechanism serving all users must be certified to the satisfaction of every user, a job presumably harder than satisfying only one or a few users. For example, given the choice of implementing a new function as a supervisor procedure shared by all users or as a library procedure that can be handled as though it were the user&#39;s own, choose the latter course. Then, if one or a few users are not satisfied with the level of certification of the function, they can provide a substitute or not use it at all. Either way, they can avoid being harmed by a mistake in it.&quot;</div><br /><div><span style="color: #0060bf; ">Gelernter:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;6. Miniaturization was the big theme in the first age of computers: rising power, falling prices, computers for everybody. Theme of the Second Age now approaching: computing transcends computers. Information travels through a sea of anonymous, interchangeable computers like a breeze through tall grass. A dekstop computer is a scooped-out hole in the beach where information from the Cybersphere wells up like seawater.</div><br /><div>16. The future is dense with computers. They will hang around everywhere in lush growths like Spanish moss. They will swarm like locusts. But a swarm is not merely a big crowd. The individuals in the swarm lose their identities. The computers that make up this global swarm will blend together into the seamless substance of the Cybersphere. Within the swarm, individual computers will be as anonymous as molecules of air.</div><br /><div>55. Software can solve hard problems in two ways: by algorithm or by making connections — by delivering the problem to exactly the right human problem-solver. The second technique is just as powerful as the first, but so far we have ignored it.</div><br /><div>56. Lifestreams and microcosms are the two most important cyberbody types; they relate to each other as a single musical line relates to a single chord. The stream is a &quot;moment in space,&quot; the microcosm a moment in time.&quot;</div><br /><div>**</div><br /><div><span style="color: #bf5f00; ">Saltzer and Schroeder:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;h) Psychological acceptability: It is essential that the human interface be designed for ease of use, so that users routinely and automatically apply the protection mechanisms correctly. Also, to the extent that the user&#39;s mental image of his protection goals matches the mechanisms he must use, mistakes will be minimized. If he must translate his image of his protection needs into a radically different specification language, he will make errors.&quot;</div><br /><div><span style="color: #0060bf; ">Gelernter:</span><br /></div><div>&quot;7. &quot;The network is the computer&quot; — yes; but we&#39;re less interested in computers all the time. The real topic in astronomy is the cosmos, not telescopes. The real topic in computing is the Cybersphere and the cyberstructures in it, not the computers we use as telescopes and tuners.</div><br /><div>27. Modern computing is based on an analogy between computers and file cabinets that is fundamentally wrong and affects nearly every move we make. (We store &quot;files&quot; on disks, write &quot;records,&quot; organize files into &quot;folders&quot; — file-cabinet language.) Computers are fundamentally unlike file cabinets because they can take action.</div><br /><div>31. Our standard policy on file names has far-reaching consequences: doesn&#39;t merely force us to make up names where no name is called for; also imposes strong limits on our handling of an important class of documents — ones that arrive from the outside world. A newly-arrived email message (for example) can&#39;t stand on its own as a separate document — can&#39;t show up alongside other files in searches, sit by itself on the desktop, be opened or printed independently; it has no name, so it must be buried on arrival inside some existing file (the mail file) that does have a name. The same holds for incoming photos and faxes, Web bookmarks, scanned images...</div><br /><div>32. You shouldn&#39;t have to put files in directories. The directories should reach out and take them. If a file belongs in six directories, all six should reach out and grab it automatically, simultaneously.</div><br /><div>33. A file should be allowed to have no name, one name or many names. Many files should be allowed to share one name. A file should be allowed to be in no directory, one directory, or many directories. Many files should be allowed to share one directory. Of these eight possibilities, only three are legal and the other five are banned — for no good reason.</div><br /><div>53. Your car, your school, your company and yourself are all one-track vehicles moving forward through time, and they will each leave a stream-shaped cyberbody (like an aircraft&#39;s contrail) behind them as they go. These vapor-trails of crystallized experience will represent our first concrete answer to a hard question: what is a company, a university, any sort of ongoing organization or institution, if its staff and customers and owners can all change, its buildings be bulldozed, its site relocated — what&#39;s left? What is it? The answer: a lifestream in cyberspace.&quot;</div><br /><br /><div>**</div><div style="color: #00bf00; ">Conclusion(gp):</div><br /><div>The Saltzer and Schroeder principles of Open Design and Economy of Mechanism hold up well in the face of modern computing realities, and to a certain extent Fail Safe Defaults does as well; however if we information security people are to be effective we need to re-think the other principles.</div><br /><div>**</div><br /><div>Last word:&#0160;<span style="color: #0060bf; ">Gelernter:</span></div><div>We&#39;ll know the system is working when a butterfly wanders into the in-box and (a few wingbeats later) flutters out — and in that brief interval the system has transcribed the creature&#39;s appearance and analyzed its way of moving, and the real butterfly leaves a shadow-butterfly behind. Some time soon afterward you&#39;ll be examining some tedious electronic document and a cyber-butterfly will appear at the bottom left corner of your screen (maybe a Hamearis lucina) and pause there, briefly hiding the text (and showing its neatly-folded rusty-chocolate wings like Victorian paisley, with orange eyespots) — and moments later will have crossed the screen and be gone.</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 25 Jun 2008 13:29:25 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/protection mechanisms">protection mechanisms</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/protection mechanisms correctly">protection mechanisms correctly</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/implements protection mechanisms">implements protection mechanisms</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information travels">information travels</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security people">information security people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/protection">protection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/potential information path">potential information path</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/06/mashup-of-the-titans.html">Mashup of the Titans</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Arizona Office of the Auditor General finds plenty of holes]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/7c68cfbfdcec6acecbe25fdbae0ec186</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/7c68cfbfdcec6acecbe25fdbae0ec186</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
6/19/08

