I’m sure you already know about the other “network management” – where ISPs and carriers get their hands publicly slapped for limiting bandwidth to high-traffic offenders. But when is this kind of “network management” a good thing? At a panel sponsored by the FCC in DC, reps from carriers and ISPs discussed what steps they’ve been taking to prepare for a pandemic or other major global crisis – that would force workers to stay at home or work from more remote locations to limit exposure.

Are people paying attention to ICANN? They’re saying that IPv4 will be fully allocated in the next two or three years. Does anyone care? In their bid to make people care, ICANN talks about the state of IPv6 adoption and touts Africa as the most rapid adopter.

SOA soon part of the ‘cloud’? No, please no.

Microsoft – The Silver Lining in Every Cloud. Joe Wilcox over at eWeek’s Microsoft Watch, has been following Steve Ballmer around and collecting some nice quotes on how the company is transitioning. “For many years, we had kind of what I would call the all-encompassing mission, vision and scorecard statement: a computer on every desk and in every home. …Well, our footprint and portfolio is broader than that. “ [In every hand and of course, in every cloud…] “So, as a vision statement we talk about creating seamless experiences that combine the magic of software, the power of the Internet across a world of devices.” The magic of software – something I haven’t thought about for a while. And:

“You need a real platform in the cloud. When we wanted to go after the PC, we built an operating system. When we wanted to go after the phone, we built an operating system. When we wanted to go after the enterprise, we built an operating system. We’ll announce a new operating system, one that runs in the cloud and has a wide variety of capabilities.”

• Love, love, love this piece :-) Remember the "robotic gun rampage" stories from last year? How does this sound: "The gun can track 360 degress, but there is a software-driven safety zone that makes sure rounds don't blow the rotors off. If the Osprey has to maneuver away from the target and the crew chief can't hold the gun on the bad guys manually, the system slaves the gun to the point of the last shot, slewing it as the plane moves." (watch the fun video there too)
  
• "Security idiot" meme lives on - go here. BTW, the post is a follow-up to this
• A fun follow-up to my post on compliance approaches titled Is PCI DSS "Too Prescriptive"?
• Finally, my fave post: "Increase Your Logging." I am sooooo happy that logging evangelism is spreading far and wide! A quote from the paper: ”Logs are interesting, logs are fun, logs should be done by EVERYONE…..get to logging!!!” (I promise that specific case was not my quote, even though I do say that very thing all the time!)
  

The announcement is of course Good News — because once the PCeU is up and running next Spring, it should plug (to the limited extent that £2 million a year can plug) the “level 2″ eCrime gap that I’ve written about before. viz: that SOCA tackles “serious and organised crime” (level 3), your local police force tackles local villains (level 1), but if criminals operate outside their force’s area — and on the Internet this is more likely than not — yet they don’t meet SOCA’s threshold, then who is there to deal with them?

In particular, the PCeU is envisaged to be the unit that deals with the intelligence packages coming from the City of London Fraud Squad’s new online Fraud Reporting website (once intended to launch in November 2008, now scheduled for Summer 2009).

Of course everyone expects the website to generate more reports of eCrime than could ever be dealt with (even with much more money), so the effectiveness of the PCeU in dealing with eCriminality will depend upon their prioritisation criteria, and how carefully they select the cases they tackle.

Nevertheless, although the news this week shows that the Home Office have finally understood the need to fund more ePolicing, I don’t think that they are thinking about the problem in a sufficiently global context.

A little history lesson might be in order to explain why.

Back in 1930’s, Bonnie and Clyde and other US bank robbers were using the new-fangled automobile to flee across state lines — creating jurisdictional problems as a result. The US solution was to make bank robbery (along with auto-theft and other related offences) into federal offences rather keeping them as state-specific infractions. In particular this meant that the FBI could provide federal level policing (tracking down and killing John Dillinger for example).

We have the same jurisdictional issues dealing with cyberspace, with criminals in one country fleecing consumers in another while using systems hosted in a third. The Convention on Cybercrime addresses part of the problem by trying to ensure international consistency where eLaws are specifically needed (which of course is only the case for small parts of eCriminality, fraud is fraud whether eEnabled or not). However, there is limited inter-jurisdictional co-ordination for eCrime investigations — for example Interpol (often incorrectly perceived to be international police force) merely keeps a large database and passes faxes from one place to another.

In practice, most cross-border investigations are done as “joint operations” and the jointness is usually very limited — one force does all the legwork and a liaison officer in the other country deals with local paperwork. There’s usually a quid pro quo element to these joint operations, for budgeting reasons if no other.

