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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: valuable]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/valuable</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jul 2008 23:52:14 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Digital Cash in Iraq]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/84493590b736c33ff0c22bfa1fc5590a</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/84493590b736c33ff0c22bfa1fc5590a</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Smart cards have still never quite taken off across the US, and at this point its fair to wonder if they will or if they will be eclipsed by phones or some such, but smart cards sure are big outside...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Smart cards have still never quite taken off across the US, and at this point its fair to wonder if they will or if they will be eclipsed by phones or some such, but smart cards sure are big outside the US. One of the most interesting applications is of course digital cash and transaction processing. <a href="http://www.aplitec.co.za/">Net1 UEPS</a>&#160;(ticker: <a href="http://finance.google.com/finance?q=ueps">UEPS</a>) out of South Africa appears to be the leader here having built a $1.2B business out of this model. there are lots of regions in the world where people are underbanked or unbanked altogether and where its dangerous to have too much cash. I blogged about this earlier on <a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2007/08/beer-shotguns-a.html">Beer, Shotguns and Digital Cash</a>.&#160;</p><br /><div>Now <a href="http://biz.yahoo.com/iw/080804/0421781.html">Net1 UEPS is in Iraq as well</a>:</div><br /><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: arial; line-height: normal; ">The first UEPS transaction was performed on Sunday, August 3, 2008, in Baghdad, Iraq, during the official launch of the UEPS smart card technology with the two state banks namely, Rafidain Bank and Rasheed Bank.</span></p></blockquote><div><span style="font-family: arial; line-height: normal;"><br /></span></div><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: arial; line-height: normal; ">The official launch, attended by invitees from Rafidain Bank, Rasheed Bank, the Iraqi Government, War Victim Ministry and Martyrdom Ministry, demonstrated smart card registration, biometric enrolment and issuing of UEPS cards, offline loading of wage payments and government grants to the UEPS cards and dispensing of cash.</span><br /><span style="font-family: arial; line-height: normal; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: arial; line-height: normal; ">The pilot project involving 100,000 beneficiaries is now ready for implementation across selected bank branches and will enable the distribution and payment of government grants to war victims and martyrdom beneficiaries, as well as salary and wage distribution and payment to employees of the two state banks.</span><br /><span style="font-family: arial; line-height: normal; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: arial; line-height: normal; ">Brenda Stewart, Net1 Senior Vice President Sales and Marketing, said, &quot;From the entire team at Net1, we congratulate the Iraqi consortium on this historic achievement and look forward to the successful implementation of the various projects already identified for implementation, as well as the projects currently in business development. Net1 is proud that the development of its core technology, from which it creates end-user products that satisfy the requirements of its customers, can change the way business is conducted leading to the improvement of people&#39;s lives. We share the belief of our Iraqi partners that our technology can play a fundamental role in the upliftment of the economy. The success of any technology should be measured, not only by the profits it generates for its inventors, suppliers and users, but also by the difference that it makes to the lives of people,&quot; Stewart concluded.</span></p></blockquote><div><span style="font-family: arial; line-height: normal;"><p>I think there are lessons to be learned here wrt data and message level security. Net1 UEPS is a good example a of system carrying valuable assets across hostile terrain, web security architecture can learn a lot from this model.</p><p>P.S. If you are a <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joel_Greenblatt">Joel Greenblatt</a> geek - UEPS is a <a href="http://www.magicformulainvesting.com/">magic formula stock</a>&#160;(meaning they make cash and are priced cheaply) last time I checked.</p><p></p></span></div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 11 Aug 2008 08:53:52 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ueps cards">ueps cards</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ueps">ueps</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/digital cash">digital cash</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cash">cash</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/net1 ueps">net1 ueps</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bank">bank</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/net1">net1</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rafidain bank">rafidain bank</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ueps transaction">ueps transaction</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/08/digital-cash-in-iraq.html">Digital Cash in Iraq</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Black Hat wrap up - secure@microsoft, booth babes and bloggers]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/bd7d7b3698d05a16a10cc4d0a21e2bfd</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/bd7d7b3698d05a16a10cc4d0a21e2bfd</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[You can read plenty of other blogs about some of the great presentations at Black Hat. So I thought I would take another angle and talk about some of the other stuff that may be important to you
1....]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p></p>  <p>You can read plenty of other blogs about some of the great presentations at Black Hat.  So I thought I would take another angle and talk about some of the other stuff that may be important to you.</p>  <p>1.  <a href="mailto:secure@microsoft.com"><font face="Courier"><a href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/Picture%20049.jpg"><img title="Picture 049" style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; margin: 5px 10px 5px 0px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" height="184" alt="Picture 049" src="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/Picture%20049_thumb.jpg" width="244" align="left" border="0"></img></a></font><font face="Courier New">secure@microsoft.com</font></a> – This years hottest party was again the Microsoft party.  This year it was at the LAX club in the Luxor.  As usual there were quite a number of people at the door who thought they could talk their way in or worse yet were told they “were one the list”.  I was happy to be able to go and saw many of the usual suspects there as well. I had to leave the party early to go catch my red eye flight home, so went right to the airport from the party.  As I wrote earlier, Microsoft is trying really hard on security.  But I couldn’t help but notice the irony of this grainy, lousy picture of the DJ booth at the party.  If you can, notice the computers that the <a href="mailto:secure@microsoft.com">secure@microsoft.com</a> DJs are using. That’s right they are Macs!</p>  <p>2. A new low for booth babes – What would a Shimel review of a trade show be without a booth babe rant.  Hey I recognize it is Vegas and all, but EdgeOS went way over the line this year.  A booth babe dressed as a Las Vegas showgirl or some other type of costume makes a statement.  I personally don’t like exploiting woman to make that statement, but I understand.  However, these guys had woman who were dressed so raunchy and classless, that I could not bring myself to post a picture of them.  Come on guys!  You want to resort to the booth babe thing (and BTW I think the Black Hat crowd does not respond to that), at least have a little class.  These girls looked like street walkers and do you and your company no favors.  Is that really the image you want to promote?  Grow up!</p>  <p>3.  The Security Bloggers Network – We are back!  With the end of the Black Hat show, the SBN is going back to being the<a href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/securitybloggers.gif"><img title="securitybloggers" style="margin: 5px 5px 5px 10px" height="147" alt="securitybloggers" src="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/securitybloggers_thumb.gif" width="112" align="right" border="0"></img></a> SBN.  The old logo is back and our promotion with Black Hat is at an end.  However, I want to personally thank so many of you SBN members who blogged about Black Hat.  The Black Hat marketing folks made it a point to come over to me and thank us for the overwhelming support and help of the community.  Our network delivered big time with them and they are already thinking about ways we can work together next year.  I will keep you all posted on that.</p>  <p>We have several new promotions we are working on with the SBN and will have more on that soon. Also, we learned some valuable lessons.  Next time we will work with the network members more closely in doing these affiliations.  Also, for any show like this we need to have an official bloggers get together.  Not because we don’t want to buy our own drinks (thanks to Chris Hoff for doing more than his share in picking up a big bar tab), but frankly we need to reserve a place that has enough space for us.  Security bloggers are big time. We have a great community of people who get together. Lets make it better.</p>  <p>I have some other ideas around the SBN I am working on too and want to form a committee to help. If you are a member and want to get involved, please drop me a line or comment.</p>  <p>Anyway, another year of Black Hat is in the books. It was a good one and I can’t wait until next year!</p>
