<![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: visible]]> http://securityratty.com/tag/visible Wed, 09 Jul 2008 22:54:02 +0000 iRatty Engine http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss <![CDATA[EstDomains and Intercage VS Cybercrime]]> http://securityratty.com/article/54303a8239cd0becf5843fb3552a50a8 http://securityratty.com/article/54303a8239cd0becf5843fb3552a50a8
Surreal, especially when you get to read that EstDomains has "ruthlessly suspended over five thousand domains only for last week", and also, that it "has a reliable ally in its battle against malware in a face of Intercage, Inc".

Here's the press release :

"The EstDomains, Inc management does not deny the fact that no one is secured from having a customer who uses provided services for delinquent purposes. But it must be noted that the carefully planned infrastructure of EstDomains, Inc makes the special provision for the cases of malware distribution that may originate from the domain name registered under the company's name. Such domain names are suspended immediately along with domain holder's account if there is an evidence of malware presence on the web site. According to the most recent statistics over five thousand domain names were detected and ruthlessly suspended by EstDomains, Inc specialists only last week.

The company also has a reliable ally in its battle against malware in a face of Intercage, Inc which provides company with the hosting services of the highest quality. But the outstanding performance of hosting services is not the sole reason why EstDomains, Inc appreciates this partnership so greatly. Intercage, Inc generously provides EstDomains, Inc specialists with reports regarding discovered malware vehicles. As the main database for additional domain name management services is located in Intercage Data Center, EstDomains, Inc has the perfect opportunity to get notifications of the slightest mark of malware presence in the shortest time and take measures in advance. "

The press release reminds me of RBN's defacement of my blog posted on the 1st of April, and despite that EstDomains started "performing for the community" as of recently, thanks to the collective intelligence and persistence of everyone turning their research into actionable intelligence against them, this performance aiming to minimize the effect of the negative PR is more or less futile considering all the cybercrime activities that they've been tolerating or ignoring for the past couple of years. For future generations to see, this is how EstDomains "performs for the community" :

"We've suspended all the domains listed in this topic. But please don't make posting these domains on this forum a habit. We have a 24/7 online tech support which can be contacted at https://support.estdomains.com

Best regards,
EstDomains Team 

EstMate says : Ihatemondayand.com and antispycheck.com - both suspended. If any of the suspended websites are still active to you it maybe be because of your computer's or ISP's DNS-cache, others won't be able to access these websites

googlescanners-360.com isn't registered with us. As for other domains, the ones, which were registered through us, have been suspended. Regarding our preventive measures, the fact that you don't see them doesn't mean there isn't any. Yes, we don't write about them but in most cases we suspend whole accounts with problematic domains and look for connections to other accounts etc. During the last week we've suspended over 15000 different domains."

What's more disturbing regarding this particular domain registrar is that it's a U.S based operation, namely, using the lack of international cybercrime cooperation as an excuse for not taking actions earlier doesn't fit into the picture. Moreover, this is just the tip of the iceberg, and taking into consideration a personal mentality that the cybercriminals you know are better than the cybercriminals you don't know, the RBN or any of its "leftovers" aren't fully taking advantage of the tactics they could be using in order to make it harder to shut them down, but how come? Simply, they don't have to put extra efforts and would once again remain online for years to come, which is perhaps more disturbing at the first place.

What in the world is the Russian Business Network, is it still alive and kicking, are the same people that used to maintain my favorite netblock ever, still the ones running it, and what tactics are they taking advantage of in order to make it harder for the community to establish direct links with a particular netblock and the RBN itself?