Organization
The Arizona Board of Regents

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
Arizona State University
University of Arizona
Northern Arizona...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/abor.jpg" width="82" align="right" height="102"><font size="2"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Date Reported: </span><br>6/19/08<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Organization: </span><br><a href="http://www.abor.asu.edu/">The Arizona Board of Regents</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br><a href="http://www.asu.edu/">Arizona State University</a> <br><a href="http://www.arizona.edu/">University of Arizona</a> <br><a href="http://home.nau.edu/">Northern Arizona University</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>Students, faculty and staff<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>"more than 10,000"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>Names, Social Security numbers, student identification numbers, addresses, phone numbers, e-mail addresses and user accounts<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance audit of information technology security at Arizona State University (ASU), the University of Arizona (UA), and Northern Arizona University (NAU) pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §41-2958."&nbsp; "ASU’s, UA’s, and NAU's Web-based applications are vulnerable. Auditors were able to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information, such as social security numbers, and could have modified or deleted important university information."<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br>Arizona Office of the Auditor General's report titled "<a href="http://www.auditorgen.state.az.us/Reports/Universities/UniversitySystemWide/Performance/08-04/08-04.pdf">Arizona’s Universities—Information Technology Security</a>" <br><a href="http://www.azstarnet.com/sn/hourlyupdate/244720.php">The Arizona Daily Star </a><br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>Arizona Office of the Auditor General<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online sources cited above:<br><br>The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance audit of information technology security at Arizona State University (ASU), the University of Arizona (UA), and Northern Arizona University (NAU) pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)<br>§41-2958.<br><br>Information technology (IT) security practices are important for Arizona's universities to protect large amounts of sensitive and confidential information that are stored on their computer systems, including information for more than 122,000 students and nearly 25,000 faculty and staff.<br><br>Universities in general are attractive targets for computer hackers because universities traditionally have a strong culture of academic freedom that values open access to information and a free exchange of ideas.<br><br>University IT security problems are occurring more often through weaknesses in computer programs called Web-based applications.<br><br>The Arizona universities combined use at least 205 significant Web-based applications for educational and administrative purposes, such as curriculum and course management, documenting personal information for admissions and financial aid, and processing financial, payroll, and other transactions, such as purchasing parking permits.<br><br>ASU’s, UA’s, and NAU's Web-based applications are vulnerable.<br><br>Auditors were able to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information, such as social security numbers, and could have modified or deleted important university information.<br><br>Auditors were able to gain this access by exploiting some critical and commonly found weaknesses that exist in many of the universities' Web-based applications.<br><br>Security weaknesses in one Web-based application allowed auditors to access a database and obtain more than 10,000 records with names and social security numbers.<br><br>Auditors also obtained other records that contained student identification numbers, addresses, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses.<br><br>Auditors also had the ability to modify and delete this information.<br><br>In two other applications, auditors were able to exploit a security weakness that would have allowed them to take over a large number of user accounts, including accounts with high-level access.<br><br>In many applications, auditors discovered a security flaw that would allow an attacker to take over user accounts and install malicious software.<br><br>Auditors did not attempt to identify every flaw that may exist because the testing was designed to determine what the impact could be if certain identified vulnerabilities were successfully exploited.<br><br>To better protect the information processed through their Web-based applications,<br>ASU, UA, and NAU need to:<br><br></font><ul><li><font size="2">Conduct regular security assessments of Web-based applications. The universities first need to determine how many Web-based applications they have and then make provisions to regularly update their lists of applications.&nbsp; They then need to develop and implement procedures for regularly conducting security reviews of their critical Web-based applications.</font></li></ul><font size="2"><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Even though it seems like it’s the same story in company after company, I am still amazed by how many organizations don't know what or how many applications that have (not to mention servers, clients, routers, switches, wireless access points, etc.)!&nbsp; Its pretty hard to secure something if you don't know it exists, and just because you don't know it exists does not mean you are not responsible for it.