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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: worthless]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/worthless</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Fri, 28 Jul 2006 04:38:00 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Malware and Office Documents Joining Forces]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/dee3d028ca8134c75e2aec7f397d1493</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/dee3d028ca8134c75e2aec7f397d1493</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Common office files as documents, presentations, spreadsheets and PDF files, are the most widely abused ones in targeted attacks, which when backed up with enough personal information and take into...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div>
<div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div>
<a href="http://bp1.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHtuv_mJSwI/AAAAAAAAB6M/X83g6Zkr9hg/s1600-h/screen1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp1.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHtuv_mJSwI/AAAAAAAAB6M/b0YAu_NWEQk/s200-R/screen1.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>Common office files as documents, presentations, spreadsheets and PDF files, are the most widely abused ones in targeted attacks, which when backed up with enough personal information and take into consideration the time of their attack if the social engineering campaign is either going to be based on a current/upcoming event, or on an event anticipated due to information gathered through open source intelligence, often make it through common signature based scanning solutions.<br />
<br />
Despite the relatively easy to obtain, point'n'click <a href="http://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00001450.html">DIY tools for backdooring common office files</a> are available for the script kiddies to take advantage of, some are <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/dynamics-of-malware-industry.html">naturally remaining proprietary tools</a>, making them harder to analyze unless a copy is obtained. Like this one, generating "undetected" by signatures based scanning, office documents and spreadsheets that would drop the actual malware on the PC.<br />
<br />
Automatic translation of its description and core features :<br />
<br />
<i>"The program represents a generator OfficeJoiner macros in the language Visual Basic for Application (VBA), for introduction in the document Microsoft Office Word / Microsoft Office Excel executable file (win32 exe), followed by fully automatic recovery and launch, without any&nbsp; additional action by the user. The only requirement that formed in such a way xls / doc files is to support&nbsp; VBA macros on the computer end-user formed file and permission to launch macros.</i><br />
<br />
<i>The program uses NOT a vulnerability (exploit) or macro-virus tools for the introduction, extraction or running embedded files. This means that it has generated macros compatible with ALL versions of Microsoft Office products starting with Microsoft Office 97 package, with any established "patches" and the service pack. Macros generated by this program not detected antivirus, for the simple reason that they are not viruses or macro viruses. The program uses only "established" means products built into Microsoft Excel VBA language to achieve their goals.</i><br />
<br />
<i>- Fully automatic generation of macro for the introduction of documents word / excel any given exe-file with his persistence in the body and subsequent documents automatic recovery and launch, when opening a document word / excel.&nbsp;</i><br />
<br />
<i>- Generated macros are compatible with all versions of ms word / excel since version 97,&nbsp; employments and regardless of the presence / absence of any patches / servicepacs.&nbsp;</i><br />
<br />
<i>- Generated macros are not macro-viruses, exploits do not use and do not contain any malicious code, so do not be detected by any antivirus tools as viruses.&nbsp;</i><br />
<br />
<i>- Conversion body ex-file macro happening in such a way that while in doc / xls file it not detected any antivirus, and can be freely sent by mail safely passed all checks, even if in itself contains viral code defined antivirus. <br />
&nbsp;</i><br />
<i>- Sgenerirovanny and attached to the body of the document macro can be protected with a password or signed certificate, using funds established Microsoft Office, which does not affect him productivity or efficiency (macro, in any case remain fully workable).&nbsp;</i><br />
<br />
<i>- Box macro can be made both in the new document, and in any document containing data and-or other macros. Generated program code is fully compatible with any other embedded in the document macros or entering data, and will not interfere with their work, as well as maintain its efficiency.</i><br />
<br />
<div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><i>- Added auto-finding ways to extract exe-file; <br />
&nbsp;</i></div>
<div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><i>- Added possibility of a macro arbitrary text in the body of the instrument; <br />
&nbsp;</i></div>
<div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><i>- Optimized algorithm macro-generation code; <br />
</i></div>
<div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><i>&nbsp;</i> </div>
<div dir="ltr" id="result_box"></div>
<div style="text-align: left;"></div>
<div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div>