With RBN's "leftovers" -- InterCage, Inc., Softlayer Technologies, Layered Technologies, Inc., Ukrtelegroup Ltd, Turkey Abdallah Internet Hizmetleri, and Hostfresh -- making headlines just like the way it should be, what I've been researching for the past couple of months is how they've migrated from the centralized hosting provider to what appears to be a fully operational franchise. The business model is very simple, the RBN through its extensive underground networking skills supplies to customers to franchisers operating small anti-abuse netblocks across the globe, where they offer dedicated hosting and share revenue with the RBN. Anyone trusted enough and capable of supplying such netblocks starts running the RBN anti-abuse franchise. It's also worth pointing out that these franchises are in fact starting to cut the middle man, and disintermediate the RBN by actively advertising their services in order for them to create a self-sustainable business model without having to rely on the RBN connecting them with customers.

What used to be a centralized cybercrime powerhouse operating several highly visible anti-abuse netblocks, is today's decentralized infrastructure, with the profit margins for the anti-abuse services that it's logically capable to break-even and earn profits even with a few high profile dedicated hosting customers. Anyone can be the Russian Business Network, gain experience into the market segment, then disintermediate them by starting to advertise their own services. From a powerhouse to a franchise model, what the RBN had to offer can be easily duplicated by a countless number of local RBN's, and this is only starting to take place.

Related posts:
Lazy Summer Days at UkrTeleGroup Ltd.
The Malicious ISPs you Rarely See in Any Report
Geolocationg Malicious ISPs
The New Media Malware Gang - Part Four
The New Media Malware Gang - Part Three
The New Media Malware Gang - Part Two
The New Media Malware Gang
RBN's Fake Account Suspended Notices
HACKED BY THE RBN!
Rogue RBN Software Pushed Through Blackhat SEO
RBN's Phishing Activities
RBN's Puppets Need Their Master
RBN's Fake Account Suspended Notices
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software
Go to Sleep, Go to Sleep my Little RBN
Exposing the Russian Business Network
Detecting the Blocking the Russian Business Network
Over 100 Malwares Hosted on a Single RBN IP
RBN's Fake Security Software
The Russian Business Network
]]> Tue, 16 Sep 2008 05:09:44 +0000 single rbn rbn rbn anti-abuse franchise estdomains malware malware distribution thousand domain names domain names rogue rbn software EstDomains and Intercage VS Cybercrime <![CDATA[Chrome, Safari And Selt-Signed Certificates]]> http://securityratty.com/article/21c07c2ffc76dd0bcffce90d5ab15846 http://securityratty.com/article/21c07c2ffc76dd0bcffce90d5ab15846 browsers and how they handle unsigned certificates. How does Chrome handle them? For that matter, how does Safari handle them, since I forgot to include it in that column? Chrome, at first, is much like IE7; it puts up an impossible-to-miss warning but lets you continue past it: chrome-ssl-error.jpg Then if you do continue, like Firefox, it keeps a warning present in the address bar. Neat. chrome-address-error.jpg Safari is much like IE7: It pops up warning dialog box: safari.JPG But when you choose Continue it continues with no visible indicator that anything is different.

]]> Wed, 03 Sep 2008 05:10:29 +0000 safari chrome chrome handle handle choose continue continue safari handle continue past address bar Chrome, Safari And Selt-Signed Certificates <![CDATA[How To Become A Security Blogger?]]> http://securityratty.com/article/566eb8d7c8113949794dbf6e4eead107 http://securityratty.com/article/566eb8d7c8113949794dbf6e4eead107 I know, I know. Some might say that it is a silly question since you rarely seek to become a blogger - you just become one.

However, I got a few emails from my readers asking me something along these line, thus this post. For example, I got asked "Should I focus more on targeting security professionals or general IT users?", "Any pitfalls I should be aware of?" as well as general questions about how to start, what content is best, etc all the way to "How did I profit from my blog?"

 

Q: Who should I blog to?

A: Blog to colleagues first i.e. infosecurity pros. Blogging to IT or general public is - in some sense - harder or - gasp! - will turn you into a journalist (someone who knows nothing about everything BUT writes about it as an "expert" :-)) Maybe you can broaden it later. Even better, write for YOU (!)