</span><br><br></font><ul><li><font size="2">Develop a university-wide policy and associated procedures for updating Web servers, which are computers that host Web-based applications. Software vulnerabilities are constantly being discovered and publicized, and the universities need to develop or enhance: (1) procedures for identifying vulnerabilities relevant to their Web servers, (2) a timeline for reacting to notifications of newly discovered Web server vulnerabilities, and (3) a process for determining whether to apply a software update, establish another control to address the Web server vulnerability, or accept the risk of not updating the software.</font></li><li>Ensure that security is built into the process for developing Web-based applications. According to ASU, UA, and NAU officials, none of them have university-wide security standards for developing applications. According to an IT best practice, building security into the development process is more cost-effective and secure than applying it afterwards.</li><li>Provide training to application developers so that they are aware of common Web-based application vulnerabilities and methodologies that can be used to avoid them. None of the universities have a training program that is mandatory for all users and geared toward an individual's role within the university.<br></li></ul><font size="2"><br>All three Arizona universities have taken some key steps toward developing an overall<br>IT security approach; however, additional work is needed.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Creating information security staffs</span>--Over the past few years, ASU, UA, and NAU have established and filled information security officer (ISO) positions and made these ISOs responsible for information security efforts university-wide.&nbsp; Until the ISOs were hired, the universities have not had any staff whose sole responsibility included directing and coordinating all aspects of information security across the university.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Typically, this position is more effective if it reports directly to an executive such as CEO, President, etc.&nbsp; Information security is not an IT problem, and often times there is a conflict of interest if an ISO reports up through the IT organization.</span><br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Developing information security programs</span>--The universities are at varying stages in developing formal programs to guide their information security efforts, but none have yet developed all the standards or procedures needed to support a complete information security program. The universities are in the beginning stages of implementing their information security programs, in part because the ISO positions are relatively new.<br><br style="font-style: italic;"><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] The report goes on to address specific findings and recommendations for all three of the schools.&nbsp; In my opinion, the report is very well-written and definitely worth your reading time!</span><br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>I didn't provide much commentary on the Auditor General's report because it really speaks for itself.&nbsp; It was a good read (for a security guy anyway).&nbsp; Kudos to the Arizona legislature for funding the audit, Kudos to the Auditor General on the findings, the report, and the excellent recommendations, and Kudos to the schools for their agreements and plans for improvement.&nbsp; I feel a little giddy and I'm not really sure why.<br><br>Is anyone planning to notify the people whose information was found to be vulnerable to attack and exploit?&nbsp; I would be surprised if the auditors were the first to find these chinks in the armor.<br><br>I highly recommend reading the <a href="http://www.auditorgen.state.az.us/Reports/Universities/UniversitySystemWide/Performance/08-04/08-04.pdf">report</a>. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>Unknown</font><br><br>
<script src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/%7Es/breachblog?i=http://breachblog.com/2008/06/23/abor.aspx" type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8"></script>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 23 Jun 2008 08:28:27 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security officer">information security officer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security staffs">information security staffs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/confidential information">confidential information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/university information">university information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sensitive information">sensitive information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sensitive">sensitive</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/06/23/abor.aspx">The Arizona Office of the Auditor General finds plenty of holes</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Metro Round-Up: Delays and New Beginnings]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/488b7b0e0613e236ac9686e26658de8f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/488b7b0e0613e236ac9686e26658de8f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Milwaukee, Wisc., network likely won't expand: Midwest Fiber Networks spent $700,000 to build a pilot network that they can't fund citywide. They want anchor tenants for the $20m network, and can't...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="http://wifinetnews.com/images/muni_icon.jpg" align="right" border="0" hspace="5" /><a href="http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=764862"><strong>Milwaukee, Wisc., network likely won't expand:</strong></a> Midwest Fiber Networks spent $700,000 to build a pilot network that they can't fund citywide. They want anchor tenants for the $20m network, and can't get the city signed on. The company will continue running the network, though, and is looking into alternatives. I always thought a fiber provider had a great win in having their backhaul to operate the many Wi-Fi nodes needed.</p>