<div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://bp1.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHt7EgPiRwI/AAAAAAAAB6U/BtNJaK_13LM/s1600-h/officedocs_malware_sample.PNG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp1.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHt7EgPiRwI/AAAAAAAAB6U/xhaiKacT-eM/s200-R/officedocs_malware_sample.PNG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a><i>Enabling this option will lead to the creation macro code, who himself will find a way to unpack and run embedded exe-file. Auto-search finds the current user folder and produces there extraction and launch embedded file. The peculiarity of this method is that this method will work on the computers of users with a limited account, because in its user folder in any case has the right to record / performance. Using this option is justified to improve the "punching" macro on computers with limited account or unknown file structure (let Windows installed on the disk is different from C). <br />
<br />
You can specify a name for final file independently, or leave blank, then the name will be generated automatically.</i> </div>
<div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><i><br />
</i></div>
<div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><i>On this possibility has asked for a user program, its essence is that after running a macro, retrieval and downloading exe-file the document with the introduction of exe-file will be withdrawn posed text. Perhaps in this way can improve the application of social engineering, designed to force the user to allow support for macros. For example, in the text of the document indicate: <br />
<br />
"This document contains hidden text (password, a system of calculation formulas, interactive components, etc.), Which can be viewed only after the inclusion of support macros. Please enable support for macros and re-opening this document ". <br />
<br />
After resolving support macros, and the implementation of embedded exe-file, the document will be withdrawn given a string containing probable "password" or any other textual information.</i>  " </div>
<br />
Despite that the tool is proprietary, the underground economy's leaks are largely driven by bargain hunters who would exchange proprietary tool, whose often biased exclusiveness may increase the profit margins, for a service or a good that may be worthless for them in general, but impossible to obtain and take advantage of in the present. It will not just leak in one way or another, someone will inevitably backdoor the backdooring tool and trick the novice bargain hunters into running it, by having both their host infected and money taken.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/03/underground-economys-supply-of-goods.html">The Underground Economy's Supply of Goods and Services</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/yet-another-diy-proprietary-malware.html">Yet Another DIY Proprietary Malware Builder</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/small-pack-web-malware-exploitation-kit.html">The Small Pack Web Malware Exploitation Kit - Proprietary</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/diy-exploit-embedding-tool-proprietary.html">DIY Exploit Embedding Tool - A Proprietary Release</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/skype-spamming-tool-in-wild.html">Skype Spamming Tool in the Wild - Proprietary Release</a><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=mMDIJJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=mMDIJJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=vtGZUJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=vtGZUJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=Voeqqj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=Voeqqj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=QZJLHj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=QZJLHj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=4VmcIJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=4VmcIJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=rqLHKJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=rqLHKJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=LnaC8j"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=LnaC8j" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/335226251" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 14 Jul 2008 07:20:34 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/document">document</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/document macros">document macros</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/support">support</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/enable support">enable support</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/macro">macro</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/macro viruses">macro viruses</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/support vba macros">support vba macros</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/exe-file">exe-file</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/extract exe-file">extract exe-file</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/335226251/malware-and-office-documents-joining.html">Malware and Office Documents Joining Forces</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[How Can I Find Them? They Haven't Gone Missing!]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/521b9f6d9f84284358b728d75d93f7cb</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/521b9f6d9f84284358b728d75d93f7cb</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I've often highlighted the utterly worthless spam messages that seem to endlessly circulate on Facebook, usually warning not to add (insert random name here) because they're an evil hacker and will...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