Q: What area of security I should focus my blogging on?

A: Focus on the area of security that you like the most or know them most: IDS? Patching? PIX administration? Linux? AD esoterica? Logs, maybe? :-) Then broaden if you feel like it or as you learn new areas

 

Q: Any advice on site design, themes, etc?

A: Site design, themes, etc will all come later; just pick something basic and FOCUS on content, not on SEO, design, etc. MUST have RSS feed; make it highly visible (HTML is out, RSS is IN :-))

 

Q: Any security blogging pitfalls that I should avoid? Any other tips?

A:

  • Don't stick to only long, deep posts? Unbelievably, people often prefer shorter posts or a mix of short/shallow and longer/deep posts (that came as a shock to me early on!)
  • Tips on how to do whatever useful work well; comments on hot issues (that you understand) works too for a shorter post.
  • Definitely comment on other bloggers posts (more often early on, later - as you wish...)
  • Avoid long breaks in blogging (>7 days); it will  lead to reader loss (you should only care about it later - focus on fun content first!)
  • Join Security Bloggers Network (drop an email to Alan Shimel for it)

Q:  Has blogging in this niche generated any income for you? If so, how much?

A: Exactly $0. The reason is that I never wanted to "monetize" my blog;  I don't have banners, etc. This is by design.

Q: How did it help your professional career in a significant way?

Yes, I think it helped my career and connected me to a lot of fun people! I sure hope I am not "known only as as blogger", but blog can definitely make one much more known professionally, especially if you create fun and/or useful content.

Overall, blog is a time commitment, but it is also a passion. It does help your career, but "forcing " yourself to do it just for "career benefits" is,  IMHO, a wrong approach.

Yo, my fellow bloggers; help the newbies out, will ya?! Let's start a series of posts on "how to be a good security blogger!"

About me: http://www.chuvakin.org
]]> Fri, 29 Aug 2008 07:07:00 +0000 security blogger security blogger posts bloggers posts longerdeep posts security professionals site design design How To Become A Security Blogger? <![CDATA[DIY Botnet Kit Promising Eternal Updates]]> http://securityratty.com/article/c280e95d4aabb245987b5dc2c799185b http://securityratty.com/article/c280e95d4aabb245987b5dc2c799185b
Among the main differences between a professional botnet command and control kit, and one that's been originally released for free, is the quality and the clearly visible experience of the kit's programmer in the professional one.

A Chinese hacking group is offering the moon, and asking for nothing. And in times when a cybercriminal can even monetize his conversation with a potential customer by telling him he's actually consulting them and barely talking, is this for real and how come? This "Robin Hood approach" on behalf of the group could have worked an year ago, when greedy cybercriminals were still charging hundreds of thousands of dollars for their sophisticated banker malwares. Today, most of them leaked in such a surprising, and definitely not anticipated on behalf of the malware coders way, that not only they stopped offering support and abandoned their releases, but what used to be available only to those willing to open their virtual pocket and transfer some virtual currency, is available to everyone making such free botnet kits irrelevant - mostly due to their simplicity speaking for zero quality assurance we can see in professional kits.

Once the dust settles on this populist underground release, its potential users would once again return to their localized copies of web based botnet command and control kits.
]]> Tue, 19 Aug 2008 23:53:16 +0000 professional professional kits kit professional botnet command quality assurance populist underground release control kit quality robin hood approach DIY Botnet Kit Promising Eternal Updates <![CDATA[Visible Web Site Flaws]]> http://securityratty.com/article/f6d7d0cfcd4e18898f78b1cb08c2cdf0 http://securityratty.com/article/f6d7d0cfcd4e18898f78b1cb08c2cdf0 Sat, 26 Jul 2008 08:01:55 +0000 websites Visible Web Site Flaws <![CDATA[Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire]]> http://securityratty.com/article/1dbd4bddd9e4248009d0273ad7cae5dd http://securityratty.com/article/1dbd4bddd9e4248009d0273ad7cae5dd What type of antivirus evasion do you want today? For the past several years, we have been witnessing the emerging customerization applied in malware and spyware for hire services. What used to be a situation where the malware authors would code and then start promoting a piece of malware including features that he thinks his potential customers would want by generalizing a cybercriminal's needs, is today's "listening to the customer" win-win situation that they've reached already.