<p><a href="http://www.nashuatelegraph.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080622/OPINION01/649297741/-1/opinion"><strong>Nashua, N.H.'s downtown network may never launch:</strong></a> The local paper says, c'mon, already. The network was to span a 1.2-mi stretch of the main street and use donations. Deadlines have come and gone for a year.</p>

<p><a href="http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=764862"><strong>Covad may launch San Carlos, Calif., test network:</strong></a> The company know for wired installations as the last-man-standing among competitive DSL and other digital line providers nationwide, is looking for city access to build a square mile test area. This is the latest wrinkle in trying to get Wireless Silicon Valley underway after the consortium was unable to raise funds, and lead-partner Azulstar stepped back or was replaced. </p>

<p><a href="http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=764862"><strong>Lexington, Kent., may relaunch shuttered network:</strong></a> The city bought SkyTel's network assets for $10 over a year ago--10 dollars, not 10 plus any zeroes--and the city may partner with the University of Kentucky to build a public-safety network. The university would manage the network. It's unclear from the article if any public access would be included.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 23 Jun 2008 06:54:43 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network">network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/20m network">20m network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/test network">test network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pilot network">pilot network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network assets">network assets</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/public-safety network">public-safety network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/downtown network">downtown network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/city">city</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/city access">city access</category>
      <source url="http://wifinetnews.com/archives/008372.html">Metro Round-Up: Delays and New Beginnings</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The first steps in reducing the embarrassing frequency of college system breaches]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/655ab0e39d157dd8b64f4a44bdd8e2a3</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/655ab0e39d157dd8b64f4a44bdd8e2a3</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Heres a scenario that could happen to anybody in any organization. But with the staggering number of information security breaches occurring at colleges and universities recently, this scenario is...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Here&#8217;s a scenario that could happen to anybody in any organization. But with the staggering number of information security breaches occurring at colleges and universities recently, this scenario is perhaps more common in within educational institutions.
A university professor receives an email from another colleague working in the university. The subject line says, &#8220;Here&#8217;s a good [...]]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Jun 2008 12:52:59 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/university">university</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/university professor receives">university professor receives</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security breaches">information security breaches</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/scenario">scenario</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/universities recently">universities recently</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/subject line">subject line</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/educational institutions">educational institutions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/common">common</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email">email</category>
      <source url="http://securityviews.com/blog/2008/06/20/the-first-steps-in-reducing-the-embarrassing-frequency-of-college-system-breaches/">The first steps in reducing the embarrassing frequency of college system breaches</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Past, Present and Future Security Initiatives on Exhibit at Microsoft TechEd]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a775f7be296ea3190fad435babd2a571</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a775f7be296ea3190fad435babd2a571</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Blogger: Dan Blum
One of our service directors likes to quote William Gibson: The future is here, its just unevenly distributed
At Microsofts Server and Tools Business (STB) Analyst and Tech Ed...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Blogger: Dan Blum</p>