<p><a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=mqB9CC"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=mqB9CC" border="0"></img></a></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=rP6xlK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=rP6xlK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=fhzqOK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=fhzqOK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=roBQzK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=roBQzK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=yW5ceK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=yW5ceK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=zosCbk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=zosCbk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=XDP8lk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=XDP8lk" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~4/359668026" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 08 Aug 2008 10:46:21 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/booth">booth</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/black hat">black hat</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/booth babes">booth babes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/booth babe rant">booth babe rant</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/black hat crowd">black hat crowd</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security bloggers network">security bloggers network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network">network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security bloggers">security bloggers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/booth babe">booth babe</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~3/359668026/black-hat-wrap.html">Black Hat wrap up - secure@microsoft, booth babes and bloggers</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Black Hat : Got2 Luv the H8ers]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d5f40fbddbb173969933598d3796b520</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d5f40fbddbb173969933598d3796b520</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[So, this afternoon, I'm in the Microsoft booth at Black Hat when this guy comes up (badge hidden of course) and starts talking to some of my colleagues. Right away, it was pretty obvious that he was...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="124" alt="bh2008news" src="http://blogs.technet.com/blogfiles/security/WindowsLiveWriter/BlackHatGot2LuvtheH8ers_F8AC/bh2008news_5.png" width="180" align="left" border="0"> So, this afternoon, I'm in the Microsoft booth at Black Hat when this guy comes up (badge hidden of course) and starts talking to some of my colleagues.&nbsp; Right away, it was pretty obvious that he was antagonistic.&nbsp; I will refer to him as "h8er" from here on out.&nbsp; Though I am paraphrasing a bit, this is based upon a true story.&nbsp; It gave me a chuckle, so I thought I'd share.</p> <p></p> <p><em><strong>h8er:</strong>&nbsp; So, how does it feel to work for a company that has made so many bad security decisions.</em></p> <p><em><strong>MSFT guy:</strong>&nbsp; Well, I feel lucky to be in a position to try and influence good security decisions going forward - are there any specifics you want to give me feedback on?</em></p> <p><em><strong>h8er:</strong>&nbsp; All those prompts irritating people, for example.</em></p> <p><em><strong>MSFT guy:</strong>&nbsp; Oh, so you don't like that aspect of UAC.&nbsp; We've gotten a lot of feedback on that, but the UAC security changes in Windows Vista encompass a pretty wide range of options designed to make it easier for most users to run as non-admin.&nbsp; Plus, we've incorporated some of the feedback into SP1 and I think it is a lot better.&nbsp; Have you tried SP1?</em></p> <p><em><strong>h8er:</strong>&nbsp; &lt;crickets chirping in the silence&gt;</em></p> <p><em><strong>MSFT guy:</strong> (still trying) Let me ask it a different way.&nbsp; A lot of folks have said that after the first few weeks, the UAC prompts tapered off, have you not found that to be the case?</em></p> <p><em><strong>h8er:</strong>&nbsp; &lt;crickets chirping in the silence&gt;</em></p> <p><em><strong>MSFT guy:</strong> What about some of the other changes in Windows Vista - I think the addition of ASLR, for example, was a good decision and raises the bars for attackers developing exploits.</em></p> <p><em><strong>non-MSFT guys standing nearby:</strong>&nbsp; He has probably never even tried Vista - I bet you run Linux and just heard the prompt stuff second hand.<img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="86" alt="cultofmac" src="http://blogs.technet.com/blogfiles/security/WindowsLiveWriter/BlackHatGot2LuvtheH8ers_F8AC/cultofmac_3.jpg" width="69" align="right" border="0"></em></p> <p><em><strong>h8er:</strong>&nbsp; I don't run Linux ... I run a Mac! </em></p> <p>(NOTE: This seemed to rattle him, so he went on the offensive.)</p> <p><em><strong>h8er:</strong>&nbsp; Don't you feel embarrassed working for Microsoft knowing that 40% of your customers are infected with Malware?</em></p> <p><em><strong>MSFT guy:</strong>&nbsp; Actually, based upon research in the latest <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/sir" target="_blank">Security Intelligence Report</a>, less than 1% of machines have malware and need corrective action - plus, recent research in the same report has shown that most of that is on older platforms and Windows Vista has an even lower incidence.&nbsp; 4</em><em>0% is a pretty high number, what source did you hear that from?</em></p> <p><em><strong>h8er:</strong>&nbsp; &lt;crickets chirping in the silence&gt;</em></p> <p>(NOTE:&nbsp; Need a new tack, better try something different.)</p> <p><em><strong>h8er:</strong>&nbsp; Well, I feel a lot safer running my Mac and knowing the malware writers aren't targeting me.</em></p> <p><em><strong>MSFT guy:</strong>&nbsp; Oh, threat landscape is a different topic than the security of the software, but I can't really agree anyway.&nbsp; Many of the folks I talk to are more concerned about spearphishing or targeted attacks specifically against their valuable data.&nbsp; Recent data shows that Mac OS X has quite a higher incidence of security vulnerabilities that other comparable systems.&nbsp; That means that if an attacker did target them, he'd have a lot more options to choose from.&nbsp; In that case, I feel much more comfortable using or recommending Windows Vista than I would using your Mac.</em></p> <p>He left shortly after that, but not before giving the Microsoft guy an invite to his company's party - I won't tell you which company it was, but it makes the story even funnier.&nbsp; To cap it, a few minutes later, one of the bystanders came by and said "so, did the Mac fanboy get tired of harrassing you and leave?"</p> <p>Having lots of fun at Black Hat 2008 ~ Jeff</p><img src="http://blogs.technet.com/aggbug.aspx?PostID=3101931" width="1" height="1">]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 07 Aug 2008 01:07:02 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/guy">guy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/msft guy">msft guy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/windows vista encompass">windows vista encompass</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/windows vista">windows vista</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/report">report</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/uac">uac</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/uac security">uac security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security intelligence report">security intelligence report</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <source url="http://blogs.technet.com/security/archive/2008/08/07/black-hat-got2-luv-the-h8ers.aspx">Black Hat : Got2 Luv the H8ers</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Summarizing July's Threatscape]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2860027a1eaa69350d814429c3bf6070</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2860027a1eaa69350d814429c3bf6070</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[July's threatscape -- consider going through June's summary as well -- once again demonstrated that nothing is impossible, the impossible just takes a little longer where the incentive would be the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJLdSTaizDI/AAAAAAAAB_E/WogqT88LBdc/s1600-h/ddanchev_july.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJLdSTaizDI/AAAAAAAAB_E/Bb9z-K3ib7c/s200-R/ddanchev_july.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>July's threatscape -- consider going through <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/summarizing-junes-threatscape.html">June's summary</a> as well -- once again demonstrated that nothing is impossible, the impossible just takes a little longer where the incentive would be the ultimate monetization of the process.<br />
<br />
Russian hacktivists attacking Lithuania and Georgia, several Storm Worm campaigns, a couple of new malware tools, Neosploit team abandoning support for their web malware exploitation kit, CAPTCHA for several of the most popular free email providers getting efficiently attacked in order to resell the bogus accounts registered in the process, several copycat SQL injects next to the evasion techniques applied by the copycats, botnets continuing to commit click fraud and generate revenue for those who own or have rented them, an infamous money mule recruitment service taking advantage of the fast-fluxed network provided by the ASProx botnet - pretty interesting month indeed.<br />
<br />
<b>01.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/decrypting-and-restoring-gpcode.html">Decrypting and Restoring GPcode Encrypted Files</a> -<br />