        I've often highlighted the utterly worthless spam messages that seem to endlessly circulate on Facebook, usually warning not to add (insert random name here) because they're an evil hacker and will destroy your PC, kill your family and so on.<br /><br />Well, today I came across another such message:<br /><br /><div align="center"><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><img alt="norris1.jpg" src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/norris1.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="94" width="313" /></span></div><br /> <div><br />.....insert gag about them being related to Chuck here....but underneath that message was something far more interesting:<br /><br /><div align="center"><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/norris21.html" onclick="window.open('http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/norris21.html','popup','width=304,height=434,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/norris2-thumb-304x434.gif" alt="norris2.gif" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="434" width="304" /></a></span><br /></div><br /></div><div><br />Sounds serious, right? It seems personal, because it's their friend missing which adds a little more urgency - they provide a contact email address to notify them on, and it mentions a real world example of someone who went missing and was found via the Internet.<br /><br />However.<br /><br />Dig into this a little bit, and it all becomes clear quite quickly that something isn't quite right here. For starters, search for the missing persons name and there is no mention of him ever "going missing". Nothing on websites, news pages....it's like the whole thing is a work of fiction. In fact, buried in unrelated entries is the following snippet from a page on myyearbook.com:<br /><br /><div align="center"><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/norris3.html" onclick="window.open('http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/norris3.html','popup','width=586,height=89,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/norris3-thumb-386x58.jpg" alt="norris3.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="58" width="386" /></a></span><br /></div></div><div><div align="center"><br />Click to Enlarge<br /></div><br />Check out the name of the "hacker" you shouldn't add. It seems someone has simply swiped the name and started pasting it into spam messages. A quick search of Facebook confirms the <a href="http://www.facebook.com/people/Nour_Ajouz/650060261">name and face go together</a>.<br /><br />A quick search for the email address listed as a contact brings up more interesting posts, this time posted to a personal blog:<br /><br /><div align="center"><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/norris51.html" onclick="window.open('http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/norris51.html','popup','width=496,height=487,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/norris5-thumb-396x388.gif" alt="norris5.gif" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="388" width="396" /></a></span>
<br /><br />Click to Enlarge<br /></div><br />Same text....same reference to "real world" example....same email address. This person sure does get through a lot of missing friends! Note that this "missing person" chain letter has now stepped outside of Facebook and into other websites and networks.<br /><br />At this point, you're probably wondering about the validity of the "real world" example, aren't you? Well, that would be a good idea! Notice they don't give any detail - it simply says "That is how the girl from Stevens Point was found by circulation of her picture on TV", and expect you to accept it as is. If you go searching for that phrase, it doesn't take long to find a page on Snopes.com regarding a <a href="http://www.snopes.com/inboxer/missing/penny.asp">missing girl hoax</a> that stretches back some years:<br /><br /><i>"Please look at the picture, read what her father says, then forward his message on. Maybe if everyone passes this on, someone will see this child. That is how the girl from Stevens Point was found by circulation of her picture on tv..."</i><br /><br />An email hoax, wrapped up and repackaged for the Facebook generation.<br /></div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div>
        
    ]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 09 Jul 2008 08:45:35 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/contact email address">contact email address</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email address">email address</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/real world">real world</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/facebook">facebook</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/facebook confirms">facebook confirms</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/girl hoax">girl hoax</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/facebook generation">facebook generation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/girl">girl</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/evil hacker">evil hacker</category>