What isn’t happening, or at least only in a handful of very specialised areas, is any international co-operation in setting priorities or selecting cases to pursue. Every country is doing its own thing about eCrime, and there’s a widespread impression that any criminal who can operate from “across the state line” is essentially immune from serious investigation.

We identified this problem last year when we (Ross Anderson, Rainer Böhme, Tyler Moore and myself) wrote a report on Security Economics and the Internal Market for ENISA. It’s not an easy one to fix whilst politicians (and populaces) are unwilling to see “foreign” police officers operating in their country, and the establishment of a truly international “cyber police force” seems equally unlikely.

Our policy proposal to tackle the issue harks back to WWII’s SHAEF, which has morphed into similar arrangements within NATO. In essence liaison officers from multiple forces would sit around a single table, working with a central coordinator, to set policy and decide which investigations to pursue. They would then communicate back to their own countries, who have specifically budgeted to provide appropriate assistance. So it’s very like “joint operations”, but the scheme is multi-laterial, and has a true command and control function in the centre — who will quickly learn to shy away from politically sensitive topics and make a real impact on eCriminality.

To summarise then, a welcome to the Home Office for finally finding a small amount of funding for some country-wide ePolicing; but it’s well past time to be working on world-wide initiatives.

Blogger: Dan Blum

It is no surprise for us to hear loose lips flapping in India about a capability to decrypt Blackberry and other carrier traffic.

After all, we’ve done basic threat analysis for years and it was only months ago that I was brought into a company-wide CISO meeting at a U.S. defense contractor to help them hash out their travel policy for mobile devices. Going into the meeting, I knew their policy restricted taking devices to a list of countries considered dangerous – but there was an exemption for BlackBerries.

Our research uncovered that BlackBerry is pretty secure in most respects. It has transport encryption along with optional password protection, remote kill, disk encryption, and S/MIME encryption. Viruses have not flourished on this functionally limited and closed platform. Few if any third party add on programs are required for additional protection. Nonetheless, I went into the meeting prepared to talk with the CISOs about the risks and security limitations of life on BlackBerry.

Was the BlackBerry exemption reasonable? At the time, BlackBerry transport encryption was not known to have been broken (to be fair, the article listed above still qualifies as rumor, not certainty of breakage). However, I pointed out that it is dangerous to assume well-equipped attackers like military or intelligence organizations can’t crack transport encryption. And even if they haven’t cracked the BlackBerry network and whole disk encryption features, sophisticated adversaries have other attack paths. Check out Neal Stephenson’s excellent book Cryptonomicon for a description of how a talented adversary might “see” your keystrokes and screen images through a motel room wall, for example.

If one of your employees – such as a key scientist, project manager, or executive – is targeted for surveillance and is carrying sensitive data through certain countries, one could argue that he or she had better undergo serious counter-intelligence training.  Learn to spot and shake tails, sneak into dark alleys for that BlackBerry fix. Learn to paper the closet with layers of aluminum foil and send messages in the dark. Defend that BlackBerry with encryption, long passphrases, and kung fu. But unless James Bond is running your company, I doubt this is what your executives have in mind for the next business trip!

Assuming your organization’s lower level employees are like needles in a haystack and won’t be bothered could be an exercise in wishful thinking. It is always possible that nation states are monitoring some or all of the airwaves. Not so long ago the NSA had a massive a covert surveillance program in place. Years before the government was reportedly snarfing up terabytes of emails and crunching them through a program called Carnivore. And of course, selective monitoring of people on watch lists continues on a large scale. This is just the surveillance we know about in the U.S. We suspect there’s more behind the scenes and especially in countries such as China. Even if you train your non-specifically-targeted low level employees to write and speak in search-keyword-free code, the carnivore programs of the world are pretty good at sniffing out those interesting needles – such as descriptions of your business plans, manufacturing processes, and trade secrets.

Sound paranoid? I admit that I don’t know what the probabilities of being targeted or monitored are – just that it can happen. It’s the height of arrogance to believe that a nation state can’t get your information if they’ve targeted it and you’re within their borders. And it’s dangerous to rely on security by obscurity when medium or high consequence information must be protected.

What can be done? If key personnel can't dispense with the BlackBerry (or any other email device) during international travel to those countries where information may be most at risk, they (the users) should limit communications to what they’d feel comfortable uttering over a potentially-monitored telephone call. Controlling incoming communications – messages sent by others – is a harder problem. Until data loss prevention (DLP) products become more contextually sensitive about the travel issues, it may be best not to synchronize the BlackBerry with the overseas user’s home mailbox. Instead, have the user give out a temporary address for the BlackBerry and warn senders to be discreet.