The GPcode authors read the news too, and are catching up with the major weaknesses pointed out in their previous release in order to come with a virtually unbreakable algorithm. And since more evidence of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/whos-behind-gpcode-ransomware.html">who's behind the GPcode ransomware</a> was gathered, vendors and independent researchers realized that the latest release is also susceptible to a plain simple flaw, namely the encrypted files were basically getting deleting and not securely erased making them fairly easy to recover.<br />
<br />
<b>02.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/chinese-bloggers-bypassing-censorship.html">Chinese Bloggers Bypassing Censorship by Blogging Backward</a> -<br />
When you know how it works, you can either improve, abuse or destroy it in that very particular order. Chinese bloggers are always very adaptive in respect to spreading their message by obfuscating their messages in a way that common keywords filtering software wouldn't be able to pick them.<br />
<br />
<b>03.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/gmail-yahoo-and-hotmails-captcha-broken.html">Gmail, Yahoo and Hotmail’s CAPTCHA Broken</a> -<br />
This has been an urban legend for a while, but with more services starting to offer hundreds of thousands of pre-registered accounts at these providers, it's surprising that <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1514">spam and phishing emails coming from legitimate email providers is increasing</a>. The "vendors" behind these propositions are naturally starting to "vertically integrate" by offering value-added services for extra payments, namely, scripts to automatically abuse the pre-registered accounts for automatic registration of splogs and anything else malicious or blackhat SEO related.<br />
<br />
<b>04.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/antivirus-industry-in-2008.html">The Antivirus Industry in 2008</a> -<br />
If it were anyone else but a security vendor to come up with such a realistic cartoon aiming to stimulate innovation by emphasizing on how prolific and sophisticated malware groups have become, it would have been a biased cartoon. However, this one is courtesy of a security vendor, and it's pretty objective.<br />
<br />
<b>05.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lithuania-attacked-by-russian.html">Lithuania Attacked by Russian Hacktivists, 300 Sites Defaced</a> -<br />
This attack is a good example of a decent PSYOPS operation. Of course they have already build the capabilities to deface and even execute DDoS attacks against Lithuania, so why not put them in a "stay tuned" mode, by speculating on the upcoming attack and then executing it making it look like they delived what they've promised? This a lone gunman mass defacement given that the sites were all hosted on a single ISP, with no indication of any kind of coordination whatsoever. The same for the <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1533">Georgia President’s web site which was under DDoS attack from Russian hackers</a> later this month. Despite that the hacktivists behind it dedicated a separate C&amp;C for the attack, one that hasn't been used in any type of previous attacks so far, they did a minor mistake by using a secondary command and control location that's known to have been connected with a particular "botnet on demand" service in the past. The second attack once again proves that you don't need to build capacity when you can basically outsource the process to someone else.<br />
<br />
<b>06.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/icann-responds-to-dns-hijacking-its.html">The ICANN Responds to the DNS Hijacking, Its Blog Under Attack</a> -<br />
The ICANN finally issued a statement concerning the DNS hijacking of some of their domains, which is in fact what Comcast.net and Photobucket.com should have done as well, next to stating it was a "glitch". The ICANN also took advantage of the moment and also pointed out that their blog has also been under attack during the month. There's no better example of how the combination of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/icann-and-ianas-domain-names-hijacked.html"> tactics can result in the hijacking of the domains</a> of the organizations implementing procedures aiming to protect against these very same attacks. And while Photobucket.com remained silent during the entire incident, the hosting provider that was used by the Netdevilz team in the two attacks, since they were also responsible for the ICANN and IANA DNS hijackings, <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/update-to-photobuckets-dns-hijacking.html">technological and social engineeringissued a statement</a>.<br />
<br />
<b>07.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/risks-of-outdated-situational-awareness.html">The Risks of Outdated Situational Awareness</a> -<br />
Security vendors are often in a "catch-up mode" and if I were an average Internet user not knowing that real-time situational awareness speaks for the degree to which my vendor knows what going on online, I'd be pretty excited. However, I'm not. <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1085">Prevx were catching up with a service which I covered approximately two months ago</a>, I even had the chance to constructively confront with one of the affected sites on how despite their security measures in place, this attack was still possible. Recently <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/07/18/limbo_trojan/">Prevx have once again demonstrated an outdated situational awareness</a> by coming across a banking malware in July 2008, whereas the malware has been around since July 2007, and earlier depending on which version you're referring to.<br />
<br />
<b>08.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/fake-porn-sites-serving-malware-part.html">Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Two</a> -<br />
Yet another domain portfolio of fake porn sites serving rogue codecs and live exploit URLs, just the tip of the iceberg as usual, however their centralization is greatly assisting in tracking them down.<br />
<br />
<b>09.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/storm-worms-us-invasion-of-iran.html">Storm Worm's U.S Invasion of Iran Campaign</a> -<br />
Stormy Wormy is once again making the headlines with their ability to actually make up the headlines on their own.<br />
<br />
<b>10.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/mobile-malware-scam-isexplayer-wants.html">Mobile Malware Scam iSexPlayer Wants Your Money</a> -<br />
The best scams are the ones to which you've personally agreed to be scammed with without even knowing it. Like this one, which was tracked down and analyzed a couple of hours once a uset tipped on it.<br />
<br />
<b>11.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/template-ization-of-malware-serving.html">The Template-ization of Malware Serving Sites</a> -<br />
The increase of fake porn and celebrity sites is due to the overall template-ization of these, with the people behind them basically implementing several malicious doorways to ensure that the domains get rotated on the fly. Despite that they all look the same, they all sever different type of malware, and zero porn of celebrity content at all except the thumbnails.<br />
<br />
<b>12.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/violating-opsec-for-increasing.html">Violating OPSEC for Increasing the Probability of Malware Infection</a> -<br />
No better way to expose your affiliations and several unknown bad netblocks so far, by adding the netblocks and the malicious domains as trusted sites upon infecting a PC with the malware. Of course, the usual suspects lead the "trusted netblocks".<br />
<br />
<b>13.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/monetizing-compromised-web-sites.html">Monetizing Compromised Web Sites</a> -<br />
Several years ago, a script kiddie would install Apache on a mail server, they claim that they defaced it. Today, these amusing situations are replaced by monetization of the compromised sites, by reselling the access to them to blackhat SEO-ers, malware authors, phishers, or personally starting to manage a scammy infrastructure on them, by earning money on an affiliate based model, like this particular attack.<br />
<br />
<b>14.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/malware-and-office-documents-joining.html">Malware and Office Documents Joining Forces</a> -<br />
A recent DIY malware kit, sold as a proprietary tool basically crunching out malware infected office documents, whose built-in obfuscation makes them harder to detect. It will sooner or later leak out, turning into a commodity tool, a process that's been pretty evident for web malware exploitation kits as well.<br />
<br />
<b>15.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/are-stolen-credit-card-details-getting.html">Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?</a> -<br />
Depends on who you're buying them from, and whether or not they offer discounts on a volume basis, namely the more you buy the cheaper the price of a card is supposed to get. With the current oversupply of stolen credit card details, what used to be an exclusive good once where they could enjoy a higher profit-margin, is today's commodity good.<br />
<br />
<b>16.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-malware-kit-updated-with.html">The Neosploit Malware Kit Updated with Snapshot ActiveX Exploit</a> -<br />
Since alll the web malware exploitation kits are open source, and leaked in the wild at large, their modularity allows everyone to easily embed any type of exploit that they want to, resulting in Neosploit's single most beneficial feature, the fact that certain versions include all the publicly available exploits targeting Internet Explorer, Firefox and Opera. Moreover, the open source nature of the kit is resulting in a countless number of modified versions yet to be detected and analyzed, therefore keeping track of the exploits included in a malware kit can only be realistic if you take into considered the exploits that come with the default installation.<br />