      <source url="http://blog.spywareguide.com/2008/07/how-can-i-find-them-they-haven.html">How Can I Find Them? They Haven't Gone Missing!</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Infant, the Elephant and the Intelligent Event]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/69d5df2507ada50dcc8e08da37c1e831</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/69d5df2507ada50dcc8e08da37c1e831</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Fellow blogger Opher Etzion, replies to On Elephants andAnalytics with On Unicorn,Professor and Infant . Opher is kindly givingus another metaphor to consider, the Infant and the Profession, since we...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class='snap_preview'><br /><p>Fellow blogger Opher Etzion, replies to  <a title="On Elephants and Analytics" rel="bookmark" href="http://thecepblog.com/2008/06/26/on-elephants-and-analytics/">On Elephants and Analytics</a> with <a href="http://epthinking.blogspot.com/2008/06/on-unicorn-professor-and-infant.html" target="_blank">On Unicorn, Professor and Infant</a>.   Opher is kindly giving us another metaphor to consider, the Infant and the Profession, since we are both big fans of big gentle elephants, babies and our universities.  </p>
<p>Opher and I agree that Infants are not Professors, and we also agree that CEP is in its Infancy and there is overhype by folks often implying CEP is a Professor.     So it seems we all have a huge elephant in the room with an Infant Professor hanging on the end of a wildly swinging Elephant&#8217;s trunk!</p>
<p>To keep the blogopoints interesting, I should point out that with all this agreement and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kumbaya" target="_self">Kumbaya</a><strong> </strong>campfire singing, there are a couple of things I do disagree with in Opher&#8217;s amusing counterpoint. </p>
<p>First of all, Opher uses the well know debate technique of falsely attributing some easily refutable discussion point and then offering a slam dunk counterpoint.   He does this in this clever, but completely inaccurate Opher quote,</p>
<blockquote><p> <em>&#8220;I [Opher] respectfully disagree with Tim &#8230; in his claim that what has been done until today is just hype and hence totally worthless&#8230;&#8221;</em></p></blockquote>
<p>Folks reading my blog know that I have never said &#8220;what has been done until today is &#8230; totally worthless.&#8221;    This is a misfortunate misquote.  Shame on you Opher!  </p>
<p>What I said, easily read in the blog, was that CEP is overhyped and that most of the self-described CEP software on the market today does not live up to the inflated claims we read and hear from CEP software vendors, the analysts and reporters they influence.</p>
<p>The second counterpoint that I find interesting is Opher&#8217;s consistent attempt to redress the dramatic lack of capability and analytics in current generation self-described CEP software by repositioning CEP as &#8220;intelligent event processing&#8221; (IEP) as he is continues in <a href="http://epthinking.blogspot.com/2008/06/on-intelligent-event-processing-aaai.html" target="_self">On Intelligent Event Processing</a>.   </p>
<p>Perhaps Opher will be successful in repositioning the vast majority of the original CEP problem space as IEP.   This is a interesting slippery slope, in my opinion.   The new positioning that Opher is offering is that when &#8220;event processing&#8221; has advanced analytics, it is not CEP anymore, it becomes IEP because CEP is really &#8220;Simple Event Processing&#8221; (SEP) - event processing with little to no analytical capability.</p>
<p>I don&#8217;t know about most of our readers, but all this positioning and repositioning to match the capabilities, or lack of capabilities, in the current portfolio of self-described CEP software vendors is fascinating.</p>
<p>Here is the next logical question is:</p>
<p>What is the difference between a &#8220;Complex Event&#8221; and an &#8220;Intelligent Event&#8221; ?</p>
<p>This could get quite interesting, so stay tuned!</p>
<img alt="" border="0" src="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/categories/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/261/" /> <img alt="" border="0" src="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/tags/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/261/" /> <a rel="nofollow" href="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/gocomments/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/261/"><img alt="" border="0" src="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/comments/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/261/" /></a> <a rel="nofollow" href="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/godelicious/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/261/"><img alt="" border="0" src="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/delicious/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/261/" /></a> <a rel="nofollow" href="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/gostumble/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/261/"><img alt="" border="0" src="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/stumble/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/261/" /></a> <a rel="nofollow" href="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/godigg/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/261/"><img alt="" border="0" src="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/digg/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/261/" /></a> <a