Today's announcement sees Meraki nicely footing the bill for extending their service into neighborhood affordable housing, municipal-speak for low-income housing that's subsidized typically through government efforts and funds. Meraki will install networks at 12 buildings in the Tenderloin, known as San Francisco's roughest neighborhood, now going on many decades with that designation.

Meraki claims a "presence" in 42 of 52 major neighborhoods in the city, although their map tells a very different story about how usage is clustered in areas in which it would make perfect sense that usage was seen.

Meraki has engaged in a very interesting public project, and likes the imprimatur of San Francisco, even as they don't really need the city; the city, in contrast, needs them (or Newsom particularly) to salvage something from years of planning that blew up in their faces.

Anyway, SF's EarthLink network would never have been built; or, having been underway, would never have been completed.

Forgive my snark tone and cynicism: Meraki has put a lot of resources into building a publicly accessible network across a hunk of SF that wouldn't otherwise exist.

The case of Terry Childs, the former San Francisco City Systems Administrator, is a good example of why you should be careful — Childs held the network hostage by withholding passwords and setting up a rogue access point. However in the court case, a supposedly expert witness testified that Childs posed no danger because the city could lock him out with simple steps.

Unfortunately, as Ira Winkler at RSA says, it’s not that simple –

…an administrator with a grudge can cause infinitely more damage than a “computer hacker” could ever dream of.

Given that Childs had his job for years, and purposefully kept a wide variety of critical network information from everyone else, it is impossible for them to lock him out of the network with “simple steps”. Of course soon after Tygar [the expert witness] filed his “expert” report, they discovered the rogue access point.

Read the full commentary here.

Italian free space optics test hits 1.2 terabits per second (in Italian, Google translation): Researchers in Pisa, Italy, along with colleagues from two Japanese institutions, crossed 1.2 Tbps in a test. Free space optics typically uses infrared lasers, and can work over a distance of kilometers.

More Canadian Wi-Fi health fears: This time in an island in Montréal. One of the concerned citizens: "This is something that is really under the radar. People do not know that long-term health hazards are associated with wireless technology." They don't know that because all verifiable, repeatable, well-conducted, academic tests so far indicate that there's no such health hazard associated with EMF. The concerned folks are raising an alarm about Wi-Fi being broadcast island wide, but are not paying attention, obviously, to the AM/FM radio, satellite radio, cellular, cordless, and thousand other wireless uses that are bombarding them right now, often at far higher signal levels.

Wi-Fi in a tub: I'm not going to say anything more.

QuickerTek adds antenna to 300 mW ExpressCard for MacBook Pro: Users of Apple's higher-end laptops can drop $200 to get a 300 mW Draft N (802.11n) ExpressCard and 5 dBi external antenna with a mounting clip. That's a lot of power, and it's important to recall that have a louder signal doesn't mean that distant base stations can necessarily hear you better. Draft N devices typically pair better listening (receive sensitivity) with higher transmission power, however.

Mac product ties location settings to Wi-Fi position: Centrix has updated its $29 Mac OS X location preferences program NetworkLocation to take advantage of Skyhook Wireless's Wi-Fi positioning data. You can now tie the package of settings that control what email account you use, iChat status, programs launched, disks mounted, and other factors, to where you're currently at.

The New York Times rounds up using cell phones as hotspots: Though the reporter, Bob Tedeschi, mentions the issue of having to have an unlimited data plan to avoid unpleasant charges, and worries about bad drains and malicious users, he doesn't note that many carriers don't allow this kind of sharing or routing without a separate "tethering" plan, that can run $20 or more per month. Also, U.S. carriers have now all imposed a 5 GB per month reasonable use cap; some will cut you off, some charge you more, some cancel your service based on exceeding this use.

Gigabit Wi-Fi? Someday: TechWorld considers the IEEE's Very High Throughput (VHT) study group, which wants to start work on 1 Gbps or faster Wi-Fi standard for completion in 2012. With 802.11n offering raw symbol rates up to 600 Mbps--even though no devices have shipped with the radios and antennas to offer that optional high speed yet--there's interest in other frequencies that would allow faster encodings, as well as aggregating multiple links to achieve high speed rates. My experience in testing and using 2.4 GHz with Draft N would show that wide or aggregated channels doesn't work very well. The article's writer, Peter Judge, notes that ultrawideband had potential (over short distances) to approach the gigabit mark, but that UWB hasn't really reached the market in any substantive way years after it was promised to be a big technology.