<br />
<b>17.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/obfuscating-fast-fluxed-sql-injected.html">Obfuscating Fast-fluxed SQL Injected Domains</a> -<br />
Now that's a very good example of different tactics combined to attack, ensure survivability, and apply a certain degree of evasion in between.<br />
<br />
<b>18.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/unbreakable-captcha.html">The Unbreakable CAPTCHA</a> -<br />
There's never been a shortage of ideas, there's always been an issue of usability.<br />
<br />
<b>19.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/ayyildiz-turkish-hacking-group-vs.html">The Ayyildiz Turkish Hacking Group VS Everyone</a> -<br />
That's a pretty inspiring mission if you are to ensure your future in the next couple of years, by targeting everyone, everywhere that has ever publicly stated their disagreement with the Turkish foreign policy.<br />
<br />
<b>20.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/money-mule-recruiters-use-asproxs-fast.html">Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services</a> -<br />
A true multitasking in action with a botnet that's been crunching out phishing emails, SQL injecting and now hosting a well known money mule recruitment service. <br />
<br />
<b>21.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/sql-injecting-malicious-doorways-to.html">SQL Injecting Malicious Doorways to Serve Malware</a> -<br />
Constantly switching tactics and combining different ones to achive an objective that used to be accomplished by plain simple techniques, is only starting to take place. In this case, instead of a hard coded SQL injected domain, we have the typical malicious doorways the result of the converging traffic management tools with web malware exploitation kits.<br />
<br />
<b>22.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/impersonating-stopbadwareorg-to-serve.html">Impersonating StopBadware.org to Serve Fake Security Warnings</a> -<br />
Typosquatting popular security vendors and services is nothing new, by having HostFresh providing the hosting for the parked domains promoting the rogue security software, is a privilege and flattery for the success of the Stopbadware initiative.<br />
<br />
<b>23.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire</a> -<br />
Customerization -- not customization -- has been taking place for a while, that's the process of tailoring your upcoming products to the needs of your future customers, compared to the product concept myopia where the malware coder would code something that he believes would be valuable to the potential customers. End user agreements, issuing licenses for the malware tool, as well as forbidding the reverse engineering of the malware so that no remotely exploitable flaws could be, are among the requirements the coder assists on.<br />
<br />
<b>24. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lazy-summer-days-at-ukrtelegroup-ltds.html">Lazy Summer Days at UkrTeleGroup Ltd</a><b> -</b><br />
Taking a random snapshot of the current malicious activity at a well known provider of hosting services for rogue security applications, live exploit URLs and botnet command&amp;control locations, always provides an insight into what are their customers up to. In this case, centralization of their scammy ecosystem, and parking a countless number of rogue domains on the same server.<br />
<br />
<b>25. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/email-hacking-going-commercial.html">Email Hacking Going Commercial</a> -<br />
Cybercrime is in fact getting easier to outsource, and while the number of scammers trying to offer non-existent services, or at least services where they cannot deliver the goods, the business model of this service that is that you only pay once they show you a proof that they've managed to hack the email address you game them. How are they doing it? Social engineering and enticing the user to click on live exploit URL from where they'll infect the PC and obtain the email password, of course, next to definitely abusing it for many other purposes in the process.<br />
<br />
<b>26.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/vulnerabilities-in-antivirus-software.html">Vulnerabilities in Antivirus Software - Conflict of Interest</a> -<br />
You can easily twist the number of vulnerabilities found in your antivirus solution, but not recognizing them as vulnerabilities at the first place. It's all a matter of what you define as a vulnerability, or perhaps what you admit as a serious vulnerability - remote code execution through a security software, or a flaw that's allowing malware to bypass the security solution itself.<br />
<br />
<b>27. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/counting-bullets-on-malware-front.html">Counting the Bullets on the (Malware) Front</a> -<br />
Emphasizing on the number of malware/threats/viruses/worms/slugs your solution detects may be marketable in the short-term, but is damaging the end user's understanding of the threatscape in the long-term. So, by the time he catches up with what exactly is going on, he'll recall the moment in time where he was using the number of threats his solution was detecting as the main benchmark for its usefulness. In reality through, the number is irrelevant from a pro-active point of view, with zero day malware like the one coded for hire undermining the signatures based scanning model.<br />
<br />
<b>28. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/smells-like-copycat-sql-injection-in.html">Smells Like a Copycat SQL Injection In the Wild</a> -<br />
It was pretty obvious that copycats seeing the success of SQL injections the the huge number of sites susceptible to exploitation, would also starting taking advantage of the practice. Some are, however, targeting local communities and trying to avoid detection by using targeted SQL injections.<br />
<br />
<b>29. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/click-fraud-botnets-and-parked-domains.html">Click Fraud, Botnets and Parked Domains - All Inclusive</a> -<br />
The scheme is nothing new, what's new is that the botnet masters are trying to limit the revenues that used to go out to affiliate networks they were participating in, and are trying to own or rent the entire infrastructure on their own.<br />
<br />
<b>30. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/over-80-percent-of-storm-worm-spam-sent.html">Over 80 percent of Storm Worm Spam Sent by Pharmaceutical Spam Kings</a><b> -</b><br />
With access to Storm Worm sold and resold, and new malware introduced on Storm Worm infected hosts used as foundation for the propagation of the new malware in this case, it's questionable whether or not the Storm Worm-ers themselves are sending out the junk emails, or are they people who've rented access to the botnet doing it. <br />
<br />
<b>31. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-team-leaving-it-underground.html">Neosploit Team Leaving the IT Underground</a> -<br />
Pretty surprising at the first place, but in reality it clearly demonstrates that when you cannot enforce the end user agreement on your crimeware kit, but continue seeing it used in a very profitable malware operations, you basically shut down the support for the public version. The team is not going to stop innovating for their own purposes, and in the long-term they may in fact re-appear with an updated malware kit that's converging different services next to the product itself.<br />
<br />
<b>32. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/dissecting-managed-spamming-service.html">Dissecting a Managed Spamming Service</a> - <br />
Managed spamming services using botnets as the foundation for the campaigns are starting to introduce improved metrics for the delivery, as well as experienced customer support ensuring the spam messages make it through spam filters, or at least increase the probability of making the happen. This is an example of a random service emphasizing on the improved metrics they're capable of delivering.<br />
<br />
<b>33. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/storm-worms-lazy-summer-campaigns.html">Storm Worm's Lazy Summer Campaigns</a> -<br />
Looks like a "cybercrime intern" launched this campaign, lacking any of the usual Storm Worm evasive practices, no exploitation of client side vulnerabilities, as well as no survivability offered by their usual fast-flux nodes.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=dMjxcK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=dMjxcK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=IC3AVK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=IC3AVK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=d2XWZk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=d2XWZk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=vRFZyk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=vRFZyk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=6ZdeKK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=6ZdeKK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=jVlXIK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=jVlXIK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=W4mAWk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=W4mAWk" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/352993637" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Aug 2008 12:08:24 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/profitable malware operations">profitable malware operations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware authors">malware authors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware tools">malware tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware coder">malware coder</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware kit">malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware infection">malware infection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/neosploit malware kit">neosploit malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam">spam</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/352993637/summarizing-julys-threatscape.html">Summarizing July's Threatscape</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Wrapping up "Walking" with the SDL]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/cc3867cc259837f6a1ca5ad069ff43b7</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/cc3867cc259837f6a1ca5ad069ff43b7</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Jeremy Dallman here. Before we move on with our regularly-scheduled programming here at the SDL blog, I wanted to pull all of the Walking with the SDL blog posts into a single document to put it all...