The whole maturity from a product concept to customerization is in fact so prevalent these days, that malware authors wanting to preserve their intellectual property are forbidding their customers from reverse engineering their malware modules, presumably fearing that remotely exploitable flaws like this one in one of the most popular Ebanker malwares for the last two yers Zeus, could be discovered due to the malware author's insecure coding practices. Moreover, limiting the distribution of a single license they are given to more than three people will result in the malware author ignoring any future business relationships with the party that ruined the exclusiveness of the malware, thereby leaking it to the public, something that's been happening and will continue happening with web malware exploitation kits.

What would be the price of a custom malware module coded on demand? How much does it cost to have a built in email harvester that would sniff all the incoming and outgoing email addresses from the infected host to later on include them in upcoming spam and malware campaigns? Would the malware author also provide a managed hosting service for the command and control and the actual binaries on a revenue sharing

Here's an automatically translated, and fairly easy to understand random proposition for coding spyware and malware for hire, aiming to answer many of these questions, clearly demonstrating that today's malware is coded in exactly the same way the customer wants it to :

"As you can see in the history of its development turned directly into the combine, while almost no raspuh in weight, full-size pack аж 18 kb and minialno 5 kb, for all nampomnyu again, all descriptions below can be done as otdelnym bot, and any combination of cross except for a few restrictions. This product is targeted at mass-user and will not be all prodavatsya row. So, you can choose from:

Actually loader - is able to load a file from adminki, by country and other characteristics, such as the number of animals on board with a specific bot, a country group of countries, the availability of certain authors or Fire, sredenemu time online, etc. etc.. You can adjust the speed of shipping limits for each file, can load 1 as well as how files simultaneously
300 €

FTP and not only Graber
Analyzes user traffic and collects from the ftp acclamation, that is ftp acclamation would you regardless of how the customer uses ftp user, thus can be obtained most valuable ftp aka (even those to which the password is not saved), you can also grab other in a way not only acclamation acclamation and other tasty things more)
150 € 

Assembler spam bases
Analyzes user traffic and collects from all email, snifit http pop3 smtp protocols, keeps records unikallnosti locally on each boat to reduce the burden on the server as well as globally on a server has 2 mode of operation - ie passive with only collects user to please and active - the very beginning to download the entire inet) in search of soap
220 €

Socks 4 / 5
Normal soks with competently implemented multithreading, is activated only if the user real Ip, otherwise not. And also optional, depending on the connection type and speed ineta.
70 €

Indicates
The primitive method, contamination fleshek avtoranom gives 2-3% increase in the first week and up to 7% in the next, a pleasant trifle)
35 €

Scripts
Loader supports internal scripting language - jscript, to carry out arbitrary actions on the victim machine, whether recording data in the register, setting authentic hon-Pago, opening URL in your browser (it was done so to please with 90% punching)), apload arbitrary files on a server, even theoretically possible to form and grabing inzhekty in IE) has only to write the script zaebetes, vobschem lyuboye actions soul who wish)
70 € basic functionality

Assembler passwords
Collects data such as passwords pstorage IE, MSN, etc., will be added at the request of other sources of passwords
70 €

Mini-AV
When installing loadera wheelbarrows to remove BHO shaped three, zevso-shaped, the majority of shit from all avtoranov, render most keylogerov until all) forward proposals to improve
70 €