rel="nofollow" href="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/goreddit/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/261/"><img alt="" border="0" src="http://feeds.wordpress.com/1.0/reddit/eventprocessing.wordpress.com/261/" /></a> <img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=thecepblog.com&blog=1100533&post=261&subd=eventprocessing&ref=&feed=1" /></div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Jun 2008 11:49:56 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cep software">cep software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/event">event</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/intelligent event">intelligent event</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cep">cep</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/original cep">original cep</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cep software vendors">cep software vendors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/opher quote">opher quote</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/opher">opher</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/complex event">complex event</category>
      <source url="http://thecepblog.com/2008/06/27/the-infant-the-elephant-and-the-intelligent-event/">The Infant, the Elephant and the Intelligent Event</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Infant, the Elephant and the Intelligent Event]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/3d0a83c8a231895433e42292765a0893</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/3d0a83c8a231895433e42292765a0893</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Fellow blogger Opher Etzion, replies to On Elephants andAnalytics with On Unicorn,Professor and Infant . Opher is kindly givingus another metaphor to consider, the Infant and the Profession, since we...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Fellow blogger Opher Etzion, replies to  <a title="On Elephants and Analytics" rel="bookmark" href="http://thecepblog.com/2008/06/26/on-elephants-and-analytics/">On Elephants and Analytics</a> with <a href="http://epthinking.blogspot.com/2008/06/on-unicorn-professor-and-infant.html" target="_blank">On Unicorn, Professor and Infant</a>.   Opher is kindly giving us another metaphor to consider, the Infant and the Profession, since we are both big fans of big gentle elephants, babies and our universities.  </p>
<p>Opher and I agree that Infants are not Professors, and we also agree that CEP is in its Infancy and there is overhype by folks often implying CEP is a Professor.     So it seems we all have a huge elephant in the room with an Infant Professor hanging on the end of a wildly swinging Elephant&#8217;s trunk!</p>
<p>To keep the blogopoints interesting, I should point out that with all this agreement and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kumbaya" target="_self">Kumbaya</a><strong> </strong>campfire singing, there are a couple of things I do disagree with in Opher&#8217;s amusing counterpoint. </p>
<p>First of all, Opher uses the well know debate technique of falsely attributing some easily refutable discussion point and then offering a slam dunk counterpoint.   He does this in this clever, but completely inaccurate Opher quote,</p>
<blockquote><p> <em>&#8220;I [Opher] respectfully disagree with Tim &#8230; in his claim that what has been done until today is just hype and hence totally worthless&#8230;&#8221;</em></p></blockquote>
<p>Folks reading my blog know that I have never said &#8220;what has been done until today is &#8230; totally worthless.&#8221;    This is a misfortunate misquote.  Shame on you Opher!  </p>
<p>What I said, easily read in the blog, was that CEP is overhyped and that most of the self-described CEP software on the market today does not live up to the inflated claims we read and hear from CEP software vendors, the analysts and reporters they influence.</p>
<p>The second counterpoint that I find interesting is Opher&#8217;s consistent attempt to redress the dramatic lack of capability and analytics in current generation self-described CEP software by repositioning CEP as &#8220;intelligent event processing&#8221; (IEP) as he is continues in <a href="http://epthinking.blogspot.com/2008/06/on-intelligent-event-processing-aaai.html" target="_self">On Intelligent Event Processing</a>.   </p>
<p>Perhaps Opher will be successful in repositioning the vast majority of the original CEP problem space as IEP.   This is a interesting slippery slope, in my opinion.   The new positioning that Opher is offering is that when &#8220;event processing&#8221; has advanced analytics, it is not CEP anymore, it becomes IEP because CEP is really &#8220;Simple Event Processing&#8221; (SEP) - event processing with little to no analytical capability.</p>
<p>I don&#8217;t know about most of our readers, but all this positioning and repositioning to match the capabilities, or lack of capabilities, in the current portfolio of self-described CEP software vendors is fascinating.</p>
<p>Here is the next logical question is:</p>
<p>What is the difference between a &#8220;Complex Event&#8221; and an &#8220;Intelligent Event&#8221; ?</p>