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt" class=MsoNormal><FONT size=3 face=Calibri>Jeremy Dallman here. Before we move on with our regularly-scheduled programming here at the SDL blog, I wanted to pull all of the “Walking with the SDL” blog posts into a single document to put it all together in another format. You can find that document <A href="http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/attachment/8792205.ashx" mce_href="http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/attachment/8792205.ashx">here</A>.</FONT></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt" class=MsoNormal><?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" /><o:p><FONT size=3 face=Calibri>&nbsp;</FONT></o:p></P><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'; FONT-SIZE: 11pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA">Hopefully the “Walking with the SDL” series provided some valuable guidance that will help you formalize your own Security Development Lifecycle. As always, we welcome your thoughts or questions in the COMMENT section of this blog. If you have specific questions that you would like to discuss with our team, you can use the EMAIL link at the top of the blog and we’ll be sure to reply.</SPAN><img src="http://blogs.msdn.com/aggbug.aspx?PostID=8792205" width="1" height="1">]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 30 Jul 2008 15:16:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sdl blog">sdl blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blog">blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sdl blog posts">sdl blog posts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/document">document</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/single document">single document</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/specific questions">specific questions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/questions">questions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security development lifecycle">security development lifecycle</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/jeremy dallman">jeremy dallman</category>
      <source url="http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/archive/2008/07/30/wrapping-up-walking-with-the-sdl.aspx">Wrapping up "Walking" with the SDL</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[McAfee: Many SMBs unprepared for online security threats]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/48a64dcf064a3dcea5700a58d0482c0c</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/48a64dcf064a3dcea5700a58d0482c0c</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Security software vendor McAfee said that nearly half of the 500 small and midsize companies it surveyed recently don't view themselves as valuable targets for...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Security software vendor McAfee said that nearly half of the 500 small and midsize companies it surveyed recently don't view themselves as valuable targets for cybercriminals.
<p><a href="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~a/Computerworld/Security/News?a=WLq0tL"><img src="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~a/Computerworld/Security/News?i=WLq0tL" border="0"></img></a></p><img src="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~r/Computerworld/Security/News/~4/348759625" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 28 Jul 2008 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/valuable targets">valuable targets</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/half">half</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/recently">recently</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/view">view</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/companies">companies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cybercriminals">cybercriminals</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~r/Computerworld/Security/News/~3/348759625/article.do">McAfee: Many SMBs unprepared for online security threats</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA["Walking" with the SDL - Part 3]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/32d81dd05e4ad116720be1d3cc3ea0bd</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/32d81dd05e4ad116720be1d3cc3ea0bd</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Jeremy Dallman here. This is Part Three in my multi-part series on Walking with the Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) [ Part 1 , Part 2 ]. So far I have discussed getting management approval and...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><FONT size=3 face=Calibri>Jeremy Dallman here. This is Part Three in my multi-part series on “Walking” with the Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) [</FONT><A href="http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/archive/2008/07/18/walking-with-the-sdl-part-1.aspx"><FONT size=3 face=Calibri>Part 1</FONT></A><FONT size=3 face=Calibri>, </FONT><A href="http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/archive/2008/07/21/walking-with-the-sdl-part-2.aspx"><FONT size=3 face=Calibri>Part 2</FONT></A><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>]. So far I have discussed getting management approval and expanding security training. In this post I will discuss formalizing requirements and effective ways to reuse your threat model and attack surface review data. I’ll wrap up with a look into final security reviews and managing post-release documentation.<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" /><o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><B style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Formalize Requirements for long-term use<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></B></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Now that you are making security development a lifecycle, it is time to lock down and formalize your security requirements. At this point, you need to take what you’ve learned and begin translating your security principles into something that can apply to multiple releases and multiple levels of your development process. <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>At a product level, you need to use the security rules created in prior projects to define long-term security requirements. Those requirements will become your core security policies. <SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp;</SPAN>Then, at the version level, you should create security requirements that are version-specific and are defined by the security objectives and features you want to address in that version. <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Both of these sets of requirements can be formalized in a way that makes them easier to transfer across future product cycles and to modify based on the unique features or security issues of each version.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Making these a staple of your development lifecycle will also ease adoption of these requirements as team become familiar with them over multiple releases.<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>I would like to touch on one topic before moving on – enforcing requirements. As your team grows and your SDL matures, there is an inherent complexity that comes with managing and enforcing your requirements. In our experience, we’ve found that it is critical to identify a security advisor. Up until now, your company has probably had someone championing security and best practices – either as a formal role or simply as a informal advocate. However, making it a feature of your lifecycle requires dedicated effort to enforce and sustain the requirements as well as monitoring the security ecosystem for changes that may add requirements to your process. The security advisor(s) are the people who will help guide the creation of the security requirements both broadly and for each product cycle; for a smaller team, this may be a single individual. For a larger organization, a team of people may be needed. The security advisor should also evaluate your security policy and apply changes where needed, ensure the product bug database is tracking security issues that can be reviewed later (I’ll get to the Final Security Review in our next post), and guide the definition and enforcement of a security “bug bar”. <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Security requirements serve as the backbone of your SDL. The amount of effort you put in defining and enforcing requirements, and keeping them up to date with the current threat landscape will have a direct return on investment in the security and privacy of the product you create. Be careful to document and clearly communicate your requirements to your team, and use them as evidence when talking to your customers about how you ensure the security and privacy of your product. <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><B style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Reference &amp; Reuse Threat Modeling results &amp; Attack Surface Reviews<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></B></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Your developers and testers should have access