<p>One of our service directors likes to quote William Gibson: “The future is here, it’s just unevenly distributed.”</p>

<p>At Microsoft’s Server and Tools Business (STB) Analyst and Tech Ed conferences last week, I saw a vendor and a user community living in the past, present and future with many unevenly distributed capabilities.</p>

<p>In a session on identity management strategy, for example, Microsoft discussed a variety of initiatives. These range from Card Space (futuristic implementation of user-centric Information Card specifications) to ADFS (present day enterprise federation support, though unfortunately lacking full SAML capabilities) to self-service password reset exposed through Office (decidedly backward-looking as this functionality has been available from many vendors through browsers for many years).</p>

<p>In another session on rights management and SharePoint, Microsoft highlighted the opportunity to configure SharePoint libraries to automatically apply Active Directory Rights Management Services protections on downloaded documents. Digital rights management (DRM) is controversial and no strong guarantor of confidentiality. Nonetheless, it is a&nbsp; way to put futuristic self-protecting wrappers on content so as to prevent its accidental leakage or misuse by honest, cooperative users. Because it’s not something that can resist certain types of malicious attackers, many security professionals look down their noses at rights management. Nonetheless, preventing accidental misuse of enterprise information is a big part of the space. It was clear from the number of people in the room asking intelligent questions suggesting realistic expectations that customers see potential value for this technology.</p>

<p>Finally, I was impressed by a presentation on IPSec, PKI and NAP by a Brazilian university IT manager named Rodrigo Imaginario. Starting three years ago, the university combined its student and administrative networks into a single network. Yet servers running ERP and containing administrative content (such as grading information) need to be protected from a subset of students going through their hacking stage. Imaginario implemented a logical security zoning overlay on top of the network using IPSEC in Windows. In the restricted zone, servers only accept connections from Kerberos-authenticated IPSEC clients in the administrative domain. Today, the authentication is being upgraded to use PKI for secure, all campus wireless networking. Imaginario indicated the university took the Windows IPSEC route approach because no additional software had to be purchased. Configuration was difficult, he said, but will get easier with Windows Server 2008. This sounds like an idea whose time has come.</p></div>
<img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityAndRiskManagementStrategiesBlog/~4/315701320" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Jun 2008 12:58:11 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/digital rights management">digital rights management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rights management">rights management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ipsec clients">ipsec clients</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sharepoint">sharepoint</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/brazilian university">brazilian university</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/microsoft">microsoft</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/future">future</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/configure sharepoint libraries">configure sharepoint libraries</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/university">university</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityAndRiskManagementStrategiesBlog/~3/315701320/past-present-an.html">Past, Present and Future Security Initiatives on Exhibit at Microsoft TechEd</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Past, Present and Future Security Initiatives on Exhibit at Microsoft TechEd]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/e17aa4e81a6f3a0ca38bbc6e89d1948d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/e17aa4e81a6f3a0ca38bbc6e89d1948d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Blogger: Dan Blum
One of our service directors likes to quote William Gibson: ???The future is here, it???s just unevenly distributed
At Microsoft???s Server and Tools Business (STB) Analyst and Tech...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Blogger: Dan Blum</p>

<p>One of our service directors likes to quote William Gibson: ???The future is here, it???s just unevenly distributed.???</p>

<p>At Microsoft???s Server and Tools Business (STB) Analyst and Tech Ed conferences last week, I saw a vendor and a user community living in the past, present and future with many unevenly distributed capabilities.</p>

<p>In a session on identity management strategy, for example, Microsoft discussed a variety of initiatives. These range from Card Space (futuristic implementation of user-centric Information Card specifications) to ADFS (present day enterprise federation support, though unfortunately lacking full SAML capabilities) to self-service password reset exposed through Office (decidedly backward-looking as this functionality has been available from many vendors through browsers for many years).</p>