<p>This could get quite interesting, so stay tuned!</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Jun 2008 11:49:56 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cep software">cep software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/event">event</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/intelligent event">intelligent event</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cep">cep</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/original cep">original cep</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cep software vendors">cep software vendors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/opher quote">opher quote</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/opher">opher</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/complex event">complex event</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/06/27/the-infant-the-elephant-and-the-intelligent-event/">The Infant, the Elephant and the Intelligent Event</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Hannaford Supermarkets]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/fbe8450e5c7946e9f93d073d8580cb9c</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/fbe8450e5c7946e9f93d073d8580cb9c</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[This is going to get very interesting. Hannaford Supermarkets announced on Mar 17 that they lost 4.2 million card numbers to a hacker (Began Dec 7, discovered on Feb 27) . They also claim to be...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_XTqu2iQGpYM/R-VMKMtklvI/AAAAAAAAAbo/t3tBmVEmc30/s1600-h/hannaford.JPG"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5180630684454393586" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; CURSOR: pointer; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_XTqu2iQGpYM/R-VMKMtklvI/AAAAAAAAAbo/t3tBmVEmc30/s400/hannaford.JPG" border="0" /></a><br />This is going to get very interesting. Hannaford Supermarkets announced on Mar 17 that they lost 4.2 million card numbers to a hacker (Began Dec 7, discovered on Feb 27) . They also claim to be certified as <a href="http://www.hannaford.com/Contents/Common/PrivacyStatement.shtml">compliant</a> with PCI DSS. So what value does the certification hold ?<br /><br />Instead of saying PCI is worthless, lets step back for a minute and think about this. If this was an inside job, PCI Co can't be blamed. Also, as it stands today, the QSAs/ASVs can claim that their assessment was a point in time and as such, they shouldn't be held responsible for a company getting hacked after they gave it a clean chit. Change <em>that</em> and watch the number of QSAs/ASVs drop like a brick, and PCI Co get better value out of these QSAs and ASVs.<br /><br />Lets see what the Hannaford CEO Ron Hodge said<br />"<br />Hannaford has contained a data intrusion into its computer network that resulted in the theft of customer credit and debit card numbers. No personal information, such as names or addresses, was accessed. Hannaford doesn’t collect, know or keep any personally identifiable customer information from transactions.<br /><p style="FONT-STYLE: italic">We sincerely regret this intrusion into our systems, which we believe, are among the strongest in the industry. The stolen data was limited to credit and debit card numbers and expiration dates, and was illegally accessed from our computer systems during transmission of card authorization.</p><span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">"<br /><br /></span>Huh ?<br /><br /><span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">No personal information such as names or addresses was accessed. </span><br /><br />If that is the case, the authorizations should fail for most transactions of medium to high value when those numbers are reused since they don't have the name (I say most - because most auth engines typically use a complicated formula depending on location of purchase, amount of purchase, a margin for errors in reads during swipes etc before authorizing a transaction).<br /><br />[Interesting Update: According to <a href="http://www.boston.com/news/local/maine/articles/2008/03/22/banks_move_to_protect_hannaford_breach_victims/">this</a> article, there are around 1800 cases of related fraud so far, and they talk about a $1270 charge going through. Which really means there <span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">are </span>authorization engines out there that <span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">don't seem to care about the customer name in a transaction. </span>Either that, or someone is lying.]<br /><br />Could there be a sniffer installed on the network ?<br /><br />Track data has your name, card number, expiration date and encrypted IPIN among other things. If a sniffer was present at the swipe location, it surely would've got the name. But he clearly states no names were accessed. But what if it was in the scenario described a few posts below - about the ATM authorizations ? If you look at the message formats, they have card numbers and expiration dates. What was compromised ? <span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">Card numbers and expiration dates. </span>(ISO 8583 seems to have track data in its message transmissions - but not until a long way into the stream, and for some reason, I didn't notice it in my raw transaction data log review. The attackers probably just captured the initial bytes of the transmission ?)<br /><br />"But they were PCI Compliant and hence would've had to encrypt their data in transmission" you say.<br /><br />Thanks to the vagueness of PCI, even if rule 4.1 were to be applied -<br /><span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">Use strong cryptography and security protocols such as secure sockets layer (SSL) / transport </span><span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">layer security (TLS) and Internet protocol security (IPSEC) to safeguard sensitive cardholder data during transmission over open, public networks.