to and be familiar with the attack surface analysis or threat model documents you have created. These documents are invaluable reference tools. Use them to perform evaluate your security from multiple angles: <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 37.5pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; mso-add-space: auto" class=MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol"><SPAN style="mso-list: Ignore"><FONT size=3>·</FONT><SPAN style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Think about component-level architecture <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 37.5pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; mso-add-space: auto" class=MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol"><SPAN style="mso-list: Ignore"><FONT size=3>·</FONT><SPAN style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>List common pitfalls in writing code, or begin defining and building test cases. <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 37.5pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; mso-add-space: auto" class=MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol"><SPAN style="mso-list: Ignore"><FONT size=3>·</FONT><SPAN style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Code reviewers can reference threat models and attack surface documents to verify specific attacks were addressed in the code. <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 37.5pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; mso-add-space: auto" class=MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol"><SPAN style="mso-list: Ignore"><FONT size=3>·</FONT><SPAN style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Architects can use them to identify new areas of potential attack surface based on how new code is written or interacts with existing code. <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt 37.5pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; mso-add-space: auto" class=MsoListParagraphCxSpLast><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol"><SPAN style="mso-list: Ignore"><FONT size=3>·</FONT><SPAN style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Project leadership can reference threat models or attack surface documents to ensure the completed project meets all security goals.<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Building a “live” library of threat models that is accessible by everyone and is designed to be easily maintained or updated is a big undertaking. Based on experience, I would strongly encourage doing this early in the evolution of your security lifecycle to avoid losing valuable data and to prevent the sheer volume of data from becoming unusable. I have heard of some companies using wiki technology as their library for threat modeling while others may use searchable documents, spreadsheets, or websites to store/sort/share the information. Whatever method you use, it is important to anticipate the accumulation of a large set of information that should be easily used and shared across the organization.<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><FONT size=3 face=Calibri>I would like to do a deeper dive on the importance of security code reviews as part of your “walk” evolution. Security code reviews focus on identifying insecure coding techniques and vulnerabilities that could lead to security issues. The goal of a review is to identify as many potential security vulnerabilities as possible before the code is deployed. The cost and effort of fixing security flaws at development time is far less than fixing them later in the product deployment cycle [from </FONT><A href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa302437.aspx"><FONT size=3 face=Calibri>Improving Web Application Security</FONT></A><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>]. You should create a process where top security developers actively review code within the context of known threats prior to deploying your code. Leveraging the existing documentation about feature design is a vital reference piece to make those security reviews successful.<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Later this week, I’ll close the series with a look at final security reviews (FSRs) and how to document your work for post-release and next-release reference. <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>In the meantime, we’d like to hear from you:<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1" class=MsoNoSpacing><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol"><SPAN style="mso-list: Ignore"><FONT size=3>?</FONT><SPAN style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>How do you express your security requirements? Do you use a checklist, a whitepaper, or something else?<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1" class=MsoNoSpacing><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol"><SPAN style="mso-list: Ignore"><FONT size=3>?</FONT><SPAN style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>What challenges have you faced in enforcing requirements across your teams? <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1" class=MsoNoSpacing><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol"><SPAN style="mso-list: Ignore"><FONT size=3>?</FONT><SPAN style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>How have you implemented threat models or attack surface reviews? <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P><img src="http://blogs.msdn.com/aggbug.aspx?PostID=8767328" width="1" height="1">]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 23 Jul 2008 12:43:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security requirements serve">security requirements serve</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security requirements">security requirements</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security development lifecycle">security development lifecycle</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security development">security development</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/requirements">requirements</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lifecycle">lifecycle</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security lifecycle">security lifecycle</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security ecosystem">security ecosystem</category>
      <source url="http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/archive/2008/07/23/walking-with-the-sdl-part-3.aspx">"Walking" with the SDL - Part 3</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Growing Without Adding Overhead: Opus Interactive]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/b31466803f8417d2b35d5e511b6828a7</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/b31466803f8417d2b35d5e511b6828a7</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[We had the pleasure of interviewing client Opus Interactives Director of DataCenter Operations at Interop Las Vegas this year , and thought this was a great time to highlight some of the other...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We had the pleasure of <a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/green-it-and-virtualization-management-one-service-providers-tale/05/2008" target="_blank">interviewing client Opus Interactive’s Director of DataCenter Operations at Interop Las Vegas this year</a>, and thought this was a great time to highlight some of the other successes that Opus has had in managing their growth and IT operations.
<p>Like most of the service providers we talk to, they look to virtualization to provide immediate benefits to the business – e.g, cost savings from server consolidation and support for Green IT through cutting power/cooling requirements. And one more dimension to virtualization – Opus launched a new service, vClustr, which is a virtual dedicated server that provides the benefits of a fully managed dedicated server at a fraction of the cost&#8230;managed by EM7, of course.
<p>We were happy to help Opus by working with them to implement our EM7 solution. Their growth plan was severely limited by inefficient processes and tools. As Opus grew rapidly in 2006, the tools they had in place were not easy to integrate as they were managed independently. There was a manual billing and ticketing infrastructure in place, and valuable engineer time was spent on maintaining what they had instead of enabling business growth. The company faced a choice, either grow by adding overhead and bodies or grow through automation.
<p>Opus chose automation. They needed an automated solution to cover their immediate needs, and also enable them to scale processes for emerging technologies and future service offerings. Throughout their growth, Opus wanted to maintain their “customer first” philosophy and expand <a href="http://green-pc.blogspot.com/2008/07/green-technology-high-on-it-agenda.html" target="_blank">their green efforts</a>.
<p>By choosing EM7, Opus was able to replace their multiple, disparate tools with a single, integrated management system for networks, servers, applications, service desk assets and virtualization infrastructure. EM7 provided automated billing, ticketing, alerts and escalation options as well as a branded customer portal for transparency and self-service ticketing.
<p>The results were tremendous. Opus Interactive recouped $130k per year of engineering resources. They automated critical operations to increase efficiency, enabled proactive monitoring and prepared for growth, while giving the business the processes and tools to grow the business without additional human capital resources.
<p>We’re glad that we could help such a great company achieve their goals of providing an <a href="http://serverspecs.blogs.techtarget.com/2008/07/03/flash-advancements-help-data-center-efficiency/" target="_blank">efficient</a> “best-in-class” solution that combined superior customer service with a <a href="http://www.greenm3.com/2008/07/a-look-inside-m.html" target="_blank">green philosophy</a>.