File-default
In exe loadera program URL (in adminke) to the file which once progruzit 1 and run at first start loadera on wheelbarrows, while simultaneously helping progruzke Trojan for example, in its entire botnet that does not paired with challenges in adminke, the module operates in 20 seconds after the mini - av which excludes the removal of your Trojan bot, after progruza this exe bot continues to normal activities.
35 €

Form Graber
While in beta version, robbed IE. Sends logs in adminku, folding country. Logs are like logs agent. It consists of:

Graber certificats
On the idea is part formgrabera but could work and of itself, actually there is nothing to describe)

Injections
Literacy sold inzhekty, did not begin work after full progruza pages (as in bolshistve three) and immediately supported injection yavaskript code, which allows avtozalivy and DC inzhekty for data collection. For example not to yuzat acclamation at all is not yet introduce the necessary number of Britain, after which inzhekt ceases to operate. Вобщем mdelat can be anything and in any form) rather than the meager request field pin) And also inzhektov subspecies - a substitute for the issuance of search enginee.

Graber balances
Makes loot aka balances at the entrance to the user acclamation, detail added to the logs.

Screen
Universal method to grab information from absolutely any species and varieties klaiviatur screens, in particular html, flash, in one picture, with a drop-down fields after choosing your encrypted, as well as information such as "enter 3 yu secret letter word" etc. as well as any information which is visible a user but not seen in the logs. Screen settings of adminki, set URL where do screen as well as the type of screen: for virtual keyboard (done several small images of areas around the clique) or to "enter 3 yu secret letter words" (makes 1 full shot). With the withdrawal screen recorded in the log entry with the name of the file to the screen this position.

Antiabuznost for botneta
Feachem adminki, keep botnet enables fast, normal, bezglyuchnyh NEabuzoustoychivyh hosting, with features that you forget what abuzy, nohistory week saporta "abuzoustoychivogo" hosting inaccessibility host to half ineta etc., etc., also with the help of the supplement will be able to keep huge botnety (over SL) at 1 dedike with 512 Lake) and well on the price of hosting a savings, not $ 500 a month and 150. It may use this feature to stroronnim development, Trojans, bots, etc., actually is a separate product. And incidentally, if you do not understand the theory that nenado ask "and how does it work?" imagine that it works and point and neubivaemo in pritsnipe.
600 € +
 
All prices are in euros, the calculation is made at the rate of CB on the day of purchase. ps I will not disappear as most authors after months of sales, I DONT how to please you get to the assembly ftp, I DONT how many soap collects soap-graber, I DONT what otstuk from loadera, I DONT soksov how many will be from 1 to downloads, and how best To work load a file is not dead quickly, if you are confused my ignorance - that my loader so you do not need more tries)

Rules / Licence
-- Customer has no right to transfer any of his three 3 persons except options for harmonizing with me
-- Customer does not have the right to make any decompile, research, malicious modification of any three parts
-- Customer has no right where either rasprostanyat information about three and a public discussion with the exception of three entries.
-- For violating the rules - without any license denial manibekov and further conversations"

This malware coder seems to be participating in an affiliate program with a malicious ISP that is offering hosting services for the entire campaign, not just the malware binaries, so you have a rather good example that incentives and revenue-sharing models result in value-added services, a all-in-one shop for a customer to take advantage of without bothering to approach a third-party.

Cybercrime is getting even more easier to outsource these days, and with the malicious parties improving their communication and incentives model, the resulting transparency in the underground market