<p>In another session on rights management and SharePoint, Microsoft highlighted the opportunity to configure SharePoint libraries to automatically apply Active Directory Rights Management Services protections on downloaded documents. Digital rights management (DRM) is controversial and no strong guarantor of confidentiality. Nonetheless, it is a&nbsp; way to put futuristic self-protecting wrappers on content so as to prevent its accidental leakage or misuse by honest, cooperative users. Because it???s not something that can resist certain types of malicious attackers, many security professionals look down their noses at rights management. Nonetheless, preventing accidental misuse of enterprise information is a big part of the space. It was clear from the number of people in the room asking intelligent questions suggesting realistic expectations that customers see potential value for this technology.</p>

<p>Finally, I was impressed by a presentation on IPSec, PKI and NAP by a Brazilian university IT manager named Rodrigo Imaginario. Starting three years ago, the university combined its student and administrative networks into a single network. Yet servers running ERP and containing administrative content (such as grading information) need to be protected from a subset of students going through their hacking stage. Imaginario implemented a logical security zoning overlay on top of the network using IPSEC in Windows. In the restricted zone, servers only accept connections from Kerberos-authenticated IPSEC clients in the administrative domain. Today, the authentication is being upgraded to use PKI for secure, all campus wireless networking. Imaginario indicated the university took the Windows IPSEC route approach because no additional software had to be purchased. Configuration was difficult, he said, but will get easier with Windows Server 2008. This sounds like an idea whose time has come.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Jun 2008 12:58:11 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/digital rights management">digital rights management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rights management">rights management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/microsoft">microsoft</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ipsec clients">ipsec clients</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sharepoint">sharepoint</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/brazilian university">brazilian university</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/future">future</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server">server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/windows server">windows server</category>
      <source url="http://srmsblog.burtongroup.com/2008/06/past-present-an.html">Past, Present and Future Security Initiatives on Exhibit at Microsoft TechEd</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Eavesdropping on Encrypted Compressed Voice]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/01d3679a43ebdd7cdab4158981f0f4fb</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/01d3679a43ebdd7cdab4158981f0f4fb</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Traffic analysis works even through the encryption: The new compression technique, called variable bitrate compression produces different size packets of data for different sounds
That happens because...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Traffic analysis <a href="http://technology.newscientist.com/channel/tech/dn14124-compressed-web-phone-calls-are-easy-to-bug.html">works</a> even through the encryption:</p>

<blockquote>The new compression technique, called variable bitrate compression produces different size packets of data for different sounds.

<p>That happens because the sampling rate is kept high for long complex sounds like "ow", but cut down for simple consonants like "c". This variable method saves on bandwidth, while maintaining sound quality.</p>

<p>VoIP streams are encrypted to prevent eavesdropping. However, a team from John Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, US, has shown that simply measuring the size of packets without decoding them can identify whole words and phrases with a high rate of accuracy.</blockquote></p>

<p>The technique isn't good enough to decode entire conversations, but it's pretty impressive.</p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=z3oMbI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=z3oMbI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=lqT6SI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=lqT6SI" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Jun 2008 02:27:13 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/variable">variable</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/variable method saves">variable method saves</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/compression technique">compression technique</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/technique">technique</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/john hopkins university">john hopkins university</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/decode entire conversations">decode entire conversations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/complex sounds">complex sounds</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sounds">sounds</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/packets">packets</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/06/eavesdropping_o_2.html">Eavesdropping on Encrypted Compressed Voice</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Software makes virtual servers a moving target]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d3215e25bb3d68407e3821127d676137</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d3215e25bb3d68407e3821127d676137</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Carefully managed virtual servers can make the job of attackers more difficult by reducing the time that any one version of a server is exposed to the Internet, according to a George Mason University...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Carefully managed virtual servers can make the job of attackers more difficult by reducing the time that any one version of a server is exposed to the Internet, according to a George Mason University professor who has developed software that phases virtual servers in and out of use.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Jun 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtual servers">virtual servers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/phases virtual servers">phases virtual servers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software">software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/internet">internet</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attackers">attackers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/version">version</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/time">time</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/job">job</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server">server</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/061908-scit.html?fsrc=rss-security">Software makes virtual servers a moving target</source>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