<p>Get the entire <a href="http://www.sciencelogic.com/pdf/Opus_Interactive_Case_Study.pdf" target="_blank">case study</a> here.</p>
<p><a href="http://sharethis.com/item?&wp=abc&amp;publisher=ea11358c-69de-4e80-9804-e964a8930b70&amp;title=Growing+Without+Adding+Overhead%3A+Opus+Interactive&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fblog.sciencelogic.com%2Fgrowing-without-adding-overhead-opus-interactive%2F07%2F2008">ShareThis</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 22 Jul 2008 15:39:01 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/opus">opus</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/opus interactive">opus interactive</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization">virtualization</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization opus">virtualization opus</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/customer">customer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/customer portal">customer portal</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/superior customer service">superior customer service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service">service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/growth plan">growth plan</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/growing-without-adding-overhead-opus-interactive/07/2008">Growing Without Adding Overhead: Opus Interactive</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Maybe she should switch to unich? Get it?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ecf06941b92d24491cc844cc899c7fc3</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ecf06941b92d24491cc844cc899c7fc3</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Found this in one of the groups I belong to at Eons. Go ahead, forward it to the lil wife


clipped from www.eons.com

Dear Tech Support

Last year I upgraded from Boyfriend 5.0 to Husband 1.0 and...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div > Found this in one of the groups I belong to at Eons.<br/>Go ahead, forward it to the lil wife. </div>
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<td valign="top"><a href="http://clipmarks.com/clipmark/448B4A67-04F3-4316-8E78-9BFC0B828EDE/" title="go to this clipmark"><img src="http://content.clipmarks.com/blog_icon/198d3cab-aa4e-4a16-a468-49b3116ac02b/448B4A67-04F3-4316-8E78-9BFC0B828EDE/" alt="" width="19" height="19" border="0" style="vertical-align: middle; margin: 0px 4px; display: inline; border: none; float:none;" /></a>clipped from <a title="http://www.eons.com/groups/topic/981505--b-Computer-HA-HA-to-Start-Off-the-Day-b-" href="http://www.eons.com/groups/topic/981505--b-Computer-HA-HA-to-Start-Off-the-Day-b-" style="font-size: 11px;">www.eons.com</a></td>
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<td valign="top"><!-- CLIPPED FROM: http://www.eons.com/groups/topic/981505--b-Computer-HA-HA-to-Start-Off-the-Day-b- --><DIV>Dear Tech Support,</DIV></td>
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<td valign="top"><!-- CLIPPED FROM: http://www.eons.com/groups/topic/981505--b-Computer-HA-HA-to-Start-Off-the-Day-b- -->Last year I upgraded from Boyfriend 5.0 to Husband 1.0 and noticed a distinct slowing down in overall system performance, particularly in the Flower and Jewelry applications, which operated flawlessly under Boyfriend 5.0. In addition, Husband 1.0 uninstalled many other valuable programs, such as Romance 9.5 and Personal Attention 6.5, and then installed undesirable programs such as NBA 5.0, NASCAR 3.0 and Golf 4.1. </td>
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<td style="background:transparent;border-width:0px;padding:0px;">&nbsp;</td>
<td align="right" style="background:transparent;border-width:0px;padding:0px;width:107px" width="107"><a href="http://clipmarks.com/share/448B4A67-04F3-4316-8E78-9BFC0B828EDE/blog/" title="blog or email this clip"><img src="http://content7.clipmarks.com/images/c2b-foot.png" border="0" alt="blog it" width="107" height="17" style="border-width:0px;padding:0px;margin:0px;" /></a></td>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 22 Jul 2008 09:19:48 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dear tech support">dear tech support</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/valuable programs">valuable programs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lil wife">lil wife</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal attention">personal attention</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/eons">eons</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/husband">husband</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/system performance">system performance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/undesirable programs">undesirable programs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/boyfriend">boyfriend</category>
      <source url="http://spywarebiz.com/spywarebizblog/?p=508">Maybe she should switch to unich? Get it?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/1dbd4bddd9e4248009d0273ad7cae5dd</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/1dbd4bddd9e4248009d0273ad7cae5dd</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[What type of antivirus evasion do you want today? For the past several years, we have been witnessing the emerging customerization applied in malware and spyware for hire services. What used to be a...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="separator" style="text-align: left; clear: both;"><a href="http://bp2.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SIWJkocpGwI/AAAAAAAAB8U/_v3hJOM2k_s/s1600-h/preview_random.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp2.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SIWJkocpGwI/AAAAAAAAB8U/15Yc8N_lG74/s200-R/preview_random.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a></div>What type of antivirus evasion do you want today? For the past several years, we have been witnessing the emerging customerization applied in malware and spyware for hire services. What used to be a situation where the malware authors would code and then start promoting a piece of malware including features that he thinks his potential customers would want by generalizing a cybercriminal's needs, is today's "listening to the customer" win-win situation that they've reached already. <br />
<br />
The whole maturity from a product concept to customerization is in fact so prevalent these days, that malware authors wanting to preserve their intellectual property are forbidding their customers from reverse engineering their malware modules, presumably fearing that <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/zeus-crimeware-kit-vulnerable-to.html">remotely exploitable flaws like this one in one of the most popular Ebanker malwares for the last two yers Zeus</a>, could be discovered due to the malware author's insecure coding practices. Moreover, limiting the distribution of a single license they are given to more than three people will result in the malware author ignoring any future business relationships with the party that ruined the exclusiveness of the malware, thereby leaking it to the public, something that's been happening and will continue happening with web malware exploitation kits.<br />
<br />
What would be the price of a custom malware module coded on demand? How much does it cost to have a built in email harvester that would sniff all the incoming and outgoing email addresses from the infected host to later on include them in upcoming spam and malware campaigns? Would the malware author also provide a managed hosting service for the command and control and the actual binaries on a revenue sharing <br />
<br />
Here's an automatically translated, and fairly easy to understand random proposition for coding spyware and malware for hire, aiming to answer many of these questions, clearly demonstrating that today's malware is coded in exactly the same way the customer wants it to : <br />
<br />
"<i>As you can see in the history of its development turned directly into the combine, while almost no raspuh in weight, full-size pack аж 18 kb and minialno 5 kb, for all nampomnyu again, all descriptions below can be done as otdelnym bot, and any combination of cross except for a few restrictions. This product is targeted at mass-user and will not be all prodavatsya row. So, you can choose from:</i><br />
<br />
<i>Actually loader - is able to load a file from adminki, by country and other characteristics, such as the number of animals on board with a specific bot, a country group of countries, the availability of certain authors or Fire, sredenemu time online, etc. etc.. You can adjust the speed of shipping limits for each file, can load 1 as well as how files simultaneously<br />
300 €</i><br />
<br />
<i><b>FTP and not only Graber</b><br />