Related posts:
The Underground Economy's Supply of Goods and Services
The Dynamics of the Malware Industry - Proprietary Malware Tools
Using Market Forces to Disrupt Botnets
Multiple Firewalls Bypassing Verification on Demand
Managed Spamming Appliances - The Future of Spam
Localizing Cybercrime - Cultural Diversity on Demand
E-crime and Socioeconomic Factors
Russia's FSB vs Cybercrime
Malware as a Web Service
Localizing Open Source Malware
Quality and Assurance in Malware Attacks
Benchmarking and Optimising Malware
]]> Mon, 21 Jul 2008 23:52:14 +0000 malware malware author malware authors malware binaries malware attacks ftp ftp user collects malware industry Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire <![CDATA[Interop NY 2008 Hot Stage: A Tale of Two Cities]]> http://securityratty.com/article/47273ded1435f902f1bd70d7c7bf36fc http://securityratty.com/article/47273ded1435f902f1bd70d7c7bf36fc For the past week I’ve been in Freemont California (outside San Jose) with the InteropNet Team getting the network back up after Vegas so that it’s ready for New York. This Hot Stage has been interesting because it really has been about the difference in the shows in Las Vegas and New York. The show in New York is a bit smaller, but because access to the venue (Javitz Center) is more restrictive than the access the team gets in Vegas (Mandalay Bay), things need to be done differently.

The big difference between the two cities is the amount of time that the InteropNet team gets to produce a live, fully operational and redundant network. In Las Vegas, this was nearly a full week of time - a tight timeframe across 17 different vendors, but now we’re looking back at that timeframe as a luxury. In NY, we’ll be getting started Saturday morning, and the network needs to be delivered on Sunday morning for the registration desk and exhibitor move-in to begin. If you’re keeping score, that’s about 24 hours to deliver a working network. Sounds hard, but it’s even harder when you consider that this means four DS-3s from two different locations, 17 full and 7 half racks of network gear, all the fiber and copper that the network is delivered over, etc all have to get done. Good thing that with 2 and 3/4 kids, I’m not planning on much sleep, and I don’t think the rest of the team is either.

In order to try and get the network delivered in that short timeframe, we worked hard at Hot Stage to assure that everything is ready to go. With some luck, the work that we’ve done here will allow us simply to roll the network gear into place, run the cables, fire up and go.

Now, things never really work out that way but that’s what EM7 is going to be there for. We’ll watch in real time as the network elements come live and be able to let the other InteropNet vendors know if their gear isn’t behaving as expected or is not visible for all the areas of the network that it should be. We’ll keep track of all of this in the EM7 ticketing system so that after the show we’ll be able to analyze the behavior of the network and systems as we did after Vegas.

I’m looking forward to the show and once again working with some of the top engineers in the country on a complex and rapidly deployed network.  Speaking of which, we’re still looking for volunteers to help in the NOC.  Volunteers get to work with some really smart people, get an education that would be hard to get anywhere else, and get a trip to NY where your expenses (for things like hotel accommodations and food provided by the show) are taken care of.  Sound interesting?  Be sure and check out the application.

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]]> Mon, 21 Jul 2008 18:01:04 +0000 network redundant network network gear gear network elements hot stage las vegas vegas interopnet team Interop NY 2008 Hot Stage: A Tale of Two Cities <![CDATA[Are you using the latest web browser?]]> http://securityratty.com/article/f99696393f35efc81b36eae37200a248 http://securityratty.com/article/f99696393f35efc81b36eae37200a248 Written by Thomas Duebendorfer

In view of mass defacements of hundreds of thousand of web pages - with the intent to misuse them to launch drive-by download attacks - security researchers from ETH Zurich, Google, and IBM Internet Security Systems were interested in looking at the other side of the attack: the web browser. By analyzing the web browser versions seen in visits to Google websites, they have shown that more than 600 million Internet users don't use the latest version of their browser.

Slow migration to latest browser version
The researchers' paper, entitled "Understanding the Web Browser Threat", shows that as of June 2008, only 59.1% percent of Internet users worldwide use the latest major version of their preferred web browser. Firefox users are the most attentive: 92.2% of them surfed with Firefox 2, the latest major version before the recently released 3.0. Only 52.5% of Microsoft Internet Explorer users have updated to version 7, which is the most secure according to multiple publicly-cited Microsoft experts (among them Sandi Hardmeier). The study revealed that 637 million Internet users worldwide who use web browsers are either not running the latest version of their preferred browser or have not installed the latest patches. These users are vulnerable to exploitation due to their web browser's "built-in" vulnerabilities and the lack of more recent security mechanisms such as improved phishing protection.