Flight attendants express concerns about in-flight broadband porn: When I've spoken to airlines, industry experts, and service providers, I find that they all have stories about how porn is viewed on computers, through DVD players, and in convenient magazine form on planes today. Adding the Internet may provide new salacious imagery, but the problem predates Internet access, and filtering Internet service is never as good a solution as a social one. Someone idiotic enough to view porn on a plane over the Internet is also stupid enough to bring along inappropriate DVDs they watch while seated next to children. Flight attendants already have the power vested in them to take care of this. The flight attendants for American might be expressing this concern as part of a bargaining issue, where their responsibilities but not commensurate pay have increased.

Spokane ends free Wi-Fi: Remember Vivato? Boy, I sure do. A company with a reach far exceeding its grasp, Vivato initially powered Spokane's downtown network. The network has continued to run on some basis--I'm not sure using what equipment--and now will move from free to fee. OneEighty Networks will charge about $10 per month to cover the costs of the network, for which local businesses at one point chipped in.

Brazilian TAM airline signs up for in-flight calling, messaging: OnAir has signed up the Brazilian carrier TAM, which will deploy the service on its Airbus A320 craft. Brazil hasn't yet provided regulatory approval, so no launch date is noted. TAM is the largest domestic and international carrier for Brazil.

Just a few months after CEO and founder Diane Greene was ousted, it comes as no surprise that her husband and co-founder, Mendel Rosenblum, has also resigned via a company wide message last night. Turns out he’s going back to Stanford to teach. What a lovely way to get out of the political mess VMware has become. Admit it, haven’t we all had a point where we get fed up with the latest work snafu and wondered, maybe I should go back to college and teach? I had a really good time in college… Kudos to Rosenblum for doing it and doing it in style.

And if you believe Tarry Singh, the company knew this was going to happen but waited until after registrations were closed for VMworld before making it official. Hmm.

From the New York Times, more on Greene’s firing and just what kind of atmosphere is forcing executives to leave VMware:

After Ms. Greene made a special presentation to VMware’s board, Mr. Tucci, who heads VMware’s parent company, EMC, pulled her aside, according to people familiar with the events, who asked for anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss internal company decisions.

Inviting Mendel Rosenblum, Ms. Greene’s husband and the co-founder of VMware, into the room, Mr. Tucci told Ms. Greene she was fired, effective immediately. And he said the board wanted Mr. Rosenblum, VMware’s chief scientist, to take her seat on the board. Mr. Rosenblum declined the offer.

Honestly, what kind of a judgement call was made to first fire the man’s wife in front of him and then offer him her board seat? Has Tucci never seen an episode of Survivor?

In the case of phishing, it is relatively clear. The developers believe the PKI book. The PKI people believe in the efficacy of digital signatures to prove stuff. The cryptographers believe in the perfection of mathematics, and the security world believes in the completeness of their own learning. They are all wrong, but only at the large level of generalisations, not at the detailed level of particular claims. Any one of the claims, in isolation can be shown to be true. But, generalising these brittle claims to be solid building blocks is a completely different question. Few of the claims are strong enough to partake in a general model without severe support; the general model of secure browsing is the best evidence of how it is secure in name only.

How then is it built? By accident or by design, a series of claims meet together in a holy ring of righteous architecture. Each of the proponents claim loudly that their part is strong, but the ring has no strength. Eventually, one of the claims in the links is broken. For phishing, the browsers never did have the potential to show authenticity; not only did they not have the security strength to do it (c.f., Skype v. CSRF), they didn't even do it in practice (recall the lost padlock?), and their recent efforts to show authenticity (c.f. colour debate) reveal how far they are from understanding even the goal, let alone the implementation. Once that link was broken, and money was made, all the others revealed their weaknesses, as crooks systematically worked to breach the lot.

If we look at the wider financial collapse, now underscored by the nationalisation of the worlds biggest financiers of mortgages ($ 5.3 trillion.... or is it $ 5.4 ?), we see the same pattern. The bankers believed in their product. The originators believed in their origination, the securitizers believed in their free market and accurate price, and the holders believed in the assets. The CDO, the subprime, the other 100 special names, each was a contract. Each was clear in and of itself. But, when placed end-to-end, in a line, with a bunch of other agreements, the claims that were good in isolation were not strong enough to participate in the super-claim made of the overall edifice.
The financial system was built like a bridge; each piece rested on the previous one. And then, the clever architects bent the bridge around ... and around again, until the first piece met the last. The elegant keystone of finance was to finally lift up the first one to rest on the last.

Thus, the banks themselves invested their capital in their own product.