<br /><br /></span>Could they have used the excuse that the network was not open or public ? And then - they could always use the <span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">compensating controls</span> excuse to not encrypt.<span style="FONT-STYLE: italic"><br /></span><br />I'm willing to bet there was some form of sniffing involved - and this probably is sniffing of the POS/ATM transaction in the ISO8583 format. (a scenario I was afraid of in <a href="http://securitycoin.blogspot.com/2008/03/atm-communication.html">this</a> post)<br /><br /><span style="FONT-STYLE: italic"><span style="FONT-STYLE: italic"><span style="FONT-STYLE: italic"><span style="FONT-STYLE: italic"></span></span></span><br /><br /></span><span style="FONT-STYLE: italic"></span>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 22 Mar 2008 09:27:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/card">card</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/debit card">debit card</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci">pci</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/track data">track data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci dss">pci dss</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hannaford supermarkets">hannaford supermarkets</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hannaford">hannaford</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci compliant">pci compliant</category>
      <source url="http://securitycoin.blogspot.com/2008/03/hannaford-supermarkets.html">Hannaford Supermarkets</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[An Option with a Negative Value?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/02ce38e218900e317899e8ad702f0c48</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/02ce38e218900e317899e8ad702f0c48</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[A recent post in the Wilmott forums asked &quot;Can an option have a negative value

Conceptually, an option with a negative value does not make sense. A negative value means that the option seller...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A recent post in the Wilmott forums asked <a href="http://www.wilmott.com/messageview.cfm?catid=8&threadid=40618">"Can an option have a negative value?"</a><br /><br />Conceptually, an option with a negative value does not make sense. A negative value means that the option seller (writer) pays the option buyer. This results into a "free lunch" as described by one of the posters (waiter222). The option buyer will always win out in this case. He can exercise and make money when "in-the-money". He also has an instant gain even when the option expires worthless due to the initial cash flow. Indeed it is unfair.<br /><br />Mathematically, an option value cannot be less than zero as well. (Please correct me if I'm wrong). I've played with several scenarios using the <strong>Black-Scholes</strong> and <strong>Binomial </strong>methods and the least value of an option is zero ("worthless").<br /><br />But it is possible for an <strong>option position</strong> (note that I'm talking about an option position) to have a negative value when doing <strong>mark-to-market valuation</strong>. Marking-to-market is getting the <strong>close out (unwind) value</strong> of the position. And it can result into a loss (negative value). Here's an example, an option writer sells an option for $5. After some time, the value of an option at the same strike and expiration date rises to $6. This could mean that the option is getting more "in-the-money" and the possibility of an exercise increases. This is bad news for the option seller. The value of his position is obtained by assuming an offsetting transaction (he buys an option at $6) . The net result is -$1.<br /><br />The point that I'm getting at here is that is quite <span style="font-weight: bold;">unthinkable</span> to have negative option value. So far no one has disputed that fact. But depending on one's position (P&amp;L standpoint), the treatment of that option can be negative or positive depending on whether you treat is as an asset or liability. Does this make sense?<br /><br />Tags: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/finance" ref="tag">finance</a> <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/derivatives" ref="tag">derivatives</a> <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/options" ref="tag">options</a> <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/valuation" ref="tag">valuation</a>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 28 Jul 2006 04:38:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/option">option</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/negative option">negative option</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/option seller">option seller</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/option writer sells">option writer sells</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/option buyer">option buyer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/option position">option position</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/negative">negative</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/position">position</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/writer">writer</category>
      <source url="http://rmquant.blogspot.com/2006/07/option-with-negative-value.html">An Option with a Negative Value?</source>
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