Neglected security patches
Over the past 18 months, the study also shows, a maximum of 83.3% of Firefox users were using the latest major version of the web browser and also had all current patches installed (i.e. latest minor version). Only 56.1% and 47.6% of Opera and Internet Explorer users, respectively, were similarly utilizing fully-patched web browsers. Apple users are no better: since the public release of Safari 3, only 65.3% of users operate the latest Safari version.


Maximum measured share of users surfing the web with the most secure versions of Firefox, Safari, Opera and Internet Explorer in June 2008 as seen on Google websites.


Obsolete browser warning
The study's most important finding is that technical measures now in place do not sufficiently guarantee browser security, and that users' security awareness must be further developed. The problem is that most users are unaware that they are not using their browser's latest version. It must be made clear to web browser users that outdated software is associated with significantly higher risk. The researchers therefore suggest that, as a critical component of web software, a visible warning be instituted that warns the user of missing security patches in a way analogous to the 'best before' date in the perishable food industry. Software updates must also be made easier to find. The resulting transparency would go far in contributing to end user awareness of software weaknesses, and allow users to better evaluate risks.


Example "best before" implementation on a Web browser


As a side effect, having users migrate faster to the latest browser version would not only increase security but also make the lives of webmasters easier, as they would need to test and optimize websites for fewer older versions of web browsers.
]]> Wed, 16 Jul 2008 09:24:00 +0000 browser web browser browser version versions secure versions obsolete browser web browser versions web browser users web Are you using the latest web browser? <![CDATA[Data can leak from partially encrypted disks]]> http://securityratty.com/article/86fd7a42f0caf8a49f0a2af7a27adaf6 http://securityratty.com/article/86fd7a42f0caf8a49f0a2af7a27adaf6

]]> Wed, 16 Jul 2008 09:00:00 +0000 popular software programs information visible researchers warn google desktop word hard Data can leak from partially encrypted disks <![CDATA['The' DNS Issue of 2008]]> http://securityratty.com/article/8315adcbb13e33219dfe0b230098982c http://securityratty.com/article/8315adcbb13e33219dfe0b230098982c It’s been a day since the public announcement, so by now you’ve probably heard about the DNS issue. The bug was found earlier this year, but the discoverer (Dan Kaminsky) and team worked fervently with leaders of the technology industry to create patches for all platforms before the big announcement. And- kudos to them all for keeping zipped lips until the problem could be contained (despite all the heckling and harassing).

You can find out a little more right now- I’m including some links below for you to read more.

If you don’t know what DNS is or why you care, see the bottom of this post for a little background info.

As for the real deal on disclosure- you’ll have to wait for Black Hat in August. I’ll be there, along with other members of the Security Bloggers Network (a (non-exclusive but highly visible and well-respected) security bloggers channel for Black Hat and RSA). I’m sure you’ll see *plenty* of post-Black Hat blogs, tweets and podcasts recapping the story.

Hear the buzz…

 

What is a DNS Server? DNS are servers throughout the Internet (and inside networks) that resolve domain names (ie www.SecurityUncorked.com) to the IP address of the hosting server. The idea is, if you can trick a DNS server, your request for ESPN.com may just take you to a malicious site where you’ll be immediately infected with a virus, malware or other undesirable creepy Internet-bred monster. They’ve found a bug that could be exploited to do just that.

What do we do? It’s not the end of the world. For now, know that almost all DNS servers need to have a patch installed to protect them from this vulnerability. It’s pretty universal and every manufacturer is on board and offering a patch as of yesterday, July 8th.

# # #

]]> Wed, 09 Jul 2008 22:54:02 +0000 dns dns issue dns servers servers post-black hat blogs black hat dns server server post 'The' DNS Issue of 2008