Analyzes user traffic and collects from the ftp acclamation, that is ftp acclamation would you regardless of how the customer uses ftp user, thus can be obtained most valuable ftp aka (even those to which the password is not saved), you can also grab other in a way not only acclamation acclamation and other tasty things more)<br />
150 €<b>&nbsp;</b></i><br />
<br />
<i><b>Assembler spam bases</b><br />
Analyzes user traffic and collects from all email, snifit http pop3 smtp protocols, keeps records unikallnosti locally on each boat to reduce the burden on the server as well as globally on a server has 2 mode of operation - ie passive with only collects user to please and active - the very beginning to download the entire inet) in search of soap<br />
220 €<br />
<br />
<b>Socks 4 / 5</b><br />
Normal soks with competently implemented multithreading, is activated only if the user real Ip, otherwise not. And also optional, depending on the connection type and speed ineta.<br />
70 €<br />
<br />
<b>Indicates</b><br />
The primitive method, contamination fleshek avtoranom gives 2-3% increase in the first week and up to 7% in the next, a pleasant trifle)<br />
35 €<br />
<br />
<b>Scripts</b><br />
Loader supports internal scripting language - jscript, to carry out arbitrary actions on the victim machine, whether recording data in the register, setting authentic hon-Pago, opening URL in your browser (it was done so to please with 90% punching)), apload arbitrary files on a server, even theoretically possible to form and grabing inzhekty in IE) has only to write the script zaebetes, vobschem lyuboye actions soul who wish)<br />
70 € basic functionality<br />
<br />
<b>Assembler passwords</b><br />
Collects data such as passwords pstorage IE, MSN, etc., will be added at the request of other sources of passwords<br />
70 €<br />
<br />
<b>Mini-AV</b><br />
When installing loadera wheelbarrows to remove BHO shaped three, zevso-shaped, the majority of shit from all avtoranov, render most keylogerov until all) forward proposals to improve<br />
70 €<br />
<br />
<b>File-default</b><br />
In exe loadera program URL (in adminke) to the file which once progruzit 1 and run at first start loadera on wheelbarrows, while simultaneously helping progruzke Trojan for example, in its entire botnet that does not paired with challenges in adminke, the module operates in 20 seconds after the mini - av which excludes the removal of your Trojan bot, after progruza this exe bot continues to normal activities.<br />
35 €<br />
<br />
<b>Form Graber</b><br />
While in beta version, robbed IE. Sends logs in adminku, folding country. Logs are like logs agent. It consists of:<br />
<br />
<b>Graber certificats</b><br />
On the idea is part formgrabera but could work and of itself, actually there is nothing to describe)<br />
<br />
<b>Injections</b><br />
Literacy sold inzhekty, did not begin work after full progruza pages (as in bolshistve three) and immediately supported injection yavaskript code, which allows avtozalivy and DC inzhekty for data collection. For example not to yuzat acclamation at all is not yet introduce the necessary number of Britain, after which inzhekt ceases to operate. Вобщем mdelat can be anything and in any form) rather than the meager request field pin) And also inzhektov subspecies - a substitute for the issuance of search enginee.<br />
<br />
<b>Graber balances</b><br />
Makes loot aka balances at the entrance to the user acclamation, detail added to the logs.<br />
<br />
<b>Screen</b><br />
Universal method to grab information from absolutely any species and varieties klaiviatur screens, in particular html, flash, in one picture, with a drop-down fields after choosing your encrypted, as well as information such as "enter 3 yu secret letter word" etc. as well as any information which is visible a user but not seen in the logs. Screen settings of adminki, set URL where do screen as well as the type of screen: for virtual keyboard (done several small images of areas around the clique) or to "enter 3 yu secret letter words" (makes 1 full shot). With the withdrawal screen recorded in the log entry with the name of the file to the screen this position.<br />
<br />
<b>Antiabuznost for botneta</b><br />
Feachem adminki, keep botnet enables fast, normal, bezglyuchnyh NEabuzoustoychivyh hosting, with features that you forget what abuzy, nohistory week saporta "abuzoustoychivogo" hosting inaccessibility host to half ineta etc., etc., also with the help of the supplement will be able to keep huge botnety (over SL) at 1 dedike with 512 Lake) and well on the price of hosting a savings, not $ 500 a month and 150. It may use this feature to stroronnim development, Trojans, bots, etc., actually is a separate product. And incidentally, if you do not understand the theory that nenado ask "and how does it work?" imagine that it works and point and neubivaemo in pritsnipe.<br />
600 € +<br />
&nbsp;</i><br />
<i>All prices are in euros, the calculation is made at the rate of CB on the day of purchase. ps I will not disappear as most authors after months of sales, I DONT how to please you get to the assembly ftp, I DONT how many soap collects soap-graber, I DONT what otstuk from loadera, I DONT soksov how many will be from 1 to downloads, and how best To work load a file is not dead quickly, if you are confused my ignorance - that my loader so you do not need more tries)<br />
<br />
Rules / Licence<br />
-- Customer has no right to transfer any of his three 3 persons except options for harmonizing with me<br />
-- Customer does not have the right to make any decompile, research, malicious modification of any three parts<br />
-- Customer has no right where either rasprostanyat information about three and a public discussion with the exception of three entries.<br />
-- For violating the rules - without any license denial manibekov and further conversations</i>" <br />
<br />
This malware coder seems to be participating in an affiliate program with a malicious ISP that is offering hosting services for the entire campaign, not just the malware binaries, so you have a rather good example that incentives and revenue-sharing models result in value-added services, a all-in-one shop for a customer to take advantage of without bothering to approach a third-party.<br />
<br />
Cybercrime is getting even more easier to outsource these days, and with the malicious parties improving their communication and incentives model, the resulting transparency in the underground market<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/03/underground-economys-supply-of-goods.html">The Underground Economy's Supply of Goods and Services</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/dynamics-of-malware-industry.html">The Dynamics of the Malware Industry - Proprietary Malware Tools</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/using-market-forces-to-disrupt-botnets.html">Using Market Forces to Disrupt Botnets</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/multiple-firewalls-bypassing.html">Multiple Firewalls Bypassing Verification on Demand</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/managed-spamming-appliances-future-of.html">Managed Spamming Appliances - The Future of Spam</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/localizing-cybercrime-cultural.html">Localizing Cybercrime - Cultural Diversity on Demand</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/01/e-crime-and-socioeconomic-factors.html">E-crime and Socioeconomic Factors</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/russias-fsb-vs-cybercrime.html">Russia's FSB vs Cybercrime</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/08/malware-as-web-service.html">Malware as a Web Service</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/localizing-open-source-malware.html">Localizing Open Source Malware</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/quality-and-assurance-in-malware.html">Quality and Assurance in Malware Attacks</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2006/09/benchmarking-and-optimising-malware.html">Benchmarking and Optimising Malware</a><div class="feedflare">
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      <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jul 2008 23:52:14 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware author">malware author</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware authors">malware authors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware binaries">malware binaries</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware attacks">malware attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ftp">ftp</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ftp user">ftp user</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/collects">collects</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware industry">malware industry</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/342366718/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire</source>
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